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Sample records for weapons grade plutonium

  1. Analysis of Surplus Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposition Options | National

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

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  2. Cooperative Studies in the Utilization and Storage of Excess Weapons-Grade Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bolyatko, V. V.

    1998-01-29

    This technical report is a tangible and verifiable deliverable associated with the Nuclear Group subproject ďCooperative Studies in the Utilization and Storage of Excess Weapons-grade Plutonium.Ē This report is an assessment ofthe work performed by the Russian party from 1 October 1995 through 30 September 1996 regarding milestones defined in the contract between the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and the Texas Engineering Experiment Station (TEES). In these interactions, TEES serves as agent of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) in the capacity oflead institution for the Nuclear Group of the ANRCP. The official Statement ofWork dated 8 April 1996 enumerates specific milestones and deliverables. In its present form, this report is an edited version ofthe translation submitted to TEES by MEPhI on 7 October 1996. The principal investigators for this subproject are Dr. Paul Nelson of TEES and Dr. Victor Bolyatko of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute.

  3. Why is weapons grade plutonium more hazardous to work with than highly enriched uranium?

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Costigan, Stephen A.; Schake, Bradley S.

    2015-08-01

    Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons grade plutonium have assumed positions of dominant importance among the actinide elements because of their successful uses as explosive ingredients in nuclear weapons and the place they hold as key materials in the development of industrial use of nuclear power. While most chemists are familiar with the practical interest concerning HEU and WG Pu, fewer know the subtleties among their hazards. In this study, a primer is provided regarding the hazards associated with working with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides. The care that must be taken to safely handle these materials is emphasizedmore¬†¬Ľ and the extent of the hazards is described. The controls needed to work with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides are differentiated. Given the choice, one would rather work with HEU metal and oxides than WG Pu metal and oxides.¬ę¬†less

  4. Why is weapons grade plutonium more hazardous to work with than highly enriched uranium?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Costigan, Stephen A.; Schake, Bradley S.

    2015-08-01

    Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons grade plutonium have assumed positions of dominant importance among the actinide elements because of their successful uses as explosive ingredients in nuclear weapons and the place they hold as key materials in the development of industrial use of nuclear power. While most chemists are familiar with the practical interest concerning HEU and WG Pu, fewer know the subtleties among their hazards. In this study, a primer is provided regarding the hazards associated with working with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides. The care that must be taken to safely handle these materials is emphasized and the extent of the hazards is described. The controls needed to work with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides are differentiated. Given the choice, one would rather work with HEU metal and oxides than WG Pu metal and oxides.

  5. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 4. Plutonium dispositioning in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sterbentz, J.W.; Olsen, C.S.; Sinha, U.P.

    1993-06-01

    This study is in response to a request by the Reactor Panel Subcommittee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to evaluate the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing conventional or advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs and in low temperature/pressure LWR designs that might be developed for plutonium disposal. Three plutonium-based fuel forms (oxides, aluminum metallics, and carbides) are evaluated for neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and material and compatibility issues. For the carbides, only the fabrication technologies are addressed. Viable plutonium oxide fuels for conventional or advanced LWRs include plutonium-zirconium-calcium oxide (PuO{sub 2}-ZrO{sub 2}-CaO) with the addition of thorium oxide (ThO{sub 2}) or a burnable poison such as erbium oxide (Er{sub 2}O{sub 3}) or europium oxide (Eu{sub 2}O{sub 3}) to achieve acceptable neutronic performance. Thorium will breed fissile uranium that may be unacceptable from a proliferation standpoint. Fabrication of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuels is well established; however, fabrication of plutonium-based oxide fuels will require further development. Viable aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels for a low temperature/pressure LWR include plutonium aluminide in an aluminum matrix (PuAl{sub 4}-Al) with the addition of a burnable poison such as erbium (Er) or europium (Eu). Fabrication of low-enriched plutonium in aluminum-plutonium metallic fuel rods was initially established 30 years ago and will require development to recapture and adapt the technology to meet current environmental and safety regulations. Fabrication of high-enriched uranium plate fuel by the picture-frame process is a well established process, but the use of plutonium would require the process to be upgraded in the United States to conform with current regulations and minimize the waste streams.

  6. The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

    2008-12-23

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including unenriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to divert in large quantities. This report discusses the application of the LIFE concept to nonproliferation issues, initially looking at the LIFE (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) engine as a means of completely burning WG Pu and HEU. By combining a neutron-rich inertial fusion point source with energy-rich fission, the once-through closed fuel-cycle LIFE concept has the following characteristics: it is capable of efficiently burning excess weapons or separated civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium; the fission blanket is sub-critical at all times (keff < 0.95); because LIFE can operate well beyond the point at which light water reactors (LWRs) need to be refueled due to burn-up of fissile material and the resulting drop in system reactivity, fuel burn-up of 99% or more appears feasible. The objective of this work is to develop LIFE technology for burning of WG-Pu and HEU.

  7. Neutronic evaluation of a non-fertile fuel for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in a boiling water reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sterbentz, J.W.

    1994-10-01

    A new non-fertile, weapons-grade plutonium oxide fuel concept is developed and evaluated for deep burn applications in a boiling water reactor environment using the General Electric 8x8 Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) fuel assembly dimensions and pitch. Detailed infinite lattice fuel burnup results and neutronic performance characteristics are given and although preliminary in nature, clearly demonstrate the fuel`s potential as an effective means to expedite the disposition of plutonium in existing light water reactors. The new non-fertile fuel concept is an all oxide composition containing plutonia, zirconia, calcia, and erbia having the following design weight percentages: 8.3; 80.4; 9.7; and 1.6. This fuel composition in an infinite fuel lattice operating at linear heat generation rates of 6.0 or 12.0 kW/ft per rod can remain critical for up to 1,200 and 600 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD), respectively, and achieve a burnup of 7.45 {times} 10{sup 20} f/cc. These burnups correspond to a 71--73% total plutonium isotope destruction and a 91--94% destruction of the {sup 239}Pu isotope for the 0--40% moderator steam void condition. Total plutonium destruction greater than 73% is possible with a fuel management scheme that allows subcritical fuel assemblies to be driven by adjacent high reactivity assemblies. The fuel exhibits very favorable neutron characteristics from beginning-of-life (BOL) to end-of-life (EOL). Prompt fuel Doppler coefficient of reactivity are negative, with values ranging between {minus}0.4 to {minus}2.0 pcm/K over the temperature range of 900 to 2,200 K. The ABWR fuel lattice remains in an undermoderated condition for both hot operational and cold startup conditions over the entire fuel burnup lifetime.

  8. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  9. Source terms for plutonium aerosolization from nuclear weapon accidents

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stephens, D.R.

    1995-07-01

    The source term literature was reviewed to estimate aerosolized and respirable release fractions for accidents involving plutonium in high-explosive (HE) detonation and in fuel fires. For HE detonation, all estimates are based on the total amount of Pu. For fuel fires, all estimates are based on the amount of Pu oxidized. I based my estimates for HE detonation primarily upon the results from the Roller Coaster experiment. For hydrocarbon fuel fire oxidation of plutonium, I based lower bound values on laboratory experiments which represent accident scenarios with very little turbulence and updraft of a fire. Expected values for aerosolization were obtained from the Vixen A field tests, which represent a realistic case for modest turbulence and updraft, and for respirable fractions from some laboratory experiments involving large samples of Pu. Upper bound estimates for credible accidents are based on experiments involving combustion of molten plutonium droplets. In May of 1991 the DOE Pilot Safety Study Program established a group of experts to estimate the fractions of plutonium which would be aerosolized and respirable for certain nuclear weapon accident scenarios.

  10. U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Department of Energy Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S.

  11. Disposition of excess weapon plutonium in deep boreholes - site selection handbook

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Heiken, G.; Woldegabriel, G.; Morley, R.; Plannerer, H.; Rowley, J.

    1996-09-01

    One of the options for disposing of excess weapons plutonium is to place it near the base of deep boreholes in stable crystalline rocks. The technology needed to begin designing this means of disposition already exists, and there are many attractive sites available within the conterminous United States. There are even more potential sites for this option within Russia. The successful design of a borehole system must address two criteria: (1) how to dispose of 50 metric tons of weapons plutonium while making it inaccessible for unauthorized retrieval, and (2) how to prevent contamination of the accessible biosphere, defined here as the Earth`s surface and usable groundwaters.

  12. Plutonium radiation surrogate

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Frank, Michael I. (Dublin, CA)

    2010-02-02

    A self-contained source of gamma-ray and neutron radiation suitable for use as a radiation surrogate for weapons-grade plutonium is described. The source generates a radiation spectrum similar to that of weapons-grade plutonium at 5% energy resolution between 59 and 2614 keV, but contains no special nuclear material and emits little .alpha.-particle radiation. The weapons-grade plutonium radiation surrogate also emits neutrons having fluxes commensurate with the gamma-radiation intensities employed.

  13. High-value use of weapons-plutonium by burning in molten salt accelerator-driven subcritical systems or reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowman, C.D.; Venneri, F.

    1993-11-01

    The application of thermal-spectrum molten-salt reactors and accelerator-driven subcritical systems to the destruction of weapons-return plutonium is considered from the perspective of deriving the maximum societal benefit. The enhancement of electric power production from burning the fertile fuel {sup 232}Th with the plutonium is evaluated. Also the enhancement of destruction of the accumulated waste from commercial nuclear reactors is considered using the neutron-rich weapons plutonium. Most cases examined include the concurrent transmutation of the long-lived actinide and fission product waste ({sup 99}Tc, {sup 129}I, {sup 135}Cs, {sup 126}Sn and {sup 79}Se).

  14. Development of a fresh MOX fuel transport package for disposition of weapons plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ludwig, S.B.; Pope, R.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Michelhaugh, R.D.; Chae, S.M.

    1998-11-01

    The US Department of Energy announced its Record of Decision on January 14, 1997, to embark on a dual-track approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium using immobilization in glass or ceramics and burning plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in reactors. In support of the MOX fuel alternative, Oak Ridge National Laboratory initiated development of conceptual designs for a new package for transporting fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel assemblies between the MOX fabrication facility and existing commercial light-water reactors in the US. This paper summarizes progress made in development of new MOX transport package conceptual designs. The development effort has included documentation of programmatic and technical requirements for the new package and development and analysis of conceptual designs that satisfy these requirements.

  15. Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel Burnup Characteristics in Advanced Test Reactor Irradiation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    G. S. Chang

    2006-07-01

    Mixed oxide (MOX) test capsules prepared with weapons-derived plutonium have been irradiated to a burnup of 50 GWd/t. The MOX fuel was fabricated at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) by a master-mix process and has been irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Previous withdrawals of the same fuel have occurred at 9, 21, 30, 40, and 50 GWd/t. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) manages this test series for the Department of Energyís Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP). A UNIX BASH (Bourne Again SHell) script CMO has been written and validated at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to couple the Monte Carlo transport code MCNP with the depletion and buildup code ORIGEN-2 (CMO). The new Monte Carlo burnup analysis methodology in this paper consists of MCNP coupling through CMO with ORIGEN-2(MCWO). MCWO is a fully automated tool that links the Monte Carlo transport code MCNP with the radioactive decay and burnup code ORIGEN-2. The fuel burnup analyses presented in this study were performed using MCWO. MCWO analysis yields time-dependent and neutron-spectrum-dependent minor actinide and Pu concentrations for the ATR small I-irradiation test position. The purpose of this report is to validate both the Weapons-Grade Mixed Oxide (WG-MOX) test assembly model and the new fuel burnup analysis methodology by comparing the computed results against the neutron monitor measurements and the irradiated WG-MOX post irradiation examination (PIE) data.

  16. Accelerator-based conversion (ABC) of weapons plutonium: Plant layout study and related design issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fontana, M.H.; Krakowski, R.A.; Beard, C.A.; Buksa, J.J.; Davidson, J.W.; Sailor, W.C.; Williamson, M.A.

    1995-04-01

    In preparation for and in support of a detailed R and D Plan for the Accelerator-Based Conversion (ABC) of weapons plutonium, an ABC Plant Layout Study was conducted at the level of a pre-conceptual engineering design. The plant layout is based on an adaptation of the Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) detailed conceptual design that was completed in the early 1070s. Although the ABC Plant Layout Study included the Accelerator Equipment as an essential element, the engineering assessment focused primarily on the Target; Primary System (blanket and all systems containing plutonium-bearing fuel salt); the Heat-Removal System (secondary-coolant-salt and supercritical-steam systems); Chemical Processing; Operation and Maintenance; Containment and Safety; and Instrumentation and Control systems. Although constrained primarily to a reflection of an accelerator-driven (subcritical) variant of MSBR system, unique features and added flexibilities of the ABC suggest improved or alternative approaches to each of the above-listed subsystems; these, along with the key technical issues in need of resolution through a detailed R&D plan for ABC are described on the bases of the ``strawman`` or ``point-of-departure`` plant layout that resulted from this study.

  17. Preliminary study on weapon grade uranium utilization in molten salt reactor miniFUJI

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Aji, Indarta Kuncoro; Waris, A.

    2014-09-30

    Preliminary study on weapon grade uranium utilization in 25MWth and 50MWth of miniFUJI MSR (molten salt reactor) has been carried out. In this study, a very high enriched uranium that we called weapon grade uranium has been employed in UF{sub 4} composition. The {sup 235}U enrichment is 90 - 95 %. The results show that the 25MWth miniFUJI MSR can get its criticality condition for 1.56 %, 1.76%, and 1.96% of UF{sub 4} with {sup 235}U enrichment of at least 93%, 90%, and 90%, respectively. In contrast, the 50 MWth miniFUJI reactor can be critical for 1.96% of UF{sub 4} with {sup 235}U enrichment of at smallest amount 95%. The neutron spectra are almost similar for each power output.

  18. Method of immobilizing weapons plutonium to provide a durable, disposable waste product

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ewing, Rodney C.; Lutze, Werner; Weber, William J.

    1996-01-01

    A method of atomic scale fixation and immobilization of plutonium to provide a durable waste product. Plutonium is provided in the form of either PuO.sub.2 or Pu(NO.sub.3).sub.4 and is mixed with and SiO.sub.2. The resulting mixture is cold pressed and then heated under pressure to form (Zr,Pu)SiO.sub.4 as the waste product.

  19. Plutonium 239 Equivalency Calculations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wen, J

    2011-05-31

    This document provides the basis for converting actual weapons grade plutonium mass to a plutonium equivalency (PuE) mass of Plutonium 239. The conversion can be accomplished by performing calculations utilizing either: (1) Isotopic conversions factors (CF{sub isotope}), or (2) 30-year-old weapons grade conversion factor (CF{sub 30 yr}) Both of these methods are provided in this document. Material mass and isotopic data are needed to calculate PuE using the isotopic conversion factors, which will provide the actual PuE value at the time of calculation. PuE is the summation of the isotopic masses times their associated isotopic conversion factors for plutonium 239. Isotopic conversion factors are calculated by a normalized equation, relative to Plutonium 239, of specific activity (SA) and cumulated dose inhalation affects based on 50-yr committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). The isotopic conversion factors for converting weapons grade plutonium to PuE are provided in Table-1. The unit for specific activity (SA) is curies per gram (Ci/g) and the isotopic SA values come from reference [1]. The cumulated dose inhalation effect values in units of rem/Ci are based on 50-yr committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). A person irradiated by gamma radiation outside the body will receive a dose only during the period of irradiation. However, following an intake by inhalation, some radionuclides persist in the body and irradiate the various tissues for many years. There are three groups CEDE data representing lengths of time of 0.5 (D), 50 (W) and 500 (Y) days, which are in reference [2]. The CEDE values in the (W) group demonstrates the highest dose equivalent value; therefore they are used for the calculation.

  20. PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) SUB-GRADE EE/CA EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES A NEW MODEL

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    HOPKINS, A.M.

    2007-06-08

    An engineering evaluation/cost analysis (EE/CA) was performed at the Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The purpose of the EVCA was to identify the sub-grade items to be evaluated; determine the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) hazardous substances through process history and available data; evaluate these hazards; and as necessary, identify the available alternatives to reduce the risk associated with the contaminants. The sub-grade EWCA considered four alternatives for an interim removal action: (1) No Action; (2) Surveillance and Maintenance (S&M); (3) Stabilize and Leave in Place (Stabilization); and (4) Remove, Treat and Dispose (RTD). Each alternative was evaluated against the CERCLA criteria for effectiveness, implementability, and cost.

  1. U.S. and Russia Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Plutonium

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    WASHINGTON, DC - U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman and Sergey Kiriyenko, the director of Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency, have signed a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to...

  2. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  3. DOE plutonium disposition study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 2, Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-05-15

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document Volume 2, provides a discussion of: Plutonium Fuel Cycle; Technology Needs; Regulatory Considerations; Cost and Schedule Estimates; and Deployment Strategy.

  4. The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944 - 2009

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2012-06-01

    This report updates the report -Plutonium: The first 50 years- which was released by the U.S.Department of Energy (DOE) in 1996. The topic of both reports is plutonium, sometimes referred to as Pu-239, which is capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction and is used in nuclear weapons and for nuclear power production. This report updates 1994 data through 2009. The four most significant changes since 1994 include: (a) the completion of cleanup activities at the Rocky Flats Plant in 2005; (b) material consolidation and disposition activities, especially shipments from Hanford to the Savannah River Site; (c) the 2007 declaration of an additional 9.0 MT of weapons grade plutonium to be surplus to defense needs in the coming decades; and (d) the opening of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico in 1999.

  5. ESTIMATING IMPURITIES IN SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Moore, E.

    2013-07-17

    The United States holds at least 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Many of the items that require disposition are only partially characterized, and SRNL uses a variety of techniques to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that are important for processing through the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and alternative disposition paths. Recent advances in laboratory tools, including Prompt Gamma Analysis and Peroxide Fusion treatment, provide data on the existing inventories that will enable disposition without additional, costly sampling and destructive analysis.

  6. PFP Commercial Grade Food Pack Cans for Plutonium Handling and Storage Critical Characteristics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BONADIE, E.P.

    2000-10-26

    This document specifies the critical characteristics for containers procured for Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP's) Vault Operations system as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to perform its safety function.

  7. Excess plutonium disposition using ALWR technology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Phillips, A.; Buckner, M.R.; Radder, J.A.; Angelos, J.G.; Inhaber, H.

    1993-02-01

    The Office of Nuclear Energy of the Department of Energy chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force in August 1992. The Task Force was created to assess the range of practicable means of disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. Within the Task Force, working groups were formed to consider: (1) storage, (2) disposal,and(3) fission options for this disposition,and a separate group to evaluate nonproliferation concerns of each of the alternatives. As a member of the Fission Working Group, the Savannah River Technology Center acted as a sponsor for light water reactor (LWR) technology. The information contained in this report details the submittal that was made to the Fission Working Group of the technical assessment of LWR technology for plutonium disposition. The following aspects were considered: (1) proliferation issues, (2) technical feasibility, (3) technical availability, (4) economics, (5) regulatory issues, and (6) political acceptance.

  8. DOE Plutonium Disposition Study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 1, Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-05-15

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document, Volume 1, presents a technical description of the various elements of the System 80 + Standard Plant Design upon which the Plutonium Disposition Study was based. The System 80 + Standard Design is fully developed and directly suited to meeting the mission objectives for plutonium disposal. The bass U0{sub 2} plant design is discussed here.

  9. The effect of the composition of plutonium loaded on the reactivity change and the isotopic composition of fuel produced in a fast reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blandinskiy, V. Yu.

    2014-12-15

    This paper presents the results of a numerical investigation into burnup and breeding of nuclides in metallic fuel consisting of a mixture of plutonium and depleted uranium in a fast reactor with sodium coolant. The feasibility of using plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel from domestic thermal reactors and weapons-grade plutonium is discussed. It is shown that the largest production of secondary fuel and the least change in the reactivity over the reactor lifetime can be achieved when employing plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel from a reactor of the RBMK-1000 type.

  10. PFP Commercial Grade Food Pack Cans for Plutonium Handling and Storage Critical Characteristics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BONADIE, E.P.

    2000-08-22

    This screening addresses the critical characteristics for food industry type cans and containers used for handling and storage of special nuclear materials at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). HNF-5460, Revision 0 specified a minimum tin plate of 0.50 Ib./base box. Since the food pack cans currently used and that have been tested have a listed tin plate of 0.20 lbs. per base box, Revision 1 reduced the tin plate to {ge} 0.20 Ib./base box (i.e., No. 20 tinned commercial steel or heavier). This revision lists Critical Characteristics for two (2) large filtered containers, and associated shielding over-packs. These new containers are called ''Nuclear Material Containers'' (NMCs). They are supplied in various sizes, which can be nested, one inside another. The PFP will use NMCs with volumes up to 8-quarts as needed to over-pack largely bulged containers.

  11. CHARACTERIZATION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION OPTIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J; Edwin Moore, E; Scott Davies, S

    2008-07-15

    The United States (U.S.) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Except for materials that remain in use for programs outside of national defense, including programs for nuclear-energy development, the surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. Some items will be disposed as transuranic waste, low-level waste, or spent fuel. The remaining surplus plutonium will be managed through: (1) the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (FFF), to be constructed at the Savannah River Site (SRS), where the plutonium will be converted to fuel that will be irradiated in civilian power reactors and later disposed to a high-level waste (HLW) repository as spent fuel; (2) the SRS H-Area facilities, by dissolving and transfer to HLW systems, also for disposal to the repository; or (3) alternative immobilization techniques that would provide durable and secure disposal. From the beginning of the U.S. program for surplus plutonium disposition, DOE has sponsored research to characterize the surplus materials and to judge their suitability for planned disposition options. Because many of the items are stored without extensive analyses of their current chemical content, the characterization involves three interacting components: laboratory sample analysis, if available; non-destructive assay data; and rigorous evaluation of records for the processing history for items and inventory groups. This information is collected from subject-matter experts at inventory sites and from materials stabilization and surveillance programs, in cooperation with the design agencies for the disposition facilities. This report describes the operation and status of the characterization program.

  12. Characterizing surplus US plutonium for disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, Jeffrey S.; Moore, Edwin N.

    2013-02-26

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems.

  13. Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-03-01

    This Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan describes the Department of Energy`s response to the vulnerabilities identified in the Plutonium Working Group Report which are a result of the cessation of nuclear weapons production. The responses contained in this document are only part of an overall, coordinated approach designed to enable the Department to accelerate conversion of all nuclear materials, including plutonium, to forms suitable for safe, interim storage. The overall actions being taken are discussed in detail in the Department`s Implementation Plan in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 94-1. This is included as Attachment B.

  14. Survey of Worldwide Light Water Reactor Experience with Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fisher, S.E.

    1999-02-01

    The US and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have recently declared quantities of weapons materials, including weapons-grade (WG) plutonium, excess to strategic requirements. One of the leading candidates for the disposition of excess WG plutonium is irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) as mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. A description of the MOX fuel fabrication techniques in worldwide use is presented. A comprehensive examination of the domestic MOX experience in US reactors obtained during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s is also presented. This experience is described by manufacturer and is also categorized by the reactor facility that irradiated the MOX fuel. A limited summary of the international experience with MOX fuels is also presented. A review of MOX fuel and its performance is conducted in view of the special considerations associated with the disposition of WG plutonium. Based on the available information, it appears that adoption of foreign commercial MOX technology from one of the successful MOX fuel vendors will minimize the technical risks to the overall mission. The conclusion is made that the existing MOX fuel experience base suggests that disposition of excess weapons plutonium through irradiation in LWRs is a technically attractive option.

  15. Los Alamos National Laboratory to work on nuclear design, plutonium...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    LANL selected as preferred alternative site for plutonium research, development, and limited manufacturing, along with nuclear weapons design and engineering, and supercomputing. ...

  16. Decay Heat Calculations for PWR and BWR Assemblies Fueled with Uranium and Plutonium Mixed Oxide Fuel using SCALE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ade, Brian J; Gauld, Ian C

    2011-10-01

    In currently operating commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), there are two main types of nuclear fuel, low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and mixed-oxide uranium-plutonium (MOX) fuel. The LEU fuel is made of pure uranium dioxide (UO{sub 2} or UOX) and has been the fuel of choice in commercial light water reactors (LWRs) for a number of years. Naturally occurring uranium contains a mixture of different uranium isotopes, primarily, {sup 235}U and {sup 238}U. {sup 235}U is a fissile isotope, and will readily undergo a fission reaction upon interaction with a thermal neutron. {sup 235}U has an isotopic concentration of 0.71% in naturally occurring uranium. For most reactors to maintain a fission chain reaction, the natural isotopic concentration of {sup 235}U must be increased (enriched) to a level greater than 0.71%. Modern nuclear reactor fuel assemblies contain a number of fuel pins potentially having different {sup 235}U enrichments varying from {approx}2.0% to {approx}5% enriched in {sup 235}U. Currently in the United States (US), all commercial nuclear power plants use UO{sub 2} fuel. In the rest of the world, UO{sub 2} fuel is still commonly used, but MOX fuel is also used in a number of reactors. MOX fuel contains a mixture of both UO{sub 2} and PuO{sub 2}. Because the plutonium provides the fissile content of the fuel, the uranium used in MOX is either natural or depleted uranium. PuO{sub 2} is added to effectively replace the fissile content of {sup 235}U so that the level of fissile content is sufficiently high to maintain the chain reaction in an LWR. Both reactor-grade and weapons-grade plutonium contains a number of fissile and non-fissile plutonium isotopes, with the fraction of fissile and non-fissile plutonium isotopes being dependent on the source of the plutonium. While only RG plutonium is currently used in MOX, there is the possibility that WG plutonium from dismantled weapons will be used to make MOX for use in US reactors. Reactor-grade plutonium in MOX fuel is generally obtained from reprocessed irradiated nuclear fuel, whereas weapons-grade plutonium is obtained from decommissioned nuclear weapons material and thus has a different plutonium (and other actinides) concentration. Using MOX fuel instead of UOX fuel has potential impacts on the neutronic performance of the nuclear fuel and the design of the nuclear fuel must take these differences into account. Each of the plutonium sources (RG and WG) has different implications on the neutronic behavior of the fuel because each contains a different blend of plutonium nuclides. The amount of heat and the number of neutrons produced from fission of plutonium nuclides is different from fission of {sup 235}U. These differences in UOX and MOX do not end at discharge of the fuel from the reactor core - the short- and long-term storage of MOX fuel may have different requirements than UOX fuel because of the different discharged fuel decay heat characteristics. The research documented in this report compares MOX and UOX fuel during storage and disposal of the fuel by comparing decay heat rates for typical pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies with and without weapons-grade (WG) and reactor-grade (RG) MOX fuel.

  17. A Supplement Analysis on Plutonium Consolidation at Savannah River Site |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Department of Energy A Supplement Analysis on Plutonium Consolidation at Savannah River Site A Supplement Analysis on Plutonium Consolidation at Savannah River Site DOE's April 2002 decision to consolidate surplus, non-pit weapons-usable plutonium at Savannah River Site did not affect a 1997 DOE decision to continue storage of non-pit surplus plutonium at Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory. PDF icon Supplement Analysis Plutonium Consolidation More Documents

  18. Consolidation of Surplus Plutonium at Savannah River Site | Department of

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Energy Waste Management ¬Ľ Nuclear Materials & Waste ¬Ľ Consolidation of Surplus Plutonium at Savannah River Site Consolidation of Surplus Plutonium at Savannah River Site In April 2002, DOE decided to consolidate surplus, non-pit, weapons-usable plutonium that had been stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in long-term storage at the Savannah River Site. DOE Amends Record of Decision for Plutonium Consolidation A Supplement Analysis on Plutonium Consolidation at

  19. Nuclear Weapons Journal

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Nuclear Weapons Journal Nuclear Weapons Journal The Nuclear Weapons Journal ceased publication after Issue 2, 2009. Below are Nuclear Weapons Journal archived issues. Issue 2, 2009 ...

  20. The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944 - 2009

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    is capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction and is used in nuclear weapons and for nuclear power production. The measures of plutonium are total element weight 1 in metric...

  1. DOE Amends Record of Decision for Plutonium Consolidation | Department of

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Energy Amends Record of Decision for Plutonium Consolidation DOE Amends Record of Decision for Plutonium Consolidation DOE amended the Record of Decision (ROD) for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Specifically, DOE decided to take the actions necessary to transfer approximately 2,511 additional 3013-compliant packages containing surplus non-pit weapons-usable plutonium metals and oxides to the Savannah River Site

  2. Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-07-31

    DOE is investigating methods for long term dispositioning of weapons grade plutonium. One such method would be to utilize the plutonium in Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel assemblies in existing CANDU reactors. CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed, licensed, built, and supported by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and currently use natural uranium oxide as fuel. The MOX spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactor would be similar to the spent fuel currently produced using natural uranium fuel, thus rendering the plutonium as unattractive as that in the stockpiles of commercial spent fuel. This report presents the results of a study sponsored by the DOE for dispositioning the plutonium using CANDU technology. Ontario Hydro`s Bruce A was used as reference. The fuel design study defined the optimum parameters to disposition 50 tons of Pu in 25 years (or 100 tons). Two alternate fuel designs were studied. Safeguards, security, environment, safety, health, economics, etc. were considered. Options for complete destruction of the Pu were also studied briefly; CANDU has a superior ability for this. Alternative deployment options were explored and the potential impact on Pu dispositioning in the former Soviet Union was studied. An integrated system can be ready to begin Pu consumption in 4 years, with no changes required to the reactors other than for safe, secure storage of new fuel.

  3. Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 2. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-04-30

    As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design`s capability for plutonium disposition.

  4. Plutonium Detection with Straw Neutron Detectors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mukhopadhyay, Sanjoy; Maurer, Richard; Guss, Paul

    2014-03-27

    A kilogram of weapons grade plutonium gives off about 56,000 neutrons per second of which 55,000 neutrons come from spontaneous fission of 240Pu (~6% by weight of the total plutonium). Actually, all even numbered isotopes (238Pu, 240Pu, and 242Pu) produce copious spontaneous fission neutrons. These neutrons induce fission in the surrounding fissile 239Pu with an approximate multiplication of a factor of ~1.9. This multiplication depends on the shape of the fissile materials and the surrounding material. These neutrons (typically of energy 2 MeV and air scattering mean free path >100 meters) can be detected 100 meters away from the source by vehicle-portable neutron detectors. [1] In our current studies on neutron detection techniques, without using 3He gas proportional counters, we designed and developed a portable high-efficiency neutron multiplicity counter using 10B-coated thin tubes called straws. The detector was designed to perform like commercially available fission meters (manufactured by Ortec Corp.) except instead of using 3He gas as a neutron conversion material, we used a thin coating of 10B.

  5. Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah River Site, USA. A Long-Term Study

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Armstrong, Christopher R.; Nuessle, Patterson R.; Brant, Heather A.; Hall, Gregory; Halverson, Justin E.; Cadieux, James R.

    2015-01-16

    This work presents the findings of a long term plutonium study at Savannah River Site (SRS) conducted between 2003 and 2013. Terrestrial environmental samples were obtained at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) in A-area. Plutonium content and isotopic abundances were measured over this time period by alpha spectrometry and three stage thermal ionization mass spectrometry (3STIMS). Here we detail the complete sample collection, radiochemical separation, and measurement procedure specifically targeted to trace plutonium in bulk environmental samples. Total plutonium activities were determined to be not significantly above atmospheric global fallout. However, the 238Pu/239+240Pu activity ratios attributed to SRS are abovemore¬†¬Ľ atmospheric global fallout ranges. The 240Pu/239Pu atom ratios are reasonably consistent from year to year and are lower than fallout, while the 242Pu/239Pu atom ratios are higher than fallout values. Overall, the plutonium signatures obtained in this study reflect a mixture of weapons-grade, higher burn-up, and fallout material. This study provides a blue print for long term low level monitoring of plutonium in the environment.¬ę¬†less

  6. Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium, and Nonproliferation

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium and Nuclear Nonproliferation Resources with Additional Information * Awards Siegfried S. Hecker Photo Credit: Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory LeRoy Sanchez On September 17, 2009, U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu named Siegfried S. Hecker as a winner of the Enrico Fermi Award 'in recognition for his contributions to plutonium metallurgy, his broad scientific leadership and for his energetic and continuing efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons

  7. Introduction to Pits and Weapons Systems (U)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kautz, D.

    2012-07-02

    A Nuclear Explosive Package includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components. This is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield and it converts mechanical energy into nuclear energy. The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to electromagnetic energy. Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility: casting, forming, machining and welding. Some of the materials used in pits include: Plutonium, Uranium, Stainless Steel, Beryllium, Titanium, and Aluminum. Gloveboxes are used for three reasons: (1) Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides - (a) Plutonium is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides, (b) While not the 'Most dangerous material in the world' of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled; (2) Protect plutonium from reactive materials - (a) Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen, (b) As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control, (c) As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product; and (3) Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: {alpha}, {gamma}, and {eta} are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as {sup 241}Am and {sup 238}Pu.

  8. Sandia's Nuclear Weapons Mission

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Nuclear Weapons Mission Ensuring that the nation's stockpile is safe, secure and effective, and that it meets military requirements America's Nuclear Weapons Systems Engineering ...

  9. Department of Energy Announces Decision to Consolidate Surplus Plutonium in

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    South Carolina | Department of Energy Decision to Consolidate Surplus Plutonium in South Carolina Department of Energy Announces Decision to Consolidate Surplus Plutonium in South Carolina September 5, 2007 - 3:16pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced its decision to consolidate surplus, non-pit plutonium at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, greatly reducing storage costs and significantly enhancing security across the nation's weapons

  10. SHIELDING AND DETECTOR RESPONSE CALCULATIONS PERTAINING TO CATEGORY 1 QUANTITIES OF PLUTONIUM AND HAND-HELD PLASTIC SCINTILLATORS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Couture, A.

