Development, Application, and Implementation of RAMCAP to Characterize Nuclear Power Plant Risk From Terrorism
- Electric Power Research Institute, 1300 Harris Boulevard, Charlotte, NC 28262 (United States)
- ERIN Engineering and Research (United States)
In response to increased interest in risk-informed decision making regarding terrorism, EPRI and ERIN Engineering were selected by U.S. DHS and ASME to develop and demonstrate the RAMCAP method for nuclear power plant (NPP) risk assessment. The objective is to characterize plant-specific NPP risk for risk management opportunities and to provide consistent information for DHS decision making. This paper is an update of this project presented at the American Nuclear Society (ANS) International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA05) in September, 2005. The method uses a characterization of risk as a function of Consequence, Vulnerability, and Threat. For each site, worst case scenarios are developed for each of sixteen benchmark threats. Nuclear RAMCAP hypothesizes that the intent of the perpetrator is to cause offsite radiological consequences. Specific targets are the reactor core, the spent fuel pool, and nuclear spent fuel in a dry storage facility (ISFSI). Results for each scenario are presented as conditional risk for financial loss, early fatalities and early injuries. Expected consequences for each scenario are quantified, while vulnerability is estimated on a relative likelihood scale. Insights for other societal risks are provided. Although threat frequencies are not provided, target attractiveness and threat deterrence are estimated. To assure efficiency, completeness, and consistency; results are documented using standard RAMCAP Evaluator software. Trial applications were successfully performed at four plant sites. Implementation at all other U.S. commercial sites is underway, supported by the Nuclear Sector Coordinating Council (NSCC). Insights from RAMCAP results at 23 U.S. plants completed to date have been compiled and presented to the NSCC. Results are site-specific. Physical security barriers, an armed security force, preparedness for design-basis threats, rugged design against natural hazards, multiple barriers between fuel and environment, accident mitigation capability, severe accident management procedures, and offsite emergency plans are risk-beneficial against all threat types. (authors)
- Research Organization:
- The ASME Foundation, Inc., Three Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5990 (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 20995670
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: 14. international conference on nuclear engineering (ICONE 14), Miami, FL (United States), 17-20 Jul 2006; Other Information: Country of input: France
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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