Managing the coming glut of nuclear weapons materials

Journal Article · Sun Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 1992 · Arms Control Today; (United States)

OSTI ID:7171758

Scheinman, L ^[1]; Fischer, D A.V.

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1. Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY (United States)

Nuclear disarmament should be pursued in a way that reinforces the nonproliferation regime and its international safeguards system. To this end, the US and the successor states of the former Soviet Union should: (1) commit all fissile material from dismantled nuclear warheads to secure storage and exclusively peaceful use or terminal disposal; (2) establish a fissile material storage regime with host-country protection and safety for the material, and verification by the IAEA, alone or in conjunction with a bilateral verification arrangement between the parties directly involved; (3) undertake that any material withdrawn from storage will be used for exclusively peaceful purposes and be subject to IAEA verification in perpetuity; (4) in conjunction with the commercial nuclear marketplace, establish an arrangement whereby HEU released from military use is made available as low-enriched uranium to support peaceful nuclear activity in states in full compliance with their nonproliferation and safeguards undertakings; and (5) delay any release of plutonium until such time as arrangements for its use or disposal consistent with international security and safety can be agreed, and a system for the management and control of all facets of its use, movement, and disposal is in place.

• OSTI ID: 7171758
• Journal Information: Arms Control Today; (United States), Vol. 22:2; ISSN 0196-125X
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
29 ENERGY PLANNING
POLICY AND ECONOMY
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PLUTONIUM
FISSILE MATERIALS
IAEA
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS
REPROCESSING
STORAGE
USA
USSR
VERIFICATION
ACTINIDES
ASIA
COOPERATION
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
ELEMENTS
ENRICHED URANIUM
EUROPE
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
ISOTOPE ENRICHED MATERIALS
MANAGEMENT
MATERIALS
METALS
NORTH AMERICA
SEPARATION PROCESSES
TRANSURANIUM ELEMENTS
URANIUM
WEAPONS
055002* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability- Nontechnical Aspects
350200 - Arms Control- Proliferation- (1987-)
290600 - Energy Planning & Policy- Nuclear Energy