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Title: Verifying a comprehensive test ban

Abstract

Verification can never be accomplished with 100% certainty. Decisions about verification therefore involve judgments about acceptable levels of risk. Such judgments, in turn, can only be made by weighing the potential costs of undetected cheating against the expected benefits of a proposed treaty. Given the recent changes in the international political climate and shifts in the focus of US security concerns, the scale that balances these arguments may now be tipping in favor of a comprehensive test ban (CTB). In this new security environment, the potential advantages cited by CTB advocates - strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, limiting the development of destabilizing new weapons, stopping the remaining environmental hazards of underground testing, and providing a first step toward nuclear disarmament - appear ever more important. Meanwhile, the disadvantages critics warn of - the uncertainties of verification, the need for testing to develop new weapons, and the alleged difficulties of maintaining high weapons reliability without testing - seem less compelling.

Authors:
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
5842831
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Journal Name:
Arms Control Today; (USA)
Additional Journal Information:
Journal Volume: 20:9; Journal ID: ISSN 0196-125X
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; ARMS CONTROL; NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY; VERIFICATION; NUCLEAR EXPLOSION DETECTION; POLITICAL ASPECTS; SECURITY; DETECTION; INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS; 450300* - Military Technology, Weaponry, & National Defense- Nuclear Explosion Detection; 350300 - Arms Control- Verification- (1987-)

Citation Formats

van der Vink, G E. Verifying a comprehensive test ban. United States: N. p., 1990. Web.
van der Vink, G E. Verifying a comprehensive test ban. United States.
van der Vink, G E. 1990. "Verifying a comprehensive test ban". United States.
@article{osti_5842831,
title = {Verifying a comprehensive test ban},
author = {van der Vink, G E},
abstractNote = {Verification can never be accomplished with 100% certainty. Decisions about verification therefore involve judgments about acceptable levels of risk. Such judgments, in turn, can only be made by weighing the potential costs of undetected cheating against the expected benefits of a proposed treaty. Given the recent changes in the international political climate and shifts in the focus of US security concerns, the scale that balances these arguments may now be tipping in favor of a comprehensive test ban (CTB). In this new security environment, the potential advantages cited by CTB advocates - strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, limiting the development of destabilizing new weapons, stopping the remaining environmental hazards of underground testing, and providing a first step toward nuclear disarmament - appear ever more important. Meanwhile, the disadvantages critics warn of - the uncertainties of verification, the need for testing to develop new weapons, and the alleged difficulties of maintaining high weapons reliability without testing - seem less compelling.},
doi = {},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5842831}, journal = {Arms Control Today; (USA)},
issn = {0196-125X},
number = ,
volume = 20:9,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Nov 01 00:00:00 EST 1990},
month = {Thu Nov 01 00:00:00 EST 1990}
}