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Title: U. S. /NATO sea-based non-strategic nuclear deterrence: Paradox or pitfall. Master's thesis

Technical Report ·
OSTI ID:5407446

The present study examines the evolution of nuclear strategy with particular emphasis on the capacity of U.S./NATO sea-based non-strategic nuclear forces. The current trend in NATO towards a certain denuclearization of the Central European states might well place an increased reliance on the sea-based theater nuclear weapons to counter Soviet theater nuclear forces in the Western Soviet Union. The present work analyzes the policy background of the NATO nuclear strategy from a European perspective in light of recent problems as a necessary precondition to an understanding of the more concrete issues of hardware. Although the U.S. Navy's nuclear-capable Tomahawk land attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) remains a potent and flexible nuclear strike asset, it is best suited for heavily defended high value fixed targets. Emphasis on offensive mobility in a future conflict will make carrier-based aircraft a more decisive platform from which to prosecute and destroy high value mobile targets. However, an analysis of the U.S. Navy's non-strategic nuclear forces reveals substantial deficiencies when compared with those of the Soviet Union. A declining U.S. Navy nuclear stockpile of air-deliverable strike weapons in combination with the lack of a long-range nuclear-capable stealth aircraft weakens the credibility of the aircraft carrier battle group as a nuclear deterrent force.

Research Organization:
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (United States)
OSTI ID:
5407446
Report Number(s):
AD-A-246379/2/XAB
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Thesis (M.S.)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English