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1

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

2

Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile  

SciTech Connect

In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

1992-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

3

Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

We have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. We have designed three transition cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. We found that four-loop Westinghouse reactors such as the Vogtle power plant are capable of handling up to 45 percent weapons-grade MOX loading without any modifications. We have also designed two kinds of weapons-grade MOX assemblies with three enrichments per assembly and four enrichments total. Wet annular burnable absorber (WABA) rods were used in all the feed and some burned MOX assemblies and some LEU feed assemblies. Integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) was used in the rest of the LEU feed assemblies. The average discharge burnup of MOX assemblies was over 47,000 MWD/MTM, which is more than enough to meet the "spent fuel standard." One unit is capable of consuming 0.462 MT of weapons-grade plutonium a year. Preliminary analyses showed that important reactor physics parameters for the three transitions cycles are comparable to those of LEU cores including boron levels, reactivity coefficients, peaking factors, and shutdown margins. Further transient analyses need to be performed.

Alsaed, Abdelhalim Ali

1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

4

Disposition of Weapons-Grade Plutonium in Westinghouse Reactors  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Disposition of Weapons-Grade Plutonium in Westinghouse Reactors Abdelhalim Ali Alsaed and Marvin Adams We have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. We have designed three transition cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. We found that four-loop Westinghouse reactors such as the Vogtle power plant are capable of handling up to 45 percent weapons-grade MOX loading without any modifications. We have also designed two kinds of weapons-grade MOX assemblies with three enrichments per assembly and four total enrichments. Wet annular burnable absorber (WABA) rods were used in all the MOX feed assemblies, some burned MOX assemblies, and some LEU feed assemblies. Integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) was used in the rest of the LEU feed assemblies. The average discharge burnup of MOX assemblies was over 47,000 MWD/MTM, which is more than enough to meet the "spent fuel standard." One unit is ...

No. De-fc-al; Abdelhalim Ali Alsaed; Abdelhalim Ali Alsaed; Marvin Adams; Marvin Adams

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

5

U.S. and Russia Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Plutonium  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Plutonium U.S. and Russia Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Plutonium July 13, 2006 - 3:05pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman and Sergey Kiriyenko, the director of Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency, have signed a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium by irradiation in nuclear reactors. "This statement is a clear sign of our mutual commitment to keeping dangerous nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists. We look forward to working together with the Russians to ensure that this important nonproliferation project moves forward in both Russia and the United States," Secretary Bodman said.

6

Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition.

Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S. [and others

1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

7

A Multiattribute Utility Analysis of Alternatives for the Disposition of Surplus Weapons-Grade Plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper describes an application of multiattribute utility theory to support the selection of a technology for the disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium by the Department of Energy (DOE). This analysis evaluated 13 alternatives, examined ... Keywords: Utility/preference, applications, multiattribute

James S. Dyer; Thomas Edmunds; John C. Butler; Jianmin Jia

1998-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

8

Neutronics and safety characteristics of a 100% MOX fueled PWR using weapons grade plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Preliminary neutronics and safety studies, pertaining to the feasibility of using 100% weapons grade mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in an advanced PWR Westinghouse design are presented in this paper. The preliminary results include information on boron concentration, power distribution, reactivity coefficients and xenon and control rode worth for the initial and the equilibrium cycle. Important safety issues related to rod ejection and steam line break accidents and shutdown margin requirements are also discussed. No significant change from the commercial design is needed to denature weapons-grade plutonium under the current safety and licensing criteria.

Biswas, D.; Rathbun, R.; Lee, Si Young [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Rosenthal, P. [Westinghouse Electric Corp., Pittsburgh, PA (United States)

1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

9

Transmutation facility for weapons grade plutonium based on a tokamak fusion neutron source  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

It is suggested that weapons grade plutonium could be processed through a transmutation facility to build up sufficient actinide and fission product inventories to serve as a deterrent to diversion or theft, pending eventual use as nuclear reactor fuel. A transmutation facility consisting of a fusion neutron source surrounded by fuel assemblies containing the weapons grade plutonium in the form of PuO2 pebbles in a lithium slurry was investigated and found to be technically feasible. A design concept/operation scenario was developed for a facility which would be able to transmute the world's estimated inventory of weapons grade plutonium to 11% Pu-240 concentration in about 25 years. The fusion neutron source would be based on tokamak plasma operating conditions and magnet technology being qualified in ongoing R D programs, and the plutonium fuel would be based on existing technology. A new R D program would be required to qualify a refractory metal alloy structural material needed to handle the high heat fluxes. Extensions of existing technologies and acceleration of existing R D programs would seem to be adequate to qualify other technologies required for the facility.

Not Available

1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

10

Transmutation facility for weapons-grade plutonium disposition based on a tokamak fusion neutron source  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

It is suggested that weapons-grade plutonium could be processed through a transmutation facility to build up sufficient actinide and fission product inventories to serve as a deterrent to diversion or theft during subsequent storage, pending eventual use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. A transmutation facility consisting of a tokamak fusion neutron source surrounded by fuel assemblies containing the weapons-grade plutonium in the form of PuO{sub 2} pebbles in a lithium slurry is investigated. A design concept/operation scenario is developed for a facility that would be able to transmute the world`s estimated surplus inventory of weapons-grade plutonium to 11% {sup 240}Pu concentration in nearly 25 yr. The fusion neutron source would be based on plasma physics and plasma support technology being qualified in ongoing research and development (R&D) programs, and the plutonium fuel would be based on existing technology. A new R&D program would be required to qualify a refractory metal alloy structural material that would be needed to handle the high heat fluxes; otherwise, extensions of existing technologies and acceleration of existing R&D programs would seem to be adequate to qualify all required technologies. Such a facility might feasibly be deployed in 20 to 30 yr, or sooner with a crash program. 49 refs., 5 figs., 13 tabs.

Stacey, W.M.; Pilger, B.L.; Mowrey, J.A. [Georgia Inst. of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States)] [and others

1995-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

11

Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 3: A new reactor concept without uranium or thorium for burning weapons-grade plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) requested that the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) examine concepts that focus only on the destruction of 50,000 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. A concept has been developed by the INEL for a low-temperature, low-pressure, low-power density, low-coolant-flow-rate light water reactor that destroys plutonium quickly without using uranium or thorium. This concept is very safe and could be designed, constructed, and operated in a reasonable time frame. This concept does not produce electricity. Not considering other missions frees the design from the paradigms and constraints used by proponents of other dispositioning concepts. The plutonium destruction design goal is most easily achievable with a large, moderate power reactor that operates at a significantly lower thermal power density than is appropriate for reactors with multiple design goals. This volume presents the assumptions and requirements, a reactor concept overview, and a list of recommendations. The appendices contain detailed discussions on plutonium dispositioning, self-protection, fuel types, neutronics, thermal hydraulics, off-site radiation releases, and economics.

Ryskamp, J.M.; Schnitzler, B.G.; Fletcher, C.D. [and others

1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

12

CONVERSION OF RUSSIAN WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM INTO OXIDE FOR MIXED OXIDE (MOX) FUEL FABRICATION.  

SciTech Connect

Progress has been made in the Russian Federation towards the conversion of weapons-grade plutonium (w-Pu) into plutonium oxide (PuO{sub 2}) suitable for further manufacture into mixed oxide (MOX) fuels. This program is funded both by French Commissariat x 1'Energie Atomique (CEA) and the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The French program was started as a way to make available their expertise gained from manufacturing MOX fuel. The US program was started in 1998 in response to US proliferation concerns and the acknowledged international need to decrease available w-Pu. Russia has selected both the conversion process and the manufacturing site. This paper discusses the present state of development towards fulfilling this mission: the demonstration plant designed to process small amounts of Pu and validate all process stages and the industrial plant that will process up to 5 metric tons of Pu per year.

Glagovski, E.; Kolotilov, Y.; Glagolenko, Y.; Zygmunt, Stanley J.; Mason, C. F. V. (Caroline F. V.); Hahn, W. K. (Wendy K.); Durrer, R. E. (Russell E.); Thomas, S.; Sicard, B.; Herlet, N.; Fraize, G.; Villa, A.

2001-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

13

Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 4. Plutonium dispositioning in light water reactors  

SciTech Connect

This study is in response to a request by the Reactor Panel Subcommittee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to evaluate the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing conventional or advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs and in low temperature/pressure LWR designs that might be developed for plutonium disposal. Three plutonium-based fuel forms (oxides, aluminum metallics, and carbides) are evaluated for neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and material and compatibility issues. For the carbides, only the fabrication technologies are addressed. Viable plutonium oxide fuels for conventional or advanced LWRs include plutonium-zirconium-calcium oxide (PuO{sub 2}-ZrO{sub 2}-CaO) with the addition of thorium oxide (ThO{sub 2}) or a burnable poison such as erbium oxide (Er{sub 2}O{sub 3}) or europium oxide (Eu{sub 2}O{sub 3}) to achieve acceptable neutronic performance. Thorium will breed fissile uranium that may be unacceptable from a proliferation standpoint. Fabrication of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuels is well established; however, fabrication of plutonium-based oxide fuels will require further development. Viable aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels for a low temperature/pressure LWR include plutonium aluminide in an aluminum matrix (PuAl{sub 4}-Al) with the addition of a burnable poison such as erbium (Er) or europium (Eu). Fabrication of low-enriched plutonium in aluminum-plutonium metallic fuel rods was initially established 30 years ago and will require development to recapture and adapt the technology to meet current environmental and safety regulations. Fabrication of high-enriched uranium plate fuel by the picture-frame process is a well established process, but the use of plutonium would require the process to be upgraded in the United States to conform with current regulations and minimize the waste streams.

Sterbentz, J.W.; Olsen, C.S.; Sinha, U.P.

1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

14

Imaging the ionization track of alpha recoils for the directional detection of weapons grade plutonium  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Since the dawn of the nuclear weapons era, political, military, and scientific leaders around the world have been working to contain the proliferation of Special Nuclear Material and explosively fissile material. This paper ...

Koch, William Lawrence

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

15

Neutronic evaluation of a non-fertile fuel for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in a boiling water reactor  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A new non-fertile, weapons-grade plutonium oxide fuel concept is developed and evaluated for deep burn applications in a boiling water reactor environment using the General Electric 8x8 Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) fuel assembly dimensions and pitch. Detailed infinite lattice fuel burnup results and neutronic performance characteristics are given and although preliminary in nature, clearly demonstrate the fuel`s potential as an effective means to expedite the disposition of plutonium in existing light water reactors. The new non-fertile fuel concept is an all oxide composition containing plutonia, zirconia, calcia, and erbia having the following design weight percentages: 8.3; 80.4; 9.7; and 1.6. This fuel composition in an infinite fuel lattice operating at linear heat generation rates of 6.0 or 12.0 kW/ft per rod can remain critical for up to 1,200 and 600 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD), respectively, and achieve a burnup of 7.45 {times} 10{sup 20} f/cc. These burnups correspond to a 71--73% total plutonium isotope destruction and a 91--94% destruction of the {sup 239}Pu isotope for the 0--40% moderator steam void condition. Total plutonium destruction greater than 73% is possible with a fuel management scheme that allows subcritical fuel assemblies to be driven by adjacent high reactivity assemblies. The fuel exhibits very favorable neutron characteristics from beginning-of-life (BOL) to end-of-life (EOL). Prompt fuel Doppler coefficient of reactivity are negative, with values ranging between {minus}0.4 to {minus}2.0 pcm/K over the temperature range of 900 to 2,200 K. The ABWR fuel lattice remains in an undermoderated condition for both hot operational and cold startup conditions over the entire fuel burnup lifetime.

Sterbentz, J.W.

1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

16

The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including unenriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to diver

Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

2008-12-23T23:59:59.000Z

17

Hot Cell Examination of Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel  

SciTech Connect

The U.S. Department of Energy has decided to dispose of a portion of the nation s surplus weapons-grade plutonium by reconstituting it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiating it in commercial power reactors. Four lead assemblies were manufactured with weapons-grade MOX and irradiated to a maximum fuel rod burnup of 47.3 MWd/kg. As part of the fuel qualification process, five fuel rods with varying burnups and plutonium contents were selected from one of the assemblies and shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory for hot cell examination. This is the first hot cell examination of weapons-grade MOX fuel. The rods have been examined nondestructively with the ADEPT apparatus and are currently being destructively examined. Examinations completed to date include length measurements, visual examination, gamma scanning, profilometry, eddy-current testing, gas measurement and analysis, and optical metallography. Representative results of these examinations are reviewed and found to be consistent with predictions and with prior experience with reactor-grade MOX fuel. The results will be used to support licensing of weapons-grade MOX for batch use in commercial power reactors.

Morris, Robert Noel [ORNL; Bevard, Bruce Balkcom [ORNL; McCoy, Kevin [Areva NP

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

18

TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

2013-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

19

Utilization of Surplus Weapons Plutonium As Mixed Oxide Fuel Position Statement  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The American Nuclear Society (ANS) endorses the rapid application of mixed uraniumplutonium oxide (MOX) fuel technology to accomplish the timely disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The end of the Cold War has led to universal recognition that both the United States and Russia possess stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium that far exceed their defense requirements. In 1994 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) stated the following: “The existence of this material [surplus weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium] constitutes a clear and present danger to national and international security. 1 ” Russia and the United States have held extensive discussions on plutonium disposition, culminating in a September 2000 agreement 2 to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weaponsgrade plutonium in each country. The U.S. Department of Energy has completed two major Environmental Impact Statements on surplus plutonium disposition. 3,4 Implementation of the associated Records of Decision 5,6 has resulted in an ongoing program to dispose of surplus U.S. weapons-grade plutonium by fabricating the material into MOX fuel and using the fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. As with the blend-down of highly enriched uranium, a

unknown authors

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

20

Crystalline ceramics: Waste forms for the disposal of weapons plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (i) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (ii) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass ``logs``; (iii) deep borehole disposal (National Academy of Sciences Report, 1994). The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramics apatite, pyrochlore, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium.

Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W. [New Mexico Univ., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Weber, W.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

1995-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


21

Chinese strategic weapons and the plutonium option (U)  

SciTech Connect

In their article "Chinese Strategic Weapons and the Plutonium Option," John W. Lewis and Xue Litai of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University's International Strategic Institute present an unclassified look at plutonium processing in the PRC. The article draws heavily on unclassified PRC sources for its short look at this important subject. Interested readers will find more detailed information in the recently available works referenced in the article.

Lewis, John W.; Xui Litai

1988-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

22

Excess Plutonium: Weapons Legacy or National Asset?  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative was established in January, 2000, to accelerate the work of achieving integration and cutting long-term costs associated with the management of nuclear materials. As part of that initiative, the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (EM), has established Nuclear Material Management Groups for the management of excess nuclear materials. As one of these groups, the Plutonium Material Management Group (PMMG) has been chartered to serve as DOE's complex wide resource and point of contact for technical coordination and program planning support in the safe and efficient disposition of the nations excess Plutonium 239. This paper will explain the mission, goals, and objectives of the PMMG. In addition, the paper will provide a broad overview of the status of the plutonium inventories throughout the DOE complex. The DOE currently manages approximately 99.5 MT of plutonium isotopes. Details of the various categories of plutonium, from material designated for national security needs through material that has been declared excess, will be explained. For the plutonium that has been declared excess, the various pathways to disposition (including reuse, recycling, sale, transfer, treatment, consumption, and disposal) will be discussed. At this time 52.5 MT of plutonium has been declared excess and the method of disposition for that material is the subject of study and evaluation within DOE. The role of the PMMG in those evaluations will be outlined.

Klipa, G.; Boeke, S.; Hottel, R.

2002-02-27T23:59:59.000Z

23

Monitoring under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement : the prospects of antineutrino detection as an IAEA verification metric for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in the United States  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

After the end of World War II, the world entered an even more turbulent period as it faced the beginnings of the Cold War, during which the prospect of mutually assured destruction between the world's largest nuclear weapon ...

Copeland, Christopher Michael, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

24

Experience making mixed oxide fuel with plutonium from dismantled weapons  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Mixed depleted UO{sub 2} and PuO{sub 2} (MOX) pellets prototypic of fuel proposed for use in commercial power reactors were made with plutonium recovered from dismantled weapons. We characterized plutonium dioxide powders that were produced at the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LANL and LLNL) using various methods to recover the plutonium from weapons parts and to convert It to oxide. The gallium content of the PUO{sub 2} prepared at LANL was the same as in the weapon alloy while the content of that prepared at LLNL was less. The MOX was prepared with a five weight percent plutonium content. We tested various MOX powders milling methods to improve homogeneity and found vibratory milling superior to ball milling. The sintering behavior of pellets made with the PuO{sub 2} from the two laboratories was similar. We evaluated the effects of gallium and of erbium and gadolinium, that are added to the MOX fuel as deplorable neutron absorbers, on the pellet fabrication process and an the sintered pellets. The gallium content of the sintered pellets was <10 ppm, suggesting that the gallium will not be an issue in the reactor, but that it will be an Issue in the operation of the fuel fabrication processing equipment unless it is removed from the PuO{sub 2} before it is blended with the UO{sub 2}.

Blair, H.T.; Ramsey, K.B.

1995-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

25

Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition: Plutonium Packaging, Storage and Transportation and Waste Treatment, Storage and Disposal Activities  

SciTech Connect

A fifth annual Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition meeting organized by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was held February 16-18, 2004, at the State Education Center (SEC), 4 Aerodromnya Drive, St. Petersburg, Russia. The meeting discussed Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition topics for which LLNL has the US Technical Lead Organization responsibilities. The technical areas discussed included Radioactive Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal, Plutonium Oxide and Plutonium Metal Packaging, Storage and Transportation and Spent Fuel Packaging, Storage and Transportation. The meeting was conducted with a conference format using technical presentations of papers with simultaneous translation into English and Russian. There were 46 Russian attendees from 14 different Russian organizations and six non-Russian attendees, four from the US and two from France. Forty technical presentations were made. The meeting agenda is given in Appendix B and the attendance list is in Appendix C.

Jardine, L J; Borisov, G B

2004-07-21T23:59:59.000Z

26

U.S. weapons-usable plutonium disposition policy: Implementation of the MOX fuel option  

SciTech Connect

A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of US weapons-grade plutonium, which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option was examined in the context of national and international nonproliferation policy, and in contrast to US plutonium policy. The study reveals numerous difficulties in achieving effective implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option including unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, technological uncertainties, public opposition, potentially conflicting federal policies, and the need for international assurances of reciprocal plutonium disposition activities. It is believed that these difficulties can be resolved in time so that the implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option can eventually be effective in accomplishing its policy objective.

Woods, A.L. [ed.] [Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium, TX (United States); Gonzalez, V.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States). Dept. of Political Science

1998-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

27

US weapons-useable plutonium disposition policy: implementation of the MOX fuel option  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of U.S. weapons-grade plutonium which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option was examined in the context of national and international nonproliferation policy, and in contrast to U.S. plutonium policy. The study reveals numerous difficulties in achieving effective implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option including unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, technological uncertainties, public opposition, potentially conflicting federal policies, and the need for international assurances of reciprocal plutonium disposition activities. It is believed that these difficulties can be resolved in time so that the implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option can eventually be effective in accomplishing its policy objective.

Gonzalez, Vanessa L

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

28

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

29

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

30

Deep burn strategy for the optimized incineration of reactor waste plutonium in pebble bed high temperature gas–cooled reactors / Serfontein D.E.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??In this thesis advanced fuel cycles for the incineration, i.e. deep–burn, of weapons–grade plutonium, reactor–grade plutonium from pressurised light water reactors and reactor–grade plutonium +… (more)

Serfontein, Dawid Eduard.

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

31

Utilization of Surplus Weapons Plutonium As Mixed Oxide Fuel Background Information  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

with worldwide stockpiles of plutonium, both civil and military. The 1995 position statement included an endorsement of the use of reactor irradiation for disposition of surplus U.S. and Russian weapons

unknown authors

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

32

A HOST PHASE FOR THE DISPOSAL OF WEAPONS PLUTONIUM  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Research was conducted into the possible use of zircon (ZrSiO{sub 4}) as a host phase for storage or disposal of excess weapons plutonium. Zircon is one of the most chemically durable minerals. Its structure can accommodate a variety of elements, including plutonium and uranium. Natural zircon contains uranium and thorium together in different quantities, usually in the range of less than one weight percent up to several weight percent. Zircon occurs in nature as a crystalline or a partially to fully metamict mineral, depending on age and actinide element concentration, i.e., on radiation damage. These zircon samples have been studied extensively and the results are documented in the literature in terms of radiation damage to the crystal structure and related property changes, e.g., density, hardness, loss of uranium and lead, etc. Thus, a unique suite of natural analogues are available to describe the effect of decay of {sup 239}Pu on zircon's structure and how zircon's physical and chemical properties will be affected over very long periods of time. Actually, the oldest zircon samples known are over 3 billion years old. This period covers the time for decay of {sup 239}Pu (half-life 24,300 yr.) and most of its daughter {sup 235}U (half-life 700 million yr.). Because of its chemical durability, even under extreme geological conditions, zircon is the most widely used mineral for geochronological dating (7,000 publications). It is the oldest dated mineral on earth and in the universe. Zircon has already been doped with about 10 weight percent of plutonium. Pure PuSiO{sub 4} has also been synthesized and has the same crystal structure as zircon. However, use of zircon as a storage medium or waste form for plutonium requires further materials characterization. Experiments can either be conducted in laboratories where plutonium can be handled or plutonium can be simulated by other elements, and experiments can be done under less restricted conditions. The authors conducted work with zircon doped with thorium, uranium and cerium, respectively. They synthesized various zircon compositions and studied the solid solution properties of mixed (Zr,X)SiO{sub 4} [X represents Th, U, Ce, respectively]. They measured the dissolution rate of pure crystalline zircon at elevated temperatures and of an amorphous hydrated zircon. This final report together with two previous annual reports summarize the accomplishments made in two areas: (1) synthesis of zircon solid solutions with Th, U, and Ce; and (2) measurement of the chemical durability of zircon. The focus of the final report is on the measurement of zircon's dissolution rate in water and on the determination of volubility limits of Th, U, and Ce in zircon.

WERNER LUTZE; K. B. HELEAN; W. L. GONG - UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO RODNEY C. EWING - UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

33

Analysis of Enriched Uranium and Weapons Plutonium Reloads for PWRs Using BRACC  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Comparisons of the multicycle results demonstrate that the correlation coefficients based on the CASMO3 data were implemented correctly and that the Linear Reactivity Model is acceptably accurate for missed reloads containing both uranium and weapons plutonium fuel. The expanded set of correlation coefficients make BRACC a useful tool for performing multi-cycle in-core fuel management studies of PWR cores containing weapons plutonium.

Alonso, G.; Parish, T.A.

1997-06-05T23:59:59.000Z

34

Fabrication of zircon for disposition of weapons plutonium  

SciTech Connect

This is the final report of a one-year, Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In an effort to address the problems of long term storage and nuclear waste minimization, zircon has been proposed as a host medium for plutonium and other actinides recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons. The objective of this work is to investigate the feasibility of large scale fabrication of Pu-bearing zircon. Since PuO{sub 2} is thermodynamically less stable than ZrO{sub 2}, it is expected that the process parameters determined for synthesizing ZrSiO{sub 4} (zircon) would be applicable to those for PuSiO{sub 4} (Pu-zircon). Furthermore, since the foremost concern in plutonium processing is the potential for contamination release, this work emphasizes the development of process parameters, using zircon first, to anticipate potential material problems in the containment system for reaction mixtures during processing. Stoichiometric mixtures of ZrO{sub 2} and SiO{sub 2}, in hundred-gram batches, have been subjected to hot isostatic pressing (HIP) at temperatures near 1,500 C and pressures approximately 10,000 psi. The product materials have been analyzed by x-ray powder diffraction, and are found to consist of zircon after approximately two hours of reaction time. From this work, it is clear that the fabrication of large quantities of Pu-zircon is feasible. The most notable result of this work is evidence for the existence of container problems. This result, in turn, suggests potential solutions to these problems. Experiments with the quartz inner container, the glass sealant, a sacrificial metal barrier, and a metal outer container are being investigated to mitigate these potential hazards.

Kim, K.C.; Huang, J.Y.; Serrano, P.L. [and others

1997-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

35

Safety issues in fabricating mixed oxide fuel using surplus weapons plutonium  

SciTech Connect

This paper presents an assessment of the safety issues and implications of fabricating mixed oxide (MOX) fuel using surplus weapons plutonium. The basis for this assessment is the research done at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in identifying and resolving the technical issues surrounding the production of PuO{sub 2} feed, removal of gallium from the PuO{sub 2} feed, the fabrication of test fuel, and the work done at the LANL plutonium processing facility. The use of plutonium in MOX fuel has been successfully demonstrated in Europe, where the experience has been almost exclusively with plutonium separated from commercial spent nuclear fuel. This experience in safely operating MOX fuel fabrication facilities directly applies to the fabrication and irradiation of MOX fuel made from surplus weapons plutonium. Consequently, this paper focuses on the technical difference between plutonium from surplus weapons, and light-water reactor recycled plutonium. Preliminary assessments and research lead to the conclusion that no new process or product safety concerns will arise from using surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel.

Buksa, J.; Badwan, F.; Barr, M.; Motley, F.

1998-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

36

Plutonium radiation surrogate  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A self-contained source of gamma-ray and neutron radiation suitable for use as a radiation surrogate for weapons-grade plutonium is described. The source generates a radiation spectrum similar to that of weapons-grade plutonium at 5% energy resolution between 59 and 2614 keV, but contains no special nuclear material and emits little .alpha.-particle radiation. The weapons-grade plutonium radiation surrogate also emits neutrons having fluxes commensurate with the gamma-radiation intensities employed.

Frank, Michael I. (Dublin, CA)

2010-02-02T23:59:59.000Z

37

Physics studies of weapons plutonium disposition in the IFR closed fuel cycle  

SciTech Connect

The core performance impact of weapons plutonium introduction into the IFR closed fuel cycle is investigated by comparing three disposition scenarios: a power production mode, a moderate destruction mode, and a maximum destruction mode all at a constant heat rating of 840 MWt. For each scenario, two fuel cycle models are evaluated: cores using weapons material as the sole source of transuranics in a once-through mode, and recycle corns using weapons material only as required for a make-up feed. Calculated results include mass flows, detailed isotopic distributions, neutronic performance characteristics, and reactivity feedback coefficients. In general, it is shown that weapons plutonium feed does not have an adverse impact on IFR core performance characteristics.

Hill, R.N.; Wade, D.C.; Liaw, J.R.; Fujita, E.K.

1994-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

38

Disposition of excess weapon plutonium in deep boreholes - site selection handbook  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

One of the options for disposing of excess weapons plutonium is to place it near the base of deep boreholes in stable crystalline rocks. The technology needed to begin designing this means of disposition already exists, and there are many attractive sites available within the conterminous United States. There are even more potential sites for this option within Russia. The successful design of a borehole system must address two criteria: (1) how to dispose of 50 metric tons of weapons plutonium while making it inaccessible for unauthorized retrieval, and (2) how to prevent contamination of the accessible biosphere, defined here as the Earth`s surface and usable groundwaters.

Heiken, G.; Woldegabriel, G.; Morley, R.; Plannerer, H.; Rowley, J.

1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

39

Laboratory directed research and development on disposal of plutonium recovered from weapons. FY1994 final report  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This research project was conceived as a multi-year plan to study the use of mixed plutonium oxide-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in existing nuclear reactors. Four areas of investigation were originally proposed: (1) study reactor physics including evaluation of control rod worth and power distribution during normal operation and transients; (2) evaluate accidents focusing upon the reduced control rod worth and reduced physical properties of PuO{sub 2}; (3) assess the safeguards required during fabrication and use of plutonium bearing fuel assemblies; and (4) study public acceptance issues associated with using material recovered from weapons to fuel a nuclear reactor. First year accomplishments are described. Appendices contain 2 reports entitled: development and validation of advanced computational capability for MOX fueled ALWR assembly designs; and long-term criticality safety concerns associated with weapons plutonium disposition.

Pitts, J.H.; Choi, J.S.

1994-11-14T23:59:59.000Z

40

Plutonium Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Plutonium Disposition Program Plutonium Disposition Program Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Fissile Materials Disposition > Plutonium Disposition Program Plutonium Disposition Program The U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which entered into force on July 13, 2011, commits each country to dispose of at least 34 metric tons (MT) of weapon-grade plutonium withdrawn from their respective nuclear weapon programs. The U.S. remains firmly committed to its PMDA obligation to dispose of excess weapons plutonium. U.S. Plutonium Disposition The current U.S. plan to dispose of 34 MT of weapon-grade plutonium is to fabricate it into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiate it in existing light water reactors. This approach requires construction of new facilities

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


41

History of the US weapons-usable plutonium disposition program leading to DOE`s record of decision  

SciTech Connect

This report highlights important events and studies concerning surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition in the United States. Included are major events that led to the creation of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition in 1994 and to that DOE office issuing the January 1997 Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Useable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Emphasis has been given to reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives.

Spellman, D.J.; Thomas, J.F.; Bugos, R.G.

1997-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

42

Reduction of Weapon Grade Plutonium Inventories in a Thorium Burner  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Fusion-Fission Hybrids and Transmutation / Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Emerging Nuclear Energy Systems

Sümer Sahin; Haci Mehmet Sahin; Adem Acir

43

Reactor options for disposition of excess weapon plutonium: Selection criteria and decision process for assessment  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

DOE is currently considering a wide range of alternatives for disposition of excess weapon plutonium, including using plutonium in mixed oxide fuel for light water reactors (LWRs). Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has been tasked to assist DOE in its efforts to develop a decision process and criteria for evaluating the technologies and reactor designs that have been proposed for the fission disposition alternative. This report outlines an approach for establishing such a decision process and selection criteria. The approach includes the capability to address multiple, sometimes conflicting, objectives, and to incorporate the impact of uncertainty. The approach has a firm theoretical foundation and similar approaches have been used successfully by private industry, DOE, and other government agencies to support and document complex, high impact technology choice decisions. Because of their similarity and relatively simple technology, this report focuses on three light water reactors studied in Phase 1 of the DOE Plutonium Disposition Study. The decision process can be extended to allow evaluation of other reactor technologies and disposition options such as direct disposal and retrievable storage.

Edmunds, T.; Buonpane, L.; Sicherman, A.; Sutcliffe, W.; Walter, C.; Holman, G.

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

44

The U.S.-Russian joint studies on using power reactors to disposition surplus weapon plutonium as spent fuel  

SciTech Connect

In 1996, the US and the Russian Federation completed an initial joint study of the candidate options for the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium in both countries. The options included long term storage, immobilization of the plutonium in glass or ceramic for geologic disposal, and the conversion of weapons plutonium to spent fuel in power reactors. For the latter option, the US is only considering the use of existing light water reactors (LWRs) with no new reactor construction for plutonium disposition, or the use of Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) heavy water reactors. While Russia advocates building new reactors, the cost is high, and the continuing joint study of the Russian options is considering only the use of existing VVER-1000 LWRs in Russia and possibly Ukraine, the existing BN-60O fast neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia, or the use of the Canadian CANDU reactors. Six of the seven existing VVER-1000 reactors in Russia and the eleven VVER-1000 reactors in Ukraine are all of recent vintage and can be converted to use partial MOX cores. These existing VVER-1000 reactors are capable of converting almost 300 kg of surplus weapons plutonium to spent fuel each year with minimum nuclear power plant modifications. Higher core loads may be achievable in future years.

Chebeskov, A.; Kalashnikov, A. [State Scientific Center, Obninsk (Russian Federation). Inst. of Physics and Power Engineering; Bevard, B.; Moses, D. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Pavlovichev, A. [State Scientific Center, Moscow (Russian Federation). Kurchatov Inst.

1997-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

45

Accelerator-based conversion (ABC) of weapons plutonium: Plant layout study and related design issues  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In preparation for and in support of a detailed R and D Plan for the Accelerator-Based Conversion (ABC) of weapons plutonium, an ABC Plant Layout Study was conducted at the level of a pre-conceptual engineering design. The plant layout is based on an adaptation of the Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) detailed conceptual design that was completed in the early 1070s. Although the ABC Plant Layout Study included the Accelerator Equipment as an essential element, the engineering assessment focused primarily on the Target; Primary System (blanket and all systems containing plutonium-bearing fuel salt); the Heat-Removal System (secondary-coolant-salt and supercritical-steam systems); Chemical Processing; Operation and Maintenance; Containment and Safety; and Instrumentation and Control systems. Although constrained primarily to a reflection of an accelerator-driven (subcritical) variant of MSBR system, unique features and added flexibilities of the ABC suggest improved or alternative approaches to each of the above-listed subsystems; these, along with the key technical issues in need of resolution through a detailed R&D plan for ABC are described on the bases of the ``strawman`` or ``point-of-departure`` plant layout that resulted from this study.

Cowell, B.S.; Fontana, M.H. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Krakowski, R.A.; Beard, C.A.; Buksa, J.J.; Davidson, J.W.; Sailor, W.C.; Williamson, M.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

1995-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

46

Proceedings of the 6th Annual Meeting for Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition: Plutonium Packaging, Storage and Transportation and WasteTreatment, Storage and Disposal Activities  

SciTech Connect

The sixth annual Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition meeting organized by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was held November 15-17, 2004, at the State Education Center (SEC), 4 Aerodromnya Drive, St. Petersburg, Russia. The meeting discussed Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition topics for which LLNL has the US Technical Lead Organization responsibilities. The technical areas discussed included Radioactive Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal, and Plutonium Oxide and Plutonium Metal Packaging, Storage and Transportation and Spent Fuel Packaging, Storage and Transportation. The meeting was conducted with a conference format using technical presentations of papers with simultaneous translation into English and Russian. There were 55 Russian attendees from 16 different Russian organizations and four non-Russian attendees from the US. Forty technical presentations were made. The meeting agenda is given in Appendix B and the attendance list is in Appendix C. The 16 different Russian design, industrial sites, and scientific organizations in attendance included staff from Rosatom/Minatom, Federal Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority of Russia (GOSATOMNADZOR, NIERA/GAN), All Russian Designing & Scientific Research Institute of Complex Power Technology (VNIPIET), Khlopin Radium Institute (KRI), A. A. Bochvar All Russian Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials (VNIINM), All Russian & Design Institute of Production Engineering (VNIPIPT), Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russian Federation Specialized State Designing Institute (GSPI), State Scientific Center Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (RIAR), Siberian Chemical Combine Tomsk (SCC), Mayak PO, Mining Chemical Combine (MCC K-26), Institute of Biophysics (IBPh), Sverdlosk Scientific Research Institute of Chemical Machine Building (SNIIChM), Kurchatov Institute (KI), Institute of Physical Chemistry Russian Academy of Science (IPCh RAS) and Radon PO-Moscow. The four non-Russian attendees included one representative from DOE NNSA, and LLNL, and two from Duratek, The meeting was organized into three major sessions: (1) Waste Treatment, Storage and Disposal; (2) Plutonium Packaging, Storage and Transportation; (3) Spent Fuel Packaging, Storage and Transportation. Twenty presentations were made on the topic of Waste Treatment, Storage and Disposal (Session II), ten presentations on Plutonium Packaging, Storage and Transportation (Session III), and four presentations on Spent Fuel Packaging, Storage and Transportation (Session IV). In addition, DOE/NNSA, Minatom/Rosatom and TVEL summarized the bases for the conference at the beginning of the meeting (Session I). Nine months had passed since the last LLNL contracts review meeting. During that time period, LLNL and TVEL have been able to sign six contracts for a total of $1,700,000 in the areas of: (1) Waste treatment, storage and disposal; and (2) Plutonium packaging, storage and transportation. The scope of several other work projects are now in various stages of development in these areas. It is anticipated that more contracts will be signed before the next meeting of this type. These events have allowed us to start work in our technical activities under new direction from TVEL, which is now the single Russian organization to coordinate and conclude contracts with LLNL. The meeting presentations and discussions have defined where we are and where we are going in the near term in regard to our joint interests in excess weapons plutonium disposition. Each topical section of this Proceedings is introduced by a summary of the presentations in that section.

Jardine, L J

2005-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

47

Method of immobilizing weapons plutonium to provide a durable, disposable waste product  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method of atomic scale fixation and immobilization of plutonium to provide a durable waste product. Plutonium is provided in the form of either PuO.sub.2 or Pu(NO.sub.3).sub.4 and is mixed with and SiO.sub.2. The resulting mixture is cold pressed and then heated under pressure to form (Zr,Pu)SiO.sub.4 as the waste product.

Ewing, Rodney C. (Albuquerque, NM); Lutze, Werner (Albuquerque, NM); Weber, William J. (Richland, WA)

1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

48

Multi-generational stewardship of plutonium  

SciTech Connect

The post-cold war era has greatly enhanced the interest in the long-term stewardship of plutonium. The management of excess plutonium from proposed nuclear weapons dismantlement has been the subject of numerous intellectual discussions during the past several years. In this context, issues relevant to long-term management of all plutonium as a valuable energy resource are also being examined. While there are differing views about the future role of plutonium in the economy, there is a recognition of the environmental and health related problems and proliferation potentials of weapons-grade plutonium. The long-term management of plutonium as an energy resource will require a new strategy to maintain stewardship for many generations to come.

Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Nuclear Materials Technology Div.

1997-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

49

Obstacles to US ability to control and track weapons-grade uranium supplied abroad  

SciTech Connect

The United States has exported over 16,000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors in over 40 nations. GAO learned that the central computerized system used for tracking such exports is incomplete and inaccurate. Intended users also consider it inadequate and unreliable. In addition, three other systems gather information on highly enriched uranium. GAO recommends streamlining and consolidating the information maintained on this material in a more accurate, comprehensive, and flexible manner. GAO believes that reducing the use of highly enriched uranium is a sound non-proliferation objective. A number of obstacles, however, must be overcome if the conversion of research reactors to non-weapons grade fuels is to become a reality in the next few years. In the meantime, US ability to ensure adequate physical protection of highly enriched uranium supplied abroad is limited and international safeguards of nuclear material need further improvement.

Bowsher, C.A.

1982-08-02T23:59:59.000Z

50

Plutonium 239 Equivalency Calculations  

SciTech Connect

This document provides the basis for converting actual weapons grade plutonium mass to a plutonium equivalency (PuE) mass of Plutonium 239. The conversion can be accomplished by performing calculations utilizing either: (1) Isotopic conversions factors (CF{sub isotope}), or (2) 30-year-old weapons grade conversion factor (CF{sub 30 yr}) Both of these methods are provided in this document. Material mass and isotopic data are needed to calculate PuE using the isotopic conversion factors, which will provide the actual PuE value at the time of calculation. PuE is the summation of the isotopic masses times their associated isotopic conversion factors for plutonium 239. Isotopic conversion factors are calculated by a normalized equation, relative to Plutonium 239, of specific activity (SA) and cumulated dose inhalation affects based on 50-yr committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). The isotopic conversion factors for converting weapons grade plutonium to PuE are provided in Table-1. The unit for specific activity (SA) is curies per gram (Ci/g) and the isotopic SA values come from reference [1]. The cumulated dose inhalation effect values in units of rem/Ci are based on 50-yr committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). A person irradiated by gamma radiation outside the body will receive a dose only during the period of irradiation. However, following an intake by inhalation, some radionuclides persist in the body and irradiate the various tissues for many years. There are three groups CEDE data representing lengths of time of 0.5 (D), 50 (W) and 500 (Y) days, which are in reference [2]. The CEDE values in the (W) group demonstrates the highest dose equivalent value; therefore they are used for the calculation.

Wen, J

2011-05-31T23:59:59.000Z

51

Plutonium Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Home > Media Room > Fact Sheets > Plutonium Disposition Program Home > Media Room > Fact Sheets > Plutonium Disposition Program Fact Sheet Plutonium Disposition Program Jun 26, 2013 SUPPORTING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION Weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the critical ingredients for making a nuclear weapon. With the end of the Cold War, hundreds of tons of these materials were determined to be surplus to U.S. and Russian defense needs. Denying access to plutonium and HEU is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist organizations. The most certain method to prevent these materials from falling into the wrong hands is to dispose of them. During the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov signed a protocol

52

PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) SUB-GRADE EE/CA EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES A NEW MODEL  

SciTech Connect

An engineering evaluation/cost analysis (EE/CA) was performed at the Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The purpose of the EVCA was to identify the sub-grade items to be evaluated; determine the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) hazardous substances through process history and available data; evaluate these hazards; and as necessary, identify the available alternatives to reduce the risk associated with the contaminants. The sub-grade EWCA considered four alternatives for an interim removal action: (1) No Action; (2) Surveillance and Maintenance (S&M); (3) Stabilize and Leave in Place (Stabilization); and (4) Remove, Treat and Dispose (RTD). Each alternative was evaluated against the CERCLA criteria for effectiveness, implementability, and cost.

HOPKINS, A.M.

2007-06-08T23:59:59.000Z

53

Theory of Antineutrino Monitoring of Burning MOX Plutonium Fuels  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This letter presents the physics and feasibility of reactor antineutrino monitoring to verify the burnup of plutonium loaded in the reactor as a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel. It examines the magnitude and temporal variation in the antineutrino signals expected for different MOX fuels, for the purposes of nuclear accountability and safeguards. The antineutrino signals from reactor-grade and weapons-grade MOX are shown to be distinct from those from burning low enriched uranium. Thus, antineutrino monitoring could be used to verify the destruction of plutonium in reactors, though verifying the grade of the plutonium being burned is found to be more challenging.

Hayes, A C; Nieto, Michael Martin; WIlson, W B

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

54

Theory of Antineutrino Monitoring of Burning MOX Plutonium Fuels  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This letter presents the physics and feasibility of reactor antineutrino monitoring to verify the burnup of plutonium loaded in the reactor as a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel. It examines the magnitude and temporal variation in the antineutrino signals expected for different MOX fuels, for the purposes of nuclear accountability and safeguards. The antineutrino signals from reactor-grade and weapons-grade MOX are shown to be distinct from those from burning low enriched uranium. Thus, antineutrino monitoring could be used to verify the destruction of plutonium in reactors, though verifying the grade of the plutonium being burned is found to be more challenging.

A. C. Hayes; H. R. Trellue; Michael Martin Nieto; W. B. WIlson

2011-10-03T23:59:59.000Z

55

U.S. and Russia Sign Plan for Russian Plutonium Disposition | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Sign Plan for Russian Plutonium Disposition Sign Plan for Russian Plutonium Disposition U.S. and Russia Sign Plan for Russian Plutonium Disposition November 19, 2007 - 4:31pm Addthis Will Eliminate Enough Russian Plutonium for Thousands of Nuclear Weapons WASHINGTON, DC -U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman and Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency Director Sergey Kiriyenko have signed a joint statement outlining a plan to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium from Russia's weapons program. Under the new plan, the United States will cooperate with Russia to convert Russian weapon-grade plutonium into mixed oxide fuel (MOX) and irradiate the MOX fuel in the BN-600 fast reactor, currently operating at the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant, and in the BN-800 fast reactor, currently under construction at the same site. The United States and Russia also

56

Plutonium destruction in a non-fertile, ZrO{sub 2}-based fuel: A reactor option for disposition of surplus plutonium  

SciTech Connect

The United States and Russia are assessing options for disposition of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. This paper reviews the options under consideration by the US Department of Energy and suggests an additional option that fits within the framework of the environmental analysis provided in the draft PEIS (Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement). In addition to the burning of Pu in mixed U-Pu oxide fuel, we recommend consideration of a non-fertile fuel based on zirconia with inclusion of rare earth elements for phase stabilization and control of reactivity. The zirconia based fuel could also be used to burn plutonium generated in commercial reactor fuels, which represent a larger inventory of plutonium than the weapon-grade material. The increasing inventories of civilian plutonium potentially represent a larger threat with respect to diversion weapons usable material than the stocks of weapon-grade material considered for disposition by the US and Russia. We discuss the use of zirconia-based fuel and pyrochemical processing of spent commercial reactor fuels as a means of decreasing world-wide plutonium inventories. The experience gained in burning weapon-grade plutonium in the new non-fertile fuel would shorten the time required to gain acceptance of the fuel for commercial reactor use.

Oversby, V.M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); McPheeters, C.C. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

1996-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

57

AN APPROACH TO CHARACTERIZING & EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF SUB-GRADE STRUCTURES AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)  

SciTech Connect

In 2002, the Richland Operations Office (RL) of the US Department of Energy (DOE), the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) developed milestones for transitioning the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) facility to a clean slab-on-grade configuration. These milestones required developing an engineering evaluation/cost analysis (EF/CA) for the facility's sub-grade structures and installations as part of a series of evaluations intended to provide for the transition of the facility to a clean slab-on-grade configuration. In addition to supporting decisions for interim actions, the analyses of sub-grade structures and installations performed through this EE/CA will contribute to the remedial investigation feasibility study(ies) and subsequently to the final records of decision for the relevant operable units responsible for site closure in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site.

HOPKINS, A.M.; KLOS, D.B.

2007-01-25T23:59:59.000Z

58

Fuel qualification issues and strategies for reactor-based surplus plutonium disposition  

SciTech Connect

The Department of Energy (DOE) has proposed irradiation of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing commercial reactors as a disposition method for surplus plutonium from the weapons program. The burning of MOX fuel in reactors is supported by an extensive technology base; however, the infrastructure required to implement reactor-based plutonium disposition does not exist domestically. This report identifies and examines the actions required to qualify and license weapons-grade (WG) plutonium-based MOX fuels for use in domestic commercial light-water reactors (LWRs).

Cowell, B.S.; Copeland, G.L.; Moses, D.L.

1997-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

59

Plutonium Disposition Now!  

SciTech Connect

A means for use of existing processing facilities and reactors for plutonium disposition is described which requires a minimum capital investment and allows rapid implementation. The scenario includes interim storage and processing under IAEA control, and fabrication into MOX fuel in existing or planned facilities in Europe for use in operating reactors in the two home countries. Conceptual studies indicate that existing Westinghouse four-loop designs can safety dispose of 0.94 MT of plutonium per calendar year. Thus, it would be possible to consume the expected US excess stockpile of about 50 MT in two to three units of this type, and it is highly likely that a comparable amount of the FSU excess plutonium could be deposed of in a few VVER-1000`s. The only major capital project for this mode of plutonium disposition would be the weapons-grade plutonium processing which could be done in a dedicated international facility or using existing facilities in the US and FSU under IAEA control. This option offers the potential for quick implementation at a very low cost to the governments of the two countries.

Buckner, M.R.

1995-05-24T23:59:59.000Z

60

Evaluation of weapons-grade mixed oxide fuel performance in U.S. Light Water Reactors using COMETHE 4D release 23 computer code  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The COMETHE 4D Release 23 computer code was used to evaluate the thermal, chemical and mechanical performance of weapons-grade MOX fuel irradiated under U.S. light water reactor typical conditions. Comparisons were made to and UO? fuels exhibited similar conventional UO? fuel. Weapons-grade MOX behavior. However, MOX fuel rods feature higher fuel centerline temperatures due to a lower thermal conductivity. Moreover, higher diffusion in MOX fuel results in a slightly higher fission gas release. Finally, MOX fuel shows better mechanical behavior than UO? fuel due to lower pellet-cladding mechanical interaction and rod deformation. These results indicate that the MOX fuel meets all potential licensing requirements.

Bellanger, Philippe

1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


61

ESTIMATING IMPURITIES IN SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The United States holds at least 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Many of the items that require disposition are only partially characterized, and SRNL uses a variety of techniques to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that are important for processing through the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and alternative disposition paths. Recent advances in laboratory tools, including Prompt Gamma Analysis and Peroxide Fusion treatment, provide data on the existing inventories that will enable disposition without additional, costly sampling and destructive analysis.

Allender, J.; Moore, E.

2013-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

62

Spiked Alloy Production for Accelerated Aging of Plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The accelerated aging effects on weapons grade plutonium alloys are being studied using {sup 238}Pu-enriched plutonium metal to increase the rate of formation of defect structures. Pyrochemical processing methods have been used to produce two {sup 238}Pu-spiked plutonium alloys with nominal compositions of 7.5 wt% {sup 238}Pu. Processes used in the preparation of the alloys include direct oxide reduction of PuO{sub 2} with calcium and electrorefining. Rolled disks were prepared from the spiked alloys for sampling. Test specimens were cut out of the disks for physical property measurements.

Wilk, P A; McNeese, J A; Dodson, K E; Williams, W L; Krikorian, O H; Blau, M S; Schmitz, J E; Bajao, F G; Mew, D A; Matz, T E; Torres, R A; Holck, D M; Moody, K J; Kenneally, J M

2009-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

63

Summary of near-term options for Russian plutonium production reactors  

SciTech Connect

The Russian Federation desires to phase out the production of weapons-grade plutonium. To this end, ten graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactors have been shut down during the last several years. However, complete cessation of plutonium production is impeded because the three operating Russian reactors supply district heat and electricity to the Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk regions in addition to producing weapon-grade plutonium. In August 1992 the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the Russian Nuclear Regulatory Agency (GAN) requested U.S. assistance for achieving a cessation of weapons-grade plutonium production, placing the plutonium production reactors under safeguards, and conducting a program to evaluate and assist in the upgrade of plant safety. As a result of that and subsequent communications, Secretary O`Leary and Minister Mikhailov have signed a protocol that expressed their desire to shut down the three remaining plutonium production reactors as soon as possible by replacing them with alternate energy sources. In the meantime, both MINATOM and the Department of Energy (DOE) are concerned about the safety of the plants as well as the difficulty in ceasing the production of plutonium as long as the plants continue to operate. A military subsidy has been provided for operation of the production reactor complex. Revenues received for providing district heat and electricity are insufficient to cover costs for the current natural uranium metal fuel cycle. A more economical fuel cycle is needed for civilian operations.

Newman, D.F.; Gesh, C.J.; Love, E.F.; Harms, S.L.

1994-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

64

Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives  

SciTech Connect

This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

65

PFP Commercial Grade Food Pack Cans for Plutonium Handling and Storage Critical Characteristics  

SciTech Connect

This document specifies the critical characteristics for containers procured for Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP's) Vault Operations system as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to perform its safety function.

BONADIE, E.P.

2000-10-26T23:59:59.000Z

66

From separations to reconstitution - a short history of Plutonium in the U.S. and Russia  

SciTech Connect

During the cold war plutonium was produced in reactors in both the US and Russia. It was then separated from the residual uranium and fission products by a variety of precipitation processes, such as Bismuth Phosphate, Redox, Butex, Purex, etc. in the US and uranium acetate and Purex in Russia. After a period of time in the field, plutonium weapons were recycled and the plutonium re-purified and returned to weapons. purification was accomplished by a variety of aqueous and molten salt processes, such as nitric-hydrofluoric acid dissolution followed by anion exchange, Purex modifications, molten salt extraction, electrorefining, etc. in the US and nitric acid dissolution or sodium hydroxide fusion followed by anion exchange in Russia. At the end of the Cold War, plutonium production of weapons-grade plutonium was cut off in the US and is expected to be cut off in Russia shortly after the turn of the century. Now both countries are looking at methods to reconstitute plutonium with fission products to render it no longer useful for nuclear weapons. These methods include immobilization in a ceramic matrix and then encasement in fission product laden glass, irradiation of MOX fuel, and disposal as waste in WIPP in the US and irradiation of MOX fuel in Russia. This paper details the contrast between the treatment of plutonium during the cold war and after the cold war was over.

Gray, L W

1999-04-15T23:59:59.000Z

67

Reconversion of nuclear weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

Kapitza, Sergei P

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

68

How much plutonium does North Korea really have?  

SciTech Connect

In a previous study, as part of the Global Nuclear Material Control Model effort, the author estimated the maximum quantity of plutonium that could be produced in thermal research reactors in the potential nuclear weapon states (including North Korea), based on their declared power level. D. Albright has estimated the amount of plutonium the North Koreans may have produced since 1986 in the 5-megawatt-electric power reactor at Yongbon. Albright provided an upper-bound estimate of 53 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium produced cumulatively if the gas-graphite (magnox) reactor had achieved a load factor of 0.80. This cumulative estimate of 53 kilograms ignores the potential plutonium production in the 8-megawatt-thermal research reactor, IRT-DPRK. To better quantify the cumulative North Korean production, the author conducted a study to estimate the amount of plutonium that could have been produced in the IRT-DPRK research reactor operating at the declared power level during the entire period it has operated, including a period it was not safeguarded. The author estimates that, at most, an additional 6 to 33 kilograms of plutonium could have been produced cumulatively in the research reactor operating at the declared power level during the entire period it has operated, including a 12-year period it was not safeguarded, resulting in a total of 13 to 47 kilograms of plutonium possibly produced in both the research and power reactors.

Dreicer, J.S.

1997-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

69

DOE Plutonium Disposition Study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 1, Final report  

SciTech Connect

The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document, Volume 1, presents a technical description of the various elements of the System 80 + Standard Plant Design upon which the Plutonium Disposition Study was based. The System 80 + Standard Design is fully developed and directly suited to meeting the mission objectives for plutonium disposal. The bass U0{sub 2} plant design is discussed here.

Not Available

1993-05-15T23:59:59.000Z

70

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Criticality Alarm System Commercial Grade Item (CGI) Critical Characteristics  

SciTech Connect

This document specifies the critical characteristics for Commercial Grade Items (CGI) procured for PFP's criticality alarm system as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to properly perform its safety function. There may be several manufacturers or models that meet the critical characteristics for any one item. PFP's Criticality Alarm System includes the nine criticality alarm system panels and their associated hardware. This includes all parts up to the first breaker in the electrical distribution system. Specific system boundaries and justifications are contained in HNF-SD-CP-SDD-003, ''Definition and Means of Maintaining the Criticality Detectors and Alarms Portion of the PFP Safety Envelope.'' The procurement requirements associated with the system necessitates procurement of some system equipment as Commercial Grade Items in accordance with HNF-PRO-268, ''Control of Purchased Items and Services.''

WHITE, W.F.

1999-09-16T23:59:59.000Z

71

CHARACTERIZATION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION OPTIONS  

SciTech Connect

The United States (U.S.) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Except for materials that remain in use for programs outside of national defense, including programs for nuclear-energy development, the surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. Some items will be disposed as transuranic waste, low-level waste, or spent fuel. The remaining surplus plutonium will be managed through: (1) the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (FFF), to be constructed at the Savannah River Site (SRS), where the plutonium will be converted to fuel that will be irradiated in civilian power reactors and later disposed to a high-level waste (HLW) repository as spent fuel; (2) the SRS H-Area facilities, by dissolving and transfer to HLW systems, also for disposal to the repository; or (3) alternative immobilization techniques that would provide durable and secure disposal. From the beginning of the U.S. program for surplus plutonium disposition, DOE has sponsored research to characterize the surplus materials and to judge their suitability for planned disposition options. Because many of the items are stored without extensive analyses of their current chemical content, the characterization involves three interacting components: laboratory sample analysis, if available; non-destructive assay data; and rigorous evaluation of records for the processing history for items and inventory groups. This information is collected from subject-matter experts at inventory sites and from materials stabilization and surveillance programs, in cooperation with the design agencies for the disposition facilities. This report describes the operation and status of the characterization program.

Allender, J; Edwin Moore, E; Scott Davies, S

2008-07-15T23:59:59.000Z

72

Plutonium and tritium produced in the Hanford Site production reactors  

SciTech Connect

In a news release on December 7, 1993, the Secretary of Energy announced declassification action that included totals for plutonium and tritium production in the Hanford Site production reactors. This information was reported as being preliminary because it was not fully supported by documentation. Subsequently, production data were made available from the US Department of Energy-Headquarters (DOE-HQ) records that indicated an increase of about one and one-half metric tons in total plutonium production. The Westinghouse Hanford Company was tasked by the US Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office to substantiate production figures and DOE-HQ data and to provide a defensible report of weapons- (6 wt% {sup 240}Pu) and nonweapons- (fuels-)grade (nominally 9 wt% or higher {sup 240}Pu) plutonium and tritium production in the Hanford Site production reactors. The task was divided into three parts. The first part was to determine plutonium and tritium production based on available reported accountability records. The second part was to determine plutonium production independently by calculational checks based on reactor thermal power generation and plutonium conversion factors representing the various reactor fuels. The third part was to resolve differences, if they occurred, in the reported and calculational results. In summary, the DOE-HQ-reported accountability records of plutonium and tritium production were determined to be the most defensible record of Hanford Site reactor production. The DOE-HQ records were consistently supported by the independent calculational checks and the records of operational data. Total production quantities are 67.4 MT total plutonium, which includes 12.9 MT of nonweapons-grade plutonium. The total tritium production was 10.6 kg.

Roblyer, S.P.

1994-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

73

Plutonium disposition study phase 1b final report  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report provides the results of the Westinghouse activities performed as part of the Plutonium Disposition Study Phase 1b. These activities, which took place from May 16, 1993 to September 15, 1993, build upon the work completed in Phase 1a, which concluded on May 15, 1993. In Phase 1a, three Plutonium Disposal Reactor (PDR) options were developed for the disposal of excess weapons grade plutonium from returned and dismantled nuclear weapons. This report documents the results of several tasks that were performed to further knowledge in specific areas leading up to Phase 2 of the PDR Study. The Westinghouse activities for Phase 1b are summarized as follows: (1) resolved technical issues concerning reactor physics including equilibrium cycle calculations, use of gadolinium, moderator temperature coefficient, and others as documented in Section 2.0; (2) analyzed large Westinghouse commercial plants for plutonium disposal; (3) reactor safety issues including the steam line break were resolved, and are included in Section 2.0; (4) several tasks related to the PDR Fuel Cycle were examined; (5) cost and deployment options were examined to determine optimal configuration for both plutonium disposal and tritium production; (6) response to questions from DOE and National Academy of Scientists (NAS) reviewers concerning the PDR Phase 1a report are included in Appendix A.

NONE

1993-09-15T23:59:59.000Z

74

Density and Tensile Properties Changed by Aging Plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

We present volume, density, and tensile property change observed from both naturally and accelerated aged plutonium alloys. Accelerated alloys are plutonium alloys with a fraction of Pu-238 to accelerate the aging process by approximately 18 times the rate of unaged weapons-grade plutonium. After thirty-five equivalent years of aging on accelerated alloys, the dilatometry shows the samples at 35 C have swelled in volume by 0.12 to 0.14% and now exhibit a near linear volume increase due to helium in-growth while showing possible surface effects on samples at 50 C and 65 C. The engineering stress of the accelerated alloy at 18 equivalent years increased significantly compared to at 4.5 equivalent years.

Chung, B W; Choi, B W; Thompson, S R; Woods, C H; Hopkins, D J; Ebbinghaus, B B

2005-03-14T23:59:59.000Z

75

The distribution and history of nuclear weapons related contamination in sediments from the Ob River, Siberia as determined by isotopic ratios of Plutonium, Neptunium, and Cesium  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This thesis addresses the sources and transport of nuclear weapons related contamination in the Ob River region, Siberia. In addition to being one of the largest rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean, the bulk of the former ...

Kenna, Timothy C

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

76

Survey of Worldwide Light Water Reactor Experience with Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel  

SciTech Connect

The US and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have recently declared quantities of weapons materials, including weapons-grade (WG) plutonium, excess to strategic requirements. One of the leading candidates for the disposition of excess WG plutonium is irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) as mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. A description of the MOX fuel fabrication techniques in worldwide use is presented. A comprehensive examination of the domestic MOX experience in US reactors obtained during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s is also presented. This experience is described by manufacturer and is also categorized by the reactor facility that irradiated the MOX fuel. A limited summary of the international experience with MOX fuels is also presented. A review of MOX fuel and its performance is conducted in view of the special considerations associated with the disposition of WG plutonium. Based on the available information, it appears that adoption of foreign commercial MOX technology from one of the successful MOX fuel vendors will minimize the technical risks to the overall mission. The conclusion is made that the existing MOX fuel experience base suggests that disposition of excess weapons plutonium through irradiation in LWRs is a technically attractive option.

Cowell, B.S.; Fisher, S.E.

1999-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

77

Preserving Plutonium-244 as a National Asset  

SciTech Connect

Plutonium-244 (244 Pu) is an extremely rare and long-lived isotope of plutonium with a half-life of 80 million years. Measureable amounts of 244 Pu are found in neither reactor-grade nor weapons-grade plutonium. Production of this isotope requires a very high thermal flux to permit the two successive neutron captures that convert 242 Pu to 243 Pu to 244 Pu, particularly given the short (about 5 hour) half-life of 243 Pu. Such conditions simply do not exist in plutonium production processes. Therefore, 244 Pu is ideal for precise radiochemical analyses measuring plutonium material properties and isotopic concentrations in items containing plutonium. Isotope dilution mass spectrometry is about ten times more sensitive when using 244 Pu rather than 242 Pu for determining plutonium isotopic content. The isotope can also be irradiated in small quantities to produce superheavy elements. The majority of the existing global inventory of 244 Pu is contained in the outer housing of Mark-18A targets at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The total inventory is about 20 grams of 244 Pu in about 400 grams of plutonium distributed among the 65 targets. Currently, there are no specific plans to preserve these targets. Although the cost of separating and preserving this material would be considerable, it is trivial in comparison to new production costs. For all practical purposes, the material is irreplaceable, because new production would cost billions of dollars and require a series of irradiation and chemical separation cycles spanning up to 50 years. This paper will discuss a set of options for overcoming the significant challenges to preserve the 244 Pu as a National Asset: (1) the need to relocate the material from SRS in a timely manner, (2) the need to reduce the volume of material to the extent possible for storage, and (3) the need to establish an operational capability to enrich the 244 Pu in significant quantities. This paper suggests that if all the Mark-18A plutonium is separated, it would occupy a small volume and would be inexpensive to store while an enrichment capability is developed. Very small quantities could be enriched in existing mass separators to support critical needs.

Patton, Bradley D [ORNL; Alexander, Charles W [ORNL; Benker, Dennis [ORNL; Collins, Emory D [ORNL; Romano, Catherine E [ORNL; Wham, Robert M [ORNL

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

78

ABSTRACT: Zirconia Ceramics for Excess Weapons ... - TMS  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Jun 26, 2007 ... A zirconia (ZrO sub(2))-based single-phase ceramic containing simulated excess weapons plutonium waste. ZrO sub(2) has large solubility for ...

79

Nuclear power and nuclear-weapons proliferation  

SciTech Connect

The danger that fissile isotopes may be diverted from nuclear power production to the construction of nuclear weapons would be aggravated by a switch to the plutonium breeder: but future uranium supplies are uncertain.

Moniz, E.J.; Neff, T.L.

1978-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

80

Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan describes the Department of Energy`s response to the vulnerabilities identified in the Plutonium Working Group Report which are a result of the cessation of nuclear weapons production. The responses contained in this document are only part of an overall, coordinated approach designed to enable the Department to accelerate conversion of all nuclear materials, including plutonium, to forms suitable for safe, interim storage. The overall actions being taken are discussed in detail in the Department`s Implementation Plan in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 94-1. This is included as Attachment B.

NONE

1995-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


81

A Supplement Analysis on Plutonium Consolidation at Savannah River Site  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

DOE’s April 2002 decision to consolidate surplus, non-pit weapons-usable plutonium at Savannah River Site did not affect a 1997 DOE decision to continue storage of non-pit surplus plutonium at...

82

Decay Heat Calculations for PWR and BWR Assemblies Fueled with Uranium and Plutonium Mixed Oxide Fuel using SCALE  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In currently operating commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), there are two main types of nuclear fuel, low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and mixed-oxide uranium-plutonium (MOX) fuel. The LEU fuel is made of pure uranium dioxide (UO{sub 2} or UOX) and has been the fuel of choice in commercial light water reactors (LWRs) for a number of years. Naturally occurring uranium contains a mixture of different uranium isotopes, primarily, {sup 235}U and {sup 238}U. {sup 235}U is a fissile isotope, and will readily undergo a fission reaction upon interaction with a thermal neutron. {sup 235}U has an isotopic concentration of 0.71% in naturally occurring uranium. For most reactors to maintain a fission chain reaction, the natural isotopic concentration of {sup 235}U must be increased (enriched) to a level greater than 0.71%. Modern nuclear reactor fuel assemblies contain a number of fuel pins potentially having different {sup 235}U enrichments varying from {approx}2.0% to {approx}5% enriched in {sup 235}U. Currently in the United States (US), all commercial nuclear power plants use UO{sub 2} fuel. In the rest of the world, UO{sub 2} fuel is still commonly used, but MOX fuel is also used in a number of reactors. MOX fuel contains a mixture of both UO{sub 2} and PuO{sub 2}. Because the plutonium provides the fissile content of the fuel, the uranium used in MOX is either natural or depleted uranium. PuO{sub 2} is added to effectively replace the fissile content of {sup 235}U so that the level of fissile content is sufficiently high to maintain the chain reaction in an LWR. Both reactor-grade and weapons-grade plutonium contains a number of fissile and non-fissile plutonium isotopes, with the fraction of fissile and non-fissile plutonium isotopes being dependent on the source of the plutonium. While only RG plutonium is currently used in MOX, there is the possibility that WG plutonium from dismantled weapons will be used to make MOX for use in US reactors. Reactor-grade plutonium in MOX fuel is generally obtained from reprocessed irradiated nuclear fuel, whereas weapons-grade plutonium is obtained from decommissioned nuclear weapons material and thus has a different plutonium (and other actinides) concentration. Using MOX fuel instead of UOX fuel has potential impacts on the neutronic performance of the nuclear fuel and the design of the nuclear fuel must take these differences into account. Each of the plutonium sources (RG and WG) has different implications on the neutronic behavior of the fuel because each contains a different blend of plutonium nuclides. The amount of heat and the number of neutrons produced from fission of plutonium nuclides is different from fission of {sup 235}U. These differences in UOX and MOX do not end at discharge of the fuel from the reactor core - the short- and long-term storage of MOX fuel may have different requirements than UOX fuel because of the different discharged fuel decay heat characteristics. The research documented in this report compares MOX and UOX fuel during storage and disposal of the fuel by comparing decay heat rates for typical pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies with and without weapons-grade (WG) and reactor-grade (RG) MOX fuel.

Ade, Brian J [ORNL; Gauld, Ian C [ORNL

2011-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

83

National Security, Weapons Science  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

National Security, Weapons Science National Security, Weapons Science /science-innovation/_assets/images/icon-science.jpg National Security, Weapons Science National security depends on science and technology. The United States relies on Los Alamos National Laboratory for the best of both. No place on Earth pursues a broader array of world-class scientific endeavors. Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at LANL is part of the DOE's stockpile stewardship program. It uses two large X-ray machines to record three-dimensional interior images of materials. In most experiments, materials (including plutonium) undergo hydrodynamic shock to simulate the implosion process in nuclear bombs and/or the effects of severe hydrodynamic stress. The tests are described as "full-scale mockups

84

Demolition Begins on Hanford's Historic Plutonium Vaults - Plutonium  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Demolition Begins on Hanford's Historic Plutonium Vaults - Demolition Begins on Hanford's Historic Plutonium Vaults - Plutonium Finishing Plant on track to meet regulatory milestone Demolition Begins on Hanford's Historic Plutonium Vaults - Plutonium Finishing Plant on track to meet regulatory milestone November 18, 2011 - 12:00pm Addthis Media Contacts Geoff Tyree Department of Energy Geoffrey.Tyree@rl.doe.gov 509-376-4171 Dee Millikin CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company Dee_Millikin@rl.gov 509-376-1297 RICHLAND, WASH. - The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL) began demolishing a vault complex that once held stores of plutonium for the U.S. nuclear weapons program at the Hanford Site in southeast Washington State. The vault complex is part of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant, which

85

Supplement Analysis Plutonium Consolidation  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

9-SA-4 9-SA-4 SUPPLEMENT ANALYSIS STORAGE OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM MATERIALS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE In April 2002, DOE decided to immediately consolidate long-term storage at the Savannah River Site (SRS) of surplus, non-pit weapons-usable plutonium then stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) (DOE, 2002a). That 2002 decision did not affect an earlier DOE decision made in the January 21, 1997, Record of Decision (ROD, DOE, 1997) for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE, 1996) to continue storage of non-pit surplus plutonium at Hanford, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and the Los Alamos

86

LANL | Physics | Dynamic Plutonium Experiments  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Dynamic plutonium experiments Dynamic plutonium experiments Since the end of nuclear testing the nation has had to rely on sophisticated computer models to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This program is known as science-based stockpile stewardship. Despite possessing the world's fastest computers and most advanced modeling capability, the behavior of materials under dynamic loads that occur in a nuclear weapon are difficult to accurately model. The Dynamic Plutonium experimental program carries out experiments at the Nevada National Security Site on plutonium driven by high explosives. These experiments are needed to measure and understand the behavior of plutonium under extreme conditions. Physics Division has unique capabilities in high-speed x-ray imaging and velocimetry (measuring the

87

A Collaborative Effort to Address the Distribution of Plutonium-Contaminated Sludge in Livermore, California  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

For over a half-century, the U.S. Department of Energy nuclear weapons laboratory in Livermore, California has worked with plutonium in the course of its mission to research and develop nuclear weapons. Plutonium releases via the Laboratory’s sewer system resulted in the contamination of sewage sludge that was distributed and used widely as soil conditioner in parks, landscaping around public buildings, and in home lawns and gardens. The amount of sludge distributed and the concentration of the radioactivity in the sludge are uncertain. In 1999, research was undertaken to investigate the historic distribution of sewage sludge (1958-1976) in Livermore. Navigating the uncertainties surrounding the sludge distribution more than forty years after it began presented an enormous ethical challenge. Community members who received the sludge at no cost were not told that the sludge they received may have been contaminated with plutonium, and the log-book that had recorded the names and addresses of sludge recipients had disappeared. The half-life of weapons-grade plutonium is about 24,000 years. Therefore, former, current, and future Livermore residents are at potential increased risk of cancer and other health impacts from their largely unrecognized and therefore unavoidable

Patrice Sutton; A Jacqueline Cabasso; A Tracy Barreau; B Marylia Kelley C

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

88

Plutonium disposition via immobilization in ceramic or glass  

SciTech Connect

The management of surplus weapons plutonium is an important and urgent task with profound environmental, national, and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Policy Directive 13, and various analyses by renown scientific, technical, and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths for the long term disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The central goal of this effort is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in spent fuel from civilian reactors. One disposition option being considered for surplus plutonium is immobilization, in which the plutonium would be incorporated into a glass or ceramic material that would ultimately be entombed permanently in a geologic repository for high-level waste.

Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, A.

1997-03-05T23:59:59.000Z

89

Nuclear Weapons  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

nuclear science that has had a significant global influence. Following the observation of fission products of uranium by Hahn and Strassmann in 1938, a uranium fission weapon...

90

Nuclear Weapons Journal Archive  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Weapons Journal Archive Nuclear Weapons Journal The Nuclear Weapons Journal ceased publication after Issue 2, 2009. Below are Nuclear Weapons Journal archived issues. Issue...

91

Plutonium Consolidation Amended ROD  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

6450-01-P] 6450-01-P] DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Amended Record of Decision: Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials at the Savannah River Site AGENCY: Department of Energy ACTION: Amended Record of Decision SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is amending the Record of Decision (ROD) for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0229, 1996; Storage and Disposition PEIS). Specifically, DOE has decided to take the actions necessary to transfer approximately 2,511 additional 3013-compliant packages 1 containing surplus non-pit weapons-usable plutonium metals and oxides to the Savannah River Site (SRS), near Aiken, South Carolina. Approximately 2,300 containers will be transferred from the Hanford Site (Hanford) near

92

Screening study for evaluation of the potential for system 80+ to consume excess plutonium - Volume 2. Final report  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

As part of the U.S. effort to evaluate technologies offering solutions for the safe disposal or utilization of surplus nuclear materials, the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations legislation provided the Department of Energy (DOE) the necessary funds to conduct multi-phased studies to determine the technical feasibility of using reactor technologies for the triple mission of burning weapons grade plutonium, producing tritium for the existing smaller weapons stockpile, and generating commercial electricity. DOE limited the studies to five advanced reactor designs. Among the technologies selected is the ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) System 80+. The DOE study, currently in Phase ID, is proceeding with a more detailed evaluation of the design`s capability for plutonium disposition.

Not Available

1994-04-30T23:59:59.000Z

93

Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project final report  

SciTech Connect

DOE is investigating methods for long term dispositioning of weapons grade plutonium. One such method would be to utilize the plutonium in Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel assemblies in existing CANDU reactors. CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed, licensed, built, and supported by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and currently use natural uranium oxide as fuel. The MOX spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactor would be similar to the spent fuel currently produced using natural uranium fuel, thus rendering the plutonium as unattractive as that in the stockpiles of commercial spent fuel. This report presents the results of a study sponsored by the DOE for dispositioning the plutonium using CANDU technology. Ontario Hydro`s Bruce A was used as reference. The fuel design study defined the optimum parameters to disposition 50 tons of Pu in 25 years (or 100 tons). Two alternate fuel designs were studied. Safeguards, security, environment, safety, health, economics, etc. were considered. Options for complete destruction of the Pu were also studied briefly; CANDU has a superior ability for this. Alternative deployment options were explored and the potential impact on Pu dispositioning in the former Soviet Union was studied. An integrated system can be ready to begin Pu consumption in 4 years, with no changes required to the reactors other than for safe, secure storage of new fuel.

Not Available

1994-07-31T23:59:59.000Z

94

The Influence of Lewis Acid/Base Chemistry on the Removal of Gallium by Volatility from Weapons-Grade Plutonium Dissolved in Molten Chlorides  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

It has been proposed that GaCl{sub 3} can be removed by direct volatilization from a Pu-Ga alloy that is dissolved in a molten chloride salt. Although pure GaCl{sub 3} is quite volatile (boiling point: 201 deg. C), the behavior of GaCl{sub 3} dissolved in chloride salts is quite different because of solution effects and is critically dependent upon the composition of the solvent salt (i.e., its Lewis acid/base character). In this technical note, the behavior of gallium in prototypical Lewis acid and Lewis base salts is contrasted. It is found that gallium volatility is suppressed in basic melts and promoted in acidic melts. These results have an important influence on the potential for simple gallium removal in molten salt systems.

