National Library of Energy BETA

Sample records for usive pra ctices

  1. PRA and Risk Informed Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bernsen, Sidney A.; Simonen, Fredric A.; Balkey, Kenneth R.

    2006-01-01

    The Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC) of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) has introduced a risk based approach into Section XI that covers Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components. The risk based approach requires application of the probabilistic risk assessments (PRA). Because no industry consensus standard existed for PRAs, ASME has developed a standard to evaluate the quality level of an available PRA needed to support a given risk based application. The paper describes the PRA standard, Section XI application of PRAs, and plans for broader applications of PRAs to other ASME nuclear codes and standards. The paper addresses several specific topics of interest to Section XI. Important consideration are special methods (surrogate components) used to overcome the lack of PRA treatments of passive components in PRAs. The approach allows calculations of conditional core damage probabilities both for component failures that cause initiating events and failures in standby systems that decrease the availability of these systems. The paper relates the explicit risk based methods of the new Section XI code cases to the implicit consideration of risk used in the development of Section XI. Other topics include the needed interactions of ISI engineers, plant operating staff, PRA specialists, and members of expert panels that review the risk based programs.

  2. Linkage of PRA models. Phase 1, Results

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, C.L.; Knudsen, J.K.; Kelly, D.L.

    1995-12-01

    The goal of the Phase I work of the ``Linkage of PRA Models`` project was to postulate methods of providing guidance for US Nuclear Regulator Commission (NRC) personnel on the selection and usage of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models that are best suited to the analysis they are performing. In particular, methods and associated features are provided for (a) the selection of an appropriate PRA model for a particular analysis, (b) complementary evaluation tools for the analysis, and (c) a PRA model cross-referencing method. As part of this work, three areas adjoining ``linking`` analyses to PRA models were investigated: (a) the PRA models that are currently available, (b) the various types of analyses that are performed within the NRC, and (c) the difficulty in trying to provide a ``generic`` classification scheme to groups plants based upon a particular plant attribute.

  3. Probabilistic risk assessment course documentation. Volume 1: PRA fundamentals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Breeding, R J; Leahy, T J; Young, J

    1985-08-01

    The full range of PRA topics is presented, with a special emphasis on systems analysis and PRA applications. Systems analysis topics include system modeling such as fault tree and event tree construction, failure rate data, and human Reliability. The discussion of PRA applications is centered on past and present PRA based programs, such as WASH-1400 and the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program, as well as on some of the potential future applications of PRA. The relationship of PRA to generic safety issues such as station blackout and Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) is also discussed. In addition to system modeling, the major PRA tasks of accident process analysis, and consequence analysis are presented. An explanation of the results of these activities, and the techniques by which these results are derived, forms the basis for a discussion of these topics. An additional topic which is presented in this course is the topic of PRA management, organization, and evaluation. 84 figs., 41 tabs.

  4. Performance & Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Performance & Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP) Technical Exchanges Performance & Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP) Technical Exchanges PA CoP has ...

  5. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA): status report and guidance for regulatory application. Draft report for comment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    none,

    1984-02-01

    This document describes the current status of the methodologies used in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and provides guidance for the application of the results of PRAs to the nuclear reactor regulatory process. The PRA studies that have been completed or are underway are reviewed. The levels of maturity of the methodologies used in a PRA are discussed. Insights derived from PRAs are listed. The potential uses of PRA results for regulatory purposes are discussed.

  6. Advanced Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Demonstration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Curtis Smith; Steven Prescott; Tony Koonce

    2014-04-01

    A key area of the Advanced Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) strategy is the development of methodologies and tools that will be used to predict the safety, security, safeguards, performance, and deployment viability of SMRs. The goal of the SMR PRA activity will be to develop quantitative methods and tools and the associated analysis framework for assessing a variety of risks. Development and implementation of SMR-focused safety assessment methods may require new analytic methods or adaptation of traditional methods to the advanced design and operational features of SMRs. We will need to move beyond the current limitations such as static, logic-based models in order to provide more integrated, scenario-based models based upon predictive modeling which are tied to causal factors. The development of SMR-specific safety models for margin determination will provide a safety case that describes potential accidents, design options (including postulated controls), and supports licensing activities by providing a technical basis for the safety envelope. This report documents the progress that was made to implement the PRA framework, specifically by way of demonstration of an advanced 3D approach to representing, quantifying and understanding flooding risks to a nuclear power plant.

  7. DYNAMIC AND CLASSICAL PRA: A BWR SBO CASE COMPARISON

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mandelli, Diego; Smith, Curtis L; Ma, Zhegang

    2011-07-01

    As part of the Light-Water Sustainability Program (LWRS), the purpose of the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) Pathway research and development is to support plant decisions for risk-informed margin management with the aim to improve economics, reliability, and sustain the safety of current NPPs. In this paper, we describe the RISMC analysis process illustrating how mechanistic (i.e., dynamic system simulators) and probabilistic (stochastic sampling strategies) approaches are combined in a dynamic PRA fashion in order to estimate safety margins. We use the scenario of a station blackout (SBO) wherein offsite power and onsite power are lost, thereby causing a challenge to plant safety systems. We describe the RISMC approach, illustrate the station blackout modeling, and compare this with traditional risk analysis modeling for this type of accident scenario. In the RISMC approach the dataset obtained consists of set of simulation runs (performed by using codes such as RELAP5/3D) where timing and ordering of events is changed accordingly to the stochastic sampling strategy adopted. On the other side, classical PRA methods, which are based on event-tree (FT) and fault-tree (FT) structures, generate minimal cut sets and probability values associated to each ET branch. The comparison of the classical and RISMC approaches is performed not only in terms of overall core damage probability but also considering statistical differences in the actual sequence of events. The outcome of this comparison analysis shows similarities and dissimilarities between the approaches but also highlights the greater amount of information that can be generated by using the RISMC approach.

  8. Level 1 Tornado PRA for the High Flux Beam Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bozoki, G.E.; Conrad, C.S.

    1994-05-01

    This report describes a risk analysis primarily directed at providing an estimate for the frequency of tornado induced damage to the core of the High Flux Beam Reactor (HFBR), and thus it constitutes a Level 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) covering tornado induced accident sequences. The basic methodology of the risk analysis was to develop a ``tornado specific`` plant logic model that integrates the internal random hardware failures with failures caused externally by the tornado strike and includes operator errors worsened by the tornado modified environment. The tornado hazard frequency, as well as earlier prepared structural and equipment fragility data, were used as input data to the model. To keep modeling/calculational complexity as simple as reasonable a ``bounding`` type, slightly conservative, approach was applied. By a thorough screening process a single dominant initiating event was selected as a representative initiator, defined as: ``Tornado Induced Loss of Offsite Power.`` The frequency of this initiator was determined to be 6.37E-5/year. The safety response of the HFBR facility resulted in a total Conditional Core Damage Probability of .621. Thus, the point estimate of the HFBR`s Tornado Induced Core Damage Frequency (CDF) was found to be: (CDF){sub Tornado} = 3.96E-5/year. This value represents only 7.8% of the internal CDF and thus is considered to be a small contribution to the overall facility risk expressed in terms of total Core Damage Frequency. In addition to providing the estimate of (CDF){sub Tornado}, the report documents, the relative importance of various tornado induced system, component, and operator failures that contribute most to (CDF){sub Tornado}.

  9. Methodology and application of surrogate plant PRA analysis to the Rancho Seco Power Plant: Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gore, B.F.; Huenefeld, J.C.

    1987-07-01

    This report presents the development and the first application of generic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) information for identifying systems and components important to public risk at nuclear power plants lacking plant-specific PRAs. A methodology is presented for using the results of PRAs for similar (surrogate) plants, along with plant-specific information about the plant of interest and the surrogate plants, to infer important failure modes for systems of the plant of interest. This methodology, and the rationale on which it is based, is presented in the context of its application to the Rancho Seco plant. The Rancho Seco plant has been analyzed using PRA information from two surrogate plants. This analysis has been used to guide development of considerable plant-specific information about Rancho Seco systems and components important to minimizing public risk, which is also presented herein.

  10. Advanced Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Technical Exchange Meeting

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Curtis Smith

    2013-09-01

    During FY13, the INL developed an advanced SMR PRA framework which has been described in the report Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Detailed Technical Framework Specification, INL/EXT-13-28974 (April 2013). In this framework, the various areas are considered: Probabilistic models to provide information specific to advanced SMRs Representation of specific SMR design issues such as having co-located modules and passive safety features Use of modern open-source and readily available analysis methods Internal and external events resulting in impacts to safety All-hazards considerations Methods to support the identification of design vulnerabilities Mechanistic and probabilistic data needs to support modeling and tools In order to describe this framework more fully and obtain feedback on the proposed approaches, the INL hosted a technical exchange meeting during August 2013. This report describes the outcomes of that meeting.

  11. Development of a methodology for conducting an integrated HRA/PRA --

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Luckas, W.J.; Barriere, M.T.; Brown, W.S. ); Wreathall, J. and Co., Dublin, OH ); Cooper, S.E. )

    1993-01-01

    During Low Power and Shutdown (LP S) conditions in a nuclear power plant (i.e., when the reactor is subcritical or at less than 10--15% power), human interactions with the plant's systems will be more frequent and more direct. Control is typically not mediated by automation, and there are fewer protective systems available. Therefore, an assessment of LP S related risk should include a greater emphasis on human reliability than such an assessment made for power operation conditions. In order to properly account for the increase in human interaction and thus be able to perform a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) applicable to operations during LP S, it is important that a comprehensive human reliability assessment (HRA) methodology be developed and integrated into the LP S PRA. The tasks comprising the comprehensive HRA methodology development are as follows: (1) identification of the human reliability related influences and associated human actions during LP S, (2) identification of potentially important LP S related human actions and appropriate HRA framework and quantification methods, and (3) incorporation and coordination of methodology development with other integrated PRA/HRA efforts. This paper describes the first task, i.e., the assessment of human reliability influences and any associated human actions during LP S conditions for a pressurized water reactor (PWR).

  12. RAVEN: a GUI and an Artificial Intelligence Engine in a Dynamic PRA Framework

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C. Rabiti; D. Mandelli; A. Alfonsi; J. Cogliati; R. Kinoshita; D. Gaston; R. Martineau; C. Curtis

    2013-06-01

    Increases in computational power and pressure for more accurate simulations and estimations of accident scenario consequences are driving the need for Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [1] of very complex models. While more sophisticated algorithms and computational power address the back end of this challenge, the front end is still handled by engineers that need to extract meaningful information from the large amount of data and build these complex models. Compounding this problem is the difficulty in knowledge transfer and retention, and the increasing speed of software development. The above-described issues would have negatively impacted deployment of the new high fidelity plant simulator RELAP-7 (Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program) at Idaho National Laboratory. Therefore, RAVEN that was initially focused to be the plant controller for RELAP-7 will help mitigate future RELAP-7 software engineering risks. In order to accomplish this task, Reactor Analysis and Virtual Control Environment (RAVEN) has been designed to provide an easy to use Graphical User Interface (GUI) for building plant models and to leverage artificial intelligence algorithms in order to reduce computational time, improve results, and help the user to identify the behavioral pattern of the Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). In this paper we will present the GUI implementation and its current capability status. We will also introduce the support vector machine algorithms and show our evaluation of their potentiality in increasing the accuracy and reducing the computational costs of PRA analysis. In this evaluation we will refer to preliminary studies performed under the Risk Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMC) project of the Light Water Reactors Sustainability (LWRS) campaign [3]. RISMC simulation needs and algorithm testing are currently used as a guidance to prioritize RAVEN developments relevant to PRA.

  13. EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA guide for nuclear power facilities. Volume 1, summary and overview.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    2004-09-01

    This report documents state-of-the-art methods, tools, and data for the conduct of a fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for a commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) application. The methods have been developed under the Fire Risk Re-quantification Study. This study was conducted as a joint activity between EPRI and the U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) under the terms of an EPRI/RES Memorandum of Understanding [RS.1] and an accompanying Fire Research Addendum [RS.2]. Industry participants supported demonstration analyses and provided peer review of this methodology. The documented methods are intended to support future applications of Fire PRA, including risk-informed regulatory applications. The documented method reflects state-of-the-art fire risk analysis approaches. The primary objective of the Fire Risk Study was to consolidate recent research and development activities into a single state-of-the-art fire PRA analysis methodology. Methodological issues raised in past fire risk analyses, including the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) fire analyses, have been addressed to the extent allowed by the current state-of-the-art and the overall project scope. Methodological debates were resolved through a consensus process between experts representing both EPRI and RES. The consensus process included a provision whereby each major party (EPRI and RES) could maintain differing technical positions if consensus could not be reached. No cases were encountered where this provision was invoked. While the primary objective of the project was to consolidate existing state-of-the-art methods, in many areas, the newly documented methods represent a significant advancement over previously documented methods. In several areas, this project has, in fact, developed new methods and approaches. Such advances typically relate to areas of past methodological debate.

  14. Comparing Simulation Results with Traditional PRA Model on a Boiling Water Reactor Station Blackout Case Study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zhegang Ma; Diego Mandelli; Curtis Smith

    2011-07-01

    A previous study used RELAP and RAVEN to conduct a boiling water reactor station black-out (SBO) case study in a simulation based environment to show the capabilities of the risk-informed safety margin characterization methodology. This report compares the RELAP/RAVEN simulation results with traditional PRA model results. The RELAP/RAVEN simulation run results were reviewed for their input parameters and output results. The input parameters for each simulation run include various timing information such as diesel generator or offsite power recovery time, Safety Relief Valve stuck open time, High Pressure Core Injection or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling fail to run time, extended core cooling operation time, depressurization delay time, and firewater injection time. The output results include the maximum fuel clad temperature, the outcome, and the simulation end time. A traditional SBO PRA model in this report contains four event trees that are linked together with the transferring feature in SAPHIRE software. Unlike the usual Level 1 PRA quantification process in which only core damage sequences are quantified, this report quantifies all SBO sequences, whether they are core damage sequences or success (i.e., non core damage) sequences, in order to provide a full comparison with the simulation results. Three different approaches were used to solve event tree top events and quantify the SBO sequences: W process flag, default process flag without proper adjustment, and default process flag with adjustment to account for the success branch probabilities. Without post-processing, the first two approaches yield incorrect results with a total conditional probability greater than 1.0. The last approach accounts for the success branch probabilities and provides correct conditional sequence probabilities that are to be used for comparison. To better compare the results from the PRA model and the simulation runs, a simplified SBO event tree was developed with only four top events and eighteen SBO sequences (versus fifty-four SBO sequences in the original SBO model). The estimated SBO sequence conditional probabilities from the original SBO model were integrated to the corresponding sequences in the simplified SBO event tree. These results were then compared with the simulation run results.

  15. Calculation of Fire Severity Factors and Fire Non-Suppression Probabilities For A DOE Facility Fire PRA

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tom Elicson; Bentley Harwood; Jim Bouchard; Heather Lucek

    2011-03-01

    Over a 12 month period, a fire PRA was developed for a DOE facility using the NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI/NRC fire PRA methodology. The fire PRA modeling included calculation of fire severity factors (SFs) and fire non-suppression probabilities (PNS) for each safe shutdown (SSD) component considered in the fire PRA model. The SFs were developed by performing detailed fire modeling through a combination of CFAST fire zone model calculations and Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS). Component damage times and automatic fire suppression system actuation times calculated in the CFAST LHS analyses were then input to a time-dependent model of fire non-suppression probability. The fire non-suppression probability model is based on the modeling approach outlined in NUREG/CR-6850 and is supplemented with plant specific data. This paper presents the methodology used in the DOE facility fire PRA for modeling fire-induced SSD component failures and includes discussions of modeling techniques for: • Development of time-dependent fire heat release rate profiles (required as input to CFAST), • Calculation of fire severity factors based on CFAST detailed fire modeling, and • Calculation of fire non-suppression probabilities.

  16. Application of the NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI/NRC Fire PRA Methodology to a DOE Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tom Elicson; Bentley Harwood; Richard Yorg; Heather Lucek; Jim Bouchard; Ray Jukkola; Duan Phan

    2011-03-01

    The application NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI/NRC fire PRA methodology to DOE facility presented several challenges. This paper documents the process and discusses several insights gained during development of the fire PRA. A brief review of the tasks performed is provided with particular focus on the following: • Tasks 5 and 14: Fire-induced risk model and fire risk quantification. A key lesson learned was to begin model development and quantification as early as possible in the project using screening values and simplified modeling if necessary. • Tasks 3 and 9: Fire PRA cable selection and detailed circuit failure analysis. In retrospect, it would have been beneficial to perform the model development and quantification in 2 phases with detailed circuit analysis applied during phase 2. This would have allowed for development of a robust model and quantification earlier in the project and would have provided insights into where to focus the detailed circuit analysis efforts. • Tasks 8 and 11: Scoping fire modeling and detailed fire modeling. More focus should be placed on detailed fire modeling and less focus on scoping fire modeling. This was the approach taken for the fire PRA. • Task 14: Fire risk quantification. Typically, multiple safe shutdown (SSD) components fail during a given fire scenario. Therefore dependent failure analysis is critical to obtaining a meaningful fire risk quantification. Dependent failure analysis for the fire PRA presented several challenges which will be discussed in the full paper.

  17. Review results of a BWR standard plant PRA and an assessment of potential benefits from design modifications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shiu, K.; Hanan, N.; Rubin, M.

    1985-01-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has participated in the review of the GESSAR II Standard Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). One major objective of this review was to utilize the PRA as a tool for investigation of the relative benefits available for incorporation of various proposed modifications to the baseline design. This paper presents the findings of the BNL review and assessment of the impact upon core damage frequency from two suggested design modifications. This work was restricted to consideration of interal events only. Review results indicated that the point estimate core damage frequency of the GESSAR II plant is equal to 2.2 x 10/sup -5//reactor-year for a plant site located within the Mid-Atlantic Area Council Grid (MAAC) and 3.8 x 10/sup -5//reactor-year if the national average loss of offsite power initiator frequency is used.

  18. Development of a methodology for conducting an integrated HRA/PRA --. Task 1, An assessment of human reliability influences during LP&S conditions PWRs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Luckas, W.J.; Barriere, M.T.; Brown, W.S.; Wreathall, J.; Cooper, S.E.

    1993-06-01

    During Low Power and Shutdown (LP&S) conditions in a nuclear power plant (i.e., when the reactor is subcritical or at less than 10--15% power), human interactions with the plant`s systems will be more frequent and more direct. Control is typically not mediated by automation, and there are fewer protective systems available. Therefore, an assessment of LP&S related risk should include a greater emphasis on human reliability than such an assessment made for power operation conditions. In order to properly account for the increase in human interaction and thus be able to perform a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) applicable to operations during LP&S, it is important that a comprehensive human reliability assessment (HRA) methodology be developed and integrated into the LP&S PRA. The tasks comprising the comprehensive HRA methodology development are as follows: (1) identification of the human reliability related influences and associated human actions during LP&S, (2) identification of potentially important LP&S related human actions and appropriate HRA framework and quantification methods, and (3) incorporation and coordination of methodology development with other integrated PRA/HRA efforts. This paper describes the first task, i.e., the assessment of human reliability influences and any associated human actions during LP&S conditions for a pressurized water reactor (PWR).

  19. FOIA-PRA Doc.pdf

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

  20. Loss of spent fuel pool cooling PRA: Model and results

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Siu, N.; Khericha, S.; Conroy, S.; Beck, S.; Blackman, H.

    1996-09-01

    This letter report documents models for quantifying the likelihood of loss of spent fuel pool cooling; models for identifying post-boiling scenarios that lead to core damage; qualitative and quantitative results generated for a selected plant that account for plant design and operational practices; a comparison of these results and those generated from earlier studies; and a review of available data on spent fuel pool accidents. The results of this study show that for a representative two-unit boiling water reactor, the annual probability of spent fuel pool boiling is 5 {times} 10{sup {minus}5} and the annual probability of flooding associated with loss of spent fuel pool cooling scenarios is 1 {times} 10{sup {minus}3}. Qualitative arguments are provided to show that the likelihood of core damage due to spent fuel pool boiling accidents is low for most US commercial nuclear power plants. It is also shown that, depending on the design characteristics of a given plant, the likelihood of either: (a) core damage due to spent fuel pool-associated flooding, or (b) spent fuel damage due to pool dryout, may not be negligible.

  1. Microsoft Word - 2015-05-20 PRA CoP Webinar Agenda

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Proposed Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for 10 CFR Part 61 (Christopher Grossman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Time will be allotted for questions and...

  2. U.S. NRC CONFIRMATORY LEVEL 1 PRA SUCCESS CRITERIA ACTIVITIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Donald Helton; Hossein Esmaili; Robert Buell

    2011-03-01

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s standardized plant analysis risk (SPAR) models are used to support a number of risk-informed initiatives. The fidelity and realism of these models are ensured through a number of processes including cross-comparison with industry models, review and use by a wide range of technical experts, and confirmatory analysis. This paper will describe a key activity in the latter arena. Specifically, this paper will describe MELCOR analyses performed to augment the technical basis for confirming or modifying specific success criteria of interest. The analyses that will be summarized provide the basis for confirming or changing success criteria in a specific 3-loop pressurized-water reactor and a Mark-I boiling-water reactor. Initiators that have been analyzed include loss-of-coolant accidents, loss of main feedwater, spontaneous steam generator tube rupture, inadvertent opening of a relief valve at power, and station blackout. For each initiator, specific aspects of the accident evolution are investigated via a targeted set of calculations (3 to 22 distinct accident analyses per initiator). Further evaluation is ongoing to extend the analyses’ conclusions to similar plants (where appropriate), with consideration of design and modeling differences on a scenario-by-scenario basis. This paper will also describe future plans.

  3. Performance & Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    (e.g., cribs and trenches); 4) in-situ decontamination and decommissioning; 5) soil and groundwater remediation; and 6) management of disposal facilities (e.g., land-fills ...

  4. Upcoming P&RA CoP Activities | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Craig Benson, Dean of School of Engineering and Applied Science, and Janet Scott Hamilton and John Downman Hamilton Professor, Univ. of Virginia), scheduled for May 16, 2016, ...

  5. Performance & Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP)

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Performance assessments (PAs) and risk assessments (RAs) evaluate the impact of a proposed remedial action on human health and the environment, and provide a demonstration of compliance and important technical inputs to meet regulatory requirements for: 1) waste form development and implementation; 2) tank closure activities; 3) waste site closure activities (e.g., cribs and trenches); 4) in-situ decontamination and decommissioning; 5) soil and groundwater remediation; and 6) management of disposal facilities (e.g., land-fills or near surface disposal facilities). The PAs and RAs or P&RAs become public documents upon completion. As such, the Department of Energy (DOE) needs to ensure that P&RAs continue to be performed and documented consistently and to high standards.

  6. Microsoft Word - PRA CoP Techncial Exchange Draft Agenda 2015...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Building 10:30 am - 11:15 pm Approaches for Uncertainty Quantification and Sensitivity Analysis, Dr. Matt Kozak (INTERA) 11:15 am - 12:00 pm Use of Performance and Risk...

  7. P&RA CoP TE Mtg Attendees.xlsx

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    EM 74 Humphries, Ginger SRNS 75 Krenzien, Susan Navarro 76 Mallick, Pramod DOE EM 77 Moore, Beth DOE EM 78 Parks, Leah 79 Proehl, Gerhard IAEA 80 Richards, Jon EPA Region 4 81...

