Turmoil and triumph: My years as secretary of state
The Reagan administration, or members of it, may have believed their own propaganda about the United States (U.S.) military weakness in 1980 and 1981, but the Soviet leaders never did. Nor did they ever doubt or challenge U.S. deterrence or determination to repel agression against the U.S. or its allies. What was new was a belated recognition by Moscow`s leaders that the Marxist-Lennist world view they had held for 70 years did not accord with reality, and that their combined efforts to apply that pattern for internal development did not accord with the real needs of society. It was a remarkable turn of policy in Reagan`s second term that led to five summit meetings, as many as in the preceding three presidencies, and One-third of all the postwar, Cold War summits. One of the most interesting and valuable contributions of this book is the picture of the inner workings of the Reagan administration, as seen by the secretary of state.
- OSTI ID:
- 45351
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: DN: From review by Raymond L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution, in Arms Control Today, Vol. 23, No. 8 (Oct 1993); PBD: 1993
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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