Lessons from shielding retrofits at the LAMPF/LANSCE/PSR accelerator, beam lines and target facilities
Abstract
The experience in the past 7 years to improve the shielding and radiation control systems at the Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF) and the Manuel Lujan Jr. Neutron Scattering Center (LANSCE) provides important lessons for the design of radiation control systems at future, high beam power proton accelerator facilities. Major issues confronted and insight gained in developing shielding criteria and in the use of radiation interlocks are discussed. For accelerators and beam lines requiring hands-on-maintenance, our experience suggests that shielding criteria based on accident scenarios will be more demanding than criteria based on routinely encountered beam losses. Specification and analysis of the appropriate design basis accident become all important. Mitigation by active protection systems of the consequences of potential, but severe, prompt radiation accidents has been advocated as an alternate choice to shielding retrofits for risk management at both facilities. Acceptance of active protection systems has proven elusive primarily because of the difficulty in providing convincing proof that failure of active systems (to mitigate the accident) is incredible. Results from extensive shielding assessment studies are presented including data from experimental beam spill tests, comparisons with model estimates, and evidence bearing on the limitations of line-of-sight attenuation models in complexmore »
- Authors:
- Publication Date:
- Research Org.:
- Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Org.:
- USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
- OSTI Identifier:
- 10163586
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-94-1874; CONF-9404150-1
ON: DE94014467; TRN: 94:013647
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-36
- Resource Type:
- Conference
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Specialist`s meeting on shielding aspects of accelerators, targets and irradiation facilities,Arlington, TX (United States),28-29 Apr 1994; Other Information: PBD: [1994]
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS; 07 ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES; 73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS; ACCELERATORS; SHIELDING; NEUTRON SOURCE FACILITIES; RETROFITTING; RADIATION PROTECTION; MEASURING INSTRUMENTS; MODIFICATIONS; DOSE EQUIVALENTS; 430100; 070201; 663600; DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, AND OPERATION; DESIGN, FABRICATION, AND OPERATION; RADIATION PHYSICS
Citation Formats
Macek, R J. Lessons from shielding retrofits at the LAMPF/LANSCE/PSR accelerator, beam lines and target facilities. United States: N. p., 1994.
Web.
Macek, R J. Lessons from shielding retrofits at the LAMPF/LANSCE/PSR accelerator, beam lines and target facilities. United States.
Macek, R J. 1994.
"Lessons from shielding retrofits at the LAMPF/LANSCE/PSR accelerator, beam lines and target facilities". United States. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/10163586.
@article{osti_10163586,
title = {Lessons from shielding retrofits at the LAMPF/LANSCE/PSR accelerator, beam lines and target facilities},
author = {Macek, R J},
abstractNote = {The experience in the past 7 years to improve the shielding and radiation control systems at the Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF) and the Manuel Lujan Jr. Neutron Scattering Center (LANSCE) provides important lessons for the design of radiation control systems at future, high beam power proton accelerator facilities. Major issues confronted and insight gained in developing shielding criteria and in the use of radiation interlocks are discussed. For accelerators and beam lines requiring hands-on-maintenance, our experience suggests that shielding criteria based on accident scenarios will be more demanding than criteria based on routinely encountered beam losses. Specification and analysis of the appropriate design basis accident become all important. Mitigation by active protection systems of the consequences of potential, but severe, prompt radiation accidents has been advocated as an alternate choice to shielding retrofits for risk management at both facilities. Acceptance of active protection systems has proven elusive primarily because of the difficulty in providing convincing proof that failure of active systems (to mitigate the accident) is incredible. Results from extensive shielding assessment studies are presented including data from experimental beam spill tests, comparisons with model estimates, and evidence bearing on the limitations of line-of-sight attenuation models in complex geometries. The scope and significant characteristics of major shielding retrofit projects at the LAMPF site are illustrated by the project to improve the shielding beneath a road over a multiuse, high-intensity beam line (Line D).},
doi = {},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/10163586},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Fri Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 1994},
month = {Fri Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 1994}
}