  8. Microsoft PowerPoint - P&RA CoP EPA optimization Biggs final...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    ... Optimization Events...? * RIFS Reports * Decision documents * Design basis ... Army Environmental Command, http:aec.army.mil * U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer Center, ...

  9. Microsoft Word - P&RA CoP Techncial Exchange Final Agenda

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Agenda Interagency Steering Committee on Performance and Risk Assessment Community of Practice Annual Technical Exchange Meeting December 15 and 16, 2015 Washington State ...

  10. P&RA CoP TE Mtg Attendees List _2014-12-23.xlsx

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AgencyCompany Affliation 1 George Alexander NRC 2 Alaa Aly INTERA 3 Bob Andrews INTERA 4 Cynthia Barr NRC 5 Debbie Barr DOE LM 6 Craig Benson University of Wisconsin-Madison 7 ...

  11. A methodology for generating dynamic accident progression event trees for level-2 PRA

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hakobyan, A.; Denning, R.; Aldemir, T. [Ohio State Univ., Nuclear Engineering Program, 650 Ackerman Road, Columbus, OH 43202 (United States); Dunagan, S.; Kunsman, D. [Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM 87185 (United States)

    2006-07-01

    Currently, the development and analysis of Accident Progression Event Trees (APETs) are performed in a manner that is computationally time consuming, difficult to reproduce and also can be phenomenologically inconsistent. A software tool (ADAPT) is described for automated APET generation using the concept of dynamic event trees. The tool determines the branching times from a severe accident analysis code based on user specified criteria for branching. It assigns user specified probabilities to every branch, tracks the total branch probability, and truncates branches based on the given pruning/truncation rules to avoid an unmanageable number of scenarios. While the software tool could be applied to any systems analysis code, the MELCOR code is used for this illustration. A case study is presented involving station blackout with the loss of auxiliary feedwater system for a pressurized water reactor. (authors)

  12. Validation and verification plan for safety and PRA codes. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ades, M.J.; Crowe, R.D.; Toffer, H.

    1991-04-01

    This report discusses a verification and validation (V&V) plan for computer codes used for safety analysis and probabilistic risk assessment calculations. The present plan fulfills the commitments by Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) to the Department of Energy Savannah River Office (DOE-SRO) to bring the essential safety analysis and probabilistic risk assessment codes in compliance with verification and validation requirements.

  13. Comparison of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for Fuel Cycle Facilities, 2/17/11

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    During the 580th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), February10-12, 2011, we reviewed the staff’s white paper, “A Comparison of Integrated Safety Analysisand...

  14. Analyzing simulation-based PRA data through traditional and topological clustering: A BWR station blackout case study

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Maljovec, D.; Liu, S.; Wang, B.; Mandelli, D.; Bremer, P. -T.; Pascucci, V.; Smith, C.

    2015-07-14

    Here, dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) methodologies couple system simulator codes (e.g., RELAP and MELCOR) with simulation controller codes (e.g., RAVEN and ADAPT). Whereas system simulator codes model system dynamics deterministically, simulation controller codes introduce both deterministic (e.g., system control logic and operating procedures) and stochastic (e.g., component failures and parameter uncertainties) elements into the simulation. Typically, a DPRA is performed by sampling values of a set of parameters and simulating the system behavior for that specific set of parameter values. For complex systems, a major challenge in using DPRA methodologies is to analyze the large number of scenarios generated,more » where clustering techniques are typically employed to better organize and interpret the data. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of two nuclear simulation datasets that are part of the risk-informed safety margin characterization (RISMC) boiling water reactor (BWR) station blackout (SBO) case study. We provide the domain experts a software tool that encodes traditional and topological clustering techniques within an interactive analysis and visualization environment, for understanding the structures of such high-dimensional nuclear simulation datasets. We demonstrate through our case study that both types of clustering techniques complement each other for enhanced structural understanding of the data.« less

  15. Status Updates on the Performance and Risk Assessment Community...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Practice (P&RA CoP) Status Updates on the Performance and Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP) Ming Zhu, Ph.D., PE, PMP Chair of P&RA CoP P&RA CoP Technical Exchange ...

  16. 7th Workshop on Risk Informed Regulation and Safety Culture ...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    their PRA. However, Qinshan will hire two U.S. PRA firms to develop its "Generation Risk Analysis" model. This summer, a team of Qinshan PSA personnel will visit South Texas...

  17. Microsoft Word - PA CoP Charter 12-11-2013

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    112013 1 Interagency Performance and Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP) Charter Rationale for P&RA CoP: Performance Assessments (PAs) provide a demonstration of ...

  18. Interagency Performance and Risk Assessment Community of Practice...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Interagency Performance and Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP) Charter Interagency Performance and Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP) Charter Charter ...

  19. The 10,000-year debate

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wilson, J.R.

    1996-08-01

    Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has developed into a respected tool within the reactor community. Now, this PRA technique is being applied to a new arena, the distant future of the nuclear waste repository. Problems are already testing the credibility of PRA.

  20. Radiation transport and energetics of laser-driven half-hohlraums at the National Ignition Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moore, A. S. [Directorate Science and Technology, AWE Aldermaston, Reading (United Kingdom); Cooper, A. B.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Schneider, M. B. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); MacLaren, S. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Graham, P. [Directorate Science and Technology, AWE Aldermaston, Reading (United Kingdom); Lu, K. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Seugling, R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Satcher, J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Klingmann, J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Comley, A. J. [Directorate Science and Technology, AWE Aldermaston, Reading (United Kingdom); Marrs, R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); May, M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Widmann, K. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Glendinning, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Castor, J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Sain, J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Back, C. A. [General Atomics, San Diego, CA (United States); Hund, J. [General Atomics, San Diego, CA (United States); Baker, K. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Hsing, W. W. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Foster, J. [Directorate Science and Technology, AWE Aldermaston, Reading (United Kingdom); Young, B. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Young, P. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2014-06-01

    Experiments that characterize and develop a high energy-density half-hohlraum platform for use in bench-marking radiation hydrodynamics models have been conducted at the National Ignition Facility (NIF). Results from the experiments are used to quantitatively compare with simulations of the radiation transported through an evolving plasma density structure, colloquially known as an N-wave. A half-hohlraum is heated by 80 NIF beams to a temperature of 240 eV. This creates a subsonic di#11;usive Marshak wave which propagates into a high atomic number Ta2O5 aerogel. The subsequent radiation transport through the aerogel and through slots cut into the aerogel layer is investigated. We describe a set of experiments that test the hohlraum performance and report on a range

  1. A review of NRC staff uses of probabilistic risk assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-03-01

    The NRC staff uses probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and risk management as important elements its licensing and regulatory processes. In October 1991, the NRC`s Executive Director for Operations established the PRA Working Group to address concerns identified by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards with respect to unevenness and inconsistency in the staff`s current uses of PRA. After surveying current staff uses of PRA and identifying needed improvements, the Working Group defined a set of basic principles for staff PRA use and identified three areas for improvements: guidance development, training enhancements, and PRA methods development. For each area of improvement, the Working Group took certain actions and recommended additional work. The Working Group recommended integrating its work with other recent PRA-related activities the staff completed and improving staff interactions with PRA users in the nuclear industry. The Working Group took two key actions by developing general guidance for two uses of PRA within the NRC (that is, screening or prioritizing reactor safety issues and analyzing such issues in detail) and developing guidance on basic terms and methods important to the staff`s uses of PRA.

  2. Search for: All records | SciTech Connect

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    modeling the probabilistic system evolution and uses ... belong to this new class of dynamic PRA methodologies. ... them back without any change in shapeloss of mass. ...

  3. November 12, 2015 Webinar- Implementing Optimization in the Superfund Program

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    P&RA CoP Webinar - November 12, 2015 Webinar - Implementing Optimization in the Superfund Program, Mr. Kirby Biggs and Mr. Daniel Powell (EPA OSRTI).

  4. January 28, 2016 Webinar- Borehole Disposal of Spent Radioactive Sources

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Performance & RIsk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Webinar - January 28, 2016 - Borehole Disposal of Spent Radioactive Sources (Dr. Matt Kozak, INTERA).

  5. 2015 Annual Technical Exchange Meeting Presenters Biographical...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Sketches 2015 Annual Technical Exchange Meeting Presenters Biographical Sketches Interagency Performance & Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP) 2015 Annual ...

  6. Training for Records and Information Management

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Records Management Training:  NARA Records Management Training   NARA Targeted Assistance NARA Brochures Training Presentation:  Information Collection Requests/PRA (pdf)  

  7. List of Topics for Interagency Performance & Risk Assessment...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    List of Topics for Interagency Performance & Risk Assessment Community of Practice (P&RA CoP) Discussion List of Topics for Interagency Performance & Risk Assessment Community of ...

  8. DOE F 4200.34.cdr

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    ink on recycled paper Procurement Request-Authorization Funding Data Continuation Sheet 1. PRA Number 2. ChangeCorrection in Process Yes No 25. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA...

  9. February 20, 2014 Webinar- Performance of Engineered Barriers: Lessons Learned

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    P&RA CoP Webinar - 2/20/2014 - Performance of Engineered Barriers: Lessons Learned Craig H. Benson (University of Wisconsin-Madison/CRESP)

  10. DOE-STD-1104 Acronyms

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Position O Order PDSA Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSDR Preliminary Safety Design Report SBAA Safety Basis Approval Authority SBRT...

  11. Microsoft Word - List of topics_2015-11-12

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    the 2014 P&RA CoP Technical Exchange Meeting: * Confidence building in performance and risk assessments models (Kirby Biggs, November 12, 2015) * Speciation and transport of...

  12. Statement of Intent NO. 2 between the US Department of Energy...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Site & Facility Restoration Deactivation & Decommissioning (D&D) P&RA Community of Practice Facility Engineering Soil & Groundwater Sustainability Program Management Safety ...

  13. Statement of Intent between US Department of Energy and the State...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Site & Facility Restoration Deactivation & Decommissioning (D&D) P&RA Community of Practice Facility Engineering Soil & Groundwater Sustainability Program Management Safety ...

  14. DOE F 4200.33.cdr

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Code (Applies to Acquisition only) 21. Master BIN 23. Unsolicited Proposal Number 20. ... 30. Total Funds This PRA 29. Project Period 31. Budget Period Are These Annual Funds? ...

  15. NETL F 451.1/1-1, Categorical Exclusion Designation Form

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    FE0025387 PRA Multiple sites in AK Environmental Resources Management Alaska Inc. (ERM); Loundsbury & Associates, Inc.; Peak Oilfield Services Company, LLC; Maritime Helicopters...

  16. Procedures for Obtaining OMB Clearance to Conduct a Survey

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2009-01-18

    This appendix uses two flow charts (General Clearance Process and PRA Review Process) to provide a visual image of the OMB clearance process.

  17. Factsheet: Third Meeting of the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Commission...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    and * Decommissioning and environmental management. ... from a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) roundtable also ... approaches to aircraft impact assessments, and the US ...

  18. Risk assessment of CST-7 proposed waste treatment and storage facilities Volume I: Limited-scope probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of proposed CST-7 waste treatment & storage facilities. Volume II: Preliminary hazards analysis of proposed CST-7 waste storage & treatment facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sasser, K.

    1994-06-01

    In FY 1993, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Management Group [CST-7 (formerly EM-7)] requested the Probabilistic Risk and Hazards Analysis Group [TSA-11 (formerly N-6)] to conduct a study of the hazards associated with several CST-7 facilities. Among these facilities are the Hazardous Waste Treatment Facility (HWTF), the HWTF Drum Storage Building (DSB), and the Mixed Waste Receiving and Storage Facility (MWRSF), which are proposed for construction beginning in 1996. These facilities are needed to upgrade the Laboratory`s storage capability for hazardous and mixed wastes and to provide treatment capabilities for wastes in cases where offsite treatment is not available or desirable. These facilities will assist Los Alamos in complying with federal and state requlations.

  19. Augmenting Probabilistic Risk Assesment with Malevolent Initiators

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Curtis Smith; David Schwieder

    2011-11-01

    As commonly practiced, the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in nuclear power plants only considers accident initiators such as natural hazards, equipment failures, and human error. Malevolent initiators are ignored in PRA, but are considered the domain of physical security, which uses vulnerability assessment based on an officially specified threat (design basis threat). This paper explores the implications of augmenting and extending existing PRA models by considering new and modified scenarios resulting from malevolent initiators. Teaming the augmented PRA models with conventional vulnerability assessments can cost-effectively enhance security of a nuclear power plant. This methodology is useful for operating plants, as well as in the design of new plants. For the methodology, we have proposed an approach that builds on and extends the practice of PRA for nuclear power plants for security-related issues. Rather than only considering 'random' failures, we demonstrated a framework that is able to represent and model malevolent initiating events and associated plant impacts.

  20. Operational phase of inspection prioritization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Campbell, D.J.; Guthrie, V.H.; Flanagan, G.F.

    1985-01-01

    Inspectors must make many decisions on the allocation of their efforts. To date, these decisions have been made based upon their own judgment and guidance from inspection procedures. The goal of this paper is to provide PRA information as an additional aid to inspectors. A structured approach for relating PRA information to specific inspection decisions has been developed. The use of PRA information as an aid in optimal decision making (1) in response to the current plant status and (2) in the scheduling of effort over an extended period of time is considered. 21 figs.

  1. Code development incorporating environmental, safety, and economic aspects of fusion reactors (FY 89--91). Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ho, S.K.; Fowler, T.K.; Holdren, J.P. [eds.

    1991-11-01

    This report discusses the following aspects of Fusion reactors.: Activation Analysis; Tritium Inventory; Environmental and Safety Indices and Their Graphical Representation; Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Decision Analysis; Plasma Burn Control -- Application to ITER; and Other Applications.

  2. Code development incorporating environmental, safety, and economic aspects of fusion reactors (FY 89--91)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ho, S.K.; Fowler, T.K.; Holdren, J.P. (eds.)

    1991-11-01

    This report discusses the following aspects of Fusion reactors.: Activation Analysis; Tritium Inventory; Environmental and Safety Indices and Their Graphical Representation; Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Decision Analysis; Plasma Burn Control -- Application to ITER; and Other Applications.

  3. Interstate Technology & Regulatory Council (ITRC) Remediation...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Council (ITRC) Remediation Management of Complex Sites: Case Studies and Guidance Hope Lee Pacific Northwest National Laboratory December 17, 2014 To view all the P&RA CoP...

  4. Analysis of Environmental Monitoring Data Following Site Closure...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    and Risk Assessment Community of Practice Annual Technical Exchange Meeting Richard Bush, Program Manager December 11, 2014 To view all the P&RA CoP 2014 Technical Exchange...

  5. E-Area Performance Assessment

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  6. Hanford Site Waste Management Area C Performance Assessment

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  7. Quality Assurance for Performance Assessment Modeling

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  8. MODARIA: Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessment Context and Overview

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  9. December 12, 2013 Webinar- The Use of Graded Approach in Hanford Vadose Zone Modeling

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    P&RA CoP Webinar - Dec. 12, 2013 - Alaa Aly (INTERA) & Dib Goswami (Washington State Ecology), “The Use of Graded Approach in Hanford Vadose Zone Modeling”

  10. Scaling of Saltstone Disposal Facility Testing

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  11. Status of SRS Liquid Waste Performance Assessment Program

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  12. Probabilistic Modeling and Phase 2 Decision Making at the West...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Performance & Risk Assessment Community of Practice Technical Exchange Meeting December 12, 2014 To view all the P&RA CoP 2014 Technical Exchange Meeting videos click here. Video ...

  13. Nevada National Security Site Performance Assessment Updates...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Performance and Risk Assessment Community of Practice Annual Technical Exchange Meeting December 11 and 12, 2014 To view all the P&RA CoP 2014 Technical Exchange Meeting videos ...

  14. The Hanford Site-Wide Risk Review Project | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    December 11, 2014 To view all the P&RA CoP 2014 Technical Exchange Meeting videos click here. Video Presentation PDF icon The Hanford Site-Wide Risk Review Project More...

  15. Highlights from a Workshop Series: Best Practices for Risk-Informed...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Technical Exchange Meeting To view all the P&RA CoP 2014 Technical Exchange Meeting videos click here. Video Presentation PDF icon Highlights from a Workshop Series: Best...

  16. Hanford Site Waste Management Area C Performance Assessment ...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Exchange December 11-12, 2014 To view all the P&RA CoP 2014 Technical Exchange Meeting videos click here. Video Presentation - Part 1 Video Presentation - Part 2 PDF icon Hanford...

  17. On Performance of Covers and Liners In Performance Assessments...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    December 11 and 12, 2014 To view all the P&RA CoP 2014 Technical Exchange Meeting videos click here. Video Presentation PDF icon On Performance of Covers and Liners In...

  18. May 20, 2015 Webinar - Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Performance & RIsk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Webinar - May 20, 2015 - Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for 10 CFR Part 61 by Mr. Chris Grossman (NRC) ...

  19. Information Management and Supporting Documentation

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 requires each Federal agency to seek and obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before undertaking a collection of information...

  20. Risk Informing Environmental Cleanup Priorities

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  1. WIPP Performance Assessment: Current Status and the Road Ahead

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  2. Summary of NWTRB Deep Borehole Disposal Workshop

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  3. A Regulator’s Perspective on Interpretation of Performance and Risk Assessment Results

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  4. Using Performance Assessments to Focus Research & Development Activities

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation from the 2015 Annual Performance and Risk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Technical Exchange Meeting held in Richland, Washington on December 15-16, 2015.

  5. Analysis of the Space Propulsion System Problem Using RAVEN (Conference) |

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    SciTech Connect Analysis of the Space Propulsion System Problem Using RAVEN Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Analysis of the Space Propulsion System Problem Using RAVEN This paper presents the solution of the space propulsion problem using a PRA code currently under development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). RAVEN (Reactor Analysis and Virtual control ENviroment) is a multi-purpose Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) software framework that allows dispatching different

  6. New Methods and Tools to Perform Safety Analysis within RISMC

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Diego Mandelli; Curtis Smith; Cristian Rabiti; Andrea Alfonsi; Robert Kinoshita; Joshua Cogliati

    2013-11-01

    The Risk Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMC) Pathway uses a systematic approach developed to characterize and quantify safety margins of nuclear power plant structures, systems and components. What differentiates the RISMC approach from traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is the concept of safety margin. In PRA, a safety metric such as core damage frequency (CDF) is generally estimated using static fault-tree and event-tree models. However, it is not possible to estimate how close we are to physical safety limits (say peak clad temperature) for most accident sequences described in the PRA. In the RISMC approach, what we want to understand is not just the frequency of an event like core damage, but how close we are (or not) to this event and how we might increase our safety margin through margin management strategies in a Dynamic PRA (DPRA) fashion. This paper gives an overview of methods that are currently under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) with the scope of advance the current state of the art of dynamic PRA.

  7. Use of limited data to construct Bayesian networks for probabilistic risk assessment.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Groth, Katrina M.; Swiler, Laura Painton

    2013-03-01

    Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a fundamental part of safety/quality assurance for nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Traditional PRA very effectively models complex hardware system risks using binary probabilistic models. However, traditional PRA models are not flexible enough to accommodate non-binary soft-causal factors, such as digital instrumentation&control, passive components, aging, common cause failure, and human errors. Bayesian Networks offer the opportunity to incorporate these risks into the PRA framework. This report describes the results of an early career LDRD project titled %E2%80%9CUse of Limited Data to Construct Bayesian Networks for Probabilistic Risk Assessment%E2%80%9D. The goal of the work was to establish the capability to develop Bayesian Networks from sparse data, and to demonstrate this capability by producing a data-informed Bayesian Network for use in Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) as part of nuclear power plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). This report summarizes the research goal and major products of the research.

  8. Peer Review of NRC Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anthony Koonce; James Knudsen; Robert Buell

    2011-03-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Models underwent a Peer Review using ASME PRA standard (Addendum C) as endorsed by NRC in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200. The review was performed by a mix of industry probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) experts and NRC PRA experts. Representative SPAR models, one PWR and one BWR, were reviewed against Capability Category I of the ASME PRA standard. Capability Category I was selected as the basis for review due to the specific uses/applications of the SPAR models. The BWR SPAR model was reviewed against 331 ASME PRA Standard Supporting Requirements; however, based on the Capability Category I level of review and the absence of internal flooding and containment performance (LERF) logic only 216 requirements were determined to be applicable. Based on the review, the BWR SPAR model met 139 of the 216 supporting requirements. The review also generated 200 findings or suggestions. Of these 200 findings and suggestions 142 were findings and 58 were suggestions. The PWR SPAR model was also evaluated against the same 331 ASME PRA Standard Supporting Requirements. Of these requirements only 215 were deemed appropriate for the review (for the same reason as noted for the BWR). The PWR review determined that 125 of the 215 supporting requirements met Capability Category I or greater. The review identified 101 findings or suggestions (76 findings and 25 suggestions). These findings or suggestions were developed to identify areas where SPAR models could be enhanced. A process to prioritize and incorporate the findings/suggestions supporting requirements into the SPAR models is being developed. The prioritization process focuses on those findings that will enhance the accuracy, completeness and usability of the SPAR models.

  9. SAPHIRE 8 Volume 3 - Users' Guide

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C. L. Smith; K. Vedros; K. J. Kvarfordt

    2011-03-01

    The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer. SAPHIRE is funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The INL's primary role in this project is that of software developer. However, the INL also plays an important role in technology transfer by interfacing and supporting SAPHIRE users comprised of a wide range of PRA practitioners from the NRC, national laboratories, the private sector, and foreign countries. SAPHIRE can be used to model a complex systems response to initiating events, quantify associated damage outcome frequencies, and identify important contributors to this damage (Level 1 PRA) and to analyze containment performance during a severe accident and quantify radioactive releases (Level 2 PRA). It can be used for a PRA evaluating a variety of operating conditions, for example, for a nuclear reactor at full power, low power, or at shutdown conditions. Furthermore, SAPHIRE can be used to analyze both internal and external initiating events and has special features for transforming models built for internal event analysis to models for external event analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify risk in terms of release consequences to both the public and the environment (Level 3 PRA). This reference guide will introduce the SAPHIRE Version 8.0 software. A brief discussion of the purpose and history of the software is included along with general information such as installation instructions, starting and stopping the program, and some pointers on how to get around inside the program. Next, database concepts and structure are discussed. Following that discussion are nine sections, one for each of the menu options on the SAPHIRE main menu, wherein the purpose and general capabilities for each option are furnished. Next, the capabilities and limitations of the software are provided.

  10. A review of the Crystal River Unit 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment: Internal events, core damage frequency

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hanan, N.A.; Henley, D.R.

    1989-01-01

    A review of the Crystal River Unit 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CR-3 PRA) was performed with the objective of evaluating the dominant accident sequences and major contributions to the core damage frequency from internally-generated initiators. This review included not only an assessment of the assumption and methods used in the CR-3 PRA, but also included a quantitative analysis of the accident initiators, and accident sequences resulting in core damage. The effects of data uncertainties on the core damage frequency were quantified and sensitivity analysis was also performed. 55 refs., 22 figs., 30 tabs.

