Deception and deterrence: the theater nuclear balance in a conventional war. Student essay

Technical Report · Mon Apr 07 00:00:00 EST 1986

OSTI ID:5271505

Bridgewater, G L

The unprecedented buildup of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces has created a dilemma for the West to successfully adhere to the strategy of deterrence with a flexible stop the Soviets conventionally or face the likely prospect of a strategic nuclear response. The author postulates that through the use of the lost art of deception, coupled with dedicated offensive actions to destroy Soviet theater nuclear systems, the USSR can be placed in a perceived position of theater nuclear inferiority and, therefore, war can be terminated on terms favorable to the West. There is a plethora of successful examples of the use of deception in the history of warfare and the Soviets are masters of the use of this low-cost high-return combat multiplier. Research also indicates that there are few viable systems rather than air power available to the theater commander to attack and destroy Soviet theater nuclear assets and in all cases, it is a high risk venture with a very iffy chance of success. However, future initiatives such as force modernization, the Strategic Defense Initiative, arms reduction talks and others may make this concept more attractive.

• Research Organization: Army War Coll., Carlisle Barracks, PA (USA)
• OSTI ID: 5271505
• Report Number(s): AD-A-168469/5/XAB
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS//MATHEMATICS, COMPUTING, AND INFORMATION SCIENCE
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