Accidental nuclear war: Modifications to superpower arsenals and to procedures for handling them could substantially reduce the risk of unintended Armageddon

Journal Article · Sat Dec 01 00:00:00 EST 1990 · Scientific American; (United States)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican1290-53· OSTI ID:5231857

Blair, B G; Kendall, H W

If nuclear war breaks out in the coming decade or two, it will probably be by accident. The threat of a cold-blooded, calculated first strike is vanishing, but beneath the calm surface of constructive diplomacy among the traditional nuclear rivals lurks the danger of unpremeditated use of nuclear weapons. The accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent use of these weapons has become the most plausible path to nuclear war. Both superpowers, as well as France, Great Britain and China - long-standing members of the nuclear club - are potential sources of accidental missile launch. The emergence of fledgling nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan and Israel - some armed with ballistic missiles - pushes nuclear safeguards even closer to the top of the international security agenda. The chances of unwanted nuclear war would be reduced significantly if tamper proof, coded locks were installed on all nuclear weapons and if methods were put in place to disarm nuclear forces even after launch. In addition, the US and the Soviet Union should reduce their reliance on the dangerous policy of launch on warning and reduce the launch readiness of their nuclear forces. The social and political upheavals in the Soviet Union underscore fears of unintended nuclear war. Civil turmoil raises the possibility that rebellious ethnic groups or splinter organizations could capture nuclear weapons. Other, deeper fault lines run through the whole of Soviet society and may be capable of cracking the foundations of its nuclear command system. Although the US faces no such civil unrest, the country's system of nuclear command carries some risk that nuclear weapons might be used contrary to the intentions of legitimate authorities.

• OSTI ID: 5231857
• Journal Information: Scientific American; (United States), Vol. 263:6; ISSN 0036-8733
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

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45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ACCIDENTS
SAFEGUARDS
CHINA
FRANCE
INDIA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ISRAEL
LAUNCHING
MILITARY PERSONNEL
MISSILES
NATIONAL SECURITY
PAKISTAN
POLITICAL ASPECTS
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450400* - Military Technology
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& National Defense- Nuclear & Radiological Warfare- (1990-)