  11. Uncertainty Quantification in the Reliability and Risk Assessment of Generation IV Reactors: Final Scientific/Technical Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vierow, Karen; Aldemir, Tunc

    2009-09-10

    The project entitled, Uncertainty Quantification in the Reliability and Risk Assessment of Generation IV Reactors, was conducted as a DOE NERI project collaboration between Texas A&M University and The Ohio State University between March 2006 and June 2009. The overall goal of the proposed project was to develop practical approaches and tools by which dynamic reliability and risk assessment techniques can be used to augment the uncertainty quantification process in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods and PRA applications for Generation IV reactors. This report is the Final Scientific/Technical Report summarizing the project.

  12. Low Power and Shutdown Risk Assessment Benchmarking Study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J.Mitman, J. Julius, R. Berucio, M. Phillips, J. Grobbelaaar, D. Bley, R. Budniz

    2002-12-15

    (B204)Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) insights are now used by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) to confirm the level of safety for plant operations and to justify changes in nuclear power plant operating requirements, both on an exception basis and as changeds to a plant's licensing basis. This report examines qualitative and quantitative risk assessments during shutdown plant states, providing feedback to utilities in the use of qualitative models for outage risk management, and also providing input to the development of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) Low Power and Shutdown PRA Standard.

  13. May 16, 2016 Webinar- Predicting the Service Life of Geomembranes in Low-Level and Mixed-Waste Disposal Facilities

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Performance & RIsk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Webinar - May 16, 2016 - Predicting the Service Life of Geomembranes in Low-Level and Mixed-Waste Disposal Facilities: Findings from a Long-Term Study. Presented by Dr. Craig Benson (Dean of School of Engineering and Applied Science, and Janet Scott Hamilton and John Downman Hamilton Professor, Univ. of Virginia).

  14. August 18, 2015 Webinar- Probabilistic Analysis of Inadvertent Intrusion and the International Atomic Energy Agency Human Intrusion in the Context of Disposal of Radioactive Waste (HIDRA) Project

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    P&RA CoP Webinar - August 18, 2015 - Probabilistic Analysis of Inadvertent Intrusion and the International Atomic Energy Agency Human Intrusion in the Context of Disposal of Radioactive Waste (HIDRA) Project, by Dr. Paul Black (Neptune) and Mr. Roger Seitz (Savannah River National Laboratory), August 18, 2015, 1:30 – 3:00 pm Eastern Daylight Time.

  15. SAPHIRE 8 Volume 7 - Data Loading

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    K. J. Kvarfordt; S. T. Wood; C. L. Smith; S. R. Prescott

    2011-03-01

    The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer. SAPHIRE Version 8 is funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory. This report is intended to assist the user to enter PRA data into the SAPHIRE program using the built-in MAR-D ASCII-text file data transfer process. Towards this end, a small sample database is constructed and utilized for demonstration. Where applicable, the discussion includes how the data processes for loading the sample database relate to the actual processes used to load a larger PRA models. The procedures described herein were developed for use with SAPHIRE Version 8. The guidance specified in this document will allow a user to have sufficient knowledge to both understand the data format used by SAPHIRE and to carry out the transfer of data between different PRA projects.

  16. Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Data Loading Manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C. L. Smith; K. J. Kvarfordt; S. T. Wood

    2008-08-01

    The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer. SAPHIRE is primarily funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory. This report is intended to assist the user to enter PRA data into the SAPHIRE program using the built-in MAR-D ASCII-text file data transfer process. Towards this end, a small sample database is constructed and utilized for demonstration. Where applicable, the discussion includes how the data processes for loading the sample database relate to the actual processes used to load a larger PRA models. The procedures described herein were developed for use with SAPHIRE Version 6.0 and Version 7.0. In general, the data transfer procedures for version 6 and 7 are the same, but where deviations exist, the differences are noted. The guidance specified in this document will allow a user to have sufficient knowledge to both understand the data format used by SAPHIRE and to carry out the transfer of data between different PRA projects.

  17. Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Data Loading Manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C. L. Smith; K. J. Kvarfordt; S. T. Wood

    2006-07-01

    The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer. SAPHIRE is primarily funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory. This report is intended to assist the user to enter PRA data into the SAPHIRE program using the built-in MAR-D ASCII-text file data transfer process. Towards this end, a small sample database is constructed and utilized for demonstration. Where applicable, the discussion includes how the data processes for loading the sample database relate to the actual processes used to load a larger PRA models. The procedures described herein were developed for use with SAPHIRE Version 6.0 and Version 7.0. In general, the data transfer procedures for version 6 and 7 are the same, but where deviations exist, the differences are noted. The guidance specified in this document will allow a user to have sufficient knowledge to both understand the data format used by SAPHIRE and to carry out the transfer of data between different PRA projects.

  18. November 10, 2015 Webinar- Congressionally Mandated Review of the Use Of Risk-Informed Management in the DOE EM Program

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    P&RA CoP Webinar - November 10, 2015 Webinar - Congressionally Mandated Review of the Use Of Risk-Informed Management in the DOE EM Program. (Dr. Michael Greenberg, Rutgers University; Dr. Steven Krahn, Vanderbilt University; and Mr. Timothy Fields, MDB, Inc.).

  19. May 16, 2016- Predicting the Service Life of Geomembranes in Low-Level and Mixed-Waste Disposal Facilities: Findings from a Long-Term Study

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Performance & RIsk Assessment (P&RA) Community of Practice (CoP) Webinar - May 16, 2016 - Predicting the Service Life of Geomembranes in Low-Level and Mixed-Waste Disposal Facilities: Findings from a Long-Term Study. Presented by Dr. Craig Benson (Dean of School of Engineering and Applied Science, and Janet Scott Hamilton and John Downman Hamilton Professor, Univ. of Virginia).

  20. Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Code Reference Manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C. L. Smith; K. J. Kvarfordt; S. T. Wood

    2008-08-01

    The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer. SAPHIRE is funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The INL's primary role in this project is that of software developer. However, the INL also plays an important role in technology transfer by interfacing and supporting SAPHIRE users comprised of a wide range of PRA practitioners from the NRC, national laboratories, the private sector, and foreign countries. SAPHIRE can be used to model a complex systems response to initiating events, quantify associated damage outcome frequencies, and identify important contributors to this damage (Level 1 PRA) and to analyze containment performance during a severe accident and quantify radioactive releases (Level 2 PRA). It can be used for a PRA evaluating a variety of operating conditions, for example, for a nuclear reactor at full power, low power, or at shutdown conditions. Furthermore, SAPHIRE can be used to analyze both internal and external initiating events and has special features for transforming models built for internal event analysis to models for external event analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify risk in terms of release consequences to both the public and the environment (Level 3 PRA). SAPHIRE includes a separate module called the Graphical Evaluation Module (GEM). GEM provides a highly specialized user interface with SAPHIRE that automates SAPHIRE process steps for evaluating operational events at commercial nuclear power plants. Using GEM, an analyst can estimate the risk associated with operational events in a very efficient and expeditious manner. This reference guide will introduce the SAPHIRE Version 7.0 software. A brief discussion of the purpose and history of the software is included along with general information such as installation instructions, starting and stopping the program, and some pointers on how to get around inside the program. Next, database concepts and structure are discussed. Following that discussion are nine sections, one for each of the menu options on the SAPHIRE main menu, wherein the purpose and general capabilities for each option are furnished. Next, the capabilities and limitations of the software are provided.

  1. Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Code Reference Manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C. L. Smith; K. J. Kvarfordt; S. T. Wood

    2006-07-01

    The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer. SAPHIRE is funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The INL's primary role in this project is that of software developer. However, the INL also plays an important role in technology transfer by interfacing and supporting SAPHIRE users comprised of a wide range of PRA practitioners from the NRC, national laboratories, the private sector, and foreign countries. SAPHIRE can be used to model a complex systems response to initiating events, quantify associated damage outcome frequencies, and identify important contributors to this damage (Level 1 PRA) and to analyze containment performance during a severe accident and quantify radioactive releases (Level 2 PRA). It can be used for a PRA evaluating a variety of operating conditions, for example, for a nuclear reactor at full power, low power, or at shutdown conditions. Furthermore, SAPHIRE can be used to analyze both internal and external initiating events and has special features for ansforming models built for internal event analysis to models for external event analysis. It can also be used in a limited manner to quantify risk in terms of release consequences to both the public and the environment (Level 3 PRA). SAPHIRE includes a separate module called the Graphical Evaluation Module (GEM). GEM provides a highly specialized user interface with SAPHIRE that automates SAPHIRE process steps for evaluating operational events at commercial nuclear power plants. Using GEM, an analyst can estimate the risk associated with operational events in a very efficient and expeditious manner. This reference guide will introduce the SAPHIRE Version 7.0 software. A brief discussion of the purpose and history of the software is included along with general information such as installation instructions, starting and stopping the program, and some pointers on how to get around inside the program. Next, database concepts and structure are discussed. Following that discussion are nine sections, one for each of the menu options on the SAPHIRE main menu, wherein the purpose and general capabilities for each option are furnished. Next, the capabilities and limitations of the software are provided.

  2. Licensing topical report: application of probabilistic risk assessment in the selection of design basis accidents. [HTGR

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Houghton, W.J.

    1980-06-01

    A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach is proposed to be used to scrutinize selection of accident sequences. A technique is described in this Licensing Topical Report to identify candidates for Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) utilizing the risk assessment results. As a part of this technique, it is proposed that events with frequencies below a specified limit would not be candidates. The use of the methodology described is supplementary to the traditional, deterministic approach and may result, in some cases, in the selection of multiple failure sequences as DBAs; it may also provide a basis for not considering some traditionally postulated events as being DBAs. A process is then described for selecting a list of DBAs based on the candidates from PRA as supplementary to knowledge and judgments from past licensing practice. These DBAs would be the events considered in Chapter 15 of Safety Analysis Reports of high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs).

  3. Methodology Development for Passive Component Reliability Modeling in a Multi-Physics Simulation Environment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Aldemir, Tunc; Denning, Richard; Catalyurek, Umit; Unwin, Stephen

    2015-01-23

    Reduction in safety margin can be expected as passive structures and components undergo degradation with time. Limitations in the traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology constrain its value as an effective tool to address the impact of aging effects on risk and for quantifying the impact of aging management strategies in maintaining safety margins. A methodology has been developed to address multiple aging mechanisms involving large numbers of components (with possibly statistically dependent failures) within the PRA framework in a computationally feasible manner when the sequencing of events is conditioned on the physical conditions predicted in a simulation environment, such as the New Generation System Code (NGSC) concept. Both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties can be accounted for within the same phenomenological framework and maintenance can be accounted for in a coherent fashion. The framework accommodates the prospective impacts of various intervention strategies such as testing, maintenance, and refurbishment. The methodology is illustrated with several examples.

  4. Probabilistic risk analysis toward cost-effective 3S (safety, safeguards, security) implementation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2014-09-30

    Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) has been introduced for several decades in safety and nuclear advanced countries have already used this methodology in their own regulatory systems. However, PRA has not been developed in safeguards and security so far because of inherent difficulties in intentional and malicious acts. In this paper, probabilistic proliferation and risk analysis based on random process is applied to hypothetical reprocessing process and physical protection system in nuclear reactor with the Markov model that was originally developed by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) in Generation IV International Framework (GIF). Through the challenge to quantify the security risk with a frequency in this model, integrated risk notion among 3S to pursue the cost-effective installation of those countermeasures is discussed in a heroic manner.

  5. System 80+ D-RAP, a communication tool

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Siegmann, E.R.; Mody, A.A.

    1994-12-31

    The purpose of {open_quotes}RAP{close_quotes} music is to communicate, and the purpose of D-RAP is to foster communication between the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) group, designers, and the future combined operating license (COL) applicant. This is to ensure that the design is self-consistent and integrated with the procurement process. The designer reliability assurance program (D-RAP) is the first part of the RAP. The goals of the D-RAP are to have risk-significant systems, structures, and components (SSCs) identified and considered in the detail design and procurement phases and to maintain consistency between PRA and design. Plant safety is maintained throughout the design phase, and pertinent information is passed on to the COL applicant. The operations RAP (O-RAP) covers the plant operation and maintenance.

  6. SAPHIRE 8 Software Quality Assurance Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Curtis Smith

    2010-02-01

    This Quality Assurance (QA) Plan documents the QA activities that will be managed by the INL related to JCN N6423. The NRC developed the SAPHIRE computer code for performing probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) using a personal computer (PC) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) under Job Code Number (JCN) L1429. SAPHIRE started out as a feasibility study for a PRA code to be run on a desktop personal PC and evolved through several phases into a state-of-the-art PRA code. The developmental activity of SAPHIRE was the result of two concurrent important events: The tremendous expansion of PC software and hardware capability of the 90s and the onset of a risk-informed regulation era.

  7. A Program for Risk Assessment Associated with IGSCC of BWR Vessel Internals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    A. G. Ware; D. K. Morton; J. D. Page; M. E. Nitzel; S. A. Eide; T. -Y. Chang

    1999-08-01

    A program is being carried out for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), to conduct an independent risk assessment of the consequences of failures initiated by intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of the reactor vessel internals of boiling water reactor (BWR) plants. The overall project objective is to assess the potential consequences and risks associated with the failure of IGSCC-susceptible BWR vessel internals, both singly and in combination with the failures of others, with specific consideration given to potential cascading and common mode effects on system performance. This paper presents a description of the overall program that is underway to modify an existing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the BWR/4 plant to include IGSCC-initiated failures, subsequently to complete a quantitative PRA.

  8. Information Collection Management | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Information Collection Management Information Collection Management Forms44.jpg The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 requires federal agencies and government-owned, contractor-operated facilities to obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before collecting information from the general public, which includes contractors. This ensures each organization will maximize the utility of information created, collected, maintained, and used. The coordination with OMB also

  9. fe0025387-Petrotechnical-Resources | netl.doe.gov

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Support for Methane Hydrate Research on the Alaska North Slope Last Reviewed 1/15/2016 DE-FE0025387 Goal The objective of this contract between the Department of Energy (DOE) and Petrotechnical Resources of Alaska (PRA) is to provide specific planning, analytical, arctic engineering, and environmental services associated with the potential drilling of methane hydrate stratigraphic test well(s) and a long-term methane hydrate production test well on the North Slope of Alaska. Performer

  10. Applicability of Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) Events in NUREG/CR-6890 for Entergy Nuclear South (ENS) Plants LOSP Calculations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Li, Yunlong; Yilmaz, Fatma; Bedell, Loys

    2006-07-01

    Significant differences have been identified in loss of offsite power (LOSP or LOOP) event description, category, duration, and applicability between the LOSP events used in NUREG/CR-6890 and ENS'LOSP packages, which were based on EPRI LOSP reports with plant-specific applicability analysis. Thus it is appropriate to reconcile the LOSP data listed in the subject NUREG and EPRI reports. A cross comparison showed that 62 LOSP events in NUREG/CR-6890 were not included in the EPRI reports while 4 events in EPRI reports were missing in the NUREG. Among the 62 events missing in EPRI reports, the majority were applicable to shutdown conditions, which could be classified as category IV events in EPRI reports if included. Detailed reviews of LERs concluded that some events did not result in total loss of offsite power. Some LOSP events were caused by subsequent component failures after a turbine/plant trip, which have been modeled specifically in most ENS plant PRA models. Moreover, ENS has modeled (or is going to model) the partial loss of offsite power events with partial LOSP initiating events. While the direct use of NUREG/CR-6890 results in SPAR models may be appropriate, its direct use in ENS' plant PRA models may not be appropriate because of modeling details in ENS' plant-specific PRA models. Therefore, this paper lists all the differences between the data in NUREG/CR-6890 and EPRI reports and evaluates the applicability of the LOSP events to ENS plant-specific PRA models. The refined LOSP data will characterize the LOSP risk in a more realistic fashion. (authors)

  11. ORISE: Advanced Radiation Medicine | REAC/TS Continuing Medical Education

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Course Advanced Radiation Medicine Dates Scheduled Register Online August 15-19, 2016 Fee: $275 Maximum enrollment: 28 30 hours AMA PRA Category 1 Credits(tm) This 4½-day course includes more advanced information for medical practitioners. This program is academically more rigorous than the REM course and is primarily for Physicians, Physician Assistants, Nurse Practitioners, and Nurses desiring an advanced level of information on the diagnosis and management of ionizing radiation injuries

  12. ORISE: Radiation Emergency Medicine - Continuing Medical Education Course

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Radiation Emergency Medicine Dates Scheduled Register Online June 14-17, 2016 August 9-12, 2016 Fee: $200 Maximum enrollment: 24 24.5 hours AMA PRA Category 1 Credits(tm) This 3½-day course is intended for Physicians, Physician Assistants, Nurse Practitioners, Nurses and other healthcare providers. First responders, emergency management, and public health professionals may find the course beneficial. The course emphasizes the practical aspects of initial hospital management of irradiated and/or

  13. Dynamic Event Tree Analysis Through RAVEN

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    A. Alfonsi; C. Rabiti; D. Mandelli; J. Cogliati; R. A. Kinoshita; A. Naviglio

    2013-09-01

    Conventional Event-Tree (ET) based methodologies are extensively used as tools to perform reliability and safety assessment of complex and critical engineering systems. One of the disadvantages of these methods is that timing/sequencing of events and system dynamics is not explicitly accounted for in the analysis. In order to overcome these limitations several techniques, also know as Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (D-PRA), have been developed. Monte-Carlo (MC) and Dynamic Event Tree (DET) are two of the most widely used D-PRA methodologies to perform safety assessment of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). In the past two years, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed its own tool to perform Dynamic PRA: RAVEN (Reactor Analysis and Virtual control ENvironment). RAVEN has been designed in a high modular and pluggable way in order to enable easy integration of different programming languages (i.e., C++, Python) and coupling with other application including the ones based on the MOOSE framework, developed by INL as well. RAVEN performs two main tasks: 1) control logic driver for the new Thermo-Hydraulic code RELAP-7 and 2) post-processing tool. In the first task, RAVEN acts as a deterministic controller in which the set of control logic laws (user defined) monitors the RELAP-7 simulation and controls the activation of specific systems. Moreover, RAVEN also models stochastic events, such as components failures, and performs uncertainty quantification. Such stochastic modeling is employed by using both MC and DET algorithms. In the second task, RAVEN processes the large amount of data generated by RELAP-7 using data-mining based algorithms. This paper focuses on the first task and shows how it is possible to perform the analysis of dynamic stochastic systems using the newly developed RAVEN DET capability. As an example, the Dynamic PRA analysis, using Dynamic Event Tree, of a simplified pressurized water reactor for a Station Black-Out scenario is presented.

  14. Numerical Investigation of Advanced Compressor Technologies | Department of

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Department of Energy This paper addresses why the use of an Integrated Safety Analysis ("ISA") is appropriate for fuel recycling facilities1 which would be licensed under new regulations currently being considered by NRC. The use of the ISA for fuel facilities under Part 70 is described and compared to the use of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment ("PRA") for reactor facilities. A basis is provided for concluding that future recycling facilities - which will possess

  15. Robustness of RISMC Insights under Alternative Aleatory/Epistemic Uncertainty Classifications: Draft Report under the Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) Pathway of the DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Unwin, Stephen D.; Eslinger, Paul W.; Johnson, Kenneth I.

    2012-09-20

    The Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) pathway is a set of activities defined under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program. The overarching objective of RISMC is to support plant life-extension decision-making by providing a state-of-knowledge characterization of safety margins in key systems, structures, and components (SSCs). A technical challenge at the core of this effort is to establish the conceptual and technical feasibility of analyzing safety margin in a risk-informed way, which, unlike conventionally defined deterministic margin analysis, would be founded on probabilistic characterizations of uncertainty in SSC performance. In the context of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technology, there has arisen a general consensus about the distinctive roles of two types of uncertainty: aleatory and epistemic, where the former represents irreducible, random variability inherent in a system, whereas the latter represents a state of knowledge uncertainty on the part of the analyst about the system which is, in principle, reducible through further research. While there is often some ambiguity about how any one contributing uncertainty in an analysis should be classified, there has nevertheless emerged a broad consensus on the meanings of these uncertainty types in the PRA setting. However, while RISMC methodology shares some features with conventional PRA, it will nevertheless be a distinctive methodology set. Therefore, the paradigms for classification of uncertainty in the PRA setting may not fully port to the RISMC environment. Yet the notion of risk-informed margin is based on the characterization of uncertainty, and it is therefore critical to establish a common understanding of uncertainty in the RISMC setting.

  16. A probabilistic risk assessment of the LLNL Plutonium facility`s evaluation basis fire operational accident

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brumburgh, G.

    1994-08-31

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility conducts numerous involving plutonium to include device fabrication, development of fabrication techniques, metallurgy research, and laser isotope separation. A Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the building 332 Plutonium Facility was completed rational safety and acceptable risk to employees, the public, government property, and the environment. This paper outlines the PRA analysis of the Evaluation Basis Fire (EDF) operational accident. The EBF postulates the worst-case programmatic impact event for the Plutonium Facility.

  17. A REVIEW OF SOFTWARE-INDUCED FAILURE EXPERIENCE.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    CHU, T.L.; MARTINEZ-GURIDI, G.; YUE, M.; LEHNER, J.

    2006-09-01

    We present a review of software-induced failures in commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) and in several non-nuclear industries. We discuss the approach used for connecting operational events related to these failures and the insights gained from this review. In particular, we elaborate on insights that can be used to model this kind of failure in a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model. We present the conclusions reached in these areas.

  18. Severe accident progression perspectives based on IPE results

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lehner, J.R.; Lin, C.C.; Pratt, W.T.; Drouin, M.

    1996-08-01

    Accident progression perspectives were gathered from the level 2 PRA analyses (the analysis of the accident after core damage has occurred involving the containment performance and the radionuclide release from the containment) described in the IPE submittals. Insights related to the containment failure modes, the releases associated with those failure modes, and the factors responsible for the types of containment failures and release sizes reported were obtained. Complete results are discussed in NUREG-1560 and summarized here.

  19. Containment performance perspectives based on IPE results

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lehner, J.R.; Lin, C.C.; Pratt, W.T.

    1996-12-31

    Perspectives on Containment Performance were obtained from the accident progression analyses, i.e. level 2 PRA analyses, found in the IPE submittals. Insights related to the containment failure modes, the releases associated with those failure modes, and the factors responsible for the types of containment failures and release sizes reported were gathered. The results summarized here are discussed in detail in volumes 1 and 2 of NUREG 1560. 3 refs., 4 figs.

  20. WHEN MODEL MEETS REALITY – A REVIEW OF SPAR LEVEL 2 MODEL AGAINST FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zhegang Ma

    2013-09-01

    The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models are a set of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate the risk of operations at U.S. nuclear power plants and provide inputs to risk informed regulatory process. A small number of SPAR Level 2 models have been developed mostly for feasibility study purpose. They extend the Level 1 models to include containment systems, group plant damage states, and model containment phenomenology and accident progression in containment event trees. A severe earthquake and tsunami hit the eastern coast of Japan in March 2011 and caused significant damages on the reactors in Fukushima Daiichi site. Station blackout (SBO), core damage, containment damage, hydrogen explosion, and intensive radioactivity release, which have been previous analyzed and assumed as postulated accident progression in PRA models, now occurred with various degrees in the multi-units Fukushima Daiichi site. This paper reviews and compares a typical BWR SPAR Level 2 model with the “real” accident progressions and sequences occurred in Fukushima Daiichi Units 1, 2, and 3. It shows that the SPAR Level 2 model is a robust PRA model that could very reasonably describe the accident progression for a real and complicated nuclear accident in the world. On the other hand, the comparison shows that the SPAR model could be enhanced by incorporating some accident characteristics for better representation of severe accident progression.

