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Title: Modelling and evaluating against the violent insider

Conference ·
OSTI ID:10162784

The violent insider threat poses a special challenge to facilities protecting special nuclear material from theft or diversion. These insiders could potentially behave as nonviolent insiders to deceitfully defeat certain safeguards elements and use violence to forcefully defeat hardware or personnel. While several vulnerability assessment tools are available to deal with the nonviolent insider, very limited effort has been directed to developing analysis tools for the violent threat. In this paper, we present an approach using the results of a vulnerability assessment for nonviolent insiders to evaluate certain violent insider scenarios. Since existing tools do not explicitly consider violent insiders, the approach is intended for experienced safeguards analysts and relies on the analyst to brainstorm possible violent actions, to assign detection probabilities, and to ensure consistency. We then discuss our efforts in developing an automated tool for assessing the vulnerability against those violent insiders who are willing to use force against barriers, but who are unwilling to kill or be killed. Specifically, we discuss our efforts in developing databases for violent insiders penetrating barriers, algorithms for considering the entry of contraband, and modelling issues in considering the use of violence.

Research Organization:
Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
DOE Contract Number:
W-7405-ENG-48
OSTI ID:
10162784
Report Number(s):
UCRL-JC-107027; CONF-910774-108; ON: DE93015106; TRN: 93:020875
Resource Relation:
Conference: 32. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) annual meeting,New Orleans, LA (United States),28-31 Jul 1991; Other Information: PBD: Jul 1991
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English