    2013-06-07

    Nuclear facilities sometimes use hand-held plastic scintillator detectors to detect attempts to divert special nuclear material in situations where portal monitors are impractical. MCNP calculations have been performed to determine the neutron and gamma radiation field arising from a Category I quantity of weapons-grade plutonium in various shielding configurations. The shields considered were composed of combinations of lead and high-density polyethylene such that the mass of the plutonium plus shield was 22.7 kilograms. Monte-Carlo techniques were also used to determine the detector response to each of the shielding configurations. The detector response calculations were verified using field measurements of high-, medium-, and low- energy gamma-ray sources as well as a Cf-252 neutron source.

  11. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  12. National Laboratory's Weapons Program

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    McMillan to lead Los Alamos National Laboratory's Weapons Program July 28, 2009 Los Alamos, New Mexico, July 28, 2009- Charles McMillan has been appointed the new principal associate director for Weapons Programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory. McMillan succeeds Glenn Mara, who recently retired. McMillan has been the Laboratory's associate director for weapons physics. In his new capacity, he will provide oversight and direction for the nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos to accomplish the

  13. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1997-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement.

  14. U.S. and Russia Sign Plan for Russian Plutonium Disposition ...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    November 19, 2007 - 4:31pm Addthis Will Eliminate Enough Russian Plutonium for Thousands of Nuclear Weapons WASHINGTON, DC -U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman and Russian ...

  15. plutonium dioxide

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    plutonium dioxide - Sandia Energy Energy Search Icon Sandia Home Locations Contact Us Employee Locator Energy & Climate Secure & Sustainable Energy Future Stationary Power Energy Conversion Efficiency Solar Energy Wind Energy Water Power Supercritical CO2 Geothermal Natural Gas Safety, Security & Resilience of the Energy Infrastructure Energy Storage Nuclear Power & Engineering Grid Modernization Battery Testing Nuclear Fuel Cycle Defense Waste Management Programs Advanced

  16. Plutonium story

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Seaborg, G T

    1981-09-01

    The first nuclear synthesis and identification (i.e., the discovery) of the synthetic transuranium element plutonium (isotope /sup 238/Pu) and the demonstration of its fissionability with slow neutrons (isotope /sup 239/Pu) took place at the University of California, Berkeley, through the use of the 60-inch and 37-inch cyclotrons, in late 1940 and early 1941. This led to the development of industrial scale methods in secret work centered at the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory and the application of these methods to industrial scale production, at manufacturing plants in Tennessee and Washington, during the World War II years 1942 to 1945. The chemical properties of plutonium, needed to devise the procedures for its industrial scale production, were studied by tracer and ultramicrochemical methods during this period on an extraordinarily urgent basis. This work, and subsequent investigations on a worldwide basis, have made the properties of plutonium very well known. Its well studied electronic structure and chemical properties give it a very interesting position in the actinide series of inner transition elements.

  17. Plutonium Story

    DOE R&D Accomplishments [OSTI]

    Seaborg, G. T.

    1981-09-01

    The first nuclear synthesis and identification (i.e., the discovery) of the synthetic transuranium element plutonium (isotope /sup 238/Pu) and the demonstration of its fissionability with slow neutrons (isotope /sup 239/Pu) took place at the University of California, Berkeley, through the use of the 60-inch and 37-inch cyclotrons, in late 1940 and early 1941. This led to the development of industrial scale methods in secret work centered at the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory and the application of these methods to industrial scale production, at manufacturing plants in Tennessee and Washington, during the World War II years 1942 to 1945. The chemical properties of plutonium, needed to devise the procedures for its industrial scale production, were studied by tracer and ultramicrochemical methods during this period on an extraordinarily urgent basis. This work, and subsequent investigations on a worldwide basis, have made the properties of plutonium very well known. Its well studied electronic structure and chemical properties give it a very interesting position in the actinide series of inner transition elements.

  18. Identification of nuclear weapons

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  19. Weapons Program Associate Directors

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    integration we have achieved between the various components of the program," said Bret Knapp, Principal Associate Director for Weapons Programs. "They have both done an...

  20. Reference computations of public dose and cancer risk from airborne releases of plutonium. Nuclear safety technical report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peterson, V.L.

    1993-12-23

    This report presents results of computations of doses and the associated health risks of postulated accidental atmospheric releases from the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) of one gram of weapons-grade plutonium in a form that is respirable. These computations are intended to be reference computations that can be used to evaluate a variety of accident scenarios by scaling the dose and health risk results presented here according to the amount of plutonium postulated to be released, instead of repeating the computations for each scenario. The MACCS2 code has been used as the basis of these computations. The basis and capabilities of MACCS2 are summarized, the parameters used in the evaluations are discussed, and results are presented for the doses and health risks to the public, both the Maximum Offsite Individual (a maximally exposed individual at or beyond the plant boundaries) and the population within 50 miles of RFP. A number of different weather scenarios are evaluated, including constant weather conditions and observed weather for 1990, 1991, and 1992. The isotopic mix of weapons-grade plutonium will change as it ages, the {sup 241}Pu decaying into {sup 241}Am. The {sup 241}Am reaches a peak concentration after about 72 years. The doses to the bone surface, liver, and whole body will increase slightly but the dose to the lungs will decrease slightly. The overall cancer risk will show almost no change over this period. This change in cancer risk is much smaller than the year-to-year variations in cancer risk due to weather. Finally, x/Q values are also presented for other applications, such as for hazardous chemical releases. These include the x/Q values for the MOI, for a collocated worker at 100 meters downwind of an accident site, and the x/Q value integrated over the population out to 50 miles.

  1. PLUTONIUM ALLOYS

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Chynoweth, W.

    1959-06-16

    The preparation of low-melting-point plutonium alloys is described. In a MgO crucible Pu is placed on top of the lighter alloying metal (Fe, Co, or Ni) and the temperature raised to 1000 or 1200 deg C. Upon cooling, the alloy slug is broke out of the crucible. With 14 at. % Ni the m.p. is 465 deg C; with 9.5 at. % Fe the m.p. is 410 deg C; and with 12.0 at. % Co the m.p. is 405 deg C. (T.R.H.) l6262 l6263 ((((((((Abstract unscannable))))))))

  2. Mobile Pit verification system design based on passive special nuclear material verification in weapons storage facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Paul, J. N.; Chin, M. R.; Sjoden, G. E.

    2013-07-01

    A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reaction rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)

  3. Chemical and Radiochemical Composition of Thermally Stabilized Plutonium Oxide from the Plutonium Finishing Plant Considered as Alternate Feedstock for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tingey, Joel M.; Jones, Susan A.

    2005-07-01

    Eighteen plutonium oxide samples originating from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site were analyzed to provide additional data on the suitability of PFP thermally stabilized plutonium oxides and Rocky Flats oxides as alternate feedstock to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). Radiochemical and chemical analyses were performed on fusions, acid leaches, and water leaches of these 18 samples. The results from these destructive analyses were compared with nondestructive analyses (NDA) performed at PFP and the acceptance criteria for the alternate feedstock. The plutonium oxide materials considered as alternate feedstock at Hanford originated from several different sources including Rocky Flats oxide, scrap from the Remote Mechanical C-Line (RMC) and the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF), and materials from other plutonium conversion processes at Hanford. These materials were received at PFP as metals, oxides, and solutions. All of the material considered as alternate feedstock was converted to PuO2 and thermally stabilized by heating the PuO2 powder at 950 C in an oxidizing environment. The two samples from solutions were converted to PuO2 by precipitation with Mg(OH)2. The 18 plutonium oxide samples were grouped into four categories based on their origin. The Rocky Flats oxide was divided into two categories, low- and high-chloride Rocky Flats oxides. The other two categories were PRF/RMC scrap oxides, which included scrap from both process lines and oxides produced from solutions. The two solution samples came from samples that were being tested at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory because all of the plutonium oxide from solutions at PFP had already been processed and placed in 3013 containers. These samples originated at the PFP and are from plutonium nitrate product and double-pass filtrate solutions after they had been thermally stabilized. The other 16 samples originated from thermal stabilization batches before canning at PFP. Samples varied in appearance depending on the original source of material. Rocky Flats items were mostly dark olive green with clumps that crushed easily with a mortar and pestle. PRF/RMC items showed more variability. These items were mostly rust colored. One sample contained white particles that were difficult to crush, and another sample was a dark grey with a mixture of fines and large, hard fragments. The appearance and feel of the fragments indicated they might be an alloy. The color of the solution samples was indicative of the impurities in the sample. The double-pass filtrate solution was a brown color indicative of the iron impurities in the sample. The other solution sample was light gray in color. Radiochemical analyses, including thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS), alpha and gamma energy analysis (AEA and GEA), and kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA), indicate that these materials are all weapons-grade plutonium with consistent plutonium isotopics. A small amount of uranium (<0.14 wt%) is also present in these samples. The isotopic composition of the uranium varied widely but was consistent among each category of material. The primary water-soluble anions in these samples were Cl-, NO3-, SO42-, and PO43-. The only major anion observed in the Rocky Flats materials was Cl-, but the PRF/RMC samples had significant quantities of all of the primary anions observed. Prompt gamma measurements provide a representative analysis of the Cl- concentration in the bulk material. The primary anions observed in the solution samples were NO3-, and PO43-. The concentration of these anions did not exceed the mixed oxide (MOX) specification limits. Cations that exceeded the MOX specification limits included Cr, Fe, Ni, Al, Cu, and Si. All of the samples exceeded at least the 75% specification limit in one element.

  4. Mixed oxide fuels testing in the advanced test reactor to support plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Sterbentz, J.W.; Chang, G.S.

    1995-09-01

    An intense worldwide effort is now under way to find means of reducing the stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. One of the most attractive solutions would be to use WGPu as fuel in existing light water reactors (LWRs) in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel - i.e., plutonia (PUO{sub 2}) mixed with urania (UO{sub 2}). Before U.S. reactors could be used for this purpose, their operating licenses would have to be amended. Numerous technical issues must be resolved before LWR operating licenses can be amended to allow the use of MOX fuel. These issues include the following: (1) MOX fuel fabrication process verification, (2) Whether and how to use burnable poisons to depress MOX fuel initial reactivity, which is higher than that of urania, (3) The effects of WGPu isotopic composition, (4) The feasibility of loading MOX fuel with plutonia content up to 7% by weight, (5) The effects of americium and gallium in WGPu, (6) Fission gas release from MOX fuel pellets made from WGPu, (7) Fuel/cladding gap closure, (8) The effects of power cycling and off-normal events on fuel integrity, (9) Development of radial distributions of burnup and fission products, (10) Power spiking near the interfaces of MOX and urania fuel assemblies, and (11) Fuel performance code validation. We have performed calculations to show that the use of hafnium shrouds can produce spectrum adjustments that will bring the flux spectrum in ATR test loops into a good approximation to the spectrum anticipated in a commercial LWR containing MOX fuel while allowing operation of the test fuel assemblies near their optimum values of linear heat generation rate. The ATR would be a nearly ideal test bed for developing data needed to support applications to license LWRs for operation with MOX fuel made from weapons-grade plutonium. The requirements for planning and implementing a test program in the ATR have been identified.

  5. PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM METAL

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Lyon, W.L.; Moore, R.H.

    1961-01-17

    A process is given for producing plutonium metal by the reduction of plutonium chloride, dissolved in alkali metal chloride plus or minus aluminum chloride, with magnesium or a magnesium-aluminum alloy at between 700 and 800 deg C and separating the plutonium or plutonium-aluminum alloy formed from the salt.

  6. SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Maddock, A.G.; Smith, F.

    1959-08-25

    A method is described for separating plutonium from uranium and fission products by treating a nitrate solution of fission products, uranium, and hexavalent plutonium with a relatively water-insoluble fluoride to adsorb fission products on the fluoride, treating the residual solution with a reducing agent for plutonium to reduce its valence to four and less, treating the reduced plutonium solution with a relatively insoluble fluoride to adsorb the plutonium on the fluoride, removing the solution, and subsequently treating the fluoride with its adsorbed plutonium with a concentrated aqueous solution of at least one of a group consisting of aluminum nitrate, ferric nitrate, and manganous nitrate to remove the plutonium from the fluoride.

  7. Principal Associate Director - Weapons Programs

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Weapons Programs As Principal Associate Director for the Weapons Program, Robert Webster leads the programs to assure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the systems in the...

  8. Overview of Modeling and Simulations of Plutonium Aging

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schwartz, A J; Wolfer, W G

    2007-04-24

    Computer-aided materials research is now an integral part of science and technology. It becomes particularly valuable when comprehensive experimental investigations and materials testing are too costly, hazardous, or of excessive duration; then, theoretical and computational studies can supplement and enhance the information gained from limited experimental data. Such is the case for improving our fundamental understanding of the properties of aging plutonium in the nuclear weapons stockpile. The question of the effects of plutonium aging on the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile emerged after the United States closed its plutonium manufacturing facility in 1989 and decided to suspend any further underground testing of nuclear weapons in 1992. To address this, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiated a research program to investigate plutonium aging, i.e., the changes with time of properties of Pu-Ga alloys employed in the nuclear weapons and to develop models describing these changes sufficiently reliable to forecast them for several decades. The November 26, 2006 press release by the NNSA summarizes the conclusions of the investigation, '...there appear to be no serious or sudden changes occurring, or expected to occur, in plutonium that would affect performance of pits beyond the well-understood, gradual degradation of plutonium materials'. Furthermore, 'These studies show that the degradation of plutonium in our nuclear weapons will not affect warhead reliability for decades', then NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks said. 'It is now clear that although plutonium aging contributes, other factors control the overall life expectancy of nuclear weapons systems'. The origin of plutonium aging is the natural decay of certain plutonium isotopes. Specifically, it is the process of alpha decay in which a plutonium atom spontaneously splits into a 5 MeV alpha particle and an 85keV uranium recoil. The alpha particle traverses the lattice, slowly loosing energy through electronic excitations, acquiring two electrons to become a helium atom, then finally coming to rest approximately 10 microns away with the generation of a few-hundred Frenkel pairs. The uranium recoil immediately displaces a couple-thousand Pu atoms from their original lattice sites. This process, which occurs at a rate of approximately 41 parts-per-million per year, is the source of potential property changes in aging plutonium. Plutonium aging encompasses many areas of research: radiation damage and radiation effects, diffusion of point defects, impurities and alloying elements, solid state phase transformations, dislocation dynamics and mechanical properties, equations of state under extreme pressures, as well as surface oxidation and corrosion. Theory, modeling, and computer simulations are involved to various degrees in many of these areas. The joint research program carried out at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory encompassed experimental measurements of numerous properties of newly fabricated reference alloys, archival material that have accumulated the effects of several decades of radioactive decay, and accelerated aging alloys in which the isotropic composition was adjusted to increase the rate of self-irradiation damage. In particular, the physical and chemical processes of nuclear materials degradation were to be studied individually and in great depth. Closely coupled to the experimental efforts are theory, modeling, and simulations. These efforts, validated by the experiments, aim to develop predictive models to evaluate the effects of age on the properties of plutonium. The need to obtain a scientific understanding of plutonium aging has revitalized fundamental research on actinides and plutonium in particular. For example, the experimental discovery of superconductivity in Pu-based compounds, the observation of helium bubbles in naturally aged material, and the measurement of phonon dispersion properties in gallium-stabilized delta plu

  9. Geomorphology of plutonium in the Northern Rio Grande

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Graf, W.L.

    1993-03-01

    Nearly all of the plutonium in the natural environment of the Northern Rio Grande is associated with soils and sediment, and river processes account for most of the mobility of these materials. A composite regional budget for plutonium based on multi-decadal averages for sediment and plutonium movement shows that 90 percent of the plutonium moving into the system is from atmospheric fallout. The remaining 10 percent is from releases at Los Alamos. Annual variation in plutonium flux and storage exceeds 100 percent. The contribution to the plutonium budget from Los Alamos is associated with relatively coarse sediment which often behaves as bedload in the Rio Grande. Infusion of these materials into the main stream were largest in 1951, 1952, 1957, and 1968. Because of the schedule of delivery of plutonium to Los Alamos for experimentation and weapons manufacturing, the latter two years are probably the most important. Although the Los Alamos contribution to the entire plutonium budget was relatively small, in these four critical years it constituted 71--86 percent of the plutonium in bedload immediately downstream from Otowi.

  10. DOE nuclear material packaging manual: storage container requirements for plutonium oxide materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Veirs, D Kirk

    2009-01-01

    Loss of containment of nuclear material stored in containers such as food-pack cans, paint cans, or taped slip lid cans has generated concern about packaging requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials in working facilities such as the plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In response, DOE has recently issued DOE M 441.1 'Nuclear Material Packaging Manual' with encouragement from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. A unique feature compared to transportation containers is the allowance of filters to vent flammable gases during storage. Defining commonly used concepts such as maximum allowable working pressure and He leak rate criteria become problematic when considering vented containers. Los Alamos has developed a set of container requirements that are in compliance with 441.1 based upon the activity of heat-source plutonium (90% Pu-238) oxide, which bounds the requirements for weapons-grade plutonium oxide. The pre and post drop-test He leak rates depend upon container size as well as the material contents. For containers that are routinely handled, ease of handling and weight are a major consideration. Relatively thin-walled containers with flat bottoms are desired yet they cannot be He leak tested at a differential pressure of one atmosphere due to the potential for plastic deformation of the flat bottom during testing. The He leak rates and He leak testing configuration for containers designed for plutonium bearing materials will be presented. The approach to meeting the other manual requirements such as corrosion and thermal degradation resistance will be addressed. The information presented can be used by other sites to evaluate if their conditions are bounded by LANL requirements when considering procurement of 441.1 compliant containers.

  11. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required.

  12. Interaction of Plutonium with Diverse Materials in Moist Air and Nitrogen-Argon Atmospheres at Room Temperature

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    John M. Haschke; Raymond J. Martinez; Robert E. Pruner II; Barbara Martinez; Thomas H. Allen

    2001-04-01

    Chemical and radiolytic interactions of weapons-grade plutonium with metallic, inorganic, and hydrogenous materials in atmospheres containing moist air-argon mixtures have been characterized at room temperature from pressure-volume-temperature and mass spectrometric measurements of the gas phase. A reaction sequence controlled by kinetics and gas-phase composition is defined by correlating observed and known reaction rates. In all cases, O{sub 2} is eliminated first by the water-catalyzed Pu + O{sub 2} reaction and H{sub 2}O is then consumed by the Pu + H{sub 2}O reaction, producing a gas mixture of N{sub 2}, argon, and H{sub 2}. Hydrogen formed by the reaction of water and concurrent radiolysis of hydrogenous materials either reacts to form PuH{sub 2} or accumulates in the system. Accumulation of H{sub 2} is correlated with the presence of hydrogenous materials in liquid and volatile forms that are readily distributed over the plutonium surface. Areal rates of radiolytic H{sub 2} generation are determined and applied in showing that modest extents of H{sub 2} production are expected for hydrogenous solids if the contact area with plutonium is limited. The unpredictable nature of complex chemical systems is demonstrated by occurrence of the chloride-catalyzed Pu + H{sub 2}O reaction in some tests and hydride-catalyzed nitriding in another.

  13. Virtual nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  14. National Security, Weapons Science

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    National Security, Weapons Science /science-innovation/_assets/images/icon-science.jpg National Security, Weapons Science National security depends on science and technology. The United States relies on Los Alamos National Laboratory for the best of both. No place on Earth pursues a broader array of world-class scientific endeavors. CoMuEx¬Ľ Explosives Center¬Ľ Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at LANL is part of the

  15. LANSCE Weapons Physics

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    7 LANSCE Weapons Physics Fortune 500 companies and weapons designers alike rely on our internationally recognized nuclear physics and materials science expertise as well as our one-of-a-kind experimental tools. Contact Us Group Leader Gus Sinnis Email Deputy Group Leader Fredrik Tovesson Email Deputy Group Leader and Experimental Area Manager Charles Kelsey Email Group Office (505) 665-5390 Time Projection Chamber at LANSCE Researcher making measurements of fission cross sections on the Time

  16. PROCESS FOR PURIFYING PLUTONIUM

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Mastick, D.F.; Wigner, E.P.

    1958-05-01

    A method is described of separating plutonium from small amounts of uranium and other contaminants. An acidic aqueous solution of higher valent plutonium and hexavalent uranium is treated with a soluble iodide to obtain the plutonium in the plus three oxidation state while leaving the uranium in the hexavalent state, adding a soluble oxalate such as oxalic acid, and then separating the insoluble plus the plutonium trioxalate from the solution.

  17. Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Directorates at Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates at Los Alamos National Laboratory New leadership position will allow for greater integration in the planning and execution of the stockpile stewardship program. August 18, 2009 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and

  18. Study of plutonium disposition using existing GE advanced Boiling Water Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-06-01

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the US to dispose of 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in a safe and proliferation resistant manner. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing permanent conversion and long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study ``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium identified Light Water Reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a US disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a typical 1155 MWe GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. A companion study of the Advanced BWR has recently been submitted. The MOX core design work that was conducted for the ABWR enabled GE to apply comparable fuel design concepts and consequently achieve full MOX core loading which optimize plutonium throughput for existing BWRs.

  19. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  20. Thermal and Physical Properties of Plutonium Dioxide Produced from the Oxidation of Metal: a Data Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wayne, David M.

    2014-01-13

    The ARIES Program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory removes plutonium metal from decommissioned nuclear weapons, and converts it to plutonium dioxide in a specially-designed Direct Metal Oxidation furnace. The plutonium dioxide is analyzed for specific surface area, particle size distribution, and moisture content. The purpose of these analyses is to certify that the plutonium dioxide powder meets or exceeds the specifications of the end-user, and the specifications for the packaging and transport of nuclear materials. Analytical results from plutonium dioxide from ARIES development activities, from ARIES production activities, from muffle furnace oxidation of metal, and from metal that was oxidized over a lengthy time interval in air at room temperature, are presented. The processes studied produce plutonium dioxide powder with distinct differences in measured properties, indicating the significant influence of oxidation conditions on physical properties.

  1. Weapons Program Associate Directors named

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    integration we have achieved between the various components of the program," said Bret Knapp, Principal Associate Director for Weapons Programs. "They have both done an...

  2. weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy ...

  3. Nuclear Weapons Mission at Sandia

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2015-03-12

    Take a rare ‚Äútour‚ÄĚ of Sandia National Laboratories‚Äô nuclear weapons work and see the strong, multidisciplinary relationship between all of Sandia‚Äôs missions and capabilities.

  4. Los Alamos DP West Plutonium Facility decontamination project, 1978-1981

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garde, R.; Cox, E.J.; Valentine, A.M.

    1982-09-01

    The DP West Plutonium Facility operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico was decontaminated between April 1978 and April 1981. The facility was constructed in 1944 to 1945 to produce plutonium metal and fabricate parts for nuclear weapons. It was continually used as a plutonium processing and research facility until mid-1978. Decontamination operations included dismantling and removing gloveboxes and conveyor tunnels; removing process systems, utilities, and exhaust ducts; and decontaminating all remaining surfaces. This report describes glovebox and conveyor tunnel separations, decontamination techniques, health and safety considerations, waste management procedures, and costs of the operation.

  5. Criticality characteristics of mixtures of plutonium, silicon dioxide, Nevada tuff, and water

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sanchez, R.; Myers, W.; Hayes, D.

    1997-01-01

    The nuclear criticality characteristics of mixtures of plutonium, silicon dioxide, and water (Part A) or plutonium, silicon dioxide, Nevada Yucca Mountain tuff, and water (Part B) have become of interest because of the appearance of recent papers on the subject. These papers postulate that if excess weapons plutonium is vitrified into a silicate log and buried underground, a self-sustaining neutron chain reaction may develop given sufficient time and interaction with the burial medium. Moreover, given specific geologic actions resulting in postulated configurations, the referenced papers state that nuclear explosions could occur with multi-kiloton yields or yields equivalent to hundreds of tons of TNT.

  6. Recovery of Plutonium from Refractory Residues Using a Sodium Peroxide Pretreatment Process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rudisill, T.S.

    2003-10-23

    The recycle of plutonium from refractory residues is a necessary activity for the nuclear weapon production complex. Traditionally, high-fired plutonium oxide (PuO2) was leached from the residue matrix using a nitric acid/fluoride dissolving flowsheet. The recovery operations were time consuming and often required multiple contacts with fresh dissolving solution to reduce the plutonium concentration to levels where residual solids could be discarded. Due to these drawbacks, the development of an efficient process for the recovery of plutonium from refractory materials is desirable. To address this need, a pretreatment process was developed. The development program utilized a series of small-scale experiments to optimize processing conditions for the fusion process and demonstrate the plutonium recovery efficiency using ceramic materials developed as potential long-term storage forms for PuO2 and an incinerator ash from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats) as te st materials.

  7. Plutonium dissolution process

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Vest, Michael A.; Fink, Samuel D.; Karraker, David G.; Moore, Edwin N.; Holcomb, H. Perry

    1996-01-01

    A two-step process for dissolving plutonium metal, which two steps can be carried out sequentially or simultaneously. Plutonium metal is exposed to a first mixture containing approximately 1.0M-1.67M sulfamic acid and 0.0025M-0.1M fluoride, the mixture having been heated to a temperature between 45.degree. C. and 70.degree. C. The mixture will dissolve a first portion of the plutonium metal but leave a portion of the plutonium in an oxide residue. Then, a mineral acid and additional fluoride are added to dissolve the residue. Alteratively, nitric acid in a concentration between approximately 0.05M and 0.067M is added to the first mixture to dissolve the residue as it is produced. Hydrogen released during the dissolution process is diluted with nitrogen.

  8. River Corridor Work Creates Legacy of Success in Cleanup of Nation’s Plutonium Production

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    RICHLAND, Wash. ‚Äď The Columbia River flows through the Hanford Site for approximately 50 miles. Nine reactors were built along its southern shore during World War II and the Cold War to produce plutonium for the nation‚Äôs nuclear weapons program.

  9. weapons material protection | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Video Gallery Photo Gallery Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home weapons material protection weapons material protection...

  10. PLUTONIUM METALLOGRAPHY AT LOS ALAMOS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    PEREYRA, RAMIRO A.; LOVATO, DARRYL

    2007-01-08

    From early days of the Manhattan program to today, scientists and engineers have continued to investigate the metallurgical properties of plutonium (Pu). Although issues like aging was not a concern to the early pioneers, today the reliability of our aging stockpile is of major focus. And as the country moves toward a new generation of weapons similar problems that the early pioneers faced such as compatibility, homogeneity and malleability have come to the forefront. And metallography will continue to be a principle tool for the resolution of old and new issues. Standard metallographic techniques are used for the preparation of plutonium samples. The samples are first cut with a slow speed idamond saw. After mounting in Epon 815 epoxy resin, the samples are ground through 600 grit silicon carbide paper. PF 5070 (a Freon substitute) is used as a coolant, lubricant, and solvent for most operations. Rough mechanical polished is done with 9-{mu} diamond using a nap less cloth, for example nylon or cotton. Final polish is done with 1-{mu} diamond on a nappy cloth such as sylvet. Ethyl alcohol is then used ultrasonically to clean the samples before electro polishing. The sample is then electro-polished and etched in an electrolyte containing 10% nitric acid, and 90% dimethyleneformalmide. Ethyl alcohol is used as a final cleaning agent. Although standard metallographic preparation techniques are used, there are several reasons why metallography of Pu is difficult and challenging. Firstly, because of the health hazards associated with its radioactive properties, sample preparation is conducted in glove boxes. Figure 1 shows the metallography line, in an R and D facility. Since they are designed to be negative in pressure to the laboratory, cross-contamination of abrasives is a major problem. In addition, because of safety concerns and waste issues, there is a limit to the amount of solvent that can be used. Secondly, Pu will readily hydride or oxidize when in contact with metallographic polishing lubricants, solvents, or chemicals. And water being one of the most reactive solutions, is not used in the preparation. Figure 2 shows an example of a plutonium sample in which an oxide film has formed on the surface due to overexposure to solutions. it has been noted that nucleation of the hydride/oxide begins around inclusions and samples with a higher concentration of impurities seem to be more susceptible to this reaction. Figure 3 shows examples of small oxide rings, forming around inclusions. Lastly, during the cutting, grinding, or polishing process there is enough stress induced in the sample that the surface can transform from the soft face-centered-cubic delta phase (30 HV) to the strain-induced monoclinic alpha{prime} phase (300 HV). Figure 4 and 5 shows cross-sectional views of samples in which one was cut using a diamond saw and the other was processed through 600 grit. The white layers on the edges is the strain induced alpha{prime} phase. The 'V' shape indentation in Figure 5 was caused by a coarser abrasive which resulted in transformations to a depth of approximately 20 {micro}m. Another example of the transformation sensitivity of plutonium can be seen in Figure 6, in which the delta phase has partly transformed to alpha{prime} during micro hardness indentation.

  11. Interim Storage of Plutonium in Existing Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Woodsmall, T.D.

    1999-05-10

    'In this era of nuclear weapons disarmament and nonproliferation treaties, among many problems being faced by the Department of Energy is the safe disposal of plutonium. There is a large stockpile of plutonium at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Center and it remains politically and environmentally strategic to relocate the inventory closer to a processing facility. Savannah River Site has been chosen as the final storage location, and the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) is currently under construction for this purpose. With the ability of APSF to receive Rocky Flats material an estimated ten years away, DOE has decided to use the existing reactor building in K-Area of SRS as temporary storage to accelerate the removal of plutonium from Rocky Flats. There are enormous cost savings to the government that serve as incentive to start this removal as soon as possible, and the KAMS project is scheduled to receive the first shipment of plutonium in January 2000. The reactor building in K-Area was chosen for its hardened structure and upgraded seismic qualification, both resulting from an effort to restart the reactor in 1991. The KAMS project has faced unique challenges from Authorization Basis and Safety Analysis perspectives. Although modifying a reactor building from a production facility to a storage shelter is not technically difficult, the nature of plutonium has caused design and safety analysis engineers to make certain that the design of systems, structures and components included will protect the public, SRS workers, and the environment. A basic overview of the KAMS project follows. Plutonium will be measured and loaded into DOT Type-B shipping packages at Rocky Flats. The packages are 35-gallon stainless steel drums with multiple internal containment boundaries. DOE transportation vehicles will be used to ship the drums to the KAMS facility at SRS. They will then be unloaded, stacked and stored in specific locations throughout the reactor building. The storage life is projected to be ten years to allow the preparation of APSF. DOE has stipulated that there be no credible release during storage, since there are no design features in place to mitigate a release of plutonium (i.e. HEPA filters, facility containment boundaries, etc.). This mandate has presented most of the significant challenges to the safety analysis team. The shipping packages are designed to withstand certain accidents and conditions, but in order to take credit for these the storage environment must be strictly controlled. Damages to the packages from exposure to fire, dropping, crushing and other impact accidents have been analyzed, and appropriate preventative design features have been incorporated. Other efforts include the extension of the shipping life (roughly two years) to a suitable storage life of ten years. These issues include the effects of internal pressure increases, seal degradation and the presence of impurities. A process known as the Container Qualification Program has been conducted to address these issues. The KAMS project will be ready to receive the first shipment from Rocky Flats in January 2000. No credible design basis scenarios resulting in the release of plutonium exist. This work has been useful in the effort to provide a safer disposition of plutonium, but also the lessons learned and techniques established by the team will help with the analysis of future facility modifications.'

  12. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-14

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  13. Demolition Begins on Hanford's Historic Plutonium Vaults - Plutonium

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Finishing Plant on track to meet regulatory milestone | Department of Energy Demolition Begins on Hanford's Historic Plutonium Vaults - Plutonium Finishing Plant on track to meet regulatory milestone Demolition Begins on Hanford's Historic Plutonium Vaults - Plutonium Finishing Plant on track to meet regulatory milestone November 18, 2011 - 12:00pm Addthis Media Contacts Geoff Tyree Department of Energy Geoffrey.Tyree@rl.doe.gov 509-376-4171 Dee Millikin CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company

  14. History and stabilization of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) complex, Hanford Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gerber, M.S., Fluor Daniel Hanford

    1997-02-18

    The 231-Z Isolation Building or Plutonium Metallurgy Building is located in the Hanford Site`s 200 West Area, approximately 300 yards north of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) (234-5 Building). When the Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) built it in 1944 to contain the final step for processing plutonium, it was called the Isolation Building. At that time, HEW used a bismuth phosphate radiochemical separations process to make `AT solution,` which was then dried and shipped to Los Alamos, New Mexico. (AT solution is a code name used during World War II for the final HEW product.) The process was carried out first in T Plant and the 224-T Bulk Reduction Building and B Plant and the 224-B Bulk Reduction Building. The 224-T and -B processes produced a concentrated plutonium nitrate stream, which then was sent in 8-gallon batches to the 231-Z Building for final purification. In the 231-Z Building, the plutonium nitrate solution underwent peroxide `strikes` (additions of hydrogen peroxide to further separate the plutonium from its carrier solutions), to form the AT solution. The AT solution was dried and shipped to the Los Alamos Site, where it was made into metallic plutonium and then into weapons hemispheres.` The 231-Z Building began `hot` operations (operations using radioactive materials) with regular runs of plutonium nitrate on January 16, 1945.

  15. Dry sample storage system for an analytical laboratory supporting plutonium processing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Treibs, H.A.; Hartenstein, S.D.; Griebenow, B.L.; Wade, M.A.

    1990-07-25

    The Special Isotope Separation (SIS) plant is designed to provide removal of undesirable isotopes in fuel grade plutonium by the atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) process. The AVLIS process involves evaporation of plutonium metal, and passage of an intense beam of light from a laser through the plutonium vapor. The laser beam consists of several discrete wavelengths, tuned to the precise wavelength required to ionize the undesired isotopes. These ions are attracted to charged plates, leaving the bulk of the plutonium vapor enriched in the desired isotopes to be collected on a cold plate. Major portions of the process consist of pyrochemical processes, including direct reduction of the plutonium oxide feed material with calcium metal, and aqueous processes for purification of plutonium in residues. The analytical laboratory for the plant is called the Material and Process Control Laboratory (MPCL), and provides for the analysis of solid and liquid process samples.

  16. Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1994-04-30

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.

