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Title: The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis

Abstract

This thesis develops an analytical framework for optimal design of a ban on chemical weapons (CW). The thesis addresses two principal questions: first, could it be in the interest of individual states to adopt a CW ban, even if compliance by adversaries cannot be presupposed Second, how can designers of the treaty maximize incentives to accede and comply, but simultaneously minimize the threat to national sovereignty, including the risk of giving up a deterrent stockpile, and the risk that sensitive information would be revealed during inspections Three problems can plague any disarmament agreement. The first danger is that the agreement will be so minimalist that although all countries may adhere to it, it will have little effect on international behavior. The second danger is that the treaty will have such a weak enforcement mechanism that although nations may accede, they may not comply under conditions of international stress. The third danger is that the terms of the arrangement will be so onerous that few nations will agree to adopt it in the first place. This thesis develops a framework for thinking about how to strike the proper balance between these competing concerns. A salient characteristic of CW is the relativemore » ease with which they can be produced in secret. The dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of inspection procedures of varying intrusiveness, and investigates the risks to sensitive government and industrial facilities. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the extent to which a ban on a single weapon could enhance the stability of the [open quotes]balance of terror.[close quotes] The author makes specific policy recommendations about how to set the optimal level of enforcement so that the ban is likely to succeed, and thus become more than a symbolic gesture.« less

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Harvard Univ., Cambridge, MA (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
7105433
Resource Type:
Miscellaneous
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Thesis (Ph.D.)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS; INTERNATIONAL CONTROL; TREATIES; RECOMMENDATIONS; ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL; CONTROL; WEAPONS; 350100* - Arms Control- Policy, Negotiations, & Legislation- (1987-)

Citation Formats

Stern, J E. The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis. United States: N. p., 1992. Web.
Stern, J E. The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis. United States.
Stern, J E. 1992. "The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis". United States.
@article{osti_7105433,
title = {The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis},
author = {Stern, J E},
abstractNote = {This thesis develops an analytical framework for optimal design of a ban on chemical weapons (CW). The thesis addresses two principal questions: first, could it be in the interest of individual states to adopt a CW ban, even if compliance by adversaries cannot be presupposed Second, how can designers of the treaty maximize incentives to accede and comply, but simultaneously minimize the threat to national sovereignty, including the risk of giving up a deterrent stockpile, and the risk that sensitive information would be revealed during inspections Three problems can plague any disarmament agreement. The first danger is that the agreement will be so minimalist that although all countries may adhere to it, it will have little effect on international behavior. The second danger is that the treaty will have such a weak enforcement mechanism that although nations may accede, they may not comply under conditions of international stress. The third danger is that the terms of the arrangement will be so onerous that few nations will agree to adopt it in the first place. This thesis develops a framework for thinking about how to strike the proper balance between these competing concerns. A salient characteristic of CW is the relative ease with which they can be produced in secret. The dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of inspection procedures of varying intrusiveness, and investigates the risks to sensitive government and industrial facilities. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the extent to which a ban on a single weapon could enhance the stability of the [open quotes]balance of terror.[close quotes] The author makes specific policy recommendations about how to set the optimal level of enforcement so that the ban is likely to succeed, and thus become more than a symbolic gesture.},
doi = {},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/7105433}, journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1992},
month = {Wed Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1992}
}

Miscellaneous:
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