Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program
The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the “human factor.” Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former “Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security” at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that “good security is 20% equipment and 80% people.”1 Although eliminating the “human factor” is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the risk of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 1011814
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA-69509; TRN: US201109%%626
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: The 4th Russian International Conference on Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting, October 19-23, 2009, Obninsk, Russia
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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