  17. Tag: weapons | Y-12 National Security Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    weapons Tag: weapons Displaying 1 - 2 of 2... Category: News Y-12 National Security Complex Completes W69 Dismantlement Dismantlement of W69 canned subassemblies has been completed at the Y-12 National Security Complex. More... Category: News Y-12 hosts visit from directors of weapons labs Weapons lab directors toured production buildings and the Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center at Y-12

  18. METHOD OF PRODUCING PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Tolley, W.B.; Smith, R.C.

    1959-12-15

    A process is presented for preparing plutonium tetrafluoride from plutonium(IV) oxalate. The oxalate is dried and decomposed at about 300 deg C to the dioxide, mixed with ammonium bifluoride, and the mixture is heated to between 50 and 150 deg C whereby ammonium plutonium fluoride is formed. The ammonium plutonium fluoride is then heated to about 300 deg C for volatilization of ammonium fluoride. Both heating steps are preferably carried out in an inert atmosphere.

  19. Modeling of the performance of weapons MOX fuel in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alvis, J.; Bellanger, P.; Medvedev, P.G.; Peddicord, K.L.; Gellene, G.I.

    1999-05-01

    Both the Russian Federation and the US are pursing mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel in light water reactors (LWRs) for the disposition of excess plutonium from disassembled nuclear warheads. Fuel performance models are used which describe the behavior of MOX fuel during irradiation under typical power reactor conditions. The objective of this project is to perform the analysis of the thermal, mechanical, and chemical behavior of weapons MOX fuel pins under LWR conditions. If fuel performance analysis indicates potential questions, it then becomes imperative to assess the fuel pin design and the proposed operating strategies to reduce the probability of clad failure and the associated release of radioactive fission products into the primary coolant system. Applying the updated code to anticipated fuel and reactor designs, which would be used for weapons MOX fuel in the US, and analyzing the performance of the WWER-100 fuel for Russian weapons plutonium disposition are addressed in this report. The COMETHE code was found to do an excellent job in predicting fuel central temperatures. Also, despite minor predicted differences in thermo-mechanical behavior of MOX and UO{sub 2} fuels, the preliminary estimate indicated that, during normal reactor operations, these deviations remained within limits foreseen by fuel pin design.

  20. Lithium metal reduction of plutonium oxide to produce plutonium metal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Coops, Melvin S. (Livermore, CA)

    1992-01-01

    A method is described for the chemical reduction of plutonium oxides to plutonium metal by the use of pure lithium metal. Lithium metal is used to reduce plutonium oxide to alpha plutonium metal (alpha-Pu). The lithium oxide by-product is reclaimed by sublimation and converted to the chloride salt, and after electrolysis, is removed as lithium metal. Zinc may be used as a solvent metal to improve thermodynamics of the reduction reaction at lower temperatures. Lithium metal reduction enables plutonium oxide reduction without the production of huge quantities of CaO--CaCl.sub.2 residues normally produced in conventional direct oxide reduction processes.

  1. Atomic spectrum of plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blaise, J.; Fred, M.; Gutmacher, R.G.

    1984-08-01

    This report contains plutonium wavelengths, energy level classifications, and other spectroscopic data accumulated over the past twenty years at Laboratoire Aime Cotton (LAC) Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary purpose was term analysis: deriving the energy levels in terms of quantum numbers and electron configurations, and evaluating the Slater-Condon and other parameters from the levels.

  2. PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT: UNITED STATES PLUTONIUM CONSOLIDATION AND DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Koenig, R.; Davies, S.

    2009-06-01

    Following the end of the Cold War, the United States identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium and larger quantities of enriched uranium that are permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) also began shutting down, stabilizing, and removing inventories from production facilities that were no longer needed to support weapons programs and non-weapons activities. The storage of 'Category I' nuclear materials at Rocky Flats, Sandia National Laboratories, and several smaller sites has been terminated to reduce costs and safeguards risks. De-inventory continues at the Hanford site and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Consolidation of inventories works in concert with the permanent disposition of excess inventories, including several tonnes of plutonium that have already been disposed to waste repositories and the preparation for transfers to the planned Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (for the bulk of the excess plutonium) and alternative disposition methods for material that cannot be used readily in the MOX fuel cycle. This report describes status of plutonium consolidation and disposition activities and their impacts on continuing operations, particularly at the Savannah River Site.

  3. Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hart, Mark

    2014-11-20

    Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

  4. Weapons Quality Assurance Qualification Standard

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    5-2008 September 2008 DOE STANDARD WEAPON QUALITY ASSURANCE QUALIFICATION STANDARD NNSA Weapon Quality Assurance Technical Personnel U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-1025-2008 This document is available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web Site at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds/ DOE-STD-1025-2008 iv INTENTIONALLY BLANK DOE-STD-1025-2008 v

  5. Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home Our Mission Maintaining the Stockpile Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Nuclear weapons are ...

  6. Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J.; Nass, R.

    1995-08-01

    This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage.

  7. Control of Nuclear Weapon Data

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21

    The directive establishes the policy, process and procedures for control of nuclear weapon data to ensure that dissemination of the information is restricted to individuals with appropriate clearances, approved authorization and valid need-to-know in keeping with the Atomic Energy Act (as amended) stipulation of ensuring common defense and security. Supersedes DOE O 5610.2.

  8. The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wood, Houston G.; Glaser, Alexander; Kemp, R. Scott

    2014-05-09

    Uranium enrichment by centrifugation is the basis for the quick and efficient production of nuclear fuel-or nuclear weapons.

  9. Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing ...

  10. Manufacturing of Plutonium Tensile Specimens

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Knapp, Cameron M

    2012-08-01

    Details workflow conducted to manufacture high density alpha Plutonium tensile specimens to support Los Alamos National Laboratory's science campaigns. Introduces topics including the metallurgical challenge of Plutonium and the use of high performance super-computing to drive design. Addresses the utilization of Abaqus finite element analysis, programmable computer numerical controlled (CNC) machining, as well as glove box ergonomics and safety in order to design a process that will yield high quality Plutonium tensile specimens.

  11. What is Plutonium? - Fact Sheet

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    key role in today's technology. It will safely, effectively, and permanently dispose of trash contaminated with traces of plutonium and other transuranic isotopes that have no...

  12. TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    most modern plutonium science and manufacturing facility, and it is the only fully operational, full capability plutonium facility in the nation. Thus, TA-55 supports a wide...

  13. Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1991-01-01

    Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

  14. Photochemical preparation of plutonium pentafluoride

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Rabideau, Sherman W. (Los Alamos, NM); Campbell, George M. (Los Alamos, NM)

    1987-01-01

    The novel compound plutonium pentafluoride may be prepared by the photodissociation of gaseous plutonium hexafluoride. It is a white solid of low vapor pressure, which consists predominantly of a face-centered cubic structure with a.sub.o =4.2709.+-.0.0005 .ANG..

  15. SUPPORTING SAFE STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM-BEARING MATERIALS THROUGH SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND SURVEILLANCE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dunn, K.; Chandler, G.; Gardner, C.; Louthan, M.; Mcclard, J.

    2009-11-10

    Reductions in the size of the U. S. nuclear weapons arsenal resulted in the need to store large quantities of plutonium-bearing metals and oxides for prolonged periods of time. To assure that the excess plutonium from the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites was stored in a safe and environmentally friendly manner the plutonium-bearing materials are stabilized and packaged according to well developed criteria published as a DOE Standard. The packaged materials are stored in secure facilities and regular surveillance activities are conducted to assure continuing package integrity. The stabilization, packaging, storage and surveillance requirements were developed through extensive science and engineering activities including those related to: plutonium-environment interactions and container pressurization, corrosion and stress corrosion cracking, plutonium-container material interactions, loss of sealing capability and changes in heat transfer characteristics. This paper summarizes some of those activities and outlines ongoing science and engineering programs that assure continued safe and secure storage of the plutonium-bearing metals and oxides.

  16. Development of weld closure stations for plutonium long-term storage containers

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fernandez, R.; Martinez, D.A.; Martinez, H.E.; Nelson, T.O.; Ortega, R.E.; Rofer, C.K.; Romero, W.; Stewart, J.; Trujillo, V.L.

    1998-12-31

    Weld closure stations for plutonium long-term storage containers have been designed, fabricated, and tested for the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) at the TA-55 Plutonium Facility of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. ARIES is a processing system used for the dismantlement of the plutonium pits from nuclear weapons. ARIES prepares the extracted-plutonium in a form which is compatible with long-term storage and disposition options and meets international inspection requirements. The processed plutonium is delivered to the canning module of the ARIES line, where it is packaged in a stainless steel container. This container is then packaged in a secondary container for long-term storage. Each of the containers is hermetically sealed with a full penetration weld closure that meets the requirements of the ASME Section IX Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Welding is performed with a gas tungsten arc process in an inert atmosphere of helium. The encapsulated helium in the nested containers allows for leak testing the weld closure and container. The storage package was designed to meet packaging requirements of DOE Standard 3013-96 for long-term storage of plutonium metal and oxides. Development of the process parameters, weld fixture, weld qualification, and the welding chambers is discussed in this paper.

  17. Options for converting excess plutonium to feed for the MOX fuel fabrication facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Watts, Joe A; Smith, Paul H; Psaras, John D; Jarvinen, Gordon D; Costa, David A; Joyce, Jr., Edward L

    2009-01-01

    The storage and safekeeping of excess plutonium in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar lifecycle cost to the taxpayers and poses challenges to National Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Los Alamos National Laboratory is considering options for converting some portion of the 13 metric tons of excess plutonium that was previously destined for long-term waste disposition into feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). This approach could reduce storage costs and security ri sks, and produce fuel for nuclear energy at the same time. Over the course of 30 years of weapons related plutonium production, Los Alamos has developed a number of flow sheets aimed at separation and purification of plutonium. Flow sheets for converting metal to oxide and for removing chloride and fluoride from plutonium residues have been developed and withstood the test oftime. This presentation will address some potential options for utilizing processes and infrastructure developed by Defense Programs to transform a large variety of highly impure plutonium into feedstock for the MFFF.

  18. weapons

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    thanks to the vision and determination of its proponents and the significant investment in the necessary tools, facilities, and people. The men and women employed by the...

  19. Guide of good practices for occupational radiological protection in plutonium facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-06-01

    This Technical Standard (TS) does not contain any new requirements. Its purpose is to provide guides to good practice, update existing reference material, and discuss practical lessons learned relevant to the safe handling of plutonium. the technical rationale is given to allow US Department of Energy (DOE) health physicists to adapt the recommendations to similar situations throughout the DOE complex. Generally, DOE contractor health physicists will be responsible to implement radiation protection activities at DOE facilities and DOE health physicists will be responsible for oversight of those activities. This guidance is meant to be useful for both efforts. This TS replaces PNL-6534, Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Plutonium Facilities, by providing more complete and current information and by emphasizing the situations that are typical of DOE`s current plutonium operations; safe storage, decontamination, and decommissioning (environmental restoration); and weapons disassembly.

  20. Opportunities for mixed oxide fuel testing in the advanced test reactor to support plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Terry, W.K.; Ryskamp, J.M.; Sterbentz, J.W.

    1995-08-01

    Numerous technical issues must be resolved before LWR operating licenses can be amended to allow the use of MOX fuel. These issues include the following: (1) MOX fuel fabrication process verification; (2) Whether and how to use burnable poisons to depress MOX fuel initial reactivity, which is higher than that of urania; (3) The effects of WGPu isotopic composition; (4) The feasibility of loading MOX fuel with plutonia content up to 7% by weight; (5) The effects of americium and gallium in WGPu; (6) Fission gas release from MOX fuel pellets made from WGPu; (7) Fuel/cladding gap closure; (8) The effects of power cycling and off-normal events on fuel integrity; (9) Development of radial distributions of burnup and fission products; (10) Power spiking near the interfaces of MOX and urania fuel assemblies; and (11) Fuel performance code validation. The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory possesses many advantages for performing tests to resolve most of the issues identified above. We have performed calculations to show that the use of hafnium shrouds can produce spectrum adjustments that will bring the flux spectrum in ATR test loops into a good approximation to the spectrum anticipated in a commercial LWR containing MOX fuel while allowing operation of the test fuel assemblies near their optimum values of linear heat generation rate. The ATR would be a nearly ideal test bed for developing data needed to support applications to license LWRs for operation with MOX fuel made from weapons-grade plutonium. The requirements for planning and implementing a test program in the ATR have been identified. The facilities at Argonne National Laboratory-West can meet all potential needs for pre- and post-irradiation examination that might arise in a MOX fuel qualification program.

  1. President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon ...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Photo Gallery Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home About Us Our History NNSA Timeline President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon...

  2. Weapons production | Y-12 National Security Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Sharing resources: the benefits of consolidation Stockpile Weapons production Material ManagementStrategic Reserve Material Recycle and Recovery Processing Secure Storage...

  3. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-08-05

    The Order defines the Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, which was established to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives.

  4. FAQS Reference Guide ‚Äď Weapon Quality Assurance

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    This reference guide addresses the competency statements in the August 2008 edition of DOE-STD-1025-2008, Weapon Quality Assurance Functional Area Qualification Standard.

  5. nuclear weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy ...

  6. Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition NNSS Capabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pat Arnold

    2011-12-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has tasked the WDD working group to disposition the large inventory of legacy classified weapon components scattered across the complex.

  7. Historical Exposures to Chemicals at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant: A Pilot Retrospective Exposure Assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Janeen Denise Robertson

    1999-02-01

    In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

  8. The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944-2009 | National Nuclear...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Pits The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944-2009 The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944-2009 The United States has released an inventory of its plutonium balances...

  9. AIR FORCE SPECIAL WEAPONS CENTER

    Office of Legacy Management (LM)

    HEADQUARTERS aII?y 9 AIR FORCE SPECIAL WEAPONS CENTER 1 AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND . - KlRTlAND AIR FORCE BASE, NEW MEXICO - k FINAL REPORT O N AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION PROJECT RULISON .1 O c t o b e r 1969 P r e p a r e d by : CONT INENTAL TEST D I V I S ION DIRECTORATE OF NUCLEAR FIELD OPERATIONS This page intentionally left blank INDEX AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION I N PROJECT RULISON FINAL REPORT PARAGRAPH BASIC REPORT SUBJECT R e f e r e n c e s PAGE 2 G e n e r a l 1 3 P l a n n i n g 3 4 Command

  10. Characterization of plutonium-bearing wastes by chemical analysis and analytical electron microscopy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Behrens, R.G.; Buck, E.C.; Dietz, N.L.; Bates, J.K.; Van Deventer, E.; Chaiko, D.J.

    1995-09-01

    This report summarizes the results of characterization studies of plutonium-bearing wastes produced at the US Department of Energy weapons production facilities. Several different solid wastes were characterized, including incinerator ash and ash heels from Rocky Flats Plant and Los Alamos National Laboratory; sand, stag, and crucible waste from Hanford; and LECO crucibles from the Savannah River Site. These materials were characterized by chemical analysis and analytical electron microscopy. The results showed the presence of discrete PuO{sub 2}PuO{sub 2{minus}x}, and Pu{sub 4}O{sub 7} phases, of about 1{mu}m or less in size, in all of the samples examined. In addition, a number of amorphous phases were present that contained plutonium. In all the ash and ash heel samples examined, plutonium phases were found that were completely surrounded by silicate matrices. Consequently, to achieve optimum plutonium recovery in any chemical extraction process, extraction would have to be coupled with ultrafine grinding to average particle sizes of less than 1 {mu}m to liberate the plutonium from the surrounding inert matrix.

  11. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    O 452.4C, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons by LtCol Karl Basham Functional areas: Nuclear Explosives, Nuclear Weapons, Security, Safety, Weapon...

  12. Plutonium focus area

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-08-01

    To ensure research and development programs focus on the most pressing environmental restoration and waste management problems at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environmental Management (EM) established a working group in August 1993 to implement a new approach to research and technology development. As part of this new approach, EM developed a management structure and principles that led to the creation of specific Focus Areas. These organizations were designed to focus the scientific and technical talent throughout DOE and the national scientific community on the major environmental restoration and waste management problems facing DOE. The Focus Area approach provides the framework for intersite cooperation and leveraging of resources on common problems. After the original establishment of five major Focus Areas within the Office of Technology Development (EM-50, now called the Office of Science and Technology), the Nuclear Materials Stabilization Task Group (EM-66) followed the structure already in place in EM-50 and chartered the Plutonium Focus Area (PFA). The following information outlines the scope and mission of the EM, EM-60, and EM-66 organizations as related to the PFA organizational structure.

  13. Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates at Los Alamos National

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates at Los Alamos National Laboratory August 18, 2009 Los Alamos, New Mexico, August 18, 2009- Two of the three Los Alamos National Laboratory weapons programs directorates have been combined under the leadership of Bret Knapp as the associate director for the new weapons directorate. The new organization adds the Weapons Physics directorate to the Weapons Engineering directorate already under Knapp's leadership. The third

  14. Detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Detection and treatment of chemical weapons andor biological pathogens Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Detection and treatment of chemical weapons andor biological...

  15. National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers October 28, 2013 - ...

  16. Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administra...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home About Us Our History NNSA Timeline Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes September 01, 1961 ...

  17. Weapons Intern Program participants visit Pantex | National Nuclear...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    and individual and team projects, weapon interns have honed their skills, broadened their knowledge base, and expanded their network of colleagues in the nuclear weapons community. ...

  18. Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    70th anniversary lecture Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of next 70th anniversary lecture Lab's role in the development of nuclear weapons ...

  19. In situ remediation of plutonium from glovebox exhaust ducts at the Department of Energy`s Rocky Flats Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dugdale, J.S.; Humiston, T.J.; Omer, G.E.

    1993-10-01

    Plutonium and other miscellaneous hold-up materials have been accumulating in the glovebox exhaust ducts at the Rocky Flats Plant over the 40 years of weapons production at the site. The Duct Remediation Project was undertaken to assess the safety impacts of this material, and to remove it from the ductwork. The project necessitated the development of specialized tools, equipment and methods to remediate the material from continuously operating ventilation systems. Special engineered access locations were also required to provide access to the ductwork, and to ensure that safety and system operability were not degraded as a result of the remediation efforts. Operations personnel underwent significant training and development, and became an important asset to the success of the project. In total, the project succeeded in removing over 40 kilograms of plutonium-bearing material from one of the major weapons production buildings at the plant.

  20. Selecting a plutonium vitrification process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jouan, A. [Centre d`Etudes de la Vallee du Rhone, Bagnols sur Ceze (France)

    1996-05-01

    Vitrification of plutonium is one means of mitigating its potential danger. This option is technically feasible, even if it is not the solution advocated in France. Two situations are possible, depending on whether or not the glass matrix also contains fission products; concentrations of up to 15% should be achievable for plutonium alone, whereas the upper limit is 3% in the presence of fission products. The French continuous vitrification process appears to be particularly suitable for plutonium vitrification: its capacity is compatible with the required throughout, and the compact dimensions of the process equipment prevent a criticality hazard. Preprocessing of plutonium metal, to convert it to PuO{sub 2} or to a nitric acid solution, may prove advantageous or even necessary depending on whether a dry or wet process is adopted. The process may involve a single step (vitrification of Pu or PuO{sub 2} mixed with glass frit) or may include a prior calcination step - notably if the plutonium is to be incorporated into a fission product glass. It is important to weigh the advantages and drawbacks of all the possible options in terms of feasibility, safety and cost-effectiveness.

  1. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  2. TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Facilities ¬Ľ TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities TA-55 supports a wide range of national security programs that involve stockpile stewardship, plutonium processing, nuclear materials stabilization, materials disposition, nuclear forensics, nuclear counter-terrorism, and nuclear energy. ...the only fully operational, full capability plutonium facility in the nation. National Security At the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), virtually all

  3. Direct vitrification of plutonium-containing materials (PCM`s) with the glass material oxidation and dissolution system (GMODS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Forsberg, C.W. Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Rudolph, J.C.; Haas, P.A.; Malling, G.F.; Elam, K.; Ott, L.

    1995-10-30

    The end of the cold war has resulted in excess PCMs from nuclear weapons and associated production facilities. Consequently, the US government has undertaken studies to determine how best to manage and dispose of this excess material. The issues include (a) ensurance of domestic health, environment, and safety in handling, storage, and disposition, (b) international arms control agreements with Russia and other countries, and (c) economics. One major set of options is to convert the PCMs into glass for storage or disposal. The chemically inert characteristics of glasses make them a desirable chemical form for storage or disposal of radioactive materials. A glass may contain only plutonium, or it may contain plutonium along with other radioactive materials and nonradioactive materials. GMODS is a new process for the direct conversion of PCMs (i.e., plutonium metal, scrap, and residues) to glass. The plutonium content of these materials varies from a fraction of a percent to pure plutonium. GMODS has the capability to also convert other metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass, destroy organics, and convert chloride-containing materials into a low-chloride glass and a secondary clean chloride salt strewn. This report is the initial study of GMODS for vitrification of PCMs as input to ongoing studies of plutonium management options. Several tasks were completed: initial analysis of process thermodynamics, initial flowsheet analysis, identification of equipment options, proof-of-principle experiments, and identification of uncertainties.

  4. Plutonium Oxide Process Capability Work Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meier, David E.; Tingey, Joel M.

    2014-02-28

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been tasked to develop a Pilot-scale Plutonium-oxide Processing Unit (P3U) providing a flexible capability to produce 200g (Pu basis) samples of plutonium oxide using different chemical processes for use in identifying and validating nuclear forensics signatures associated with plutonium production. Materials produced can also be used as exercise and reference materials.

  5. Plutonium stabilization and packaging system

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-05-01

    This document describes the functional design of the Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (Pu SPS). The objective of this system is to stabilize and package plutonium metals and oxides of greater than 50% wt, as well as other selected isotopes, in accordance with the requirements of the DOE standard for safe storage of these materials for 50 years. This system will support completion of stabilization and packaging campaigns of the inventory at a number of affected sites before the year 2002. The package will be standard for all sites and will provide a minimum of two uncontaminated, organics free confinement barriers for the packaged material.

  6. AEC and control of nuclear weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    control of nuclear weapons The Atomic Energy Commission took control of the atomic energy project known originally as the Manhattan Project on January 1, 1947. This shift from the ...

  7. Plutonium metal exchange program : current status and statistical analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tandon, L.; Eglin, J. L.; Michalak, S. E.; Picard, R. R.; Temer, D. J.

    2004-01-01

    The Rocky Flats Plutonium (Pu) Metal Sample Exchange program was conducted to insure the quality and intercomparability of measurements such as Pu assay, Pu isotopics, and impurity analyses. The Rocky Flats program was discontinued in 1989 after more than 30 years. In 2001, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) reestablished the Pu Metal Exchange program. In addition to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, six Department of Energy (DOE) facilities Argonne East, Argonne West, Livermore, Los Alamos, New Brunswick Laboratory, and Savannah River are currently participating in the program. Plutonium metal samples are prepared and distributed to the sites for destructive measurements to determine elemental concentration, isotopic abundance, and both metallic and nonmetallic impurity levels. The program provides independent verification of analytical measurement capabilies for each participating facility and allows problems in analytical methods to be identified. The current status of the program will be discussed with emphasis on the unique statistical analysis and modeling of the data developed for the program. The discussion includes the definition of the consensus values for each analyte (in the presence and absence of anomalous values and/or censored values), and interesting features of the data and the results.

  8. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and...

  9. PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Weapons Data Control Systems PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems PIA PDF icon PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems More Documents & Publications Integrated Safety Management Workshop Registration, PIA, Idaho National Laboratory PIA - Bonneville Power Adminstration Ethics Helpline PIA - Advanced Test Reactor National Scientific User Facility Users Week 2009

  10. Method of separating thorium from plutonium

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Clifton, D.G.; Blum, T.W.

    1984-07-10

    A method is described for chemically separating plutonium from thorium. Plutonium and thorium to be separated are dissolved in an aqueous feed solution, preferably as the nitrate salts. The feed solution is acidified and sodium nitrite is added to the solution to adjust the valence of the plutonium to the +4 state. A chloride salt, preferably sodium chloride, is then added to the solution to induce formation of an anionic plutonium chloride complex. The anionic plutonium chloride complex and the thorium in solution are then separated by ion exchange on a strong base anion exchange column.

  11. Method of separating thorium from plutonium

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Clifton, David G. (Los Alamos, NM); Blum, Thomas W. (Los Alamos, NM)

    1984-01-01

    A method of chemically separating plutonium from thorium. Plutonium and thorium to be separated are dissolved in an aqueous feed solution, preferably as the nitrate salts. The feed solution is acidified and sodium nitrite is added to the solution to adjust the valence of the plutonium to the +4 state. A chloride salt, preferably sodium chloride, is then added to the solution to induce formation of an anionic plutonium chloride complex. The anionic plutonium chloride complex and the thorium in solution are then separated by ion exchange on a strong base anion exchange column.

  12. Plutonium inventory characterization technical evaluation report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wittman, G.R., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-07-10

    This is a technical report on the data, gathered to date, under WHC- SD-CP-TP-086, Rev. 1, on the integrity of the food pack cans currently being used to store plutonium or plutonium compounds at the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Workplan PFP-96-VO-009, `Inspection of Special Nuclear Material Using X-ray`, was used to gather data on material and containment conditions using real time radiography. Some of those images are included herein. A matrix found in the `Plutonium Inventory Characterization Implementation Plan` was used to categorize different plutonium items based upon the type of material being stored and the life expectancy of the containers.

  13. Neutron Detectors for Detection of Nuclear Materials at LANL...

    Office of Science (SC) Website

    The applications are in (a) detection of smuggled neutron-emitting special nuclear materials (SNM), such as weapons grade plutonium and certain uranium compounds, (b) terrorist ...

  14. Measurements of plutonium, 237Np, and 137Cs in the BCR 482 lichen reference material

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Lavelle, Kevin B.; Miller, Jeffrey L.; Hanson, Susan K.; Connick, William B.; Spitz, Henry B.; Glover, Samuel E.; Oldham, Warren J.

    2015-10-01

    Select anthropogenic radionuclides were measured in lichen reference material, BCR 482. This material was originally collected in Axalp, Switzerland in 1991 and is composed of the epiphytic lichen Pseudevernia furfuracea. Samples from three separate bottles of BCR 482 were analyzed for uranium, neptunium, and plutonium isotopes by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and analyzed for cesium-137 by gamma-ray spectrometry. The isotopic composition of the radionuclides measured in BCR 482 suggests contributions from both global fallout resulting from historical nuclear weapons testing and more volatile materials released following the Chernobyl accident.

  15. Plutonium nitrate bottle counter manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Menlove, H.O.; Adams, E.L.; Holbrooks, O.R.

    1984-03-01

    A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for plutonium nitrate assay in large storage bottles. This assay system can be used in the reprocessing plant or in the nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility. The system is based on the family of neutron detectors similar to the high-level neutron coincidence counter. This manual describes the system and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications. 4 references, 11 figures, 9 tables.

  16. Air transport of plutonium metal: content expansion initiative for the plutonium air transportable (PAT01) packaging

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Caviness, Michael L; Mann, Paul T

    2010-01-01

    The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has submitted an application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the air shipment of plutonium metal within the Plutonium Air Transportable (PAT-1) packaging. The PAT-1 packaging is currently authorized for the air transport of plutonium oxide in solid form only. The INMM presentation will provide a limited overview of the scope of the plutonium metal initiative and provide a status of the NNSA application to the NRC.

  17. Plutonium less mysterious with nuclear magnetic resonance

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Plutonium less mysterious with nuclear magnetic resonance Plutonium less mysterious with nuclear magnetic resonance For more than 50 years, chemists and physicists have been searching for the plutonium-239 magnetic resonance signal. May 21, 2012 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new

  18. US Releases Updated Plutonium Inventory Report | National Nuclear...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    details the current plutonium inventory of the U.S. Titled The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944-2009, the document serves as an update to Plutonium: the First 50 Years,...

  19. Plutonium transmutation in thorium fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Necas, Vladimir; Breza, Juraj |; Darilek, Petr

    2007-07-01

    The HELIOS spectral code was used to study the application of the thorium fuel cycle with plutonium as a supporting fissile material in a once-through scenario of the light water reactors PWR and VVER-440 (Russian design). Our analysis was focused on the plutonium transmutation potential and the plutonium radiotoxicity course of hypothetical thorium-based cycles for current nuclear power reactors. The paper shows a possibility to transmute about 50% of plutonium in analysed reactors. Positive influence on radiotoxicity after 300 years and later was pointed out. (authors)

  20. Calculating Plutonium and Praseodymium Structural Transformations...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    transition of praseodymium. As plutonium is heated it undergoes six complex crystalline phase transitions-the most of any element at ambient pressure. Explaining these six...

  1. NON-AQUEOUS DISSOLUTION OF MASSIVE PLUTONIUM

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Reavis, J.G.; Leary, J.A.; Walsh, K.A.

    1959-05-12

    A method is presented for obtaining non-aqueous solutions or plutonium from massive forms of the metal. In the present invention massive plutonium is added to a salt melt consisting of 10 to 40 weight per cent of sodium chloride and the balance zinc chloride. The plutonium reacts at about 800 deg C with the zinc chloride to form a salt bath of plutonium trichloride, sodium chloride, and metallic zinc. The zinc is separated from the salt melt by forcing the molten mixture through a Pyrex filter.

  2. EA-0841: Import of Russian Plutonium-238

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of a proposal to purchase plutonium-238 from the Russian Federation (Russia) for use in the Nation's space program.

  3. Neutrons find "missing" magnetism of plutonium

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Neutrons find "missing" magnetism of plutonium Alumni Link: Opportunities, News and Resources for Former Employees Latest Issue:September 2015 all issues All Issues submit...

  4. Comparative repository performance of plutonium forms - initial...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    IL (United States) Country of Publication: United States Language: English Subject: 05 NUCLEAR FUELS; HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES; RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL; PLUTONIUM; WASTE...

  5. Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (PUREX) - Hanford Site

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Site. The Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant is massive. It is longer than three football fields, stands 64 feet above the ground, and extends another 40 feet below ground....

  6. Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Security Administration Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Photo

  7. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2014-05-09

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  8. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2015-01-26

    All nuclear explosives and nuclear explosive operations require special safety, security, and use control consideration because of the potentially unacceptable consequences of an accident or unauthorized act; therefore, a Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program is established to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Supersedes DOE O 452.1D.

  9. Nov Dec NNSA NEWS 2010.pmd

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    contained more than 10 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and three metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium in Kazakhstan - enough material to make 775 nuclear weapons. ...

  10. The meteorological monitoring audit, preventative maintenance and quality assurance programs at a former nuclear weapons facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Maxwell, D.R.

    1995-12-31

    The purposes of the meteorological monitoring audit, preventative maintenance, and quality assurance programs at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Site), are to (1) support Emergency Preparedness (EP) programs at the Site in assessing the transport, dispersion, and deposition of effluents actually or potentially released into the atmosphere by Site operations; and (2) provide information for onsite and offsite projects concerned with the design of environmental monitoring networks for impact assessments, environmental surveillance activities, and remediation activities. The risk from the Site includes chemical and radioactive emissions historically related to nuclear weapons component production activities that are currently associated with storage of large quantities of radionuclides (plutonium) and radioactive waste forms. The meteorological monitoring program provides information for site-specific weather forecasting, which supports Site operations, employee safety, and Emergency Preparedness operations.

  11. Type A Accident Investigation of the March 16, 2000, Plutonium...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    New Mexico Type A Accident Investigation of the March 16, 2000, Plutonium-238 Multiple Intake Event at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico July ...

  12. Massive Hanford Test Reactor Removed - Plutonium Recycle Test...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Massive Hanford Test Reactor Removed - Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor removed from Hanford's 300 Area Massive Hanford Test Reactor Removed - Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor removed ...

  13. Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Journal Article: Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah River Site, USA. A Long-Term Study Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Plutonium Isotopes...

  14. LLNL Conducts First Plutonium Shot Using the JASPER Gas Gun ...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Conducts First Plutonium Shot Using the JASPER Gas Gun | National Nuclear Security ... LLNL Conducts First Plutonium Shot Using the JASPER Gas Gun July 08, 2003 LLNL Conducts ...

  15. Phase Diagram and Electronic Structure of Praseodymium and Plutonium...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Phase Diagram and Electronic Structure of Praseodymium and Plutonium Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Phase Diagram and Electronic Structure of Praseodymium and Plutonium...

  16. Phase Diagram and Electronic Structure of Praseodymium and Plutonium...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Published Article: Phase Diagram and Electronic Structure of Praseodymium and Plutonium Prev Next Title: Phase Diagram and Electronic Structure of Praseodymium and Plutonium...

  17. The plutonium-hydrogen reaction: SEM characterization of product...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    The plutonium-hydrogen reaction: SEM characterization of product morphology Citation Details In-Document Search Title: The plutonium-hydrogen reaction: SEM characterization of...

  18. The plutonium-hydrogen reaction: SEM characterization of product...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    The plutonium-hydrogen reaction: SEM characterization of product morphology Citation Details In-Document Search Title: The plutonium-hydrogen reaction: SEM characterization of ...

  19. Pantex Takes a Green Approach to Cleaning Weapons Parts | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Takes a Green Approach to Cleaning Weapons Parts At NNSA's Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, a new green approach to cleaning weapons parts was brought online recently at the...

  20. Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of Defense

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-05-14

    This Order establishes Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration requirements and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system surety activities in conjunction with the Department of Defense. Supersedes DOE O 452.6.

  1. Two CNS employees selected for prestigious Weapons Internship...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Weapons Internship Program Posted: November 2, 2015 - 5:54pm Print version Aaron Lee is the Y-12 participant in the Weapons Internship Program. Y-12 and Pantex will both be...

  2. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress | Department...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress July 24, 2007 - 2:55pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC -U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. ...

  3. Picture of the Week: From nuclear weapons testing to stockpile...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    9 From nuclear weapons testing to stockpile stewardship On Sept. 23, 1992, the last full-scale underground test of a nuclear weapon was conducted by Los Alamos National Lab at the ...

  4. Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program WHEN: Jan 13, 2015 7:30 PM - 8:00 PM WHERE: Fuller Lodge Central ...

  5. The Steps of Weapons Production | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    The Steps of Weapons Production The Steps of Weapons Production This graphic provides an overview of the steps of weapons production beginning in 1943. PDF icon Fat Man and Little Boy: The first two production weapons More Documents & Publications Booklet, DOE Subject Area Indicators and Key Word List for RD and FRD - October 2005 Closing the Circle on the Splitting of the Atom The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb

  6. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and...

