Verification of warhead dismantelment and the importance of baseline validation
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)
This paper presents an approach for evaluating verification regimes for nuclear warhead dismantlement. The approach is an adaptation of the traditional nuclear materials management model. As such the approach integrates the difficulties of verifying both stockpile estimates and numbers of warheads dismantled. Both random uncertainties and systematic uncertainties are considered in this approach. By making some basic assumptions about the relative uncertainties surrounding the stockpile estimates and the numbers of warheads dismantled, the authors illustrate their relative impacts on overall verification ability. The results highlight the need for increased attention on the problem of validating baseline declarations of stockpile size.
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 5336021
- Report Number(s):
- CONF-910774-; CODEN: NUMMB
- Journal Information:
- Nuclear Materials Management. Annual Meeting Proceedings; (United States), Vol. 20; Conference: 32. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) annual meeting, New Orleans, LA (United States), 28-31 Jul 1991; ISSN 0362-0034
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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