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Title: Three essays in economics and international politics: nuclear deterrence theory; trade and a security dilemma; uncertainty and interest elasticity

Thesis/Dissertation ·
OSTI ID:6004997

Three independent essays comprise this dissertation. The first, The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence, attempts to make explicit important assumptions and essential elements of the logic of deterrence theory that have too often been left implicit. The essay identifies two versions of strategic nuclear deterrence theory and formalizes the differences between them by relating these differences to the game theoretic concepts of imperfect and incomplete information and sequentially rational strategies. The most-important distinction between these two versions is the assumption of the existence or nonexistence of mutually invulnerable strategic forces. If these forces are assumed to exist, then deterrence rests on a spectrum of risk. The second essay, International Politics and the Pattern of International Trade, is a simplistic counterexample of the usual claim that trade improves states' welfare. The third essay, Uncertainty and the Interest Inelasticity of Investment, suggests that, in an economy with an incomplete set of markets, firms may become increasingly insensitive to market signals - prices - as the level of general uncertainty increases.

Research Organization:
California Univ., Berkeley (USA)
OSTI ID:
6004997
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Thesis (Ph. D.)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English