  7. Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing ...

  8. GLASS FABRICATION AND PRODUCT CONSISTENCY TESTING OF LANTHANIDE BOROSILICATE FRIT B COMPOSITION FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Marra, J

    2006-01-19

    The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE/EM) plans to conduct the Plutonium Disposition Project at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to disposition excess weapons-usable plutonium. A plutonium glass waste form is a leading candidate for immobilization of the plutonium for subsequent disposition in a geologic repository. A reference glass composition (Lanthanide Borosilicate (LaBS) Frit B) was developed during the Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) to immobilize plutonium. A limited amount of performance testing was performed on this baseline composition before efforts to further pursue Pu disposition via a glass waste form ceased. Therefore, the objectives of this present task were to fabricate plutonium loaded LaBS Frit B glass and perform additional testing to provide near-term data that will increase confidence that LaBS glass product is suitable for disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository. Specifically, testing was conducted in an effort to provide data to Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) personnel for use in performance assessment calculations. Plutonium containing LaBS glass with the Frit B composition with a 9.5 wt% PuO{sub 2} loading was prepared for testing. Glass was prepared to support Product Consistency Testing (PCT) at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and for additional performance testing at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The glass was characterized using x-ray diffraction (XRD) and scanning electron microscopy coupled with energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) prior to performance testing. A series of PCTs were conducted at SRNL with varying exposed surface area and test durations. The leachates from these tests were analyzed to determine the dissolved concentrations of key elements. Acid stripping of leach vessels was performed to determine the concentration of the glass constituents that may have sorbed on the vessels during leach testing. Additionally, the leachate solutions were ultrafiltered to quantify colloid formation. The leached solids from select PCTs were examined in an attempt to evaluate the Pu and neutron absorber release behavior from the glass and to identify the formation of alteration phases on the glass surface. Characterization of the glass prior to testing revealed that some undissolved plutonium oxide was present in the glass. The undissolved particles had a disk-like morphology and likely formed via coarsening of particles in areas compositionally enriched in plutonium. Similar disk-like PuO{sub 2} phases were observed in previous LaBS glass testing at PNNL. In that work, researchers concluded that plutonium formed with this morphology as a result of the leaching process. It was more likely that the presence of the plutonium oxide crystals in the PNNL testing was a result of glass fabrication. A series of PCTs were conducted at 90 C in ASTM Type 1 water. The PCT-Method A (PCT-A) was conducted to compare the Pu LaBS Frit B glass durability to current requirements for High Level Waste (HLW) glass in a geologic repository. The PCT-A test has a strict protocol and is designed to specifically be used to evaluate whether the chemical durability and elemental release characteristics of a nuclear waste glass have been consistently controlled during production and, thus, meet the repository acceptance requirements. The PCT-A results on the Pu containing LaBS Frit B glass showed that the glass was very durable with a normalized elemental release value for boron of approximately 0.02 g/L. This boron release value was better than two orders of magnitude better from a boron release standpoint than the current Environmental Assessment (EA) glass used for repository acceptance. The boron release value for EA glass is 16.7 g/L.

  9. Management of the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-06-08

    The Order defines and affirms the authorities and responsibilities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for the management of the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex and emphasizes that the management of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile is the DOE's highest priority for the NNSA and the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. Supersedes DOE O 5600.1.

  10. REMOVAL OF LEGACY PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FROM SWEDEN

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dunn, Kerry A.; Bellamy, J. Steve; Chandler, Greg T.; Iyer, Natraj C.; Koenig, Rich E.; Leduc, D.; Hackney, B.; Leduc, Dan R.

    2013-08-18

    U.S. Department of Energyís National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) recently removed legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in collaboration with AB SVAFO, Sweden. This paper details the activities undertaken through the U.S. receiving site (Savannah River Site (SRS)) to support the characterization, stabilization, packaging and removal of legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in 2012. This effort was undertaken as part of GTRIís Gap Materials Program and culminated with the successful removal of plutonium from Sweden as announced at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. The removal and shipment of plutonium materials to the United States was the first of its kind under NNSAís Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The Environmental Assessment for the U.S. receipt of gap plutonium material was approved in May 2010. Since then, the multi-year process yielded many first time accomplishments associated with plutonium packaging and transport activities including the application of the of DOE-STD-3013 stabilization requirements to treat plutonium materials outside the U.S., the development of an acceptance criteria for receipt of plutonium from a foreign country, the development and application of a versatile process flow sheet for the packaging of legacy plutonium materials, the identification of a plutonium container configuration, the first international certificate validation of the 9975 shipping package and the first intercontinental shipment using the 9975 shipping package. This paper will detail the technical considerations in developing the packaging process flow sheet, defining the key elements of the flow sheet and its implementation, determining the criteria used in the selection of the transport package, developing the technical basis for the package certificate amendment and the reviews with multiple licensing authorities and most importantly integrating the technical activities with the Swedish partners.

  11. weapon dismantlement | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    weapon dismantlement | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Photo Gallery Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at

  12. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Immele, John D; Wagner, Richard L

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.

  13. EIS-0283: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium.

  14. Characterization of Representative Materials in Support of Safe, Long Term Storage of Surplus Plutonium in DOE-STD-3013 Containers

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Narlesky, Joshua E.; Stroud, Mary Ann; Smith, Paul Herrick; Wayne, David M.; Mason, Richard E.; Worl, Laura A.

    2013-02-15

    The Surveillance and Monitoring Program is a joint Los Alamos National Laboratory/Savannah River Site effort funded by the Department of Energy-Environmental Management to provide the technical basis for the safe, long-term storage (up to 50 years) of over 6 metric tons of plutonium stored in over 5,000 DOE-STD-3013 containers at various facilities around the DOE complex. The majority of this material is plutonium that is surplus to the nuclear weapons program, and much of it is destined for conversion to mixed oxide fuel for use in US nuclear power plants. The form of the plutonium ranges from relatively pure metal and oxide to very impure oxide. The performance of the 3013 containers has been shown to depend on moisture content and on the levels, types and chemical forms of the impurities. The oxide materials that present the greatest challenge to the storage container are those that contain chloride salts. Other common impurities include oxides and other compounds of calcium, magnesium, iron, and nickel. Over the past 15 years the program has collected a large body of experimental data on 54 samples of plutonium, with 53 chosen to represent the broader population of materials in storage. This paper summarizes the characterization data, moisture analysis, particle size, surface area, density, wattage, actinide composition, trace element impurity analysis, and shelf life surveillance data and includes origin and process history information. Limited characterization data on fourteen nonrepresentative samples is also presented.

  15. Self-irradiation damage to the local structure of plutonium and plutonium

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    intermetallics (Journal Article) | SciTech Connect Self-irradiation damage to the local structure of plutonium and plutonium intermetallics Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Self-irradiation damage to the local structure of plutonium and plutonium intermetallics Authors: Booth, C. H. ; Jiang, Yu ; Medling, S. A. ; Wang, D. L. ; Costello, A. L. ; Schwartz, D. S. ; Mitchell, J. N. ; Tobash, P. H. ; Bauer, E. D. ; McCall, S. K. ; Wall, M. A. ; Allen, P. G. Publication Date: 2013-01-01

  16. Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor 309 B-Roll | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor 309 B-Roll Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor 309 B-Roll Addthis Description Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor 309 B-Roll

  17. Characterization of past and present solid waste streams from the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pottmeyer, J.A.; Weyns, M.I.; Lorenzo, D.S.; Vejvoda, E.J. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc., NM (US); Duncan, D.R. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (US)

    1993-04-01

    During the next two decades the transuranic wastes, now stored in the burial trenches and storage facilities at the Hanford Site, are to be retrieved, processed at the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility, and shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal. Over 7% of the transuranic waste to be retrieved for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant has been generated at the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant. The purpose of this report is to characterize the radioactive solid wastes generated by PUREX using process knowledge, existing records, and oral history interviews. The PUREX Plant is currently operated by the Westinghouse Hanford Company for the US Department of Energy and is now in standby status while being prepared for permanent shutdown. The PUREX Plant is a collection of facilities that has been used primarily to separate plutonium for nuclear weapons from spent fuel that had been irradiated in the Hanford Site`s defense reactors. Originally designed to reprocess aluminum-clad uranium fuel, the plant was modified to reprocess zirconium alloy clad fuel elements from the Hanford Site`s N Reactor. PUREX has provided plutonium for research reactor development, safety programs, and defense. In addition, the PUREX was used to recover slightly enriched uranium for recycling into fuel for use in reactors that generate electricity and plutonium. Section 2.0 provides further details of the PUREX`s physical plant and its operations. The PUREX Plant functions that generate solid waste are as follows: processing operations, laboratory analyses and supporting activities. The types and estimated quantities of waste resulting from these activities are discussed in detail.

  18. EIS-0219: F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of processing†the plutonium solutions to metal form using the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities at the Savannah River Site.

  19. Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE`s independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91.

  20. Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of Defense

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-10-19

    The Order prescribes how the Department of Energy participates with the Department of Defense (DoD) to ensure the surety (safety, security and control) of military nuclear weapon systems deployed around the world. The Order establishes National Nuclear Security Administration requirements and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system surety activities in conjunction with the DoD. Cancels DOE O 5610.13. Canceled by DOE O 452.6A.

  1. Secretary Bodman Celebrates Clean Up Completion of Three Former Weapons

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Research and Production Sites in Ohio | Department of Energy Clean Up Completion of Three Former Weapons Research and Production Sites in Ohio Secretary Bodman Celebrates Clean Up Completion of Three Former Weapons Research and Production Sites in Ohio January 19, 2007 - 9:59am Addthis Over 1,100 Acres in Fernald, Columbus and Ashtabula Restored CROSBY TOWNSHIP, OH - U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today certified that environmental cleanup is complete at three former weapons

  2. Los Alamos National Laboratory names new leadership for Weapons and

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Operations Directorates New leadership for Weapons and Operations Directorates Los Alamos National Laboratory names new leadership for Weapons and Operations Directorates Robert (Bob) Webster has been selected to be the Lab's next Principal Associate Director for Weapons Programs, and Craig Leasure has been selected as the new Principal Associate Director for Operations. June 19, 2015 Bob Webster and Craig Leasure Bob Webster and Craig Leasure Contact Los Alamos National Laboratory Kevin

  3. Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program WHEN: Jan 13, 2015 7:30 PM - 8:00 PM WHERE: Fuller Lodge Central Avenue, Los Alamos, NM, USA SPEAKER: Bill Archer of the Weapons Physics (ADX) Directorate CONTACT: Bill Archer 505 665 7235 CATEGORY: Science INTERNAL: Calendar Login Event Description Rich history of computing in the Laboratory's weapons program. The talk is free and open to the public and is part of the 2014-15 Los

  4. Joint Venture Established Between Russian Weapons Plant And the...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home Library Press Releases Joint Venture Established Between Russian Weapons Plant ... Joint Venture Established...

  5. Record-Setting Year for Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Achieved...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Record-Setting Year for Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Achieved at the Y-12 National Security Complex | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS...

  6. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile...

  7. Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation ...

  8. NNSA Administrator Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons Complex | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile ...

  9. EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Certain contractor personnel, DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) staff have interpreted this language to exempt all routine and emergency nuclear weapons ...

  10. Annular Core Research Reactor - Critical to Science-Based Weapons...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    - Critical to Science-Based Weapons Design, Certification | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile ...

  11. Y-12, Pantex employees selected for prestigious Weapons Internship...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Pantex employees selected for prestigious Weapons Internship Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the ...

  12. President Obama Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation ...

  13. Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile ...

  14. Reducing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile | National Nuclear Security...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering ...

  15. Statement on Budget Priorities for NNSA Weapons Activities before...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Budget Priorities for NNSA Weapons Activities before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy & Water Development | National Nuclear Security Administration ...

  16. Date Set for Closure of Russian Nuclear Weapons Plant - NNSA...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Date Set for Closure of Russian Nuclear Weapons Plant - NNSA Is Helping Make It Happen | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission ...

  17. Gordon Assesses Security At Nuclear Weapons Complex News.....

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Anson Franklin, 202586-7371 September 21, 2001 NNSA Administrator Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons Complex John Gordon, Administrator of the Department of Energy's ...

  18. NNSA Weapons Chief Participates in ROTC Day at Lawrence Livermore...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Weapons Chief Participates in ROTC Day at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission ...

  19. SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM FROM URANIUM AND FISSION PRODUCTS

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Boyd, G.E.; Adamson, A.W.; Schubert, J.; Russell, E.R.

    1958-10-01

    A chromatographic adsorption process is presented for the separation of plutonium from other fission products formed by the irradiation of uranium. The plutonium and the lighter element fission products are adsorbed on a sulfonated phenol-formaldehyde resin bed from a nitric acid solution containing the dissolved uranium. Successive washes of sulfuric, phosphoric, and nitric acids remove the bulk of the fission products, then an eluate of dilute phosphoric and nitric acids removes the remaining plutonium and fission products. The plutonium is selectively removed by passing this solution through zirconium phosphate, from which the plutonium is dissolved with nitric acid. This process provides a convenient and efficient means for isolating plutonium.

  20. U.S. and Russia Sign Plutonium Disposition Agreement | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home About Us Our History NNSA Timeline U.S. and Russia Sign Plutonium Disposition Agreement U.S. and Russia Sign Plutonium...

  1. Joint DOE-Rosatom Statement

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Joint Statement on the U.S. - Russian Excess Weapon-grade Plutonium Disposition Program The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Russian Federation (Rosatom), as the Executive Agents for the implementation of the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, hereby reaffirm their commitment to implementing the 2000 Agreement and effective and transparent disposition of 34 metric tons each of weapon- grade plutonium designated as no longer required for

  2. Fused salt processing of impure plutonium dioxide to high-purity plutonium metal

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mullins, L.J.; Christensen, D.C.; Babcock, B.R.

    1982-01-01

    A process for converting impure plutonium dioxide (approx. 96% pure) to high-purity plutonium metal (>99.9%) was developed. The process consists of reducing the oxide to an impure plutonium metal intermediate with calcium metal in molten calcium chloride. The impure intermediate metal is cast into an anode and electrorefined to produce high-purity plutonium metal. The oxide reduction step is being done now on a 0.6-kg scale with the resulting yield being >99.5%. The electrorefining is being done on a 4.0-kg scale with the resulting yield being 80 to 85%. The purity of the product, which averages 99.98%, is essentially insensitive to the purity of the feed metal. The yield, however, is directly dependent on the chemical composition of the feed. To date, approximately 250 kg of impure oxide has been converted to pure metal by this processing sequence. The availability of impure plutonium dioxide, together with the need for pure plutonium metal, makes this sequence a valuable plutonium processing tool.

  3. Independent Activity Report, Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant- May 2012

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Criticality Safety Information Meeting for the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant [HIAR-RL-2012-05-14

  4. Special Nuclear Materials: EM Manages Plutonium, Highly Enriched Uranium

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    and Uranium-233 | Department of Energy Waste Management ¬Ľ Nuclear Materials & Waste ¬Ľ Special Nuclear Materials: EM Manages Plutonium, Highly Enriched Uranium and Uranium-233 Special Nuclear Materials: EM Manages Plutonium, Highly Enriched Uranium and Uranium-233 105-K building houses the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility, designated for the consolidated storage of surplus plutonium at Savannah River Site pending disposition. The plutonium shipped to KAMS is sealed inside a

  5. Independent Oversight Review, Plutonium Finishing Plant- July 2014

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Targeted Review of the Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System and Review of Federal Assurance Capability at the Plutonium Finishing Plant

  6. EIS-0283: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Department of Energy 283: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement EIS-0283: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement Summary This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium. Also see Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental EIS (DOE/EIS-0283-S2). Public Comment Opportunities No public comment opportunities available at this time. Documents Available for Download April 30,

  7. Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic Safety |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Department of Energy Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic Safety Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic Safety Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic Safety PDF icon Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic Safety More Documents & Publications EIS-0236-SA-06: Draft Supplement Analysis FPD's Perspective Photos - Los Alamos National Labratory - NISA EIS-0236-SA-06: Final Supplement Analysis

  8. EA-2024: Gap Material Plutonium - Transport, Receipt, and Processing |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Department of Energy 4: Gap Material Plutonium - Transport, Receipt, and Processing EA-2024: Gap Material Plutonium - Transport, Receipt, and Processing Summary This environmental assessment evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with transporting up to 900 kilograms of plutonium from foreign nations to the United States, storing the plutonium at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and processing it for disposition. This action would be pursued only if it is

  9. EIS-0283-S2: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Impact Statement | Department of Energy 83-S2: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement EIS-0283-S2: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Summary This Supplemental EIS (SEIS) analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with changes to the surplus plutonium disposition program, including changes to the inventory of surplus plutonium and proposed new alternatives. The Final SEIS does not identify a preferred

  10. Method for dissolving delta-phase plutonium

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Karraker, David G. (1600 Sherwood Pl., SE., Aiken, SC 29801)

    1992-01-01

    A process for dissolving plutonium, and in particular, delta-phase plutonium. The process includes heating a mixture of nitric acid, hydroxylammonium nitrate (HAN) and potassium fluoride to a temperature between 40.degree. and 70.degree. C., then immersing the metal in the mixture. Preferably, the nitric acid has a concentration of not more than 2M, the HAN approximately 0.66M, and the potassium fluoride 0.1M. Additionally, a small amount of sulfamic acid, such as 0.1M can be added to assure stability of the HAN in the presence of nitric acid. The oxide layer that forms on plutonium metal may be removed with a non-oxidizing acid as a pre-treatment step.

  11. Alternating layers of plutonium and lead or indium as surrogate for plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rudin, Sven Peter

    2009-01-01

    Elemental plutonium (Pu) assumes more crystal structures than other elements, plausibly due to bonding f electrons becoming non-bonding. Complex geometries hamper understanding of the transition in Pu, but calculations predict this transition in a system with simpler geometry: alternating layers either of plutonium and lead or of plutonium and indium. Here the transition occurs via a pairing-up of atoms within Pu layers. Calculations stepping through this pairing-up reveal valuable details of the transition, for example that the transition from bonding to non-bonding proceeds smoothly.

  12. Fire Protection in Plutonium Facilities | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Protection in Plutonium Facilities Fire Protection in Plutonium Facilities May 5, 2015 Presenter: Rob Plonski, PE, Fire Protection Engineer, Empowered Global Solutions Topics Covered: Pyrophoricity Burning Characteristics Past Events Lessons Learned Moving Forward Questions PDF icon Fire Protection in Plutonium Facilities More Documents & Publications DOE-HDBK-1081-2014 DOE-HDBK-1081-94 DOE-STD-1128-98

  13. Manhattan Project: More Piles and Plutonium, 1942

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    "Met Lab" alumni at the University of Chicago -- Fermi is on the far left of the front row; Zinn is on Fermi's left; Anderson is on the far right of the front row; and Szilard is over Anderson's right shoulder. MORE PILES AND PLUTONIUM (1942) Events > Difficult Choices, 1942 More Uranium Research, 1942 More Piles and Plutonium, 1942 Enter the Army, 1942 Groves and the MED, 1942 Picking Horses, November 1942 Final Approval to Build the Bomb, December 1942 At the University of

  14. Dehydration of plutonium or neptunium trichloride hydrate

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Foropoulos, Jr., Jerry (Los Alamos, NM); Avens, Larry R. (Los Alamos, NM); Trujillo, Eddie A. (Espanola, NM)

    1992-01-01

    A process of preparing anhydrous actinide metal trichlorides of plutonium or neptunium by reacting an aqueous solution of an actinide metal trichloride selected from the group consisting of plutonium trichloride or neptunium trichloride with a reducing agent capable of converting the actinide metal from an oxidation state of +4 to +3 in a resultant solution, evaporating essentially all the solvent from the resultant solution to yield an actinide trichloride hydrate material, dehydrating the actinide trichloride hydrate material by heating the material in admixture with excess thionyl chloride, and recovering anhydrous actinide trichloride is provided.

  15. Dehydration of plutonium or neptunium trichloride hydrate

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Foropoulos, J. Jr.; Avens, L.R.; Trujillo, E.A.

    1992-03-24

    A process is described for preparing anhydrous actinide metal trichlorides of plutonium or neptunium by reacting an aqueous solution of an actinide metal trichloride selected from the group consisting of plutonium trichloride or neptunium trichloride with a reducing agent capable of converting the actinide metal from an oxidation state of +4 to +3 in a resultant solution, evaporating essentially all the solvent from the resultant solution to yield an actinide trichloride hydrate material, dehydrating the actinide trichloride hydrate material by heating the material in admixture with excess thionyl chloride, and recovering anhydrous actinide trichloride.

  16. Separation Of Uranium And Plutonium Isotopes For Measurement By Multi Collector Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectroscopy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Martinelli, R E; Hamilton, T F; Williams, R W; Kehl, S R

    2009-03-29

    Uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) isotopes in coral soils, contaminated by nuclear weapons testing in the northern Marshall Islands, were isolated by ion-exchange chromatography and analyzed by mass spectrometry. The soil samples were spiked with {sup 233}U and {sup 242}Pu tracers, dissolved in minerals acids, and U and Pu isotopes isolated and purified on commercially available ion-exchange columns. The ion-exchange technique employed a TEVA{reg_sign} column coupled to a UTEVA{reg_sign} column. U and Pu isotope fractions were then further isolated using separate elution schemes, and the purified fractions containing U and Pu isotopes analyzed sequentially using multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer (MCICP-MS). High precision measurements of {sup 234}U/{sup 235}U, {sup 238}U/{sup 235}U, {sup 236}U/{sup 235}U, and {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu in soil samples were attained using the described methodology and instrumentation, and provide a basis for conducting more detailed assessments of the behavior and transfer of uranium and plutonium in the environment.

  17. Evaluation of Impurity Extremes in a Plutonium-loaded Borosilicate Glass

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fox, K.M.; Crawford, C.L.; Marra, J.C.; Bibler, N.E.; Hoffman, E.N.; Edwards, T.B. [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken, SC (United States)

    2008-07-01

    A vitrification technology utilizing a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass appears to be a viable option for the disposition of excess weapons-usable plutonium that is not suitable for processing into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. A significant effort to develop a glass formulation and vitrification process to immobilize plutonium was completed in the mid-1990's. The LaBS glass formulation was found to be capable of immobilizing in excess of 10 wt % Pu and to be tolerant of a range of impurities. To confirm the results of previous testing with surrogate Pu feeds containing impurities, four glass compositions were selected for fabrication with actual plutonium oxide and impurities. The four compositions represented extremes in impurity type and concentration. The homogeneity and durability of these four compositions were measured. The homogeneity of the glasses was evaluated using x-ray diffraction (XRD) and scanning electron microscopy coupled with energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM/EDS). The XRD results indicated that the glasses were amorphous with no evidence of crystalline species in the glass. The SEM/EDS analyses did show the presence of some undissolved PuO{sub 2} material. The EDS spectra indicated that some of the PuO{sub 2} crystals also contained hafnium oxide. The SEM/EDS analyses showed that there were no heterogeneities in the glass due to the feed impurities. The durability of the glasses was measured using the Product Consistency Test (PCT). The PCT results indicated that the durability of Pu impurity glasses was comparable with Pu glasses without impurities and significantly more durable than the Environmental Assessment (EA) glass used as the benchmark for repository disposition of high-level waste (HLW) glasses. (authors)

  18. Y-12 weapons work expands in 1950s

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    weapons work expands in 1950s During the era immediately following the end of World War II, as early as 1946, evidence of the Cold War was emerging. Russia was working on its own nuclear weapon, the United States was trying to control the spread of nuclear weapons, but at the same time releasing much of the technology trying to promote peaceful uses of atomic energy. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Graphite Reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was used to create medical isotopes

  19. Two CNS employees selected for prestigious Weapons Internship Program |

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Y-12 National Security Complex Two CNS employees selected ... Two CNS employees selected for prestigious Weapons Internship Program Posted: November 2, 2015 - 5:54pm Print version Aaron Lee is the Y-12 participant in the Weapons Internship Program. Y-12 and Pantex will both be represented during the 2016 Weapons Internship Class. HaliAnne Crawford, a process engineer at Pantex, and Aaron Lee, a shift technical advisor at Y-12, were selected to participate in the highly sought-after

  20. Macroencapsulation Equivalency Guidance for Classified Weapon Components and NNSSWAC Compliance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Poling, J.

    2012-05-15

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex has a surplus of classified legacy weapon components generated over the years with no direct path for disposal. The majority of the components have been held for uncertainty of future use or no identified method of sanitization or disposal. As more weapons are retired, there is an increasing need to reduce the amount of components currently in storage or on hold. A process is currently underway to disposition and dispose of the legacy/retired weapons components across the DOE complex.

  1. Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963.

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I | Department of Energy Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I Terrence R. Fehner and F.G. Gosling. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I (pdf). DOE/MA-0003. Washington,

  2. Electrochemically Modulated Separation for Plutonium Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pratt, Sandra H.; Breshears, Andrew T.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-12-31

    Accurate and timely analysis of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is critical in nuclear safeguards for detection of both protracted and rapid plutonium diversions. Gamma spectroscopy is a viable method for accurate and timely measurements of plutonium provided that the plutonium is well separated from the interfering fission and activation products present in spent nuclear fuel. Electrochemically modulated separation (EMS) is a method that has been used successfully to isolate picogram amounts of Pu from nitric acid matrices. With EMS, Pu adsorption may be turned "on" and "off" depending on the applied voltage, allowing for collection and stripping of Pu without the addition of chemical reagents. In this work, we have scaled up the EMS process to isolate microgram quantities of Pu from matrices encountered in spent nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Several challenges have been addressed including surface area limitations, radiolysis effects, electrochemical cell performance stability, and chemical interferences. After these challenges were resolved, 6 Ķg Pu was deposited in the electrochemical cell with approximately an 800-fold reduction of fission and activation product levels from a spent nuclear fuel sample. Modeling showed that these levels of Pu collection and interference reduction may not be sufficient for Pu detection by gamma spectroscopy. The main remaining challenges are to achieve a more complete Pu isolation and to deposit larger quantities of Pu for successful gamma analysis of Pu. If gamma analyses of Pu are successful, EMS will allow for accurate and timely on-site analysis for enhanced Pu safeguards.

  3. 233-S plutonium concentration facility hazards assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Broz, R.E.

    1994-12-19

    This document establishes the technical basis in support of Emergency Planning activities for the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility on the Hanford Site. The document represents an acceptable interpretation of the implementing guidance document for DOE ORDER 5500.3A. Through this document, the technical basis for the development of facility specific Emergency Action Levels and the Emergency Planning Zone is demonstrated.

  4. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    National Nuclear Security Administration Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact

  5. Westinghouse Advanced Reactors Division Plutonium Fuel Laboratories

    Office of Legacy Management (LM)

    Radiological Condition of the Westinghouse Advanced Reactors Division Plutonium Fuel Laboratories Cheswick, Pennsylvania -. -, -- AGENCY: Office of Operational Safety, Department of Energy ACTION: Notice of Availability of Archival Information Package SUMMARY: The Office of Operational Safety of the Department of Energy (DOE) has, reviewed documentation relating to the decontamination and decommissioning operations conducted at the Westinghouse Advanced Reactor Division laboratories (buildings 7

  6. Quantitative ion-exchange separation of plutonium from impurities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pietri, C.E.; Freeman, B.P.; Weiss, J.R.

    1981-09-01

    The methods used at the New Brunswick Laboratory for the quantitative ion exchange separation of plutonium from impurities prior to plutonium assay are described. Other ion exchange separation procedures for impurity determination and for isotopic abundance measurements are given. The primary technique used consists of sorption of plutonium(IV) in 8N HNO/sub 3/ on Dowex-1 anion exchange resin and elution of the purified plutonium with 0.3N HCl-0.01N HF. Other methods consist of the anion exchange separation of plutonium(IV) in 12N HCl and the cation exchange separation of plutonium(III) in 0.2 N HNO/sub 3/. The application of these procedures to the subsequent assay of plutonium, isotopic analysis, and impurity determination is described.

  7. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    Following President Clinton`s Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.

  8. Risk-Based Decision Process for Accelerated Closure of a Nuclear Weapons Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Butler, L.; Norland, R. L.; DiSalvo, R.; Anderson, M.

    2003-02-25

    Nearly 40 years of nuclear weapons production at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS or Site) resulted in contamination of soil and underground systems and structures with hazardous substances, including plutonium, uranium and hazardous waste constituents. The Site was placed on the National Priority List in 1989. There are more than 370 Individual Hazardous Substance Sites (IHSSs) at RFETS. Accelerated cleanup and closure of RFETS is being achieved through implementation and refinement of a regulatory framework that fosters programmatic and technical innovations: (1) extensive use of ''accelerated actions'' to remediate IHSSs, (2) development of a risk-based screening process that triggers and helps define the scope of accelerated actions consistent with the final remedial action objectives for the Site, (3) use of field instrumentation for real time data collection, (4) a data management system that renders near real time field data assessment, and (5) a regulatory agency consultative process to facilitate timely decisions. This paper presents the process and interim results for these aspects of the accelerated closure program applied to Environmental Restoration activities at the Site.

  9. Supercritical-fluid carbon dioxide (SCCO{sub 2}) cleaning of nuclear weapon components

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Taylor, C.M.V.; Sivils, L.D.; Rubin, J.B.

    1998-05-01

    Supercritical fluid carbon dioxide (SCCO{sub 2}) has been evaluated as a cleaning solvent for the cleaning of plutonium (Pu) metal parts. The results of the evaluation show that SCCO{sub 2} is an effective alternative to halogenated solvents that are conventionally used for removing organic and inorganic contaminants from the surface of these parts. The cleaning process was demonstrated at the laboratory scale for steel and uranium substrates and has been found to be compatible with Pu. The efficacy of this cleaning method is found to be dependent on process conditions of pressure, temperature, fluid-flow rate, as well as cleaning time. Process parameters of P > 2,500 psi, T > 40 C, and moderate fluid flow rates, produced good cleaning results in less than 10 minutes using a simple flow-through process configuration. Within the parameter range studied, cleaning efficiency generally improved with increasing process pressure and flow rate. SCCO{sub 2} cleaning is suitable for a variety of component cleaning tasks and is adaptable to precision cleaning requirements. The SCCO{sub 2} cleaning process is currently being developed for deployment for weapons production at LANL.

  10. Little Boy weaponeer William "Deak" Parsons, wartime Los Alamos...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    at the beginning of World War II, came to the Lab to oversee the engineering of Fat Man and Little Boy to be combat weapons. Parsons also served as one of the first two...

  11. Arms Control: US and International efforts to ban biological weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-12-01

    The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

  12. Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-12-17

    This directive establishes requirements and responsibilities to prevent the deliberate unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear explosives and U.S. nuclear weapons. Cancels DOE O 452.4.

  13. Briefing, Classification of Nuclear Weapons-Related Information

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This brief will familiarize individuals from agencies outside of DOE who may come in contact with RD and FRD with the procedures for identifying, classifying, marking, handling, and declassifying documents containing Nuclear Weapons-Related Information.

  14. Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    This report described each step in the cycle of nuclear weapons production and defined for the first time a planned disposition path for all waste streams generated prior to 1992 ...

  15. SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    UNAUTHORIZED USE 1. PURPOSE. This NNSA Supplemental Directive (SD) supports the requirements of DOE O 452.4B, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons. ...

  16. NNSA implements nondestructive gas sampling technique for nuclear weapon

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    components | Y-12 National Security Complex implements ... NNSA implements nondestructive gas sampling technique for nuclear weapon components Posted: June 12, 2012 - 1:34pm The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today announced that it has deployed a nondestructive process at its Y-12 facility for assessing nuclear weapon components as part of its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, called Nondestructive Laser Gas Sampling (NDLGS). The NDLGS system is capable of

  17. Tag: weapons production | Y-12 National Security Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    weapons production Tag: weapons production Displaying 1 - 3 of 3... Category: News Y-12 National Security Complex Completes W69 Dismantlement Dismantlement of W69 canned subassemblies has been completed at the Y-12 National Security Complex. More... Category: Nuclear Deterrence Material Management/Strategic Reserve Y-12 ensures safe, secure and compliant storage of the nation's strategic reserve of nuclear materials at Y-12. More... Category: Nuclear Deterrence Material Recycle and Recovery Y-12

  18. Materiel availability modeling and analysis for a complex army weapon

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    system. (Conference) | SciTech Connect Materiel availability modeling and analysis for a complex army weapon system. Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Materiel availability modeling and analysis for a complex army weapon system. Materiel availability (A{sub m}) is a new US Department of Defense Key Performance Parameter (KPP) implemented through a mandatory Sustainment Metric consisting of an Availability KPP and two supporting Key System Attributes (KSAs), materiel reliability and

  19. Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    sampling Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas sampling Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas sampling Nondestructive laser welding process far less expensive, no underground testing. June 8, 2012 Nondestructive Laser Gas Sampling Nondestructive Laser Gas Sampling is expected to save several million dollars per year and requires no underground testing. "We're continually innovating and working to improve the way we do

  20. Los Alamos National Laboratory names new head of weapons programs

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Laboratory names new head of weapons programs Los Alamos National Laboratory names new head of weapons programs Bret Knapp has been acting in that position since June 2011. December 1, 2011 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a

  1. Improved Reliability of Ballistic Weapons and Combustion Engines - Energy

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Innovation Portal Vehicles and Fuels Vehicles and Fuels Advanced Materials Advanced Materials Find More Like This Return to Search Improved Reliability of Ballistic Weapons and Combustion Engines Methods of Forming Boron Nitride DOE Grant Recipients Idaho National Laboratory Contact GRANT About This Technology Publications: PDF Document Publication 8968827.pdf (626 KB) Technology Marketing Summary A novel method for coating the barrel of a ballistic weapon or its bullets with a unique

  2. Gordon Assesses Security At Nuclear Weapons Complex News...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Anson Franklin, 202/586-7371 September 21, 2001 NNSA Administrator Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons Complex John Gordon, Administrator of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), conducted a two-day tour of NNSA laboratory and plant facilities in five states to assess security preparations and to thank security guard force personnel for their work to protect the nation's nuclear weapons complex. Gordon made the trip to review the current security

  3. FAQS Qualification Card - Weapon Quality Assurance | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Weapon Quality Assurance FAQS Qualification Card - Weapon Quality Assurance A key element for the Department's Technical Qualification Programs is a set of common Functional Area Qualification Standards (FAQS) and associated Job Task Analyses (JTA). These standards are developed for various functional areas of responsibility in the Department, including oversight of safety management programs identified as hazard controls in Documented Safety Analyses (DSA). For each functional area, the FAQS

  4. National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Workers | Department of Energy National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers October 28, 2013 - 3:11pm Addthis Color Guard | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Color Guard | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 US Representative Dina Titus (1st Congressional District of Nevada) | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 US Representative Dina Titus (1st

  5. EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel | Department of Energy 18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel SUMMARY This study analyzes the potential environmental impacts of adopting a policy to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. In particular, the

  6. Measurements of plutonium, 237Np, and 137Cs in the BCR 482 lichen reference material

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lavelle, Kevin B.; Miller, Jeffrey L.; Hanson, Susan K.; Connick, William B.; Spitz, Henry B.; Glover, Samuel E.; Oldham, Warren J.

