Evaluating the contributions of material control to insider protection
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
Facilities handling nuclear material must be adequately protected against a spectrum of threats including insiders, outsiders, and collusion among insider and outsider adversaries. To counter these threats, facilities implement an integrated system of physical protection (PP), material control (MC), and material accountability (MA). (Personnel Security Assurance Programs are also used to help deter and detect potential insider adversaries.) Naturally, the contribution of each of these systems to protection against the different threats varies. Material control plays an important role in protecting against the insider threat and in assuring that material is where it should be. Evaluating its contributions, however, to the overall protection is challenging. This paper focuses on one of the modules of the ASSESS code --- a state-of-the-art safeguards evaluation tool developed jointly with Sandia National Laboratories --- and discusses its use for assessing the contributions of MC to an overall insider protection program and for evaluating the safeguards benefits of new MC technologies. 2 refs.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/DP
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 5658573
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-101305; CONF-891103-17; ON: DE89015706
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Winter meeting of the American Nuclear Society, San Francisco, CA (USA), 26-30 Nov 1989
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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