  1. Auxiliary feedwater system risk-based inspection guide for the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pugh, R.; Gore, B.F.; Vo, T.V.; Moffitt, N.E. )

    1991-09-01

    In a study sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Pacific Northwest Laboratory has developed and applied a methodology for deriving plant-specific risk-based inspection guidance for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system at pressurized water reactors that have not undergone probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This methodology uses existing PRA results and plant operating experience information. Existing PRA-based inspection guidance information recently developed for the NRC for various plants was used to identify generic component failure modes. This information was then combined with plant-specific and industry-wide component information and failure data to identify failure modes and failure mechanisms for the AFW system at the selected plants. Ginna was selected as the eighth plant for study. The product of this effort is a prioritized listing of AFW failures which have occurred at the plant and at other PWRs. This listing is intended for use by NRC inspectors in the preparation of inspection plans addressing AFW risk-important components at the Ginna plant. 23 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab.

  2. Auxiliary feedwater system risk-based inspection guide for the South Texas Project nuclear power plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bumgardner, J.D.; Nickolaus, J.R.; Moffitt, N.E.; Gore, B.F.; Vo, T.V.

    1993-12-01

    In a study sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Pacific Northwest Laboratory has developed and applied a methodology for deriving plant-specific risk-based inspection guidance for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system at pressurized water reactors that have not undergone probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This methodology uses existing PRA results and plant operating experience information. Existing PRA-based inspection guidance information recently developed for the NRC for various plants was used to identify generic component failure modes. This information was then combined with plant-specific and industry-wide component information and failure data to identify failure modes and failure mechanisms for the AFW system at the selected plants. South Texas Project was selected as a plant for study. The product of this effort is a prioritized listing of AFW failures which have occurred at the plant and at other PWRs. This listing is intended for use by the NRC inspectors in preparation of inspection plans addressing AFW risk important components at the South Texas Project plant.

  3. Auxiliary feedwater system risk-based inspection guide for the McGuire nuclear power plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bumgardner, J.D.; Lloyd, R.C.; Moffitt, N.E.; Gore, B.F.; Vo, T.V.

    1994-05-01

    In a study sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Pacific Northwest Laboratory has developed and applied a methodology for deriving plant-specific risk-based inspection guidance for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system at pressurized water reactors that have not undergone probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This methodology uses existing PRA results and plant operating experience information. Existing PRA-based inspection guidance information recently developed for the NRC for various plants was used to identify generic component failure modes. This information was then combined with plant-specific and industry-wide component information and failure data to identify failure modes and failure mechanisms for the AFW system at the selected plants. McGuire was selected as one of a series of plants for study. The product of this effort is a prioritized listing of AFW failures which have occurred at the plant and at other PWRs. This listing is intended for use by NRC inspectors in the preparation of inspection plans addressing AFW risk-important components at the McGuire plant.

  4. Auxiliary feedwater system risk-based inspection guide for the Point Beach nuclear power plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lloyd, R C; Moffitt, N E; Gore, B F; Vo, T V; Vehec, T A

    1993-02-01

    In a study sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Pacific Northwest Laboratory has developed and applied a methodology for deriving plant-specific risk-based inspection guidance for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system at pressurized water reactors that have not undergone probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This methodology uses existing PRA results and plant operating experience information. Existing PRA-based inspection guidance information recently developed for the NRC for various plants was used to identify generic component failure modes. This information was then combined with plant-specific and industry-wide component information and failure data to identify failure modes and failure mechanisms for the AFW system at the selected plants. Point Beach was selected as one of a series of plants for study. The product of this effort is a prioritized listing of AFW failures which have occurred at the plant and at other PWRS. This listing is intended for use by NRC inspectors in the preparation of inspection plans addressing AFW risk-important components at the Point Beach plant.

  5. Auxiliary feedwater system risk-based inspection guide for the J. M. Farley Nuclear Power Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vo, T.V.; Pugh, R.; Gore, B.F.; Harrison, D.G. )

    1990-10-01

    In a study sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Pacific Northwest Laboratory has developed and applied a methodology for deriving plant-specific risk-based inspection guidance for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system at pressurized water reactors that have not undergone probabilistic risk assessment(PRA). This methodology uses existing PRA results and plant operating experience information. Existing PRA-based inspection guidance recently developed for the NRC for various plants was used to identify generic component failure modes. This information was then combined with plant-specific and industry-wide component information and failure data to identify failure modes and failure mechanisms for the AFW system at the selected plants. J. M. Farley was selected as the second plant for study. The product of this effort is a prioritized listing of AFW failures which have occurred at the plant and at other PWRs. This listing is intended for use by NRC inspectors in the preparation of inspection plans addressing AFW risk-important at the J. M. Farley plant. 23 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab.

  6. Auxiliary feedwater system risk-based inspection guide for the H. B. Robinson nuclear power plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moffitt, N.E.; Lloyd, R.C.; Gore, B.F.; Vo, T.V.; Garner, L.W.

    1993-08-01

    In a study sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Pacific Northwest Laboratory has developed and applied a methodology for deriving plant-specific risk-based inspection guidance for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system at pressurized water reactors that have not undergone probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This methodology uses existing PRA results and plant operating experience information. Existing PRA-based inspection guidance information recently developed for the NRC for various plants was used to identify generic component failure modes. This information was then combined with plant-specific and industry-wide component information and failure data to identify failure modes and failure mechanisms for the AFW system at the selected plants. H. B. Robinson was selected as one of a series of plants for study. The product of this effort is a prioritized listing of AFW failures which have occurred at the plant and at other PWRs. This listing is intended for use by NRC inspectors in the preparation of inspection plans addressing AFW risk-important components at the H. B. Robinson plant.

  7. Auxiliary feedwater system risk-based inspection guide for the Byron and Braidwood nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moffitt, N.E.; Gore, B.F.: Vo, T.V. )

    1991-07-01

    In a study sponsored by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Pacific Northwest Laboratory has developed and applied a methodology for deriving plant-specific risk-based inspection guidance for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system at pressurized water reactors that have not undergone probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This methodology uses existing PRA results and plant operating experience information. Existing PRA-based inspection guidance information recently developed for the NRC for various plants was used to identify generic component failure modes. This information was then combined with plant-specific and industry-wide component information and failure data to identify failure modes and failure mechanisms for the AFW system at the selected plants. Byron and Braidwood were selected for the fourth study in this program. The produce of this effort is a prioritized listing of AFW failures which have occurred at the plants and at other PWRs. This listing is intended for use by NRC inspectors in the preparation of inspection plans addressing AFW risk-important components at the Byron/Braidwood plants. 23 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab.

  8. A Research Roadmap for Computation-Based Human Reliability Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boring, Ronald; Mandelli, Diego; Joe, Jeffrey; Smith, Curtis; Groth, Katrina

    2015-08-01

    The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) is sponsoring research through the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program to extend the life of the currently operating fleet of commercial nuclear power plants. The Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) research pathway within LWRS looks at ways to maintain and improve the safety margins of these plants. The RISMC pathway includes significant developments in the area of thermalhydraulics code modeling and the development of tools to facilitate dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). PRA is primarily concerned with the risk of hardware systems at the plant; yet, hardware reliability is often secondary in overall risk significance to human errors that can trigger or compound undesirable events at the plant. This report highlights ongoing efforts to develop a computation-based approach to human reliability analysis (HRA). This computation-based approach differs from existing static and dynamic HRA approaches in that it: (i) interfaces with a dynamic computation engine that includes a full scope plant model, and (ii) interfaces with a PRA software toolset. The computation-based HRA approach presented in this report is called the Human Unimodels for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) and incorporates in a hybrid fashion elements of existing HRA methods to interface with new computational tools developed under the RISMC pathway. The goal of this research effort is to model human performance more accurately than existing approaches, thereby minimizing modeling uncertainty found in current plant risk models.

  9. A technique for human error analysis (ATHEANA)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cooper, S.E.; Ramey-Smith, A.M.; Wreathall, J.; Parry, G.W.

    1996-05-01

    Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has become an important tool in the nuclear power industry, both for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the operating utilities. Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a critical element of PRA; however, limitations in the analysis of human actions in PRAs have long been recognized as a constraint when using PRA. A multidisciplinary HRA framework has been developed with the objective of providing a structured approach for analyzing operating experience and understanding nuclear plant safety, human error, and the underlying factors that affect them. The concepts of the framework have matured into a rudimentary working HRA method. A trial application of the method has demonstrated that it is possible to identify potentially significant human failure events from actual operating experience which are not generally included in current PRAs, as well as to identify associated performance shaping factors and plant conditions that have an observable impact on the frequency of core damage. A general process was developed, albeit in preliminary form, that addresses the iterative steps of defining human failure events and estimating their probabilities using search schemes. Additionally, a knowledge- base was developed which describes the links between performance shaping factors and resulting unsafe actions.

  10. Accident progression event tree analysis for postulated severe accidents at N Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wyss, G.D.; Camp, A.L.; Miller, L.A.; Dingman, S.E.; Kunsman, D.M. ); Medford, G.T. )

    1990-06-01

    A Level II/III probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has been performed for N Reactor, a Department of Energy (DOE) production reactor located on the Hanford reservation in Washington. The accident progression analysis documented in this report determines how core damage accidents identified in the Level I PRA progress from fuel damage to confinement response and potential releases the environment. The objectives of the study are to generate accident progression data for the Level II/III PRA source term model and to identify changes that could improve plant response under accident conditions. The scope of the analysis is comprehensive, excluding only sabotage and operator errors of commission. State-of-the-art methodology is employed based largely on the methods developed by Sandia for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in support of the NUREG-1150 study. The accident progression model allows complex interactions and dependencies between systems to be explicitly considered. Latin Hypecube sampling was used to assess the phenomenological and systemic uncertainties associated with the primary and confinement system responses to the core damage accident. The results of the analysis show that the N Reactor confinement concept provides significant radiological protection for most of the accident progression pathways studied.

  11. Methodology for the Incorporation of Passive Component Aging Modeling into the RAVEN/ RELAP-7 Environment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mandelli, Diego; Rabiti, Cristian; Cogliati, Joshua; Alfonsi, Andrea; Askin Guler; Tunc Aldemir

    2014-11-01

    Passive system, structure and components (SSCs) will degrade over their operation life and this degradation may cause to reduction in the safety margins of a nuclear power plant. In traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using the event-tree/fault-tree methodology, passive SSC failure rates are generally based on generic plant failure data and the true state of a specific plant is not reflected realistically. To address aging effects of passive SSCs in the traditional PRA methodology [1] does consider physics based models that account for the operating conditions in the plant, however, [1] does not include effects of surveillance/inspection. This paper represents an overall methodology for the incorporation of aging modeling of passive components into the RAVEN/RELAP-7 environment which provides a framework for performing dynamic PRA. Dynamic PRA allows consideration of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties (including those associated with maintenance activities) in a consistent phenomenological and probabilistic framework and is often needed when there is complex process/hardware/software/firmware/ human interaction [2]. Dynamic PRA has gained attention recently due to difficulties in the traditional PRA modeling of aging effects of passive components using physics based models and also in the modeling of digital instrumentation and control systems. RAVEN (Reactor Analysis and Virtual control Environment) [3] is a software package under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) as an online control logic driver and post-processing tool. It is coupled to the plant transient code RELAP-7 (Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program) also currently under development at INL [3], as well as RELAP 5 [4]. The overall methodology aims to: • Address multiple aging mechanisms involving large number of components in a computational feasible manner where sequencing of events is conditioned on the physical conditions predicted in a simulation environment such as RELAP-7. • Identify the risk-significant passive components, their failure modes and anticipated rates of degradation • Incorporate surveillance and maintenance activities and their effects into the plant state and into component aging progress. • Asses aging affects in a dynamic simulation environment 1. C. L. SMITH, V. N. SHAH, T. KAO, G. APOSTOLAKIS, “Incorporating Ageing Effects into Probabilistic Risk Assessment –A Feasibility Study Utilizing Reliability Physics Models,” NUREG/CR-5632, USNRC, (2001). 2. T. ALDEMIR, “A Survey of Dynamic Methodologies for Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Nuclear Power Plants, Annals of Nuclear Energy, 52, 113-124, (2013). 3. C. RABITI, A. ALFONSI, J. COGLIATI, D. MANDELLI and R. KINOSHITA “Reactor Analysis and Virtual Control Environment (RAVEN) FY12 Report,” INL/EXT-12-27351, (2012). 4. D. ANDERS et.al, "RELAP-7 Level 2 Milestone Report: Demonstration of a Steady State Single Phase PWR Simulation with RELAP-7," INL/EXT-12-25924, (2012).

  12. Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization Methods Development Work

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, Curtis L; Ma, Zhegang; Tom Riley; Mandelli, Diego; Nielsen, Joseph W; Alfonsi, Andrea; Rabiti, Cristian

    2014-09-01

    This report summarizes the research activity developed during the Fiscal year 2014 within the Risk Informed Safety Margin and Characterization (RISMC) pathway within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) campaign. This research activity is complementary to the one presented in the INL/EXT-??? report which shows advances Probabilistic Risk Assessment Analysis using RAVEN and RELAP-7 in conjunction to novel flooding simulation tools. Here we present several analyses that prove the values of the RISMC approach in order to assess risk associated to nuclear power plants (NPPs). We focus on simulation based PRA which, in contrast to classical PRA, heavily employs system simulator codes. Firstly we compare, these two types of analyses, classical and RISMC, for a Boiling water reactor (BWR) station black out (SBO) initiating event. Secondly we present an extended BWR SBO analysis using RAVEN and RELAP-5 which address the comments and suggestions received about he original analysis presented in INL/EXT-???. This time we focus more on the stochastic analysis such probability of core damage and on the determination of the most risk-relevant factors. We also show some preliminary results regarding the comparison between RELAP5-3D and the new code RELAP-7 for a simplified Pressurized Water Reactors system. Lastly we present some conceptual ideas regarding the possibility to extended the RISMC capabilities from an off-line tool (i.e., as PRA analysis tool) to an online-tool. In this new configuration, RISMC capabilities can be used to assist and inform reactor operator during real accident scenarios.

  13. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Grand Gulf, Unit 1: Evaluation of severe accident risks for plant operational state 5 during a refueling outage. Main report and appendices, Volume 6, Part 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brown, T.D.; Kmetyk, L.N.; Whitehead, D.; Miller, L.; Forester, J.; Johnson, J.

    1995-03-01

    Traditionally, probabilistic risk assessments (PRAS) of severe accidents in nuclear power plants have considered initiating events potentially occurring only during full power operation. Recent studies and operational experience have, however, implied that accidents during low power and shutdown could be significant contributors to risk. In response to this concern, in 1989 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The program consists of two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (Surry) and Sandia National Laboratories (Grand Gulf). The program objectives include assessing the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than full power operation and comparing the estimated risks with the risk associated with accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The scope of the program is that of a Level-3 PRA. The subject of this report is the PRA of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1. The Grand Gulf plant utilizes a 3833 MWt BUR-6 boiling water reactor housed in a Mark III containment. The Grand Gulf plant is located near Port Gibson, Mississippi. The regime of shutdown analyzed in this study was plant operational state (POS) 5 during a refueling outage, which is approximately Cold Shutdown as defined by Grand Gulf Technical Specifications. The entire PRA of POS 5 is documented in a multi-volume NUREG report (NUREG/CR-6143). The internal events accident sequence analysis (Level 1) is documented in Volume 2. The Level 1 internal fire and internal flood analyses are documented in Vols 3 and 4, respectively.

  14. Review of the Diablo Canyon probabilistic risk assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bozoki, G.E.; Fitzpatrick, R.G.; Bohn, M.P.; Sabek, M.G.; Ravindra, M.K.; Johnson, J.J.

    1994-08-01

    This report details the review of the Diablo Canyon Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DCPRA). The study was performed under contract from the Probabilistic Risk Analysis Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor Research, USNRC by Brookhaven National Laboratory. The DCPRA is a full scope Level I effort and although the review touched on all aspects of the PRA, the internal events and seismic events received the vast majority of the review effort. The report includes a number of independent systems analyses sensitivity studies, importance analyses as well as conclusions on the adequacy of the DCPRA for use in the Diablo Canyon Long Term Seismic Program.

  15. Adaptive Sampling using Support Vector Machines

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    D. Mandelli; C. Smith

    2012-11-01

    Reliability/safety analysis of stochastic dynamic systems (e.g., nuclear power plants, airplanes, chemical plants) is currently performed through a combination of Event-Tress and Fault-Trees. However, these conventional methods suffer from certain drawbacks: Timing of events is not explicitly modeled Ordering of events is preset by the analyst The modeling of complex accident scenarios is driven by expert-judgment For these reasons, there is currently an increasing interest into the development of dynamic PRA methodologies since they can be used to address the deficiencies of conventional methods listed above.

  16. Review of Quantitative Software Reliability Methods

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chu, T.L.; Yue, M.; Martinez-Guridi, M.; Lehner, J.

    2010-09-17

    The current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing process for digital systems rests on deterministic engineering criteria. In its 1995 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) policy statement, the Commission encouraged the use of PRA technology in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data. Although many activities have been completed in the area of risk-informed regulation, the risk-informed analysis process for digital systems has not yet been satisfactorily developed. Since digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are expected to play an increasingly important role in nuclear power plant (NPP) safety, the NRC established a digital system research plan that defines a coherent set of research programs to support its regulatory needs. One of the research programs included in the NRC's digital system research plan addresses risk assessment methods and data for digital systems. Digital I&C systems have some unique characteristics, such as using software, and may have different failure causes and/or modes than analog I&C systems; hence, their incorporation into NPP PRAs entails special challenges. The objective of the NRC's digital system risk research is to identify and develop methods, analytical tools, and regulatory guidance for (1) including models of digital systems into NPP PRAs, and (2) using information on the risks of digital systems to support the NRC's risk-informed licensing and oversight activities. For several years, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has worked on NRC projects to investigate methods and tools for the probabilistic modeling of digital systems, as documented mainly in NUREG/CR-6962 and NUREG/CR-6997. However, the scope of this research principally focused on hardware failures, with limited reviews of software failure experience and software reliability methods. NRC also sponsored research at the Ohio State University investigating the modeling of digital systems using dynamic PRA methods. These efforts, documented in NUREG/CR-6901, NUREG/CR-6942, and NUREG/CR-6985, included a functional representation of the system's software but did not explicitly address failure modes caused by software defects or by inadequate design requirements. An important identified research need is to establish a commonly accepted basis for incorporating the behavior of software into digital I&C system reliability models for use in PRAs. To address this need, BNL is exploring the inclusion of software failures into the reliability models of digital I&C systems, such that their contribution to the risk of the associated NPP can be assessed.

  17. Cloud-based Architecture Capabilities Summary Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vang, Leng; Prescott, Steven R; Smith, Curtis

    2014-09-01

    In collaborating scientific research arena it is important to have an environment where analysts have access to a shared of information documents, software tools and be able to accurately maintain and track historical changes in models. A new cloud-based environment would be accessible remotely from anywhere regardless of computing platforms given that the platform has available of Internet access and proper browser capabilities. Information stored at this environment would be restricted based on user assigned credentials. This report reviews development of a Cloud-based Architecture Capabilities (CAC) as a web portal for PRA tools.

  18. Framework Development Supporting the Safety Portal

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Prescott, Steven Ralph; Kvarfordt, Kellie Jean; Vang, Leng; Smith, Curtis Lee

    2015-07-01

    In a collaborating scientific research arena it is important to have an environment where analysts have access to a shared repository of information, documents, and software tools, and be able to accurately maintain and track historical changes in models. The new Safety Portal cloud-based environment will be accessible remotely from anywhere regardless of computing platforms given that the platform has available Internet access and proper browser capabilities. Information stored at this environment would be restricted based on user assigned credentials. This report discusses current development of a cloud-based web portal for PRA tools.

  19. Modeling and Quantification of Team Performance in Human Reliability Analysis for Probabilistic Risk Assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jeffrey C. JOe; Ronald L. Boring

    2014-06-01

    Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) are important technical contributors to the United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) risk-informed and performance based approach to regulating U.S. commercial nuclear activities. Furthermore, all currently operating commercial NPPs in the U.S. are required by federal regulation to be staffed with crews of operators. Yet, aspects of team performance are underspecified in most HRA methods that are widely used in the nuclear industry. There are a variety of "emergent" team cognition and teamwork errors (e.g., communication errors) that are 1) distinct from individual human errors, and 2) important to understand from a PRA perspective. The lack of robust models or quantification of team performance is an issue that affects the accuracy and validity of HRA methods and models, leading to significant uncertainty in estimating HEPs. This paper describes research that has the objective to model and quantify team dynamics and teamwork within NPP control room crews for risk informed applications, thereby improving the technical basis of HRA, which improves the risk-informed approach the NRC uses to regulate the U.S. commercial nuclear industry.

  20. Advance Liquid Metal Reactor Discrete Dynamic Event Tree/Bayesian Network Analysis and Incident Management Guidelines (Risk Management for Sodium Fast Reactors)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Denman, Matthew R.; Groth, Katrina M.; Cardoni, Jeffrey N.; Wheeler, Timothy A.

    2015-04-01

    Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of self-correcting, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the system's design to manage the accident. Inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, but nonetheless extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety, thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a beyond design basis seismic event with the intend of exploring two issues : (1) can human intervention either improve or worsen the potential end states and (2) can a Bayesian Network be constructed to infer the state of the reactor to inform (1). ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to acknowledge the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy for funding this research through Work Package SR-14SN100303 under the Advanced Reactor Concepts program. The authors also acknowledge the PRA teams at Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Idaho National Laboratory for their continue d contributions to the advanced reactor PRA mission area.

  1. Risk Management for Sodium Fast Reactors.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Denman, Matthew R; Groth, Katrina; Cardoni, Jeffrey N; Wheeler, Timothy A.

    2015-01-01

    Accident management is an important component to maintaining risk at acceptable levels for all complex systems, such as nuclear power plants. With the introduction of self - correcting, or inherently safe, reactor designs the focus has shifted from management by operators to allowing the syste m's design to manage the accident. While inherently and passively safe designs are laudable, extreme boundary conditions can interfere with the design attributes which facilitate inherent safety , thus resulting in unanticipated and undesirable end states. This report examines an inherently safe and small sodium fast reactor experiencing a beyond design basis seismic event with the intend of exploring two issues : (1) can human intervention either improve or worsen the potential end states and (2) can a Bayes ian Network be constructed to infer the state of the reactor to inform (1). ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author s would like to acknowledge the U.S. Department of E nergy's Office of Nuclear Energy for funding this research through Work Package SR - 14SN100303 under the Advanced Reactor Concepts program. The authors also acknowledge the PRA teams at A rgonne N ational L aborator y , O ak R idge N ational L aborator y , and I daho N ational L aborator y for their continue d contributions to the advanced reactor PRA mission area.