    2015-10-01

    Select anthropogenic radionuclides were measured in lichen reference material, BCR 482. This material was originally collected in Axalp, Switzerland in 1991 and is composed of the epiphytic lichen Pseudevernia furfuracea. Samples from three separate bottles of BCR 482 were analyzed for uranium, neptunium, and plutonium isotopes by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and analyzed for cesium-137 by gamma-ray spectrometry. The isotopic composition of the radionuclides measured in BCR 482 suggests contributions from both global fallout resulting from historical nuclear weapons testing and more volatile materials released following the Chernobyl accident.

  7. A Note on the Reaction of Hydrogen and Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-15

    Plutonium hydride has many practical and experimental purposes. The reaction of plutonium and hydrogen has interesting characteristics, which will be explored in the following analysis. Plutonium is a radioactive actinide metal that emits alpha particles. When plutonium metal is exposed to air, the plutonium oxides and hydrides, and the volume increases. PuH{sub 2} and Pu{sub 2}O{sub 3} are the products. Hydrogen is a catalyst for plutonium's corrosion in air. The reaction can take place at room temperature because it is fairly insensitive to temperature. Plutonium hydride, or PuH{sub 2}, is black and metallic. After PuH{sub 2} is formed, it quickly flakes off and burns. The reaction of hydrogen and plutonium is described as pyrophoric because the product will spontaneously ignite when oxygen is present. This tendency must be considered in the storage of metal plutonium. The reaction is characterized as reversible and nonstoichiometric. The reaction goes as such: Pu + H{sub 2} {yields} PuH{sub 2}. When PuH{sub 2} is formed, the hydrogen/plutonium ratio is between 2 and 2.75 (approximately). As more hydrogen is added to the system, the ratio increases. When the ratio exceeds 2.75, PuH{sub 3} begins to form along with PuH{sub 2}. Once the ratio surpasses 2.9, only PuH{sub 3} remains. The volume of the plutonium sample increases because of the added hydrogen and the change in crystal structure which the sample undergoes. As more hydrogen is added to a system of metal plutonium, the crystal structure evolves. Plutonium has a crystal structure classified as monoclinic. A monoclinic crystal structure appears to be a rectangular prism. When plutonium reacts with hydrogen, the product PuH{sub 2}, becomes a fluorite structure. It can also be described as a face centered cubic structure. PuH{sub 3} forms a hexagonal crystal structure. As plutonium evolves from metal plutonium to plutonium hydride to plutonium trihydride, the crystal structure evolves from monoclinic to fluorite to hexagonal. This change in crystal structure as a result of adding hydrogen is a shared characteristic with other actinide elements. Americium is isostructural with plutonium because they both form cubic dihyrides and hexagonal trihydrides. Reacting hydrogen with plutonium has the practical application of separating plutonium from other materials that don't react as well with hydrogen. When plutonium is placed in a chamber where there is very little oxygen, it can react with hydrogen without igniting. The hydrogen plutonium reaction can then be reversed, thus regaining the separated plutonium. Another application of this reaction is that it can be used to predict how plutonium reacts with other substances. Deuterium and tritium are two isotopes of hydrogen that are of interest. They are known to react likewise to hydrogen because they have similar properties. The reaction of plutonium and isotopes of hydrogen can prove to be very informative.

  8. EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri

  9. Canada and the United States Cooperate to Shut Down One of the Last

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Reactors in Russia | Department of Energy Canada and the United States Cooperate to Shut Down One of the Last Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Reactors in Russia Canada and the United States Cooperate to Shut Down One of the Last Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Reactors in Russia March 30, 2005 - 11:08am Addthis WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew and United States Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman today announced the

  10. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    145-2008 April 2008 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax (301) 903-9823. Available to the public

  11. Real-time monitoring of plutonium content in uranium-plutonium alloys

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Li, Shelly Xiaowei; Westphal, Brian Robert; Herrmann, Steven Douglas

    2015-09-01

    A method and device for the real-time, in-situ monitoring of Plutonium content in U--Pu Alloys comprising providing a crucible. The crucible has an interior non-reactive to a metallic U--Pu alloy within said interior of said crucible. The U--Pu alloy comprises metallic uranium and plutonium. The U--Pu alloy is heated to a liquid in an inert or reducing atmosphere. The heated U--Pu alloy is then cooled to a solid in an inert or reducing atmosphere. As the U--Pu alloy is cooled, the temperature of the U--Pu alloy is monitored. A solidification temperature signature is determined from the monitored temperature of the U--Pu alloy during the step of cooling. The amount of Uranium and the amount of Plutonium in the U--Pu alloy is then determined from the determined solidification temperature signature.

  12. Neutrons find "missing" magnetism of plutonium

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Neutrons find "missing" magnetism of plutonium Neutrons find "missing" magnetism of plutonium Groundbreaking work at two Department of Energy national laboratories has confirmed plutonium's magnetism, which scientists have long theorized but have never been able to experimentally observe. July 10, 2015 Doug Abernathy, left, ARCS instrument scientist at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Marc Janoschek, Los Alamos National Laboratory, prepare their sample for experiments at

  13. Additional public meeting on plutonium disposition on September 18

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Additional Public Meeting on Plutonium Disposition Community Connections: Your link to news and opportunities from Los Alamos National Laboratory Latest Issue:Mar. 2016 all issues All Issues ¬Ľ submit Additional public meeting on plutonium disposition on September 18 DOE has extended the public review and comment period for the Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). September 1, 2012 dummy image Read our archives Contacts Editor Linda

  14. PLUTONIUM-238 RECOVERY FROM IRRADIATED NEPTUNIUM TARGETS USING SOLVENT

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    EXTRACTION (Conference) | SciTech Connect PLUTONIUM-238 RECOVERY FROM IRRADIATED NEPTUNIUM TARGETS USING SOLVENT EXTRACTION Citation Details In-Document Search Title: PLUTONIUM-238 RECOVERY FROM IRRADIATED NEPTUNIUM TARGETS USING SOLVENT EXTRACTION The United States Department of Energy proposes to re-establish a domestic capability for producing plutonium-238 (238Pu) to fuel radioisotope power systems primarily in support of future space missions. A conceptual design report is currently

  15. Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah River

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Site, USA. A Long-Term Study (Journal Article) | SciTech Connect Journal Article: Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah River Site, USA. A Long-Term Study Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah River Site, USA. A Long-Term Study This work presents the findings of a long term plutonium study at Savannah River Site (SRS) conducted between 2003 and 2013. Terrestrial environmental samples were

  16. Kondo universality, energy scales, and intermediate valence in plutonium

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    (Journal Article) | SciTech Connect Journal Article: Kondo universality, energy scales, and intermediate valence in plutonium Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Kondo universality, energy scales, and intermediate valence in plutonium On the basis of the concepts of an intermediate-valence (IV) regime, an analysis is carried out of macroscopic properties of the {alpha} and {delta} phases of plutonium, as well as of several model systems based on rare earth elements. Within a

  17. EIS-0244: Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization, Hanford Site, Richland, WA

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS evaluates the impacts on the human environment of: Stabilization of residual, plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP Facility to a form suitable for interim storage at the PFP Facility. Immobilization of residual plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP Facility. Removal of readily retrievable, plutonium-bearing materials left behind in process equipment, process areas, and air and liquid waste management systems as a result of historic uses.

  18. U.S. Plutonium "Pit" Production: Additional Facilities, Production

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    ... investment over contingency planning signals an intent to produce new-design warheads ... process, and prepare metal 4. Cast and machine new plutonium pit 5. Fabricate other pit ...

  19. EIS-0276: Rocky Flats Plutonium Storage, Golden, Colorado

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS analyzes DOE's proposed action to provide safe interim storage of approximately 10 metric tons of plutonium at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS).

  20. Plutonium Certified Reference Materials Price List | U.S. DOE...

    Office of Science (SC) Website

    Plutonium Certified Reference Materials Price List New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) NBL Home About Programs Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) Prices and Certificates Ordering ...

  1. Elastic Moduli of Unalloyed Delta Plutonium (Conference) | SciTech...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Resource Relation: Conference: Plutonium Futures 2012 ; 2012-07-16 - 2012-07-20 ; Cambridge, United Kingdom Research Org: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Sponsoring Org:...

  2. Instability and Anharmonicity in Plutonium Thermo-physical Properties...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP: FUNDAMENTAL PLUTONIUM PROPERTIES ; 2012-07-21 - 2012-07-22 ; Cambridge, United Kingdom Research Org: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Sponsoring Org:...

  3. Instability and Anharmonicity in Plutonium Thermo-physical Properties...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Resource Relation: Conference: XII INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP: FUNDAMENTAL PLUTONIUM PROPERTIES ; 2012-07-21 - 2012-07-22 ; Cambridge, United Kingdom Research Org: Los Alamos National ...

  4. Probing Radiation Damage in Plutonium Alloys with Multiple Measurement...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Conference: Probing Radiation Damage in Plutonium Alloys with Multiple Measurement ... as well as external parameters such as the temperature and starting material composition. ...

  5. President Truman Increases Production of Uranium and Plutonium...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Increases Production of Uranium and Plutonium | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing...

  6. Design of the improved plutonium canister assay system (IPCAS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Abhold, M. E.; Baker, M. C.; Bourret, S. C.; Polk, P. J.; Vo, Duc T.

    2001-01-01

    The improved Plutonium Canister Assay System (iPCAS) is designed to detect gross and partial defects in the declared plutonium content of plutonium and MOX storage canisters during transfer to storage and process areas of the MOX fuel fabrication facility in Kokkasho, Japan. In addition, an associated Gamma Isotopics System (GIS) will be used to confirm facility-declared plutonium isotopics with accuracy sufficient to reduce the amount of destructive isotopic analysis needed. The design of the iPCAS instrument and its associated GIS is described and the expected performance of the instrument is discussed.

  7. Investigation of the November 8, 2011, Plutonium Contamination...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    the Zero Power Physics Reactor Facility, at the Idaho National Laboratory Investigation of the November 8, 2011, Plutonium Contamination in the Zero Power Physics Reactor ...

  8. PLUTONIUM RECOVERY FROM NEUTRON-BOMBARDED URANIUM FUEL

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Moore, R.H.

    1962-04-10

    A process of recovering plutonium from neutronbombarded uranium fuel by dissolving the fuel in equimolar aluminum chloride-potassium chloride; heating the mass to above 700 deg C for decomposition of plutonium tetrachloride to the trichloride; extracting the plutonium trichloride into a molten salt containing from 40 to 60 mole % of lithium chloride, from 15 to 40 mole % of sodium chloride, and from 0 to 40 mole % of potassium chloride or calcium chloride; and separating the layer of equimolar chlorides containing the uranium from the layer formed of the plutonium-containing salt is described. (AEC)

  9. Elastic Moduli of Unalloyed Delta Plutonium (Conference) | SciTech...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    United States Language: English Subject: 36 MATERIALS SCIENCE; 75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND SUPERFLUIDITY; ELASTICITY; MECHANICAL PROPERTIES; PLUTONIUM-DELTA...

  10. Selected papers for global `95 concerning plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1996-06-14

    This report contains selected papers from the Global `95 Conference ``Evaluation of Emerging Nuclear Fuel Cycle Systems,`` held in Versailles, Sept. 11-14, 1995. The 11 papers in Part I are from ``Benefits and Risks of Reprocessing`` sessions. The 7 papers in Part II are some of the more interesting poster papers that relate to the use of Pu for power generation. Finally, the 3 papers are on the topic of management and disposition of Pu from retired nuclear weapons.

  11. Preliminary results of calculations for heavy-water nuclear-power-plant reactors employing {sup 235}U, {sup 233}U, and {sup 232}Th as a fuel and meeting requirements of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ioffe, B. L.; Kochurov, B. P.

    2012-02-15

    A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of {sup 235}U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving {sup 233}U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.

  12. Type A Accident Investigation of the March 16, 2000, Plutonium-238 Multiple

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Intake Event at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico | Department of Energy March 16, 2000, Plutonium-238 Multiple Intake Event at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico Type A Accident Investigation of the March 16, 2000, Plutonium-238 Multiple Intake Event at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico July 1, 2000 On March 16, 2000, at approximately 2 p.m., a radiological release of plutonium-238 occurred

  13. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-12-31

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  14. Chemical Disposition of Plutonium in Hanford Site Tank Wastes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Delegard, Calvin H.; Jones, Susan A.

    2015-05-07

    This report examines the chemical disposition of plutonium (Pu) in Hanford Site tank wastes, by itself and in its observed and potential interactions with the neutron absorbers aluminum (Al), cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn), nickel (Ni), and sodium (Na). Consideration also is given to the interactions of plutonium with uranium (U). No consideration of the disposition of uranium itself as an element with fissile isotopes is considered except tangentially with respect to its interaction as an absorber for plutonium. The report begins with a brief review of Hanford Site plutonium processes, examining the various means used to recover plutonium from irradiated fuel and from scrap, and also examines the intermediate processing of plutonium to prepare useful chemical forms. The paper provides an overview of Hanford tank defined-waste‚Äďtype compositions and some calculations of the ratios of plutonium to absorber elements in these waste types and in individual waste analyses. These assessments are based on Hanford tank waste inventory data derived from separately published, expert assessments of tank disposal records, process flowsheets, and chemical/radiochemical analyses. This work also investigates the distribution and expected speciation of plutonium in tank waste solution and solid phases. For the solid phases, both pure plutonium compounds and plutonium interactions with absorber elements are considered. These assessments of plutonium chemistry are based largely on analyses of idealized or simulated tank waste or strongly alkaline systems. The very limited information available on plutonium behavior, disposition, and speciation in genuine tank waste also is discussed. The assessments show that plutonium coprecipitates strongly with chromium, iron, manganese and uranium absorbers. Plutonium‚Äôs chemical interactions with aluminum, nickel, and sodium are minimal to non-existent. Credit for neutronic interaction of plutonium with these absorbers occurs only if they are physically proximal in solution or the plutonium present in the solid phase is intimately mixed with compounds or solutions of these absorbers. No information on the potential chemical interaction of plutonium with cadmium was found in the technical literature. Definitive evidence of sorption or adsorption of plutonium onto various solid phases from strongly alkaline media is less clear-cut, perhaps owing to fewer studies and to some well-attributed tests run under conditions exceeding the very low solubility of plutonium. The several studies that are well-founded show that only about half of the plutonium is adsorbed from waste solutions onto sludge solid phases. The organic complexants found in many Hanford tank waste solutions seem to decrease plutonium uptake onto solids. A number of studies show plutonium sorbs effectively onto sodium titanate. Finally, this report presents findings describing the behavior of plutonium vis-√†-vis other elements during sludge dissolution in nitric acid based on Hanford tank waste experience gained by lab-scale tests, chemical and radiochemical sample characterization, and full-scale processing in preparation for strontium-90 recovery from PUREX sludges.

  15. EIS-0136: Special Isotope Separation Project Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho Falls, Idaho

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The U.S. Department of Energy developed this EIS to provide environmental input to the decision to construct the Special Isotope Separation Project, which would allow for the processing of existing fuel-grade plutonium into weapons-grade plutonium using the Atomic Laser Isotope Separation process.

  16. PLUTONIUM-238 PRODUCTION TARGET DESIGN STUDIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hurt, Christopher J [ORNL; Wham, Robert M [ORNL; Hobbs, Randall W [ORNL; Owens, R Steven [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Maldonado, G Ivan [ORNL

    2014-01-01

    A new supply chain is planned for plutonium-238 using existing reactors at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and existing chemical recovery facilities at ORNL. Validation and testing activities for new irradiation target designs have been conducted in three phases over a 2 year period to provide data for scale-up to production. Target design, qualification, target fabrication, and irradiation of fully-loaded targets have been accomplished. Data from post-irradiation examination (PIE) supports safety analysis and irradiation of future target designs.

  17. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1145-2013 March 2013 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy TRNG-0061 Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax (301) 903-9823. Available to the

  18. Fuel bundle design for enhanced usage of plutonium fuel

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Reese, Anthony P.; Stachowski, Russell E.

    1995-01-01

    A nuclear fuel bundle includes a square array of fuel rods each having a concentration of enriched uranium and plutonium. Each rod of an interior array of the rods also has a concentration of gadolinium. The interior array of rods is surrounded by an exterior array of rods void of gadolinium. By this design, usage of plutonium in the nuclear reactor is enhanced.

  19. Procedure for plutonium determination using Pu(VI) spectra

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Walker, L.F.; Temer, D.J.; Jackson, D.D.

    1996-09-01

    This document describes a simple spectrophotometric method for determining total plutonium in nitric acid solutions based on the spectrum of Pu(VI). Plutonium samples in nitric acid are oxidized to Pu(VI) with Ce(IV) and the net absorbance at the 830 nm peak is measured.

  20. Recommended plutonium release fractions from postulated fires. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kogan, V.; Schumacher, P.M.

    1993-12-01

    This report was written at the request of EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc. in support of joint emergency planning for the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) by EG&G and the State of Colorado. The intent of the report is to provide the State of Colorado with an independent assessment of any respirable plutonium releases that might occur in the event of a severe fire at the plant. Fire releases of plutonium are of interest because they have been used by EG&G to determine the RFP emergency planning zones. These zones are based on the maximum credible accident (MCA) described in the RFP Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) of 1980, that MCA is assumed to be a large airplane crashing into a RFP plutonium building.The objective of this report was first, to perform a worldwide literature review of relevant release experiments from 1960 to the present and to summarize those findings, and second, to provide recommendations for application of the experimental data to fire release analyses at Rocky Flats. The latter step requires translation between experimental and expected RFP accident parameters, or ``scaling.`` The parameters of particular concern are: quantities of material, environmental parameters such as the intensity of a fire, and the physico-chemical forms of the plutonium. The latter include plutonium metal, bulk plutonium oxide powder, combustible and noncombustible wastes contaminated with plutonium oxide powder, and residues from plutonium extraction processes.

  1. Processing of Non-PFP Plutonium Oxide in Hanford Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jones, Susan A.; Delegard, Calvin H.

    2011-03-10

    Processing of non-irradiated plutonium oxide, PuO2, scrap for recovery of plutonium values occurred routinely at Hanfordís Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) in glovebox line operations. Plutonium oxide is difficult to dissolve, particularly if it has been high-fired; i.e., calcined to temperatures above about 400įC and much of it was. Dissolution of the PuO2 in the scrap typically was performed in PFPís Miscellaneous Treatment line using nitric acid (HNO3) containing some source of fluoride ion, F-, such as hydrofluoric acid (HF), sodium fluoride (NaF), or calcium fluoride (CaF2). The HNO3 concentration generally was 6 M or higher whereas the fluoride concentration was ~0.5 M or lower. At higher fluoride concentrations, plutonium fluoride (PuF4) would precipitate, thus limiting the plutonium dissolution. Some plutonium-bearing scrap also contained PuF4 and thus required no added fluoride. Once the plutonium scrap was dissolved, the excess fluoride was complexed with aluminum ion, Al3+, added as aluminum nitrate, Al(NO3)3ē9H2O, to limit collateral damage to the process equipment by the corrosive fluoride. Aluminum nitrate also was added in low quantities in processing PuF4.

  2. Proceedings of the Tungsten Workshop for Hard Target Weapons Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mackiewicz-Ludtka, G.; Hayden, H.W.; Davis, R.M.

    1995-06-01

    The purpose of this meeting was to review and exchange information and provide technical input for improving technologies relevant to the Hard Target Weapons Program. This workshop was attended by representatives from 17 organizations, including 4 Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, 8 industrial companies, and 5 laboratories within DOE. Hard targets are defined as reinforced underground structures that house enemy forces, weapon systems, and support equipment. DOE-ORO and Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems) have been involved in advanced materials research and development (R&D) for several DOE and DoD programs. These programs are conducted in close collaboration with Eglin AFB, Department of the Army`s Picatinny Arsenal, and other DoD agencies. As part of this ongoing collaboration, Eglin AFB and Oak Ridge National Laboratory planned and conducted this workshop to support the Hard Target Weapons Program. The objectives of this workshop were to (1) review and identify the technology base that exists (primarily due to anti-armor applications) and assess the applicability of this technology to the Hard Target Weapons Program requirements; (2) determine future directions to establish the W materials, processing, and manufacturing technologies suitable for use in fixed, hard target penetrators; and (3) identify and prioritize the potential areas for technical collaboration among the participants.

  3. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-11-19

    The Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control (UC) elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts (DUAs), deliberate unauthorized use (DUU), and denial of authorized use (DAU).

  4. The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-01-01

    This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

  5. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-01-22

    This Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts/deliberate unauthorized use. Cancels DOE O 452.4A. Canceled by DOE O 452.4C.

  6. NNSA Administrator Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    | National Nuclear Security Administration Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons Complex | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets

  7. Sandia completes major overhaul of key nuclear weapons test facilities |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    National Nuclear Security Administration completes major overhaul of key nuclear weapons test facilities | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets

  8. Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Security Administration Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases

  9. President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon | National

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Nuclear Security Administration Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases

  10. Sandia starts silicon wafer production for three nuclear weapon programs |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    National Nuclear Security Administration starts silicon wafer production for three nuclear weapon programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact

  11. CRAD, Configuration Management- Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Configuration Management program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Weapons Facility.

  12. NNSA Administrator, Three Lab Directors Tour Key Weapons Facility |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator, Three Lab Directors Tour Key Weapons Facility | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets

  13. Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Administration Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Photo Gallery Jobs Apply for Our

  14. Thermal Stability Studies of Candidate Decontamination Agents for Hanfordís Plutonium Finishing Plant Plutonium-Contaminated Gloveboxes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Scheele, Randall D.; Cooper, Thurman D.; Jones, Susan A.; Ewalt, John R.; Compton, James A.; Trent, Donald S.; Edwards, Matthew K.; Kozelisky, Anne E.; Scott, Paul A.; Minette, Michael J.

    2005-09-29

    This report provides the results of PNNL's and Fluor's studies of the thermal stabilities of potential wastes arising from decontamination of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant's plutonium contaminated gloveboxes. The candidate wastes arising from the decontamination technologies ceric nitrate/nitric acid, RadPro, Glygel, and Aspigel.

  15. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility.

  16. Co-Design: Fabrication of Unalloyed Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Korzekwa, Deniece R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Knapp, Cameron M. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Korzekwa, David A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Gibbs, John W [Northwestern University

    2012-07-25

    The successful induction casting of plutonium is a challenge which requires technical expertise in areas including physical metallurgy, surface and corrosion chemistry, materials science, electromagnetic engineering and a host of other technologies all which must be applied in concert. Here at LANL, we are employing a combined experimental and computational approach to design molds and develop process parameters needed to produce desired temperature profiles and improved castings. Computer simulations are performed using the commercial code FLOW-3D and the LANL ASC computer code TRUCHAS to reproduce the entire casting process starting with electromagnetic or radiative heating of the mold and metal and continuing through pouring with coupled fluid flow, heat transfer and non-isothermal solidification. This approach greatly reduces the time required to develop a new casting designs and also increases our understanding of the casting process, leading to a more homogeneous, consistent product and better process control. We will discuss recent casting development results in support of unalloyed plutonium rods for mechanical testing.

  17. U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home About Us Our History NNSA Timeline U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons May...

  18. Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production Processes to Their Environmental Consequences

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This report described each step in the cycle of nuclear weapons production and defined for the first time a planned disposition path for all waste streams generated prior to 1992 as a result of weapons production.

  19. Y-12, the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement ¬Ą Or:...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement - Or: The Cold War and nuclear weapons dismantlement (title used in The Oak Ridger) The Cold War heated up over the years with such ...

  20. Los Alamos turns its nuclear weapons power to war on cancer

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Los Alamos turns its nuclear weapons power to war on cancer Los Alamos turns its nuclear weapons power to war on cancer Los Alamos Physicist Eva Birnbaum shows how the laboratory ...

  1. Charles McMillan to lead Los Alamos National Laboratory's Weapons...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Charles McMillan to lead Los Alamos National Laboratory's Weapons Program He will provide oversight and direction for the nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos to accomplish the ...

  2. Kondo universality, energy scales, and intermediate valence in plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Clementyev, E. S.; Mirmelstein, A. V.

    2009-07-15

    On the basis of the concepts of an intermediate-valence (IV) regime, an analysis is carried out of macroscopic properties of the {alpha} and {delta} phases of plutonium, as well as of several model systems based on rare earth elements. Within a single-site approximation (SSA), the characteristic Kondo interaction energy, the f-electron shell occupation number, the effective degeneracy of the ground-state f multiplet, and the crystal field splitting energy are estimated. The ground state in plutonium is considered as a quantum-mechanical superposition of states with different valences. The temperature dependence of the static magnetic susceptibility of {delta} plutonium is calculated. It is shown that {delta} plutonium satisfies the Wilson and Kadowaki-Woods universal relations, whereby it can be classified as a Kondo system. At the same time, the problem of the position of plutonium in the general classification of solids, as well as the problem of the temperature dependence of magnetic susceptibility of {delta} plutonium, remains open. The concept of multiple intermediate valence (MIV) is put forward as a possible means for solving the above problems. The MIV regime is characterized by fluctuations from the basic configuration 3+ to the states 4+ and 2+, which make a fundamental difference between plutonium and 4f electron systems based, say, on samarium.

  3. Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ackerman, John P.

    1992-01-01

    A process for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished.

  4. Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ackerman, J.P.

    1992-03-17

    A process is described for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished.

  5. Summary - Plutonium Preparation Project at the Savannah River Site

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Site EM Project: PuPP ETR Report Date: October 2008 ETR-17 United States Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) External Technical Review of the Plutonium Preparation Project at the Savannah River Site Why DOE-EM Did This Review The purpose of the Plutonium Preparation Project (PuPP) is to prepare for disposition of plutonium materials; for examination, re-stabilization, and disassembly of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) unirradiated fuel; and for repackaging of Pu

  6. Grades K-4

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Build a Tower Grades K-4 Learning objective: Students will develop teamwork skills as they work together to design and construct a tower, problem-solving along the way. These are...

  7. Plutonium immobilization plant using glass in existing facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DiSabatino, A., LLNL

    1998-06-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a glass immobilization process, converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors.

  8. DARHT Delivers Cibola Takes Flight Plutonium Superconductivity

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    663 DARHT Delivers Cibola Takes Flight Plutonium Superconductivity Not for the Birds l o S a l a m o S N a T i o N a l l a B o r a T o r y loS alamoS SCieNCe aND TeChNology magaziNe may 2007 1 663 From Terry Wallace About Our Name: During World War II, all that the outside world knew of Los Alamos and its top-secret laboratory was the mailing address-P . O. Box 1663, Santa Fe, New Mexico. That box number, still part of our address, symbolizes our historic role in the nation's service. Located on

  9. Site restoration: Estimation of attributable costs from plutonium-dispersal accidents

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chanin, D.I.; Murfin, W.B.

    1996-05-01

    A nuclear weapons accident is an extremely unlikely event due to the extensive care taken in operations. However, under some hypothetical accident conditions, plutonium might be dispersed to the environment. This would result in costs being incurred by the government to remediate the site and compensate for losses. This study is a multi-disciplinary evaluation of the potential scope of the post-accident response that includes technical factors, current and proposed legal requirements and constraints, as well as social/political factors that could influence decision making. The study provides parameters that can be used to assess economic costs for accidents postulated to occur in urban areas, Midwest farmland, Western rangeland, and forest. Per-area remediation costs have been estimated, using industry-standard methods, for both expedited and extended remediation. Expedited remediation costs have been evaluated for highways, airports, and urban areas. Extended remediation costs have been evaluated for all land uses except highways and airports. The inclusion of cost estimates in risk assessments, together with the conventional estimation of doses and health effects, allows a fuller understanding of the post-accident environment. The insights obtained can be used to minimize economic risks by evaluation of operational and design alternatives, and through development of improved capabilities for accident response.

  10. Plutonium-bearing materials feed report for the DOE Fissile Materials Disposition Program alternatives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brough, W.G.; Boerigter, S.T.

    1995-04-06

    This report has identified all plutonium currently excess to DOE Defense Programs under current planning assumptions. A number of material categories win clearly fan within the scope of the MD (Materials Disposition) program, but the fate of the other categories are unknown at the present time. MD planning requires that estimates be made of those materials likely to be considered for disposition actions so that bounding cases for the PEIS (Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement) can be determined and so that processing which may be required can be identified in considering the various alternatives. A systematic analysis of the various alternatives in reachmg the preferred alternative requires an understanding of the possible range of values which may be taken by the various categories of feed materials. One table identifies the current total inventories excess to Defense Program planning needs and represents the bounding total of Pu which may become part of the MD disposition effort for all materials, except site return weapons. The other categories, principally irradiated fuel, rich scrap, and lean scrap, are discussed. Another table summarizes the ranges and expected quantities of Pu which could become the responsibility of the MD program. These values are to be used for assessing the impact of the various alternatives and for scaling operations to assess PEIS impact. Determination of the actual materials to be included in the disposition program will be done later.

  11. ARRAYS OF BOTTLES OF PLUTONIUM NITRATE SOLUTION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Margaret A. Marshall

    2012-09-01

    In October and November of 1981 thirteen approaches-to-critical were performed on a remote split table machine (RSTM) in the Critical Mass Laboratory of Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) in Richland, Washington using planar arrays of polyethylene bottles filled with plutonium (Pu) nitrate solution. Arrays of up to sixteen bottles were used to measure the critical number of bottles and critical array spacing with a tight fitting Plexiglasģ reflector on all sides of the arrays except the top. Some experiments used Plexiglas shells fitted around each bottles to determine the effect of moderation on criticality. Each bottle contained approximately 2.4 L of Pu(NO3)4 solution with a Pu content of 105 g Pu/L and a free acid molarity H+ of 5.1. The plutonium was of low 240Pu (2.9 wt.%) content. These experiments were sponsored by Rockwell Hanford Operations because of the lack of experimental data on the criticality of arrays of bottles of Pu solution such as might be found in storage and handling at the Purex Facility at Hanford. The results of these experiments were used ďto provide benchmark data to validate calculational codes used in criticality safety assessments of [the] plant configurationsĒ (Ref. 1). Data for this evaluation were collected from the published report (Ref. 1), the approach to critical logbook, the experimenterís logbook, and communication with the primary experimenter, B. Michael Durst. Of the 13 experiments preformed 10 were evaluated. One of the experiments was not evaluated because it had been thrown out by the experimenter, one was not evaluated because it was a repeat of another experiment and the third was not evaluated because it reported the critical number of bottles as being greater than 25. Seven of the thirteen evaluated experiments were determined to be acceptable benchmark experiments. A similar experiment using uranyl nitrate was benchmarked as U233-SOL-THERM-014.

  12. Special isotope separation at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hendrickson, P.D.

    1989-02-03

    The SIS facilities will include a Plutonium Processing Facility (PPF), a Laser Support Facility (LSF), and all associated equipment required for isotope separation. The SIS Plant will process fuel-grade plutonium into weapons-grade plutonium using Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) and supporting chemical processes. The AVLIS process uses precisely tuned visible laser light to selectively ionize or excite specific plutonium isotopes in a vapor stream. The ionized plutonium isotopes (Pu 240, Pu 238 and Pu 241) are then separated from the plutonium isotope of interest (Pu 239). Chemical processes are required to (1) prepare the AVLIS plutonium feed for processing, remove americium-241, and cast plutonium metal into forms that meet AVLIS processing requirements; (2) recover and, if required, purify the AVLIS plutonium product; and (3) recover and process the AVLIS separated by-products. This presentation describes the production facility and some of the plutonium processes.

  13. A simple method for rapidly processing HEU from weapons returns

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McLean, W. II; Miller, P.E.

    1994-01-01

    A method based on the use of a high temperature fluidized bed for rapidly oxidizing, homogenizing and down-blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons is presented. This technology directly addresses many of the most important issues that inhibit progress in international commerce in HEU; viz., transaction verification, materials accountability, transportation and environmental safety. The equipment used to carry out the oxidation and blending is simple, inexpensive and highly portable. Mobile facilities to be used for point-of-sale blending and analysis of the product material are presented along with a phased implementation plan that addresses the conversion of HEU derived from domestic weapons and related waste streams as well as material from possible foreign sources such as South Africa or the former Soviet Union.

  14. EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Enforcement Guidance Supplement EGS:01-01 Appendix E-Operational Procedures for Enforcement Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 October 15, 2001 MEMORANDUM FOR: DOE PAAA COORDINATORS CONTRACTOR PAAA COORDINATORS FROM: R. KEITH CHRISTOPHER DIRECTOR OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION SUBJECT: Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the

  15. Y-12 employees receive awards recognizing excellence in nuclear weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    program | Y-12 National Security Complex receive ... Y-12 employees receive awards recognizing excellence in nuclear weapons program Posted: October 6, 2014 - 9:09am Defense Programs 2013 Award of Excellence recipient Penny Cunningham receives congratulations from Jim Haynes (far left), CNS president and CEO, Tim Driscoll, NNSA uranium program manager, and Mark Padilla, NPO's assistant manager for programs and projects. Thirteen Y-12 teams received DP Awards of Excellence for 2013 at a

  16. Nuclear energy in a nuclear weapon free world

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph

    2009-01-01

    The prospect of a nuclear renaissance has revived a decades old debate over the proliferation and terrorism risks of the use of nuclear power. This debate in the last few years has taken on an added dimension with renewed attention to disarmament. Increasingly, concerns that proliferation risks may reduce the prospects for realizing the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world are being voiced.

