Nigeria`s oil production behavior: Tests of alternative hypotheses
The sudden quadrupling of world oil prices in 1973-1974 marked the beginning of several formal inquiries by economists into the production behavior of members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Interest in the organization was further heightened in 1979 when nominal oil prices further doubled. However, oil market analysts have differed in their evaluation of OPEC`s role in the determination of world oil prices. Most energy economists have modeled OPEC as a cartel. Morris Adelman has suggested that OPEC`s true nature lies somewhere between two polar cases of a dominant-firm industry and an imperfect, market-sharing cartel. In the former case, one large, dominant firm (i.e., Saudi Arabia) serves as the {open_quotes}swing producer,{close_quotes} allowing other cartel members and non-OPEC oil producers to produce whatever they wished, controlling the market price by itself through its own output adjustments. The latter case of an imperfect market-sharing cartel is a loose collusive arrangement in which all members agree on an acceptable price level and individual output shares for each producer. Adelman believes that OPEC wobbles between these two cases, depending upon market conditions.
- OSTI ID:
- 443422
- Journal Information:
- Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 19, Issue 2; Other Information: PBD: Spr 1994
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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