Williams, David F.; Cul, Guillermo D. del [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (United States); Toth, Louis M. [Electrochemical Systems (United States); Collins, Emory D. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (United States)

2001-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

95

Canada and the United States Cooperate to Shut Down One of the Last Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Reactors in Russia  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew and United States Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman today announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to...

96

Shielding and criticality characterization of ALR8(SI) plutonium storage containers  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

An examination of the shielding and criticality safety performance of the Pantex-designed ALR8(SI) container for storage of ex-weapons pits is described. Both experimental and calculational studies were performed. The MCNP-4A code was used as the major analysis tool. The nuclear data libraries and usage of MCNP-4A was verified by comparison to photon dose rates from experiments with isotopic photon sources placed inside an ALR8(SI) container. An MCNP-4A model of an ALR8(SI) container with a "hypothetical" ex-weapons pit inside was also formulated. The hypothetical pit consisted of a hollow sphere of plutonium encased in stainless steel. Data for the gamma ray intensities from the decay of the plutonium isotopes were taken from the LANL web site, "Map of the Nuclides.'' All of the energy lines from the isotopes in weapons-grade plutonium were used for the photon source description. Dose rates due to the photons emitted by the hypothetical pit were calculated at various positions external to the ALR8(SI) container. Since Pu-241 may undergo significant decay during the possible period of storage, the effect of varying the amount of Am-241 in the hypothetical pit's plutonium was considered. The criticality and neutron dose rates around the ALR8(SI) container with a hypothetical pit inside were also calculated using MCNP-4A. To increase the computational efficiency, the neutron dose rate calculations were carried out using the neutron source distribution at the pit surface that was generated during the criticality calculations. The effective neutron multiplication factor (k[]) for the ALR8(SI) container including the hypothetical pit was calculated both for normal conditions and when the container was flooded with water.

Terekhin, Yevgeniy Vasilyevich

1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

97

Introduction to Pits and Weapons Systems (U)  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A Nuclear Explosive Package includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components. This is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield and it converts mechanical energy into nuclear energy. The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to electromagnetic energy. Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility: casting, forming, machining and welding. Some of the materials used in pits include: Plutonium, Uranium, Stainless Steel, Beryllium, Titanium, and Aluminum. Gloveboxes are used for three reasons: (1) Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides - (a) Plutonium is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides, (b) While not the 'Most dangerous material in the world' of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled; (2) Protect plutonium from reactive materials - (a) Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen, (b) As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control, (c) As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product; and (3) Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: {alpha}, {gamma}, and {eta} are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as {sup 241}Am and {sup 238}Pu.

Kautz, D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-07-02T23:59:59.000Z

98

PLUTONIUM ISOTOPES I N THE NORTH ATLANTIC KEN 0. BUESSELER  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The a r t i f i c i a l radionuclide Plutonium (Pu) has been introduced i n t o the environment p r i m ~ : Dbis Recalculated from Core E Pu Data f o r D i f f e r e n t Input Years . 165 #12;CHAPTER 1 Plutonium environment. The main source of t h i s plutonium (Pu) i s atmospheric nuclear weapons t e s t i n g during

Buesseler, Ken

99

Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium, and Nonproliferation  

Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium and Nuclear Nonproliferation Resources with Additional Information · Awards Siegfried S. Hecker Photo Credit: Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory LeRoy Sanchez On September 17, 2009, U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu named Siegfried S. Hecker as a winner of the Enrico Fermi Award 'in recognition for his contributions to plutonium metallurgy, his broad scientific leadership and for his energetic and continuing efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons around the globe. Dr. Hecker is credited with resolving a long-standing controversy involving the stability of certain structures (or phases) in plutonium alloys near equilibrium that arose from significant discrepancies between U.S. and former USSR research on plutonium metallurgy.'1

100

Plutonium Button  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Alternatives Background and Alternatives To reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is engaged in a program to disposition its...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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101

Plutonium - Humic Acid Stability Constant Determination and Subsequent Studies Examining Sorption in the Ternary Pu(IV) - Humic Acid - Gibbsite System.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??Plutonium has been released to the environment through a variety of intentional and unintentional mechanisms, including atmospheric testing, disposition from weapons manufacturing processes, and subsurface… (more)

Zimmerman, Trevor

102

Characteristics of Spent Fuel from Plutonium Disposition Reactors. Vol. 3: A Westinghouse Pressurized-Water Reactor Design  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report discusses the results of a simulation study involving the burnup of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in a Westinghouse pressurized-water reactor (PWR). The MOX was composed of uranium and plutonium oxides, where the plutonium was of weapons-grade composition. The study was part of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program and considered the possibility of fueling commercial reactors with weapons plutonium. The isotopic composition, the activities, and the decay heat, together with the gamma and neutron dose rates are discussed for the spent fuel. For the steady-state situation involving this PWR burning MOX fuel, two burn histories are reported. In one case, an assembly is burned in the reactor for two cycles, and in the second case and assembly is burned for three cycles. Furthermore, assemblies containing wet annular burnable absorbers (WABAs) and assemblies that do not contain WABAs are considered in all cases. The two-cycle cases have a burnup of 35 GWd/t, and the three-cycle cases have a burnup of 52.5 GWd/t.

Murphy, B.D.

1997-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

103

ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement.

O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

1997-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

104

Selection of Russian Plutonium Beryllium Sources for Inclusion in the Nuclear Mateirals Information Program Archive  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the former Soviet Union produced and exported Plutonium-Beryllium (PuBe) neutron sources to various Eastern European countries. The Russian sources consist of an intermetallic compound of plutonium and beryllium encapsulated in an inner welded, sealed capsule and consisting of a body and one or more covers. The amount of plutonium in the sources ranges from 0.002 g up to 15 g. A portion of the sources was originally exported to East Germany. A portion of these sources were acquired by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in the late 1990s for destruction in the Offsite Source Recovery Program. When the OSRP was canceled, the remaining 88 PuBe neutron sources were packaged and stored in a 55-gal drum at T A-55. This storage configuration is no longer acceptable for PuBe sources, and the sources must either be repackaged or disposed of. Repackaging would place the sources into Hagan container, and depending on the dose rates, some sources may be packaged individually increasing the footprint and cost of storage. In addition, each source will be subject to leak-checking every six months. Leaks have already been detected in some of the sources, and due to the age of these sources, it is likely that additional leaks may be detected over time, which will increase the overall complexity of handling and storage. Therefore, it was decided that the sources would be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) due to the cost and labor associated with continued storage at TA-55. However, the plutonium in the sources is of Russian origin and needs to be preserved for research purposes. Therefore, it is important that a representative sample of the sources retained and archived for future studies. This report describes the criteria used to obtain a representative sample of the sources. Nine Russian PuBe neutron sources have been selected out of a collection of 77 sources for inclusion in the NMIP archive. Selection criteria were developed so that the largest sources that are representative of the collection are included. One representative source was chosen for every 20 sources in the collection, and effort was made to preserve sources unique to the collection. In total, four representative sources and five unique sources were selected for the archive. The archive samples contain 40 grams of plutonium with an isotopic composition similar to that of weapon grade material and three grams of plutonium with an isotopic composition similar to that of reactor grade plutonium.

Narlesky, Joshua E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Padilla, Dennis D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Watts, Joe [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

105

Measurement of achievable plutonium decontamination from gallium by means of PUREX solvent extraction  

SciTech Connect

The objective of the work described herein was to measure, experimentally, the achievable decontamination of plutonium from gallium by means of the PUREX solvent extraction process. Gallium is present in surplus weapons-grade plutonium (WG-Pu) at a concentration of approximately 1 wt%. Plans are to dispose of surplus WG-Pu by converting it to UO{sub 2}-PuO{sub 2} mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiating it in commercial power reactors. However, the presence of high concentrations of gallium in plutonium is a potential corrosion problem during the process of MOX fuel irradiation. The batch experiments performed in this study were designed to measure the capability of the PUREX solvent extraction process to separate gallium from plutonium under idealized conditions. Radioactive tracing of the gallium with {sup 72}Ga enabled the accurate measurement of low concentrations of extractable gallium. The experiments approximated the proposed flowsheet for WG-Pu purification, except that only one stage was used for each process: extraction, scrubbing, and stripping. With realistic multistage countercurrent systems, much more efficient separations are generally obtained. The gallium decontamination factor (DF) obtained after one extraction stage was about 3 x 10{sup 6}. After one scrub stage, all gallium measurements were less than the detection limit, which corresponded to DFs >5 x 10{sup 6}. All these values exceed a 10{sup 6} DF needed to meet a hypothetical 10-ppb gallium impurity limit in MOX fuel. The results of this study showed no inherent or fundamental problem with regard to removing gallium from plutonium.

Collins, E.D.; Campbell, D.O.; Felker, L.K.

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

106

Department of Energy Announces Decision to Consolidate Surplus Plutonium in  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Decision to Consolidate Surplus Decision to Consolidate Surplus Plutonium in South Carolina Department of Energy Announces Decision to Consolidate Surplus Plutonium in South Carolina September 5, 2007 - 3:16pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced its decision to consolidate surplus, non-pit plutonium at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, greatly reducing storage costs and significantly enhancing security across the nation's weapons complex. DOE will begin shipping the surplus, non-pit plutonium no sooner than 30 days from today and under the plan this surplus plutonium is expected to be shipped to SRS by 2010. "Consolidation is a key part of the Department's efforts to properly manage surplus plutonium and follows our dedication to non-proliferation,

107

Department of Energy Announces Decision to Consolidate Surplus Plutonium in  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Department of Energy Announces Decision to Consolidate Surplus Department of Energy Announces Decision to Consolidate Surplus Plutonium in South Carolina Department of Energy Announces Decision to Consolidate Surplus Plutonium in South Carolina September 5, 2007 - 3:16pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced its decision to consolidate surplus, non-pit plutonium at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, greatly reducing storage costs and significantly enhancing security across the nation's weapons complex. DOE will begin shipping the surplus, non-pit plutonium no sooner than 30 days from today and under the plan this surplus plutonium is expected to be shipped to SRS by 2010. "Consolidation is a key part of the Department's efforts to properly manage surplus plutonium and follows our dedication to non-proliferation,

108

What is Plutonium? - Fact Sheet  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

a critical step toward solving the nation's nuclear waste disposal problem a critical step toward solving the nation's nuclear waste disposal problem What Is Plutonium? Plu-to-ni-um n. Symbol Pu (plÇÇ-tÇ'n‘-bm) A radioactive, silvery, metallic transuranic element, produced artificially by neutron bombardment of uranium, having 15 isotopes with masses ranging from 232 to 246 and half- lives from 20 minutes to 76 million years. It is a radiological poison, specifically absorbed by bone marrow, and is used, especially the highly fissionable isotope Pu239, as a reactor fuel and in nuclear weapons. The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition The U.S. Department of Energy's Carlsbad Field Office is responsible for the management, transportation, and permanent disposal of large amounts of the transuranic wastes left over from both World War II and the

109

CONVERSION OF PLUTONIUM TRIFLUORIDE TO PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A large proportion of the trifluoride of plutonium can be converted, in the absence of hydrogen fluoride, to the tetrafiuoride of plutonium. This is done by heating plutonium trifluoride with oxygen at temperatures between 250 and 900 deg C. The trifiuoride of plutonium reacts with oxygen to form plutonium tetrafluoride and plutonium oxide, in a ratio of about 3 to 1. In the presence of moisture, plutonium tetrafluoride tends to hydrolyze at elevated temperatures and therefore it is desirable to have the process take place under anhydrous conditions.

Fried, S.; Davidson, N.R.

1957-09-10T23:59:59.000Z

110

Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy: Neutronic Design Aspects of a Hybrid Fusion-Fission Nuclear Energy System  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

flux at startup and peak plutonium for different fuel kerneltrack illicit uranium and plutonium. In Proc. Global 2007:Ratio wgPu Weapons Grade Plutonium xi Acknowledgments The

Kramer, Kevin James

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

111

Reference computations of public dose and cancer risk from airborne releases of plutonium. Nuclear safety technical report  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report presents results of computations of doses and the associated health risks of postulated accidental atmospheric releases from the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) of one gram of weapons-grade plutonium in a form that is respirable. These computations are intended to be reference computations that can be used to evaluate a variety of accident scenarios by scaling the dose and health risk results presented here according to the amount of plutonium postulated to be released, instead of repeating the computations for each scenario. The MACCS2 code has been used as the basis of these computations. The basis and capabilities of MACCS2 are summarized, the parameters used in the evaluations are discussed, and results are presented for the doses and health risks to the public, both the Maximum Offsite Individual (a maximally exposed individual at or beyond the plant boundaries) and the population within 50 miles of RFP. A number of different weather scenarios are evaluated, including constant weather conditions and observed weather for 1990, 1991, and 1992. The isotopic mix of weapons-grade plutonium will change as it ages, the {sup 241}Pu decaying into {sup 241}Am. The {sup 241}Am reaches a peak concentration after about 72 years. The doses to the bone surface, liver, and whole body will increase slightly but the dose to the lungs will decrease slightly. The overall cancer risk will show almost no change over this period. This change in cancer risk is much smaller than the year-to-year variations in cancer risk due to weather. Finally, x/Q values are also presented for other applications, such as for hazardous chemical releases. These include the x/Q values for the MOI, for a collocated worker at 100 meters downwind of an accident site, and the x/Q value integrated over the population out to 50 miles.

Peterson, V.L.

1993-12-23T23:59:59.000Z

112

Plutonium: The first 50 years. United States plutonium production, acquisition, and utilization from 1944 through 1994  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The report contains important newly declassified information regarding the US production, acquisition, and removals of plutonium. This new information, when combined with previously declassified data, has allowed the DOE to issue, for the first time, a truly comprehensive report on the total DOE plutonium inventory. At the December 7, 1993, Openness Press Conference, the DOE declassified the plutonium inventories at eight locations totaling 33.5 metric tons (MT). This report declassifies the remainder of the DOE plutonium inventory. Newly declassified in this report is the quantity of plutonium at the Pantex Site, near Amarillo, Texas, and in the US nuclear weapons stockpile of 66.1 MT, which, when added to the previously released inventory of 33.5 MT, yields a total plutonium inventory of 99.5 MT. This report will document the sources which built up the plutonium inventory as well as the transactions which have removed plutonium from that inventory. This report identifies four sources that add plutonium to the DOE/DoD inventory, and seven types of transactions which remove plutonium from the DOE/DoD inventory. This report also discusses the nuclear material control and accountability system which records all nuclear material transactions, compares records with inventory and calculates material balances, and analyzes differences to verify that nuclear materials are in quantities as reported. The DOE believes that this report will aid in discussions in plutonium storage, safety, and security with stakeholders as well as encourage other nations to declassify and release similar data. These data will also be available for formulating policies with respect to disposition of excess nuclear materials. The information in this report is based on the evaluation of available records. The information contained in this report may be updated or revised in the future should additional or more detailed data become available.

NONE

1996-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

113

Plutonium Immobilization Project System Design Description for Can Loading System  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The purpose of this System Design Description (SDD) is to specify the system and component functions and requirements for the Can Loading System and provide a complete description of the system (design features, boundaries, and interfaces), principles of operation (including upsets and recovery), and the system maintenance approach. The Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) will immobilize up to 13 metric tons (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons usable plutonium materials.

Kriikku, E.

2001-02-15T23:59:59.000Z

114

PLUTONIUM PROCESSING OPTIMIZATION IN SUPPORT OF THE MOX FUEL PROGRAM  

SciTech Connect

After Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) personnel completed polishing 125 Kg of plutonium as highly purified PuO{sub 2} from surplus nuclear weapons, Duke, COGEMA, Stone, and Webster (DCS) required as the next process stage, the validation and optimization of all phases of the plutonium polishing flow sheet. Personnel will develop the optimized parameters for use in the upcoming 330 kg production mission.

GRAY, DEVIN W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; COSTA, DAVID A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2007-02-02T23:59:59.000Z

115

THE PLUTONIUM STORY  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Soc. , The occurrence of plutonium in nature. Mastick, D. F.positive oxidation state of plutonium. G. T. Seaborg, J. J.The first isolation of plutonium J. Am. Chem. Soc. , Fermi,

Seaborg, G.T.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

116

Environmental application of stable xenon and radioxenon monitoring  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

materials. Introduction Nuclear weapon and nuclear energyand potentially, nuclear weapons testing. Xe (5.243 day halfat most nuclear waste sites. Weapons-grade plutonium

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

117

Chemical and Radiochemical Composition of Thermally Stabilized Plutonium Oxide from the Plutonium Finishing Plant Considered as Alternate Feedstock for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Eighteen plutonium oxide samples originating from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site were analyzed to provide additional data on the suitability of PFP thermally stabilized plutonium oxides and Rocky Flats oxides as alternate feedstock to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). Radiochemical and chemical analyses were performed on fusions, acid leaches, and water leaches of these 18 samples. The results from these destructive analyses were compared with nondestructive analyses (NDA) performed at PFP and the acceptance criteria for the alternate feedstock. The plutonium oxide materials considered as alternate feedstock at Hanford originated from several different sources including Rocky Flats oxide, scrap from the Remote Mechanical C-Line (RMC) and the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF), and materials from other plutonium conversion processes at Hanford. These materials were received at PFP as metals, oxides, and solutions. All of the material considered as alternate feedstock was converted to PuO2 and thermally stabilized by heating the PuO2 powder at 950 C in an oxidizing environment. The two samples from solutions were converted to PuO2 by precipitation with Mg(OH)2. The 18 plutonium oxide samples were grouped into four categories based on their origin. The Rocky Flats oxide was divided into two categories, low- and high-chloride Rocky Flats oxides. The other two categories were PRF/RMC scrap oxides, which included scrap from both process lines and oxides produced from solutions. The two solution samples came from samples that were being tested at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory because all of the plutonium oxide from solutions at PFP had already been processed and placed in 3013 containers. These samples originated at the PFP and are from plutonium nitrate product and double-pass filtrate solutions after they had been thermally stabilized. The other 16 samples originated from thermal stabilization batches before canning at PFP. Samples varied in appearance depending on the original source of material. Rocky Flats items were mostly dark olive green with clumps that crushed easily with a mortar and pestle. PRF/RMC items showed more variability. These items were mostly rust colored. One sample contained white particles that were difficult to crush, and another sample was a dark grey with a mixture of fines and large, hard fragments. The appearance and feel of the fragments indicated they might be an alloy. The color of the solution samples was indicative of the impurities in the sample. The double-pass filtrate solution was a brown color indicative of the iron impurities in the sample. The other solution sample was light gray in color. Radiochemical analyses, including thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS), alpha and gamma energy analysis (AEA and GEA), and kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA), indicate that these materials are all weapons-grade plutonium with consistent plutonium isotopics. A small amount of uranium (Rocky Flats materials was Cl-, but the PRF/RMC samples had significant quantities of all of the primary anions observed. Prompt gamma measurements provide a representative analysis of the Cl- concentration in the bulk material. The primary anions observed in the solution samples were NO3-, and PO43-. The concentration of these anions did not exceed the mixed oxide (MOX) specification limits. Cations that exceeded the MOX specification limits included Cr, Fe, Ni, Al, Cu, and Si. All of the samples exceeded at least the 75% specification limit in one element.

Tingey, Joel M.; Jones, Susan A.

2005-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

118

Chemical and Radiochemical Composition of Thermally Stabilized Plutonium Oxide from the Plutonium Finishing Plant Considered as Alternate Feedstock for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility  

SciTech Connect

Eighteen plutonium oxide samples originating from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site were analyzed to provide additional data on the suitability of PFP thermally stabilized plutonium oxides and Rocky Flats oxides as alternate feedstock to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). Radiochemical and chemical analyses were performed on fusions, acid leaches, and water leaches of these 18 samples. The results from these destructive analyses were compared with nondestructive analyses (NDA) performed at PFP and the acceptance criteria for the alternate feedstock. The plutonium oxide materials considered as alternate feedstock at Hanford originated from several different sources including Rocky Flats oxide, scrap from the Remote Mechanical C-Line (RMC) and the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF), and materials from other plutonium conversion processes at Hanford. These materials were received at PFP as metals, oxides, and solutions. All of the material considered as alternate feedstock was converted to PuO2 and thermally stabilized by heating the PuO2 powder at 950 C in an oxidizing environment. The two samples from solutions were converted to PuO2 by precipitation with Mg(OH)2. The 18 plutonium oxide samples were grouped into four categories based on their origin. The Rocky Flats oxide was divided into two categories, low- and high-chloride Rocky Flats oxides. The other two categories were PRF/RMC scrap oxides, which included scrap from both process lines and oxides produced from solutions. The two solution samples came from samples that were being tested at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory because all of the plutonium oxide from solutions at PFP had already been processed and placed in 3013 containers. These samples originated at the PFP and are from plutonium nitrate product and double-pass filtrate solutions after they had been thermally stabilized. The other 16 samples originated from thermal stabilization batches before canning at PFP. Samples varied in appearance depending on the original source of material. Rocky Flats items were mostly dark olive green with clumps that crushed easily with a mortar and pestle. PRF/RMC items showed more variability. These items were mostly rust colored. One sample contained white particles that were difficult to crush, and another sample was a dark grey with a mixture of fines and large, hard fragments. The appearance and feel of the fragments indicated they might be an alloy. The color of the solution samples was indicative of the impurities in the sample. The double-pass filtrate solution was a brown color indicative of the iron impurities in the sample. The other solution sample was light gray in color. Radiochemical analyses, including thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS), alpha and gamma energy analysis (AEA and GEA), and kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA), indicate that these materials are all weapons-grade plutonium with consistent plutonium isotopics. A small amount of uranium (<0.14 wt%) is also present in these samples. The isotopic composition of the uranium varied widely but was consistent among each category of material. The primary water-soluble anions in these samples were Cl-, NO3-, SO42-, and PO43-. The only major anion observed in the Rocky Flats materials was Cl-, but the PRF/RMC samples had significant quantities of all of the primary anions observed. Prompt gamma measurements provide a representative analysis of the Cl- concentration in the bulk material. The primary anions observed in the solution samples were NO3-, and PO43-. The concentration of these anions did not exceed the mixed oxide (MOX) specification limits. Cations that exceeded the MOX specification limits included Cr, Fe, Ni, Al, Cu, and Si. All of the samples exceeded at least the 75% specification limit in one element.

Tingey, Joel M.; Jones, Susan A.

2005-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

119

Mixed oxide fuels testing in the advanced test reactor to support plutonium disposition  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

An intense worldwide effort is now under way to find means of reducing the stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. One of the most attractive solutions would be to use WGPu as fuel in existing light water reactors (LWRs) in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel - i.e., plutonia (PUO{sub 2}) mixed with urania (UO{sub 2}). Before U.S. reactors could be used for this purpose, their operating licenses would have to be amended. Numerous technical issues must be resolved before LWR operating licenses can be amended to allow the use of MOX fuel. These issues include the following: (1) MOX fuel fabrication process verification, (2) Whether and how to use burnable poisons to depress MOX fuel initial reactivity, which is higher than that of urania, (3) The effects of WGPu isotopic composition, (4) The feasibility of loading MOX fuel with plutonia content up to 7% by weight, (5) The effects of americium and gallium in WGPu, (6) Fission gas release from MOX fuel pellets made from WGPu, (7) Fuel/cladding gap closure, (8) The effects of power cycling and off-normal events on fuel integrity, (9) Development of radial distributions of burnup and fission products, (10) Power spiking near the interfaces of MOX and urania fuel assemblies, and (11) Fuel performance code validation. We have performed calculations to show that the use of hafnium shrouds can produce spectrum adjustments that will bring the flux spectrum in ATR test loops into a good approximation to the spectrum anticipated in a commercial LWR containing MOX fuel while allowing operation of the test fuel assemblies near their optimum values of linear heat generation rate. The ATR would be a nearly ideal test bed for developing data needed to support applications to license LWRs for operation with MOX fuel made from weapons-grade plutonium. The requirements for planning and implementing a test program in the ATR have been identified.

Ryskamp, J.M.; Sterbentz, J.W.; Chang, G.S. [and others

1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

120

Decision model for evaluating reactor disposition of excess plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The US Department of Energy is currently considering a range of technologies for disposition of excess weapon plutonium. Use of plutonium fuel in fission reactors to generate spent fuel is one class of technology options. This report describes the inputs and results of decision analyses conducted to evaluate four evolutionary/advanced and three existing fission reactor designs for plutonium disposition. The evaluation incorporates multiple objectives or decision criteria, and accounts for uncertainty. The purpose of the study is to identify important and discriminating decision criteria, and to identify combinations of value judgments and assumptions that tend to favor one reactor design over another.

Edmunds, T.

1995-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
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121

LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required.

O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

1998-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

122

DOE nuclear material packaging manual: storage container requirements for plutonium oxide materials  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Loss of containment of nuclear material stored in containers such as food-pack cans, paint cans, or taped slip lid cans has generated concern about packaging requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials in working facilities such as the plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In response, DOE has recently issued DOE M 441.1 'Nuclear Material Packaging Manual' with encouragement from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. A unique feature compared to transportation containers is the allowance of filters to vent flammable gases during storage. Defining commonly used concepts such as maximum allowable working pressure and He leak rate criteria become problematic when considering vented containers. Los Alamos has developed a set of container requirements that are in compliance with 441.1 based upon the activity of heat-source plutonium (90% Pu-238) oxide, which bounds the requirements for weapons-grade plutonium oxide. The pre and post drop-test He leak rates depend upon container size as well as the material contents. For containers that are routinely handled, ease of handling and weight are a major consideration. Relatively thin-walled containers with flat bottoms are desired yet they cannot be He leak tested at a differential pressure of one atmosphere due to the potential for plastic deformation of the flat bottom during testing. The He leak rates and He leak testing configuration for containers designed for plutonium bearing materials will be presented. The approach to meeting the other manual requirements such as corrosion and thermal degradation resistance will be addressed. The information presented can be used by other sites to evaluate if their conditions are bounded by LANL requirements when considering procurement of 441.1 compliant containers.

Veirs, D Kirk [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

123

Identification of nuclear weapons  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

1987-04-10T23:59:59.000Z

124

Global estimation of potential unreported plutonium in thermal research reactors  

SciTech Connect

As of November, 1993, 303 research reactors (research, test, training, prototype, and electricity producing) were operational worldwide; 155 of these were in non-nuclear weapon states. Of these 155 research reactors, 80 are thermal reactors that have a power rating of 1 MW(th) or greater and could be utilized to produce plutonium. A previously published study on the unreported plutonium production of six research reactors indicates that a minimum reactor power of 40 MW (th) is required to make a significant quantity (SQ), 8 kg, of fissile plutonium per year by unreported irradiations. As part of the Global Nuclear Material Control Model effort, we determined an upper bound on the maximum possible quantity of plutonium that could be produced by the 80 thermal research reactors in the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). We estimate that in one year a maximum of roughly one quarter of a metric ton (250 kg) of plutonium could be produced in these 80 NNWS thermal research reactors based on their reported power output. We have calculated the quantity of plutonium and the number of years that would be required to produce an SQ of plutonium in the 80 thermal research reactors and aggregated by NNWS. A safeguards approach for multiple thermal research reactors that can produce less than 1 SQ per year should be conducted in association with further developing a safeguards and design information reverification approach for states that have multiple research reactors.

Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A.

1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

125

Excess plutonium disposition: The deep borehole option  

SciTech Connect

This report reviews the current status of technologies required for the disposition of plutonium in Very Deep Holes (VDH). It is in response to a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report which addressed the management of excess weapons plutonium and recommended three approaches to the ultimate disposition of excess plutonium: (1) fabrication and use as a fuel in existing or modified reactors in a once-through cycle, (2) vitrification with high-level radioactive waste for repository disposition, (3) burial in deep boreholes. As indicated in the NAS report, substantial effort would be required to address the broad range of issues related to deep bore-hole emplacement. Subjects reviewed in this report include geology and hydrology, design and engineering, safety and licensing, policy decisions that can impact the viability of the concept, and applicable international programs. Key technical areas that would require attention should decisions be made to further develop the borehole emplacement option are identified.

Ferguson, K.L.

1994-08-09T23:59:59.000Z

126

Plutonium isotope ratio variations in North America  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Historically, approximately 12,000 TBq of plutonium was distributed throughout the global biosphere by thermo nuclear weapons testing. The resultant global plutonium fallout is a complex mixture whose {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratio is a function of the design and yield of the devices tested. The average {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratio in global fallout is 0.176 + 014. However, the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratio at any location may differ significantly from 0.176. Plutonium has also been released by discharges and accidents associated with the commercial and weapons related nuclear industries. At many locations contributions from this plutonium significantly alters the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios from those observed in global fallout. We have measured the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios in environmental samples collected from many locations in North America. This presentation will summarize the analytical results from these measurements. Special emphasis will be placed on interpretation of the significance of the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios measured in environmental samples collected in the Arctic and in the western portions of the United States.

Steiner, Robert E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; La Mont, Stephen P [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Eisele, William F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fresquez, Philip R [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mc Naughton, Michael [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Whicker, Jeffrey J [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-12-14T23:59:59.000Z

127

Geomorphology of plutonium in the Northern Rio Grande  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nearly all of the plutonium in the natural environment of the Northern Rio Grande is associated with soils and sediment, and river processes account for most of the mobility of these materials. A composite regional budget for plutonium based on multi-decadal averages for sediment and plutonium movement shows that 90 percent of the plutonium moving into the system is from atmospheric fallout. The remaining 10 percent is from releases at Los Alamos. Annual variation in plutonium flux and storage exceeds 100 percent. The contribution to the plutonium budget from Los Alamos is associated with relatively coarse sediment which often behaves as bedload in the Rio Grande. Infusion of these materials into the main stream were largest in 1951, 1952, 1957, and 1968. Because of the schedule of delivery of plutonium to Los Alamos for experimentation and weapons manufacturing, the latter two years are probably the most important. Although the Los Alamos contribution to the entire plutonium budget was relatively small, in these four critical years it constituted 71--86 percent of the plutonium in bedload immediately downstream from Otowi.

Graf, W.L. [Arizona Univ., Tempe, AZ (United States). Dept., of Geography] Arizona Univ., Tempe, AZ (United States). Dept., of Geography

1993-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

128

Interaction of Plutonium with Diverse Materials in Moist Air and Nitrogen-Argon Atmospheres at Room Temperature  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

Chemical and radiolytic interactions of weapons-grade plutonium with metallic, inorganic, and hydrogenous materials in atmospheres containing moist air-argon mixtures have been characterized at room temperature from pressure-volume-temperature and mass spectrometric measurements of the gas phase. A reaction sequence controlled by kinetics and gas-phase composition is defined by correlating observed and known reaction rates. In all cases, O{sub 2} is eliminated first by the water-catalyzed Pu + O{sub 2} reaction and H{sub 2}O is then consumed by the Pu + H{sub 2}O reaction, producing a gas mixture of N{sub 2}, argon, and H{sub 2}. Hydrogen formed by the reaction of water and concurrent radiolysis of hydrogenous materials either reacts to form PuH{sub 2} or accumulates in the system. Accumulation of H{sub 2} is correlated with the presence of hydrogenous materials in liquid and volatile forms that are readily distributed over the plutonium surface. Areal rates of radiolytic H{sub 2} generation are determined and applied in showing that modest extents of H{sub 2} production are expected for hydrogenous solids if the contact area with plutonium is limited. The unpredictable nature of complex chemical systems is demonstrated by occurrence of the chloride-catalyzed Pu + H{sub 2}O reaction in some tests and hydride-catalyzed nitriding in another.

John M. Haschke; Raymond J. Martinez; Robert E. Pruner II; Barbara Martinez; Thomas H. Allen

2001-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

129

THE DEACTIVATION DECONTAMINATION & DECOMMISSIONING OF THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) A FORMER PLUTONIUM PROCESSING FACILITY AT DOE HANFORD SITE  

SciTech Connect

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. The Manhattan Project was developed to usher in the use of nuclear weapons to end the war. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material (SNM) for fabrication of nuclear devices for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race and later the processing of fuel grade mixed plutonium-uranium oxide to support DOE's breeder reactor program. In October 1990, at the close of the production mission for PFP, a shutdown order was prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) in Washington, DC and issued to the Richland DOE field office. Subsequent to the shutdown order, a team from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) analyzed the hazards at PFP associated with the continued storage of certain forms of plutonium solutions and solids. The assessment identified many discrete actions that were required to stabilize the different plutonium forms into stable form and repackage the material in high integrity containers. These actions were technically complicated and completed as part of the PFP nuclear material stabilization project between 1995 and early 2005. The completion of the stabilization project was a necessary first step in deactivating PFP. During stabilization, DOE entered into negotiations with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Washington and established milestones for the Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) of the PFP. The DOE and its contractor, Fluor Hanford (Fluor), have made great progress in deactivating, decontaminating and decommissioning the PFP at the Hanford Site as detailed in this paper. Background information covering the PFP D&D effort includes descriptions of negotiations with the State of Washington concerning consent-order milestones, milestones completed to date, and the vision of bringing PFP to slab-on-grade. Innovative approaches in planning and regulatory strategies, as well new technologies from within the United States and from other countries and field decontamination techniques developed by workforce personnel, such as the ''turkey roaster'' and the ''lazy Susan'' are covered in detail in the paper. Critical information on issues and opportunities during the performance of the work such as concerns regarding the handling and storage of special nuclear material, concerns regarding criticality safety and the impact of SNM de-inventory at PFP are also provided. The continued success of the PFP D&D effort is due to the detailed, yet flexible, approach to planning that applied innovative techniques and tools, involved a team of experienced independent reviewers, and incorporated previous lessons learned at the Hanford site, Rocky Flats, and commercial nuclear D&D projects. Multi-disciplined worker involvement in the planning and the execution of the work has produced a committed workforce that has developed innovative techniques, resulting in safer and more efficient work evolutions.

CHARBONEAU, S.L.

2006-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

130

THE DEACTIVATION DECONTAMINATION & DECOMMISSIONING OF THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) A FORMER PLUTONIUM PROCESSING FACILITY AT DOE HANFORD SITE  

SciTech Connect

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. The Manhattan Project was developed to usher in the use of nuclear weapons to end the war. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material (SNM) for fabrication of nuclear devices for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race and later the processing of fuel grade mixed plutonium-uranium oxide to support DOE's breeder reactor program. In October 1990, at the close of the production mission for PFP, a shutdown order was prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) in Washington, DC and issued to the Richland DOE field office. Subsequent to the shutdown order, a team from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) analyzed the hazards at PFP associated with the continued storage of certain forms of plutonium solutions and solids. The assessment identified many discrete actions that were required to stabilize the different plutonium forms into stable form and repackage the material in high integrity containers. These actions were technically complicated and completed as part of the PFP nuclear material stabilization project between 1995 and early 2005. The completion of the stabilization project was a necessary first step in deactivating PFP. During stabilization, DOE entered into negotiations with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Washington and established milestones for the Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) of the PFP. The DOE and its contractor, Fluor Hanford (Fluor), have made great progress in deactivating, decontaminating and decommissioning the PFP at the Hanford Site as detailed in this paper. Background information covering the PFP D&D effort includes descriptions of negotiations with the State of Washington concerning consent-order milestones, milestones completed to date, and the vision of bringing PFP to slab-on-grade. Innovative approaches in planning and regulatory strategies, as well new technologies from within the United States and from other countries and field decontamination techniques developed by workforce personnel, such as the ''turkey roaster'' and the ''lazy Susan'' are covered in detail in the paper. Critical information on issues and opportunities during the performance of the work such as concerns regarding the handling and storage of special nuclear material, concerns regarding criticality safety and the impact of SNM de-inventory at PFP are also provided. The continued success of the PFP D&D effort is due to the detailed, yet flexible, approach to planning that applied innovative techniques and tools, involved a team of experienced independent reviewers, and incorporated previous lessons learned at the Hanford site, Rocky Flats, and commercial nuclear D&D projects. Multi-disciplined worker involvement in the planning and the execution of the work has produced a committed workforce that has developed innovative techniques, resulting in safer and more efficient work evolutions.

CHARBONEAU, S.L.

2006-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

131

PLUTONIUM ALLOYS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

The preparation of low-melting-point plutonium alloys is described. In a MgO crucible Pu is placed on top of the lighter alloying metal (Fe, Co, or Ni) and the temperature raised to 1000 or 1200 deg C. Upon cooling, the alloy slug is broke out of the crucible. With 14 at. % Ni the m.p. is 465 deg C; with 9.5 at. % Fe the m.p. is 410 deg C; and with 12.0 at. % Co the m.p. is 405 deg C. (T.R.H.) l6262 l6263 ((((((((Abstract unscannable))))))))

Chynoweth, W.

1959-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

132

PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM METAL  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is given for producing plutonium metal by the reduction of plutonium chloride, dissolved in alkali metal chloride plus or minus aluminum chloride, with magnesium or a magnesium-aluminum alloy at between 700 and 800 deg C and separating the plutonium or plutonium-aluminum alloy formed from the salt.

Lyon, W.L.; Moore, R.H.

1961-01-17T23:59:59.000Z

133

SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is described for separating plutonium from uranium and fission products by treating a nitrate solution of fission products, uranium, and hexavalent plutonium with a relatively water-insoluble fluoride to adsorb fission products on the fluoride, treating the residual solution with a reducing agent for plutonium to reduce its valence to four and less, treating the reduced plutonium solution with a relatively insoluble fluoride to adsorb the plutonium on the fluoride, removing the solution, and subsequently treating the fluoride with its adsorbed plutonium with a concentrated aqueous solution of at least one of a group consisting of aluminum nitrate, ferric nitrate, and manganous nitrate to remove the plutonium from the fluoride.

Maddock, A.G.; Smith, F.

1959-08-25T23:59:59.000Z

134

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Much About North Korean Nuclear Weapons,” unpublished paper,the South and use nuclear weapons in doing so. How concernedout how to use nuclear weapons except for deterrence. Is a

Waltz, Kenneth N.

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

135

STRIPPING PROCESS FOR PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method for removing silver, nickel, cadmium, zinc, and indium coatings from plutonium objects while simultaneously rendering the plutonium object passive is described. The coated plutonium object is immersed as the anode in an electrolyte in which the plutonium is passive and the coating metal is not passive, using as a cathode a metal which does not dissolve rapidly in the electrolyte. and passing an electrical current through the electrolyte until the coating metal is removed from the plutonium body.

Kolodney, M.

1959-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

136

Principal Associate Director - Weapons Programs  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons Programs As Principal Associate Director for the Weapons Program, Knapp leads the programs to assure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the systems in the nation's...

137

EIS-0229: Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

29: Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile 29: Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials EIS-0229: Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Summary The EIS will evaluate the reasonable alternatives and potential environmental impacts for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three types of facilities for plutonium disposition. Public Comment Opportunities None available at this time. Documents Available For Download September 5, 2007 EIS-0229: Supplement Analysis (September 2007) Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials at the Savannah River Site November 14, 2003 EIS-0229: Record of Decision (November 2003) Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials November 7, 2003 EIS-0229-SA-03: Supplement Analysis Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuel Lead Assemblies in Europe

138

Plutonium residue recovery (PuRR) project: Quarterly progress report, January--March 1989  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This quarterly report presents experimental and conceptual design information covering the development of a new pyrochemical process to recover weapons-grade plutonium from and reduce the amount of aqueous process intractable transuranic (TRU) residues now stored at Department of Energy facilities. During this period, experiments were performed in which zinc-calcium alloys were used to reduce the Rocky Flats ash heel. They offer potential advantages to reduce wastes because of reagent recycle. One reduction run using zinc-10 wt % calcium alloy was 99.7% complete. In another run, the calcium was titrated into the zinc alloy to observe the stepwise progression of the reduction. In support of planned electrochemical recovery of calcium, experiments were performed to determine the solubility of calcium CaCl/sub 2/-CaF/sub 2/ in the presence of zinc-calcium alloys. Also, initial experiments with reference electrodes for electrochemical operations or titration-type chemical reactions were encouraging. Pyrolytic boron nitride and vitreous carbon underwent preliminary evaluation for use as materials in the equipment under development. Electrochemical cells were designed for recovering calcium from the salt used in the oxide reduction step. Calculations were made to estimate activity coefficients for plutonium in calcium-zinc alloys. 16 refs., 9 figs., 5 tabs.

Alire, R.M.; Gregg, D.W.; Hickman, R.G.; Kuhl, W.D.; Landrum, J.H.; Johnson, G.K.; Johnson, I.; Mulcahey, T.P.; Pierce, R.D.; Poa, D.S.

1989-05-26T23:59:59.000Z

139

Strong Lines of Plutonium ( Pu )  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... Plutonium (Pu) Homepage - Introduction Finding list Select element by name. Select element by atomic number. ... Strong Lines of Plutonium ( Pu ). ...

140

Atomic Data for Plutonium (Pu)  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... Plutonium (Pu) Homepage - Introduction Finding list Select element by name. Select element by atomic number. ... Atomic Data for Plutonium (Pu). ...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


141

PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Weapons Data Control Systems PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems PIA PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems...

142

Los Alamos National Laboratory to work on nuclear design, plutonium  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Lab to work on nuclear design, plutonium research Lab to work on nuclear design, plutonium research Los Alamos National Laboratory to work on nuclear design, plutonium research and development, and supercomputing LANL selected as preferred alternative site for plutonium research, development, and limited manufacturing, along with nuclear weapons design and engineering, and supercomputing. December 18, 2007 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and

143

METHOD OF SEPARATING PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Plutonium hexafluoride is a satisfactory fluorinating agent and may be reacted with various materials capable of forming fluorides, such as copper, iron, zinc, etc., with consequent formation of the metal fluoride and reduction of the plutonium to the form of a lower fluoride. In accordance with the present invention, it has been found that the reactivity of plutonium hexafluoride with other fluoridizable materials is so great that the process may be used as a method of separating plutonium from mixures containing plutonium hexafluoride and other vaporized fluorides even though the plutonium is present in but minute quantities. This process may be carried out by treating a mixture of fluoride vapors comprising plutonium hexafluoride and fluoride of uranium to selectively reduce the plutonium hexafluoride and convert it to a less volatile fluoride, and then recovering said less volatile fluoride from the vapor by condensation.

Brown, H.S.; Hill, O.F.

1958-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

144

PREPARATION OF PLUTONIUM TRIFLUORIDE  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process of producing plutonium trifluoride by reacting dry plutonium(IV) oxalate with chlorofluorinated methane or ethane at 400 to 450 deg C and cooling the product in the absence of oxygen is described.

Burger, L.L.; Roake, W.E.

1961-07-11T23:59:59.000Z

145

Plutonium Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administrati...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Plutonium Disposition Program Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Fissile Materials Disposition > Plutonium Disposition Program Plutonium Disposition Program The...

146

PROCESS FOR PURIFYING PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is described of separating plutonium from small amounts of uranium and other contaminants. An acidic aqueous solution of higher valent plutonium and hexavalent uranium is treated with a soluble iodide to obtain the plutonium in the plus three oxidation state while leaving the uranium in the hexavalent state, adding a soluble oxalate such as oxalic acid, and then separating the insoluble plus the plutonium trioxalate from the solution.

Mastick, D.F.; Wigner, E.P.

1958-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

147

Study of plutonium disposition using existing GE advanced Boiling Water Reactors  

SciTech Connect

The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the US to dispose of 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in a safe and proliferation resistant manner. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing permanent conversion and long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study ``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium identified Light Water Reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a US disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a typical 1155 MWe GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. A companion study of the Advanced BWR has recently been submitted. The MOX core design work that was conducted for the ABWR enabled GE to apply comparable fuel design concepts and consequently achieve full MOX core loading which optimize plutonium throughput for existing BWRs.

Not Available

1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

148

PLUTONIUM CLEANING PROCESS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is described for rapidly removing iron, nickel, and zinc coatings from plutonium objects while simultaneously rendering the plutonium object passive. The method consists of immersing the coated plutonium object in an aqueous acid solution containing a substantial concentration of nitrate ions, such as fuming nitric acid.

Kolodney, M.

1959-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

149

PLUTONIUM-THORIUM ALLOYS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

New plutonium-base binary alloys useful as liquid reactor fuel are described. The alloys consist of 50 to 98 at.% thorium with the remainder plutonium. The stated advantages of these alloys over unalloyed plutonium for reactor fuel use are easy fabrication, phase stability, and the accompanying advantuge of providing a means for converting Th/sup 232/ into U/sup 233/.

Schonfeld, F.W.

1959-09-15T23:59:59.000Z

150

Radioactive air emissions notice of construction for vertical calciner operation at the plutonium finishing plant  

SciTech Connect

This document serves as a notice of construction (NOC) for construction, installation, and operation of a vertical calciner to stabilize plutonium at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)Complex, pursuant to the requirements of Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 246-247-060. The PFP Complex activities are focused on the cleanout and stabilization of plutonium residue left from plutonium weapons material processing activities. The prime purpose of the vertical calciner is to convert plutonium acid solutions to a more stable plutonium oxide. A test calciner has been developed and put in place in the 234-5Z Building. Development testing of this vertical calciner is ongoing. A new vertical calciner will be assembled for actual stabilization operation in Room 230C of the 234-5Z Building. The test calciner may be upgraded or replaced as an alternative to building a new calciner in Room 230C.

Hays, C.B., Westinghouse Hanford

1996-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

151

Development of the plutonium oxide vitrification system  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Repository disposal of plutonium in a suitable, immobilized form is being considered as one option for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. Accelerated development efforts were completed in 1997 on two potential immobilization forms to facilitate downselection to one form for continued development. The two forms studied were a crystalline ceramic based on Synroc technology and a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass. As part of the glass development program, melter design activities and component testing were completed to demonstrate the feasibility of using glass as an immobilization medium. A prototypical melter was designed and built in 1997. The melter vessel and drain tube were constructed of a Pt/Rh alloy. Separate induction systems were used to heat the vessel and drain tube. A Pt/Rh stirrer was incorporated into the design to facilitate homogenization of the melt. Integrated powder feeding and off-gas systems completed the overall design. Concurrent with the design efforts, testing was conducted using a plutonium surrogate LaBS composition in an existing (near-scale) melter to demonstrate the feasibility of processing the LaBS glass on a production scale. Additionally, the drain tube configuration was successfully tested using a plutonium surrogate LaBS glass.

Marshall, K.M.; Marra, J.C.; Coughlin, J.T.; Calloway, T.B.; Schumacher, R.F.; Zamecnik, J.R.; Pareizs, J.M.

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

152

Analytical inverse model for post-event attribution of plutonium  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

An integral part of deterring nuclear terrorism is the swift attribution of any event to a particular state or organization. By quickly being able to identify the responsible party after a nuclear event, appropriate people may be held accountable for their actions. Currently, there is a system in place to determine the origin of nuclear devices and materials from post-event data; however, the system requires significant time to produce an answer within acceptable error margins. Described here is a deterministic approach derived from first principles to solve the inverse problem. The derivation starts with the basic change rate equation and ends in relationships for important nuclear concentrations and device yield. This results in a computationally efficient and timely method for producing an estimate of the material attributes. This estimate can then be used as a starting point for other more detailed methods and reduce the overall computation time of the post-event forensics. This work focused on a specific type of nuclear event: a plutonium improvised nuclear device (IND) explosion. From post-event isotopic ratios, this method determines the device’s pre-event isotopic concentrations of special nuclear material. From the original isotopic concentrations, the field of possible origins for the nuclear material is narrowed. In this scenario, knowing where the nuclear material did not originate is as important as knowing where it did. The derived methodology was tested using several cases of interest including simplified and realistic cases. For the simplistic cases, only two isotopes comprised the material being fissioned. In the realistic cases, both Weapons Grade and Reactor Grade plutonium were used to cover the spectrum of possible fissile material to be used by terrorists. The methodology performed very well over the desired energy range. Errors were under two percent from the expected values for all yields under 50 kT. In the realistic cases, competing reactions caused an increase in error; however, these stayed under five percent. As expected, with an increased yield, the error continued to rise, but these errors increased linearly. A sensitivity analysis was performed on the methodology to determine the impact of uncertainty in various physical constants. The result was that the inverse methodology is not overly sensitive to perturbations in these constants.

Miller, James Christopher

2008-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

153

Plutonium: Aging Mechanisms and Weapon Pit Lifetime Assessment  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

At the end of this year, the U.S. Nuclear National Security Administration (NNSA) ... Experience from all materials in reactor environments of similar crystal ...

154

President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon ...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapon President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon January 31, 1950 Washington, DC President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon President...

155

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons  

SciTech Connect

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described.

Vaughen, V.C.A.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

156

Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

Alfred Tang

2008-05-26T23:59:59.000Z

157

Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software  

SciTech Connect

This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

2007-05-02T23:59:59.000Z

158

NIST Manuscript Publication Search  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... 1 - 48. Keywords: fluence rate; highly enriched uranium; photons; radionuclides; spheres; weapons-grade plutonium. Research Areas: Physics. ...

2009-11-30T23:59:59.000Z

159

TMS Young Leaders Committee 1998 Meeting Minutes  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Feb 5, 1998 ... Thoughts included advanced refractories (including NASA work), nuclear fuels ( including burning weapons grade plutonium--swords into ...

160

Demolition Begins on Hanford's Historic Plutonium Vaults - Plutonium...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

workers used chemical processing and furnaces to fabricate plutonium metal, primarily hockey puck-shaped pieces called buttons. The plutonium buttons were stored in high-security...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


161

PREPARATION OF PLUTONIUM HALIDES  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process ls presented for the preparation of plutonium trihalides. Plutonium oxide or a compound which may be readily converted to plutonlum oxide, for example, a plutonium hydroxide or plutonlum oxalate is contacted with a suitable halogenating agent. Speciflc agents mentioned are carbon tetrachloride, carbon tetrabromide, sulfur dioxide, and phosphorus pentachloride. The reaction is carried out under superatmospberic pressure at about 300 icient laborato C.

Davidson, N.R.; Katz, J.J.

1958-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

162

PLUTONIUM-ZIRCONIUM ALLOYS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A series of nuclear reactor fuel alloys consisting of from about 5 to about 50 at.% zirconium (or higher zirconium alloys such as Zircaloy), balance plutonium, and having the structural composition of a plutonium are described. Zirconium is a satisfactory diluent because it alloys readily with plutonium and has desirable nuclear properties. Additional advantages are corrosion resistance, excellent fabrication propenties, an isotropie structure, and initial softness.

Schonfeld, F.W.; Waber, J.T.

1960-08-30T23:59:59.000Z

163

Continuous plutonium dissolution apparatus  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

This invention is concerned with continuous dissolution of metals such as plutonium. A high normality acid mixture is fed into a boiler vessel, vaporized, and subsequently condensed as a low normality acid mixture. The mixture is then conveyed to a dissolution vessel and contacted with the plutonium metal to dissolve the plutonium in the dissolution vessel, reacting therewith forming plutonium nitrate. The reaction products are then conveyed to the mixing vessel and maintained soluble by the high normality acid, with separation and removal of the desired constituent. (Official Gazette)

Meyer, F.G.; Tesitor, C.N.

1974-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

164

THE PLUTONIUM STORY  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

vast processing plants at Hanford, Washington, in Decemberconsideration for use at Hanford. The various parts of thewere tested c u the Hanford concentration:, of plutonium in

Seaborg, G.T.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

165

PREPARATION OF PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Methods are presented for the electro-deposition of plutonium from fused mixtures of plutonium halides and halides of the alkali metals and alkaline earth metals. Th salts, preferably chlorides and with the plutonium prefer ably in the trivalent state, are placed in a refractory crucible such as tantalum or molybdenam and heated in a non-oxidizing atmosphere to 600 to 850 deg C, the higher temperatatures being used to obtain massive plutonium and the lower for the powder form. Electrodes of graphite or non reactive refractory metals are used, the crucible serving the cathode in one apparatus described in the patent.

Kolodney, M.

1959-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

166

Method for dissolving plutonium dioxide  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method for dissolving plutonium dioxide comprises adding silver ions to a nitric acid-hydrofluoric acid solution to significantly speed up dissolution of difficultly soluble plutonium dioxide.

Tallent, Othar K. (Oak Ridge, TN)

1976-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

167

It's Elemental - The Element Plutonium  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Next Element (Americium) Americium The Element Plutonium Click for Isotope Data 94 Pu Plutonium 244 Atomic Number: 94 Atomic Weight: 244 Melting Point: 913 K (640C or...

168

The dissolution vessel for plutonium pits at the U.S. DOE Pantex Plant  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The US DOE Pantex Plant has been given the mission to recertify and requalify plutonium pits for reuse in existing War Reserve nuclear weapons. The first process common to both recertification and requalification is cleaning the plutonium pit. The pit will be cleaned in a dissolution vessel using N-methyl pyrrolidone (NMP) solvent. The recertification and requalification programs are both in the design concept phase at Pantex Plant. The US DOE Pantex Plant secures the national security of the United States by using safe vessels for cleaning plutonium pits in a manner that protects the health and safety of employees, the public and the environment.

Eifert, E.J.; Vickers, L.D.

2000-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

169

A Pressurized Water Reactor Plutonium Incinerator Based on Thorium Fuel and Seed-Blanket Assembly Geometry  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel cycle is proposed, whose purpose is the elimination and degradation of weapons-grade plutonium. This Radkowsky thorium-fuel Pu incinerator (RTPI) cycle is based on a core and assemblies retrofittable to a Westinghouse-type PWR. The RTPI assembly, however, is a seed-blanket unit. The seed is supercritical, loaded with Pu-Zr alloy as fuel in a high moderator-to-fuel ratio configuration. The blanket is subcritical, loaded mainly with ThO{sub 2}, generating and burning {sup 233}U in situ. Blankets are loaded once every 6 yr. The seed fuel management scheme is based on three batches, with one-third of the seed modules replaced every year. The core generates 1100 MW(electric). Equilibrium conditions are achieved with the second seed loading. For equilibrium conditions, the annual average of disposed (loaded) Pu is 1210 kg, of which 702 kg are completely eliminated, and 508 kg are discharged, but with significantly degraded isotopics (i.e., with a high percentage of even mass isotopes). Spontaneous fissions per second in a gram of this degraded Pu are {approx}500, resulting in significantly increased proliferation resistance.Every 6 yr the blanket discharge contains 780 kg of {sup 233}U (including {sup 233}Pa) and 36 kg of {sup 235}U. However, the blankets are initially loaded with an amount of natural uranium selected such that these U fissile isotopes constitute only 12% of the total U discharge, a percentage equivalent to 20% {sup 235}U enrichment; hence, both the discharged uranium isotopics satisfy proliferation-resistant criteria.The RTPI control variables, namely, the moderator temperature coefficient, the reactivity per ppm boron, and the control rods worth, are about equal to those of a PWR. The RTPI spent-fuel stockpile ingestion toxicity over a period of ten million years is about the same as the counterpart toxicities of a regular, or a mixed-oxide (MOX), PWR. Compared with known PWR MOX variants, the RTPI is, per 1000 MW(electric) and per annum, a significantly more efficient incinerator of weapons-grade plutonium.

Galperin, A. [Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel); Segev, M. [Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel); Todosow, M. [Brookhaven National Laboratory (United States)

2000-11-15T23:59:59.000Z

170

INTERDICTION MODELING FOR SMUGGLED NUCLEAR MATERIAL Nedialko B. Dimitrov, Marc A. Gonzalez, Dennis P. Michalopoulos, David P. Morton,  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

1990s, Russia inherited roughly 600- 850 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium [9% of these involved nuclear material and 18 involved weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. Sometimes a smuggler's intent (SNM), i.e., weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu), reactor-grade plutonium, natural uranium, low

Morton, David

171

Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates at Los Alamos National Laboratory New leadership position will allow for greater integration in the planning and execution of the stockpile stewardship program. August 18, 2009 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy

172

DELTA PHASE PLUTONIUM ALLOYS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Delta-phase plutonium alloys were developed suitable for use as reactor fuels. The alloys consist of from 1 to 4 at.% zinc and the balance plutonium. The alloys have good neutronic, corrosion, and fabrication characteristics snd possess good dimensional characteristics throughout an operating temperature range from 300 to 490 deg C.

Cramer, E.M.; Ellinger, F.H.; Land. C.C.

1960-03-22T23:59:59.000Z

173

PLUTONIUM-CERIUM ALLOY  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

An alloy is presented for use as a reactor fuel. The binary alloy consists essentially of from about 5 to 90 atomic per cent cerium and the balance being plutonium. A complete phase diagram for the cerium--plutonium system is given.

Coffinberry, A.S.

1959-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

174

PLUTONIUM-CERIUM-COBALT AND PLUTONIUM-CERIUM-NICKEL ALLOYS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

>New plutonium-base teroary alloys useful as liquid reactor fuels are described. The alloys consist of 10 to 20 atomic percent cobalt with the remainder plutonium and cerium in any desired proportion, with the plutonium not in excess of 88 atomic percent; or, of from 10 to 25 atomic percent nickel (or mixture of nickel and cobalt) with the remainder plutonium and cerium in any desired proportion, with the plutonium not in excess of 86 atomic percent. The stated advantages of these alloys over unalloyed plutonium for reactor fuel use are a lower melting point and a wide range of permissible plutonium dilution.

Coffinberry, A.S.

1959-08-25T23:59:59.000Z

175

Incorporation of excess weapons material into the IFR fuel cycle  

SciTech Connect

The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) provides both a diversion resistant closed fuel cycle for commercial power generation and a means of addressing safeguards concerns related to excess nuclear weapons material. Little head-end processing and handling of dismantled warhead materials is required to convert excess weapons plutonium (Pu) to IFR fuel and a modest degree of proliferation protection is available immediately by alloying weapons Pu to an IFR fuel composition. Denaturing similar to that of spent fuel is obtained by short cycle (e.g. 45 day) use in an IFR reactor, by mixing which IFR recycle fuel, or by alloying with other spent fuel constituents. Any of these permanent denaturings could be implemented as soon as an operating IFR and/or an IFR recycle capability of reasonable scale is available. The initial Pu charge generated from weapons excess Pu can then be used as a permanent denatured catalyst, enabling the IFR to efficiently and economically generate power with only a natural or depleted uranium feed. The Pu is thereafter permanently safeguarded until consumed, with essentially none going to a waste repository.

Hannum, W.H.; Wade, D.C.

1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

176

Will our nuclear weapons work?  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Will our nuclear weapons work? Will our nuclear weapons work? National Security Science magazine Latest Issue:April 2013 All Issues » submit Supercomputers are essential for assessing the health of the U.S. nuclear stockpile Supercomputers provide assurance by simulating nuclear weapons performance March 25, 2013 Graphic of a missile being tested through computer simulation Los Alamos uses supercomputers to make high-resolution 3D simulations that help to assess the health of nuclear weapons like this B-61 bomb. Contact Managing Editor Clay Dillingham Email The nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile were designed and built to be replaced with new designs and builds every 10 to 15 years. These weapons have lived beyond their expected lifespans. Supercomputers provide the high-resolution 3D simulations needed for

177

Method for dissolving plutonium dioxide  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

The fluoride-catalyzed, non-oxidative dissolution of plutonium dioxide in HNO.sub.3 is significantly enhanced in rate by oxidizing dissolved plutonium ions. It is believed that the oxidation of dissolved plutonium releases fluoride ions from a soluble plutonium-fluoride complex for further catalytic action.

Tallent, Othar K. (Oak Ridge, TN)

1978-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

178

TECHNIQUES FOR MONITORING PLUTONIUM IN THE ENVIRONMENT  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of Environmental Plutonium and its Related Nuclides," IEEEJ. Koch, and C. T. Schmidt, "Plutonium Survey with an X-RayDetermination of Plutonium," Talanta!! , 215 (1967). C. E.

Nero Jr., A.V.

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

179

Performance of Thorium-Based Mixed Oxide Fuels for the Consumption of Plutonium and Minor Actinides in Current and Advanced Reactors  

SciTech Connect

A renewed interest in thorium-based fuels has arisen lately based on the need for proliferation resistance, longer fuel cycles, higher burnup and improved wasteform characteristics. Recent studies have been directed toward homogeneously mixed, heterogeneously mixed, and seed-and-blanket thorium-uranium fuel cycles that rely on "in situ" use of the bred-in U-233. However, due to the higher initial enrichment required to achieve acceptable burnups, these fuels are encountering economic constraints. Thorium can nevertheless play a large role in the nuclear fuel cycle; particularly in the reduction of plutonium. While uranium-based mixedoxide (MOX) fuel will decrease the amount of plutonium, the reduction is limited due to the breeding of more plutonium (and higher actinides) from the U-238. Here we present calculational results and a comparison of the potential burnup of a thorium-based and uranium-based mixed oxide fuel in a light water reactor (LWR). Although the uranium-based fuels outperformed the thorium-based fuels in achievable burnup, a depletion comparison of the initially charged plutonium (both reactor and weapons grade) showed that the thorium-based fuels outperformed the uranium-based fuels by more that a factor of 2; where more than 70% of the total plutonium in the thorium-based fuel is consumed during the cycle. This is significant considering that the achievable burnup of the thorium-based fuels were 1.4 to 4.6 times less than the uranium-based fuels. Furthermore, use of a thorium-based fuel could also be used as a strategy for reducing the amount of long-lived nuclides (including the minor actinides), and thus the radiotoxicity in spent nuclear fuel. Although the breeding of U-233 is a concern, the presence of U-232 and its daughter products can aid in making this fuel self-protecting, and/or enough U-238 can be added to denature the fissile uranium. From these calculations, it appears that thorium-based fuel for plutonium incineration is superior as compared to uranium-based fuel, and should be considered as an alternative to traditional MOX in both current and future reactor designs.

Weaver, Kevan Dean; Herring, James Stephen

2002-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

180

Observation challenges in a glovebox environment : behavior based safety at a plutonium facility.  

SciTech Connect

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is one of the Nation's leading scientific and defense laboratories, owned by the Department of Energy and managed by the University of California. LANL is one of the original weapons complex labs dating back to the days of the Manhattan Project during World War II. Since then, radioactive materials research has continued at LANLs Plutonium Facility, and remains a primary responsibility of the Laboratory. The Nuclear Materials Technology Division (NMT) is a multidisciplinary organization responsible for daily operations of the Plutonium Facility and the Chemistry Research Metallurgy Facility. NMT Division is responsible for the saence, engineering and technology of plutonium and other actinides in support of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear materials disposition, and nuclear energy programs. A wide amy of activities are performed within NMT Division, such as analytical chemistry, metallurgical operations, actinide processes, waste operations, radioactive materials research and related administrative tasks.

Montalvo, M. L. (Maryrose L.)

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


181

PLUTONIUM ELECTROREFINING CELLS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Electrorefining cells for obtaining 99.98% plutonium are described. The cells consist of an impure liquid plutonium anode, a molten PuCl/sub 3/-- alkali or alkaline earth metal chloanode, a molten PuCl/sub 3/-alkali or alkaline earth metal chloride electrolyte, and a nonreactive cathode, all being contained in nonreactive ceramic containers which separate anode from cathode by a short distance and define a gap for the collection of the purified liquid plutonium deposited on the cathode. Important features of these cells are the addition of stirrer blades on the anode lead and a large cathode surface to insure a low current density. (AEC)

Mullins, L.J. Jr.; Leary, J.A.; Bjorklund, C.W.; Maraman, W.J.

1963-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

182

THE PLUTONIUM STORY  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

chemical symbols would be Np and Pu. The names "eka-rhenium"DEMONSTRATION OF FISSIONABILITY OF Pu The plutonium isotopeneutron fission cross section of Pu compared to that of ' U.

Seaborg, G.T.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

183

Plutonium dissolution process  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

A two-step process for dissolving plutonium metal, which two steps can be carried out sequentially or simultaneously. Plutonium metal is exposed to a first mixture containing approximately 1.0M-1.67M sulfamic acid and 0.0025M-0.1M fluoride, the mixture having been heated to a temperature between 45.degree. C. and 70.degree. C. The mixture will dissolve a first portion of the plutonium metal but leave a portion of the plutonium in an oxide residue. Then, a mineral acid and additional fluoride are added to dissolve the residue. Alteratively, nitric acid in a concentration between approximately 0.05M and 0.067M is added to the first mixture to dissolve the residue as it is produced. Hydrogen released during the dissolution process is diluted with nitrogen.

Vest, Michael A. (Oak Park, IL); Fink, Samuel D. (Aiken, SC); Karraker, David G. (Aiken, SC); Moore, Edwin N. (Aiken, SC); Holcomb, H. Perry (North Augusta, SC)

1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

184

Calorimetric Assay Of Plutonium  

SciTech Connect

This report describes procedures for applying calorimetry for the control and accounting of plutonium. These procedures will be useful in establishing a measurement program to fulfill the regulatory requirements.

Rodenburg, W. W.

1977-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

185

Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Weapons Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Weapons Weapons The New START Treaty, which was signed in 2010, between the United States and Russian Federation will cap the strategic deployed nuclear arsenals of each country at 1,550 warheads, a nearly 75% reduction compared with the

186

History and stabilization of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) complex, Hanford Site  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The 231-Z Isolation Building or Plutonium Metallurgy Building is located in the Hanford Site`s 200 West Area, approximately 300 yards north of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) (234-5 Building). When the Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) built it in 1944 to contain the final step for processing plutonium, it was called the Isolation Building. At that time, HEW used a bismuth phosphate radiochemical separations process to make `AT solution,` which was then dried and shipped to Los Alamos, New Mexico. (AT solution is a code name used during World War II for the final HEW product.) The process was carried out first in T Plant and the 224-T Bulk Reduction Building and B Plant and the 224-B Bulk Reduction Building. The 224-T and -B processes produced a concentrated plutonium nitrate stream, which then was sent in 8-gallon batches to the 231-Z Building for final purification. In the 231-Z Building, the plutonium nitrate solution underwent peroxide `strikes` (additions of hydrogen peroxide to further separate the plutonium from its carrier solutions), to form the AT solution. The AT solution was dried and shipped to the Los Alamos Site, where it was made into metallic plutonium and then into weapons hemispheres.` The 231-Z Building began `hot` operations (operations using radioactive materials) with regular runs of plutonium nitrate on January 16, 1945.

Gerber, M.S., Fluor Daniel Hanford

1997-02-18T23:59:59.000Z

187

EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support...

188

EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

7: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant Kansas City, Missouri EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project...

189

Weapons production | Y-12 National Security Complex  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons production Weapons production An effective production infrastructure is critical to national security. Y-12 continues to replace World War II-era facilities to increase...

190

Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)  

SciTech Connect

The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.

NONE

1994-04-30T23:59:59.000Z

191

Mars Science Laboratory Launch Press Kit/NOVeMBer 2011  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

and related criminal activities" and 15 involved highly-enriched uranium or plutonium [1]. Weapons: (i) the type of nuclear material being smuggled, e.g., weapons-grade plutonium, highly

192

METHOD OF PRODUCING PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is presented for preparing plutonium tetrafluoride from plutonium(IV) oxalate. The oxalate is dried and decomposed at about 300 deg C to the dioxide, mixed with ammonium bifluoride, and the mixture is heated to between 50 and 150 deg C whereby ammonium plutonium fluoride is formed. The ammonium plutonium fluoride is then heated to about 300 deg C for volatilization of ammonium fluoride. Both heating steps are preferably carried out in an inert atmosphere.

Tolley, W.B.; Smith, R.C.

1959-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

193

METHOD OF MAKING PLUTONIUM DIOXIDE  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is presented For converting both trivalent and tetravalent plutonium oxalate to substantially pure plutonium dioxide. The plutonium oxalate is carefully dried in the temperature range of 130 to300DEC by raising the temperature gnadually throughout this range. The temperature is then raised to 600 C in the period of about 0.3 of an hour and held at this level for about the same length of time to obtain the plutonium dioxide.

Garner, C.S.

1959-01-13T23:59:59.000Z

194

Assessment of plutonium in the Savannah River Site environment. Revision 1  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Plutonium in the Savannah River Site Environment is published as a part of the Radiological Assessment Program (RAP). It is the fifth in a series of eight documents on individual radioisotopes released to the environment as a result of Savannah River Site (SRS) operations. These are living documents, each to be revised and updated on a two-year schedule. This document describes the sources of plutonium in the environment, its release from SRS, environmental transport and ecological concentration of plutonium, and the radiological impact of SRS releases to the environment. Plutonium exists in the environment as a result of above-ground nuclear weapons tests, the Chernobyl accident, the destruction of satellite SNAP 9-A, plane crashes involving nuclear weapons, and small releases from reactors and reprocessing plants. Plutonium has been produced at SRS during the operation of five production reactors and released in small quantities during the processing of fuel and targets in chemical separations facilities. Approximately 0.6 Ci of plutonium was released into streams and about 12 Ci was released to seepage basins, where it was tightly bound by clay in the soil. A smaller quantity, about 3.8 Ci, was released to the atmosphere. Virtually all releases have occurred in F- and H-Area separation facilities. Plutonium concentration and transport mechanisms for the atmosphere, surface water, and ground water releases have been extensively studied by Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) and ecological mechanisms have been studied by Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (SREL). The overall radiological impact of SRS releases to the offsite maximum individual can be characterized by a total dose of 15 mrem (atmospheric) and 0.18 mrem (liquid), compared with the dose of 12,960 mrem from non-SRS sources during the same period of time (1954--1989). Plutonium releases from SRS facilities have resulted in a negligible impact to the environment and the population it supports.

Carlton, W.H.; Evans, A.G.; Geary, L.A.; Murphy, C.E. Jr.; Pinder, J.E.; Strom, R.N.

1992-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

195

Preconceptual design for separation of plutonium and gallium by ion exchange  

SciTech Connect

The disposition of plutonium from decommissioned nuclear weapons, by incorporation into commercial UO{sub 2}-based nuclear reactor fuel, is a viable means to reduce the potential for theft of excess plutonium. This fuel, which would be a combination of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide, is referred to as a mixed oxide (MOX). Following power generation in commercial reactors with this fuel, the remaining plutonium would become mixed with highly radioactive fission products in a spent fuel assembly. The radioactivity, complex chemical composition, and large size of this spent fuel assembly, would make theft difficult with elaborate chemical processing required for plutonium recovery. In fabricating the MOX fuel, it is important to maintain current commercial fuel purity specifications. While impurities from the weapons plutonium may or may not have a detrimental affect on the fuel fabrication or fuel/cladding performance, certifying the effect as insignificant could be more costly than purification. Two primary concerns have been raised with regard to the gallium impurity: (1) gallium vaporization during fuel sintering may adversely affect the MOX fuel fabrication process, and (2) gallium vaporization during reactor operation may adversely affect the fuel cladding performance. Consequently, processes for the separation of plutonium from gallium are currently being developed and/or designed. In particular, two separation processes are being considered: (1) a developmental, potentially lower cost and lower waste, thermal vaporization process following PuO{sub 2} powder preparation, and (2) an off-the-shelf, potentially higher cost and higher waste, aqueous-based ion exchange (IX) process. While it is planned to use the thermal vaporization process should its development prove successful, IX has been recommended as a backup process. This report presents a preconceptual design with material balances for separation of plutonium from gallium by IX.

DeMuth, S.F.

1997-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

196

Risk in the Weapons Stockpile  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-08-14T23:59:59.000Z

197

PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT: UNITED STATES PLUTONIUM CONSOLIDATION AND DISPOSITION  

SciTech Connect

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium and larger quantities of enriched uranium that are permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) also began shutting down, stabilizing, and removing inventories from production facilities that were no longer needed to support weapons programs and non-weapons activities. The storage of 'Category I' nuclear materials at Rocky Flats, Sandia National Laboratories, and several smaller sites has been terminated to reduce costs and safeguards risks. De-inventory continues at the Hanford site and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Consolidation of inventories works in concert with the permanent disposition of excess inventories, including several tonnes of plutonium that have already been disposed to waste repositories and the preparation for transfers to the planned Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (for the bulk of the excess plutonium) and alternative disposition methods for material that cannot be used readily in the MOX fuel cycle. This report describes status of plutonium consolidation and disposition activities and their impacts on continuing operations, particularly at the Savannah River Site.

Allender, J.; Koenig, R.; Davies, S.

2009-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

198

Lithium metal reduction of plutonium oxide to produce plutonium metal  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is described for the chemical reduction of plutonium oxides to plutonium metal by the use of pure lithium metal. Lithium metal is used to reduce plutonium oxide to alpha plutonium metal (alpha-Pu). The lithium oxide by-product is reclaimed by sublimation and converted to the chloride salt, and after electrolysis, is removed as lithium metal. Zinc may be used as a solvent metal to improve thermodynamics of the reduction reaction at lower temperatures. Lithium metal reduction enables plutonium oxide reduction without the production of huge quantities of CaO--CaCl.sub.2 residues normally produced in conventional direct oxide reduction processes.

Coops, Melvin S. (Livermore, CA)

1992-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

199

Plutonium microstructures. Part 1  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report is the first of three parts in which Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory metallographers exhibit a consolidated set of illustrations of inclusions that are seen in plutonium metal as a consequence of inherent and tramp impurities, alloy additions, and thermal or mechanical treatments. This part includes illustrations of nonmetallic and intermetallic inclusions characteristic of major impurity elements as an aid to identifying unknowns. It also describes historical aspects of the increased purity of laboratory plutonium samples, and it gives the composition of the etchant solutions and describes the etching procedure used in the preparation of each illustrated sample. 25 figures.

Cramer, E.M.; Bergin, J.B.

1981-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

200

Environmental application of stable xenon and radioxenon monitoring  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

59, [7] D.T.CRAWLEY. Plutonium-Americium Soil Penetration atWA. [13] DOE/DP-0137. Plutonium: The First 50 Years. (1996)57 kg of weapons grade plutonium. The waste was from the

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


201

Waste minimization and the goal of an environmentally benign plutonium processing facility: A strategic plan  

SciTech Connect

To maintain capabilities in nuclear weapons technologies, the Department of Energy (DOE) has to maintain a plutonium processing facility that meets all the current and emerging standards of environmental regulations. A strategic goal to transform the Plutonium Processing Facility at Los Alamos into an environmentally benign operation is identified. A variety of technologies and systems necessary to meet this goal are identified. Two initiatives now in early stages of implementation are described in some detail. A highly motivated and trained work force and a systems approach to waste minimization and pollution prevention are necessary to maintain technical capabilities, to comply with regulations, and to meet the strategic goal.

Pillay, K.K.S.

1994-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

202

Plutonium: An introduction  

SciTech Connect

This report is a summary of the history and properties of plutonium. It presents information on the atoms, comparing chemical and nuclear properties. It looks at the history of the atom, including its discovery and production methods. It summarizes the metallurgy and chemistry of the element. It also describes means of detecting and measuring the presence and quantity of the element.

Condit, R.H.

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

203

Probing phonons in plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Plutonium (Pu) is well known to have complex and unique physico-chemical properties [1]. Notably, the pure metal exhibits six solid-state phase transformations with large volume expansions and contractions along the way to the liquid state: {alpha} {yields} {beta} {yields} {gamma} {yields} {delta} {yields} {delta}' {yields} {var_epsilon} {yields} liquid. Unalloyed Pu melts at a relatively low temperature {approx}640 C to yield a higher density liquid than that of the solid from which it melts. Detailed understanding of the properties of plutonium and plutonium-based alloys is critical for the safe handling, utilization, and long-term storage of these important, but highly toxic materials. However, both technical and safety issues have made experimental observations extremely difficult. Phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) are key experimental data to the understanding of the basic properties of Pu materials such as: force constants, sound velocities, elastic constants, thermodynamics, phase stability, electron-phonon coupling, structural relaxation, etc. However, phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) in plutonium (Pu) and its alloys have defied measurement for the past few decades since the discovery of this element in 1941. This is due to a combination of the high thermal-neutron absorption cross section of plutonium and the inability to grow the large single crystals (with dimensions of a few millimeters) necessary for inelastic neutron scattering. Theoretical simulations of the Pu PDC continue to be hampered by the lack of suitable inter-atomic potentials. Thus, until recently the PDCs for Pu and its alloys have remained unknown experimentally and theoretically. The experimental limitations have recently been overcome by using a tightly focused undulator x-ray micro-beam scattered from single-grain domains in polycrystalline specimens. This experimental approach has been applied successfully to map the complete PDCs of an fcc {delta}-Pu-Ga alloy using the high resolution inelastic x-ray scattering (HRIXS) capability on ID28 [2].

Farber, D; Chiang, T; Krisch, M; Occelli, F; Schwartz, A; Wall, M; Xu, R; Boro, C

2003-12-17T23:59:59.000Z

204

Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administra...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

> Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes September 01, 1961 Washington, DC Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes The Soviet Union breaks the nuclear test...

205

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapons Testing Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing July 03, 1993 Washington, DC Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing President Clinton...

206

Request For Records Disposition Authority-Nuclear Weapons | Department...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

For Records Disposition Authority-Nuclear Weapons Request For Records Disposition Authority-Nuclear Weapons This document identifies the nuclear weapon records generated by the...

207

Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study  

SciTech Connect

This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage.

Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Nass, R. [Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (United States)

1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

208

System Definition Document: Reactor Data Necessary for Modeling Plutonium Disposition in Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The US Department of Energy (USDOE) has contracted with Duke Engineering and Services, Cogema, Inc., and Stone and Webster (DCS) to provide mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services in support of USDOE's mission to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The nuclear station units currently identified as mission reactors for this project are Catawba Units 1 and 2 and McGuire Units 1 and 2. This report is specific to Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, but the details and materials for the McGuire reactors are very similar. The purpose of this document is to present a complete set of data about the reactor materials and components to be used in modeling the Catawba reactors to predict reactor physics parameters for the Catawba site. Except where noted, Duke Power Company or DCS documents are the sources of these data. These data are being used with the ORNL computer code models of the DCS Catawba (and McGuire) pressurized-water reactors.

Ellis, R.J.

2000-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

209

Weapons Quality Assurance Qualification Standard  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

5-2008 5-2008 September 2008 DOE STANDARD WEAPON QUALITY ASSURANCE QUALIFICATION STANDARD NNSA Weapon Quality Assurance Technical Personnel U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-1025-2008 This document is available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web Site at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds/ DOE-STD-1025-2008 iv INTENTIONALLY BLANK DOE-STD-1025-2008 v TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT ................................................................................................................ vii PURPOSE....................................................................................................................................

210

Manufacturing of Plutonium Tensile Specimens  

SciTech Connect

Details workflow conducted to manufacture high density alpha Plutonium tensile specimens to support Los Alamos National Laboratory's science campaigns. Introduces topics including the metallurgical challenge of Plutonium and the use of high performance super-computing to drive design. Addresses the utilization of Abaqus finite element analysis, programmable computer numerical controlled (CNC) machining, as well as glove box ergonomics and safety in order to design a process that will yield high quality Plutonium tensile specimens.

Knapp, Cameron M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

211

PROCESS OF PRODUCING SHAPED PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is presented for producing and casting high purity plutonium metal in one step from plutonium tetrafluoride. The process comprises heating a mixture of the plutonium tetrafluoride with calcium while the mixture is in contact with and defined as to shape by a material obtained by firing a mixture consisting of calcium oxide and from 2 to 10% by its weight of calcium fluoride at from 1260 to 1370 deg C.

Anicetti, R.J.

1959-08-11T23:59:59.000Z

212

WEAPONS QUALITY ASSURANCE QUALIFICATION STANDARD REFERENCE GUIDE  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Weapon Weapon Quality Assurance Qualification Standard Reference Guide AUGUST 2009 This page is intentionally blank. Table of Contents i LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... ii LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ ii ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................ iv PURPOSE...................................................................................................................................... 1 SCOPE ...........................................................................................................................................

213

MOLDS FOR CASTING PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A coated mold for casting plutonium comprises a mold base portion of a material which remains solid and stable at temperatures as high as the pouring temperature of the metal to be cast and having a thin coating of the order of 0.005 inch thick on the interior thereof. The coating is composed of finely divided calcium fluoride having a particle size of about 149 microns. (AEC)

Anderson, J.W.; Miley, F.; Pritchard, W.C.

1962-02-27T23:59:59.000Z

214

PLUTONIUM-URANIUM ALLOY  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Pu-U-Fe and Pu-U-Co alloys suitable for use as fuel elements tn fast breeder reactors are described. The advantages of these alloys are ease of fabrication without microcracks, good corrosion restatance, and good resistance to radiation damage. These advantages are secured by limitation of the zeta phase of plutonium in favor of a tetragonal crystal structure of the U/sub 6/Mn type.

Coffinberry, A.S.; Schonfeld, F.W.

1959-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

215

WEAPONS EFFECTS FOR PROTECTIVE DESIGN  

SciTech Connect

A lecture intended to provide a general background in weapons effects is presented. Specific areas of nuclear explosion phenomena pertinent to the design of hardened systems discussed include nuclear radiation and shielding, fireball growth and effects, thermal radiation, air blast, cratering and throwout, ground shock effects, fallout, and afterwinds. (J.R.D.)

Brode, H.L.

1960-03-31T23:59:59.000Z

216

Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

217

AECL/US INERI - Development of Inert Matrix Fuels for Plutonium and Minor Actinide Management in Power Reactors -- Fuel Requirements and Down-Select Report  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The U.S. Advanced Fuel Cycle Program and the Atomic Energy Canada Ltd (AECL) seek to develop and demonstrate the technologies needed to minimize the overall Pu and minor actinides present in the light water reactor (LWR) nuclear fuel cycles. It is proposed to reuse the Pu from LWR spent fuel both for the energy it contains and to decrease the hazard and proliferation impact resulting from storage of the Pu and minor actinides. The use of fuel compositions with a combination of U and Pu oxide (MOX) has been proposed as a way to recycle Pu and/or minor actinides in LWRs. It has also been proposed to replace the fertile U{sup 238} matrix of MOX with a fertile-free matrix (IMF) to reduce the production of Pu{sup 239} in the fuel system. It is important to demonstrate the performance of these fuels with the appropriate mixture of isotopes and determine what impact there might be from trace elements or contaminants. Previous work has already been done to look at weapons-grade (WG) Pu in the MOX configuration [1][2] and the reactor-grade (RG) Pu in a MOX configuration including small (4000 ppm additions of Neptunium). This program will add to the existing database by developing a wide variety of MOX fuel compositions along with new fuel compositions called inert-matrix fuel (IMF). The goal of this program is to determine the general fabrication and irradiation behavior of the proposed IMF fuel compositions. Successful performance of these compositions will lead to further selection and development of IMF for use in LWRs. This experiment will also test various inert matrix material compositions with and without quantities of the minor actinides Americium and Neptunium to determine feasibility of incorporation into the fuel matrices for destruction. There is interest in the U.S. and world-wide in the investigation of IMF (inert matrix fuels) for scenarios involving stabilization or burn down of plutonium in the fleet of existing commercial power reactors. IMF offer the potential advantage for more efficient destruction of plutonium and minor actinides (MA) relative to MOX fuel. Greater efficiency in plutonium reduction results in greater flexibility in managing plutonium inventories and in developing strategies for disposition of MA, as well as a potential for fuel cycle cost savings. Because fabrication of plutonium-bearing (and MA-bearing) fuel is expensive relative to UO{sub 2} in terms of both capital and production, cost benefit can be realized through a reduction in the number of plutonium-bearing elements required for a given burn rate. In addition, the choice of matrix material may be manipulated either to facilitate fuel recycling or to make plutonium recovery extremely difficult. In addition to plutonium/actinide management, an inert matrix fuel having high thermal conductivity may have operational and safety benefits; lower fuel temperatures could be used to increase operating and safety margins, uprate reactor power, or a combination of both. The CANDU reactor offers flexibility in plutonium management and MA burning by virtue of online refueling, a simple bundle design, and good neutron economy. A full core of inert matrix fuel containing either plutonium or a plutonium-actinide mix can be utilized, with plutonium destruction efficiencies greater than 90%, and high (>60%) actinide destruction efficiencies. The Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR) could allow additional possibilities in the design of an IMF bundle, since the tighter lattice pitch and light-water coolant reduce or eliminate the need to suppress coolant void reactivity, allowing the center region of the bundle to include additional fissile material and to improve actinide burning. The ACR would provide flexibility for management of plutonium and MA from the existing LWR fleet, and would be complementary to the AFCI program in the U.S. Many of the fundamental principles concerning the use of IMF are nearly identical in LWRs and the ACR, including fuel/coolant compatibility, fuel fabrication, and fuel irradiation behavior. In addition, the U.S. and Canada both

William Carmack; Randy D. Lee; Pavel Medvedev; Mitch Meyer; Michael Todosow; Holly B. Hamilton; Juan Nino; Simon Philpot; James Tulenko

2005-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

218

Plutonium Recycling in Light Water Reactors at Framatome ANP: Status and Trends  

SciTech Connect

The civil and military utilization of nuclear power results in continuously increasing stockpiles of spent fuel and separated plutonium. Since fast breeder reactors are at present not available, the majority of spent fuel discharged from commercial nuclear reactors is intended for direct final disposal or designated for interim storage. An effective form of intermediate plutonium storage is recycling in thermal reactors. Recycling of the recovered plutonium in commercial light water reactors (LWRs) is currently practiced in Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland. The number of mixed-oxide (MOX) assemblies reloaded each year in a large variety of reactors demonstrates that plutonium recycling in LWRs has reached industrial maturity. The status of experience gained today at Framatome ANP confirms the reliability of the design codes and the suitability of fuel assembly and core designs. The validation database for increasing exposures of MOX fuel is being continuously expanded. This provides the basis for further extending the discharge exposures of MOX assemblies and for licensing the use of higher plutonium concentrations. Options to support the weapons plutonium reduction programs and for the development of advanced MOX assembly designs are investigated.

Porsch, Dieter [Framatome ANP GmbH (France); Stach, Walter [Framatome ANP GmbH (France); Charmensat, Pascal [Framatome ANP S.A.S. (France); Pasquet, Michel [Framatome ANP S.A.S. (France)

2005-08-15T23:59:59.000Z

219

Options for converting excess plutonium to feed for the MOX fuel fabrication facility  

SciTech Connect

The storage and safekeeping of excess plutonium in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar lifecycle cost to the taxpayers and poses challenges to National Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Los Alamos National Laboratory is considering options for converting some portion of the 13 metric tons of excess plutonium that was previously destined for long-term waste disposition into feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). This approach could reduce storage costs and security ri sks, and produce fuel for nuclear energy at the same time. Over the course of 30 years of weapons related plutonium production, Los Alamos has developed a number of flow sheets aimed at separation and purification of plutonium. Flow sheets for converting metal to oxide and for removing chloride and fluoride from plutonium residues have been developed and withstood the test oftime. This presentation will address some potential options for utilizing processes and infrastructure developed by Defense Programs to transform a large variety of highly impure plutonium into feedstock for the MFFF.

Watts, Joe A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Paul H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Psaras, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Jarvinen, Gordon D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Costa, David A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Joyce, Jr., Edward L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

220

SUPPORTING SAFE STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM-BEARING MATERIALS THROUGH SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND SURVEILLANCE  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Reductions in the size of the U. S. nuclear weapons arsenal resulted in the need to store large quantities of plutonium-bearing metals and oxides for prolonged periods of time. To assure that the excess plutonium from the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites was stored in a safe and environmentally friendly manner the plutonium-bearing materials are stabilized and packaged according to well developed criteria published as a DOE Standard. The packaged materials are stored in secure facilities and regular surveillance activities are conducted to assure continuing package integrity. The stabilization, packaging, storage and surveillance requirements were developed through extensive science and engineering activities including those related to: plutonium-environment interactions and container pressurization, corrosion and stress corrosion cracking, plutonium-container material interactions, loss of sealing capability and changes in heat transfer characteristics. This paper summarizes some of those activities and outlines ongoing science and engineering programs that assure continued safe and secure storage of the plutonium-bearing metals and oxides.

Dunn, K.; Chandler, G.; Gardner, C.; Louthan, M.; Mcclard, J.

2009-11-10T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


221

Fluid Flow and Solidification Simulation of Plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Unalloyed plutonium, which passes through six solid-solid phase transitions as it cools ... Additional complications are the expansion of molten plutonium upon ...

222

METHOD FOR OBTAINING PLUTONIUM METAL AND ALLOYS OF PLUTONIUM FROM PLUTONIUM TRICHLORIDE  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is given for both reducing plutonium trichloride to plutonium metal using cerium as the reductant and simultaneously alloying such plutonium metal with an excess of cerium or cerium and cobalt sufficient to yield the desired nuclear reactor fuel composition. The process is conducted at a temperature from about 550 to 775 deg C, at atmospheric pressure, without the use of booster reactants, and a substantial decontamination is effected in the product alloy of any rare earths which may be associated with the source of the plutonium. (AEC)

Reavis, J.G.; Leary, J.A.; Maraman, W.J.

1962-11-13T23:59:59.000Z

223

Guide of good practices for occupational radiological protection in plutonium facilities  

SciTech Connect

This Technical Standard (TS) does not contain any new requirements. Its purpose is to provide guides to good practice, update existing reference material, and discuss practical lessons learned relevant to the safe handling of plutonium. the technical rationale is given to allow US Department of Energy (DOE) health physicists to adapt the recommendations to similar situations throughout the DOE complex. Generally, DOE contractor health physicists will be responsible to implement radiation protection activities at DOE facilities and DOE health physicists will be responsible for oversight of those activities. This guidance is meant to be useful for both efforts. This TS replaces PNL-6534, Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Plutonium Facilities, by providing more complete and current information and by emphasizing the situations that are typical of DOE`s current plutonium operations; safe storage, decontamination, and decommissioning (environmental restoration); and weapons disassembly.

NONE

1998-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

224

METHOD OF REDUCING PLUTONIUM COMPOUNDS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is described for reducing plutonium compounds in aqueous solution from a higher to a lower valence state. This reduction of valence is achieved by treating the aqueous solution of higher valence plutonium compounds with hydrogen in contact with an activated platinum catalyst.

Johns, I.B.

1958-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

225

Photochemical preparation of plutonium pentafluoride  

SciTech Connect

The novel compound plutonium pentafluoride may be prepared by the photodissociation of gaseous plutonium hexafluoride. It is a white solid of low vapor pressure, which consists predominantly of a face-centered cubic structure with a.sub.o =4.2709.+-.0.0005 .ANG..

Rabideau, Sherman W. (Los Alamos, NM); Campbell, George M. (Los Alamos, NM)

1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

226

PREPARATION OF HALIDES OF PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A dry chemical method is described for preparing plutonium halides, which consists in contacting plutonyl nitrate with dry gaseous HCl or HF at an elevated temperature. The addition to the reaction gas of a small quantity of an oxidizing gas or a reducing gas will cause formation of the tetra- or tri-halide of plutonium as desired.

Garner, C.S.; Johns, I.B.

1958-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

227

PLUTONIUM-CERIUM-COPPER ALLOYS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A low melting point plutonium alloy useful as fuel is a homogeneous liquid metal fueled nuclear reactor is described. Vessels of tungsten or tantalum are useful to contain the alloy which consists essentially of from 10 to 30 atomic per cent copper and the balance plutonium and cerium. with the plutontum not in excess of 50 atomic per cent.

Coffinberry, A.S.

1959-05-12T23:59:59.000Z

228

Microdistribution and Long-Term Retention of 239Pu (NO3)4 in the Respiratory Tracts of an Acutely Exposed Plutonium Worker and Experimental Beagle Dogs  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The long-term retention of inhaled soluble forms of plutonium raises concerns as to the potential health effects in persons working in nuclear energy or the nuclear weapons program. The distributions of long-term retained inhaled plutonium-nitrate [239Pu (NO3)4] deposited in the lungs of an accidentally exposed nuclear worker (Human Case 0269) and in the lungs of experimentally exposed beagle dogs with varying initial lung depositions were determined via autoradiographs of selected histological lung, lymph node, trachea, and nasal turbinate tissue sections. These studies showed that both the human and dogs had a non-uniform distribution of plutonium throughout the lung tissue. Fibrotic scar tissue effectively encapsulated a portion of the plutonium and prevented its clearance from the body or translocation to other tissues and diminished dose to organ parenchyma. Alpha radiation activity from deposited plutonium in Human Case 0269 was observed primarily along the sub-pleural regions while no alpha activity was seen in the tracheobronchial lymph nodes of this individual. However, relatively high activity levels in the tracheobronchial lymph nodes of the beagles indicated the lymphatic system was effective in clearing deposited plutonium from the lung tissues. In both the human case and beagle dogs, the appearance of retained plutonium within the respiratory tract was inconsistent with current biokinetic models of clearance for soluble forms of plutonium. Bound plutonium can have a marked effect on the dose to the lungs and subsequent radiation exposure has the potential increase in cancer risk.

Nielsen, Christopher E.; Wilson, Dulaney A.; Brooks, Antone L.; McCord, Stacey; Dagle, Gerald E.; James, Anthony C.; Tolmachev, Sergei Y.; Thrall, Brian D.; Morgan, William F.

2012-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

229

Opportunities for mixed oxide fuel testing in the advanced test reactor to support plutonium disposition  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Numerous technical issues must be resolved before LWR operating licenses can be amended to allow the use of MOX fuel. These issues include the following: (1) MOX fuel fabrication process verification; (2) Whether and how to use burnable poisons to depress MOX fuel initial reactivity, which is higher than that of urania; (3) The effects of WGPu isotopic composition; (4) The feasibility of loading MOX fuel with plutonia content up to 7% by weight; (5) The effects of americium and gallium in WGPu; (6) Fission gas release from MOX fuel pellets made from WGPu; (7) Fuel/cladding gap closure; (8) The effects of power cycling and off-normal events on fuel integrity; (9) Development of radial distributions of burnup and fission products; (10) Power spiking near the interfaces of MOX and urania fuel assemblies; and (11) Fuel performance code validation. The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory possesses many advantages for performing tests to resolve most of the issues identified above. We have performed calculations to show that the use of hafnium shrouds can produce spectrum adjustments that will bring the flux spectrum in ATR test loops into a good approximation to the spectrum anticipated in a commercial LWR containing MOX fuel while allowing operation of the test fuel assemblies near their optimum values of linear heat generation rate. The ATR would be a nearly ideal test bed for developing data needed to support applications to license LWRs for operation with MOX fuel made from weapons-grade plutonium. The requirements for planning and implementing a test program in the ATR have been identified. The facilities at Argonne National Laboratory-West can meet all potential needs for pre- and post-irradiation examination that might arise in a MOX fuel qualification program.

Terry, W.K.; Ryskamp, J.M.; Sterbentz, J.W. [and others

1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

230

Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

Not Available

1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

231

Characterization of U/Pu Particles Originating From the Nuclear Weapon Accidents at Palomares, Spain, 1966 And Thule, Greenland, 1968  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Following the USAF B-52 bomber accidents at Palomares, Spain in 1966 and at Thule, Greenland in 1968, radioactive particles containing uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) were dispersed into the environment. To improve long-term environmental impact assessments for the contaminated ecosystems, particles from the two sites have been isolated and characterized with respect to properties influencing particle weathering rates. Low [239]Pu/[235]U (0.62-0.78) and [240]Pu/[239]Pu (0.055-0.061) atom ratios in individual particles from both sites obtained by Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) show that the particles contain highly enriched U and weapon-grade Pu. Furthermore, results from electron microscopy with Energy Dispersive X-ray analysis (EDX) and synchrotron radiation (SR) based micrometer-scale X-ray fluorescence ({micro}-XRF) 2D mapping demonstrated that U and Pu coexist throughout the 1-50 {micro}m sized particles, while surface heterogeneities were observed in EDX line scans. SR-based micrometer-scale X-ray Absorption Near Edge Structure Spectroscopy ({micro}-XANES) showed that the particles consisted of an oxide mixture of U (predominately UO[2] with the presence ofU[3][8]) and Pu ((III)/(IV), (V)/(V) or (III), (IV) and (V)). Neither metallic U or Pu nor uranyl or Pu(VI) could be observed. Characteristics such as elemental distributions, morphology and oxidation states are remarkably similar for the Palomares and Thule particles, reflecting that they originate from similar source and release scenarios. Thus, these particle characteristics are more dependent on the original material from which the particles are derived (source) and the formation of particles (release scenario) than the environmental conditions to which the particles have been exposed since the late 1960s.

Lind, O.C.; Salbu, B.; Janssens, K.; Proost, K.; Garcia-Leon, M.; Garcia-Tenorio, R.

2007-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

232

Plutonium Pits | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

nuclear weapons without underground nuclear testing; weapons go through a surveillance process, where they are regularly taken apart, examined, and tests run on their components....

233

ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear-fusion energy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of "points" highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and fo...

Gsponer, A; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

234

Low-Level Plutonium Bioassay Measurements at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Plutonium-239 ({sup 239}Pu) and plutonium-240 ({sup 240}Pu) are important alpha emitting radionuclides contained in radioactive debris from nuclear weapons testing. {sup 239}Pu and {sup 240}Pu are long-lived radionuclides with half-lives of 24,400 years and 6580 years, respectively. Concerns over human exposure to plutonium stem from knowledge about the persistence of plutonium isotopes in the environment and the high relative effectiveness of alpha-radiation to cause potential harm to cells once incorporated into the human body. In vitro bioassay tests have been developed to assess uptakes of plutonium based on measured urinary excretion patterns and modeled metabolic behaviors of the absorbed radionuclides. Systemic plutonium absorbed by the deep lung or from the gastrointestinal tract after ingestion is either excreted or distributed to other organs, primarily to the liver and skeleton, where it is retained for biological half-times of around 20 and 50 years, respectively. Dose assessment and atoll rehabilitation programs in the Marshall Islands have historically given special consideration to residual concentrations of plutonium in the environment even though the predicted dose from inhalation and/or ingestion of plutonium accounts for less than 5% of the annual effective dose from exposure to fallout contamination. Scientists from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) have developed a state-of-the-art bioassay test to assess urinary excretion rates of plutonium from Marshallese populations. This new heavy-isotope measurement system is based on Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS). The AMS system at LLNL far exceeds the standard measurement requirements established under the latest United States Department of Energy (DOE) regulation, 10CFR 835, for occupational monitoring of plutonium, and offers several advantages over classical as well as competing new technologies for low-level detection and measurement of plutonium isotopes. The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has independently verified the accuracy and precision of the AMS detection system for low-level bioassay measurements of plutonium isotopes through participation in an intercomparison exercise whereby performance evaluation samples were prepared in a synthetic urine matrix and submitted to participating laboratories for blind analysis. The results of the analyses were then sent to the NIST to independently evaluate the performance of laboratory participants. At LLNL, the AMS measurements of {sup 239}Pu and {sup 240}Pu met ANSI 13.30 criteria for both precision and accuracy at all sample test levels. Livermore scientists continue to test the performance of the Marshall Islands Plutonium Urinalysis Program by routine blind analysis of externally prepared quality control test samples, and through the rigorous implementation of standardized methods and procedures. Although not addressed directly in the report, AMS measurements show that the urinary excretion of plutonium by selected Marshallese populations fall into a low and reproducible range. Moreover, there appears to be no evidence of small incremental intakes of plutonium associated with resettlement activities - past or present. The improved quality, reliability and detection sensitivity of AMS for low-level plutonium isotope measurements will enable DOE to develop high-quality, baseline urinary excretion data for Marshallese populations, and accurately assess and track potential uptakes of plutonium. associated with resettlement activities and/or from long-term changes in plutonium exposure conditions in the Marshall Islands.

Hamilton, T; Brown, T; Hickman, D; Marchetti, A; Williams, R; Kehl, S

2007-06-18T23:59:59.000Z

235

Historical Exposures to Chemicals at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant: A Pilot Retrospective Exposure Assessment  

SciTech Connect

In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

Janeen Denise Robertson

1999-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

236

LANL Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era weapons  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era weapons production being shipped to WIPP LANL Reaches Waste Shipment Milestone: Waste from Cold War-era weapons production being shipped to WIPP May 31, 2011 - 12:00pm Addthis Media Contact Fred deSousa 505-665-3430 fdesousa@lanl.gov LOS ALAMOS, New Mexico - Los Alamos National Laboratory has reached an important milestone in its campaign to ship transuranic (TRU) waste from Cold War-era nuclear operations to the U.S. Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. This month, the Lab surpassed 100,000 plutonium-equivalent curies of TRU waste shipped to WIPP, about one-third of the Lab's total. The waste, sent from LANL to WIPP in more than 750 shipments since 1999,

237

Public distrust and hazard management success at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant  

SciTech Connect

Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclear weapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made.

Hohenemser, C.

1987-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

238

The PEACE PIPE: Recycling nuclear weapons into a TRU storage/shipping container  

SciTech Connect

This paper describes results of a contract undertaken by the National Conversion Pilot Project (NCPP) at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) to fabricate stainless steel ``pipe`` containers for use in certification testing at Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque to qualify the container for both storage of transuranic (TRU) waste at RFETS and other DOE sites and shipping of the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). The paper includes a description of the nearly ten-fold increase in the amount of contained plutonium enabled by the product design, the preparation and use of former nuclear weapons facilities to fabricate the components, and the rigorous quality assurance and test procedures that were employed. It also describes how stainless steel nuclear weapons components can be converted into these pipe containers, a true ``swords into plowshare`` success story.

Floyd, D.; Edstrom, C. [Manufacturing Sciences Corp. (United States); Biddle, K.; Orlowski, R. [BNFL, Inc. (United States); Geinitz, R. [Safe Sites of Colorado, Golden, CO (United States); Keenan, K. [USDOE-RFFO (United States); Rivera, M. [Science Applications International Corp./LATA (United States)

1997-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

239

Complexation of Plutonium (IV) with Fluoride at Variable Tempeartures  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of Neptunium and Plutonium. Edited by OECD Nuclear EnergyComplexation of Plutonium(IV) with Fluoride at Variablehigher temperatures. Key Words: Plutonium (IV) / Fluoride /

Moore, Dean A.

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

240

PLUTONIUM-HYDROGEN REACTION PRODUCT, METHOD OF PREPARING SAME AND PLUTONIUM POWDER THEREFROM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is described for forming plutonlum hydride powder by reacting hydrogen with massive plutonium metal at room temperature and the product obtained. The plutonium hydride powder can be converted to plutonium powder by heating to above 200 deg C.

Fried, S.; Baumbach, H.L.

1959-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


241

Supplement Analysis for the Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials at the Savannah River Site (DOE/EIS-0229-SA-4)(09/05/07)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

9-SA-4 9-SA-4 SUPPLEMENT ANALYSIS STORAGE OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM MATERIALS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE In April 2002, DOE decided to immediately consolidate long-term storage at the Savannah River Site (SRS) of surplus, non-pit weapons-usable plutonium then stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) (DOE, 2002a). That 2002 decision did not affect an earlier DOE decision made in the January 21, 1997, Record of Decision (ROD, DOE, 1997) for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE, 1996) to continue storage of non-pit surplus plutonium at Hanford, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and the Los Alamos

242

Pyrochemical separations chemistry of plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The recovery and purification of plutonium involves interesting chemistry. Currently in use are several high temperature processes based on redox reactions. These processes include direct oxide reduction which uses calcium to reduce the oxide to the free metal and electrorefining which is used as a final purification step. The chemical research group at Rocky Flats is currently investigating the use of an aluminum/magnesium alloy to remove the ionic plutonium from the salts used in the above named processes. The results of this study along with an overview of pyrochemical plutonium processing chemistry will be presented.

Bynum, R.V.; Navratil, J.D.

1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

243

SOLVENT EXTRACTION PROCESS FOR PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

The separation of plutonium from aqueous inorganic acid solutions by the use of a water immiscible organic extractant liquid is described. The plutonium must be in the oxidized state, and the solvents covered by the patent include nitromethane, nitroethane, nitropropane, and nitrobenzene. The use of a salting out agents such as ammonium nitrate in the case of an aqueous nitric acid solution is advantageous. After contacting the aqueous solution with the organic extractant, the resulting extract and raffinate phases are separated. The plutonium may be recovered by any suitable method.

Seaborg, G.T.

1959-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

244

Probing phonons in plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Plutonium (Pu) is well known to have complex and unique physico-chemical properties. Notably, the pure metal exhibits six solid-state phase transformations with large volume expansions and contractions along the way to the liquid state: {alpha} {yields} {beta} {yields} {gamma} {yields} {delta} {yields} {delta}{prime} {yields} {var_epsilon} {yields} liquid. Unalloyed Pu melts at a relatively low temperature {approx}640 C to yield a higher density liquid than that of the solid from which it melts, (Figure 1). Detailed understanding of the properties of plutonium and plutonium-based alloys is critical for the safe handling, utilization, and long-term storage of these important, but highly toxic materials. However, both technical and and safety issues have made experimental observations extremely difficult. Phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) are key experimenta l data to the understanding of the basic properties of Pu materials such as: force constants, sound velocities, elastic constants, thermodynamics, phase stability, electron-phonon coupling, structural relaxation, etc. However, phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) in plutonium (Pu) and its alloys have defied measurement for the past few decades since the discovery of this element in 1941. This is due to a combination of the high thermal-neutron absorption cross section of plutonium and the inability to grow the large single crystals (with dimensions of a few millimeters) necessary for inelastic neutron scattering. Theoretical simulations of the Pu PDC continue to be hampered by the lack of suitable inter -atomic potentials. Thus, until recently the PDCs for Pu and its alloys have remained unknown experimentally and theoretically. The experimental limitations have recently been overcome by using a tightly focused undulator x-ray micro-beam scattered from single -grain domains in polycrystalline specimens. This experimental approach has been applied successfully to map the complete PDCs of an fcc d-Pu-Ga alloy using the high resolution inelastic x-ray scattering (HRIXS) capability on ID28. The complete PDCs for an fcc Pu-0.6 wt% Ga alloy are plotted in Figure 2, and represent the first full set of phonon dispersions ever determined for any Pu-bearing materials. The solid curves (red) are calculated using a standard Born-von Karman (B-vK) force constant model. An adequate fit to the experimental data is obtained if interactions up to the fourth-nearest neighbours are included. The dashed curves (blue) are recent dynamical mean field theory (DMFT) results by Dai et al. The elastic moduli calculated from the slopes of the experimental phonon dispersion curves near the {Lambda} point are: C{sub 11} = 35.3 {+-} 1.4 GPa, C{sub 12} = 25.5 {+-} 1.5 GPa and C{sub 44} = 30.53 {+-} 1.1 GPa. These values are in excellent agreement with those of the only other measurement on a similar alloy (1 wt % Ga) using ultrasonic techniques as well as with those recently calculated from a combined DMFT and linear response theory for pure {delta}-Pu. Several unusual features, including a large elastic anisotropy, a small shear elastic modulus C{prime}, a Kohn-like anomaly in the T{sub 1}[011] branch, and a pronounced softening of the [111] transverse modes are found. These features can be related to the phase transitions of plutonium and to strong coupling between the lattice structure and the 5f valence instabilities. The HRIXS results also provide a critical test for theoretical treatments of highly correlated 5f electron systems as exemplified by recent dynamical mean field theory (DMFT) calculations for {delta}-plutonium. The experimental-theoretical agreements shown in Figure 2 in terms of a low shear elastic modulus C{prime}, a Kohn-like anomaly in the T{sub 1}[011] branch, and a large softening of the T[111] modes give credence to the DMFT approach for the theoretical treatment of 5f electron systems of which {delta}-Pu is a classic example. However, quantitative differences remain. These are the position of the Kohn anomaly along the T{sub 1}[011] branch, the energy maximum of the T[111] mode s

Wong, Joe; Krisch, M.; Farber, D.; Occelli, F.; Schwartz, A.; Chiang, T.C.; Wall, M.; Boro, C.; Xu, Ruqing (UIUC); (LLNL); (ESRF); (LANL)

2010-11-16T23:59:59.000Z

245

On the application of IAEA safeguards to plutonium and highly enriched uranium from military inventories  

SciTech Connect

Progress toward the reduction of nuclear arsenals may render surplus hundreds of tonnes of plutonium and highly enriched uranium by the end of the century. None of the acknowledged nuclear weapon states (NWS) is under a specific obligation to submit surplus military inventories to international control. However, inviting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply safeguards to the plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) released from military use could contribute to building confidence as part of the reductions currently envisaged and could encourage further steps within the states currently planning reductions or by other NWS. If invited, specific arrangements for the application of IAEA safeguards to plutonium and highly enriched uranium from military inventories would be determined by: the institutional provisions adopted; the specified verification requirements; the amounts and forms of plutonium and HEU and the types of facilities to be safeguarded; facility-specific features for the control and accounting of the plutonium and HEU; and the number of facilities where safeguards will be applied. These considerations would be used to establish the most appropriate verificiation arrangements, including the technology to be employed and inspection scheduling arrangements, to provide effective and efficient safeguards. If an invitation is made, the IAEA Board of Governors must approve of the obligations and commitments of the states involved and of the financial arrangements that will ensure the safeguards can be implemented as agreed. 2 tabs.

Shea, T.E. (International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse, Vienna (Austria))

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

246

Characterization of plutonium-bearing wastes by chemical analysis and analytical electron microscopy  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report summarizes the results of characterization studies of plutonium-bearing wastes produced at the US Department of Energy weapons production facilities. Several different solid wastes were characterized, including incinerator ash and ash heels from Rocky Flats Plant and Los Alamos National Laboratory; sand, stag, and crucible waste from Hanford; and LECO crucibles from the Savannah River Site. These materials were characterized by chemical analysis and analytical electron microscopy. The results showed the presence of discrete PuO{sub 2}PuO{sub 2{minus}x}, and Pu{sub 4}O{sub 7} phases, of about 1{mu}m or less in size, in all of the samples examined. In addition, a number of amorphous phases were present that contained plutonium. In all the ash and ash heel samples examined, plutonium phases were found that were completely surrounded by silicate matrices. Consequently, to achieve optimum plutonium recovery in any chemical extraction process, extraction would have to be coupled with ultrafine grinding to average particle sizes of less than 1 {mu}m to liberate the plutonium from the surrounding inert matrix.

Behrens, R.G. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Buck, E.C.; Dietz, N.L.; Bates, J.K.; Van Deventer, E.; Chaiko, D.J. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

247

Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition NNSS Capabilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has tasked the WDD working group to disposition the large inventory of legacy classified weapon components scattered across the complex.

Pat Arnold

2011-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

248

The National Nuclear Security Administration's Weapons Dismantlement...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

National Nuclear Security Administration's Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition Program OAS-L-13-06 January 2013 Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 January 29, 2013...

249

FAQS Reference Guide – Weapon Quality Assurance  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

This reference guide addresses the competency statements in the August 2008 edition of DOE-STD-1025-2008, Weapon Quality Assurance Functional Area Qualification Standard.

250

Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Uranium Weapons Components Successfully...

251

TERNARY ALLOY-CONTAINING PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Ternary alloys of uranium and plutonium containing as the third element either molybdenum or zirconium are reported. Such alloys are particularly useful as reactor fuels in fast breeder reactors. The alloy contains from 2 to 25 at.% of molybdenum or zirconium, the balance being a combination of uranium and plutonium in the ratio of from 1 to 9 atoms of uranlum for each atom of plutonium. These alloys are prepared by melting the constituent elements, treating them at an elevated temperature for homogenization, and cooling them to room temperature, the rate of cooling varying with the oomposition and the desired phase structure. The preferred embodiment contains 12 to 25 at.% of molybdenum and is treated by quenching to obtain a body centered cubic crystal structure. The most important advantage of these alloys over prior binary alloys of both plutonium and uranium is the lack of cracking during casting and their ready machinability.

Waber, J.T.

1960-02-23T23:59:59.000Z

252

Chloride removal from plutonium alloy  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

SRP is evaluating a program to recover plutonium from a metallic alloy that will contain chloride salt impurities. Removal of chloride to sufficiently low levels to prevent damaging corrosion to canyon equipment is feasible as a head-end step following dissolution. Silver nitrate and mercurous nitrate were each successfully used in laboratory tests to remove chloride from simulated alloy dissolver solution containing plutonium. Levels less than 10 ppM chloride were achieved in the supernates over the precipitated and centrifuged insoluble salts. Also, less than 0.05% loss of plutonium in the +3, +4, or +6 oxidation states was incurred via precipitate carrying. These results provide impetus for further study and development of a plant-scale process to recover plutonium from metal alloy at SRP.

Holcomb, H.P.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

253

Fissile Material Disposition (MD) - Nuclear Engineering Division...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

a legacy of surplus fissile materials (primarily weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in the United States and the former Soviet Union. These materials pose a...

254

Savannah River Operations Office  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

is estimated the amount of weapons grade material converted at SRS from both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium could generate enough electricity to power all South...

255

NIST Ionizing Radiat. Div. - 2002: Strategic Focus 2  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... at the NIST National Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) nuclear reactor. ... Spent fuel from nuclear reactors, weapons-grade plutonium, and certain ...

256

Grain Boundary Structure Effects on Radiation Assisted Segregation ...  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... are attractive materials for use as components in nuclear reactors because of their ... in a Fusion/Fission Engine for Incineration of Weapons Grade Plutonium.

257

U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff, "Assessment Report: Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons-Related Security Oversight Process," March 1998  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

August 5, 1977 DOE, "Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization from 1944 Through 1994 GAO/RCED-92-39, "Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE's Weapons Facilities," December 13, 1991 GAO/RCED/AIMD-95-5, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities are Limited," December 27, 1994 GAO/AIMD-95-165, "Department of Energy: Poor Management of Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities Are Limited," August 3, 1995 Classified DOE report.

Gao Rced- Major

1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

258

TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities TA-55 supports a wide range of national security programs that involve stockpile stewardship, plutonium processing, nuclear materials stabilization, materials disposition, nuclear forensics, nuclear counter-terrorism, and nuclear energy. ...the only fully operational, full capability plutonium facility in the nation. National Security At the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), virtually all plutonium operations occur within the Plutonium Facility at Technical Area 55 (TA-55). TA-55 is the nation's most modern plutonium science and manufacturing facility, and it is the only fully operational, full capability plutonium facility in the nation. Thus, TA-55 supports a wide

259

METHOD OF PREPARING PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

C rystalline plutonium tetrafluoride is precipitated from aqueous up to 1.6 N mineral acid solutions of a plutorium (IV) salt with fluosilicic acid anions, preferably at room temperature. Hydrogen fluoride naay be added after precipitation to convert any plutonium fluosilicate to the tetrafluoride and any silica to fluosilicic acid. This process results in a purer product, especially as to iron and aluminum, than does the precipitation by the addition of hydrogen fluoride.

Beede, R.L.; Hopkins, H.H. Jr.

1959-11-17T23:59:59.000Z

260

IODATE METHOD FOR PURIFYING PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is presented for removing radioactive fission products from aqueous solutions containing such fission products together with plutonium. This is accomplished by incorporating into such solutions a metal iodate precipitate to remove fission products which form insoluble iodates. Suitable metal iodates are those of thorium and cerium. The plutonium must be in the hexavalent state and the pH of the solution must be manintained at less than 2.

Stoughton, R.W.; Duffield, R.B.

1958-10-14T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


261

METATHESIS OF PLUTONIUM CARRIER LANTHANUM FLUORIDE PRECIPITATE WITH AN ALKALI  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A plutonium fluoride precipitate is converted to plutonium hydroxide by digesting the precipitate with an aqueous alkali metal hydroxide solution.

Duffield, R.B.

1960-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

262

Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war  

SciTech Connect

This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

Bing, G.F.

1991-08-20T23:59:59.000Z

263

Direct vitrification of plutonium-containing materials (PCM`s) with the glass material oxidation and dissolution system (GMODS)  

SciTech Connect

The end of the cold war has resulted in excess PCMs from nuclear weapons and associated production facilities. Consequently, the US government has undertaken studies to determine how best to manage and dispose of this excess material. The issues include (a) ensurance of domestic health, environment, and safety in handling, storage, and disposition, (b) international arms control agreements with Russia and other countries, and (c) economics. One major set of options is to convert the PCMs into glass for storage or disposal. The chemically inert characteristics of glasses make them a desirable chemical form for storage or disposal of radioactive materials. A glass may contain only plutonium, or it may contain plutonium along with other radioactive materials and nonradioactive materials. GMODS is a new process for the direct conversion of PCMs (i.e., plutonium metal, scrap, and residues) to glass. The plutonium content of these materials varies from a fraction of a percent to pure plutonium. GMODS has the capability to also convert other metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass, destroy organics, and convert chloride-containing materials into a low-chloride glass and a secondary clean chloride salt strewn. This report is the initial study of GMODS for vitrification of PCMs as input to ongoing studies of plutonium management options. Several tasks were completed: initial analysis of process thermodynamics, initial flowsheet analysis, identification of equipment options, proof-of-principle experiments, and identification of uncertainties.

Forsberg, C.W. Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Rudolph, J.C.; Haas, P.A.; Malling, G.F.; Elam, K.; Ott, L.

1995-10-30T23:59:59.000Z

264

Philippine Bases and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

BASES AN-fJ U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY In 1947, when Unitedcould bring as many nuclear weapons as It wanted onto theinclude opposition to U.S. nuclear weapons and bases In the

Schirmer, Daniel Boone

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

265

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

1990 What Do We Do with Nuclear Weapons Now? by Michael M.for the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy MICHAEL M. MAYan electoral majority in nuclear weapons states. Unlike

May, Michael M

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

266

Export control guide: Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and preparation of plutonium metal  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states in Article III, paragraph 2(b) that {open_quotes}Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide . . . equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.{close_quotes} This guide was prepared to assist export control officials in the interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws and controls relating to the international Trigger List for irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, components, and materials. The guide also contains information related to the production of plutonium metal. Reprocessing and its place in the nuclear fuel cycle are described briefly; the standard procedure to prepare metallic plutonium is discussed; steps used to prepare Trigger List controls are cited; descriptions of controlled items are given; and special materials of construction are noted. This is followed by a comprehensive description of especially designed or prepared equipment, materials, and components of reprocessing and plutonium metal processes and includes photographs and/or pictorial representations. The nomenclature of the Trigger List has been retained in the numbered sections of this document for clarity.

NONE

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

267

Risk analysis of shipping plutonium pits and mixed oxide fuel  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

With the end of the cold war, there no longer seems to be a credible threat of war between nuclear superpowers, with its possible consequence of billions of fatalities. However, the residue of the cold war, most notably the now excess weapons plutonium, has been identified as the source of a number of potential catastrophes. For example, just a single crude nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist organization or rogue state and detonated in even a medium-sized city could lead to hundreds of thousands of deaths. For this reason, the ultimate disposition of this excess plutonium has been identified as a national priority. The process of carrying out this disposition itself carries some risks, and even though any conceivable consequences clearly will be much smaller in magnitude than those cited above, U.S. federal law (the National Environmental Protection Act) mandates that such risks must be analyzed. The ability to carry out one type of such an analysis is demonstrated in this thesis. Specifically, one possible option that has been identified for disposition of excess U.S. weapons plutonium is the transformation into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, that then would be used as fuel in a commercial nuclear power plant. Any such process will involve the transportation of the MOX fuel from the MOX fuel fabrication facility to the nuclear power plant, and possibly transportation of the plutonium from a storage site to the fuel fabrication facility. This thesis is intended to demonstrate the capability to analyze the risks associated with such transportation campaigns. The primary tool used for these analyses was RADTRAN, a code developed by Sandia National Laboratories for evaluating risk associated with the transportation of radioactive materials. Two sample scenarios were explored relative to the transformation of plutonium pits to MOX fuel. First, the pits would be converted to MOX fuel at a fuel fabrication facility located either at the Pantex Plant or the Savannah River Site (SRS), and then the MOX fuel would be ultimately shipped to a final destination of a commercial power plant, the Palo Verde Generating Station in Arizona. For the scenario of placing the MOX fuel fabrication facility at SRS, pits would need to be shipped from Pantex to SRS and then the MOX fuel would be shipped to Palo Verde. The total number of expected fatalities over a 25 year campaign duration for this scenario would be 1.06, with 0. 1 73 fatalities resulting from latent cancer fatalities due to radiation exposure and 0.89 resulting from traffic accidents. For the placement of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at Pantex, only the MOX fuel would need to be transported from one facility to another, in this case from Pantex to Palo Verde. The total fatalities for this scenario over 25 years would be 0.413, resulting from 5.29 x 10-2 latent cancer fatalities and 0.36 traffic accident fatalities. The maximum exposed individual along any of the three routes would receive 1.0 X 10-5 rem per year or 0.25 mrem over 25 years.

Caldwell, Amy Baker

1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

268

Plutonium and americium separation from salts  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Salts or materials containing plutonium and americium are dissolved in hydrochloric acid, heated, and contacted with an alkali metal carbonate solution to precipitate plutonium and americium carbonates which are thereafter readily separable from the solution.

Hagan, Paul G. (Northglenn, CO); Miner, Frend J. (Boulder, CO)

1976-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

269

The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944 - 2009  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

ii Preface This report updates Plutonium: The first 50 years which was released by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 1996. The topic of both reports is plutonium, sometimes...

270

DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Wildlife Refuge DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Wildlife Refuge July 12, 2007 -...

271

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

... Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program January 19, 1975 Washington, DC Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program The Energy...

272

EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...

273

The AL-R8 SI: The next generation staging container for plutonium pits at the USDOE Pantex Plant  

SciTech Connect

The AL-R8 SI (sealed insert) is the next generation staging container for plutonium pits at the US DOE Pantex Plant. The sealed insert is a stainless steel container that will be placed inside a modified AL-R8 container to stage pits. A pit is a hollow sphere of plutonium metal which is the primary fissionable material in nuclear weapons (warheads and bombs). It is hermetically sealed by a cladding material, which is usually stainless steel. Personnel exposures to ionizing radiation from the pits in storage are expected to decrease due to the attenuation provided by the new SI. All personnel exposures to ionizing radiation at Pantex Plant are As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). Pantex Plant secures the common defense and national security of the US by safely staging plutonium pits in a manner that protests the health and safety of employees, the public, and the environment.

Eifert, E.J.; Vickers, L.D. [DOE Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX (United States)

1999-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

274

Zone refining of plutonium metal  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The purpose of this study was to investigate zone refining techniques for the purification of plutonium metal. The redistribution of 10 impurity elements from zone melting was examined. Four tantalum boats were loaded with plutonium impurity alloy, placed in a vacuum furnace, heated to 700{degrees}C, and held at temperature for one hour. Ten passes were made with each boat. Metallographic and chemical analyses performed on the plutonium rods showed that, after 10 passes, moderate movement of certain elements were achieved. Molten zone speeds of 1 or 2 inches per hour had no effect on impurity element movement. Likewise, the application of constant or variable power had no effect on impurity movement. The study implies that development of a zone refining process to purify plutonium is feasible. Development of a process will be hampered by two factors: (1) the effect on impurity element redistribution of the oxide layer formed on the exposed surface of the material is not understood, and (2) the tantalum container material is not inert in the presence of plutonium. Cold boat studies are planned, with higher temperature and vacuum levels, to determine the effect on these factors. 5 refs., 1 tab., 5 figs.

NONE

1997-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

275

Seversk Plutonium Production Elimination Project (SPPEP) | National...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Seversk Plutonium Production Elimination Project (SPPEP) | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear...

276

Design and fabrication of SGS plutonium standards  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper describes our experience of fabricating four sets of plutonium segmented gamma scanner (SGS) can standards. The fabrication involves careful planning, meticulous execution in weighing the plutonium oxide while minimizing contamination, chemical analyses by three different national laboratories to get accurate and independent plutonium concentrations, vertical scanning to assure mixing of the plutonium and the diluent, and finally the nondestructive verification measurement. By following these steps, we successfully fabricated 4 sets or 20 SGS can standards. 4 refs., 5 figs., 3 tabs.

Hsue, S.T.; Simmonds, S.M.; Longmire, V.L.; Long, S.M.

1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

277

PROCESS OF SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM URANIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is presented for recovering plutonium values from aqueous solutions. It comprises forming a uranous hydroxide precipitate in such a plutonium bearing solution, at a pH of at least 5. The plutonium values are precipitated with and carried by the uranium hydroxide. The carrier precipitate is then redissolved in acid solution and the pH is adjusted to about 2.5, causing precipitation of the uranous hydroxide but leaving the still soluble plutonium values in solution.

Brown, H.S.; Hill, O.F.

1958-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

278

Zheleznogorsk Plutonium Production Elimination Project (ZPPEP...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Zheleznogorsk Plutonium Production Elimination Project (ZPPEP) | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the...

279

Plutonium-the element of surprise  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

plutonium c6n never be very large becauserheinsolubilityol Pu(OH)lsels Lrnls on the concentrallonof evenPlutonium-the element of surprise G.R.ChoppinandB.E.Stout This year marked the soth annivrsary ol the original isolation o{ plutonium, making ita relativenewcomerto the PeriodicTable.Ovrthe past 50 years

Short, Daniel

280

The occurrence of plutonium in nature  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Nuclear Energy S e r i e s , Plutonium P r o j e c t Record,Nuclear Energy S e r i e s , Plutonium P r o j e c t Record,Laboratory THE OCCURRENCE OF PLUTONIUM IN NATUIRE Charles A.

Levine, Charles A.; Seaborg, Glenn T.

1950-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


281

Universite Louis Pasteur Strasbourg I Faculte de Chimie  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

employ´e depuis des ann´ees dans le syst`eme PUREX (Plutonium URanium EXtraction) pour extraire et s weapons grade plutonium, they are considered waste products when generated by power reactors. Most

Paris-Sud XI, Université de

282

Destruction of plutonium using non-uranium fuels in pressurized water reactor peripheral assemblies  

SciTech Connect

This thesis examines and confirms the feasibility of using non-uranium fuel in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) radial blanket to eliminate plutonium of both weapons and civilian origin. In the equilibrium cycle, the periphery of the PWR is loaded with alternating fresh and once burned non-uranium fuel assemblies, with the interior of the core comprised of conventional three batch UO{sub 2} assemblies. Plutonium throughput is such that there is no net plutonium production: production in the interior is offset by destruction in the periphery. Using this approach a 50 MT WGPu inventory could be eliminated in approximately 400 reactor years of operation. Assuming all other existing constraints were removed, the 72 operating US PWRs could disposition 50 MT of WGPu in 5.6 years. Use of a low fissile loading plutonium-erbium inert-oxide-matrix composition in the peripheral assemblies essentially destroys 100% of the {sup 239}Pu and {ge}90% {sub total}Pu over two 18 month fuel cycles. Core radial power peaking, reactivity vs EFPD profiles and core average reactivity coefficients were found to be comparable to standard PWR values. Hence, minimal impact on reload licensing is anticipated. Examination of potential candidate fuel matrices based on the existing experience base and thermo-physical properties resulted in the recommendation of three inert fuel matrix compositions for further study: zirconia, alumina and TRISO particle fuels. Objective metrics for quantifying the inherent proliferation resistance of plutonium host waste and fuel forms are proposed and were applied to compare the proposed spent WGPu non-uranium fuel to spent WGPu MOX fuels and WGPu borosilicate glass logs. The elimination disposition option spent non-uranium fuel product was found to present significantly greater barriers to proliferation than other plutonium disposal products.

Chodak, P. III

1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

283

Dehydration of plutonium trichloride hydrate  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process of preparing anhydrous actinide metal trichlorides of plutonium or neptunium by reacting an aqueous solution of an actinide metal trichloride selected from the group consisting of plutonium trichloride or neptunium trichloride with a reducing agent capable of converting the actinide metal from an oxidation state of +4 to +3 in a resultant solution, evaporating essentially all the solvent from the resultant solution to yield an actinide trichloride hydrate material, dehydrating the actinide trichloride hydrate material by heating the material in admixture with excess thionyl chloride, and recovering anhydrous actinide trichloride is provided.

Foropoulos, J. Jr.; Avens, L.R.; Trujillo, E.A.

1991-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

284

Plutonium stabilization and packaging system  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This document describes the functional design of the Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (Pu SPS). The objective of this system is to stabilize and package plutonium metals and oxides of greater than 50% wt, as well as other selected isotopes, in accordance with the requirements of the DOE standard for safe storage of these materials for 50 years. This system will support completion of stabilization and packaging campaigns of the inventory at a number of affected sites before the year 2002. The package will be standard for all sites and will provide a minimum of two uncontaminated, organics free confinement barriers for the packaged material.

NONE

1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

285

A Program to Stabilize Nuclear Materials as Managed by the Plutonium Focus Area  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper describes the program to stabilize nuclear materials, consistent with the Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (EM) plan, Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure. The program is managed by the Plutonium Stabilization and Disposition Focus Area, which defines and manages technology development programs to stabilize nuclear materials and assure their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of the Plutonium Stabilization and Disposition Focus Area (PFA) activities includes non-weapons plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA provides solutions to site-specific and complex wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. Our paper describes an important programmatic function of the Department of Energy nuclear materials stabilization program, including the tie-in of policy to research needs and funding for the nuclear materials disposition area. The PFA uses a rigorous systems engineering determination of technology needs and gaps, under the guidance of a Technical Advisory Panel, consisting of complex-wide experts. The Research and Development planning provides an example for other waste areas and should be of interest to Research and Development managers. The materials disposition maps developed by the PFA and described in this paper provide an evaluation of research needs, data gaps and subsequent guidance for the development of technologies for nuclear materials disposition. This paper also addresses the PFA prioritization methodology and its ability to forecast actual time to implementation.

B. Kenley (Kenley Consulting); B. Scott; B. Seidel (ANL-W); D. Knecht (LMITCO); F. Southworth; K. Osborne (DOE-ID); N. Chipman; T. Creque

1999-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

286

Optimization and implementation study of plutonium disposition using existing CANDU Reactors. Final report  

SciTech Connect

Since early 1994, the Department of Energy has been sponsoring studies aimed at evaluating the merits of disposing of surplus US weapons plutonium as Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel in existing commercial Canadian Pressurized Heavy Water reactors, known as CANDU`s. The first report, submitted to DOE in July, 1994 (the 1994 Executive Summary is attached), identified practical and safe options for the consumption of 50 to 100 tons of plutonium in 25 years in some of the existing CANDU reactors operating the Bruce A generating station, on Lake Huron, about 300 km north east of Detroit. By designing the fuel and nuclear performance to operate within existing experience and operating/performance envelope, and by utilizing existing fuel fabrication and transportation facilities and methods, a low cost, low risk method for long term plutonium disposition was developed. In December, 1995, in response to evolving Mission Requirements, the DOE requested a further study of the CANDU option with emphasis on more rapid disposition of the plutonium, and retaining the early start and low risk features of the earlier work. This report is the result of that additional work.

NONE

1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

287

PROCESS FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM IMPURITIES  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is described for separating plutonium from aqueous solutions containing uranium. It has been found that if the plutonium is reduced to its 3+ valence state, and the uranium present is left in its higher valence state, then the differences in solubility between certain salts (e.g., oxalates) of the trivalent plutonium and the hexavalent uranium can be used to separate the metals. This selective reduction of plutonium is accomplished by adding iodide ion to the solution, since iodide possesses an oxidation potential sufficient to reduce plutonium but not sufficient to reduce uranium.

Wahl, A.C.

1957-11-12T23:59:59.000Z

288

PLUTONIUM COMPOUNDS AND PROCESS FOR THEIR PREPARATION  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

This patent relates to certain new compounds of plutonium, and to the utilization of these compounds to effect purification or separation of the plutonium. The compounds are organic chelate compounds consisting of tetravalent plutonium together with a di(salicylal) alkylenediimine. These chelates are soluble in various organic solvents, but not in water. Use is made of this property in extracting the plutonium by contacting an aqueous solution thereof with an organic solution of the diimine. The plutonium is chelated, extracted and effectively separated from any impurities accompaying it in the aqueous phase.

Wolter, F.J.; Diehl, H.C. Jr.

1958-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

289

Method of separating thorium from plutonium  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method of chemically separating plutonium from thorium. Plutonium and thorium to be separated are dissolved in an aqueous feed solution, preferably as the nitrate salts. The feed solution is acidified and sodium nitrite is added to the solution to adjust the valence of the plutonium to the +4 state. A chloride salt, preferably sodium chloride, is then added to the solution to induce formation of an anionic plutonium chloride complex. The anionic plutonium chloride complex and the thorium in solution are then separated by ion exchange on a strong base anion exchange column.

Clifton, David G. (Los Alamos, NM); Blum, Thomas W. (Los Alamos, NM)

1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

290

Method of separating thorium from plutonium  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is described for chemically separating plutonium from thorium. Plutonium and thorium to be separated are dissolved in an aqueous feed solution, preferably as the nitrate salts. The feed solution is acidified and sodium nitrite is added to the solution to adjust the valence of the plutonium to the +4 state. A chloride salt, preferably sodium chloride, is then added to the solution to induce formation of an anionic plutonium chloride complex. The anionic plutonium chloride complex and the thorium in solution are then separated by ion exchange on a strong base anion exchange column.

Clifton, D.G.; Blum, T.W.

1984-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

291

AEC and control of nuclear weapons  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

control of nuclear weapons The Atomic Energy Commission took control of the atomic energy project known originally as the Manhattan Project on January 1, 1947. This shift from the...

292

Summary report of the screening process to determine reasonable alternatives for long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials  

SciTech Connect

Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials (primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium) have become surplus to national defense needs both in the US and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety and health consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. As announced in the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the Department of Energy is currently conducting an evaluation process for disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials determined surplus to National Security needs, and long-term storage of national security and programmatic inventories, and surplus weapons-usable fissile materials that are not able to go directly from interim storage to disposition. An extensive set of long-term storage and disposition options was compiled. Five broad long-term storage options were identified; thirty-seven options were considered for plutonium disposition; nine options were considered for HEU disposition; and eight options were identified for Uranium-233 disposition. Section 2 discusses the criteria used in the screening process. Section 3 describes the options considered, and Section 4 provides a detailed summary discussions of the screening results.

NONE

1995-03-29T23:59:59.000Z

293

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) HVAC System Component Index  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) WAC System includes sub-systems 25A through 25K. Specific system boundaries and justifications are contained in HNF-SD-CP-SDD-005, ''Definition and Means of Maintaining the Ventilation System Confinement Portion of the PFP Safety Envelope.'' The procurement requirements associated with the system necessitates procurement of some system equipment as Commercial Grade Items in accordance with HNF-PRO-268, ''Control of Purchased Items and Services.'' This document lists safety class and safety significant components for the Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning and specifies the critical characteristics for Commercial Grade Items, as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to properly perform its safety function. There may be several manufacturers or models that meet the critical characteristics for any one item.

DICK, J.D.

2000-02-28T23:59:59.000Z

294

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) HVAC System Component Index  

SciTech Connect

This document lists safety class (SC) and safety significant (SS) components for the Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC) and specifies the critical characteristics for Commercial Grade Items (CGI), as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-18 19. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to properly perform its safety function. There may be several manufacturers or models that meet the critical characteristics for any one item. The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) HVAC System includes sub-systems 25A through 25K. Specific system boundaries and justifications are contained in HNF-SD-CP-SDD-005, ''Definition and Means of Maintaining the Ventilation System Confinement Portion of the PFP Safety Envelope.'' The procurement requirements associated with the system necessitates procurement of some system equipment as Commercial Grade Items in accordance with HNF-PRO-268, ''Control of Purchased Items and Services.''

DIAZ, E.N.

2000-03-30T23:59:59.000Z

295

AIR FORCE SPECIAL WEAPONS CENTER  

Office of Legacy Management (LM)

HEADQUARTERS aII?y HEADQUARTERS aII?y 9 AIR FORCE SPECIAL WEAPONS CENTER 1 AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND . - KlRTlAND AIR FORCE BASE, NEW MEXICO - k FINAL REPORT O N AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION PROJECT RULISON .1 O c t o b e r 1969 P r e p a r e d by : CONT INENTAL TEST D I V I S ION DIRECTORATE OF NUCLEAR FIELD OPERATIONS This page intentionally left blank INDEX AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION I N PROJECT RULISON FINAL REPORT PARAGRAPH BASIC REPORT SUBJECT R e f e r e n c e s PAGE 2 G e n e r a l 1 3 P l a n n i n g 3 4 Command a n d C o n t r o l 5 O p e r a t i o n s , G r a n d ' J u n c t i o n M u n i c i p a l A i r p o r t . . ' A i r O p e r a t i o n s C e n t e r , He1 i c o p t e r P a d / ' 7.. - . M a t e r i e l : ' 8 M e d i c a l 1 9 R a d - S a f e C r a s h - R e s c u e S e c u r i t y 2 1 C o m m u n i c a t i o n s ~ d m i n i s t r a t ' i o n Summary ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT SUBJECI' 1 F r a g O r d e r 69-1 ( ~ r o j ' e c t RULISON) , AFSWC D

296

Plutonium Decontamination of Uranium using CO2 Cleaning  

SciTech Connect

A concern of the Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) and Defense Programs (DP), and of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), is the disposition of thousands of legacy and recently generated plutonium (Pu)-contaminated, highly enriched uranium (HEU) parts. These parts take up needed vault space. This presents a serious problem for LLNL, as site limit could result in the stoppage of future weapons work. The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (NN-60) will also face a similar problem as thousands of HEU parts will be created with the disassembly of site-return pits for plutonium recovery when the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) becomes operational. To send HEU to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Y-12 Plant for disposition, the contamination for metal must be less than 20 disintegrations per minute (dpm) of swipable transuranic per 100 cm{sup 2} of surface area or the Pu bulk contamination for oxide must be less than 210 parts per billion (ppb). LANL has used the electrolytic process on Pu-contaminated HEU weapon parts with some success. However, this process requires that a different fixture be used for every configuration; each fixture cost approximately $10K. Moreover, electrolytic decontamination leaches the uranium metal substrate (no uranium or plutonium oxide) from the HEU part. The leaching rate at the uranium metal grain boundaries is higher than that of the grains and depends on the thickness of the uranium oxide layer. As the leaching liquid flows past the HEU part, it carries away plutonium oxide contamination and uranium oxide. The uneven uranium metal surface created by the leaching becomes a trap for plutonium oxide contamination. In addition, other DOE sites have used CO{sub 2} cleaning for Pu decontamination successfully. In the 1990's, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory investigated this technology and showed that CO{sub 2} pellet blasting (or CO{sub 2} cleaning) reduced both fixed and smearable contamination on tools. In 1997, LLNL proved that even tritium contamination could be removed from a variety of different matrices using CO{sub 2}cleaning. CO{sub 2} cleaning is a non-toxic, nonconductive, nonabrasive decontamination process whose primary cleaning mechanisms are: (1) Impact of the CO{sub 2} pellets loosens the bond between the contaminant and the substrate. (2) CO{sub 2} pellets shatter and sublimate into a gaseous state with large expansion ({approx}800 times). The expanding CO{sub 2} gas forms a layer between the contaminant and the substrate that acts as a spatula and peels off the contaminant. (3) Cooling of the contaminant assists in breaking its bond with the substrate. Thus, LLNL conducted feasibility testing to determine if CO{sub 2} pellet blasting could remove Pu contamination (e.g., uranium oxide) from uranium metal without abrading the metal matrix. This report contains a summary of events and the results of this test.

Blau, M

2002-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

297

Plutonium Decontamination of Uranium using CO2 Cleaning  

SciTech Connect

A concern of the Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) and Defense Programs (DP), and of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), is the disposition of thousands of legacy and recently generated plutonium (Pu)-contaminated, highly enriched uranium (HEU) parts. These parts take up needed vault space. This presents a serious problem for LLNL, as site limit could result in the stoppage of future weapons work. The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (NN-60) will also face a similar problem as thousands of HEU parts will be created with the disassembly of site-return pits for plutonium recovery when the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) becomes operational. To send HEU to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Y-12 Plant for disposition, the contamination for metal must be less than 20 disintegrations per minute (dpm) of swipable transuranic per 100 cm{sup 2} of surface area or the Pu bulk contamination for oxide must be less than 210 parts per billion (ppb). LANL has used the electrolytic process on Pu-contaminated HEU weapon parts with some success. However, this process requires that a different fixture be used for every configuration; each fixture cost approximately $10K. Moreover, electrolytic decontamination leaches the uranium metal substrate (no uranium or plutonium oxide) from the HEU part. The leaching rate at the uranium metal grain boundaries is higher than that of the grains and depends on the thickness of the uranium oxide layer. As the leaching liquid flows past the HEU part, it carries away plutonium oxide contamination and uranium oxide. The uneven uranium metal surface created by the leaching becomes a trap for plutonium oxide contamination. In addition, other DOE sites have used CO{sub 2} cleaning for Pu decontamination successfully. In the 1990's, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory investigated this technology and showed that CO{sub 2} pellet blasting (or CO{sub 2} cleaning) reduced both fixed and smearable contamination on tools. In 1997, LLNL proved that even tritium contamination could be removed from a variety of different matrices using CO{sub 2}cleaning. CO{sub 2} cleaning is a non-toxic, nonconductive, nonabrasive decontamination process whose primary cleaning mechanisms are: (1) Impact of the CO{sub 2} pellets loosens the bond between the contaminant and the substrate. (2) CO{sub 2} pellets shatter and sublimate into a gaseous state with large expansion ({approx}800 times). The expanding CO{sub 2} gas forms a layer between the contaminant and the substrate that acts as a spatula and peels off the contaminant. (3) Cooling of the contaminant assists in breaking its bond with the substrate. Thus, LLNL conducted feasibility testing to determine if CO{sub 2} pellet blasting could remove Pu contamination (e.g., uranium oxide) from uranium metal without abrading the metal matrix. This report contains a summary of events and the results of this test.

Blau, M

2002-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

298

Materials measurement and accounting in an operating plutonium conversion and purification process. Phase I. Process modeling and simulation. [PUCSF code  

SciTech Connect

A model of an operating conversion and purification process for the production of reactor-grade plutonium dioxide was developed as the first component in the design and evaluation of a nuclear materials measurement and accountability system. The model accurately simulates process operation and can be used to identify process problems and to predict the effect of process modifications.

Thomas, C.C. Jr.; Ostenak, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Dayem, H.A.; Kern, E.A.

1981-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

299

GLASS FABRICATION AND PRODUCT CONSISTENCY TESTING OF LANTHANIDE BOROSILICATE FRIT X COMPOSITION FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION  

SciTech Connect

The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE/EM) plans to conduct the Plutonium Disposition Project at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to disposition excess weapons-usable plutonium. A plutonium glass waste form is the preferred option for immobilization of the plutonium for subsequent disposition in a geologic repository. A reference glass composition (Lanthanide Borosilicate (LaBS) Frit B) was developed during the Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) to immobilize plutonium in the late 1990's. A limited amount of performance testing was performed on this baseline composition before efforts to further pursue Pu disposition via a glass waste form ceased. Recent FY05 studies have further investigated the LaBS Frit B formulation as well as development of a newer LaBS formulation denoted as LaBS Frit X. The objectives of this present task were to fabricate plutonium loaded LaBS Frit X glass and perform corrosion testing to provide near-term data that will increase confidence that LaBS glass product is suitable for disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository. Specifically, testing was conducted in an effort to provide data to Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) personnel for use in performance assessment calculations. Plutonium containing LaBS glass with the Frit X composition with a 9.5 wt% PuO{sub 2} loading was prepared for testing. Glass was prepared to support Product Consistency Testing (PCT) at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The glass was thoroughly characterized using x-ray diffraction (XRD) and scanning electron microscopy coupled with energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) prior to performance testing. A series of PCTs were conducted at SRNL using quenched Pu Frit X glass with varying exposed surface areas. Effects of isothermal and can-in-canister heat treatments on the Pu Frit X glass were also investigated. Another series of PCTs were performed on these different heat-treated Pu Frit X glasses. Leachates from all these PCTs were analyzed to determine the dissolved concentrations of key elements. Acid stripping of leach vessels was performed to determine the concentration of the glass constituents that may have sorbed on the vessels during leach testing. Additionally, the leachate solutions were ultrafiltered to quantify colloid formation.

Marra, J

2006-11-15T23:59:59.000Z

300

ACCOUNTING FOR A VITRIFIED PLUTONIUM WASTE FORM IN THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT (TSPA)  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A vitrification technology utilizing a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass appears to be a viable option for dispositioning excess weapons-useable plutonium that is not suitable for processing into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. A significant effort to develop a glass formulation and vitrification process to immobilize plutonium was completed in the mid-1990s to support the Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP). Further refinement of the vitrification process was accomplished as part of the Am/Cm solution vitrification project. The LaBS glass formulation was found to be capable of immobilizing in excess of 10 wt% Pu and to be very tolerant of the impurities accompanying the plutonium material streams. Thus, this waste form would be suitable for dispositioning plutonium owned by the Department of Energy-Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) that may not be well characterized and may contain high levels of impurities. The can-in-canister technology demonstrated in the PIP could be utilized to dispose of the vitrified plutonium in the federal radioactive waste repository. The can-in-canister technology involves placing small cans of the immobilized Pu form into a high level waste (HLW) glass canister fitted with a rack to hold the cans and then filling the canister with HLW glass. Testing was completed to demonstrate that this technology could be successfully employed with little or no impact to current Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) operation and that the resulting canisters were essentially equivalent to the present HLW glass canisters to be dispositioned in the federal repository. The performance of wastes in the repository and, moreover, the performance of the entire repository system is being evaluated by the Department of Energy-Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (DOE-RW) using a Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) methodology. Technical bases documents (e.g., Analysis/Modeling Reports (AMR)) that address specific issues regarding waste form performance are being used to develop process models as input to the TSPA analyses. In this report, models developed in five AMRs for waste forms currently slated for disposition in the repository are evaluated for their applicability to waste forms with plutonium immobilized in LaBS glass using the can-in-canister technology. Those AMRs address: high-level waste glass degradation; radionuclide inventory; in-package chemistry; dissolved concentration limits of radioactive elements; and colloid-associated radionuclide concentrations. Based on evaluation of how the models treated HLW glass and similarities in the corrosion behaviors of borosilicate HLW glasses and LaBS glass, the models in the AMRs were deemed to be directly applicable to the disposition of excess weapons-useable plutonium. The evaluations are summarized.

Marra, J

2007-02-12T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


301

Air transport of plutonium metal : content expansion initiative for the Plutonium Air Transportable (PAT-1) packaging.  

SciTech Connect

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has submitted an application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the air shipment of plutonium metal within the Plutonium Air Transportable (PAT-1) packaging. The PAT-1 packaging is currently authorized for the air transport of plutonium oxide in solid form only. The INMM presentation will provide a limited overview of the scope of the plutonium metal initiative and provide a status of the NNSA application to the NRC.

Mann, Paul T. (National Nuclear Security Administration); Caviness, Michael L. (Los Alamos National Laboratory); Yoshimura, Richard Hiroyuki

2010-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

302

Air transport of plutonium metal: content expansion initiative for the plutonium air transportable (PAT01) packaging  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has submitted an application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the air shipment of plutonium metal within the Plutonium Air Transportable (PAT-1) packaging. The PAT-1 packaging is currently authorized for the air transport of plutonium oxide in solid form only. The INMM presentation will provide a limited overview of the scope of the plutonium metal initiative and provide a status of the NNSA application to the NRC.

Caviness, Michael L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mann, Paul T [NNSA/ALBUQUERQUE; Yoshimura, Richard H [SNL

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

303

METHOD FOR THE PREPARATION OF PLUTONIUM HALIDES AND OXYHALIDES  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Plutonium trihalide or plutonium(III) oxyhalide is prepared by reacting plutonium dioxide with hydrogen halide at 300 to 1000 deg C in the presence of hydrogen, ammonium iodide, or ammonium bromide.

Davidson, N.R.; Katz, J.J.

1960-02-23T23:59:59.000Z

304

Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

LBNL- Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent Fuel withSwinhoe. “Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent FuelS. Tobin, “Measurement of Plutonium in Spent Nuclear Fuel by

Tobin, S. J.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

305

PRECIPITATION METHOD FOR THE SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM AND RARE EARTHS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method of purifying plutonium is given. Tetravalent plutonium is precipitated with thorium pyrophosphate, the plutonium is oxidized to the tetravalent state, and then impurities are precipitated with thorium pyrophosphate.

Thompson, S.G.

1960-04-26T23:59:59.000Z

306

SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM HYDROXIDE FROM BISMUTH HYDROXIDE  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

An tmproved method is described for separating plutonium hydroxide from bismuth hydroxide. The end product of the bismuth phosphate processes for the separation amd concentration of plutonium is a inixture of bismuth hydroxide amd plutonium hydroxide. It has been found that these compounds can be advantageously separated by treatment with a reducing agent having a potential sufficient to reduce bismuth hydroxide to metalltc bisinuth but not sufficient to reduce the plutonium present. The resulting mixture of metallic bismuth and plutonium hydroxide can then be separated by treatment with a material which will dissolve plutonium hydroxide but not metallic bismuth. Sodiunn stannite is mentioned as a preferred reducing agent, and dilute nitric acid may be used as the separatory solvent.

Watt, G.W.

1958-08-19T23:59:59.000Z

307

WET METHOD OF PREPARING PLUTONIUM TRIBROMIDE  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

S> The preparation of anhydrous plutonium tribromide from an aqueous acid solution of plutonium tetrabromide is described, consisting of adding a water-soluble volatile bromide to the tetrabromide to provide additional bromide ions sufficient to furnish an oxidation-reduction potential substantially more positive than --0.966 volt, evaporating the resultant plutonium tribromides to dryness in the presence of HBr, and dehydrating at an elevated temperature also in the presence of HBr.

Davidson, N.R.; Hyde, E.K.

1958-11-11T23:59:59.000Z

308

Addressing mixed waste in plutonium processing  

SciTech Connect

The overall goal is the minimization of all waste generated in actinide processing facilities. Current emphasis is directed toward reducing and managing mixed waste in plutonium processing facilities. More specifically, the focus is on prioritizing plutonium processing technologies for development that will address major problems in mixed waste management. A five step methodological approach to identify, analyze, solve, and initiate corrective action for mixed waste problems in plutonium processing facilities has been developed.

Christensen, D.C.; Sohn, C.L. (Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)); Reid, R.A. (New Mexico Univ., Albuquerque, NM (United States). Anderson Schools of Management)

1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

309

PROCESS FOR THE RECOVERY OF PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process for the separation of plutonium from uranlum and other associated radioactlve fission products ls descrlbed conslstlng of contacting an acid solution containing plutonium in the tetravalent state and uranium in the hexavalent state with enough ammonium carbonate to form an alkaline solution, adding cupferron to selectlvely form plutonlum cupferrlde, then recoverlng the plutonium cupferride by extraction with a water lmmiscible organic solvent such as chloroform.

Potratz, H.A.

1958-12-16T23:59:59.000Z

310

PLUTONIUM-CUPFERRON COMPLEX AND METHOD OF REMOVING PLUTONIUM FROM SOLUTION  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is presented for separating plutonium from fission products present in solutions of neutronirradiated uranium. The process consists in treating such acidic solutions with cupferron so that the cupferron reacts with the plutonium present to form an insoluble complex. This plutonium cupferride precipitates and may then be separated from the solution.

Potratz, H.A.

1959-01-13T23:59:59.000Z

311

Processing and Mechanical Behavior of Unalloyed Plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Abstract Scope, Unalloyed plutonium presents a wide variety of challenges to the ... AlMnCrCuFeNi Multicomponent Alloy with Superior Hardness and Corrosion ...

312

OXIDATIVE METHOD OF SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM NEPTUNIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is described of separating neptunium from plutonium in an aqueous solution containing neptunium and plutonium in valence states not greater than +4. This may be accomplished by contacting the solution with dichromate ions, thus oxidizing the neptunium to a valence state greater than +4 without oxidizing any substantial amount of plutonium, and then forming a carrier precipitate which carries the plutonium from solution, leaving the neptunium behind. A preferred embodiment of this invention covers the use of lanthanum fluoride as the carrier precipitate.

Beaufait, L.J. Jr.

1958-06-10T23:59:59.000Z

313

METHOD OF REDUCING PLUTONIUM WITH FERROUS IONS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is presented for separating hexavalent plutonium from fission product values. To a nitric acid solution containing the values, ferrous ions are added and the solution is heated and held at elevated temperature to convert the plutonium to the tetravalent state via the trivalent state and the plutonium is then selectively precipitated on a BiPO/sub 4/ or LaF/sub 3/ carrier. The tetravalent plutonium formed is optionally complexed with fluoride, oxalate, or phosphate anion prior to carrier precipitation.

Dreher, J.L.; Koshland, D.E.; Thompson, S.G.; Willard, J.E.

1959-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

314

NON-AQUEOUS DISSOLUTION OF MASSIVE PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method is presented for obtaining non-aqueous solutions or plutonium from massive forms of the metal. In the present invention massive plutonium is added to a salt melt consisting of 10 to 40 weight per cent of sodium chloride and the balance zinc chloride. The plutonium reacts at about 800 deg C with the zinc chloride to form a salt bath of plutonium trichloride, sodium chloride, and metallic zinc. The zinc is separated from the salt melt by forcing the molten mixture through a Pyrex filter.

Reavis, J.G.; Leary, J.A.; Walsh, K.A.

1959-05-12T23:59:59.000Z

315

EA-0841: Import of Russian Plutonium-238  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of a proposal to purchase plutonium-238 from the Russian Federation (Russia) for use in the Nation's space program.

316

ION EXCHANGE ADSORPTION PROCESS FOR PLUTONIUM SEPARATION  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Ion exchange processes for the separation of plutonium from fission products are described. In accordance with these processes an aqueous solution containing plutonium and fission products is contacted with a cation exchange resin under conditions favoring adsorption of plutonium and fission products on the resin. A portion of the fission product is then eluted with a solution containing 0.05 to 1% by weight of a carboxylic acid. Plutonium is next eluted with a solution containing 2 to 8 per cent by weight of the same carboxylic acid, and the remaining fission products on the resin are eluted with an aqueous solution containing over 10 per cent by weight of sodium bisulfate.

Boyd, G.E.; Russell, E.R.; Taylor, M.D.

1961-07-11T23:59:59.000Z

317

Accident Investigation Report Plutonium Contamination in the...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Accident Investigation Report Plutonium Contamination in the Zero Power Physics Reactor Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory, November 8, 2011 January 2012 Disclaimer...

318

Zone refining of plutonium metal  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The zone refining process was applied to Pu metal containing known amounts of impurities. Rod specimens of plutonium metal were melted into and contained in tantalum boats, each of which was passed horizontally through a three-turn, high-frequency coil in such a manner as to cause a narrow molten zone to pass through the Pu metal rod 10 times. The impurity elements Co, Cr, Fe, Ni, Np, U were found to move in the same direction as the molten zone as predicted by binary phase diagrams. The elements Al, Am, and Ga moved in the opposite direction of the molten zone as predicted by binary phase diagrams. As the impurity alloy was zone refined, {delta}-phase plutonium metal crystals were produced. The first few zone refining passes were more effective than each later pass because an oxide layer formed on the rod surface. There was no clear evidence of better impurity movement at the slower zone refining speed. Also, constant or variable coil power appeared to have no effect on impurity movement during a single run (10 passes). This experiment was the first step to developing a zone refining process for plutonium metal.

Blau, M.S.

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

319

EIS-0277: Management of Certain Plutonium Residues and Scrub...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

77: Management of Certain Plutonium Residues and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site EIS-0277: Management of Certain Plutonium Residues and Scrub...

320

U.S. and Russia Sign Plutonium Disposition Agreement | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Agreement U.S. and Russia Sign Plutonium Disposition Agreement September 01, 2000 Washington, DC U.S. and Russia Sign Plutonium Disposition Agreement After two years of...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


321

Consolidation of Surplus Plutonium at Savannah River Site | Department...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Waste Management Nuclear Materials & Waste Consolidation of Surplus Plutonium at Savannah River Site Consolidation of Surplus Plutonium at Savannah River Site Waste...

322

Savannah River Site: Plutonium Preparation Project (PuPP) at...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Site: Plutonium Preparation Project (PuPP) at Savannah River Site Savannah River Site: Plutonium Preparation Project (PuPP) at Savannah River Site Full Document and Summary...

323

Additional public meeting on plutonium disposition on September...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

produce an oxide form of plutonium suitable for disposition and the use of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabricated from surplus plutonium in domestic commercial nuclear power reactors...

324

EIS-0219: F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

of Plutonium Solutions Stored in the F-Canyon Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC December 1, 1994 EIS-0219: Final Environmental Impact Statement F-Canyon Plutonium...

325

Implementing the chemical weapons convention  

SciTech Connect

In 1993, as the CWC ratification process was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the CWC with national law could cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States as to how the CWC would be carried out. As a result, the author's colleagues and the author prepared the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Committee of CWC Legal Experts, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Central Europe, reviewed the Manual. In February 1998, they finished the second edition of the Manual in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Manual tries to increase understanding of the Convention by identifying its obligations and suggesting methods of meeting them. Education about CWC obligations and available alternatives to comply with these requirements can facilitate national response that are consistent among States Parties. Thus, the Manual offers options that can strengthen international realization of the Convention's goals if States Parties act compatibly in implementing them. Equally important, it is intended to build confidence that the legal issues raised by the Convention are finite and addressable. They are now nearing competition of an internet version of this document so that interested persons can access it electronically and can view the full text of all of the national implementing legislation it cites. The internet address, or URL, for the internet version of the Manual is http: //www.cwc.ard.gov. This paper draws from the Manual. It comparatively addresses approximately thirty implementing issues, showing how various States Parties have enacted measures that are responsive to CWC obligations. It is intended to highlight the issues that States Parties must address and to identify trends among States Parties that might be useful to States that have not yet made crucial decisions as to how to resolve key matters. At various points in the text, country names are listed in parenthesis to identify pieces of national legislation that demonstrate the point in the text. It should not be inferred that nations not listed have not addressed the point or have taken a different position. In some cases, a nation's position is explained in somewhat more depth to give specific detail to an assertion in the text. Attached to this paper is a chart which illustrates how States Parties in the Central European region as well as the United States respond to the issues raised. Obviously, in preparing such a chart, many subtle provisions in national legislation must be simplified. The point of the chart is to portray, on a few pages, the major trends of legislation.

Kellman, B.; Tanzman, E. A.

1999-12-07T23:59:59.000Z

326

Pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from an electrolyte salt  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from a plutonium-bearing salt is disclosed. The process is particularly useful in the recovery of plutonium from electrolyte salts which are left over from the electrorefining of plutonium. In accordance with the process, the plutonium-bearing salt is melted and mixed with metallic calcium. The calcium reduces ionized plutonium in the salt to plutonium metal, and also causes metallic plutonium in the salt, which is typically present as finely dispersed metallic shot, to coalesce. The reduced and coalesced plutonium separates out on the bottom of the reaction vessel as a separate metallic phase which is readily separable from the overlying salt upon cooling of the mixture. Yields of plutonium are typically on the order of 95%. The stripped salt is virtually free of plutonium and may be discarded to low-level waste storage.

Mullins, Lawrence J. (Los Alamos, NM); Christensen, Dana C. (Los Alamos, NM)

1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

327

Pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from an electrolyte salt  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from a plutonium-bearing salt is disclosed. The process is particularly useful in the recovery of plutonium for electrolyte salts which are left over from the electrorefining of plutonium. In accordance with the process, the plutonium-bearing salt is melted and mixed with metallic calcium. The calcium reduces ionized plutonium in the salt to plutonium metal, and also causes metallic plutonium in the salt, which is typically present as finely dispersed metallic shot, to coalesce. The reduced and coalesced plutonium separates out on the bottom of the reaction vessel as a separate metallic phase which is readily separable from the overlying salt upon cooling of the mixture. Yields of plutonium are typically on the order of 95%. The stripped salt is virtually free of plutonium and may be discarded to low-level waste storage.

Mullins, L.J.; Christensen, D.C.

1982-09-20T23:59:59.000Z

328

Y-12, the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement ? Or:...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement - Or: The Cold War and nuclear weapons dismantlement (title used in The Oak Ridger) The Cold War heated up over the years with such...

329

Thermodynamics of the conversion of plutonium dioxide to plutonium monocarbide  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

The present study contains an equilibrium thermodynamic analysis of the Pu--C--O system and a discussion from an equilibrium thermodynamic point of view of the direct carbothermic reduction and two-step carbothermic-hydrogen reduction of PuO/sub 2/ to PuC/sub 1-x/. Included are considerations of the partial pressures of the various species in the Pu--C--O and Pu--C--H systems, the process parameters required for conversion of the oxide to the carbide, and the loss of plutonium due to vapor species.

Besmann, T.M.; Lindemer, T.B.

1976-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

330

Interdicting a Nuclear-Weapons Project  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A “proliferator” seeks to complete a first small batch of fission weapons as quickly as possible, whereas an “interdictor” wishes to delay that completion for as long as possible. We develop and solve a max-min model that identifies ... Keywords: CPM, defense, foreign policy, government, integer, linear, military, programming, project management, targeting

Gerald G. Brown; W. Matthew Carlyle; Robert C. Harney; Eric M. Skroch; R. Kevin Wood

2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

331

"Pipeline army": a Russian geopolitical weapon?  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Huge potential of natural resources, including oil, has determined that the Russian Federation (by reserves, production and export) to occupy a dominant position in the global energy economy. Following the implosion of communism and the difficult economic ... Keywords: "geopolitical weapon", energy resources, oil, regions, russia

Teodor Simion; Gica Pehoiu; ?tefan Ispas; Ovidiu Mur?rescu

2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

332

Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

component of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) responsive infrastructure, supports NNSA an important component of the scientific and technical understanding required to assess the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. The program provides this capability

333

The history of nuclear weapon safety devices  

SciTech Connect

The paper presents the history of safety devices used in nuclear weapons from the early days of separables to the latest advancements in MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS). Although the paper focuses on devices, the principles of Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety implementation will also be presented.

Plummer, D.W.; Greenwood, W.H.

1998-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

334

Improving weapons of mass destruction intelligence Arnold Kanter  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

weapons developments in Pakistan are primarily, if not exclusively, influenced by nuclear developments of nuclear capability by sub-national states and the security of WMD weapons, materials, and technology so for the foreseeable future. WMD includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but also

Deutch, John

335

Manhattan Project: F Reactor Plutonium Production Complex  

Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

F REACTOR PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION COMPLEX F REACTOR PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION COMPLEX Hanford Engineer Works, 1945 Resources > Photo Gallery Plutonium production area, Hanford, ca. 1945 The F Reactor plutonium production complex at Hanford. The "boxy" building between the two water towers on the right is the plutonium production reactor; the long building in the center of the photograph is the water treatment plant. The photograph was reproduced from Henry DeWolf Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945). The Smyth Report was commissioned by Leslie Groves and originally issued by the Manhattan Engineer District. Princeton University Press reprinted it in book form as a "public service" with "reproduction in whole or in part authorized and permitted."

336

Cleanup of plutonium oxide reduction black salts  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This work describes pyrochemical processes employed to convert direc oxide reduction (DOR) black salts into discardable white salt and plutonium metal. The DOR process utilizes calcium metal as the reductant in a molten calcium chloride solvent salt to convert plutonium oxide to plutonium metal. An insoluble plutonium-rich dispersion called black salt sometimes forms between the metal phase and the salt phase. Black salts accumulated for processing were treated by one of two methods. One method utilized a scrub alloy of 70 wt % magnesium/30 wt % zinc. The other method utilized a pool of plutonium metal to agglomerate the metal phase. The two processes were similar in that calcium metal reductant and calcium chloride solvent salt were used in both cases. Four runs were performed by each method, and each method produced greater than 93% conversion of the black salt.

Giebel, R.E.; Wing, R.O.

1986-12-17T23:59:59.000Z

337

GLASS FABRICATION AND PRODUCT CONSISTENCY TESTING OF LANTHANIDE BOROSHILICATE FRIT X COMPOSITION FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION  

SciTech Connect

The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE/EM) plans to conduct the Plutonium Disposition Project at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to disposition excess weapons-usable plutonium. A plutonium glass waste form is the preferred option for immobilization of the plutonium for subsequent disposition in a geologic repository. A reference glass composition (Lanthanide Borosilicate (LaBS) Frit B) was developed during the Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) to immobilize plutonium in the late 1990's. A limited amount of performance testing was performed on this baseline composition before efforts to further pursue Pu disposition via a glass waste form ceased. Recent FY05 studies have further investigated the LaBS Frit B formulation as well as development of a newer LaBS formulation denoted as LaBS Frit X. The objectives of this present task were to fabricate plutonium loaded LaBS Frit X glass and perform corrosion testing to provide near-term data that will increase confidence that LaBS glass product is suitable for disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository. Specifically, testing was conducted in an effort to provide data to Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) personnel for use in performance assessment calculations. Plutonium containing LaBS glass with the Frit X composition with a 9.5 wt% PuO{sub 2} loading was prepared for testing. Glass was prepared to support Product Consistency Testing (PCT) at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The glass was thoroughly characterized using x-ray diffraction (XRD) and scanning electron microscopy coupled with energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) prior to performance testing. A series of PCTs were conducted at SRNL using quenched Pu Frit X glass with varying exposed surface areas. Effects of isothermal and can-in-canister heat treatments on the Pu Frit X glass were also investigated. Another series of PCTs were performed on these different heat-treated Pu Frit X glasses. Leachates from all these PCTs were analyzed to determine the dissolved concentrations of key elements. Acid stripping of leach vessels was performed to determine the concentration of the glass constituents that may have sorbed on the vessels during leach testing. Additionally, the leachate solutions were ultrafiltered to quantify colloid formation. Characterization of the quenched Pu Frit X glass prior to testing revealed that some crystalline plutonium oxide was present in the glass. The crystalline particles had a disklike morphology and likely formed via coarsening of particles in areas compositionally enriched in plutonium. Similar results had also been observed in previous Pu Frit B studies. Isothermal 1250 C heat-treated Pu Frit X glasses showed two different crystalline phases (PuO{sub 2} and Nd{sub 2}Hf{sub 2}O{sub 7}), as well as a peak shift in the XRD spectra that is likely due to a solid solution phase PuO{sub 2}-HfO{sub 2} formation. Micrographs of this glass showed a clustering of some of the crystalline phases. Pu Frit X glass subjected to the can-in-canister heating profile also displayed the two PuO{sub 2} and Nd{sub 2}Hf{sub 2}O{sub 7} phases from XRD analysis. Additional micrographs indicate crystalline phases in this glass were of varying forms (a spherical PuO{sub 2} phase that appeared to range in size from submicron to {approx}5 micron, a dendritic-type phase that was comprised of mixed lanthanides and plutonium, and a minor phase that contained Pu and Hf), and clustering of the phases was also observed.

Marra, J

2006-11-21T23:59:59.000Z

338

EIS-0283: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium.

339

ADSORPTION-BISMUTH PHOSPHATE METHOD FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is given for separating plutonium from uranium and fission products. Plutonium and uranium are adsorbed by a cation exchange resin, plutonium is eluted from the adsorbent, and then, after oxidation to the hexavalent state, the plutonium is contacted with a bismuth phosphate carrier precipitate.

Russell, E.R.; Adamson, A.W.; Boyd, G.E.

1960-06-28T23:59:59.000Z

340

The Plutonium Stabilization andPackaging System at the Rocky...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Technology Site (Rocky Flats) produced nuclear weapons components for the Department of Energy. In January 1992, the primary mission of the site changed from nuclear weapons...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


341

Characterization of representative materials in support of safe, long term storage of surplus plutonium in DOE-STD-3013 containers  

SciTech Connect

The Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SMP) is a joint LANL/SRS effort funded by DOE/EM to provide the technical basis for the safe, long-term storage (up to 50 years) of over 6 metric tons of plutonium stored in over 5000 DOE-STD-3013 containers at various facilities around the DOE complex. The majority of this material is plutonium that is surplus to the nuclear weapons program, and much of it is destined for conversion to mixed oxide fuel for use in US nuclear power plants. The form of the plutonium ranges from relatively pure metal and oxide to very impure oxide. The performance of the 3013 containers has been shown to depend on moisture content and on the levels, types and chemical forms of the impurities. The oxide materials that present the greatest challenge to the storage container are those that contain chloride salts. The chlorides (NaCl, KCl, CaCl{sub 2}, and MgCl{sub 2}) range from less than half of the impurities present to nearly all the impurities. Other common impurities include oxides and other compounds of calcium, magnesium, iron, and nickel. Over the past 15 years the program has collected a large body of experimental data on over 60 samples of plutonium chosen to represent the broader population of materials in storage. This paper will summarize the characterization data, including the origin and process history, particle size, surface area, density, calorimetry, chemical analysis, moisture analysis, prompt gamma, gas generation and corrosion behavior.

Smith, Paul H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Narlesky, Joshua E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Worl, Laura A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Gillispie, Obie W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

342

Comparison of NDA and DA measurement techniques for excess plutonium powders at the Hanford Site: Statistical design and heterogeneity testing  

SciTech Connect

Quantitative physical measurements are a n component of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear material m&guards verification regime. In December 1994, LA.FA safeguards were initiated on an inventory of excess plutonium powder items at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, Vault 3, on the US Department of Energy`s Hanford Site. The material originl from the US nuclear weapons complex. The diversity of the chemical form and the heterogenous physical form of this inventory were anticipated to challenge the precision and accuracy of quantitative destructive analytical techniques. A sampling design was used to estimate the degree of heterogeneity of the plutonium content of a variety of inventory items. Plutonium concentration, the item net weight, and the {sup 240}Pu content were among the variables considered in the design. Samples were obtained from randomly selected location within each item. Each sample was divided into aliquots and analyzed chemically. Operator measurements by calorimetry and IAEA measurements by coincident neutron nondestructive analysis also were performed for the initial physical inventory verification materials and similar items not yet under IAEA safeguards. The heterogeneity testing has confirmed that part of the material is indeed significantly heterogeneous; this means that precautionary measures must be taken to obtain representative samples for destructive analysis. In addition, the sampling variability due to material heterogeneity was found to be comparable with, or greater than, the variability of the operator`s calorimetric measurements.

Welsh, T.L.; McRae, L.P.; Delegard, C.H. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); Liebetrau, A.M. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Johnson, W.C. [USDOE Richland Operations Office, WA (United States); Theis, W.; Lemaire, R.J. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Xiao, J. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Toronto, Ontario (Canada)

1995-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

343

CSP Policies & Procedures Process for Grade Appeals  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

CSP Policies & Procedures Process for Grade Appeals Grade Appeals ­ Generally speaking, once grades

Leistikow, Bruce N.

344

FAQS Qualification Card - Weapon Quality Assurance | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Weapon Quality Assurance Weapon Quality Assurance FAQS Qualification Card - Weapon Quality Assurance A key element for the Department's Technical Qualification Programs is a set of common Functional Area Qualification Standards (FAQS) and associated Job Task Analyses (JTA). These standards are developed for various functional areas of responsibility in the Department, including oversight of safety management programs identified as hazard controls in Documented Safety Analyses (DSA). For each functional area, the FAQS identify the minimum technical competencies and supporting knowledge and skills for a typical qualified individual working in the area. FAQC-WeaponQualityAssurance.docx Description Weapon Quality Assurance Qualification Card More Documents & Publications DOE-STD-1025-2008

345

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing August 22, 1958 Washington, DC Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing

346

Molecular Interactions of Plutonium(VI) with Synthetic Manganese-Substituted Goethite  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

E. , Thesis, Reactions of Plutonium(VI) with the Iron Oxideof Uranium, Neptunium, Plutonium, Americium and Technetium;Molecular Interactions of Plutonium(VI) with Synthetic

Hu, Yung-Jin

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

347

Quantifying structural damage from self-irradiation in a plutonium superconductor  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

was presented as part of Plutonium Futures - The Science: Atopical Confer- ence on Plutonium and Actinide, Asilomar,in loading one of the plutonium samples. This work was

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

348

Reaction of Plutonium(VI) with the Manganese-Substituted Iron Oxide Mineral Goethite  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Plutonium(VI) Sorption on Manganese-SubstitutedX-ray Beam-Induced Chemistry on Plutonium Sorbed on Variousof Plutonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159 v E Anion

Hu, Yung-Jin Hu

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

349

Structural Characterization of and Plutonium Sorption on Mesoporous and Nanoparticulate Ferrihydrite  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

2.2.1 Plutonium Redox Chemistry . . . . . . . . .2.5 Plutonium Measurement with Liquid Scintillation CountingChemistry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9.4 Plutonium Uptake

Brogan, Luna Kestrel Schwaiger

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

350

ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of “points ” highlighting the strategic-political and militarytechnical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and foster further nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The safety and environmental problems related to the operation of largescale fusion facilities such as ITER (which contain massive amounts of hazardous and/or radioactive materials such as tritium, lithium, and beryllium, as well as neutron-activated structural materials) are not addressed in this paper.

André Gsponer; Jean-pierre Hurni

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

351

VOLATILE FLUORIDE PROCESS FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM OTHER MATERIALS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

The separation of plutonium from uranium and/or fission products by formation of the higher fluorides off uranium and/or plutonium is described. Neutronirradiated uranium metal is first converted to the hydride. This hydrided product is then treated with fluorine at about 315 deg C to form and volatilize UF/sub 6/ leaving plutonium behind. Thc plutonium may then be separated by reacting the residue with fluorine at about 5004DEC and collecting the volatile plutonium fluoride thus formed.

Spedding, F.H.; Newton, A.S.

1959-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

352

VOLATILE FLUORIDE PROCESS FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM FROM OTHER MATERIALS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

The separation of plutonium from uranium and/or tission products by formation of the higher fluorides of uranium and/or plutonium is discussed. Neutronirradiated uranium metal is first convcrted to the hydride. This hydrided product is then treatced with fluorine at about 315 deg C to form and volatilize UF/sup 6/ leaving plutonium behind. The plutonium may then be separated by reacting the residue with fluorine at about 500 deg C and collecting the volatile plutonium fluoride thus formed.

Spedding, F.H.; Newton, A.S.

1959-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

353

Effects of nuclear weapons. Third edition  

SciTech Connect

Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

Glasstone, S.; Dolan, P.J.

1977-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

354

Weapons test seismic investigations at Yucca Mountain  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Yucca Mountain, located on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site, is being characterized as part of an ongoing effort to identify a potential high-level nuclear waste repository. This site will be subjected to seismic ground motions induced by underground nuclear explosions. A knowledge of expected ground motion levels from these tests will enable the designers to provide for the necessary structural support in the designs of the various components of the repository. The primary objective of the Weapons Test Seismic Investigation project is to develop a method to predict the ground motions expected at the repository site as a result of future weapons tests. This paper summarizes the data base presently assembled for the Yucca Mountain Project, characteristics of expected ground motions, and characterization of the two-dimensional seismic properties along paths between Yucca Mountain and the testing areas of the Nevada Test Site.

Phillips, J.S.; Shephard, L.E.; Walck, M.C.

1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

355

Defense programs: A Sandia weapon review bulletin  

SciTech Connect

Sandia`s mission to explore technology that enhances US nuclear weapons capabilities has been the primary impetus for the development of a class of inertial measurement units not available commercially. The newest member of the family is the Ring Laser Gyro Assembly. The product of a five-year joint effort by Sandia and Honeywell`s Space and Strategic Systems Operation, the RLGA is a small, one-nautical-mile-per-hour-class inertial measurement unit that consumes only 16 watts - attributes that are important to a guidance and control capability for new or existing weapons. These same attributes led the Central Inertial Guidance Test Facility at Holloman Air Force Base to select the RLGA for their newest test instrumentation pod. The RLGA sensor assembly is composed of three Honeywell ring laser gyroscopes and three Sundstrand Data Control accelerometers that are selected from three types according to the user`s acceleration range and accuracy needs.

Floyd, H.L.; Goetsch, B.; Doran, L. [eds.

1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

356

Characterization of past and present solid waste streams from the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

During the next two decades the transuranic wastes, now stored in the burial trenches and storage facilities at the Hanford Site, are to be retrieved, processed at the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility, and shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal. Over 7% of the transuranic waste to be retrieved for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant has been generated at the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant. The purpose of this report is to characterize the radioactive solid wastes generated by PUREX using process knowledge, existing records, and oral history interviews. The PUREX Plant is currently operated by the Westinghouse Hanford Company for the US Department of Energy and is now in standby status while being prepared for permanent shutdown. The PUREX Plant is a collection of facilities that has been used primarily to separate plutonium for nuclear weapons from spent fuel that had been irradiated in the Hanford Site`s defense reactors. Originally designed to reprocess aluminum-clad uranium fuel, the plant was modified to reprocess zirconium alloy clad fuel elements from the Hanford Site`s N Reactor. PUREX has provided plutonium for research reactor development, safety programs, and defense. In addition, the PUREX was used to recover slightly enriched uranium for recycling into fuel for use in reactors that generate electricity and plutonium. Section 2.0 provides further details of the PUREX`s physical plant and its operations. The PUREX Plant functions that generate solid waste are as follows: processing operations, laboratory analyses and supporting activities. The types and estimated quantities of waste resulting from these activities are discussed in detail.

Pottmeyer, J.A.; Weyns, M.I.; Lorenzo, D.S.; Vejvoda, E.J. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc., NM (US); Duncan, D.R. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (US)

1993-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

357

SEPARATION OF URANIUM, PLUTONIUM AND FISSION PRODUCTS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

The separation of uranium and plutonium from neutronirradiated uranium is described. The neutron-irradiated uranium is dissolved in nitric acid to provide an aqueous solution 3N in nitric acid. The fission products of the solution are extruded by treating the solution with dibutyl carbitol substantially 1.8N in nitric acid. The organic solvent phase is separated and neutralized with ammonium hydroxide and the plutonium reduced with hydroxylamine base to the trivalent state. Treatment of the mixture with saturated ammonium nitrate extracts the reduced plutonium and leaves the uranium in the organic solvent.

Nicholls, C.M.; Wells, I.; Spence, R.

1959-10-13T23:59:59.000Z

358

The Chemical Weapons Convention -- Legal issues  

SciTech Connect

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the US system of constitutional law. Its promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world`s arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by US business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the US consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the SU through a federal implementing statute.

1997-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

359

The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.

Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

360

PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM FLUORIDE FROM BISMUTH PHOSPHATE PRECIPITATE CONTAINING PLUTONIUM VALUES  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is given for separating plutonium from fission products present on a bismuth phosphate carrier. The dried carrier is first treated with hydrogen fluoride at between 500 and 600 deg C whereby some fission product fluorides volatilize away from plutonium tetrafluoride, and nonvolatile fission product fluorides are formed then with anhydrous fluorine at between 400 and 500 deg C. Bismuth and plutonium distill in the form of volatile fluorides away from the nonvolatile fission product fluorides. The bismuth and plutonium fluorides are condensed at below 290 deg C.

Brown, H.S.; Bohlmann, E.G.

1961-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


361

Plutonium Processing Plant Deactivated | National Nuclear Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Processing Plant Deactivated | National Nuclear Security Processing Plant Deactivated | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Plutonium Processing Plant Deactivated Plutonium Processing Plant Deactivated June 20, 1997 Hanford, WA Plutonium Processing Plant Deactivated The Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility (PUREX), the largest of the

362

Plutonium Processing Plant Deactivated | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Processing Plant Deactivated | National Nuclear Security Processing Plant Deactivated | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Plutonium Processing Plant Deactivated Plutonium Processing Plant Deactivated June 20, 1997 Hanford, WA Plutonium Processing Plant Deactivated The Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility (PUREX), the largest of the

363

Sweden Plutonium Removal | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Sweden Plutonium Removal | National Nuclear Security Administration Sweden Plutonium Removal | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > content > Four-Year Plan > Sweden Plutonium Removal Sweden Plutonium Removal Location Sweden United States 62° 24' 4.4136" N, 15° 22' 51.096" E See map: Google Maps Printer-friendly version Printer-friendly version

364

Plutonium less mysterious with nuclear magnetic resonance  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Plutonium less mysterious with nuclear magnetic resonance Plutonium less mysterious with nuclear magnetic resonance Plutonium less mysterious with nuclear magnetic resonance For more than 50 years, chemists and physicists have been searching for the plutonium-239 magnetic resonance signal. May 21, 2012 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials.

365

Determination of plutonium in human urine  

SciTech Connect

Report is made of chemical procedures for determination of plutonium in human urine. The procedures are provided in outline form and statistical methods are provided for interpretation of the results.

Langham, W.H.

1947-08-14T23:59:59.000Z

366

Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Change Notice No. 1. and Reaffirmation January 2007 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585...

367

Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1145-2013 March 2013 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy TRNG-0061 Washington, D.C. 20585...

368

Reclamation of plutonium from pyrochemical processing residues  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Savannah River Laboratory (SRL), Savannah River Plant (SRP), and Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) have jointly developed a process to recover plutonium from molten salt extraction residues. These NaCl, KCL, and MgCl/sub 2/ residues, which are generated in the pyrochemical extraction of /sup 241/Am from aged plutonium metal, contain up to 25 wt % dissolved plutonium and up to 2 wt % americium. The overall objective was to develop a process to convert these residues to a pure plutonium metal product and discardable waste. To meet this objective a combination of pyrochemical and aqueous unit operations was used. The first step was to scrub the salt residue with a molten metal (aluminum and magnesium) to form a heterogeneous ''scrub alloy'' containing nominally 25 wt % plutonium. This unit operation, performed at RFP, effectively separated the actinides from the bulk of the chloride salts. After packaging in aluminum cans, the ''scrub alloy'' was then dissolved in a nitric acid - hydrofluoric acid - mercuric nitrate solution at SRP. Residual chloride was separated from the dissolver solution by precipitation with Hg/sub 2/(NO/sub 3/)/sub 2/ followed by centrifuging. Plutonium was then separated from the aluminum, americium and magnesium using the Purex solvent extraction system. The /sup 241/Am was diverted to the waste tank farm, but could be recovered if desired.

Gray, L.W.; Gray, J.H.; Holcomb, H.P.; Chostner, D.F.

1987-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

369

Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report  

SciTech Connect

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE`s independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91.

Not Available

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

370

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities. This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues More Documents & Publications Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 00-03: Specific Issues on Applicability of

371

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities. This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues More Documents & Publications Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 00-03: Specific Issues on Applicability of

372

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities.This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues More Documents & Publications Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 00-03: Specific Issues on Applicability of

373

PROCESS OF FORMING PLUOTONIUM SALTS FROM PLUTONIUM EXALATES  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is presented for converting plutonium oxalate to other plutonium compounds by a dry conversion method. According to the process, lower valence plutonium oxalate is heated in the presence of a vapor of a volatile non- oxygenated monobasic acid, such as HCl or HF. For example, in order to produce plutonium chloride, the pure plutonium oxalate is heated to about 700 deg C in a slow stream of hydrogen plus HCl. By the proper selection of an oxidizing or reducing atmosphere, the plutonium halide product can be obtained in either the plus 3 or plus 4 valence state.

Garner, C.S.

1959-02-24T23:59:59.000Z

374

SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM FROM URANIUM AND FISSION PRODUCTS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A chromatographic adsorption process is presented for the separation of plutonium from other fission products formed by the irradiation of uranium. The plutonium and the lighter element fission products are adsorbed on a sulfonated phenol-formaldehyde resin bed from a nitric acid solution containing the dissolved uranium. Successive washes of sulfuric, phosphoric, and nitric acids remove the bulk of the fission products, then an eluate of dilute phosphoric and nitric acids removes the remaining plutonium and fission products. The plutonium is selectively removed by passing this solution through zirconium phosphate, from which the plutonium is dissolved with nitric acid. This process provides a convenient and efficient means for isolating plutonium.

Boyd, G.E.; Adamson, A.W.; Schubert, J.; Russell, E.R.

1958-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

375

DOE battery program for weapon applications  

SciTech Connect

This report discusses the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Battery program which originates from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and involves activities ranging from research, design and development to testing, consulting and production support. The primary customer is the DOE/Office of Defense Programs, although work is also done for various Department of Defense agencies and their contractors. The majority of the SNL activities involve thermal battery (TB) and lithium ambient temperature battery (LAMB)technologies. Smaller efforts are underway in the areas of silver oxide/zinc and nickel oxide/cadmium batteries as well as double layer capacitors.

Clark, R.P.; Baldwin, A.R.

1992-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

376

DOE battery program for weapon applications  

SciTech Connect

This report discusses the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Battery program which originates from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and involves activities ranging from research, design and development to testing, consulting and production support. The primary customer is the DOE/Office of Defense Programs, although work is also done for various Department of Defense agencies and their contractors. The majority of the SNL activities involve thermal battery (TB) and lithium ambient temperature battery (LAMB)technologies. Smaller efforts are underway in the areas of silver oxide/zinc and nickel oxide/cadmium batteries as well as double layer capacitors.

Clark, R.P.; Baldwin, A.R.

1992-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

377

EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support 137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri SUMMARY This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of the proposal to renovate an existing building at the U.S. Department of Energy Kansas City Plant to accommodate equipment, security and environmental controls, and building restoration upon project completion, including disposal of equipment and wastes. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES None available at this time. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD December 21, 1995 EA-1137: Finding of No Significant Impact Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas

378

National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Workers National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers Third Radiation Effects Research Foundation Board of Councilors Meeting Held in Hiroshima...

379

EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Act of 1988. The following case examples are provided to help illustrate how PAAA NTS reporting interfaces with nuclear weapon program NCR processes: Example 1: A reservoir...

380

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01, Nuclear Weapon Program...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Act of 1988. The following case examples are provided to help illustrate how PAAA NTS reporting interfaces with nuclear weapon program NCR processes: Example 1: A reservoir...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


381

Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Participants in Sandia's Weapon Intern Program recently visited and toured NNSA's Kansas City Plant. The program, established in 1998, was created to meet Sandia's changing mission...