  17. Joint Venture Established Between Russian Weapons Plant And the Largest

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Dialysis Provider in the U.S. | National Nuclear Security Administration Venture Established Between Russian Weapons Plant And the Largest Dialysis Provider in the U.S. | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget

  18. Preserving Nuclear Grade Knowledge

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lange, Bob

    2008-02-05

    When people think of the government they think of the President, or Congress, or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but there are thousands of people in government-related jobs doing things most donít really notice everyday. You can find them everywhere, from the space science folks at NASA, to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) watching out for the bad guys. There are Rangers, and Social Workers, Nurses and Agricultural Managers. They are people working to keep the many facets of the USA rolling. One very diverse bunch is The Department of Energy (DOE) , a group who is expanding the ways we make and save energy to power our cars, homes, and businesses. Tucked away under the DOE is the National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA is an agency that maintains the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. It works to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction. It provides the U.S. Navy with safe nuclear propulsion, and it responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad, and it supports efforts in science and technology*. (* DOE/NNSA/KCP website info)

  19. Physical protection technologies for the reconfigured weapons complex

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-08-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was a memtier of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Safeguards and Security (S&S) team providing assistance to the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Weapons Complex Reconfigaration. New and improved S&S concepts, approaches and technologies were needed to support both new and upgraded facilities. Physical protection technologies used in these facilities were to use proven state-of-the-art systems in such areas as image processing, alarm communications and display, entry control, contraband detection, intrusion detection and video assessment, access delay, automation and robotics, and various insider protection systems. Factors considered in the selection of these technologies were protection against the design basis threat, reducing S&S life-cycle costs, automation of S&S functions to minimize operational costs, access to critical assets and exposure of people to hazardous environments, increasing the amount of delay to an outsider adversary and having reliable and maintainable systems. This paper will discuss the S&S issues, requirements, technology opportunities and needs. Physical protection technologies and systems considered in the design effort of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration facilities will be reviewed.

  20. Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Saunders, Emily C.; Rowberry, Ariana N.; Fearey, Bryan L.

    2012-07-12

    In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

  1. Workers Complete Demolition of Hanford's Historic Plutonium Vaults...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    - 12:00pm Addthis RICHLAND, Wash. - The Richland Operations Office and contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company this month completed demolition of a large plutonium vault...

  2. PRESSURIZATION OF CONTAINMENT VESSELS FROM PLUTONIUM OXIDE CONTENTS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hensel, S.

    2012-03-27

    Transportation and storage of plutonium oxide is typically done using a convenience container to hold the oxide powder which is then placed inside a containment vessel. Intermediate containers which act as uncredited confinement barriers may also be used. The containment vessel is subject to an internal pressure due to several sources including; (1) plutonium oxide provides a heat source which raises the temperature of the gas space, (2) helium generation due to alpha decay of the plutonium, (3) hydrogen generation due to radiolysis of the water which has been adsorbed onto the plutonium oxide, and (4) degradation of plastic bags which may be used to bag out the convenience can from a glove box. The contributions of these sources are evaluated in a reasonably conservative manner.

  3. Process for immobilizing plutonium into vitreous ceramic waste forms

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Feng, Xiangdong; Einziger, Robert E.

    1997-01-01

    Disclosed is a method for converting spent nuclear fuel and surplus plutonium into a vitreous ceramic final waste form wherein spent nuclear fuel is bound in a crystalline matrix which is in turn bound within glass.

  4. The valence-fluctuating ground state of plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Janoschek, Marc; Das, Pinaki; Chakrabarti, Bismayan; Abernathy, Douglas L.; Lumsden, Mark D.; Lawrence, John M.; Thompson, Joe D.; Lander, Gerard H.; Mitchell, Jeremy N.; Richmond, Scott; Ramos, Mike; Trouw, Frans; Zhu, Jian -Xin; Haule, Kristjan; Kotliar, Gabriel; Bauer, Eric D.

    2015-07-10

    A central issue in material science is to obtain understanding of the electronic correlations that control complex materials. Such electronic correlations frequently arise because of the competition of localized and itinerant electronic degrees of freedom. Although the respective limits of well-localized or entirely itinerant ground states are well understood, the intermediate regime that controls the functional properties of complex materials continues to challenge theoretical understanding. We have used neutron spectroscopy to investigate plutonium, which is a prototypical material at the brink between bonding and nonbonding configurations. In addition, our study reveals that the ground state of plutonium is governed by valence fluctuations, that is, a quantum mechanical superposition of localized and itinerant electronic configurations as recently predicted by dynamical mean field theory. Our results not only resolve the long-standing controversy between experiment and theory on plutoniumís magnetism but also suggest an improved understanding of the effects of such electronic dichotomy in complex materials.

  5. Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah River Site, USA. A Long-Term Study This work presents the findings of a ...

  6. A Lapping Technique for Metallic, Alpha-Phase, Plutonium: Achieving...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Alpha-Phase, Plutonium: Achieving and Measuring Nano-Meter Roughness and Sub-Micron Flatness Citation Details In-Document Search Title: A Lapping Technique for Metallic, Alpha-Ph...

  7. Worker Involvement Improves Safety at Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Employees at the Hanford site are working together to find new and innovative ways to stay safe at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, one of the site’s most complex decommissioning projects.

  8. Process for immobilizing plutonium into vitreous ceramic waste forms

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Feng, X.; Einziger, R.E.

    1997-01-28

    Disclosed is a method for converting spent nuclear fuel and surplus plutonium into a vitreous ceramic final waste form wherein spent nuclear fuel is bound in a crystalline matrix which is in turn bound within glass.

  9. Process for immobilizing plutonium into vitreous ceramic waste forms

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Feng, X.; Einziger, R.E.

    1997-08-12

    Disclosed is a method for converting spent nuclear fuel and surplus plutonium into a vitreous ceramic final waste form wherein spent nuclear fuel is bound in a crystalline matrix which is in turn bound within glass.

  10. Plutonium and Americium Geochemistry at Hanford: A Site Wide Review

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cantrell, Kirk J.; Felmy, Andrew R.

    2012-08-23

    This report was produced to provide a systematic review of the state-of-knowledge of plutonium and americium geochemistry at the Hanford Site. The report integrates existing knowledge of the subsurface migration behavior of plutonium and americium at the Hanford Site with available information in the scientific literature regarding the geochemistry of plutonium and americium in systems that are environmentally relevant to the Hanford Site. As a part of the report, key research needs are identified and prioritized, with the ultimate goal of developing a science-based capability to quantitatively assess risk at sites contaminated with plutonium and americium at the Hanford Site and the impact of remediation technologies and closure strategies.

  11. Fuel bundle design for enhanced usage of plutonium fuel

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Reese, A.P.; Stachowski, R.E.

    1995-08-08

    A nuclear fuel bundle includes a square array of fuel rods each having a concentration of enriched uranium and plutonium. Each rod of an interior array of the rods also has a concentration of gadolinium. The interior array of rods is surrounded by an exterior array of rods void of gadolinium. By this design, usage of plutonium in the nuclear reactor is enhanced. 10 figs.

  12. Plutonium metal and oxide container weld development and qualification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fernandez, R.; Horrell, D.R.; Hoth, C.W.; Pierce, S.W.; Rink, N.A.; Rivera, Y.M.; Sandoval, V.D.

    1996-01-01

    Welds were qualified for a container system to be used for long-term storage of plutonium metal and oxide. Inner and outer containers are formed of standard tubing with stamped end pieces gas-tungsten-arc (GTA) welded onto both ends. The weld qualification identified GTA parameters to produce a robust weld that meets the requirements of the Department of Energy standard DOE-STD-3013-94, ``Criteria for the Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides.``

  13. PLUTONIUM-238 RECOVERY FROM IRRADIATED NEPTUNIUM TARGETS USING SOLVENT

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    EXTRACTION (Conference) | SciTech Connect PLUTONIUM-238 RECOVERY FROM IRRADIATED NEPTUNIUM TARGETS USING SOLVENT EXTRACTION Citation Details In-Document Search Title: PLUTONIUM-238 RECOVERY FROM IRRADIATED NEPTUNIUM TARGETS USING SOLVENT EXTRACTION √ó You are accessing a document from the Department of Energy's (DOE) SciTech Connect. This site is a product of DOE's Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) and is provided as a public service. Visit OSTI to utilize additional

  14. Predicted Radiation Output from Several Kilograms of Plutonium Oxide

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    (Technical Report) | SciTech Connect Predicted Radiation Output from Several Kilograms of Plutonium Oxide Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Predicted Radiation Output from Several Kilograms of Plutonium Oxide Authors: Shores, Erik Frederick [1] ; Solomon, Clell Jeffrey Jr. [1] ; Myers, Steven Charles [1] ; Temple, Brian Allen [1] ; Felsher, Paul D. [1] + Show Author Affiliations Los Alamos National Laboratory Publication Date: 2015-01-20 OSTI Identifier: 1168712 Report Number(s):

  15. Probing Radiation Damage in Plutonium Alloys with Multiple Measurement

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Techniques (Conference) | SciTech Connect Conference: Probing Radiation Damage in Plutonium Alloys with Multiple Measurement Techniques Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Probing Radiation Damage in Plutonium Alloys with Multiple Measurement Techniques A material subjected to radiation damage will usually experience changes in its physical properties. Measuring these changes in the physical properties provides a basis to study radiation damage in a material which is important for a

  16. Instability and Anharmonicity in Plutonium Thermo-physical Properties

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    (Conference) | SciTech Connect Instability and Anharmonicity in Plutonium Thermo-physical Properties Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Instability and Anharmonicity in Plutonium Thermo-physical Properties Authors: Freibert, Franz J [1] ; Mitchell, Jeremy N. [1] ; Saleh, Tarik A. [1] ; Migliori, Albert [1] + Show Author Affiliations Los Alamos National Laboratory Publication Date: 2012-07-10 OSTI Identifier: 1053884 Report Number(s): LA-UR-12-22830 DOE Contract Number: AC52-06NA25396

  17. Manhattan Project: Piles and Plutonium, 1939-1942

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Enrico Fermi PILES AND PLUTONIUM (1939-1942) Events > Early Government Support, 1939-1942 Einstein's Letter, 1939 Early Uranium Research, 1939-1941 Piles and Plutonium, 1939-1941 Reorganization and Acceleration, 1940-1941 The MAUD Report, 1941 A Tentative Decision to Build the Bomb, 1941-1942 The Uranium Committee's first report, issued on November 1, 1939, recommended that, despite the uncertainty of success, the government should immediately obtain four tons of graphite and fifty tons of

  18. Progress Continues Toward Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Plant | Department of Energy Progress Continues Toward Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant Progress Continues Toward Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant March 30, 2015 - 12:00pm Addthis Employees cut a ventilation duct attached to the last glove box in the former processing portion of the facility. This work is performed in plastic enclosures to limit the spread of contamination. Employees cut a ventilation duct attached to the last glove box in the former

  19. Equations for plutonium and americium-241 decay corrections (Technical

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Report) | SciTech Connect Equations for plutonium and americium-241 decay corrections Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Equations for plutonium and americium-241 decay corrections √ó You are accessing a document from the Department of Energy's (DOE) SciTech Connect. This site is a product of DOE's Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) and is provided as a public service. Visit OSTI to utilize additional information resources in energy science and technology. A paper

  20. Literature review: Phytoaccumulation of chromium, uranium, and plutonium in

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    plant systems (Technical Report) | SciTech Connect Literature review: Phytoaccumulation of chromium, uranium, and plutonium in plant systems Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Literature review: Phytoaccumulation of chromium, uranium, and plutonium in plant systems √ó You are accessing a document from the Department of Energy's (DOE) SciTech Connect. This site is a product of DOE's Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) and is provided as a public service. Visit OSTI

  1. PLUTONIUM RECOVERY FROM NEUTRON-BOMBARDED URANIUM FUEL

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Moore, R.H.

    1964-03-24

    A process of recovering plutonium from fuel by dissolution in molten KAlCl/sub 4/ double salt is described. Molten lithium chloride plus stannous chloride is added to reduce plutonium tetrachloride to the trichloride, which is dissolved in a lithium chloride phase while the uranium, as the tetrachloride, is dissolved in a double-salt phase. Separation of the two phases is discussed. (AEC)

  2. Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    U.S. Department of Energy Office of Material Management and Minimization and Office of Environmental Management Washington, DC Summary Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement AVAILABILITY OF THE FINAL SURPLUS PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (SPD Supplemental EIS) For further information on this SPD Supplemental EIS, or to request a copy, please contact: Sachiko McAlhany, NEPA Document Manager SPD Supplemental EIS U.S.

  3. Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    of Material Management and Minimization and Office of Environmental Management Washington, DC Volume 1 (Chapters 1 through 10) Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement For further information on this SPD Supplemental EIS, or to request a copy, please contact: AVAILABILITY OF THE FINAL SURPLUS PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (SPD Supplemental EIS) Printed with soy ink on recycled paper Sachiko McAlhany, NEPA Document

  4. Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    of Material Management and Minimization and Office of Environmental Management Washington, DC Volume 3 Comment Response Document Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement For further information on this SPD Supplemental EIS, or to request a copy, please contact: AVAILABILITY OF THE FINAL SURPLUS PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (SPD Supplemental EIS) Printed with soy ink on recycled paper Sachiko McAlhany, NEPA Document

  5. Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    U.S. Department of Energy Office of Material Management and Minimization and Office of Environmental Management Washington, DC Summary Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement AVAILABILITY OF THE FINAL SURPLUS PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (SPD Supplemental EIS) For further information on this SPD Supplemental EIS, or to request a copy, please contact: Sachiko McAlhany, NEPA Document Manager SPD Supplemental EIS U.S.

  6. Assessment of plutonium exposure in the Enewetak population by urinalysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sun, L.C.; Meinhold, C.B.; Moorthy, A.R.

    1997-07-01

    Since 1980, the inhabitants of Enewetak Atoll have been monitored periodically by scientists from Brookhaven National Laboratory for internally deposited radioactive material. In 1989, the establishment of fission track analysis and of a protocol for shipboard collection of 24-h urine samples significantly improved our ability to assess the internal uptake of plutonium. The purpose of this report is to show the distribution of plutonium concentrations in urine collected in 1989 and 1991, and to assess the associated committed effective doses for the Enewetak population based on a long-term chronic uptake of low-level plutonium. To estimate dose, we derived the plutonium dose-per-unit-uptake coefficients based on the dosimetric system of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. Assuming a continuous uptake, an integrated Jones`s plutonium urine excretion function was developed to interpret the Enewetak urine data. The Appendix shows how these values were derived. The committed effective doses were 0.2 mSv, calculated from the 1991 average plutonium content in 69 urine samples. 29 refs., 3 tabs.

  7. EIS-0229: Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The EIS will evaluate the†reasonable alternatives and potential environmental impacts for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three types of facilities for plutonium disposition.

  8. Plutonium Isotopic Gamma-Ray Analysis

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (OSTI)

    1992-01-08

    The MGA8 (Multiple Group Analysis) program determines the relative abundances of plutonium and other actinide isotopes in different materials. The program analyzes spectra taken of such samples using a 4096-channel germanium (Ge) gamma-ray spectrometer. The code can be run in a one or two detector mode. The first spectrum, which is required and must be taken at a gain of 0.075 Kev/channel with a high resolution planar detector, contains the 0-300 Kev energy region. Themore¬†¬Ľsecond spectrum, which is optional, must be taken at a gain of 0.25 Kev/channel; it becomes important when analyzing high burnup samples (concentration of Pu241 greater than one percent). Isotopic analysis precisions of one percent or better can be obtained, and no calibrations are required. The system also measures the abundances of U235, U238, Np237, and Am241. A special calibration option is available to perform a one-time peak-shape characterization when first using a new detector system.¬ę¬†less

  9. Plutonium Isotopic Gamma-Ray Analysis

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (OSTI)

    1992-01-08

    The MGA8 (Multiple Group Analysis) program determines the relative abundances of plutonium and other actinide isotopes in different materials. The program analyzes spectra taken of such samples using a 4096-channel germanium (Ge) gamma-ray spectrometer. The code can be run in a one or two detector mode. The first spectrum, which is required and must be taken at a gain of 0.075 Kev/channel with a high resolution planar detector, contains the 0-300 Kev energy region. Themore¬†¬Ľ second spectrum, which is optional, must be taken at a gain of 0.25 Kev/channel; it becomes important when analyzing high burnup samples (concentration of Pu241 greater than one percent). Isotopic analysis precisions of one percent or better can be obtained, and no calibrations are required. The system also measures the abundances of U235, U238, Np237, and Am241. A special calibration option is available to perform a one-time peak-shape characterization when first using a new detector system.¬ę¬†less

  10. Fast Thorium Molten Salt Reactors Started with Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Merle-Lucotte, E.; Heuer, D.; Le Brun, C.; Brissot, R.; Liatard, E.; Meplan, O.; Nuttin, A.

    2006-07-01

    One of the pending questions concerning Molten Salt Reactors based on the {sup 232}Th/{sup 233}U fuel cycle is the supply of the fissile matter, and as a consequence the deployment possibilities of a fleet of Molten Salt Reactors, since {sup 233}U does not exist on earth and is not yet produced in the current operating reactors. A solution may consist in producing {sup 233}U in special devices containing Thorium, in Pressurized Water or Fast Neutrons Reactors. Two alternatives to produce {sup 233}U are examined here: directly in standard Molten Salt Reactors started with Plutonium as fissile matter and then operated in the Th/{sup 233}U cycle; or in dedicated Molten Salt Reactors started and fed with Plutonium as fissile matter and Thorium as fertile matter. The idea is to design a critical reactor able to burn the Plutonium and the minor actinides presently produced in PWRs, and consequently to convert this Plutonium into {sup 233}U. A particular reactor configuration is used, called 'unique channel' configuration in which there is no moderator in the core, leading to a quasi fast neutron spectrum, allowing Plutonium to be used as fissile matter. The conversion capacities of such Molten Salt Reactors are excellent. For Molten Salt Reactors only started with Plutonium, the assets of the Thorium fuel cycle turn out to be quickly recovered and the reactor's characteristics turn out to be equivalent to Molten Salt Reactors operated with {sup 233}U only. Using a combination of Molten Salt Reactors started or operated with Plutonium and of Molten Salt Reactors started with {sup 233}U, the deployment capabilities of these reactors fully satisfy the condition of sustainability. (authors)

  11. PLUTONIUM LOADING CAPACITY OF REILLEX HPQ ANION EXCHANGE COLUMN - AFS-2 PLUTONIUM FLOWSHEET FOR MOX

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kyser, E.; King, W.; O'Rourke, P.

    2012-07-26

    Radioactive plutonium (Pu) anion exchange column experiments using scaled HB-Line designs were performed to investigate the dependence of column loading performance on the feed composition in the H-Canyon dissolution process for plutonium oxide (PuO{sub 2}) product shipped to the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). These loading experiments show that a representative feed solution containing {approx}5 g Pu/L can be loaded onto Reillex{trademark} HPQ resin from solutions containing 8 M total nitrate and 0.1 M KF provided that the F is complexed with Al to an [Al]/[F] molar ratio range of 1.5-2.0. Lower concentrations of total nitrate and [Al]/[F] molar ratios may still have acceptable performance but were not tested in this study. Loading and washing Pu losses should be relatively low (<1%) for resin loading of up to 60 g Pu/L. Loading above 60 g Pu/L resin is possible, but Pu wash losses will increase such that 10-20% of the additional Pu fed may not be retained by the resin as the resin loading approaches 80 g Pu/L resin.

  12. Weapon interns: Where are they now? | Y-12 National Security Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Weapon interns: Where are ... Weapon interns: Where are they now? The mp4 video format is not supported by this browser. Download video Captions: On Time: 4:14 min. HaliAnne Crawford and Aaron Lee, the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC employees participating in the Weapon Intern Program, are now several months into their training. Watch this video where they talk about how the program compares to their expectations and their plans for the future. Read more about the internship program

  13. Los Alamos turns its nuclear weapons power to war on cancer

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Los Alamos turns its nuclear weapons power to war on cancer Los Alamos turns its nuclear weapons power to war on cancer Los Alamos Physicist Eva Birnbaum shows how the laboratory is manufacturing a radioactive treatment that targets tumors, without killing the surrounding healthy tissue. December 20, 2015 LANL physicist Eva Birnbaum LANL physicist Eva Birnbaum Los Alamos turns its nuclear weapons power to war on cancer NBC News got exclusive access to Los Alamos National Laboratory where

  14. CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing

    Office of Legacy Management (LM)

    tudies1B ackground Book 1 CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing Areas Vol. I, April 1988 This page intentionally left blank CERCLA P R E W A R Y ASSESSMENT OF DOE'S NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AREAS Prepared for U . S . Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office Las Vegas, Nevada April 1988 vo I CERCLA PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF DOE'S NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AREAS DRAFT Prepared for U.S. Department

  15. PRESSURE DEVELOPMENT IN SEALED CONTAINERS WITH PLUTONIUM BEARING MATERIALS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duffey, J.; Livingston, R.

    2010-02-01

    Gas generation by plutonium-bearing materials in sealed containers has been studied. The gas composition and pressure are determined over periods from months to years. The Pu-bearing materials studied represent those produced by all of the major processes used by DOE in the processing of plutonium and include the maximum amount of water (0.5% by weight) allowed by DOE's 3013 Standard. Hydrogen generation is of high interest and the Pu-bearing materials can be classed according to how much hydrogen is generated. Hydrogen generation by high-purity plutonium oxides packaged under conditions typical for actual 3013 materials is minimal, with very low generation rates and low equilibrium pressures. Materials with chloride salt impurities have much higher hydrogen gas generation rates and result in the highest observed equilibrium hydrogen pressures. Other materials such as those with high metal oxide impurities generate hydrogen at rates in between these extremes. The fraction of water that is converted to hydrogen gas as equilibrium is approached ranges from 0% to 25% under conditions typical of materials packaged to the 3013 Standard. Generation of both hydrogen and oxygen occurs when liquid water is present. The material and moisture conditions that result in hydrogen and oxygen generation for high-purity plutonium oxide and chloride salt-bearing plutonium oxide materials have been characterized. Other gases that are observed include nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and methane.

  16. Y-12 hosts visit from directors of weapons labs | Y-12 National...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    under budget Y-12 employees receive awards recognizing excellence in nuclear weapons program Sea change for foam Where science meets art Uranium at Y-12: Rolling and Forming...

  17. Navy's Superlaser Is More Than a Weapon (Wired.com) | Jefferson Lab

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/navys-super-laser-wont-just-be-a-weapon/ Submitted: Wednesday, November 10, 2010

  18. Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-911 World | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile ...

  19. Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Glauser, H

    2011-03-03

    Over the next 10-20 years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD. The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic. For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively without crippling the US economy. The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime domain awareness capability. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping, grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why this may be accomplished.

  20. Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium. Quarterly technical progress report, May 1, 1997--July 31, 1997

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-09-01

    Progress summaries are provided from the Amarillo National Center for Plutonium. Programs include the plutonium information resource center, environment, public health, and safety, education and training, nuclear and other material studies.

  1. Start-up Plan for Plutonium-238 Production for Radioisotope Power...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Start-up Plan for Plutonium-238 Production for Radioisotope Power System (Report to Congress - June 2010) Start-up Plan for Plutonium-238 Production for Radioisotope Power System ...

  2. Hanford Site Workers Meet Challenging Performance Goal at Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    RICHLAND, Wash. ‚Äď Safely and methodically, piece by piece, workers at the Hanford site‚Äôs Plutonium Finishing Plant are surpassing goals for removing hazardous tanks once used in the plutonium production process.

  3. Plutonium (III) and uranium (III) nitrile complexes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Enriquez, A. E.; Matonic, J. H.; Scott, B. L.; Neu, M. P.

    2002-01-01

    Iodine oxidation of uranium and plutonium metals in tetrahydrofuran and pyridine form AnI{sub 3}(THF){sub 4} and AnI{sub 3}(py){sub 4} (An = Pu, U). These compounds represent convenient entries Into solution An(III) chemistry in organic solvents. Extensions of the actinide metal oxidation methodology in nitrile solvents by I{sub 2}, AgPF{sub 6}, and TIPF{sub 6} are presented here. Treatment of Pu{sup 0} in acetonitrile with iodine yields a putative PuI{sub 3}(NCMe){sub x} intermediate which can be trapped with the tripodal nitrogen donor ligand tpza (tpza = (tris[(2-pyrazinyl)methyl]amine)) and forms the eight-coordinate complex (tpza)PuI{sub 3}(NCMe). Treatment of excess U{sup 0} metal by iodine in acetonitrile afforded a brown crystalline mixed valence complex, [U(NCMe){sub 9}][UI{sub 6}][I], instead of UI{sub 3}(NCMe){sub 4}. The analogous reaction in bezonitrile forms red crystalline UI{sub 4}(NCPh){sub 4}. In contrast, treatment of UI{sub 3}(THF){sub 4} with excess acetonitrile cleanly generates [U(NCMe){sub 9}][I]{sub 3}. Oxidation of Pu{sup 0} by either TI(I) or Ag(I) hexafluorophosphate salts generates a nine-coordinate homoleptic acetonitrile adduct [Pu(NCMe){sub 9}][PF{sub 6}]{sub 3}. Attempts to oxidize U{sub 0} with these salts were unsuccessful.

  4. A probabilistic risk assessment of the LLNL Plutonium facility`s evaluation basis fire operational accident

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brumburgh, G.

    1994-08-31

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility conducts numerous involving plutonium to include device fabrication, development of fabrication techniques, metallurgy research, and laser isotope separation. A Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the building 332 Plutonium Facility was completed rational safety and acceptable risk to employees, the public, government property, and the environment. This paper outlines the PRA analysis of the Evaluation Basis Fire (EDF) operational accident. The EBF postulates the worst-case programmatic impact event for the Plutonium Facility.

  5. Savannah River Site: Plutonium Preparation Project (PuPP) at Savannah River

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Site | Department of Energy Site: Plutonium Preparation Project (PuPP) at Savannah River Site Savannah River Site: Plutonium Preparation Project (PuPP) at Savannah River Site Full Document and Summary Versions are available for download PDF icon Savannah River Site: Plutonium Preparation Project (PuPP) at Savannah River Site PDF icon Summary - Plutonium Preparation Project at the Savannah River Site More Documents & Publications EIS-0283-S2: Interim Action Determination EIS-0283-S2:

  6. PROCESS OF REDUCING PLUTONIUM TO TETRAVALENT TRIVALENT STATE

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Mastick, D.F.

    1960-05-10

    The reduction of hexavalent and tetravalert plutonium ions to the trivalent state in strong nitric acid can be accomplished with hydrogen peroxide. The trivalent state may be stabilized as a precipitate by including oxalate or fluoride ions in the solution. The acid should be strong to encourage the reduction from the plutonyl to the trivalent state (and discourage the opposed oxidation reaction) and prevent the precipitation of plutonium peroxide, although the latter may be digested by increasing the acid concentration. Although excess hydrogen peroxide will oxidize plutonlum to the plutonyl state, complete reduction is insured by gently warming the solution to break down such excess H/ sub 2/O/sub 2/. The particular advantage of hydrogen peroxide as a reductant lies in the precipitation technique, where it introduces no contaminating ions. The process is adaptable to separate plutonium from uranium and impurities by proper adjustment of the sequence of insoluble anion additions and the hydrogen peroxide addition.

  7. Thermal Cycling on Fatigue Failure of the Plutonium Vitrification Melter

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jordan, Jeffrey; Gorczyca, Jennifer

    2009-02-11

    One method for disposition of excess plutonium is vitrification into cylindrical wasteforms. Due to the hazards of working with plutonium, the vitrification process must be carried out remotely in a shielded environment. Thus, the equipment must be easily maintained. With their simple design, induction melters satisfy this criterion, making them ideal candidates for plutonium vitrification. However, due to repeated heating and cooling cycles and differences in coefficients of thermal expansion of contacting materials fatigue failure of the induction melter is of concern. Due to the cost of the melter, the number of cycles to failure is critical. This paper presents a method for determining the cycles to failure for an induction melter by using the results from thermal and structural analyses as input to a fatigue failure model.

  8. SELECTION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FOR DISPOSITION TO WIPP

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Mcclard, J.; Christopher, J.

    2012-06-08

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing a Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). Included in the evaluation are up to 6 metric tons (MT) of plutonium in the form of impure oxides and metals for which a disposition plan has not been decided, among options that include preparation as feed for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility; disposing to high-level waste through the Savannah River Site (SRS) HB Line and H Canyon; can-in-canister disposal using the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility; and preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE and SRS have identified at least 0.5 MT of plutonium that, because of high levels of chemical and isotopic impurities, is impractical for disposition by methods other than the WIPP pathway. Characteristics of these items and the disposition strategy are discussed.

  9. Supercritical fluid carbon dioxide cleaning of plutonium parts

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hale, S.J.

    1991-12-31

    Supercritical fluid carbon dioxide is under investigation in this work for use as a cleaning solvent for the final cleaning of plutonium parts. These parts must be free of organic residue to avoid corrosion in the stockpile. Initial studies on stainless steel and full-scale mock-up parts indicate that the oils of interest are easily and adequately cleaned from the metal surfaces with supercritical fluid carbon dioxide. Results from compatibility studies show that undesirable oxidation or other surface reactions are not occurring during exposure of plutonium to the supercritical fluid. Cleaning studies indicate that the oils of interest are removed from the plutonium surface under relatively mild conditions. These studies indicate that supercritical fluid carbon dioxide is a very promising cleaning medium for this application.

  10. Evolutionary/advanced light water reactor data report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-02-09

    The US DOE Office of Fissile Material Disposition is examining options for placing fissile materials that were produced for fabrication of weapons, and now are deemed to be surplus, into a condition that is substantially irreversible and makes its use in weapons inherently more difficult. The principal fissile materials subject to this disposition activity are plutonium and uranium containing substantial fractions of plutonium-239 uranium-235. The data in this report, prepared as technical input to the fissile material disposition Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) deal only with the disposition of plutonium that contains well over 80% plutonium-239. In fact, the data were developed on the basis of weapon-grade plutonium which contains, typically, 93.6% plutonium-239 and 5.9% plutonium-240 as the principal isotopes. One of the options for disposition of weapon-grade plutonium being considered is the power reactor alternative. Plutonium would be fabricated into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and fissioned (``burned``) in a reactor to produce electric power. The MOX fuel will contain dioxides of uranium and plutonium with less than 7% weapon-grade plutonium and uranium that has about 0.2% uranium-235. The disposition mission could, for example, be carried out in existing power reactors, of which there are over 100 in the United States. Alternatively, new LWRs could be constructed especially for disposition of plutonium. These would be of the latest US design(s) incorporating numerous design simplifications and safety enhancements. These ``evolutionary`` or ``advanced`` designs would offer not only technological advances, but also flexibility in siting and the option of either government or private (e.g., utility) ownership. The new reactor designs can accommodate somewhat higher plutonium throughputs. This data report deals solely with the ``evolutionary`` LWR alternative.

  11. Separation of Plutonium from Irradiated Fuels and Targets

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, Leonard W.; Holliday, Kiel S.; Murray, Alice; Thompson, Major; Thorp, Donald T.; Yarbro, Stephen; Venetz, Theodore J.

    2015-09-30

    The production of electricity by nuclear fission is, at present, nearly 366- gigawatt electric (GWe), generated from 438 operating nuclear reactors. Unlike fossil fuel ash, with limited residual available energy content and negligible heat content, the spent nuclear fuel from power production reactors contains moderate amounts of transuranium (TRU) actinides and fission products in addition to the still slightly enriched uranium. Originally nuclear technology was developed to chemically separate and recover fissionable plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel for military purposes. Military plutonium separations had essentially ceased by the mid-1990s. Reprocessing, however, can serve multiple purposes and the relative importance has changed over time. In the 1960‚Äôs the vision of the introduction of plutonium-fueled fast-neutron breeder reactors drove the civilian separation of plutonium. More recently, reprocessing has been regarded as a means to facilitate the disposal of high-level nuclear waste and thus requires development of radically different technical approaches. In the last decade or so, principal reason for reprocessing has shifted to spent power reactor fuel being reprocessed 1) so that unused uranium and plutonium being recycled reduce the volume, gaining some 25% to 30% more energy from the original uranium in the process and thus contributing to energy security and 2) reduce the volume and radioactivity of the waste by recovering all long-lived actinides and fission products followed by recycling them in fast reactors where they are transmuted to short-lived fission products; this reduces the volume to about 20%, reduces the long term radioactivity level in the high-level waste, and complicates the possibility of the plutonium being diverted from civil use ‚Äď thereby increasing the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle.

  12. Demo of below ground site that once held the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    at Hanford | Department of Energy Demo of below ground site that once held the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor at Hanford Demo of below ground site that once held the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor at Hanford Addthis Description Demo of below ground site that once held the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor at Hanford

  13. XANES Identification of Plutonium Speciation in RFETS Samples

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    LoPresti, V.; Conradson, S.D.; Clark, D.L.

    2009-06-03

    Using primarily X-ray absorption near edge spectroscopy (XANES) with standards run in tandem with samples, probable plutonium speciation was determined for 13 samples from contaminated soil, acid-splash or fire-deposition building interior surfaces, or asphalt pads from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). Save for extreme oxidizing situations, all other samples were found to be of Pu(IV) speciation, supporting the supposition that such contamination is less likely to show mobility off site. EXAFS analysis conducted on two of the 13 samples supported the validity of the XANES features employed as determinants of the plutonium valence.

