Systems Approach to Arms Control Verification
Using the decades of experience of developing concepts and technologies for verifying bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements, a broad conceptual systems approach is being developed that takes into account varying levels of information and risk. The IAEA has already demonstrated the applicability of a systems approach by implementing safeguards at the State level, with acquisition path analysis as the key element. In order to test whether such an approach could also be implemented for arms control verification, an exercise was conducted in November 2014 at the JRC ITU Ispra. Based on the scenario of a hypothetical treaty between two model nuclear weapons states aimed at capping their nuclear arsenals at existing levels, the goal of this exercise was to explore how to use acquisition path analysis in an arms control context. Our contribution will present the scenario, objectives and results of this exercise, and attempt to define future workshops aimed at further developing verification measures that will deter or detect treaty violations.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC52-07NA27344
- OSTI ID:
- 1184177
- Report Number(s):
- LLNL-CONF-671180
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Presented at: ESARDA Symposium 2015, Manchester, United Kingdom, May 18 - May 21, 2015
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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