  2. Summary of the SRS Severe Accident Analysis Program, 1987--1992

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Long, T.A.; Hyder, M.L.; Britt, T.E.; Allison, D.K.; Chow, S.; Graves, R.D.; DeWald, A.B. Jr.; Monson, P.R. Jr.; Wooten, L.A.

    1992-11-01

    The Severe Accident Analysis Program (SAAP) is a program of experimental and analytical studies aimed at characterizing severe accidents that might occur in the Savannah River Site Production Reactors. The goals of the Severe Accident Analysis Program are: To develop an understanding of severe accidents in SRS reactors that is adequate to support safety documentation for these reactors, including the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), and other studies evaluating the safety of reactor operation; To provide tools and bases for the evaluation of existing or proposed safety related equipment in the SRS reactors; To provide bases for the development of accident management procedures for the SRS reactors; To develop and maintain on the site a sufficient body of knowledge, including documents, computer codes, and cognizant engineers and scientists, that can be used to authoritatively resolve questions or issues related to reactor accidents. The Severe Accident Analysis Program was instituted in 1987 and has already produced a substantial amount of information, and specialized calculational tools. Products of the Severe Accident Analysis Program (listed in Section 9 of this report) have been used in the development of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), and in the development of technical specifications for the SRS reactors. A staff of about seven people is currently involved directly in the program and in providing input on severe accidents to other SRS activities.

  3. MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chanin, D.I. ); Sprung, J.L.; Ritchie, L.T.; Jow, Hong-Nian )

    1990-02-01

    This report describes the MACCS computer code. The purpose of this code is to simulate the impact of severe accidents at nuclear power plants on the surrounding environment. MACCS has been developed for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to replace the previous CRAC2 code, and it incorporates many improvements in modeling flexibility in comparison to CRAC2. The principal phenomena considered in MACCS are atmospheric transport, mitigative actions based on dose projection, dose accumulation by a number of pathways including food and water ingestion, early and latent health effects, and economic costs. The MACCS code can be used for a variety of applications. These include (1) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, (2) sensitivity studies to gain a better understanding of the parameters important to PRA, and (3) cost-benefit analysis. This report is composed of three volumes. This document, Volume 1, the Users's Guide, describes the input data requirements of the MACCS code and provides directions for its use as illustrated by three sample problems.

  4. Preliminary Hazards Analysis Plasma Hearth Process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Aycock, M.; Coordes, D.; Russell, J.; TenBrook, W.; Yimbo, P.

    1993-11-01

    This Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) for the Plasma Hearth Process (PHP) follows the requirements of United States Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23 (DOE, 1992a), DOE Order 5480.21 (DOE, 1991d), DOE Order 5480.22 (DOE, 1992c), DOE Order 5481.1B (DOE, 1986), and the guidance provided in DOE Standards DOE-STD-1027-92 (DOE, 1992b). Consideration is given to ft proposed regulations published as 10 CFR 830 (DOE, 1993) and DOE Safety Guide SG 830.110 (DOE, 1992b). The purpose of performing a PRA is to establish an initial hazard categorization for a DOE nuclear facility and to identify those processes and structures which may have an impact on or be important to safety. The PHA is typically performed during and provides input to project conceptual design. The PRA then is followed by a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) performed during Title I and II design. This PSAR then leads to performance of the Final Safety Analysis Report performed during construction, testing, and acceptance and completed before routine operation. Radiological assessments indicate that a PHP facility, depending on the radioactive material inventory, may be an exempt, Category 3, or Category 2 facility. The calculated impacts would result in no significant impact to offsite personnel or the environment. Hazardous material assessments indicate that a PHP facility will be a Low Hazard facility having no significant impacts either onsite or offsite to personnel and the environment.

  5. SAPHIRE 8 Software Project Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Curtis L.Smith; Ted S. Wood

    2010-03-01

    This project is being conducted at the request of the DOE and the NRC. The INL has been requested by the NRC to improve and maintain the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluation (SAPHIRE) tool set concurrent with the changing needs of the user community as well as staying current with new technologies. Successful completion will be upon NRC approved release of all software and accompanying documentation in a timely fashion. This project will enhance the SAPHIRE tool set for the user community (NRC, Nuclear Power Plant operations, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model developers) by providing improved Common Cause Failure (CCF), External Events, Level 2, and Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis capabilities. The SAPHIRE development team at the Idaho National Laboratory is responsible for successful completion of this project. The project is under the supervision of Curtis L. Smith, PhD, Technical Lead for the SAPHIRE application. All current capabilities from SAPHIRE version 7 will be maintained in SAPHIRE 8. The following additional capabilities will be incorporated: Incorporation of SPAR models for the SDP interface. Improved quality assurance activities for PRA calculations of SAPHIRE Version 8. Continue the current activities for code maintenance, documentation, and user support for the code.

  6. Dynamical systems probabilistic risk assessment.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Denman, Matthew R.; Ames, Arlo Leroy

    2014-03-01

    Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is the primary tool used to risk-inform nuclear power regulatory and licensing activities. Risk-informed regulations are intended to reduce inherent conservatism in regulatory metrics (e.g., allowable operating conditions and technical specifications) which are built into the regulatory framework by quantifying both the total risk profile as well as the change in the risk profile caused by an event or action (e.g., in-service inspection procedures or power uprates). Dynamical Systems (DS) analysis has been used to understand unintended time-dependent feedbacks in both industrial and organizational settings. In dynamical systems analysis, feedback loops can be characterized and studied as a function of time to describe the changes to the reliability of plant Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs). While DS has been used in many subject areas, some even within the PRA community, it has not been applied toward creating long-time horizon, dynamic PRAs (with time scales ranging between days and decades depending upon the analysis). Understanding slowly developing dynamic effects, such as wear-out, on SSC reliabilities may be instrumental in ensuring a safely and reliably operating nuclear fleet. Improving the estimation of a plant's continuously changing risk profile will allow for more meaningful risk insights, greater stakeholder confidence in risk insights, and increased operational flexibility.

  7. Risk-based maintenance modeling. Prioritization of maintenance importances and quantification of maintenance effectiveness

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vesely, W.E.; Rezos, J.T.

    1995-09-01

    This report describes methods for prioritizing the risk importances of maintenances using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Approaches then are described for quantifying their reliability and risk effects. Two different PRA importance measures, minimal cutset importances and risk reduction importances, were used to prioritize maintenances; the findings show that both give similar results if appropriate criteria are used. The justifications for the particular importance measures also are developed. The methods developed to quantify the reliability and risk effects of maintenance actions are extensions of the usual reliability models now used in PRAs. These extended models consider degraded states of the component, and quantify the benefits of maintenance in correcting degradations and preventing failures. The negative effects of maintenance, including downtimes, also are included. These models are specific types of Markov models. The data for these models can be obtained from plant maintenance logs and from the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS). To explore the potential usefulness of these models, the authors analyzed a range of postulated values of input data. These models were used to examine maintenance effects on a components reliability and performance for various maintenance programs and component data. Maintenance schedules were analyzed to optimize the component`s availability. In specific cases, the effects of maintenance were found to be large.

  8. Feasibility of developing risk-based rankings of pressure boundary systems for inservice inspection

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vo, T.V.; Smith, B.W.; Simonen, F.A.; Gore, B.F.

    1994-08-01

    The goals of the Evaluation and Improvement of Non-destructive Examination Reliability for the In-service Inspection of Light Water Reactors Program sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) are to (1) assess current ISI techniques and requirements for all pressure boundary systems and components, (2) determine if improvements to the requirements are needed, and (3) if necessary, develop recommendations for revising the applicable ASME Codes and regulatory requirements. In evaluating approaches that could be used to provide a technical basis for improved inservice inspection plans, PNL has developed and applied a method that uses results of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to establish piping system ISI requirements. In the PNL program, the feasibility of generic ISI requirements is being addressed in two phases. Phase I involves identifying and prioritizing the systems most relevant to plant safety. The results of these evaluations will be later consolidated into requirements for comprehensive inservice inspection of nuclear power plant components that will be developed in Phase II. This report presents Phase I evaluations for eight selected plants and attempts to compare these PRA-based inspection priorities with current ASME Section XI requirements for Class 1, 2 and 3 systems. These results show that there are generic insights that can be extrapolated from the selected plants to specific classes of light water reactors.

  9. Integrated Risk Assessment for the LaSalle Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Phenomenology and Risk Uncertainty Evaluation Program (PRUEP), MELCOR code calculations. Volume 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shaffer, C.J. [Science and Engineering Associates, Albuquerque, NM (United States); Miller, L.A.; Payne, A.C. Jr.

    1992-10-01

    A Level III Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been performed for LaSalle Unit 2 under the Risk Methods Integration and Evaluation Program (RMIEP) and the Phenomenology and Risk Uncertainty Evaluation Program (PRUEP). This report documents the phenomenological calculations and sources of. uncertainty in the calculations performed with HELCOR in support of the Level II portion of the PRA. These calculations are an integral part of the Level II analysis since they provide quantitative input to the Accident Progression Event Tree (APET) and Source Term Model (LASSOR). However, the uncertainty associated with the code results must be considered in the use of the results. The MELCOR calculations performed include four integrated calculations: (1) a high-pressure short-term station blackout, (2) a low-pressure short-term station blackout, (3) an intermediate-term station blackout, and (4) a long-term station blackout. Several sensitivity studies investigating the effect of variations in containment failure size and location, as well as hydrogen ignition concentration are also documented.

  10. Air ingression calculations for selected plant transients using MELCOR

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kmetyk, L.N.

    1994-01-01

    Two sets of MELCOR calculations have been completed studying the effects of air ingression on the consequences of various severe accident scenarios. One set of calculations analyzed a station blackout with surge line failure prior to vessel breach, starting from nominal operating conditions; the other set of calculations analyzed a station blackout occurring during shutdown (refueling) conditions. Both sets of analyses were for the Surry plant, a three-loop Westinghouse PWR. For both accident scenarios, a basecase calculation was done, and then repeated with air ingression from containment into the core region following core degradation and vessel failure. In addition to the two sets of analyses done for this program, a similar air-ingression sensitivity study was done as part of a low-power/shutdown PRA, with results summarized here; that PRA study also analyzed a station blackout occurring during shutdown (refueling) conditions, but for the Grand Gulf plant, a BWR/6 with Mark III containment. These studies help quantify the amount of air that would have to enter the core region to have a significant impact on the severe accident scenario, and demonstrate that one effect, of air ingression is substantial enhancement of ruthenium release. These calculations also show that, while the core clad temperatures rise more quickly due to oxidation with air rather than steam, the core also degrades and relocates more quickly, so that no sustained, enhanced core heatup is predicted to occur with air ingression.

  11. Analysis of Kuosheng Station Blackout Accident Using MELCOR 1.8.4

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wang, S.-J.; Chien, C.-S.; Wang, T.-C.; Chiang, K.-S

    2000-11-15

    The MELCOR code, developed by Sandia National Laboratories, is a fully integrated, relatively fast-running code that models the progression of severe accidents in commercial light water nuclear power plants (NPPs).A specific station blackout (SBO) accident for Kuosheng (BWR-6) NPP is simulated using the MELCOR 1.8.4 code. The MELCOR input deck for Kuosheng NPP is established based on Kuosheng NPP design data and the MELCOR users' guides. The initial steady-state conditions are generated with a developed self-initialization algorithm. The main severe accident phenomena and the fission product release fractions associated with the SBO accident were simulated. The predicted results are plausible and as expected in light of current understanding of severe accident phenomena. The uncertainty of this analysis is briefly discussed. The important features of the MELCOR 1.8.4 are described. The estimated results provide useful information for the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of Kuosheng NPP. This tool will be applied to the PRA, the severe accident analysis, and the severe accident management study of Kuosheng NPP in the near future.

  12. Integrated Risk Assessment for the LaSalle Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Phenomenology and Risk Uncertainty Evaluation Program (PRUEP), MELCOR code calculations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shaffer, C.J. (Science and Engineering Associates, Albuquerque, NM (United States)); Miller, L.A.; Payne, A.C. Jr.

    1992-10-01

    A Level III Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been performed for LaSalle Unit 2 under the Risk Methods Integration and Evaluation Program (RMIEP) and the Phenomenology and Risk Uncertainty Evaluation Program (PRUEP). This report documents the phenomenological calculations and sources of. uncertainty in the calculations performed with HELCOR in support of the Level II portion of the PRA. These calculations are an integral part of the Level II analysis since they provide quantitative input to the Accident Progression Event Tree (APET) and Source Term Model (LASSOR). However, the uncertainty associated with the code results must be considered in the use of the results. The MELCOR calculations performed include four integrated calculations: (1) a high-pressure short-term station blackout, (2) a low-pressure short-term station blackout, (3) an intermediate-term station blackout, and (4) a long-term station blackout. Several sensitivity studies investigating the effect of variations in containment failure size and location, as well as hydrogen ignition concentration are also documented.

  13. Optimization Method to Branch and Bound Large SBO State Spaces Under Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment via use of LENDIT Scales and S2R2 Sets

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Joseph W. Nielsen; Akira Tokurio; Robert Hiromoto; Jivan Khatry

    2014-06-01

    Traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods have been developed and are quite effective in evaluating risk associated with complex systems, but lack the capability to evaluate complex dynamic systems. These time and energy scales associated with the transient may vary as a function of transition time to a different physical state. Dynamic PRA (DPRA) methods provide a more rigorous analysis of complex dynamic systems, while complete, results in issues associated with combinatorial explosion. In order to address the combinatorial complexity arising from the number of possible state configurations and discretization of transition times, a characteristic scaling metric (LENDIT length, energy, number, distribution, information and time) is proposed as a means to describe systems uniformly and thus provide means to describe relational constraints expected in the dynamics of a complex (coupled) systems. Thus when LENDIT is used to characterize four sets state, system, resource and response (S2R2) describing reactor operations (normal and off-normal), LENDIT and S2R2 in combination have the potential to branch and bound the state space investigated by DPRA. In this paper we introduce the concept of LENDIT scales and S2R2 sets applied to a branch-and-bound algorithm and apply the methods to a station black out transient (SBO).

  14. MC&A System Effectiveness Tool (MSET) (Presentation 2)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H

    2011-01-01

    MSET is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's material control and accountability (MC&A) system. MSET analyzes the effectiveness of an MC&A system based on defined performance metrics for MC&A functions defined based on U.S. and international best practices and regulations. MSET analysis is based on performance of the entire MC&A system including defense-in-depth attributes and sensitivity analysis of changes in the system, both positive and negative. MSET analysis considers: accounting; containment; access control; surveillance capabilities of the system; and other interfaces with the physical protection systems that provide detection of an unauthorized action. MSET performs a system effectiveness calculation evaluation against a defined performance metric. MSET uses PRA techniques to analyze the MC&A system. MSET is a tool for evaluating the system effectiveness of MC&A systems during self-assessment or external inspection. MSET has been developed, tested, and benchmarked by the U.S. DOE. In collaboration with the U.S. DOE, Rosatom is developing a Russian version (MSET-R) planned for pilot implementation at select material balance areas in 2011. MSET has been shown to be an effective training and communication tool for MC&A.

  15. Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) GEM Manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C. L. Smith; J. Schroeder; S. T. Beck

    2008-08-01

    The Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) is a software application developed for performing a complete probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using a personal computer running the Microsoft Windows? operating system. SAPHIRE is primarily funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The INL's primary role in this project is that of software developer and tester. Using the SAPHIRE analysis engine and relational database is a complementary program called GEM. GEM has been designed to simplify using existing PRA analysis for activities such as the NRC’s Accident Sequence Precursor program. In this report, the theoretical framework behind GEM-type calculations are discussed in addition to providing guidance and examples for performing evaluations when using the GEM software. As part of this analysis framework, the two types of GEM analysis are outlined, specifically initiating event (where an initiator occurs) and condition (where a component is failed for some length of time) assessments.

  16. Code cases for implementing risk-based inservice testing in the ASME OM code

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rowley, C.W.

    1996-12-01

    Historically inservice testing has been reasonably effective, but quite costly. Recent applications of plant PRAs to the scope of the IST program have demonstrated that of the 30 pumps and 500 valves in the typical plant IST program, less than half of the pumps and ten percent of the valves are risk significant. The way the ASME plans to tackle this overly-conservative scope for IST components is to use the PRA and plant expert panels to create a two tier IST component categorization scheme. The PRA provides the quantitative risk information and the plant expert panel blends the quantitative and deterministic information to place the IST component into one of two categories: More Safety Significant Component (MSSC) or Less Safety Significant Component (LSSC). With all the pumps and valves in the IST program placed in MSSC or LSSC categories, two different testing strategies will be applied. The testing strategies will be unique for the type of component, such as centrifugal pump, positive displacement pump, MOV, AOV, SOV, SRV, PORV, HOV, CV, and MV. A series of OM Code Cases are being developed to capture this process for a plant to use. One Code Case will be for Component Importance Ranking. The remaining Code Cases will develop the MSSC and LSSC testing strategy for type of component. These Code Cases are planned for publication in early 1997. Later, after some industry application of the Code Cases, the alternative Code Case requirements will gravitate to the ASME OM Code as appendices.

  17. Technical Needs for Enhancing Risk Monitors with Equipment Condition Assessment for Advanced Small Modular Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coble, Jamie B.; Coles, Garill A.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep; Meyer, Ryan M.; Berglin, Eric J.; Wootan, David W.; Mitchell, Mark R.

    2013-04-04

    Advanced small modular reactors (aSMRs) can provide the United States with a safe, sustainable, and carbon-neutral energy source. The controllable day-to-day costs of aSMRs are expected to be dominated by operation and maintenance costs. Health and condition assessment coupled with online risk monitors can potentially enhance affordability of aSMRs through optimized operational planning and maintenance scheduling. Currently deployed risk monitors are an extension of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). For complex engineered systems like nuclear power plants, PRA systematically combines event likelihoods and the probability of failure (POF) of key components, so that when combined with the magnitude of possible adverse consequences to determine risk. Traditional PRA uses population-based POF information to estimate the average plant risk over time. Currently, most nuclear power plants have a PRA that reflects the as-operated, as-modified plant; this model is updated periodically, typically once a year. Risk monitors expand on living PRA by incorporating changes in the day-by-day plant operation and configuration (e.g., changes in equipment availability, operating regime, environmental conditions). However, population-based POF (or population- and time-based POF) is still used to populate fault trees. Health monitoring techniques can be used to establish condition indicators and monitoring capabilities that indicate the component-specific POF at a desired point in time (or over a desired period), which can then be incorporated in the risk monitor to provide a more accurate estimate of the plant risk in different configurations. This is particularly important for active systems, structures, and components (SSCs) proposed for use in aSMR designs. These SSCs may differ significantly from those used in the operating fleet of light-water reactors (or even in LWR-based SMR designs). Additionally, the operating characteristics of aSMRs can present significantly different requirements, including the need to operate in different coolant environments, higher operating temperatures, and longer operating cycles between planned refueling and maintenance outages. These features, along with the relative lack of operating experience for some of the proposed advanced designs, may limit the ability to estimate event probability and component POF with a high degree of certainty. Incorporating real-time estimates of component POF may compensate for a relative lack of established knowledge about the long-term component behavior and improve operational and maintenance planning and optimization. The particular eccentricities of advanced reactors and small modular reactors provide unique challenges and needs for advanced instrumentation, control, and human-machine interface (ICHMI) techniques such as enhanced risk monitors (ERM) in aSMRs. Several features of aSMR designs increase the need for accurate characterization of the real-time risk during operation and maintenance activities. A number of technical gaps in realizing ERM exist, and these gaps are largely independent of the specific reactor technology. As a result, the development of a framework for ERM would enable greater situational awareness regardless of the specific class of reactor technology. A set of research tasks are identified in a preliminary research plan to enable the development, testing, and demonstration of such a framework. Although some aspects of aSMRs, such as specific operational characteristics, will vary and are not now completely defined, the proposed framework is expected to be relevant regardless of such uncertainty. The development of an ERM framework will provide one of the key technical developments necessary to ensure the economic viability of aSMRs.

  18. Impact of Passive Safety on FHR Instrumentation Systems Design and Classification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Holcomb, David Eugene

    2015-01-01

    Fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactors (FHRs) will rely more extensively on passive safety than earlier reactor classes. 10CFR50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, establishes minimum design requirements to provide reasonable assurance of adequate safety. 10CFR50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors, provides guidance on how the safety significance of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) should be reflected in their regulatory treatment. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has provided 10 CFR 50.69 SSC Categorization Guideline (NEI-00-04) that factors in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model insights, as well as deterministic insights, through an integrated decision-making panel. Employing the PRA to inform deterministic requirements enables an appropriately balanced, technically sound categorization to be established. No FHR currently has an adequate PRA or set of design basis accidents to enable establishing the safety classification of its SSCs. While all SSCs used to comply with the general design criteria (GDCs) will be safety related, the intent is to limit the instrumentation risk significance through effective design and reliance on inherent passive safety characteristics. For example, FHRs have no safety-significant temperature threshold phenomena, thus, enabling the primary and reserve reactivity control systems required by GDC 26 to be passively, thermally triggered at temperatures well below those for which core or primary coolant boundary damage would occur. Moreover, the passive thermal triggering of the primary and reserve shutdown systems may relegate the control rod drive motors to the control system, substantially decreasing the amount of safety-significant wiring needed. Similarly, FHR decay heat removal systems are intended to be running continuously to minimize the amount of safety-significant instrumentation needed to initiate operation of systems and components important to safety as required in GDC 20. This paper provides an overview of the design process employed to develop a pre-conceptual FHR instrumentation architecture intended to lower plant capital and operational costs by minimizing reliance on expensive, safety related, safety-significant instrumentation through the use of inherent passive features of FHRs.

  19. EPRI/NRC-RES fire human reliability analysis guidelines.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lewis, Stuart R.; Cooper, Susan E.; Najafi, Bijan; Collins, Erin; Hannaman, Bill; Kohlhepp, Kaydee; Grobbelaar, Jan; Hill, Kendra; Hendrickson, Stacey M. Langfitt; Forester, John Alan; Julius, Jeff

    2010-03-01

    During the 1990s, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed methods for fire risk analysis to support its utility members in the preparation of responses to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, 'Individual Plant Examination - External Events' (IPEEE). This effort produced a Fire Risk Assessment methodology for operations at power that was used by the majority of U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) in support of the IPEEE program and several NPPs overseas. Although these methods were acceptable for accomplishing the objectives of the IPEEE, EPRI and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognized that they required upgrades to support current requirements for risk-informed, performance-based (RI/PB) applications. In 2001, EPRI and the USNRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) embarked on a cooperative project to improve the state-of-the-art in fire risk assessment to support a new risk-informed environment in fire protection. This project produced a consensus document, NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989), entitled 'Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities' which addressed fire risk for at power operations. NUREG/CR-6850 developed high level guidance on the process for identification and inclusion of human failure events (HFEs) into the fire PRA (FPRA), and a methodology for assigning quantitative screening values to these HFEs. It outlined the initial considerations of performance shaping factors (PSFs) and related fire effects that may need to be addressed in developing best-estimate human error probabilities (HEPs). However, NUREG/CR-6850 did not describe a methodology to develop best-estimate HEPs given the PSFs and the fire-related effects. In 2007, EPRI and RES embarked on another cooperative project to develop explicit guidance for estimating HEPs for human failure events under fire generated conditions, building upon existing human reliability analysis (HRA) methods. This document provides a methodology and guidance for conducting a fire HRA. This process includes identification and definition of post-fire human failure events, qualitative analysis, quantification, recovery, dependency, and uncertainty. This document provides three approaches to quantification: screening, scoping, and detailed HRA. Screening is based on the guidance in NUREG/CR-6850, with some additional guidance for scenarios with long time windows. Scoping is a new approach to quantification developed specifically to support the iterative nature of fire PRA quantification. Scoping is intended to provide less conservative HEPs than screening, but requires fewer resources than a detailed HRA analysis. For detailed HRA quantification, guidance has been developed on how to apply existing methods to assess post-fire fire HEPs.

  20. Incorporating Equipment Condition Assessment in Risk Monitors for Advanced Small Modular Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coble, Jamie B.; Coles, Garill A.; Meyer, Ryan M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep

    2013-10-01

    Advanced small modular reactors (aSMRs) can complement the current fleet of large light-water reactors in the USA for baseload and peak demand power production and process heat applications (e.g., water desalination, shale oil extraction, hydrogen production). The day-to-day costs of aSMRs are expected to be dominated by operations and maintenance (O&M); however, the effect of diverse operating missions and unit modularity on O&M is not fully understood. These costs could potentially be reduced by optimized scheduling, with risk-informed scheduling of maintenance, repair, and replacement of equipment. Currently, most nuclear power plants have a living probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which reflects the as-operated, as-modified plant and combine event probabilities with population-based probability of failure (POF) for key components. Risk monitors extend the PRA by incorporating the actual and dynamic plant configuration (equipment availability, operating regime, environmental conditions, etc.) into risk assessment. In fact, PRAs are more integrated into plant management in todays nuclear power plants than at any other time in the history of nuclear power. However, population-based POF curves are still used to populate fault trees; this approach neglects the time-varying condition of equipment that is relied on during standard and non-standard configurations. Equipment condition monitoring techniques can be used to estimate the component POF. Incorporating this unit-specific estimate of POF in the risk monitor can provide a more accurate estimate of risk in different operating and maintenance configurations. This enhanced risk assessment will be especially important for aSMRs that have advanced component designs, which dont have an available operating history to draw from, and often use passive design features, which present challenges to PRA. This paper presents the requirements and technical gaps for developing a framework to integrate unit-specific estimates of POF into risk monitors, resulting in enhanced risk monitors that support optimized operation and maintenance of aSMRs.

  1. Nuclear Material Control and Accountability System Effectiveness Tool (MSET)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H; Roche, Charles T; Campbell, Billy J; Hammond, Glenn A; Meppen, Bruce W; Brown, Richard F

    2011-01-01

    A nuclear material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) has been developed in the United States for use in evaluating material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) systems in nuclear facilities. The project was commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation. MSET was developed by personnel with experience spanning more than six decades in both the U.S. and international nuclear programs and with experience in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in the nuclear power industry. MSET offers significant potential benefits for improving nuclear safeguards and security in any nation with a nuclear program. MSET provides a design basis for developing an MC&A system at a nuclear facility that functions to protect against insider theft or diversion of nuclear materials. MSET analyzes the system and identifies several risk importance factors that show where sustainability is essential for optimal performance and where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. MSET contains five major components: (1) A functional model that shows how to design, build, implement, and operate a robust nuclear MC&A system (2) A fault tree of the operating MC&A system that adapts PRA methodology to analyze system effectiveness and give a relative risk of failure assessment of the system (3) A questionnaire used to document the facility's current MPC&A system (provides data to evaluate the quality of the system and the level of performance of each basic task performed throughout the material balance area [MBA]) (4) A formal process of applying expert judgment to convert the facility questionnaire data into numeric values representing the performance level of each basic event for use in the fault tree risk assessment calculations (5) PRA software that performs the fault tree risk assessment calculations and produces risk importance factor reports on the facility's MC&A (software widely used in the aerospace, chemical, and nuclear power industries) MSET was peer reviewed in 2007 and validated in 2008 by benchmark testing at the Idaho National Laboratory in the United States. The MSET documents were translated into Russian and provided to Rosatom in July of 2008, and MSET is currently being evaluated for potential application in Russian Nuclear Facilities.

  2. Risk-Informing Safety Reviews for Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mubayi, V.; Azarm, A.; Yue, M.; Mukaddam, W.; Good, G.; Gonzalez, F.; Bari, R.A.

    2011-03-13

    This paper describes a methodology used to model potential accidents in fuel cycle facilities that employ chemical processes to separate and purify nuclear materials. The methodology is illustrated with an example that uses event and fault trees to estimate the frequency of a specific energetic reaction that can occur in nuclear material processing facilities. The methodology used probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)-related tools as well as information about the chemical reaction characteristics, information on plant design and operational features, and generic data about component failure rates and human error rates. The accident frequency estimates for the specific reaction help to risk-inform the safety review process and assess compliance with regulatory requirements.

  3. Effect of recirculation pump trip following anticipated transients without scram at Big Rock Point

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lyon, R.E.

    1981-08-01

    As requested by the US Atomic Energy Commission (now US Nuclear Regulatory Commission) in their Technical Report on Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) for Water-Cooled Reactors (WASH-1270), Consumers Power Company has submitted analyses which describe the response of their Big Rock Point (BRP) Plant to ATWS. The original analyses were submitted on Febuary 21, 1975, and results indicated that a recirculation pump trip (RPT) was effective in limiting the consequences of an ATWS. The response of BRP to an ATWS was reanalyzed as a part of the Big Rock Point Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Results of the analysis were submitted on February 26, 1981, with the conclusion that automatic RPT provides little safety improvement at BRP. Purpose of this report is to evaluate the submitted analyses to determine the effectiveness of Recirculation Pump Trip in ATWS recovery.

  4. Analysis of core damage frequency: Peach Bottom, Unit 2 internal events

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kolaczkowski, A.M.; Cramond, W.R.; Sype, T.T.; Maloney, K.J.; Wheeler, T.A.; Daniel, S.L.; Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM )

    1989-08-01

    This document contains the appendices for the accident sequence analysis of internally initiated events for the Peach Bottom, Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant. This is one of the five plant analyses conducted as part of the NUREG-1150 effort for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The work performed and described here is an extensive reanalysis of that published in October 1986 as NUREG/CR-4550, Volume 4. It addresses comments from numerous reviewers and significant changes to the plant systems and procedures made since the first report. The uncertainty analysis and presentation of results are also much improved, and considerable effort was expended on an improved analysis of loss of offsite power. The content and detail of this report is directed toward PRA practitioners who need to know how the work was done and the details for use in further studies. 58 refs., 58 figs., 52 tabs.

  5. Grid Inertial Response-Based Probabilistic Determination of Energy Storage System Capacity Under High Solar Penetration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Yue, Meng; Wang, Xiaoyu

    2015-07-01

    It is well-known that responsive battery energy storage systems (BESSs) are an effective means to improve the grid inertial response to various disturbances including the variability of the renewable generation. One of the major issues associated with its implementation is the difficulty in determining the required BESS capacity mainly due to the large amount of inherent uncertainties that cannot be accounted for deterministically. In this study, a probabilistic approach is proposed to properly size the BESS from the perspective of the system inertial response, as an application of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The proposed approach enables a risk-informed decision-making process regarding (1) the acceptable level of solar penetration in a given system and (2) the desired BESS capacity (and minimum cost) to achieve an acceptable grid inertial response with a certain confidence level.

  6. Exploratory Nuclear Reactor Safety Analysis and Visualization via Integrated Topological and Geometric Techniques

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dan Maljovec; Bei Wang; Valerio Pascucci; Peer-Timo Bremer; Diego Mandelli; Michael Pernice; Robert Nourgaliev

    2013-10-01

    A recent trend in the nuclear power engineering field is the implementation of heavily computational and time consuming algorithms and codes for both design and safety analysis. In particular, the new generation of system analysis codes aim to embrace several phenomena such as thermo-hydraulic, structural behavior, and system dynamics, as well as uncertainty quantification and sensitivity analyses. The use of dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodologies allows a systematic approach to uncertainty quantification. Dynamic methodologies in PRA account for possible coupling between triggered or stochastic events through explicit consideration of the time element in system evolution, often through the use of dynamic system models (simulators). They are usually needed when the system has more than one failure mode, control loops, and/or hardware/process/software/human interaction. Dynamic methodologies are also capable of modeling the consequences of epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. The Monte-Carlo (MC) and the Dynamic Event Tree (DET) approaches belong to this new class of dynamic PRA methodologies. The major challenges in using MC and DET methodologies (as well as other dynamic methodologies) are the heavier computational and memory requirements compared to the classical ET analysis. This is due to the fact that each branch generated can contain time evolutions of a large number of variables (about 50,000 data channels are typically present in RELAP) and a large number of scenarios can be generated from a single initiating event (possibly on the order of hundreds or even thousands). Such large amounts of information are usually very difficult to organize in order to identify the main trends in scenario evolutions and the main risk contributors for each initiating event. This report aims to improve Dynamic PRA methodologies by tackling the two challenges mentioned above using: 1) adaptive sampling techniques to reduce computational cost of the analysis and 2) topology-based methodologies to interactively visualize multidimensional data and extract risk-informed insights. Regarding item 1) we employ learning algorithms that aim to infer/predict simulation outcome and decide the coordinate in the input space of the next sample that maximize the amount of information that can be gained from it. Such methodologies can be used to both explore and exploit the input space. The later one is especially used for safety analysis scopes to focus samples along the limit surface, i.e. the boundaries in the input space between system failure and system success. Regarding item 2) we present a software tool that is designed to analyze multi-dimensional data. We model a large-scale nuclear simulation dataset as a high-dimensional scalar function defined over a discrete sample of the domain. First, we provide structural analysis of such a function at multiple scales and provide insight into the relationship between the input parameters and the output. Second, we enable exploratory analysis for users, where we help the users to differentiate features from noise through multi-scale analysis on an interactive platform, based on domain knowledge and data characterization. Our analysis is performed by exploiting the topological and geometric properties of the domain, building statistical models based on its topological segmentations and providing interactive visual interfaces to facilitate such explorations.

  7. Handbook of human-reliability analysis with emphasis on nuclear power plant applications. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Swain, A D; Guttmann, H E

    1983-08-01

    The primary purpose of the Handbook is to present methods, models, and estimated human error probabilities (HEPs) to enable qualified analysts to make quantitative or qualitative assessments of occurrences of human errors in nuclear power plants (NPPs) that affect the availability or operational reliability of engineered safety features and components. The Handbook is intended to provide much of the modeling and information necessary for the performance of human reliability analysis (HRA) as a part of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of NPPs. Although not a design guide, a second purpose of the Handbook is to enable the user to recognize error-likely equipment design, plant policies and practices, written procedures, and other human factors problems so that improvements can be considered. The Handbook provides the methodology to identify and quantify the potential for human error in NPP tasks.

  8. Performing Probabilistic Risk Assessment Through RAVEN

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    A. Alfonsi; C. Rabiti; D. Mandelli; J. Cogliati; R. Kinoshita

    2013-06-01

    The Reactor Analysis and Virtual control ENviroment (RAVEN) code is a software tool that acts as the control logic driver and post-processing engine for the newly developed Thermal-Hydraulic code RELAP-7. RAVEN is now a multi-purpose Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) software framework that allows dispatching different functionalities: Derive and actuate the control logic required to simulate the plant control system and operator actions (guided procedures), allowing on-line monitoring/controlling in the Phase Space Perform both Monte-Carlo sampling of random distributed events and Dynamic Event Tree based analysis Facilitate the input/output handling through a Graphical User Interface (GUI) and a post-processing data mining module

  9. New time-line technique for station blackout core-melt analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stutzke, M.A.

    1986-01-01

    Florida Power Corporation (FPC) has developed a new method for analyzing station blackout (SBO) core-melt accidents. This method, created during the recent probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3), originated from the need to analyze the interactions among the two-train emergency feedwater (EFW) system, station batteries, and diesel generators (DGs) following a loss of off-site power (LOSP) event. SBO core-melt sequences for CR-3 are unique since the time core-melt commences depends on which DG fails last. The purpose of this paper is to outline the new method of analysis of SBO core-melt accidents at CR-3. The significance of SBO core-melt accidents to total plant risk, along with the efficacy of various methods to reduce SBO risk, are also discussed.

  10. Risk-based inspection guide for Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, B.W.; Dukelow, J.S.; Vo, T.V.; Harris, M.S.; Gore, B.F.; Hunt, S.T. )

    1991-06-01

    The Level 1 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) has been analyzed to identify plant systems and components important to minimizing public risk, as measured by system contributions to plant core damage frequency, and to identify the primary failure modes for these components. The report presents a series of tables, organized by system and prioritized by risk importance, which identify components associated with 98% of the inspectable risk due to plant operation. The systems addressed, in descending order to risk importance are: Low Pressure Injection, AC Power, Service Water, Demineralized Water, High Pressure Injection, DC Power, Emergency Feedwater, Reactor Coolant Pressure Control, and Power Conversion. This ranking is based on the Fussell-Vesely measure of risk importance, i.e., the fraction of the total core damage frequency which involves failures of the system of interest. 3 refs., 9 figs., 13 tabs.

  11. Human Events Reference for ATHEANA (HERA) Database Description and Preliminary User's Manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Auflick, J.L.

    1999-08-12

    The Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) is a newly developed human reliability analysis (HRA) methodology that aims to facilitate better representation and integration of human performance into probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) modeling and quantification by analyzing risk-significant operating experience in the context of existing behavioral science models. The fundamental premise of ATHEANA is that error forcing contexts (EFCs), which refer to combinations of equipment/material conditions and performance shaping factors (PSFs), set up or create the conditions under which unsafe actions (UAs) can occur. Because ATHEANA relies heavily on the analysis of operational events that have already occurred as a mechanism for generating creative thinking about possible EFCs, a database (db) of analytical operational events, called the Human Events Reference for ATHEANA (HERA), has been developed to support the methodology. This report documents the initial development efforts for HERA.

  12. Human events reference for ATHEANA (HERA) database description and preliminary user`s manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Auflick, J.L.; Hahn, H.A.; Pond, D.J.

    1998-05-27

    The Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) is a newly developed human reliability analysis (HRA) methodology that aims to facilitate better representation and integration of human performance into probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) modeling and quantification by analyzing risk-significant operating experience in the context of existing behavioral science models. The fundamental premise of ATHEANA is that error-forcing contexts (EFCs), which refer to combinations of equipment/material conditions and performance shaping factors (PSFs), set up or create the conditions under which unsafe actions (UAs) can occur. Because ATHEANA relies heavily on the analysis of operational events that have already occurred as a mechanism for generating creative thinking about possible EFCs, a database, called the Human Events Reference for ATHEANA (HERA), has been developed to support the methodology. This report documents the initial development efforts for HERA.

  13. Modeling the thermal and structural response of engineered systems to abnormal environments

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Skocypec, R.D.; Thomas, R.K.; Moya, J.L.

    1993-10-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is engaged actively in research to improve the ability to accurately predict the response of engineered systems to thermal and structural abnormal environments. Abnormal environments that will be addressed in this paper include: fire, impact, and puncture by probes and fragments, as well as a combination of all of the above. Historically, SNL has demonstrated the survivability of engineered systems to abnormal environments using a balanced approach between numerical simulation and testing. It is necessary to determine the response of engineered systems in two cases: (1) to satisfy regulatory specifications, and (2) to enable quantification of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). In a regulatory case, numerical simulation of system response is generally used to guide the system design such that the system will respond satisfactorily to the specified regulatory abnormal environment. Testing is conducted at the regulatory abnormal environment to ensure compliance.

  14. RAVEN as a tool for dynamic probabilistic risk assessment: Software overview

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alfonsi, A.; Rabiti, C.; Mandelli, D.; Cogliati, J. J.; Kinoshita, R. A.

    2013-07-01

    RAVEN is a software tool under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) that acts as the control logic driver and post-processing tool for the newly developed Thermal-Hydraulic code RELAP-7. The scope of this paper is to show the software structure of RAVEN and its utilization in connection with RELAP-7. A short overview of the mathematical framework behind the code is presented along with its main capabilities such as on-line controlling/ monitoring and Monte-Carlo sampling. A demo of a Station Black Out PRA analysis of a simplified Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model is shown in order to demonstrate the Monte-Carlo and clustering capabilities. (authors)

  15. Grid Inertial Response-Based Probabilistic Determination of Energy Storage System Capacity Under High Solar Penetration

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Yue, Meng; Wang, Xiaoyu

    2015-07-01

    It is well-known that responsive battery energy storage systems (BESSs) are an effective means to improve the grid inertial response to various disturbances including the variability of the renewable generation. One of the major issues associated with its implementation is the difficulty in determining the required BESS capacity mainly due to the large amount of inherent uncertainties that cannot be accounted for deterministically. In this study, a probabilistic approach is proposed to properly size the BESS from the perspective of the system inertial response, as an application of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The proposed approach enables a risk-informed decision-making processmore » regarding (1) the acceptable level of solar penetration in a given system and (2) the desired BESS capacity (and minimum cost) to achieve an acceptable grid inertial response with a certain confidence level.« less

  16. RAVEN AS A TOOL FOR DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT: SOFTWARE OVERVIEW

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alfonsi Andrea; Mandelli Diego; Rabiti Cristian; Joshua Cogliati; Robert Kinoshita

    2013-05-01

    RAVEN is a software tool under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) that acts as the control logic driver and post-processing tool for the newly developed Thermo-Hydraylic code RELAP- 7. The scope of this paper is to show the software structure of RAVEN and its utilization in connection with RELAP-7. A short overview of the mathematical framework behind the code is presented along with its main capabilities such as on-line controlling/monitoring and Monte-Carlo sampling. A demo of a Station Black Out PRA analysis of a simplified Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model is shown in order to demonstrate the Monte-Carlo and clustering capabilities.

  17. Integrated systems analysis of the PIUS reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fullwood, F.; Kroeger, P.; Higgins, J.

    1993-11-01

    Results are presented of a systems failure analysis of the PIUS plant systems that are used during normal reactor operation and postulated accidents. This study was performed to provide the NRC with an understanding of the behavior of the plant. The study applied two diverse failure identification methods, Failure Modes Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Hazards & Operability (HAZOP) to the plant systems, supported by several deterministic analyses. Conventional PRA methods were also used along with a scheme for classifying events by initiator frequency and combinations of failures. Principal results of this study are: (a) an extensive listing of potential event sequences, grouped in categories that can be used by the NRC, (b) identification of support systems that are important to safety, and (c) identification of key operator actions.

  18. RAVEN. Dynamic Event Tree Approach Level III Milestone

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alfonsi, Andrea; Rabiti, Cristian; Mandelli, Diego; Cogliati, Joshua; Kinoshita, Robert

    2014-07-01

    Conventional Event-Tree (ET) based methodologies are extensively used as tools to perform reliability and safety assessment of complex and critical engineering systems. One of the disadvantages of these methods is that timing/sequencing of events and system dynamics are not explicitly accounted for in the analysis. In order to overcome these limitations several techniques, also know as Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA), have been developed. Monte-Carlo (MC) and Dynamic Event Tree (DET) are two of the most widely used D-PRA methodologies to perform safety assessment of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). In the past two years, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed its own tool to perform Dynamic PRA: RAVEN (Reactor Analysis and Virtual control ENvironment). RAVEN has been designed to perform two main tasks: 1) control logic driver for the new Thermo-Hydraulic code RELAP-7 and 2) post-processing tool. In the first task, RAVEN acts as a deterministic controller in which the set of control logic laws (user defined) monitors the RELAP-7 simulation and controls the activation of specific systems. Moreover, the control logic infrastructure is used to model stochastic events, such as components failures, and perform uncertainty propagation. Such stochastic modeling is deployed using both MC and DET algorithms. In the second task, RAVEN processes the large amount of data generated by RELAP-7 using data-mining based algorithms. This report focuses on the analysis of dynamic stochastic systems using the newly developed RAVEN DET capability. As an example, a DPRA analysis, using DET, of a simplified pressurized water reactor for a Station Black-Out (SBO) scenario is presented.

  19. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Surry, Unit-1: Analysis of core damage frequency from internal events during mid-loop operations. Appendix I, Volume 2, Part 5

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chu, T.L.; Musicki, Z.; Kohut, P.; Yang, J.; Bozoki, G.; Hsu, C.J.; Diamond, D.J.; Bley, D.; Johnson, D.; Holmes, B.

    1994-06-01

    Traditionally, probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) of severe accidents in nuclear power plants have considered initiating events potentially occurring only during full power operation. Some previous screening analyses that were performed for other modes of operation suggested that risks during those modes were small relative to full power operation. However, more recent studies and operational experience have implied that accidents during low power and shutdown could be significant contributors to risk. During 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. The program includes two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL) and Sandia National Labs. (SNL). Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The objectives of the program are to assess the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than full power operation and to compare the estimated core damage frequencies, important accident sequences and other qualitative and quantitative results with those accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The objective of this volume of the report is to document the approach utilized in the level-1 internal events PRA for the Surry plant, and discuss the results obtained. A phased approach was used in the level-1 program. In phase 1, which was completed in Fall 1991, a coarse screening analysis examining accidents initiated by internal events (including internal fire and flood) was performed for all plant operational states (POSs). The objective of the phase 1 study was to identify potential vulnerable plant configurations, to characterize (on a high, medium, or low basis) the potential core damage accident scenarios, and to provide a foundation for a detailed phase 2 analysis.

  20. Optimized Uncertainty Quantification Algorithm Within a Dynamic Event Tree Framework

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. W. Nielsen; Akira Tokuhiro; Robert Hiromoto

    2014-06-01

    Methods for developing Phenomenological Identification and Ranking Tables (PIRT) for nuclear power plants have been a useful tool in providing insight into modelling aspects that are important to safety. These methods have involved expert knowledge with regards to reactor plant transients and thermal-hydraulic codes to identify are of highest importance. Quantified PIRT provides for rigorous method for quantifying the phenomena that can have the greatest impact. The transients that are evaluated and the timing of those events are typically developed in collaboration with the Probabilistic Risk Analysis. Though quite effective in evaluating risk, traditional PRA methods lack the capability to evaluate complex dynamic systems where end states may vary as a function of transition time from physical state to physical state . Dynamic PRA (DPRA) methods provide a more rigorous analysis of complex dynamic systems. A limitation of DPRA is its potential for state or combinatorial explosion that grows as a function of the number of components; as well as, the sampling of transition times from state-to-state of the entire system. This paper presents a method for performing QPIRT within a dynamic event tree framework such that timing events which result in the highest probabilities of failure are captured and a QPIRT is performed simultaneously while performing a discrete dynamic event tree evaluation. The resulting simulation results in a formal QPIRT for each end state. The use of dynamic event trees results in state explosion as the number of possible component states increases. This paper utilizes a branch and bound algorithm to optimize the solution of the dynamic event trees. The paper summarizes the methods used to implement the branch-and-bound algorithm in solving the discrete dynamic event trees.

  1. RAVEN: Dynamic Event Tree Approach Level III Milestone

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Andrea Alfonsi; Cristian Rabiti; Diego Mandelli; Joshua Cogliati; Robert Kinoshita

    2013-07-01

    Conventional Event-Tree (ET) based methodologies are extensively used as tools to perform reliability and safety assessment of complex and critical engineering systems. One of the disadvantages of these methods is that timing/sequencing of events and system dynamics are not explicitly accounted for in the analysis. In order to overcome these limitations several techniques, also know as Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA), have been developed. Monte-Carlo (MC) and Dynamic Event Tree (DET) are two of the most widely used D-PRA methodologies to perform safety assessment of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). In the past two years, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed its own tool to perform Dynamic PRA: RAVEN (Reactor Analysis and Virtual control ENvironment). RAVEN has been designed to perform two main tasks: 1) control logic driver for the new Thermo-Hydraulic code RELAP-7 and 2) post-processing tool. In the first task, RAVEN acts as a deterministic controller in which the set of control logic laws (user defined) monitors the RELAP-7 simulation and controls the activation of specific systems. Moreover, the control logic infrastructure is used to model stochastic events, such as components failures, and perform uncertainty propagation. Such stochastic modeling is deployed using both MC and DET algorithms. In the second task, RAVEN processes the large amount of data generated by RELAP-7 using data-mining based algorithms. This report focuses on the analysis of dynamic stochastic systems using the newly developed RAVEN DET capability. As an example, a DPRA analysis, using DET, of a simplified pressurized water reactor for a Station Black-Out (SBO) scenario is presented.

  2. Integration of Advanced Probabilistic Analysis Techniques with Multi-Physics Models

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cetiner, Mustafa Sacit; none,; Flanagan, George F.; Poore III, Willis P.; Muhlheim, Michael David

    2014-07-30

    An integrated simulation platform that couples probabilistic analysis-based tools with model-based simulation tools can provide valuable insights for reactive and proactive responses to plant operating conditions. The objective of this work is to demonstrate the benefits of a partial implementation of the Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Detailed Framework Specification through the coupling of advanced PRA capabilities and accurate multi-physics plant models. Coupling a probabilistic model with a multi-physics model will aid in design, operations, and safety by providing a more accurate understanding of plant behavior. This represents the first attempt at actually integrating these two types of analyses for a control system used for operations, on a faster than real-time basis. This report documents the development of the basic communication capability to exchange data with the probabilistic model using Reliability Workbench (RWB) and the multi-physics model using Dymola. The communication pathways from injecting a fault (i.e., failing a component) to the probabilistic and multi-physics models were successfully completed. This first version was tested with prototypic models represented in both RWB and Modelica. First, a simple event tree/fault tree (ET/FT) model was created to develop the software code to implement the communication capabilities between the dynamic-link library (dll) and RWB. A program, written in C#, successfully communicates faults to the probabilistic model through the dll. A systems model of the Advanced Liquid-Metal Reactor–Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module (ALMR-PRISM) design developed under another DOE project was upgraded using Dymola to include proper interfaces to allow data exchange with the control application (ConApp). A program, written in C+, successfully communicates faults to the multi-physics model. The results of the example simulation were successfully plotted.

  3. ROBUSTNESS OF DECISION INSIGHTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE ALEATORY/EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY CLASSIFICATIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Unwin, Stephen D.; Eslinger, Paul W.; Johnson, Kenneth I.

    2013-09-22

    The Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) pathway is a set of activities defined under the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program. The overarching objective of RISMC is to support plant life-extension decision-making by providing a state-of-knowledge characterization of safety margins in key systems, structures, and components (SSCs). A key technical challenge is to establish the conceptual and technical feasibility of analyzing safety margin in a risk-informed way, which, unlike conventionally defined deterministic margin analysis, would be founded on probabilistic characterizations of SSC performance. Evaluation of probabilistic safety margins will in general entail the uncertainty characterization both of the prospective challenge to the performance of an SSC ("load") and of its "capacity" to withstand that challenge. The RISMC framework contrasts sharply with the traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) structure in that the underlying models are not inherently aleatory. Rather, they are largely deterministic physical/engineering models with ambiguities about the appropriate uncertainty classification of many model parameters. The current analysis demonstrates that if the distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties is to be preserved in a RISMC-like modeling environment, then it is unlikely that analysis insights supporting decision-making will in general be robust under recategorization of input uncertainties. If it is believed there is a true conceptual distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty (as opposed to the distinction being primarily a legacy of the PRA paradigm) then a consistent and defensible basis must be established by which to categorize input uncertainties.

  4. Advanced Test Reactor outage risk assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thatcher, T.A.; Atkinson, S.A.

    1997-12-31

    Beginning in 1997, risk assessment was performed for each Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) outage aiding the coordination of plant configuration and work activities (maintenance, construction projects, etc.) to minimize the risk of reactor fuel damage and to improve defense-in-depth. The risk assessment activities move beyond simply meeting Technical Safety Requirements to increase the awareness of risk sensitive configurations, to focus increased attention on the higher risk activities, and to seek cost-effective design or operational changes that reduce risk. A detailed probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) had been performed to assess the risk of fuel damage during shutdown operations including heavy load handling. This resulted in several design changes to improve safety; however, evaluation of individual outages had not been performed previously and many risk insights were not being utilized in outage planning. The shutdown PRA provided the necessary framework for assessing relative and absolute risk levels and assessing defense-in-depth. Guidelines were written identifying combinations of equipment outages to avoid. Screening criteria were developed for the selection of work activities to receive review. Tabulation of inherent and work-related initiating events and their relative risk level versus plant mode has aided identification of the risk level the scheduled work involves. Preoutage reviews are conducted and post-outage risk assessment is documented to summarize the positive and negative aspects of the outage with regard to risk. The risk for the outage is compared to the risk level that would result from optimal scheduling of the work to be performed and to baseline or average past performance.

  5. Component Repair Times Obtained from MSPI Data

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eide, Steven A.

    2015-05-01

    Information concerning times to repair or restore equipment to service given a failure is valuable to probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). Examples of such uses in modern PRAs include estimation of the probability of failing to restore a failed component within a specified time period (typically tied to recovering a mitigating system before core damage occurs at nuclear power plants) and the determination of mission times for support system initiating event (SSIE) fault tree models. Information on equipment repair or restoration times applicable to PRA modeling is limited and dated for U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. However, the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) program covering all U.S. commercial nuclear power plants provides up-to-date information on restoration times for a limited set of component types. This paper describes the MSPI program data available and analyzes the data to obtain median and mean component restoration times as well as non-restoration cumulative probability curves. The MSPI program provides guidance for monitoring both planned and unplanned outages of trains of selected mitigating systems deemed important to safety. For systems included within the MSPI program, plants monitor both train UA and component unreliability (UR) against baseline values. If the combined system UA and UR increases sufficiently above established baseline results (converted to an estimated change in core damage frequency or CDF), a “white” (or worse) indicator is generated for that system. That in turn results in increased oversight by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and can impact a plant’s insurance rating. Therefore, there is pressure to return MSPI program components to service as soon as possible after a failure occurs. Three sets of unplanned outages might be used to determine the component repair durations desired in this article: all unplanned outages for the train type that includes the component of interest, only unplanned outages associated with failures of the component of interest, and only unplanned outages associated with PRA failures of the component of interest. The paper will describe how component repair times can be generated from each set and which approach is most applicable. Repair time information will be summarized for MSPI pumps and diesel generators using data over 2003 – 2007. Also, trend information over 2003 – 2012 will be presented to indicate whether the 2003 – 2007 repair time information is still considered applicable. For certain types of pumps, mean repair times are significantly higher than the typically assumed 24 h duration.

  6. Development and application of the dynamic system doctor to nuclear reactor probabilistic risk assessments.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kunsman, David Marvin; Aldemir, Tunc; Rutt, Benjamin; Metzroth, Kyle; Catalyurek, Umit; Denning, Richard; Hakobyan, Aram; Dunagan, Sean C.

    2008-05-01

    This LDRD project has produced a tool that makes probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) of nuclear reactors - analyses which are very resource intensive - more efficient. PRAs of nuclear reactors are being increasingly relied on by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.N.R.C.) for licensing decisions for current and advanced reactors. Yet, PRAs are produced much as they were 20 years ago. The work here applied a modern systems analysis technique to the accident progression analysis portion of the PRA; the technique was a system-independent multi-task computer driver routine. Initially, the objective of the work was to fuse the accident progression event tree (APET) portion of a PRA to the dynamic system doctor (DSD) created by Ohio State University. Instead, during the initial efforts, it was found that the DSD could be linked directly to a detailed accident progression phenomenological simulation code - the type on which APET construction and analysis relies, albeit indirectly - and thereby directly create and analyze the APET. The expanded DSD computational architecture and infrastructure that was created during this effort is called ADAPT (Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees). ADAPT is a system software infrastructure that supports execution and analysis of multiple dynamic event-tree simulations on distributed environments. A simulator abstraction layer was developed, and a generic driver was implemented for executing simulators on a distributed environment. As a demonstration of the use of the methodological tool, ADAPT was applied to quantify the likelihood of competing accident progression pathways occurring for a particular accident scenario in a particular reactor type using MELCOR, an integrated severe accident analysis code developed at Sandia. (ADAPT was intentionally created with flexibility, however, and is not limited to interacting with only one code. With minor coding changes to input files, ADAPT can be linked to other such codes.) The results of this demonstration indicate that the approach can significantly reduce the resources required for Level 2 PRAs. From the phenomenological viewpoint, ADAPT can also treat the associated epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. This methodology can also be used for analyses of other complex systems. Any complex system can be analyzed using ADAPT if the workings of that system can be displayed as an event tree, there is a computer code that simulates how those events could progress, and that simulator code has switches to turn on and off system events, phenomena, etc. Using and applying ADAPT to particular problems is not human independent. While the human resources for the creation and analysis of the accident progression are significantly decreased, knowledgeable analysts are still necessary for a given project to apply ADAPT successfully. This research and development effort has met its original goals and then exceeded them.

  7. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE IRIS PROJECT OF INTEREST FOR LATIN AMERICA

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carelli, M.D.; Petrovic, B.

    2004-10-03

    The IRIS (International Reactor Innovative and Secure) reactor design is being developed by an international consortium of 21 organizations from ten countries, including three members from Brazil and one from Mexico. This reflects the interest that Latin America has for a project which addresses the energy needs of the region. Presented here are some of the most recent developments in the IRIS project. The project's highest priority is the current pre-application licensing with the US NRC, which has required an investigation of the major accident sequences and a preliminary probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The results of the accident analyses confirmed the outstanding inherent safety of the IRIS configuration and the PRA analyses indicated a core damage frequency due to internal events of the order of 2E-8. This not only highlights the enhanced safety characteristic of IRIS which should enhance its public acceptance, but it has also prompted IRIS to consider the possibility of being licensed without the need for off-site emergency response planning which would have a very positive economic implication. The modular IRIS, with each module rated at {approx} 335 MWe, is of course an ideal size for developing countries as it allows to easily introduce a moderate amount of power on limited electric grids. IRIS can be deployed in single modules in regions only requiring a few hundred MWs or in multiple modules deployed successively at time intervals in large urban areas requiring a larger amount of power increasing with time. IRIS is designed to operate ''hands-off'' as much as possible, with a small crew, having in mind deployment in areas with limited infrastructure. Thus IRIS has a 48-months maintenance interval, long refueling cycles in excess of three years, and is designed to increase as much as possible operational reliability. For example, the project has recently adopted internal control rod drive mechanisms to eliminate vessel head penetrations and the possibility of corrosion cracking as in Davis-Besse and other plants. Latin America, as many other regions on the earth, needs water as much as electricity. IRIS has developed a water desalination co-generation design which can employ a variety of processes as dictated by local and economic conditions. Applications to the arid Brazilian Nord-Este and Mexican Nord-Oeste are being considered.

  8. Conversion of Questionnaire Data

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H

    2011-01-01

    During the survey, respondents are asked to provide qualitative answers (well, adequate, needs improvement) on how well material control and accountability (MC&A) functions are being performed. These responses can be used to develop failure probabilities for basic events performed during routine operation of the MC&A systems. The failure frequencies for individual events may be used to estimate total system effectiveness using a fault tree in a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Numeric risk values are required for the PRA fault tree calculations that are performed to evaluate system effectiveness. So, the performance ratings in the questionnaire must be converted to relative risk values for all of the basic MC&A tasks performed in the facility. If a specific material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) task is being performed at the 'perfect' level, the task is considered to have a near zero risk of failure. If the task is performed at a less than perfect level, the deficiency in performance represents some risk of failure for the event. As the degree of deficiency in performance increases, the risk of failure increases. If a task that should be performed is not being performed, that task is in a state of failure. The failure probabilities of all basic events contribute to the total system risk. Conversion of questionnaire MPC&A system performance data to numeric values is a separate function from the process of completing the questionnaire. When specific questions in the questionnaire are answered, the focus is on correctly assessing and reporting, in an adjectival manner, the actual performance of the related MC&A function. Prior to conversion, consideration should not be given to the numeric value that will be assigned during the conversion process. In the conversion process, adjectival responses to questions on system performance are quantified based on a log normal scale typically used in human error analysis (see A.D. Swain and H.E. Guttmann, 'Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications,' NUREG/CR-1278). This conversion produces the basic event risk of failure values required for the fault tree calculations. The fault tree is a deductive logic structure that corresponds to the operational nuclear MC&A system at a nuclear facility. The conventional Delphi process is a time-honored approach commonly used in the risk assessment field to extract numerical values for the failure rates of actions or activities when statistically significant data is absent.

  9. Insights from an overview of four PRAs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fitzpatrick, R.; Arrieta, L.; Teichmann, T.; Davis, P.

    1986-01-01

    This paper summarizes the findings of an investigation of four probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), those for Millstone 3, Seabrook, Shoreham, and Oconee 3, performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) for the Reliability and Risk Assessment Branch of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This group of four PRAs was subjected to an overview process with the basic goal of ascertaining what insights might be gained (beyond those already documented within the individual PRAs) by an independent evaluation of the group with respect to nuclear plant safety and vulnerability. Specifically, the objectives of the study were (1) to identify and rank initiators, systems, components, and failure modes from dominant accident sequences according to their contribution to core melt probability and public risk; and (2) to derive from this process plant-specific and generic insights. The effort was not intended to verify the specific details and results of each PRA but rather - having accepted the results - to see what they might mean in a more global context. The NRC had previously sponsored full detailed reviews of each of these PRAs, but only two, those for Millstone 3 and Shoreham, were completed and documented in time to allow their consideration within the study. This paper also presents some comments and insights into the amenability of certain features of these PRAs to this type of overview process.

  10. RAMONA-3B application to Browns Ferry ATWS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Slovik, G.C.; Neymotin, L.Y.; Saha, P.

    1985-01-01

    The Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) is known to be a dominant accident sequence for possible core melt in a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). A recent Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) analysis for the Browns Ferry nuclear power plant indicates that ATWS is the second most dominant transient for core melt in BWR/4 with Mark I containment. The most dominant sequence being the failure of long term decay heat removal function of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system. Of all the various ATWS scenarios, the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure ATWS sequence was chosen for present analysis because of its relatively high frequency of occurrence and its challenge to the residual heat removal system and containment integrity. The objective of this paper is to discuss four MSIV closure ATWS calculations using the RAMONA-3B code. The paper is a summary of a report being prepared for the USNRC Severe Accident Sequence Analysis (SASA) program which should be referred to for details. 10 refs., 20 figs., 3 tabs.

  11. A Bayesian method for using simulator data to enhance human error probabilities assigned by existing HRA methods

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Katrinia M. Groth; Curtis L. Smith; Laura P. Swiler

    2014-08-01

    In the past several years, several international organizations have begun to collect data on human performance in nuclear power plant simulators. The data collected provide a valuable opportunity to improve human reliability analysis (HRA), but these improvements will not be realized without implementation of Bayesian methods. Bayesian methods are widely used to incorporate sparse data into models in many parts of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), but Bayesian methods have not been adopted by the HRA community. In this paper, we provide a Bayesian methodology to formally use simulator data to refine the human error probabilities (HEPs) assigned by existing HRA methods. We demonstrate the methodology with a case study, wherein we use simulator data from the Halden Reactor Project to update the probability assignments from the SPAR-H method. The case study demonstrates the ability to use performance data, even sparse data, to improve existing HRA methods. Furthermore, this paper also serves as a demonstration of the value of Bayesian methods to improve the technical basis of HRA.

  12. Regulatory cross-cutting topics for fuel cycle facilities.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Denman, Matthew R.; Brown, Jason; Goldmann, Andrew Scott; Louie, David

    2013-10-01

    This report overviews crosscutting regulatory topics for nuclear fuel cycle facilities for use in the Fuel Cycle Research&Development Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation and Screening study. In particular, the regulatory infrastructure and analysis capability is assessed for the following topical areas:Fire Regulations (i.e., how applicable are current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and/or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) fire regulations to advance fuel cycle facilities)Consequence Assessment (i.e., how applicable are current radionuclide transportation tools to support risk-informed regulations and Level 2 and/or 3 PRA) While not addressed in detail, the following regulatory topic is also discussed:Integrated Security, Safeguard and Safety Requirement (i.e., how applicable are current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations to future fuel cycle facilities which will likely be required to balance the sometimes conflicting Material Accountability, Security, and Safety requirements.)

  13. SPAR Model Structural Efficiencies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    John Schroeder; Dan Henry

    2013-04-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) are supporting initiatives aimed at improving the quality of probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). Included in these initiatives are the resolution of key technical issues that are have been judged to have the most significant influence on the baseline core damage frequency of the NRC’s Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models and licensee PRA models. Previous work addressed issues associated with support system initiating event analysis and loss of off-site power/station blackout analysis. The key technical issues were: • Development of a standard methodology and implementation of support system initiating events • Treatment of loss of offsite power • Development of standard approach for emergency core cooling following containment failure Some of the related issues were not fully resolved. This project continues the effort to resolve outstanding issues. The work scope was intended to include substantial collaboration with EPRI; however, EPRI has had other higher priority initiatives to support. Therefore this project has addressed SPAR modeling issues. The issues addressed are • SPAR model transparency • Common cause failure modeling deficiencies and approaches • Ac and dc modeling deficiencies and approaches • Instrumentation and control system modeling deficiencies and approaches

  14. A Bayesian method for using simulator data to enhance human error probabilities assigned by existing HRA methods

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Groth, Katrina M.; Smith, Curtis L.; Swiler, Laura P.

    2014-04-05

    In the past several years, several international agencies have begun to collect data on human performance in nuclear power plant simulators [1]. This data provides a valuable opportunity to improve human reliability analysis (HRA), but there improvements will not be realized without implementation of Bayesian methods. Bayesian methods are widely used in to incorporate sparse data into models in many parts of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), but Bayesian methods have not been adopted by the HRA community. In this article, we provide a Bayesian methodology to formally use simulator data to refine the human error probabilities (HEPs) assigned by existingmore » HRA methods. We demonstrate the methodology with a case study, wherein we use simulator data from the Halden Reactor Project to update the probability assignments from the SPAR-H method. The case study demonstrates the ability to use performance data, even sparse data, to improve existing HRA methods. Furthermore, this paper also serves as a demonstration of the value of Bayesian methods to improve the technical basis of HRA.« less

  15. Multidisciplinary framework for human reliability analysis with an application to errors of commission and dependencies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barriere, M.T.; Luckas, W.J.; Wreathall, J.; Cooper, S.E.; Bley, D.C.; Ramey-Smith, A.

    1995-08-01

    Since the early 1970s, human reliability analysis (HRA) has been considered to be an integral part of probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). Nuclear power plant (NPP) events, from Three Mile Island through the mid-1980s, showed the importance of human performance to NPP risk. Recent events demonstrate that human performance continues to be a dominant source of risk. In light of these observations, the current limitations of existing HRA approaches become apparent when the role of humans is examined explicitly in the context of real NPP events. The development of new or improved HRA methodologies to more realistically represent human performance is recognized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as a necessary means to increase the utility of PRAS. To accomplish this objective, an Improved HRA Project, sponsored by the NRC`s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), was initiated in late February, 1992, at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to develop an improved method for HRA that more realistically assesses the human contribution to plant risk and can be fully integrated with PRA. This report describes the research efforts including the development of a multidisciplinary HRA framework, the characterization and representation of errors of commission, and an approach for addressing human dependencies. The implications of the research and necessary requirements for further development also are discussed.

  16. Analysis of core damage frequency: Peach Bottom, Unit 2 internal events appendices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kolaczkowski, A.M.; Cramond, W.R.; Sype, T.T.; Maloney, K.J.; Wheeler, T.A.; Daniel, S.L.; Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM )

    1989-08-01

    This document contains the appendices for the accident sequence analysis of internally initiated events for the Peach Bottom, Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant. This is one of the five plant analyses conducted as part of the NUREG-1150 effort for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The work performed and described here is an extensive reanalysis of that published in October 1986 as NUREG/CR-4550, Volume 4. It addresses comments from numerous reviewers and significant changes to the plant systems and procedures made since the first report. The uncertainty analysis and presentation of results are also much improved, and considerable effort was expended on an improved analysis of loss of offsite power. The content and detail of this report is directed toward PRA practitioners who need to know how the work was done and the details for use in further studies. The mean core damage frequency is 4.5E-6 with 5% and 95% uncertainty bounds of 3.5E-7 and 1.3E-5, respectively. Station blackout type accidents (loss of all ac power) contributed about 46% of the core damage frequency with Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) accidents contributing another 42%. The numerical results are driven by loss of offsite power, transients with the power conversion system initially available operator errors, and mechanical failure to scram. 13 refs., 345 figs., 171 tabs.

  17. Desert architecture for educational buildings, a case study: A center for training university graduates

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ebeid, M.

    1996-10-01

    A new program for training graduates in desert development is being implemented by the Desert Development Center (DDC) of the American University in Cairo. The facilities consist of fifty bed/sitting rooms for accommodating 100 students. Each unit consists of two rooms and a bathroom for the use of 4 students; a lecture theater which can house 120 students, with adjoining office for trainers as well as necessary facilities; a general cafeteria which can serve 120--150 persons and an adjoining dining room for teaching staff. The cafeteria building also houses the kitchen; a cold storage area; a laundry room, storerooms, sleeping quarters and services for the labor force of the building complex; a system of solar water heaters; and a special sanitary sewage system for treatment of waste water produced by the building`s activities. When designing and implementing this complex, architectural elements and building philosophy based on the concept of integrating with the environment were considered. Elements included orientation heights and building materials suited to the desert environment, thick walls, outer and inner finishing materials, roofs, malkafs, floors, colors, solar heaters, lighting, green areas, windbreaks, terraces, and furniture. The paper includes a general evaluation of this educational building based on the PRA approach (Participatory Rapid Appraisal) involving those living and working in it. As a result of her position with the project, the author was able to evaluate the original designs, recommend modifications, and evaluate their implementation and fulfillment of the original goals of the projects.