  14. Delocalization and occupancy effects of 5f orbitals in plutonium

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    intermetallics using L3-edge resonant X-ray emission spectroscopy (Journal Article) | SciTech Connect Journal Article: Delocalization and occupancy effects of 5f orbitals in plutonium intermetallics using L3-edge resonant X-ray emission spectroscopy Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Delocalization and occupancy effects of 5f orbitals in plutonium intermetallics using L3-edge resonant X-ray emission spectroscopy Although actinide (An) L3 -edge X-ray absorption near-edge structure

  15. Critical experiments with mixed plutonium-uranium nitrate solutions having

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Pu:(Pu + U) ratios greater than 0.5 (Technical Report) | SciTech Connect Critical experiments with mixed plutonium-uranium nitrate solutions having Pu:(Pu + U) ratios greater than 0.5 Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Critical experiments with mixed plutonium-uranium nitrate solutions having Pu:(Pu + U) ratios greater than 0.5 √ó You are accessing a document from the Department of Energy's (DOE) SciTech Connect. This site is a product of DOE's Office of Scientific and Technical

  16. HB-Line Plutonium Oxide Data Collection Strategy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Watkins, R.; Varble, J.; Jordan, J.

    2015-05-26

    HB-Line and H-Canyon will handle and process plutonium material to produce plutonium oxide for feed to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). However, the plutonium oxide product will not be transferred to the MFFF directly from HB-Line until it is packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. In the interim, HB-Line will load plutonium oxide into an inner, filtered can. The inner can will be placed in a filtered bag, which will be loaded into a filtered outer can. The outer can will be loaded into a certified 9975 with getter assembly in compliance with onsite transportation requirement, for subsequent storage and transfer to the K-Area Complex (KAC). After DOE-STD-3013-2012 container packaging capabilities are established, the product will be returned to HB-Line to be packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. To support the transfer of plutonium oxide to KAC and then eventually to MFFF, various material and packaging data will have to be collected and retained. In addition, data from initial HB-Line processing operations will be needed to support future DOE-STD-3013-2012 qualification as amended by the HB-Line DOE Standard equivalency. As production increases, the volume of data to collect will increase. The HB-Line data collected will be in the form of paper copies and electronic media. Paper copy data will, at a minimum, consist of facility procedures, nonconformance reports (NCRs), and DCS print outs. Electronic data will be in the form of Adobe portable document formats (PDFs). Collecting all the required data for each plutonium oxide can will be no small effort for HB-Line, and will become more challenging once the maximum annual oxide production throughput is achieved due to the sheer volume of data to be collected. The majority of the data collected will be in the form of facility procedures, DCS print outs, and laboratory results. To facilitate complete collection of this data, a traveler form will be developed which identifies the required facility procedures, DCS print outs, and laboratory results needed to assemble a final data package for each HB-Line plutonium oxide interim oxide can. The data traveler may identify the specific values (data) required to be extracted from the collected facility procedures and DCS print outs. The data traveler may also identify associated criteria to be checked. Inevitably there will be procedure anomalies during the course of the HB-Line plutonium oxide campaign that will have to be addressed in a timely manner.

  17. The plutonium-hydrogen reaction: SEM characterization of product morphology

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    (Journal Article) | SciTech Connect The plutonium-hydrogen reaction: SEM characterization of product morphology Citation Details In-Document Search Title: The plutonium-hydrogen reaction: SEM characterization of product morphology Authors: Dinh, L N ; McCall, S K ; Saw, C K ; Haschke, J M ; Allen, P G ; McClean II, W Publication Date: 2013-12-23 OSTI Identifier: 1150726 Report Number(s): LLNL-JRNL-648158 DOE Contract Number: DE-AC52-07NA27344 Resource Type: Journal Article Resource Relation:

  18. Hanford Site Prepares for Completion of Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Demolition | Department of Energy Prepares for Completion of Plutonium Finishing Plant Demolition Hanford Site Prepares for Completion of Plutonium Finishing Plant Demolition January 14, 2016 - 12:15pm Addthis Employees cut apart a two-stories-high glove box from the top down so they can remove the structure piece by piece from the facility. Employees cut apart a two-stories-high glove box from the top down so they can remove the structure piece by piece from the facility. The GrayQb hangs

  19. Picture of the Week: Glove boxing

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    1 Glove boxing In 2000, the U.S. and Russia committed to each "permanently dispose" of "no less than or at least" 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. The Department of Energy (DOE) announced a strategy for the permanent disposition of U.S. surplus weapons-grade plutonium: convert the energy stored in the nation's stockpile of surplus plutonium pits into electrical power for homes and businesses by burning it as fuel in domestic commercial nuclear reactors. August 7,

  20. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

  1. Detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Mariella Jr., Raymond P.

    2004-09-07

    A system for detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens uses a detector system, an electrostatic precipitator or scrubber, a circulation system, and a control. The precipitator or scrubber is activated in response to a signal from the detector upon the detection of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens.

  2. Assurance and assessment techniques for nuclear weapon related software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blackledge, M.A.

    1993-07-01

    Sandia National Laboratories has the qualification evaluation responsibility for the design of certain components intended for use in nuclear weapons. Specific techniques in assurance and assessment have been developed to provide the quality evidence that the software has been properly qualified for use. Qualification Evaluation is a process for assessing the suitability of either a process used to develop or manufacture the product, or the product itself. The qualification process uses a team approach to evaluating a product or process, chaired by a Quality Assurance professional, with other members representing the design organization, the systems organization, and the production agency. Suitable for use implies that adequate and appropriate definition and documentation has been produced and formally released, adequate verification and validation activities have taken place to ensure proper operation, and the software product meets all requirements, explicitly or otherwise.

  3. Assurance and assessment techniques for nuclear weapon related software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blackledge, M.A.

    1993-12-31

    Sandia National Laboratories has the qualification evaluation responsibility for the design of certain components intended for use in nuclear weapons. Specific techniques in assurance and assessment have been developed to provide the quality evidence that the software has been properly qualified for use. Qualification Evaluation is a process for assessing the suitability of either a process used to develop or manufacture the product, or the product itself The qualification process uses a team approach to evaluating a product or process, chaired by a Quality Assurance professional, with other members representing the design organization, the systems organization, and the production agency. Suitable for use implies that adequate and appropriate definition and documentation has been produced and formally released, adequate verification and validation activities have taken place to ensure proper operation, and the software product meets all requirements, explicitly or otherwise.

  4. Assurance and assessment techniques for nuclear weapon related software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blackledge, M.A.

    1993-01-01

    Sandia National Laboratories has the qualification evaluation responsibility for the design of certain components intended for use in nuclear weapons. Specific techniques in assurance and assessment have been developed to provide the quality evidence that the software has been properly qualified for use. Qualification Evaluation is a process for assessing the suitability of either a process used to develop or manufacture the product, or the product itself. The qualification process uses a team approach to evaluating a product or process, chaired by a Quality Assurance professional, with other members representing the design organization, the systems organization, and the production agency. Suitable for use implies that adequate and appropriate definition and documentation has been produced and formally released, adequate verification and validation activities have taken place to ensure proper operation, and the software product meets all requirements, explicitly or otherwise.

  5. Quality by design in the nuclear weapons complex

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ikle, D.N.

    1988-04-01

    Modern statistical quality control has evolved beyond the point at which control charts and sampling plans are sufficient to maintain a competitive position. The work of Genichi Taguchi in the early 1970's has inspired a renewed interest in the application of statistical methods of experimental design at the beginning of the manufacturing cycle. While there has been considerable debate over the merits of some of Taguchi's statistical methods, there is increasing agreement that his emphasis on cost and variance reduction is sound. The key point is that manufacturing processes can be optimized in development before they get to production by identifying a region in the process parameter space in which the variance of the process is minimized. Therefore, for performance characteristics having a convex loss function, total product cost is minimized without substantially increasing the cost of production. Numerous examples of the use of this approach in the United States and elsewhere are available in the literature. At the Rocky Flats Plant, where there are severe constraints on the resources available for development, a systematic development strategy has been developed to make efficient use of those resources to statistically characterize critical production processes before they are introduced into production. This strategy includes the sequential application of fractional factorial and response surface designs to model the features of critical processes as functions of both process parameters and production conditions. This strategy forms the basis for a comprehensive quality improvement program that emphasizes prevention of defects throughout the product cycle. It is currently being implemented on weapons programs in development at Rocky Flats and is in the process of being applied at other production facilities in the DOE weapons complex. 63 refs.

  6. Minutes of the 28th Annual Plutonium Sample Exchange Meeting. Part II: metal sample exchange

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1984-01-01

    Contents of this publication include the following list of participating laboratories; agenda; attendees; minutes of October 25 and 26 meeting; and handout materials supplied by speakers. The handout materials cover the following: statistics and reporting; plutonium - chemical assay 100% minus impurities; americium neptunium, uranium, carbon and iron data; emission spectroscopy data; plutonium metal sample exchange; the calorimetry sample exchange; chlorine determination in plutonium metal using phyrohydrolysis; spectrophotometric determination of 238-plutonium in oxide; plutonium measurement capabilities at the Savannah River Plant; and robotics in radiochemical laboratory.

  7. Manhattan Project: The Plutonium Path to the Bomb, 1942-1944

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    THE PLUTONIUM PATH TO THE BOMB (1942-1944) Events > The Plutonium Path to the Bomb, 1942-1944 Production Reactor (Pile) Design, 1942 DuPont and Hanford, 1942 CP-1 Goes Critical, December 2, 1942 Seaborg and Plutonium Chemistry, 1942-1944 Final Reactor Design and X-10, 1942-1943 Hanford Becomes Operational, 1943-1944 Plutonium, produced in a uranium-fueled reactor (pile), was the second path taken toward achieving an atomic bomb. Design work on a full-scale plutonium production reactor began

  8. Plutonium immobilization plant using glass in new facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-06-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a glass immobilization process, converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors.

  9. Plutonium Focus Area research and development plan. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-11-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) committed to a research and development program to support the technology needs for converting and stabilizing its nuclear materials for safe storage. The R and D Plan addresses five of the six material categories from the 94-1 Implementation Plan: plutonium (Pu) solutions, plutonium metals and oxides, plutonium residues, highly enriched uranium, and special isotopes. R and D efforts related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stabilization were specifically excluded from this plan. This updated plan has narrowed the focus to more effectively target specific problem areas by incorporating results form trade studies. Specifically, the trade studies involved salt; ash; sand, slag, and crucible (SS and C); combustibles; and scrub alloy. The plan anticipates possible disposition paths for nuclear materials and identifies resulting research requirements. These requirements may change as disposition paths become more certain. Thus, this plan represents a snapshot of the current progress and will continue to be updated on a regular basis. The paper discusses progress in safeguards and security, plutonium stabilization, special isotopes stabilization, highly-enriched uranium stabilization--MSRE remediation project, storage technologies, engineered systems, core technology, and proposed DOE/Russian technology exchange projects.

  10. Dissolution Behavior of Plutonium Containing Zirconia-Magnesia Ceramics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kiel Holliday; Thomas Hartmann; Gary Cerefice; Ken Czerwinski

    2012-03-01

    This study explores the dissolution properties of zirconia-magnesia ceramics containing plutonium as the basis of an inert atrix nuclear fuel. The magnesium oxide phase remains pure MgO, while the zirconia incorporates a small amount of magnesium oxide along with all of the plutonium oxide and erbium oxide. The performance of the material under reactor and repository environments was examined. Reactor conditions are examined using a pressure vessel to expose the material to 300 degrees C water. To assess the performance of the material as a waste form it was submerged in 90 degrees C water for 1000 h. In both aqueous dissolution studies there was minimal release of less than 0.8 wt.% of plutonium from the material. To examine the potential for recycling, the dissolution behavior of the fuel matrix was examined in acidic solutions: pure nitric acid and a nitric acid-hydrofluoric acid-peroxide solution. Both acidic media exhibit potential for dissolving plutonium from the zirconia matrix. The experiments performed in this study are meant to lay a foundation for the chemical performance of zirconia-magnesia inert matrix fuel containing fissile material and burnable poison.

  11. Belgium Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Security Administration Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Photo

  12. Italy Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Security Administration Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Photo

  13. Environmental Assessment for Gap Material Plutonium - Transport, Receipt,

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    and Processing | National Nuclear Security Administration Assessment for Gap Material Plutonium - Transport, Receipt, and Processing | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios

  14. First Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Administration Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Photo Gallery Jobs Apply

  15. Hanford, WA Selected as Plutonium Production Facility | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Security Administration Hanford, WA Selected as Plutonium Production Facility | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases

  16. President Truman Increases Production of Uranium and Plutonium | National

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Nuclear Security Administration Increases Production of Uranium and Plutonium | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases

  17. Second Z Plutonium 'Shot' Safely Tests Materials for NNSA | National

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Nuclear Security Administration Second Z Plutonium 'Shot' Safely Tests Materials for NNSA | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters

  18. US Releases Updated Plutonium Inventory Report | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Administration Releases Updated Plutonium Inventory Report | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Photo Gallery Jobs

  19. Plutonium solution storage in plastic bottles: Operational experience and safety issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Conner, W.V.

    1995-03-15

    Computer spread sheet models were developed to gain a better understanding of the factors that lead to pressurization and failure of plastic bottles containing plutonium solutions. These models were developed using data obtained from the literature on gas generation rates for plutonium solutions. Leak rates from sealed plastic bottles were obtained from bottle leak tests conducted at Rocky Flats. Results from these bottle leak tests showed that narrow mouth four liter bottles will seal much better than wide mouth four liter bottles. The gas generation rate and leak rate data were used to develop models for predicting the rate of pressurization and maximum pressures expected in sealed bottles of plutonium solution containing various plutonium and acid concentrations. The computer models were used to develop proposed time limits for storing or transporting plutonium solutions in sealed plastic bottles. For plutonium solutions containing < 1.5 g/l, maximum safe storage times from 4 weeks to 12 months are proposed. The maximum safe storage times vary depending upon the plutonium concentration in the solution. Low concentration plutonium solutions can be stored safely for longer periods of time than high concentration plutonium solutions. For solutions containing > 1.5 g/l plutonium, storage in sealed bottles should not be allowed. However, transportation of higher concentration plutonium solution in sealed bottles is required, and safe transportation times of 1 shift to 6 days are proposed.

  20. LITERATURE REVIEW FOR OXALATE OXIDATION PROCESSES AND PLUTONIUM OXALATE SOLUBILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nash, C.

    2012-02-03

    A literature review of oxalate oxidation processes finds that manganese(II)-catalyzed nitric acid oxidation of oxalate in precipitate filtrate is a viable and well-documented process. The process has been operated on the large scale at Savannah River in the past, including oxidation of 20 tons of oxalic acid in F-Canyon. Research data under a variety of conditions show the process to be robust. This process is recommended for oxalate destruction in H-Canyon in the upcoming program to produce feed for the MOX facility. Prevention of plutonium oxalate precipitation in filtrate can be achieved by concentrated nitric acid/ferric nitrate sequestration of oxalate. Organic complexants do not appear practical to sequester plutonium. Testing is proposed to confirm the literature and calculation findings of this review at projected operating conditions for the upcoming campaign. H Canyon plans to commence conversion of plutonium metal to low-fired plutonium oxide in 2012 for eventual use in the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Facility. The flowsheet includes sequential operations of metal dissolution, ion exchange, elution, oxalate precipitation, filtration, and calcination. All processes beyond dissolution will occur in HB-Line. The filtration step produces an aqueous filtrate that may have as much as 4 M nitric acid and 0.15 M oxalate. The oxalate needs to be removed from the stream to prevent possible downstream precipitation of residual plutonium when the solution is processed in H Canyon. In addition, sending the oxalate to the waste tank farm is undesirable. This report addresses the processing options for destroying the oxalate in existing H Canyon equipment.

  1. Bioforensics: Characterization of biological weapons agents by NanoSIMS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Weber, P K; Ghosal, S; Leighton, T J; Wheeler, K E; Hutcheon, I D

    2007-02-26

    The anthrax attacks of Fall 2001 highlight the need to develop forensic methods based on multiple identifiers to determine the origin of biological weapons agents. Genetic typing methods (i.e., DNA and RNA-based) provide one attribution technology, but genetic information alone is not usually sufficient to determine the provenance of the material. Non-genetic identifiers, including elemental and isotopic signatures, provide complementary information that can be used to identify the means, geographic location and date of production. Under LDRD funding, we have successfully developed the techniques necessary to perform bioforensic characterization with the NanoSIMS at the individual spore level. We have developed methods for elemental and isotopic characterization at the single spore scale. We have developed methods for analyzing spore sections to map elemental abundance within spores. We have developed rapid focused ion beam (FIB) sectioning techniques for spores to preserve elemental and structural integrity. And we have developed a high-resolution depth profiling method to characterize the elemental distribution in individual spores without sectioning. We used these newly developed methods to study the controls on elemental abundances in spores, characterize the elemental distribution of in spores, and to study elemental uptake by spores. Our work under this LDRD project attracted FBI and DHS funding for applied purposes.

  2. Literature review for oxalate oxidation processes and plutonium oxalate solubility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nash, C. A.

    2015-10-01

    A literature review of oxalate oxidation processes finds that manganese(II)-catalyzed nitric acid oxidation of oxalate in precipitate filtrate is a viable and well-documented process. The process has been operated on the large scale at Savannah River in the past, including oxidation of 20 tons of oxalic acid in F-Canyon. Research data under a variety of conditions show the process to be robust. This process is recommended for oxalate destruction in H-Canyon in the upcoming program to produce feed for the MOX facility. Prevention of plutonium oxalate precipitation in filtrate can be achieved by concentrated nitric acid/ferric nitrate sequestration of oxalate. Organic complexants do not appear practical to sequester plutonium. Testing is proposed to confirm the literature and calculation findings of this review at projected operating conditions for the upcoming campaign.

  3. Quality at Y-12, part 2Or: Looking at Y-12 weapons quality ...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Quality at Y-12, part 2 Or: Looking at Y-12 weapons quality (title as it appeared in The Oak Ridger) Thanks to Ken Bernander and Bud Leete we continue with the history of Quality...

  4. Proceedings: 17th Asilomar conference on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hickman, R.G.; Meier, C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclear weapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

  5. DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Wildlife Refuge

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    WASHINGTON, DC - The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced the transfer of nearly 4,000 acres of its former Rocky Flats nuclear weapons production site to the Department of the Interior's...

  6. COLLOQUIUM: Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use in an Era of Proliferation...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    5, 2014, 4:00pm to 5:30pm Colloquia MGB Auditorium COLLOQUIUM: Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use in an Era of Proliferation, Cyber Warfare and Terrorism Dr. Bruce G. Blair Princeton ...

  7. EIS-0225: Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS evaluates the potential environemental impact of a proposal to continue operation of the Pantex Plant and associated storage of nuclear weapon components. Alternatives considered include: ...

  8. Cold War Films Yield New Effects-Data for U.S. Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Latest Issue:July 2015 past issues All Issues submit Cold War Films Yield New Effects-Data for U.S. Nuclear Weapons The rush is on to save deteriorating atmospheric ...

  9. Quality at Y-12, part 3 -- Or: Quality goes beyond nuclear weapons...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Quality at Y-12, part 3 Or: Quality goes beyond nuclear weapons (title as it appeared in The Oak Ridger) As we continue our look at the history of Quality at Y-12, Bud Leete, Y-12 ...

  10. Good Practices for Ocupational Radiological Protection in Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Not Measurement Sensitive DOE- STD-1128-2013 April 2013 DOE STANDARD GOOD PRACTICES FOR OCCUPATIONAL RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION IN PLUTONIUM FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-1128-2013 This document is available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web Site at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds/ ii DOE-STD-1128-2013 Foreword This Technical

  11. Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Savannah River Site - South Carolina Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Tennessee Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - Alabama Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - New Mexico Los Alamos National Laboratory - New Mexico DOE/EIS-0283-S2 July 2012 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition and Office of Environmental Management Washington, DC AVAILABILITY OF THE DRAFT SURPLUS PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (SPD Supplemental EIS) To submit comments on this SPD

  12. Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    SHEET Lead Agency: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) / National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Cooperating Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority Title: Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Supplemental EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283-S2) Locations: South Carolina, New Mexico, Alabama, and Tennessee For further information or for copies of this Draft SPD Supplemental EIS, contact: Sachiko McAlhany, NEPA Document Manager SPD Supplemental EIS U.S. Department of

  13. Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    SHEET Lead Agency: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) / National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Cooperating Agency: Tennessee Valley Authority Title: Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Supplemental EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283-S2) Locations: South Carolina, New Mexico, Alabama, and Tennessee For further information or for copies of this Draft SPD Supplemental EIS, contact: Sachiko McAlhany, NEPA Document Manager SPD Supplemental EIS U.S. Department

  14. Evaluation of the Magnesium Hydroxide Treatment Process for Stabilizing PFP Plutonium/Nitric Acid Solutions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gerber, Mark A.; Schmidt, Andrew J.; Delegard, Calvin H.; Silvers, Kurt L.; Baker, Aaron B.; Gano, Susan R.; Thornton, Brenda M.

    2000-09-28

    This document summarizes an evaluation of the magnesium hydroxide [Mg(OH)2] process to be used at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) for stabilizing plutonium/nitric acid solutions to meet the goal of stabilizing the plutonium in an oxide form suitable for storage under DOE-STD-3013-99. During the treatment process, nitric acid solutions bearing plutonium nitrate are neutralized with Mg(OH)2 in an air sparge reactor. The resulting slurry, containing plutonium hydroxide, is filtered and calcined. The process evaluation included a literature review and extensive laboratory- and bench-scale testing. The testing was conducted using cerium as a surrogate for plutonium to identify and quantify the effects of key processing variables on processing time (primarily neutralization and filtration time) and calcined product properties.

  15. PFPF canister counter for foreign plutonium (PCAS-3) hardware operations and procedures manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Menlove, H.O.; Baca, J.; Kroncke, K.E.; Miller, M.C. ); Takahashi, S.; Seki, S.; Inose, S.; Yamamoto, T. )

    1993-01-01

    A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for the measurement of plutonium powder contained in tall storage canisters. The counter was designed for installation in the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility fabrication plant. Each canister contains from one to five cans of PuO[sub 2]. The neutron counter measures the spontaneous-fission rate from the plutonium and, when this is combined with the plutonium isotopic ratios, the plutonium mass is determined. The system can accommodate plutonium loadings up to 12 kg, with 10 kg being a typical loading. Software has been developed to permit the continuous operation of the system in an unattended mode. Authentication techniques have been developed for the system. This manual describes the system and its operation and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications.

  16. PFPF canister counter for foreign plutonium (PCAS-3) hardware operations and procedures manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Menlove, H.O.; Baca, J.; Kroncke, K.E.; Miller, M.C.; Takahashi, S.; Seki, S.; Inose, S.; Yamamoto, T.

    1993-01-01

    A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for the measurement of plutonium powder contained in tall storage canisters. The counter was designed for installation in the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility fabrication plant. Each canister contains from one to five cans of PuO{sub 2}. The neutron counter measures the spontaneous-fission rate from the plutonium and, when this is combined with the plutonium isotopic ratios, the plutonium mass is determined. The system can accommodate plutonium loadings up to 12 kg, with 10 kg being a typical loading. Software has been developed to permit the continuous operation of the system in an unattended mode. Authentication techniques have been developed for the system. This manual describes the system and its operation and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications.

  17. Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in existing facilities at the Savannah River site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DiSabatino, A., LLNL

    1998-06-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources, and through a ceramic immobilization process converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans.

  18. Capabilities required to conduct the LLNL plutonium mission

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kass, J.; Bish, W.; Copeland, A.; West, J.; Sack, S.; Myers, B.

    1991-09-10

    This report outlines the LLNL plutonium related mission anticipated over the next decade and defines the capabilities required to meet that mission wherever the Plutonium Facility is located. If plutonium work is relocated to a place where the facility is shared, then some capabilities can be commonly used by the sharing parties. However, it is essential that LLNL independently control about 20000 sq ft of net lab space, filled with LLNL controlled equipment, and staffed by LLNL employees. It is estimated that the cost to construct this facility should range from $140M to $200M. Purchase and installation of equipment to replace that already in Bldg 332 along with additional equipment identified as being needed to meet the mission for the next ten to fifteen years, is estimated to cost $118M. About $29M of the equipment could be shared. The Hardened Engineering Test Building (HETB) with its additional 8000 sq ft of unique test capability must also be replaced. The fully equipped replacement cost is estimated to be about $10M. About 40000 sq ft of setup and support space are needed along with office and related facilities for a 130 person resident staff. The setup space is estimated to cost $8M. The annual cost of a 130 person resident staff (100 programmatic and 30 facility operation) is estimated to be $20M.

  19. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Technical Report) | SciTech Connect

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    The Effects of Nuclear Weapons Citation Details In-Document Search Title: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons √ó You are accessing a document from the Department of Energy's (DOE) SciTech Connect. This site is a product of DOE's Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) and is provided as a public service. Visit OSTI to utilize additional information resources in energy science and technology. A paper copy of this document is also available for sale to the public from the National

  20. The history of nuclear weapon safety devices (Conference) | SciTech Connect

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    The history of nuclear weapon safety devices Citation Details In-Document Search Title: The history of nuclear weapon safety devices √ó You are accessing a document from the Department of Energy's (DOE) SciTech Connect. This site is a product of DOE's Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) and is provided as a public service. Visit OSTI to utilize additional information resources in energy science and technology. A paper copy of this document is also available for sale to the

  1. DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Oversight and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives "DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship" FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY 10:00 AM September 12, 2012 1 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here at your request to testify on matters relating to the Department of Energy's oversight of the nuclear weapons complex. 1 The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was

  2. Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    next 70th anniversary lecture 70th anniversary lecture Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of next 70th anniversary lecture Lab's role in the development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War period will be discussed by Byron Ristvet of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. September 5, 2013 This photograph captures the expanding fireball of the world's first full-scale hydrogen bomb test, Ivy-Mike, which was conducted Oct. 31, 1952. This photograph captures

  3. COLLOQUIUM: Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use in an Era of Proliferation, Cyber

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Warfare and Terrorism | Princeton Plasma Physics Lab 5, 2014, 4:00pm to 5:30pm Colloquia MGB Auditorium COLLOQUIUM: Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use in an Era of Proliferation, Cyber Warfare and Terrorism Dr. Bruce G. Blair Princeton University The United States and eight other countries that possess nuclear weapons run myriad risks every day -- risks of accidental detonations, of unauthorized launches caused by false warning, of provoking escalation between nuclear forces, and of nuclear

  4. CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing

    Office of Legacy Management (LM)

    tudies/B ackground Book 1 CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing Areas Vol. 11, April 1988 DISCLAIMER Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available original document. CERCLA PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF DOE'S NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE WCILEAR WEAPONS T E S r n G AREAS Prepared by Water Resources Center Desert Research Institute University of Nevada System ,Prepared for U . S .

  5. Screening of Maritime Containers to Intercept Weapons of Mass Destruction

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Manatt, D R; Sleaford, B; Schaffer, T; Accatino, M R; Slaughter, D; Mauger, J; Newmark, R; Prussin, S; Luke, J; Frank, M; Bernstein, A; Alford, O; Mattesich, G; Stengel, J; Hall, J; Descalle, M A; Wolford, J; Hall, H; Loshak, A; Sale, K; Trombino, D; Dougan, A D; Pohl, B; Dietrich, D; Weirup, D; Walling, R; Rowland, M; Johnson, D; Hagmann, C; Hankins, D

    2004-02-18

    The goal of our research was to address the problem of detection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials within containers in common use on commercial cargo trafficking. LLNL has created an experimental test bed for researching potential solutions using (among other techniques) active interrogation with neutrons. Experiments and computational modeling were used to determine the effectiveness of the technique. Chemical weapons materials and high explosives can be detected using neutron activation and simple geometries with little or no intervening material. However in a loaded container there will be nuisance alarms from conflicting signatures resulting from the presence of material between the target and the detector (and the interrogation source). Identifying some elements may require long counting times because of the increased background. We performed some simple signature measurements and simulations of gamma-ray spectra from several chemical simulants. We identified areas where the nuclear data was inadequate to perform detailed computations. We concentrated on the detection of SNM in cargo containers, which will be emphasized here. The goal of the work reported here is to develop a concept for an active neutron interrogation system that can detect small targets of SNM contraband in cargo containers, roughly 5 kg HEU or 1 kg Pu, even when well shielded by a thick cargo. It is essential that the concept be reliable and have low false-positive and false-negative error rates. It also must be rapid to avoid interruption of commerce, completing the analysis in minutes. A potentially viable concept for cargo interrogation has been developed and its components have been evaluated experimentally. A new radiation signature unique to SNM has been identified that utilizes high-energy, fission-product gamma rays. That signature due to {gamma}-radiation in the range 3-6 MeV is distinct from normal background radioactivity that does not extend above 2.6 MeV. It's short half-life of 20-55 sec makes it distinct from neutron activation due to the interrogation that is typically much longer lived. This work spawned a collaboration with LBNL where experiments verified the abundance and other characteristics of this new signature [24]. Follow-on work funded by DoE/NA22 led to the development of a detailed system concept and evaluation of its impact on operating personnel and cargos [60] and characterization of one important interference that was identified [61]. The follow-on work led to two patent applications at LBNL and LLNL. The signature flux, while small, is 2-5 decades more intense than delayed neutron signals used and facilitates the detection of SNM even when shielded by thick cargo. The actual benefit is highly dependent on the type and thickness of cargo, with modest benefit in the case of metallic cargos of iron, lead, or aluminum, but maximum benefit in the case of hydrogenous cargo. In addition, unwanted collateral effects of the interrogation, such as neutron activation of the cargo, were analyzed [60] and one significant interference due to oxygen activation was characterized. This interference can be eliminated by lowering the energy of interrogating neutrons [60] and no others have yet been identified. The neutron source technology required exists commercially. Follow-on work to produce a laboratory prototype and to engage a commercial partner for development of a prototype to be fielded at a port was initially funded by DOE/NA-22 is currently supported by DHS. That support is expected to continue through FY06.

  6. Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology Evaluation and Training Range

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kevin Larry Young

    2009-05-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a long history for providing technology evaluation and training for military and other federal level Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response agencies. Currently there are many federal organizations and commercial companies developing technologies related to detecting, assessing, mitigating and protecting against hazards associated with a WMD event. Unfortunately, very few locations exist within the United States where WMD response technologies are realistically field tested and evaluated using real chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. This is particularly true with biological and radiological hazards. Related to this lack of adequate WMD, multi-hazard technology testing capability is the shortage of locations where WMD response teams can train using actual chemical, biological, and radiological material or highly realistic simulates. In response to these technology evaluation and training needs, the INL has assembled a consortium of subject matter experts from existing programs and identified dedicated resources for the purpose of establishing an all-hazards, WMD technology evaluation and training range. The author describes the challenges associated with creating the all-hazards WMD technology evaluation and training range and lists the technical, logistical and financial benefits of an all-hazards technology evaluation and training range. Current resources and capabilities for conducting all-hazard technology evaluation and training at the INL are identified. Existing technology evaluation and training programs at the INL related to radiological, biological and chemical hazards are highlighted, including successes and lessons learned. Finally, remaining gaps in WMD technology evaluation and training capabilities are identified along with recommendations for closing those gaps.

  7. Start-up Plan for Plutonium-238 Production for Radioisotope Power System

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    (Report to Congress - June 2010) | Department of Energy Start-up Plan for Plutonium-238 Production for Radioisotope Power System (Report to Congress - June 2010) Start-up Plan for Plutonium-238 Production for Radioisotope Power System (Report to Congress - June 2010) The Administration has requested the restart of plutonium-238 (Pu-238) production in fiscal year (FY) 2011. The following joint start-up plan, consistent with the President's request, has been developed collaboratively between

  8. Title Plutonium Mobility in Soil and Uptake in Plants: A Review...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    plant uptake, adsorption. The projected accumulation of plutonium isotopes from the USA nuclear power industry is over 1000 megacurics by the year 2020 (5). Due to the vast...

  9. Manhattan Project: Seaborg and Plutonium Chemistry, Met Lab, 1942-1944

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Glenn T. Seaborg looks through a microscope at the world's first sample of pure plutonium, Met Lab, August 20, 1942. SEABORG AND PLUTONIUM CHEMISTRY (Met Lab, 1942-1944) Events > The Plutonium Path to the Bomb, 1942-1944 Production Reactor (Pile) Design, 1942 DuPont and Hanford, 1942 CP-1 Goes Critical, December 2, 1942 Seaborg and Plutonium Chemistry, 1942-1944 Final Reactor Design and X-10, 1942-1943 Hanford Becomes Operational, 1943-1944 While the Met Lab labored to make headway on pile

  10. Conceptual Design for the Pilot-Scale Plutonium Oxide Processing Unit in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lumetta, Gregg J.; Meier, David E.; Tingey, Joel M.; Casella, Amanda J.; Delegard, Calvin H.; Edwards, Matthew K.; Jones, Susan A.; Rapko, Brian M.

    2014-08-05

    This report describes a conceptual design for a pilot-scale capability to produce plutonium oxide for use as exercise and reference materials, and for use in identifying and validating nuclear forensics signatures associated with plutonium production. This capability is referred to as the Pilot-scale Plutonium oxide Processing Unit (P3U), and it will be located in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The key unit operations are described, including plutonium dioxide (PuO2) dissolution, purification of the Pu by ion exchange, precipitation, and conversion to oxide by calcination.

  11. Voluntary Protection Program Onsite Review, Plutonium Finishing Plant Closure Project- May 2007

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Evaluation to determine whether Plutonium Finishing Plant Closure Project is continuing to perform at a level deserving DOE-VPP Star recognition.

  12. Follow-up on the Management of Plutonium-239 Sealed Sources Recovery...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    the threat of the sources being used in radiological dispersal deiices or a "dirty bomb." Plutonium-239 (Pu-239), one of the rildioactive sealed sources recovered by OSRP,...

  13. Workers Create Demolition Zone at Hanford Site’s Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    RICHLAND, Wash. ‚Äď In recent weeks, the look of Hanford site‚Äôs Plutonium Finishing Plant has changed as crews removed or demolished eight buildings surrounding it.

