On the vulnerability of basic quantum key distribution protocols and three protocols stable to attack with 'blinding' of avalanche photodetectors
- Russian Federation Academy of Cryptography (Russian Federation)
The fundamental quantum mechanics prohibitions on the measurability of quantum states allow secure key distribution between spatially remote users to be performed. Experimental and commercial implementations of quantum cryptography systems, however, use components that exist at the current technology level, in particular, one-photon avalanche photodetectors. These detectors are subject to the blinding effect. It was shown that all the known basic quantum key distribution protocols and systems based on them are vulnerable to attacks with blinding of photodetectors. In such attacks, an eavesdropper knows all the key transferred, does not produce errors at the reception side, and remains undetected. Three protocols of quantum key distribution stable toward such attacks are suggested. The security of keys and detection of eavesdropping attempts are guaranteed by the internal structure of protocols themselves rather than additional technical improvements.
- OSTI ID:
- 22027878
- Journal Information:
- Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics, Vol. 114, Issue 5; Other Information: Copyright (c) 2012 Pleiades Publishing, Ltd.; Country of input: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); ISSN 1063-7761
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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