Augmenting Probabilistic Risk Assesment with Malevolent Initiators
As commonly practiced, the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in nuclear power plants only considers accident initiators such as natural hazards, equipment failures, and human error. Malevolent initiators are ignored in PRA, but are considered the domain of physical security, which uses vulnerability assessment based on an officially specified threat (design basis threat). This paper explores the implications of augmenting and extending existing PRA models by considering new and modified scenarios resulting from malevolent initiators. Teaming the augmented PRA models with conventional vulnerability assessments can cost-effectively enhance security of a nuclear power plant. This methodology is useful for operating plants, as well as in the design of new plants. For the methodology, we have proposed an approach that builds on and extends the practice of PRA for nuclear power plants for security-related issues. Rather than only considering 'random' failures, we demonstrated a framework that is able to represent and model malevolent initiating events and associated plant impacts.
- Research Organization:
- Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC07-05ID14517
- OSTI ID:
- 1032081
- Report Number(s):
- INL/CON-11-21275; TRN: US1200411
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: ASME IMECE 2011,Denver, CO,11/14/2011,11/17/2011
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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