Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

Conference · Mon Feb 23 00:00:00 EST 2015

OSTI ID:1170624

Badwan, Faris M. ^[1]; Demuth, Scott Francis ^[1]; Miller, Michael Conrad ^[1]; Pshakin, Gennady ^[2]

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1. Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
2. Obninsk Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (Russian Federation)

Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may lead to more proliferation resistant and physically secure design features for SMRs.

• Research Organization: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• DOE Contract Number: AC52-06NA25396
• OSTI ID: 1170624
• Report Number(s): LA-UR-14-26422; TRN: US1600053
• Resource Relation: Conference: IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards, Vienna (Austria), 20 Oct 2014
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
DESIGN
SECURITY
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
USA
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
REACTORS
PROLIFERATION
SAFETY
ACCOUNTING
CONTROL
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
POWER RANGE 100-1000 MW
DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS