A human reliability analysis of a nuclear explosives dismantlement
This paper describes the methodology used in a human reliability analysis (HRA) conducted during a quantitative hazard assessment of a nuclear weapon disassembly process performed at the Pantex plant. The probability of human errors during the disassembly process is an extremely important aspect of estimating accident-sequence frequency for nuclear weapons processing. The methods include the systematic identification of potential human-initiated or enabled accident sequences using an accident-sequence fault tree, the extensive use of walkthroughs and videotaping of the disassembly process, and hands-on testing of postulated human errors. THERP modeling of rule-based behavior and operational data analysis of errors in skill-based behavior are described. A simple method for evaluating the approximate likelihood of nonmalevolent violations of procedures was developed and used to examine the process. The HRA occurred concurrently with process design, so considerable interaction between the analysts and designers occurred and resulted in design changes that are discussed in the paper.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-36
- OSTI ID:
- 100095
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-95-1775; CONF-951135-8; ON: DE95014004; IN: TSA-11-95-R126
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 1995 International mechanical engineering congress and exhibition, San Francisco, CA (United States), 12-17 Nov 1995; Other Information: PBD: [1995]
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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