AP1000 Design for Security
- Southern Nuclear Operating Company, 40 Inverness Center Parkway, Birmingham, AL 35242 (United States)
- Westinghouse Electric Company, 4350 Northern Pike, Monroeville, PA 15146 (United States)
Nuclear power plants are protected from potential security threats through a combination of robust structures around the primary system and other vital equipment, security systems and equipment, and defensive strategy. The overall objective for nuclear power plant security is to protect public health and safety by ensuring that attacks or sabotage do not challenge the ability to safely shutdown the plant or protect from radiological releases. In addition, plants have systems, features and operational strategies to cope with external conditions, such as loss of offsite power, which could be created as part of an attack. Westinghouse considered potential security threats during design of the AP1000 PWR. The differences in plant configuration, safety system design, and safe shutdown equipment between existing plants and AP1000 affect potential vulnerabilities. This paper provides an evaluation of AP1000 with respect to vulnerabilities to security threats. The AP1000 design differs from the design of operating PWRs in the US in the configuration and the functional requirements for safety systems. These differences are intentional departures from conventional PWR designs which simplify plant design and enhance overall safety. The differences between the AP1000 PWR and conventional PWRs can impact vulnerabilities to security threats. The NRC addressed security concerns as part of their reviews for AP1000 Design Certification, and did not identify any security issues of concern. However, much of the detailed security design information for the AP1000 was deferred to the combined Construction and Operating License (COL) phase as many of the security issues are site-specific. Therefore, NRC review of security issues related to the AP1000 is not necessarily complete. Further, since the AP1000 plant design differs from existing PWRs, it is not obvious that the analyses and assessments prepared for existing plants also apply to the AP1000. We conclude that, overall, the AP1000 is less vulnerable to security threats such as malevolent use of vehicles (land, water or air), than are conventional PWRs. Further, the AP1000 is less vulnerable to external events (e.g., loss of transmission) than conventional PWRs. For some of the threats evaluated the AP1000 is comparable to conventional PWRs, while for other threats the AP1000 is inherently less vulnerable. (authors)
- Research Organization:
- American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526 (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 21021076
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 2006 International congress on advances in nuclear power plants - ICAPP'06, Reno - Nevada (United States), 4-8 Jun 2006; Other Information: Country of input: France; refs; Related Information: In: Proceedings of the 2006 international congress on advances in nuclear power plants - ICAPP'06, 2734 pages.
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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