Freeze verification: time for a fresh approach
The administration's claim that some elements of a comprehensive nuclear freeze are unverifiable does not specify the nature of those elements and whether they represent a real threat to national security if we trusted the USSR to comply. The author contends that clandestine development of new weapons will have little strategic effect since both sides already have total destructive power. The risks of noncompliance are largely political and less than the risks of continued arms buildup. Since the USSR would also want the US to be bound by freeze terms, deterrence would come from mutual benefit. Hardliners argue that cheating is easier in a closed society; that our democracy would tend to relax and the USSR would move ahead with its plans for world domination. The author argues that, over time, a freeze would diminish Soviet confidence in its nuclear war fighting capabilities and that adequate verification is possible with monitoring and warning arrangements. (DCK)
- Research Organization:
- Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC
- OSTI ID:
- 6319926
- Journal Information:
- Bull. At. Sci.; (United States), Vol. 39:1
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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