  14. Mastering the art of plutonium pit production to ensure national security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Mastering the art of plutonium pit production Mastering the art of plutonium pit production to ensure national security For 19 years, the U.S. was the only nuclear superpower unable to build a pit and put it in a stockpile. That ended in 2007. April 24, 2012 Recapturing the capability of making plutonium pits "Pit manufacturing is an art," Putnam asserts. By learning from experienced subject-matter experts at Rocky Flats, LANL, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Plutonium

  15. Commercial Grade Dedication Resources | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Commercial Grade Dedication Resources Commercial Grade Dedication Resources Resource List Commercial Grade Dedication at NRC Commercial-Grade Dedication of Software, June 12, 2014 NRC Vendor Workshop Software Dedication Using the ASME NQA-1 Approach Plant Engineering: Guideline for the Acceptance of Commercial-Grade Design and Analysis Computer Programs Used in Nuclear Safety-Related Applications: EPRI report # 1025243 NQA-1 Commercial Grade Dedication Requirements Subpart 2.14, NQA-1a-2009, and

  16. EM Commerical Grade Dedication Class Slides

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Grade Dedication www.em.doe.gov safety performance cleanup closure E M Environmental Management 1 DOE TRAINING DOE TRAINING Commercial Grade Commercial Grade Dedication Dedication Training Training MODULE 1 Overview of CGD Process www.em.doe.gov safety performance cleanup closure E M Environmental Management 2 Course Objectives ÔĀĪ Define the terms "commercial grade item" and "commercial grade services" g ÔĀĪ Understand the process for commercial grade dedication (CGD) ÔĀĪ

  17. Overall Plan for Physics Outlining Steps Necessary for Insertion of the LTA and Operation Using a 1/3 MOX Loaded Core

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pavlovichev, A.M.

    2001-04-09

    Document issued according to Work Release KI-WR04RTP. P. 00-1 describes physics tasks that are included in the current version of ''Roadmap.Level 2'' concerning Reactor tasks of Weapon-grade plutonium disposition problem for VVER-1000. On this base the objective is to identify the physical tasks in FY2000 and in future as a part of global activities on weapon-grade MOX fuel introduction into VVER-1000.

  18. Igniting the Light Elements: The Los Alamos Thermonuclear Weapon Project, 1942-1952

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anne C. Fitzpatrick

    1999-07-01

    The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors--fusion (or hydrogen) devices--are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the US Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's ''large technological systems'' thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the ''Super''--the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period--and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to scientific, politician, and military participants in this project. I analyze how and when participants in the H-bomb project recognized both blatant and subtle problems facing the project, how scientists solved them, and the relationship this process had to official nuclear weapons policies. Consequently, I show how the practice of nuclear weapons science in the postwar period became an extremely complex, technologically-based endeavor.

  19. DOE (Department of Energy) nuclear weapon R and T (research, development, and testing): Objectives, roles, and responsibilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Otey, G.R.

    1989-07-01

    An overview of the DOE nuclear weapons research, development, and testing program is given along with a description of the program objectives and the roles and responsibilities of the various involved organizations. The relationship between the DoD and DOE is described and the division of responsibilities for weapon development as well as the coordinated planning and acquisition activities are reviewed. Execution of the RD T program at the nuclear weapons laboratories is outlined. 24 refs., 3 figs.

  20. A contained sealed reflux dissolution apparatus for plutonium materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Oldham, R.D.; Mitchell, W.G.; Leahy, C.K.; Narayanan, U.I.; Lewis, K.

    1991-12-01

    A containment apparatus has been designed and a procedure developed which permits the overnight operation in a tornado prone area of the sealed reflux dissolution system for the dissolution of hard-to-dissolve plutonium containing materials. A historical review of the development of the apparatus and the procedure used at the New Brunswick Laboratory is presented. The detailed operating procedure, the engineering drawings necessary to fabricate the apparatus, and the Safety Analysis Report containing a worst-case, single occurrence failure analysis are provided in the Appendices. 3 refs.

  1. Effects of self-irradiation in plutonium alloys

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Chung, B. W.; Lema, K. E.; Allen, P. G.

    2015-09-16

    In this paper, we present updated results of self-irradiation effects on 238Pu-enriched 239Pu alloys measured by immersion density, dilatometry, and tensile tests. We obtained the self-irradiation equivalent time of nearly 200 years, nearly 100 years longer than in our previous papers. At this extended aging, we find the rate of decrease in density has slowed significantly, stabilizing around 15.73 g/cc, without signs of void swelling. The volume expansion measured at 35¬įC also shows apparent saturation at less than 0.25%. Quasi-static tensile measurement still show gradual increase in the strength of plutonium alloys with age.

  2. Moisture absorption results for vertical calciner plutonium dioxide product

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Compton, J.A., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-07-03

    A sample of calcined plutonium dioxide was exposed to room air for one week. The sample was weighed daily to determine if the material absorbed moisture from the room air. A random variation of weight was observed after the first day; however, the sample returned to its original weight at the end of the week. The loss on ignition for the material increased from 0.439 to 0.544 weight percent during this time. This change is considered inconsequential as the material will normally be packaged for storage within hours of its production.

  3. LANL names new head of Plutonium Science and Manufacturing

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Jeff Yarbrough joins Los Alamos from B&W Pantex LANL names new head of Plutonium Science and Manufacturing Jeff Yarbrough joins Los Alamos from the B&W Pantex plant in Amarillo, Texas. March 2, 2012 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory

  4. Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    DOE-STD-3013-2000 September 2000 Superseding DOE-STD-3013-99 November 1999 DOE STANDARD STABILIZATION, PACKAGING, AND STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM-BEARING MATERIALS U.S. Department of Energy AREA PACK Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. TS This document has been reproduced from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax:

  5. Stailization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    DOE-STD-3013-2012 MARCH 2012 DOE STANDARD STABILIZATION, PACKAGING, AND STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM-BEARING MATERIALS U.S. Department of Energy AREA PACK Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. TS Available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web site at http://www.hss.energy.gov/NuclearSafety/ns/techstds/ DOE-STD-3013-2012 iii ABSTRACT This Standard provides guidance for the stabilization, packaging, and safe storage

  6. Reduction of Plutonium in Acidic Solutions by Mesoporous Carbons

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Parsons-Moss, Tashi; Jones, Stephen; Wang, Jinxiu; Wu, Zhangxiong; Uribe, Eva; Zhao, Dongyuan; Nitsche, Heino

    2015-12-19

    Batch contact experiments with several porous carbon materials showed that carbon solids spontaneously reduce the oxidation state of plutonium in 1-1.5 M acid solutions, without significant adsorption. The final oxidation state and rate of Pu reduction varies with the solution matrix, and also depends on the surface chemistry and surface area of the carbon. It was demonstrated that acidic Pu(VI) solutions can be reduced to Pu(III) by passing through a column of porous carbon particles, offering an easy alternative to electrolysis with a potentiostat.

  7. Plutonium_Disposition_Phase_2_TOR_082015_FINAL

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AEROSPACE REPORT NO. TOR-2015-02671 Plutonium Disposition Study Options Independent Assessment Phase 2 Report August 20, 2015 Matthew J. Hart 1 , Nichols F. Brown 2 , Mark J. Rokey 1 , Harold J. Huslage 3 , J. Denise Castro-Bran 4 , Norman Y. Lao 5 , Roland J. Duphily 5 , Vincent M. Canales 2 , Joshua P. Davis 6 , Whitney L. Plumb-Starnes 7 , Jya-Syin W. Chien 5 1 Civil Applications Directorate, Civil and Commercial Programs Division 2 Schedule and Cost Analysis Department, Acquisition Analysis

  8. Functional Design Criteria plutonium stabilization and handling (PUSH) project W-460

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NELSON, D.W.

    1999-09-02

    This Functional Design Criteria (FDC) contains information to guide the design of the Stabilization and Packaging Equipment necessary to oxidize and package the remaining plutonium-bearing Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) currently in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) inventory. The FDC also guides the design of vault modifications to allow storage of 3013 packages of stabilized SNM for up to 50 years.

  9. Measurement of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel by self-induced x-ray fluorescence

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hoover, Andrew S; Rudy, Cliff R; Tobin, Steve J; Charlton, William S; Stafford, A; Strohmeyer, D; Saavadra, S

    2009-01-01

    Direct measurement of the plutonium content in spent nuclear fuel is a challenging problem in non-destructive assay. The very high gamma-ray flux from fission product isotopes overwhelms the weaker gamma-ray emissions from plutonium and uranium, making passive gamma-ray measurements impossible. However, the intense fission product radiation is effective at exciting plutonium and uranium atoms, resulting in subsequent fluorescence X-ray emission. K-shell X-rays in the 100 keV energy range can escape the fuel and cladding, providing a direct signal from uranium and plutonium that can be measured with a standard germanium detector. The measured plutonium to uranium elemental ratio can be used to compute the plutonium content of the fuel. The technique can potentially provide a passive, non-destructive assay tool for determining plutonium content in spent fuel. In this paper, we discuss recent non-destructive measurements of plutonium X-ray fluorescence (XRF) signatures from pressurized water reactor spent fuel rods. We also discuss how emerging new technologies, like very high energy resolution microcalorimeter detectors, might be applied to XRF measurements.

  10. Implications of Plutonium isotopic separation on closed fuel cycles and repository design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Forsberg, C.

    2013-07-01

    Advances in laser enrichment may enable relatively low-cost plutonium isotopic separation. This would have large impacts on LWR closed fuel cycles and waste management. If Pu-240 is removed before recycling plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, it would dramatically reduce the buildup of higher plutonium isotopes, Americium, and Curium. Pu-240 is a fertile material and thus can be replaced by U-238. Eliminating the higher plutonium isotopes in MOX fuel increases the Doppler feedback, simplifies reactor control, and allows infinite recycle of MOX plutonium in LWRs. Eliminating fertile Pu-240 and Pu-242 reduces the plutonium content in MOX fuel and simplifies fabrication. Reducing production of Pu-241 reduces production of Am-241 - the primary heat generator in spent nuclear fuels after several decades. Reducing heat generating Am-241 would reduce repository cost and waste toxicity. Avoiding Am- 241 avoids its decay product Np-237, a nuclide that partly controls long-term oxidizing repository performance. Most of these benefits also apply to LWR plutonium recycled into fast reactors. There are benefits for plutonium isotopic separation in fast reactor fuel cycles (particularly removal of Pu-242) but the benefits are less. (author)

  11. Radiocesium Discharges and Subsequent Environmental Transport at the Major U.S. Weapons Production Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garten, Jr. C.T.; Hamby, D.M.; Schreckhise, R.G.

    1999-11-14

    Radiocesium is one of the more prevalent radionuclides in the environment as a result of weapons production related atomic projects in the United States and the former Soviet Union. Radiocesium discharges during the 1950's account for a large fraction of the historical releases from U.S. weapons production facilities. Releases of radiocesium to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems during the early ,years of nuclear weapons production provided the opportunity to conduct multidisciplinary studies on the transport mechanisms of this potentially hazardous radionuclide. The major U.S. Department of Energy facilities (Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, and Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina) are located in regions of the country that have different geographical characteristics. The facility siting provided diverse backgrounds for the development of an understanding of environmental factors contributing to the fate and transport of radiocesium. In this paper, we summarize the significant environmental releases of radiocesium in the early -years of weapons production and then discuss the historically significant transport mechanisms for r37Cs at the three facilities that were part of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

  12. Restructuring the DOE Laboratory Complex to Advance Clean Energy, Environmental Sustainability, and a Global Future without Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Restructuring the DOE Laboratory Complex to Advance Clean Energy, Environmental Sustainability, and a Global Future without Nuclear Weapons - December Commission meeting

  13. Deputy Secretary Daniel Poneman’s Remarks to the International Forum for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    Please find below Deputy Secretary Daniel Poneman’s remarks, as prepared for delivery, to the International Forum for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World in Astana, Kazakhstan.

  14. Plutonium contamination in soils in open space and residential areas near Rocky Flats, Colorado

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Litaor, M.I.

    1999-02-01

    Spatial analysis of the {sup 240}Pu:{sup 239}Pu isotopic ratio of 42 soil samples collected around Rocky Flats Plant near Golden, Colorado, was conducted to assess the effect of Rocky Flats Plant activity on the soil environment. Two probability maps that quantified the uncertainty of the spatial distribution of plutonium isotopic ratios were constructed using the sequential Gaussian simulation technique (sGs). Assuming a plutonium isotopic ratio range of 0.152 {+-} 0.003 to 0.169 {+-} 0.009 is characteristic to global fallout in Colorado, and a mean value of 0.155 is representative for the Rocky Flats Plant area, the main findings of the current work were (1) the areas northwest and southwest of Rocky Flats Plant exhibited a plutonium ratio {ge}0.155, this were minimally impacted by the plant activity; (2) he study area east of Rocky Flats Plant exhibited a plutonium isotopic ratio {le}0.155, which is a definitive indicator of Rocky Flats Plant-derived plutonium; and (3) inventory calculations across the study area exhibited large standard error of estimates. These errors were originated from the high variability in plutonium activity over a small sampling scale and the uncertainty in the global fallout isotopic ratio. Using the mean simulated estimates of plutonium isotopic ratio, coupled with plutonium activity measured at 11 soil pits and additional plutonium information published elsewhere, the plutonium loading on the open space and residential areas amounted to 111.2 GBq, with a standard error of estimate of 50.8 GBq.

  15. The valence-fluctuating ground state of plutonium

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Janoschek, Marc; Das, Pinaki; Chakrabarti, Bismayan; Abernathy, Douglas L.; Lumsden, Mark D.; Lawrence, John M.; Thompson, Joe D.; Lander, Gerard H.; Mitchell, Jeremy N.; Richmond, Scott; et al

    2015-07-10

    A central issue in material science is to obtain understanding of the electronic correlations that control complex materials. Such electronic correlations frequently arise because of the competition of localized and itinerant electronic degrees of freedom. Although the respective limits of well-localized or entirely itinerant ground states are well understood, the intermediate regime that controls the functional properties of complex materials continues to challenge theoretical understanding. We have used neutron spectroscopy to investigate plutonium, which is a prototypical material at the brink between bonding and nonbonding configurations. In addition, our study reveals that the ground state of plutonium is governed bymore¬†¬Ľ valence fluctuations, that is, a quantum mechanical superposition of localized and itinerant electronic configurations as recently predicted by dynamical mean field theory. Our results not only resolve the long-standing controversy between experiment and theory on plutonium‚Äôs magnetism but also suggest an improved understanding of the effects of such electronic dichotomy in complex materials.¬ę¬†less

  16. Benchmark Evaluation of Plutonium Hemispheres Reflected by Steel and Oil

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    John Darrell Bess

    2008-06-01

    During the period from June 1967 through September 1969 a series of critical experiments was performed at the Rocky Flats Critical Mass Laboratory with spherical and hemispherical plutonium assemblies as nested hemishells as part of a Nuclear Safety Facility Experimental Program to evaluate operational safety margins for the Rocky Flats Plant. These assemblies were both bare and fully or partially oil-reflected. Many of these experiments were subcritical with an extrapolation to critical configurations or critical at a particular oil height. Existing records reveal that 167 experiments were performed over the course of 28 months. Unfortunately, much of the data was not recorded. A reevaluation of the experiments had been summarized in a report for future experimental and computational analyses. This report examines only fifteen partially oil-reflected hemispherical assemblies. Fourteen of these assemblies also had close-fitting stainless-steel hemishell reflectors, used to determine the effective critical reflector height of oil with varying steel-reflector thickness. The experiments and their uncertainty in keff values were evaluated to determine their potential as valid criticality benchmark experiments of plutonium.

  17. Treatment of plutonium process residues by molten salt oxidation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stimmel, J.; Wishau, R.; Ramsey, K.B.; Montoya, A.; Brock, J.; Heslop, M.; Wernly, K.

    1999-04-01

    Molten Salt Oxidation (MSO) is a thermal process that can remove more than 99.999% of the organic matrix from combustible {sup 238}Pu material. Plutonium processing residues are injected into a molten salt bed with an excess of air. The salt (sodium carbonate) functions as a catalyst for the conversion of the organic material to carbon dioxide and water. Reactive species such as fluorine, chlorine, bromine, iodine, sulfur, phosphorous and arsenic in the organic waste react with the molten salt to form the corresponding neutralized salts, NaF, NaCl, NaBr, NaI, Na{sub 2}SO{sub 4}, Na{sub 3}PO{sub 4} and NaAsO{sub 2} or Na{sub 3}AsO4. Plutonium and other metals react with the molten salt and air to form metal salts or oxides. Saturated salt will be recycled and aqueous chemical separation will be used to recover the {sup 238}Pu. The Los Alamos National Laboratory system, which is currently in the conceptual design stage, will be scaled down from current systems for use inside a glovebox.

  18. Comparative behavior of plutonium and americium in the equatorial Pacific

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Noshkin, V.E.; Wong, K.M.; Jokela, T.A.; Brunk, J.L.; Eagle, R.J.

    1983-01-01

    Inventories of /sup 239 +240/Pu and /sup 241/Am greatly in excess of global fallout levels persist in the benthic environments of Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. The amount of /sup 239 +240/Pu mobilized to solution at the atolls can be predicted from a distribution coefficient K/sub d/ of 2.3 x 10/sup 5/ and the mean sediment concentrations. The mobilized /sup 239 +240/Pu has solute-like characteristics and different valence states coexist in solution - the largest fraction of the soluble plutonium is in an oxidized form (+V,VI). The adsorption of plutonium to sediments is not completely reversible because of changes that occur in the relative amounts of the mixed oxidation states in solution with time. Characteristics of /sup 239 +240/Pu described at one location may not necessarily describe its behavior elsewhere. The relative amounts of /sup 241/Am to /sup 239 +240/Pu may be altered in future years because of mobilization and radiological decay.

  19. Plutonium and americium behavior in coral atoll environments

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Noshkin, V.E.; Wong, K.M.; Jokela, T.A.; Brunk, J.L.; Eagle, R.J.

    1984-02-01

    Inventories of /sup 239 +240/Pu and /sup 241/Am greatly in excess of global fallout levels persist in the benthic environments of Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. Quantities of /sup 239 +240/Pu and lesser amounts of /sup 241/Am are continuously mobilizing from these sedimentary reservoirs. The amount of /sup 239 +240/Pu mobilized to solution at any time represents 0.08 to 0.09% of the sediment inventories to a depth of 16 cm. The mobilized /sup 239 +240/Pu has solute-like characteristics and different valence states coexist in solution - the largest fraction of the soluble plutonium is in an oxidized form (+V,VI). The adsorption of plutonium to sediments is not completely reversible because of changes that occur in the relative amounts of the mixed oxidation states in solution with time. Further, any characteristics of /sup 239 +240/Pu described at one location may not necessarily be relevant in describing its behavior elsewhere following mobilization and migration. The relative amounts of /sup 241/Am to /sup 239 +240/Pu in the sedimentary deposits at Enewetak and Bikini may be altered in future years because of mobilization and radiological decay. Mobilization of /sup 239 +240/Pu is not a process unique to these atolls, and quantities in solution derived from sedimentary deposits can be found at other global sites. These studies in the equatorial Pacific have significance in assessing the long-term behavior of the transuranics in any marine environment. 22 references, 1 figure, 13 tables.

  20. LANL Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era weapons

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    production being shipped to WIPP | Department of Energy LANL Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era weapons production being shipped to WIPP LANL Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era weapons production being shipped to WIPP May 31, 2011 - 12:00pm Addthis Media Contact Fred deSousa 505-665-3430 fdesousa@lanl.gov LOS ALAMOS, New Mexico - Los Alamos National Laboratory has reached an important milestone in its campaign to ship transuranic (TRU) waste from

  1. Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Luke, S J

    2011-12-20

    This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the genetic information associated with the various pathogens. In addition, it has been determined that a suitable information barrier could be applied to this technology when the verification regime has been defined. Finally, the report posits a path forward for additional development of information barriers in a biological weapons verification regime. This path forward has shown that a new analysis approach coined as Information Loss Analysis might need to be pursued so that a numerical understanding of how information can be lost in specific measurement systems can be achieved.

  2. All About MOX

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2014-08-06

    In 1999, the Nuclear Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

  3. NNSA B-Roll: MOX Facility

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2010-09-01

    In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

  4. NNSA B-Roll: MOX Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2010-05-21

    In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

  5. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-10-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium.

  6. Survey of plutonium and uranium atom ratios and activity levels in Mortandad Canyon

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gallaher, B.M.; Benjamin, T.M.; Rokop, D.J.; Stoker, A.K.

    1997-09-22

    For more than three decades Mortandad Canyon has been the primary release area of treated liquid radioactive waste from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Laboratory). In this survey, six water samples and seven stream sediment samples collected in Mortandad Canyon were analyzed by thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) to determine the plutonium and uranium activity levels and atom ratios. Be measuring the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios, the Laboratory plutonium component was evaluated relative to that from global fallout. Measurements of the relative abundance of {sup 235}U and {sup 236}U were also used to identify non-natural components. The survey results indicate the Laboratory plutonium and uranium concentrations in waters and sediments decrease relatively rapidly with distance downstream from the major industrial sources. Plutonium concentrations in shallow alluvial groundwater decrease by approximately 1000 fold along a 3000 ft distance. At the Laboratory downstream boundary, total plutonium and uranium concentrations were generally within regional background ranges previously reported. Laboratory derived plutonium is readily distinguished from global fallout in on-site waters and sediments. The isotopic ratio data indicates off-site migration of trace levels of Laboratory plutonium in stream sediments to distances approximately two miles downstream of the Laboratory boundary.

  7. RAPID FUSION METHOD FOR DETERMINATION OF PLUTONIUM ISOTOPES IN LARGE RICE SAMPLES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Maxwell, S.

    2013-03-01

    A new rapid fusion method for the determination of plutonium in large rice samples has been developed at the Savannah River National Laboratory (Aiken, SC, USA) that can be used to determine very low levels of plutonium isotopes in rice. The recent accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in March, 2011 reinforces the need to have rapid, reliable radiochemical analyses for radionuclides in environmental and food samples. Public concern regarding foods, particularly foods such as rice in Japan, highlights the need for analytical techniques that will allow very large sample aliquots of rice to be used for analysis so that very low levels of plutonium isotopes may be detected. The new method to determine plutonium isotopes in large rice samples utilizes a furnace ashing step, a rapid sodium hydroxide fusion method, a lanthanum fluoride matrix removal step, and a column separation process with TEVA Resin? cartridges. The method can be applied to rice sample aliquots as large as 5 kg. Plutonium isotopes can be determined using alpha spectrometry or inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS). The method showed high chemical recoveries and effective removal of interferences. The rapid fusion technique is a rugged sample digestion method that ensures that any refractory plutonium particles are effectively digested. The MDA for a 5 kg rice sample using alpha spectrometry is 7E-5 mBq g{sup -1}. The method can easily be adapted for use by ICP-MS to allow detection of plutonium isotopic ratios.

  8. Technical report for the generic site add-on facility for plutonium polishing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Collins, E. D.

    1998-06-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide environmental data and reference process information associated with incorporating plutonium polishing steps (dissolution, impurity removal, and conversion to oxide powder) into the genetic-site Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOXFF). The incorporation of the plutonium polishing steps will enable the removal of undesirable impurities, such as gallium and americium, known to be associated with the plutonium. Moreover, unanticipated impurities can be removed, including those that may be contained in (1) poorly characterized feed materials, (2) corrosion products added from processing equipment, and (3) miscellaneous materials contained in scrap recycle streams. These impurities will be removed to the extent necessary to meet plutonium product purity specifications for MOX fuels. Incorporation of the plutonium polishing steps will mean that the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) will need to produce a plutonium product that can b e dissolved at the MOXFF in nitric acid at a suitable rate (sufficient to meet overall production requirements) with the minimal usage of hydrofluoric acid, and its complexing agent, aluminum nitrate. This function will require that if the PDCF product is plutonium oxide powder, that powder must be produced, stored, and shipped without exceeding a temperature of 600 C.

  9. Survey of plutonium and uranium atom ratios and activity levels in Mortandad Canyon

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gallaher, B.M.; Efurd, D.W.; Rokop, D.J.; Benjamin, T.M.; Stoker, A.K.

    1997-10-01

    For more than three decades, Mortandad Canyon has been the primary release area of treated liquid radioactive waste from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Laboratory). In this survey, six water samples and seven stream sediment samples collected in Mortandad Canyon were analyzed by thermal ionization mass spectrometry to determine the plutonium and uranium activity levels and atom ratios. By measuring the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios, the Laboratory plutonium component was evaluated relative to that from global fallout. Measurements of the relative abundance of {sup 235}U and {sup 236}U were also used to identify non-natural components. The survey results indicate that the Laboratory plutonium and uranium concentrations in waters and sediments decrease relatively rapidly with distance downstream from the major industrial sources. Plutonium concentrations in shallow alluvial groundwater decrease by approximately 1,000-fold along a 3,000-ft distance. At the Laboratory downstream boundary, total plutonium and uranium concentrations were generally within regional background ranges previously reported. Laboratory-derived plutonium is readily distinguished from global fallout in on-site waters and sediments. The isotopic ratio data indicate off-site migration of trace levels of Laboratory plutonium in stream sediments to distances approximately two miles downstream of the Laboratory boundary.

  10. Chemistry and materials science progress report. Weapons-supporting research and laboratory directed research and development: FY 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-04-01

    This report covers different materials and chemistry research projects carried out a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory during 1995 in support of nuclear weapons programs and other programs. There are 16 papers supporting weapons research and 12 papers supporting laboratory directed research.

  11. Transuranic (Tru) waste volume reduction operations at a plutonium facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cournoyer, Michael E; Nixon, Archie E; Dodge, Robert L; Fife, Keith W; Sandoval, Arnold M; Garcia, Vincent E

    2010-01-01

    Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA 55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). Size-reduction operations on glovebox equipment are a common activity when a process has been discontinued and the room is being modified to support a new customer. The Actin ide Processing Group at TA-55 uses one-meter-long glass columns to process plutonium. Disposal of used columns is a challenge, since they must be size-reduced to get them out of the glovebox. The task is a high-risk operation because the glass shards that are generated can puncture the bag-out bags, leather protectors, glovebox gloves, and the worker's skin when completing the task. One of the Lessons Learned from these operations is that Laboratory management should critically evaluate each hazard and provide more effective measures to prevent personnel injury. A bag made of puncture-resistant material was one of these enhanced controls. We have investigated the effectiveness of these bags and have found that they safely and effectively permit glass objects to be reduced to small pieces with a plastic or rubber mallet; the waste can then be easily poured into a container for removal from the glove box as non-compactable transuranic (TRU) waste. This size-reduction operation reduces solid TRU waste generation by almost 2% times. Replacing one-time-use bag-out bags with multiple-use glass crushing bags also contributes to reducing generated waste. In addition, significant costs from contamination, cleanup, and preparation of incident documentation are avoided. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos National Laboratory Continuous Improvement Program by improving the efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and formality of glovebox operations. In this report, the technical issues, associated with implementing this process improvement are addressed, the results discussed, effectiveness of Lessons Learned evaluated, and waste savings presented.

  12. NNSS Soils Monitoring: Plutonium Valley (CAU366) FY2012

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, Julianne J.; Mizell, Steve A.; Nikolich, George; McCurdy, Greg; Campbell, Scott

    2013-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nevada Site Office (NSO), Environmental Restoration Soils Activity has authorized the Desert Research Institute (DRI) to conduct field assessments of potential sediment transport of contaminated soil from Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites Contamination Area (CA) during precipitation runoff events. Field measurements at the T-4 Atmospheric Test Site (CAU 370) suggest that radionuclide-contaminated soils may have migrated along a shallow ephemeral drainage that traverses the site (NNSA/NSO, 2009). (It is not entirely clear how contaminated soils got into their present location at the T-4 Site, but flow to the channel has been redirected and the contamination does not appear to be migrating at present.) Aerial surveys in selected portions of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) also suggest that radionuclide-contaminated soils may be migrating along ephemeral channels in Areas 3, 8, 11, 18, and 25 (Colton, 1999). In Area 11, several low-level airborne surveys of the Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites (CAU 366) show plumes of Americium 241 (Am-241) extending along ephemeral channels (Figure 1, marker numbers 5 and 6) below Corrective Action Site (CAS) 11-23-03 (marker number 3) and CAS 11 23-04 (marker number 4) (Colton, 1999). Plutonium Valley in Area 11 of the NNSS was selected for the study because of the aerial survey evidence suggesting downstream transport of radionuclide-contaminated soil. The aerial survey (Figure 1) shows a well defined finger of elevated radioactivity (marker number 5) extending to the southwest from the southernmost detonation site (marker number 4). This finger of contamination overlies a drainage channel mapped on the topographic base map used for presentation of the survey data suggesting surface runoff as a likely cause of the contaminated area. Additionally, instrumenting sites strongly suspected of conveying soil from areas of surface contamination offers the most efficient means to confirm that surface runoff may transport radioactive contamination as a result of ambient precipitation/runoff events. Closure plans being developed for the CAUs on the NNSS may include post-closure monitoring for possible release of radioactive contaminants. Determining the potential for transport of radionuclide-contaminated soils under ambient meteorological conditions will facilitate an appropriate closure design and post-closure monitoring program.

  13. PLUTONIUM SOLUBILITY IN HIGH-LEVEL WASTE ALKALI BOROSILICATE GLASS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Marra, J.; Crawford, C.; Fox, K.; Bibler, N.

    2011-01-04

    The solubility of plutonium in a Sludge Batch 6 (SB6) reference glass and the effect of incorporation of Pu in the glass on specific glass properties were evaluated. A Pu loading of 1 wt % in glass was studied. Prior to actual plutonium glass testing, surrogate testing (using Hf as a surrogate for Pu) was conducted to evaluate the homogeneity of significant quantities of Hf (Pu) in the glass, determine the most appropriate methods to evaluate homogeneity for Pu glass testing, and to evaluate the impact of Hf loading in the glass on select glass properties. Surrogate testing was conducted using Hf to represent between 0 and 1 wt % Pu in glass on an equivalent molar basis. A Pu loading of 1 wt % in glass translated to {approx}18 kg Pu per Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister, or about 10X the current allowed limit per the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (2500 g/m{sup 3} of glass or about 1700 g/canister) and about 30X the current allowable concentration based on the fissile material concentration limit referenced in the Yucca Mountain Project License Application (897 g/m{sup 3}3 of glass or about 600 g Pu/canister). Based on historical process throughput data, this level was considered to represent a reasonable upper bound for Pu loading based on the ability to provide Pu containing feed to the DWPF. The task elements included evaluating the distribution of Pu in the glass (e.g. homogeneity), evaluating crystallization within the glass, evaluating select glass properties (with surrogates), and evaluating durability using the Product Consistency Test -- Method A (PCT-A). The behavior of Pu in the melter was evaluated using paper studies and corresponding analyses of DWPF melter pour samples.The results of the testing indicated that at 1 wt % Pu in the glass, the Pu was homogeneously distributed and did not result in any formation of plutonium-containing crystalline phases as long as the glass was prepared under 'well-mixed' conditions. The incorporation of 1 wt % Pu in the glass did not adversely impact glass viscosity (as assessed using Hf surrogate) or glass durability. Finally, evaluation of DWPF glass pour samples that had Pu concentrations below the 897 g/m{sup 3} limit showed that Pu concentrations in the glass pour stream were close to targeted compositions in the melter feed indicating that Pu neither volatilized from the melt nor stratified in the melter when processed in the DWPF melter.

  14. NEW - DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    All nuclear explosives and nuclear explosive operations require special safety, security, and use control consideration because of the potentially unacceptable consequences of an accident or unauthorized act; therefore, a Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program is established to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives.

  15. Annular Core Research Reactor - Critical to Science-Based Weapons Design,

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Certification | National Nuclear Security Administration - Critical to Science-Based Weapons Design, Certification | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Library Bios Congressional Testimony

  16. Safety Functions and Other Features of Remotely Operated Weapon Systems (ROWS)

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    DOE-STD-1047-2008 August 2008 DOE STANDARD Safety Functions and Other Features of Remotely Operated Weapon Systems (ROWS) U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-STD-1047-2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD ....................................................................................................................... i 1. SCOPE AND PURPOSE

  17. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities. This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues.

  18. Preparation of high purity plutonium oxide for radiochemistry instrument calibration standards and working standards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wong, A.S.; Stalnaker, N.D.

    1997-04-01

    Due to the lack of suitable high level National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) traceable plutonium solution standards from the NIST or commercial vendors, the CST-8 Radiochemistry team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has prepared instrument calibration standards and working standards from a well-characterized plutonium oxide. All the aliquoting steps were performed gravimetrically. When a {sup 241}Am standardized solution obtained from a commercial vendor was compared to these calibration solutions, the results agreed to within 0.04% for the total alpha activity. The aliquots of the plutonium standard solutions and dilutions were sealed in glass ampules for long term storage.

  19. Conceptual design report, plutonium stabilization and handling,project W-460

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Weiss, E.V.

    1997-03-06

    Project W-460, Plutonium Stabilization and Handling, encompasses procurement and installation of a Stabilization and Packaging System (SPS) to oxidize and package for long term storage remaining plutonium-bearing special nuclear materials currently in inventory at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), and modification of vault equipment to allow storage of resulting packages of stabilized SNM for up to fifty years. This Conceptual Design Report (CDR) provides conceptual design details for the vault modification, site preparation and site interface with the purchased SPS. Two concepts are described for vault configuration; acceleration of this phase of the project did not allow completion of analysis which would clearly identify a preferred approach.

  20. Rebaselining seismic risks for resumption of Building 707 plutonium operations at the Rocky Flats Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Elia, F. Jr.; Foppe, T.; Stahlnecker, E.

    1993-08-01

    Natural phenomena risks have been assessed for plutonium handling facilities at the Rocky Flats Plant, based on numerous studies performed for the Department of Energy Natural Phenomena Hazards Project. The risk assessment was originally utilized in the facilities Final Safety Analysis Reports and in subsequent risk management decisions. Plutonium production operations were curtailed in 1989 in order for a new operating contractor to implement safety improvements. Since natural phenomena events dominated risks to the public, a re-assessment of these events were undertaken for resumption of plutonium operations.