382

DOE O 452.8, Control of Nuclear Weapon Data  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

The directive establishes the policy, process and procedures for control of nuclear weapon data to ensure that dissemination of the information is restricted ...

2011-07-21T23:59:59.000Z

383

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Engineering Sciences October 12-14, 2011, Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Understanding and Reducing...

384

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear...

385

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the...

386

DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives "DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship" FOR...

387

Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

388

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

389

Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

390

Method for Plutonium-Gallium Separation by Anodic Dissolution of a Solid Plutonium-Gallium Alloy  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Purified plutonium and gallium are efficiently recovered from a solid plutonium-gallium (Pu-Ga) alloy by using an electrorefining process. The solid Pu-Ga alloy is the cell anode, preferably placed in a moving basket within the electrolyte. As the surface of the Pu-Ga anode is depleted in plutonium by the electrotransport of the plutonium to a cathode, the temperature of the electrolyte is sufficient to liquify the surface, preferably at about 500 C, resulting in a liquid anode layer substantially comprised of gallium. The gallium drips from the liquified surface and is collected below the anode within the electrochemical cell. The transported plutonium is collected on the cathode surface and is recovered.

Miller, William E.; Tomczuk, Zygmunt

1998-12-08T23:59:59.000Z

391

Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

08 08 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 7 / Tuesday, January 11, 2000 / Notices 1 A nuclear weapon component. 2 A physical blend of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide. Staff Attorney, Entergy Power Marketing Corp., 10055 Grogan's Mill Road, Suite 500, The Woodlands, TX 77380. Comments on Solutions' request to export should be clearly marked with Docket EA-155-A. Additional copies are to be filed directly with: Richard Staines, Consolidated Edison Solutions, Inc., 701 Westchester Avenue, Suite 320E, White Plaines, NY 10604; and Steven J. Ross, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036. Comments on DETM's request to export should be clearly marked with Docket EA-163-A. Additional copies are to be filed directly with: Kris Errickson, Legal/Regulatory

392

A Proposed Methodology For The Analysis And Selection Of Alternatives For The Disposition Of Surplus Plutonium  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

A Proposed Methodology for the Analysis and Selection of Alternatives for the Disposition of Surplus Plutonium The nuclear states are currently involved in the development of comprehensive approaches to the long-term storage and management of fissile materials. A major objective of this effort is to provide a framework for prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The evaluation should include non-proliferation, economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The ANRCP has proposed that an evaluation of alternatives be guided by the principles of decision analysis, a logical and formal approach to the solution of complicated problems that are too complex to solve informally. This approach would consist of four steps: 1) identification of alternatives and objectives, 2) estimation of the performance of the alternatives with respect to the objectives, 3) development of values and weights for the objectives, and 4) evaluation of ...

James S. Dyer; James S; John C. Butler; Jianmin Jia; Thomas Edmunds

1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

393

S A V A N N A H R I V E R S I T E  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Site (SRS) is the principal location for U.S. ef- Site (SRS) is the principal location for U.S. ef- forts to dispose of surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium and weap- on-grade plutonium by peaceful use as commercial nuclear fuel. To dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, NNSA is constructing three facilities at SRS. The Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Fa- cility will fabricate surplus U.S. weapon-grade plutonium into MOX fuel, which will be irradiated in commercial power reactors. Once irradiated, the plutonium can no longer be readily used for nuclear weapons. This critical facility, along with the associated Waste Solidification Building (WSB) and a pit disassembly and conversion ( ) capability also planned to be built at SRS, are essential to U.S. plans to consolidate and dispose of surplus U.S. weapon-grade plutonium. Once operations commence, it is estimated that this

394

Associate Directorate of Plutonium Science and Manufacturing Workforce Development Program  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Associate Directorate of Plutonium Science and Manufacturing Workforce Development Program Issue No elements address workforce challenges faced by a Pu Enterprise Environment with a focus on Pu Sustainment. The Plutonium Science & Manufacturing Summer Student Program (PSMSSP) supports the Laboratory's need

395

NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative Completes First Plutonium...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

was the first shipment of plutonium to the United States under this program. Over 3 kilograms of plutonium was removed and included Swedish, UK, and U.S. origin material stemming...

396

The design and evaluation of an international plutonium storage system  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

To address the proliferation risk of separated plutonium, a technical and institutional design of an international plutonium storage system (IPSS) is presented. The IPSS is evaluated from two perspectives: its ability to ...

Bae, Eugene

2001-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

397

The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944-2009 | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944-2009 The United States has released an inventory of its plutonium balances from 1944 through 2009. The document serves as an update...

398

Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering & Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone & Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested services. The procurement process included the environmental review specified in DOE's NEPA regulations in 10 CFR 1021.216. The six reactors selected are Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in South Carolina McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in North Carolina, and North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 in Virginia. The Supplement describes the potential environmental impacts of using MOX fuel in these six specific reactors named in the DCS proposal as well as other program changes made since the SPD Draft EIS was published.

N /A

1999-05-14T23:59:59.000Z

399

Commercial Grade Dedication RM  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The objective of this Standard Review Plan (SRP) on Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) is to provide guidance for a uniform review of the CGD activities for office of Environmental Management...

400

Plutonium Chemistry in the UREX+ Separation Processes  

SciTech Connect

The project "Plutonium Chemistry in the UREX+ Separation Processes” is led by Dr. Alena Paulenova of Oregon State University under collaboration with Dr. George Vandegrift of ANL and Dr. Ken Czerwinski of the University of Nevada at Las Vegas. The objective of the project is to examine the chemical speciation of plutonium in UREX+ (uranium/tributylphosphate) extraction processes for advanced fuel technology. Researchers will analyze the change in speciation using existing thermodynamics and kinetic computer codes to examine the speciation of plutonium in aqueous and organic phases. They will examine the different oxidation states of plutonium to find the relative distribution between the aqueous and organic phases under various conditions such as different concentrations of nitric acid, total nitrates, or actinide ions. They will also utilize techniques such as X-ray absorbance spectroscopy and small-angle neutron scattering for determining plutonium and uranium speciation in all separation stages. The project started in April 2005 and is scheduled for completion in March 2008.

ALena Paulenova; George F. Vandegrift, III; Kenneth R. Czerwinski

2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


401

Design features for decontamination in new plutonium facilities  

SciTech Connect

Specific features for preventing, containing, controlling, and removing contamination in the Plutonium Recovery and Waste Treatment Facility are outlined. (LK)

Freiberg, K.J.; Haynes, C.G.

1975-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

402

Plutonium metal and alloy preparation by molten chloride reduction  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Satisfactory reduction of molten plutonium trichloride (pure and in combination with 20 wt % sodium chloride) by calcium, lanthanum, and cerium has been demonstrated on the 10-g scale. The yields were satisfactory for this scale of operation, and it is indicated that these reductions may be useful for large-scale operations. Significant separations of plutonium from rare earth impurities was demonstrated for lanthanum and cerium reductions. Preparation of plutonium-cerium and plutonium-cerium-cobalt alloys during reduction was also demonstrated.

Reavis, J.G.

1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

403

COLUMBIC OXIDE ADSORPTION PROCESS FOR SEPARATING URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM IONS  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is described for separating plutonium ions from a solution of neutron irradiated uranium in which columbic oxide is used as an adsorbert. According to the invention the plutonium ion is selectively adsorbed by Passing a solution containing the plutonium in a valence state not higher than 4 through a porous bed or column of granules of hydrated columbic oxide. The adsorbed plutonium is then desorbed by elution with 3 N nitric acid.

Beaton, R.H.

1959-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

404

U.S. and Russia Sign Plutonium Disposition Agreement | National...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Plutonium Disposition Agreement | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

405

PROCESS OF ELIMINATING HYDROGEN PEROXIDE IN SOLUTIONS CONTAINING PLUTONIUM VALUES  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A procedure is given for peroxide precipitation processes for separating and recovering plutonium values contained in an aqueous solution. When plutonium peroxide is precipitated from an aqueous solution, the supernatant contains appreciable quantities of plutonium and peroxide. It is desirable to process this solution further to recover plutonium contained therein, but the presence of the peroxide introduces difficulties; residual hydrogen peroxide contained in the supernatant solution is eliminated by adding a nitrite or a sulfite to this solution.

Barrick, J.G.; Fries, B.A.

1960-09-27T23:59:59.000Z

406

Independent Activity Report, Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant- May 2012  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

Criticality Safety Information Meeting for the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant [HIAR-RL-2012-05-14

407

Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort.

Travelli, A.; Gaines, L.L.; Minkov, V.; Olson, A.P.; Snelgrove, J.

1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

408

Plutonium Isotopic Measurements by Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy  

SciTech Connect

The nondestructive assay of plutonium is important as a safeguard tool in accounting for stategic nuclear material. Several nondestructive assay techniques, e.g., calorimetry and spontaneous fission assay detectors, require a knowledge of plutonium and americium isotopic ratios to convert their raw data to total grams of plutonium. This paper describes a nondestructive technique for calculating plutonium-238, plutonium-240, plutonium-241 and americium-241 relative to plutonium-239 from measured peak areas in the high resolution gamma-ray spectra of solid plutonium samples. Gamma-ray attenuation effects have been minimized by selecting sets of neighboring peaks in the spectrum whose components are due to the different isotopes. Since the detector efficiencies are approximately the same for adjacent peaks, the accuracy of the isotopic ratios are dependent on the half-lives, branching intensities and measured peak areas. The data presented describes the results obtained by analyzing gamma-ray spectra in the energy region from 120 to 700 keV. The majority of the data analyzed was obtained from plutonium material containing 6% plutonium-240. Sample weights varied from 0.25 g to approximately 1.2 kg. The methods have also been applied to plutonium samples containing up to 23% plutonium-240 with weights of 0.25 to 200g. Results obtained by gamma-ray spectroscopy are compared to chemical analyses of aliquots taken from the bulk samples.

Haas, Francis X.; Lemming, John F.

1976-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

409

Separation Of Uranium And Plutonium Isotopes For Measurement By Multi Collector Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectroscopy  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) isotopes in coral soils, contaminated by nuclear weapons testing in the northern Marshall Islands, were isolated by ion-exchange chromatography and analyzed by mass spectrometry. The soil samples were spiked with {sup 233}U and {sup 242}Pu tracers, dissolved in minerals acids, and U and Pu isotopes isolated and purified on commercially available ion-exchange columns. The ion-exchange technique employed a TEVA{reg_sign} column coupled to a UTEVA{reg_sign} column. U and Pu isotope fractions were then further isolated using separate elution schemes, and the purified fractions containing U and Pu isotopes analyzed sequentially using multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer (MCICP-MS). High precision measurements of {sup 234}U/{sup 235}U, {sup 238}U/{sup 235}U, {sup 236}U/{sup 235}U, and {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu in soil samples were attained using the described methodology and instrumentation, and provide a basis for conducting more detailed assessments of the behavior and transfer of uranium and plutonium in the environment.

Martinelli, R E; Hamilton, T F; Williams, R W; Kehl, S R

2009-03-29T23:59:59.000Z

410

2nd Annual Los Alamos Plutonium Metal Standard Exchange Workshop : "preliminary" results  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Rocky Flats Plutonium (Pu) Metal Sample Exchange program was conducted to insure the quality and intercomparability of measurements such as Pu assay, Pu isotopics, and impurity analyses. This program was discontinued in 1989 after more than 30 years. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has reestablished the Pu metal exchange program. During the first year, five DOE facilities, Argonne East, Argonne West, Livermore, Los Alamos, and New Brunswick Laboratory, Savannah River and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)' at Aldermaston are participating in the program. Plutonium metal samples are being prepared and distributed to the various sites primarily for destructive measurements for elemental concentration, isotopic abundance, and both metallic and nonmetallic impurity levels. The program is intended to provide independent verification of analytical measurement capability for each participating facility and to allow problems to be identified. Significants achievements in FY02 will be described. Results from category 1 elements and comparisons with Rocky Flats standards exchange metal historical data will also be presented. The roles and responsibilities of LANL and the external laboratories have been defined.

Tandon, L. (Lav); Slemmons, A. K. (Alice K.)

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

411

Independent verification of plutonium decontamination on Johnston Atoll (1992--1996)  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Field Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency (FCDSWA) (formerly FCDNA) contracted Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Environmental Technology Section (ETS) to conduct an independent verification (IV) of the Johnston Atoll (JA) Plutonium Decontamination Project by an interagency agreement with the US Department of Energy in 1992. The main island is contaminated with the transuranic elements plutonium and americium, and soil decontamination activities have been ongoing since 1984. FCDSWA has selected a remedy that employs a system of sorting contaminated particles from the coral/soil matrix, allowing uncontaminated soil to be reused. The objective of IV is to evaluate the effectiveness of remedial action. The IV contractor`s task is to determine whether the remedial action contractor has effectively reduced contamination to levels within established criteria and whether the supporting documentation describing the remedial action is adequate. ORNL conducted four interrelated tasks from 1992 through 1996 to accomplish the IV mission. This document is a compilation and summary of those activities, in addition to a comprehensive review of the history of the project.

Wilson-Nichols, M.J.; Wilson, J.E.; McDowell-Boyer, L.M.; Davidson, J.R.; Egidi, P.V.; Coleman, R.L.

1998-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

412

Investigations to site a radioactive waste repository in Cumbria: Evidence against proceeding to MRWS Stage 4  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

. This includes, for the first time, UK HLW, spent fuel, and plutonium; in addition a successful GDF would consume plutonium, and convert this to non-weapons grade. If successful, a modification to the reactor design can be reconfigured to burn plutonium as a fuel, completely eliminating the need for its disposal

413

Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP Posted By Office of Public Affairs Participants in Sandia's Weapon Intern Program recently visited and

414

Method for dissolving delta-phase plutonium  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process for dissolving plutonium, and in particular, delta-phase plutonium. The process includes heating a mixture of nitric acid, hydroxylammonium nitrate and potassium fluoride (HAN) to a temperature between 40 and 70 C, then immersing the metal in the mixture. Preferably, the nitric acid has a concentration of not ore than 2M, the HAN approximately 0.66M, and the potassium fluoride 1M. Additionally, a small amount of sulfamic acid, such as 0.1M can be added to assure stability of the HAN in the presence of nitric acid. The oxide layer that forms on plutonium metal may be removed with a non-oxidizing acid as a pre-treatment step.

Karraker, D.G.

1992-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

415

Alternating layers of plutonium and lead or indium as surrogate for plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Elemental plutonium (Pu) assumes more crystal structures than other elements, plausibly due to bonding f electrons becoming non-bonding. Complex geometries hamper understanding of the transition in Pu, but calculations predict this transition in a system with simpler geometry: alternating layers either of plutonium and lead or of plutonium and indium. Here the transition occurs via a pairing-up of atoms within Pu layers. Calculations stepping through this pairing-up reveal valuable details of the transition, for example that the transition from bonding to non-bonding proceeds smoothly.

Rudin, Sven Peter [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

416

A Methodology for the Analysis and Selection of Alternative for the Disposition of Surplus Plutonium  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Department of Energy (DOE) - Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) has announced a Record of Decision (ROD) selecting alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to further U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns that were addressed include economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses supporting the ROD are documented in three DOE reports [DOE-TSR 96, DOE-PEIS 96, and DOE-NN 97, respectively]. At the request of OFMD, a team of analysts from the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) provided an independent evaluation of the alternatives for plutonium that were considered during the evaluation effort. This report outlines the methodology used by the ANRCP team. This methodology, referred to as multiattribute utility theory (MAU), provides a structure for assembling results of detailed technical, economic, schedule, environment, and nonproliferation analyses for OFMD, DOE policy makers, other stakeholders, and the general public in a systematic way. The MAU methodology has been supported for use in similar situations by the National Research Council, an agency of the National Academy of Sciences.1 It is important to emphasize that the MAU process does not lead to a computerized model that actually determines the decision for a complex problem. MAU is a management tool that is one component, albeit a key component, of a decision process. We subscribe to the philosophy that the result of using models should be insights, not numbers. The MAU approach consists of four steps: (1) identification of alternatives, objectives, and performance measures, (2) estimation of the performance of the alternatives with respect to the objectives, (3) development of value functions and weights for the objectives, and (4) evaluation of the alternatives and sensitivity analysis. These steps are described below.

NONE

1999-08-31T23:59:59.000Z

417

Nuclear weapons issues in South Asia  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report discusses how the US can play a productive mediating role in South Asia by engaging India and Pakistan in an international forum to manage nuclear weapons, as Edward Teller advocated. India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear capabilities because they fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten the US. The appropriate response for the US, therefore, is diplomatic engagement and negotiations. In addition to the international approach, encouragement and facilitation of regional and bilateral interactions will also be important. Formal arms control agreements have been reached, but less formal confidence-building measures, and unilateral security pledges may well be combined to form a more secure strategic environment in South Asia than a nuclear armed confrontation across the porous South Asian border.

Joeck, N.

1993-07-02T23:59:59.000Z

418

REVIEW OF PLUTONIUM OXIDATION LITERATURE  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A brief review of plutonium oxidation literature was conducted. The purpose of the review was to ascertain the effect of oxidation conditions on oxide morphology to support the design and operation of the PDCF direct metal oxidation (DMO) furnace. The interest in the review was due to a new furnace design that resulted in oxide characteristics that are different than those of the original furnace. Very little of the published literature is directly relevant to the DMO furnace operation, which makes assimilation of the literature data with operating conditions and data a convoluted task. The oxidation behavior can be distilled into three regimes, a low temperature regime (RT to 350 C) with a relatively slow oxidation rate that is influenced by moisture, a moderate temperature regime (350-450 C) that is temperature dependent and relies on more or less conventional oxidation growth of a partially protective oxide scale, and high temperature oxidation (> 500 C) where the metal autocatalytically combusts and oxidizes. The particle sizes obtained from these three regimes vary with the finest being from the lowest temperature. It is surmised that the slow growth rate permits significant stress levels to be achieved that help break up the oxides. The intermediate temperatures result in a fairly compact scale that is partially protective and that grows to critical thickness prior to fracturing. The growth rate in this regime may be parabolic or paralinear, depending on the oxidation time and consequently the oxide thickness. The high temperature oxidation is invariant in quiescent or nearly quiescent conditions due to gas blanketing while it accelerates with temperature under flowing conditions. The oxide morphology will generally consist of fine particles ( 250 {micro}m). The particle size ratio is expected to be < 5%, 25%, and 70% for fine, medium and large particles, respectively, for metal temperatures in the 500-600 C range.

Korinko, P.

2009-11-12T23:59:59.000Z

419

REVIEW OF PLUTONIUM OXIDATION LITERATURE  

SciTech Connect

A brief review of plutonium oxidation literature was conducted. The purpose of the review was to ascertain the effect of oxidation conditions on oxide morphology to support the design and operation of the PDCF direct metal oxidation (DMO) furnace. The interest in the review was due to a new furnace design that resulted in oxide characteristics that are different than those of the original furnace. Very little of the published literature is directly relevant to the DMO furnace operation, which makes assimilation of the literature data with operating conditions and data a convoluted task. The oxidation behavior can be distilled into three regimes, a low temperature regime (RT to 350 C) with a relatively slow oxidation rate that is influenced by moisture, a moderate temperature regime (350-450 C) that is temperature dependent and relies on more or less conventional oxidation growth of a partially protective oxide scale, and high temperature oxidation (> 500 C) where the metal autocatalytically combusts and oxidizes. The particle sizes obtained from these three regimes vary with the finest being from the lowest temperature. It is surmised that the slow growth rate permits significant stress levels to be achieved that help break up the oxides. The intermediate temperatures result in a fairly compact scale that is partially protective and that grows to critical thickness prior to fracturing. The growth rate in this regime may be parabolic or paralinear, depending on the oxidation time and consequently the oxide thickness. The high temperature oxidation is invariant in quiescent or nearly quiescent conditions due to gas blanketing while it accelerates with temperature under flowing conditions. The oxide morphology will generally consist of fine particles (<15 {micro}m), moderately sized particles (15 < x < 250 {micro}m) and large particles (> 250 {micro}m). The particle size ratio is expected to be < 5%, 25%, and 70% for fine, medium and large particles, respectively, for metal temperatures in the 500-600 C range.

Korinko, P.

2009-11-12T23:59:59.000Z

420

Preserving Nuclear Grade Knowledge  

SciTech Connect

When people think of the government they think of the President, or Congress, or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but there are thousands of people in government-related jobs doing things most don’t really notice everyday. You can find them everywhere, from the space science folks at NASA, to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) watching out for the bad guys. There are Rangers, and Social Workers, Nurses and Agricultural Managers. They are people working to keep the many facets of the USA rolling. One very diverse bunch is The Department of Energy (DOE) , a group who is expanding the ways we make and save energy to power our cars, homes, and businesses. Tucked away under the DOE is the National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA is an agency that maintains the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. It works to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction. It provides the U.S. Navy with safe nuclear propulsion, and it responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad, and it supports efforts in science and technology*. (* DOE/NNSA/KCP website info)

Lange, Bob

2008-02-05T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


421

Dehydration of plutonium or neptunium trichloride hydrate  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A process is described for preparing anhydrous actinide metal trichlorides of plutonium or neptunium by reacting an aqueous solution of an actinide metal trichloride selected from the group consisting of plutonium trichloride or neptunium trichloride with a reducing agent capable of converting the actinide metal from an oxidation state of +4 to +3 in a resultant solution, evaporating essentially all the solvent from the resultant solution to yield an actinide trichloride hydrate material, dehydrating the actinide trichloride hydrate material by heating the material in admixture with excess thionyl chloride, and recovering anhydrous actinide trichloride.

Foropoulos, J. Jr.; Avens, L.R.; Trujillo, E.A.

1992-03-24T23:59:59.000Z

422

The future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. nuclear weapons policy .  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??This thesis addresses the viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT for short – in light of U.S. nuclear weapons… (more)

Claussen, Bjřrn Ragnar

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

423

First Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested | National Nuclear Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested | National Nuclear Security Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > First Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested First Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested July 16, 1945 Los Alamos, NM First Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested

424

First Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested | National Nuclear Security Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > First Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested First Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested July 16, 1945 Los Alamos, NM First Plutonium Bomb Successfully Tested

425

SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM FROM LANTHANUM BY CHELATION-EXTRACTION  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

Plutonium can be separated from a mixture of plutonlum and lanthanum in which the lanthanum to plutonium molal ratio ls at least five by adding the ammonium salt of N-nitrosoarylhydroxylamine to an aqueous solution having a pH between about 3 and 0.2 and containing the plutonium in a valence state of at least +3, to form a plutonium chelate compound of N-nitrosoarylhydroxylamine. The plutonium chelate compound may be recovered from the solution by extracting with an immiscible organic solvent such as chloroform.

James, R.A.; Thompson, S.G.

1958-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

426

Assessment of the risk of transporting plutonium oxide and liquid plutonium nitrate by truck  

SciTech Connect

A methodology for assessing the risk in transporting radioactive materials and the results of the initial application of the methodology to shipment of plutonium by truck are presented. (LK)

1975-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

427

Determining Plutonium Mass in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay Techniques -- Preliminary Modeling Results Emphasizing Integration among Techniques  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

LBNL- Determining Plutonium Mass in Spent Fuel withSwinhoe. “Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent FuelS. Tobin, “Measurement of Plutonium in Spent Nuclear Fuel by

Tobin, S. J.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

428

Low-level detection and quantification of Plutonium(III, IV, V, and VI) using a liquid core waveguide  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

R. , Determination of Plutonium Oxidation States at TraceThe Absorption Spectra of Plutonium Ions in Perchloric Acidor company? Yes/No Plutonium Futures – The Science

Wilson, Richard E.; Hu, Yung-Jin; Nitsche, Heino

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

429

Upgrading Below Grade Spaces  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Patrick H. Huelman, Sam Breidenbach, Steve Schirber Patrick H. Huelman, Sam Breidenbach, Steve Schirber NorthernSTAR Building America Partnership Upgrading Below Grade Spaces Residential Energy Efficiency Stakeholder March 1, 2012 Austin, TX * Act 1: Technical Challenges & Opportunities - Pat Huelman, University of Minnesota * Act 2: Assessing Homeowner Priorities & Risks - Sam Breidenbach, TDS Custom Construction * Act 3: An Industry Perspective - Steve Schirber, Cocoon Act 1. Upgrade Below Grade * Basement Remodeling: It Doesn't Get Any Riskier! - Combustion safety - Foundation moisture - Radon (& other soil gases) - Biologicals (mold, dust mites, etc.) - Garage gases (if attached) * And front and center are uncontrolled... - negative pressures in basements (beyond stack)

430

Manhattan Project: More Piles and Plutonium, 1942  

Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

"Met Lab" alumni at the University of Chicago -- Fermi is on the far left of the front row; Zinn is on Fermi's left; Anderson is on the far right of the front row; and Szilard is over Anderson's right shoulder. MORE PILES AND PLUTONIUM "Met Lab" alumni at the University of Chicago -- Fermi is on the far left of the front row; Zinn is on Fermi's left; Anderson is on the far right of the front row; and Szilard is over Anderson's right shoulder. MORE PILES AND PLUTONIUM (1942) Events > Difficult Choices, 1942 More Uranium Research, 1942 More Piles and Plutonium, 1942 Enter the Army, 1942 Groves and the MED, 1942 Picking Horses, November 1942 Final Approval to Build the Bomb, December 1942 At the University of Chicago, meanwhile, Arthur Compton had consolidated most fission research at his new Metallurgical Laboratory(Met Lab). Compton decided to combine all pile research by stages. He continued to fund Enrico Fermi's pile research at Columbia University, while Fermi began preparations to move his work to Chicago. Funding continued as well for the theoretical work of Eugene Wigner at Princeton and of J. Robert Oppenheimer at the University of California, Berkeley. Compton also appointed Leo Szilard head of materials acquisition and arranged for Glenn T. Seaborg to move his plutonium work from Berkeley to Chicago in April 1942.

431

Plutonium Management in the Medium Term  

SciTech Connect

For many years various countries with access to commercial reprocessing services have been routinely recycling plutonium as UO{sub 2}/PuO{sub 2} mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in light water reactors (LWRs). This LWR MOX recycle strategy is still widely regarded as an interim step leading to the eventual establishment of sustainable fast reactor fuel cycles. The OECD/NEA Working Party on the Physics of Plutonium Fuels and Innovative Fuel Cycles (WPPR) has recently completed a review of the technical options for plutonium management in what it refers to as the 'medium term'. For the purpose of the review, the WPPR considers the medium term to cover the period from now up to the point at which fast reactor fuel cycles are established on a commercial scale. The review identified a number of different designs of innovative plutonium fuel assemblies intended to be used in current LWR cores, in LWRs with significantly different moderation properties, as well as in high-temperature gas reactors. The full review report describes these various options and highlights their respective advantages and disadvantages. This paper briefly summarizes the main findings of the review.

Hesketh, Kevin [BNFL Nuclear Sciences and Technology Services (United Kingdom); Schlosser, Gerhard; Porsch, Dieter F. [Framatome ANP (France); Wolf, Timm [Framatome ANP (France); Koeberl, Oliver [CEA Cadarache (France); Lance, Benoit [Belgonucleaire (Belgium); Chawla, Rakesh [Paul Scherrer Institut (Switzerland); Gehin, Jess C. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (United States); Ellis, Ron [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (United States); Uchikawa, Sadao [Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (Japan); Sato, Osamu [Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (Japan); Okubo, Tsutomu [Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (Japan); Mineo, Hideaki [Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (Japan); Yamamoto, Toru [Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation (Japan); Sagayama, Yutaka [Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (Japan); Sartori, Enrico [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (France)

2004-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

432

RECOVERY OF PLUTONIUM BY CARRIER PRECIPITATION  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

The recovery of plutonium from an aqueous nitric acid Zr-containing solution of 0.2 to 1N acidity is accomplished by adding fluoride anions (1.5 to 5 mg/l), and precipitating the Pu with an excess of H/sub 2/0/sub 2/ at 53 to 65 deg C. (AEC)

Goeckermann, R.H.

1961-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

433

Studies on persons exposed to plutonium  

SciTech Connect

The results of four studies of persons exposed, or potentially exposed, to plutonium are summarized. The studies are: a five-year update on clinical examinations and health experience of 26 Manhattan District workers heavily exposed at Los Alamos in 1944 to 1945; a 30-year mortality follow-up of 224 white male workers with plutonium body burdens of 10 nCi or more; a review of cancer mortality rates between 1950 and 1969 among Los Alamos County, New Mexico, male residents, all of whom have worked in or have lived within a few kilometers of a major plutonium plant and other nuclear facilities; and a review of cancer incidence rates between 1969 and 1974 in male residents of Los Alamos County. No excess of mortality due to any cause was observed in the 224 male subjects with the highest plutonium exposures at Los Alamos. Clinical examinations of the Manhattan District workers, whose average age in 1976 was 56 years, show them to be active persons with diseases that are not unusual for their ages. The two deaths in this group over the past 30 years have not been due to cancer. Mortality and incidence data indicate no excess of lung cancer in Los Alamos County males.

Voelz, G.L.; Stebbings, J.H.; Hempelmann, L.H.; Haxton, L.K.; York, D.A.

1978-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

434

NNSS Soils Monitoring: Plutonium Valley (CAU366)  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nevada Site Office (NSO), Environmental Restoration Soils Activity has authorized the Desert Research Institute (DRI) to conduct field assessments of potential sediment transport of contaminated soil from Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites Contamination Area (CA) during precipitation runoff events.

Miller Julianne J.,Mizell Steve A.,Nikolich George, Campbell Scott

2012-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

435

PLUTONIUM PURIFICATION PROCESS EMPLOYING THORIUM PYROPHOSPHATE CARRIER  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

The separation and purification of plutonium from the radioactive elements of lower atomic weight is described. The process of this invention comprises forming a 0.5 to 2 M aqueous acidffc solution containing plutonium fons in the tetravalent state and elements with which it is normally contaminated in neutron irradiated uranium, treating the solution with a double thorium compound and a soluble pyrophosphate compound (Na/sub 4/P/sub 2/O/sub 7/) whereby a carrier precipitate of thorium A method is presented of reducing neptunium and - trite is advantageous since it destroys any hydrazine f so that they can be removed from solutions in which they are contained is described. In the carrier precipitation process for the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products including zirconium and columbium, the precipitated blsmuth phosphate carries some zirconium, columbium, and uranium impurities. According to the invention such impurities can be complexed and removed by dissolving the contaminated carrier precipitate in 10M nitric acid, followed by addition of fluosilicic acid to about 1M, diluting the solution to about 1M in nitric acid, and then adding phosphoric acid to re-precipitate bismuth phosphate carrying plutonium.

King, E.L.

1959-04-28T23:59:59.000Z

436

EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy 18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel SUMMARY This study analyzes the potential environmental impacts of adopting a policy to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. In particular, the study examines the comparative impacts of several alternative approaches to managing the spent fuel. The analysis demonstrates that the impacts on the environmental, workers and the general public of implementing any of the alternative management approaches would be small and within applicable Federal and state regulator limits. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES

437

Macroencapsulation Equivalency Guidance for Classified Weapon Components and NNSSWAC Compliance  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex has a surplus of classified legacy weapon components generated over the years with no direct path for disposal. The majority of the components have been held for uncertainty of future use or no identified method of sanitization or disposal. As more weapons are retired, there is an increasing need to reduce the amount of components currently in storage or on hold. A process is currently underway to disposition and dispose of the legacy/retired weapons components across the DOE complex.

Poling, J.

2012-05-15T23:59:59.000Z

438

A Note on the Reaction of Hydrogen and Plutonium  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

Plutonium hydride has many practical and experimental purposes. The reaction of plutonium and hydrogen has interesting characteristics, which will be explored in the following analysis. Plutonium is a radioactive actinide metal that emits alpha particles. When plutonium metal is exposed to air, the plutonium oxides and hydrides, and the volume increases. PuH{sub 2} and Pu{sub 2}O{sub 3} are the products. Hydrogen is a catalyst for plutonium's corrosion in air. The reaction can take place at room temperature because it is fairly insensitive to temperature. Plutonium hydride, or PuH{sub 2}, is black and metallic. After PuH{sub 2} is formed, it quickly flakes off and burns. The reaction of hydrogen and plutonium is described as pyrophoric because the product will spontaneously ignite when oxygen is present. This tendency must be considered in the storage of metal plutonium. The reaction is characterized as reversible and nonstoichiometric. The reaction goes as such: Pu + H{sub 2} {yields} PuH{sub 2}. When PuH{sub 2} is formed, the hydrogen/plutonium ratio is between 2 and 2.75 (approximately). As more hydrogen is added to the system, the ratio increases. When the ratio exceeds 2.75, PuH{sub 3} begins to form along with PuH{sub 2}. Once the ratio surpasses 2.9, only PuH{sub 3} remains. The volume of the plutonium sample increases because of the added hydrogen and the change in crystal structure which the sample undergoes. As more hydrogen is added to a system of metal plutonium, the crystal structure evolves. Plutonium has a crystal structure classified as monoclinic. A monoclinic crystal structure appears to be a rectangular prism. When plutonium reacts with hydrogen, the product PuH{sub 2}, becomes a fluorite structure. It can also be described as a face centered cubic structure. PuH{sub 3} forms a hexagonal crystal structure. As plutonium evolves from metal plutonium to plutonium hydride to plutonium trihydride, the crystal structure evolves from monoclinic to fluorite to hexagonal. This change in crystal structure as a result of adding hydrogen is a shared characteristic with other actinide elements. Americium is isostructural with plutonium because they both form cubic dihyrides and hexagonal trihydrides. Reacting hydrogen with plutonium has the practical application of separating plutonium from other materials that don't react as well with hydrogen. When plutonium is placed in a chamber where there is very little oxygen, it can react with hydrogen without igniting. The hydrogen plutonium reaction can then be reversed, thus regaining the separated plutonium. Another application of this reaction is that it can be used to predict how plutonium reacts with other substances. Deuterium and tritium are two isotopes of hydrogen that are of interest. They are known to react likewise to hydrogen because they have similar properties. The reaction of plutonium and isotopes of hydrogen can prove to be very informative.

Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-08-15T23:59:59.000Z

439

Source options for nuclear weapons identification system  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report briefly presents the advantages and disadvantages of two timed sources of neutrons that can be used with the source-driven noise analysis method: (1) {sup 252}Cf in an ionization chamber and (2) an associated-particle sealed tube neutron generator (APSTNG). These sources can be used with frequency and time analysis methods for nuclear weapons identification, quality assurance in production, special nuclear materials assay, criticality safety, and provision of measured data for verification of neutron and gamma ray transport calculational methods. The advantages of {sup 252}Cf for a nuclear materials identification system are that it is simple, reliable, and small and that all source events are detected. The disadvantages are that it cannot be turned off, leads to small radiation doses in handling, and produces more than one neutron per fission event. The advantages of APSTNG are that it is directional, can be turned off, and has one particle per deuterium-tritium reaction. The disadvantages are that it is large and complicated compared to {sup 252}Cf.

Mihalczo, J.T.; Koehler, P.E.; Valentine, T.E.; Phillips, L.D.

1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

440

Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Nuclear weapons are developed, produced, and maintained in the stockpile, and then retired and dismantled. This sequence of events is known as the

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "weapons grade plutonium" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


441

DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Wildlife Refuge DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Wildlife Refuge July 12, 2007 - 2:54pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced the transfer of nearly 4,000 acres of its former Rocky Flats nuclear weapons production site to the Department of the Interior's (DOI) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for use as a National Wildlife Refuge. After more than a decade of environmental cleanup work, the transfer creates the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge, 16 miles northwest of Denver, Colorado, and marks completion of the regulatory milestones to transform a formerly contaminated site into an environmental asset. "The Department of Energy's environmental cleanup of the Rocky Flats

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EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

7: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support 7: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant Kansas City, Missouri EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant Kansas City, Missouri SUMMARY This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of the proposal to renovate an existing building at the U.S. Department of Energy Kansas City Plant to accommodate equipment, security and environmental controls, and building restoration upon project completion, including disposal of equipment and wastes. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES None available at this time. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD December 21, 1995 EA-1137: Finding of No Significant Impact Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant Kansas City, Missouri

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CRAD, Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Facility CRAD, Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Facility April 2004 A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Configuration Management program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Weapons Facility. CRADs provide a recommended approach and the types of information to gather to assess elements of a DOE contractor's programs. CRAD, Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Facility More Documents & Publications CRAD, Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST

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Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas sampling Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas sampling Nondestructive laser welding process far less expensive, no underground testing. June 8, 2012 Nondestructive Laser Gas Sampling Nondestructive Laser Gas Sampling is expected to save several million dollars per year and requires no underground testing. "We're continually innovating and working to improve the way we do business, and NDLGS is a big step for us," said National Nuclear Security Administration Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Don Cook. New weapons assessment technology engineered: nondestructive laser welding process far less expensive, no underground testing Valveless Laser Processing

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Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing July 03, 1993 Washington, DC

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Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

located in closed cities. In some cases, these industrial sites are the size of small cities and contain hundreds of metric tons of highly attractive weapons-usable nu