  18. Proof-of-Concept Demonstrations for Computation-Based Human Reliability Analysis. Modeling Operator Performance During Flooding Scenarios

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Joe, Jeffrey Clark; Boring, Ronald Laurids; Herberger, Sarah Elizabeth Marie; Mandelli, Diego; Smith, Curtis Lee

    2015-09-01

    The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program has the overall objective to help sustain the existing commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs). To accomplish this program objective, there are multiple LWRS “pathways,” or research and development (R&D) focus areas. One LWRS focus area is called the Risk-Informed Safety Margin and Characterization (RISMC) pathway. Initial efforts under this pathway to combine probabilistic and plant multi-physics models to quantify safety margins and support business decisions also included HRA, but in a somewhat simplified manner. HRA experts at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) have been collaborating with other experts to develop a computational HRA approach, called the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER), for inclusion into the RISMC framework. The basic premise of this research is to leverage applicable computational techniques, namely simulation and modeling, to develop and then, using RAVEN as a controller, seamlessly integrate virtual operator models (HUNTER) with 1) the dynamic computational MOOSE runtime environment that includes a full-scope plant model, and 2) the RISMC framework PRA models already in use. The HUNTER computational HRA approach is a hybrid approach that leverages past work from cognitive psychology, human performance modeling, and HRA, but it is also a significant departure from existing static and even dynamic HRA methods. This report is divided into five chapters that cover the development of an external flooding event test case and associated statistical modeling considerations.

  19. Risk assessment handbook

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Farmer, F.G.; Jones, J.L.; Hunt, R.N.; Roush, M.L.; Wierman, T.E.

    1990-09-01

    The Probabilistic Risk Assessment Unit at EG G Idaho has developed this handbook to provide guidance to a facility manager exploring the potential benefit to be gained by performance of a risk assessment properly scoped to meet local needs. This document is designed to help the manager control the resources expended commensurate with the risks being managed and to assure that the products can be used programmatically to support future needs in order to derive maximum beneflt from the resources expended. We present a logical and functional mapping scheme between several discrete phases of project definition to ensure that a potential customer, working with an analyst, is able to define the areas of interest and that appropriate methods are employed in the analysis. In addition the handbook is written to provide a high-level perspective for the analyst. Previously, the needed information was either scattered or existed only in the minds of experienced analysts. By compiling this information and exploring the breadth of knowledge which exists within the members of the PRA Unit, the functional relationships between the customers' needs and the product have been established.

  20. Risk assessment handbook

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Farmer, F.G.; Jones, J.L.; Hunt, R.N.; Roush, M.L.; Wierman, T.E.

    1990-09-01

    The Probabilistic Risk Assessment Unit at EG&G Idaho has developed this handbook to provide guidance to a facility manager exploring the potential benefit to be gained by performance of a risk assessment properly scoped to meet local needs. This document is designed to help the manager control the resources expended commensurate with the risks being managed and to assure that the products can be used programmatically to support future needs in order to derive maximum beneflt from the resources expended. We present a logical and functional mapping scheme between several discrete phases of project definition to ensure that a potential customer, working with an analyst, is able to define the areas of interest and that appropriate methods are employed in the analysis. In addition the handbook is written to provide a high-level perspective for the analyst. Previously, the needed information was either scattered or existed only in the minds of experienced analysts. By compiling this information and exploring the breadth of knowledge which exists within the members of the PRA Unit, the functional relationships between the customers` needs and the product have been established.

  1. Development of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model for BWR Shutdown Modes 4 and 5 Integrated in SPAR Model

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    S. T. Khericha; S. Sancakter; J. Mitman; J. Wood

    2010-06-01

    Nuclear plant operating experience and several studies show that the risk from shutdown operation during modes 4, 5, and 6 can be significant This paper describes development of the standard template risk evaluation models for shutdown modes 4, and 5 for commercial boiling water nuclear power plants (BWR). The shutdown probabilistic risk assessment model uses full power Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model as the starting point for development. The shutdown PRA models are integrated with their respective internal events at-power SPAR model. This is accomplished by combining the modified system fault trees from SPAR full power model with shutdown event tree logic. For human reliability analysis (HRA), the SPAR HRA (SPAR-H) method is used which requires the analysts to complete relatively straight forward worksheet, including the performance shaping factors (PSFs). The results are then used to estimate HEP of interest. The preliminary results indicate the risk is dominated by the operators ability to diagnose the events and provide long term cooling.

  2. Research prioritization using the Analytic Hierarchy Process: basic methods. Volume 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vesely, W.E.; Shafaghi, A.; Gary, I. Jr.; Rasmuson, D.M.

    1983-08-01

    This report describes a systematic approach for prioritizing research needs and research programs. The approach is formally called the Analytic Hierarchy Process which was developed by T.L. Saaty and is described in several of his texts referenced in the report. The Analytic Hierarchy Process, or AHP for short, has been applied to a wide variety of prioritization problems and has a good record of success as documented in Saaty's texts. The report develops specific guidelines for constructing the hierarchy and for prioritizing the research programs. Specific examples are given to illustrate the steps in the AHP. As part of the work, a computer code has been developed and the use of the code is described. The code allows the prioritizations to be done in a codified and efficient manner; sensitivity and parametric studies can also be straightforwardly performed to gain a better understanding of the prioritization results. Finally, as an important part of the work, an approach is developed which utilizes probabilistic risk analyses (PRAs) to systematically identify and prioritize research needs and research programs. When utilized in an AHP framework, the PRA's which have been performed to date provide a powerful information source for focusing research on those areas most impacting risk and risk uncertainty.

  3. Development of Simplified Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model for Seismic Initiating Event

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    S. Khericha; R. Buell; S. Sancaktar; M. Gonzalez; F. Ferrante

    2012-06-01

    ABSTRACT This paper discusses a simplified method to evaluate seismic risk using a methodology built on dividing the seismic intensity spectrum into multiple discrete bins. The seismic probabilistic risk assessment model uses Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) full power Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model as the starting point for development. The seismic PRA models are integrated with their respective internal events at-power SPAR model. This is accomplished by combining the modified system fault trees from the full power SPAR model with seismic event tree logic. The peak ground acceleration is divided into five bins. The g-value for each bin is estimated using the geometric mean of lower and upper values of that particular bin and the associated frequency for each bin is estimated by taking the difference between upper and lower values of that bin. The components fragilities are calculated for each bin using the plant data, if available, or generic values of median peak ground acceleration and uncertainty values for the components. For human reliability analysis (HRA), the SPAR HRA (SPAR-H) method is used which requires the analysts to complete relatively straight forward worksheets that include the performance shaping factors (PSFs). The results are then used to estimate human error probabilities (HEPs) of interest. This work is expected to improve the NRCs ability to include seismic hazards in risk assessments for operational events in support of the reactor oversight program (e.g., significance determination process).

  4. Science-Based Simulation Model of Human Performance for Human Reliability Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dana L. Kelly; Ronald L. Boring; Ali Mosleh; Carol Smidts

    2011-10-01

    Human reliability analysis (HRA), a component of an integrated probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), is the means by which the human contribution to risk is assessed, both qualitatively and quantitatively. However, among the literally dozens of HRA methods that have been developed, most cannot fully model and quantify the types of errors that occurred at Three Mile Island. Furthermore, all of the methods lack a solid empirical basis, relying heavily on expert judgment or empirical results derived in non-reactor domains. Finally, all of the methods are essentially static, and are thus unable to capture the dynamics of an accident in progress. The objective of this work is to begin exploring a dynamic simulation approach to HRA, one whose models have a basis in psychological theories of human performance, and whose quantitative estimates have an empirical basis. This paper highlights a plan to formalize collaboration among the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the University of Maryland, and The Ohio State University (OSU) to continue development of a simulation model initially formulated at the University of Maryland. Initial work will focus on enhancing the underlying human performance models with the most recent psychological research, and on planning follow-on studies to establish an empirical basis for the model, based on simulator experiments to be carried out at the INL and at the OSU.

  5. FATE Unified Modeling Method for Spent Nuclear Fuel and Sludge Processing, Shipping and Storage - 13405

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Plys, Martin; Burelbach, James; Lee, Sung Jin; Apthorpe, Robert

    2013-07-01

    A unified modeling method applicable to the processing, shipping, and storage of spent nuclear fuel and sludge has been incrementally developed, validated, and applied over a period of about 15 years at the US DOE Hanford site. The software, FATE{sup TM}, provides a consistent framework for a wide dynamic range of common DOE and commercial fuel and waste applications. It has been used during the design phase, for safety and licensing calculations, and offers a graded approach to complex modeling problems encountered at DOE facilities and abroad (e.g., Sellafield). FATE has also been used for commercial power plant evaluations including reactor building fire modeling for fire PRA, evaluation of hydrogen release, transport, and flammability for post-Fukushima vulnerability assessment, and drying of commercial oxide fuel. FATE comprises an integrated set of models for fluid flow, aerosol and contamination release, transport, and deposition, thermal response including chemical reactions, and evaluation of fire and explosion hazards. It is one of few software tools that combine both source term and thermal-hydraulic capability. Practical examples are described below, with consideration of appropriate model complexity and validation. (authors)

  6. COMBINED ACTIVE/PASSIVE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL APPROACH FOR THE 24 MWt GAS-COOLED FAST REACTOR

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    CHENG,L.Y.; LUDEWIG, H.

    2007-06-01

    Decay heat removal at depressurized shutdown conditions has been regarded as one of the key areas where significant improvement in passive response was targeted for the GEN IV GFR over the GCFR designs of thirty years ago. It has been recognized that the poor heat transfer characteristics of gas coolant at lower pressures needed to be accommodated in the GEN IV design. The design envelope has therefore been extended to include a station blackout sequence simultaneous with a small break/leak. After an exploratory phase of scoping analysis in this project, together with CEA of France, it was decided that natural convection would be selected as the passive decay heat removal approach of preference. Furthermore, a double vessel/containment option, similar to the double vessel/guard vessel approach of the SFR, was selected as the means of design implementation to reduce the PRA risks of the depressurization accident. However additional calculations in conjunction with CEA showed that there was an economic penalty in terms of decay heat removal system heat exchanger size, elevation heights for thermal centers, and most of all in guard containment back pressure for complete reliance on natural convection only. The back pressure ranges complicated the design requirements for the guard containment. Recognizing that the definition of a loss-of-coolant-accident in the GFR is a misnomer, since gas coolant will always be present, and the availability of some driven blower would reduce fuel temperature transients significantly; it was decided instead to aim for a hybrid active/passive combination approach to the selected BDBA. Complete natural convection only would still be relied on for decay heat removal but only after the first twenty four hours after the initiation of the accident. During the first twenty four hour period an actively powered blower would be relied on to provide the emergency decay power removal. However the power requirements of the active blower/circulators would be kept low by maintaining a pressurized system coolant back pressure of {approx}7-8 bars through the design of the guard containment for such a design pressure. This approach is termed the medium pressure approach by both CEA and the US. Such a containment design pressure is in the range of the LWR experience, both PWRs and BWRs. Both metal containments and concrete guard containments are possible in this pressure range. This approach is then a time-at-risk approach as the power requirements should be low enough that battery/fuel cell banks without diesel generator start-up failure rate issues should be capable of providing the necessary power. Compressed gas sources are another possibility. A companion PRA study is being conducted to survey the reliability of such systems.

  7. Human Reliability Analysis for Small Modular Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ronald L. Boring; David I. Gertman

    2012-06-01

    Because no human reliability analysis (HRA) method was specifically developed for small modular reactors (SMRs), the application of any current HRA method to SMRs represents tradeoffs. A first- generation HRA method like THERP provides clearly defined activity types, but these activity types do not map to the human-system interface or concept of operations confronting SMR operators. A second- generation HRA method like ATHEANA is flexible enough to be used for SMR applications, but there is currently insufficient guidance for the analyst, requiring considerably more first-of-a-kind analyses and extensive SMR expertise in order to complete a quality HRA. Although no current HRA method is optimized to SMRs, it is possible to use existing HRA methods to identify errors, incorporate them as human failure events in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), and quantify them. In this paper, we provided preliminary guidance to assist the human reliability analyst and reviewer in understanding how to apply current HRA methods to the domain of SMRs. While it is possible to perform a satisfactory HRA using existing HRA methods, ultimately it is desirable to formally incorporate SMR considerations into the methods. This may require the development of new HRA methods. More practicably, existing methods need to be adapted to incorporate SMRs. Such adaptations may take the form of guidance on the complex mapping between conventional light water reactors and small modular reactors. While many behaviors and activities are shared between current plants and SMRs, the methods must adapt if they are to perform a valid and accurate analysis of plant personnel performance in SMRs.

  8. Determining importance and grading of items and activities for the Yucca Mountain Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DeKlever, R.; Verna, B.

    1993-12-31

    Raytheon Services Nevada (RSN), in support of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Yucca Mountain Project, has been responsible for the Title 2 designs of the initial structures, systems, and components for the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF), and the creation of the design output documents for the Surface-Based Testing (SBT) programs. The ESF and SBT programs are major scientific contributors to the overall site characterization program which will determine the suitability of Yucca Mountain to contain a proposed High Level Nuclear Waste (HLNW) repository. Accurate, traceable and objective characterization and testing documentation that is germane to the protection of public health and safety, and the environment, and that satisfies all the requirements of 10 CFR Part 60(1), must be established, evaluated and accepted. To assure that these requirements are satisfied, specific design functions and products, including items and activities depicted within respective design output documents, are subjected to the requirements of an NRC and DOE-approved Quality Assurance (QA) program. An evaluation (classification) is applied to these items and activities to determine their importance to radiological safety (ITS) and waste isolation (ITWI). Subsequently, QA program controls are selected (grading) for the items and activities. RSN has developed a DOE-approved classification process that is based on probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques and that uses accident/impact scenarios. Results from respective performance assessment and test interference evaluations are also integrated into the classification analyses for various items. The methodology and results of the RSN classification and grading processes, presented herein, relative to ESF and SBT design products, demonstrates a solid, defensible methodological basis for classification and grading.

  9. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Grand Gulf, Unit 1. Volume 5: Analysis of core damage frequency from seismic events for plant operational state 5 during a refueling outage

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Budnitz, R.J.; Davis, P.R.; Ravindra, M.K.; Tong, W.H.

    1994-08-01

    In 1989 the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to examine carefully the potential risks during low-power and shutdown operations. The program included two parallel projects, one at Sandia National Laboratories studying a boiling water reactor (Grand Gulf), and the other at Brookhaven National Laboratory studying a pressurized water reactor (Surry Unit 1). Both the Sandia and Brookhaven projects have examined only accidents initiated by internal plant faults---so-called ``internal initiators.`` This project, which has explored the likelihood of seismic-initiated core damage accidents during refueling outage conditions, is complementary to the internal-initiator analyses at Brookhaven and Sandia. This report covers the seismic analysis at Grand Gulf. All of the many systems modeling assumptions, component non-seismic failure rates, and human effort rates that were used in the internal-initiator study at Grand Gulf have been adopted here, so that the results of the study can be as comparable as possible. Both the Sandia study and this study examine only one shutdown plant operating state (POS) at Grand Gulf, namely POS 5 representing cold shutdown during a refueling outage. This analysis has been limited to work analogous to a level-1 seismic PRA, in which estimates have been developed for the core-damage frequency from seismic events during POS 5. The results of the analysis are that the core-damage frequency for earthquake-initiated accidents during refueling outages in POS 5 is found to be quite low in absolute terms, less than 10{sup {minus}7}/year.

  10. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Grand Gulf, Unit 1: Evaluation of severe accident risks for plant operational state 5 during a refueling outage. Supporting MELCOR calculations, Volume 6, Part 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kmetyk, L.N.; Brown, T.D.

    1995-03-01

    To gain a better understanding of the risk significance of low power and shutdown modes of operation, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research at the NRC established programs to investigate the likelihood and severity of postulated accidents that could occur during low power and shutdown (LP&S) modes of operation at commercial nuclear power plants. To investigate the likelihood of severe core damage accidents during off power conditions, probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) were performed for two nuclear plants: Unit 1 of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, which is a BWR-6 Mark III boiling water reactor (BWR), and Unit 1 of the Surry Power Station, which is a three-loop, subatmospheric, pressurized water reactor (PWR). The analysis of the BWR was conducted at Sandia National Laboratories while the analysis of the PWR was performed at Brookhaven National Laboratory. This multi-volume report presents and discusses the results of the BWR analysis. The subject of this part presents the deterministic code calculations, performed with the MELCOR code, that were used to support the development and quantification of the PRA models. The background for the work documented in this report is summarized, including how deterministic codes are used in PRAS, why the MELCOR code is used, what the capabilities and features of MELCOR are, and how the code has been used by others in the past. Brief descriptions of the Grand Gulf plant and its configuration during LP&S operation and of the MELCOR input model developed for the Grand Gulf plant in its LP&S configuration are given.

  11. Evaluation of potential severe accidents during low power and shutdown operations at Surry, Unit 1: Evaluation of severe accident risk during mid-loop operations. Main report. Volume 6. Part 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jo, J.; Lin, C.C.; Neymotin, L.

    1995-05-01

    During 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated an extensive program to carefully examine the potential risks during low power and shutdown operations. The program includes two parallel projects being performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Two plants, Surry (pressurized water reactor) and Grand Gulf (boiling water reactor), were selected as the plants to be studied. The objectives of the program are to assess the risks of severe accidents initiated during plant operational states other than full power operation and to compare the estimated core damage frequencies, important accident sequences and other qualitative and quantitative results with those accidents initiated during full power operation as assessed in NUREG-1150. The scope of the program includes that of a level-3 PRA. A phased approach was used in the level-1 program. In phase 1 which was completed in Fall 1991, a coarse screening analysis including internal fire and flood was performed for all plant operational states (POSs). The objective of the phase 1 study was to identify potential vulnerable plant configurations, to characterize (on a high, medium, or low basis) the potential core damage accident scenarios, and to provide a foundation for a detailed phase 2 analysis. In phase 2, mid-loop operation was selected as the plant configuration to be analyzed based on the results of the phase 1 study. The objective of the phase 2 study is to perform a detailed analysis of the potential accident scenarios that may occur during mid-loop operation, and compare the results with those of NUREG-1150. The results of the phase 2 level 2/3 study are the subject of this volume of NUREG/CR-6144, Volume 6.

  12. Tank waste remediation system simulation analysis retrieval model

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fordham, R.A.

    1996-09-30

    The goal of simulation was to test tll(., consequences of assumptions. For the TWRS SIMAN Retrieval Model, l@lie specific assumptions are primarily defined with respect to waste processing arid transfer timing. The model tracks 73 chem1913ical constituents from underground waste tanks to glass; yet, the detailed (@hemistrv and complete set of unit operations of the TWRS process flow sheet are represented only at the level necessary to define the waste processing and transfer logic and to estimate the feed composition for the treatment facilities. Tlierefor(,, the model should net be regarded as a substitute for the TWRS process flow sheet. Pra(!ticallv the model functions as a dyrt(imic extension of the flow sheet model. I I The following sections present the description, assunipt@ions, architecture, arid evalua- tion of the TWRS SIMAN Retrieval Model. Section 2 describes the model in terms of an overview of the processes represented. Section 3 presents the assumptions for the simulation model. Specific assumptions 9.tt(l parameter values used in the model are provided for waste retrieval, pretreatment, low-level waste (LLNN7) immobilization, and high-level waste (HLW) immobilization functions. Section 4 describes the model in terms of its functional architec- rare to d(@fine a basis for a systematic evaluation of the model. Finally, Section 5 documents an independent test and evaluation of the niodel`s performance (i.e., the verification and validation). Additionally, Appendix A gives a complete listing of the tank inventory used. Appendix B documents the verification and validation plan that was used for the (Section 5) evaluation work. A description and listing of all the model variables is given in Appendix C along with a complete source listing.

  13. Feasibility and Safety Assessment for Advanced Reactor Concepts Using Vented Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Klein, Andrew; Matthews, Topher; Lenhof, Renae; Deason, Wesley; Harter, Jackson

    2015-01-16

    Recent interest in fast reactor technology has led to renewed analysis of past reactor concepts such as Gas Fast Reactors and Sodium Fast Reactors. In an effort to make these reactors more economic, the fuel is required to stay in the reactor for extended periods of time; the longer the fuel stays within the core, the more fertile material is converted into usable fissile material. However, as burnup of the fuel-rod increases, so does the internal pressure buildup due to gaseous fission products. In order to reach the 30 year lifetime requirements of some reactor designs, the fuel pins must have a vented-type design to allow the buildup of fission products to escape. The present work aims to progress the understanding of the feasibility and safety issues related to gas reactors that incorporate vented fuel. The work was separated into three different work-scopes: 1. Quantitatively determine fission gas release from uranium carbide in a representative helium cooled fast reactor; 2. Model the fission gas behavior, transport, and collection in a Fission Product Vent System; and, 3. Perform a safety analysis of the Fission Product Vent System. Each task relied on results from the previous task, culminating in a limited scope Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the Fission Product Vent System. Within each task, many key parameters lack the fidelity needed for comprehensive or accurate analysis. In the process of completing each task, the data or methods that were lacking were identified and compiled in a Gap Analysis included at the end of the report.

  14. Individual plant examination program: Perspectives on reactor safety and plant performance. Parts 2--5: Final report; Volume 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-12-01

    This report provides perspectives gained by reviewing 75 Individual Plant Examination (IPE) submittals pertaining to 108 nuclear power plant units. IPEs are probabilistic analyses that estimate the core damage frequency (CDF) and containment performance for accidents initiated by internal events. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviewed the IPE submittals with the objective of gaining perspectives in three major areas: (1) improvements made to individual plants as a result of their IPEs and the collective results of the IPE program, (2) plant-specific design and operational features and modeling assumptions that significantly affect the estimates of CDF and containment performance, and (3) strengths and weaknesses of the models and methods used in the IPEs. These perspectives are gained by assessing the core damage and containment performance results, including overall CDF, accident sequences, dominant contributions to component failure and human error, and containment failure modes. Methods, data, boundary conditions, and assumptions used in the IPEs are considered in understanding the differences and similarities observed among the various types of plants. This report is divided into three volumes containing six parts. Part 1 is a summary report of the key perspectives gained in each of the areas identified above, with a discussion of the NRC`s overall conclusions and observations. Part 2 discusses key perspectives regarding the impact of the IPE Program on reactor safety. Part 3 discusses perspectives gained from the IPE results regarding CDF, containment performance, and human actions. Part 4 discusses perspectives regarding the IPE models and methods. Part 5 discusses additional IPE perspectives. Part 6 contains Appendices A, B and C which provide the references of the information from the IPEs, updated PRA results, and public comments on draft NUREG-1560 respectively.

  15. Hybrid processing of stochastic and subjective uncertainty data

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cooper, J.A.; Ferson, S.; Ginzburg, L.

    1995-11-01

    Uncertainty analyses typically recognize separate stochastic and subjective sources of uncertainty, but do not systematically combine the two, although a large amount of data used in analyses is partly stochastic and partly subjective. We have developed methodology for mathematically combining stochastic and subjective data uncertainty, based on new ``hybrid number`` approaches. The methodology can be utilized in conjunction with various traditional techniques, such as PRA (probabilistic risk assessment) and risk analysis decision support. Hybrid numbers have been previously examined as a potential method to represent combinations of stochastic and subjective information, but mathematical processing has been impeded by the requirements inherent in the structure of the numbers, e.g., there was no known way to multiply hybrids. In this paper, we will demonstrate methods for calculating with hybrid numbers that avoid the difficulties. By formulating a hybrid number as a probability distribution that is only fuzzy known, or alternatively as a random distribution of fuzzy numbers, methods are demonstrated for the full suite of arithmetic operations, permitting complex mathematical calculations. It will be shown how information about relative subjectivity (the ratio of subjective to stochastic knowledge about a particular datum) can be incorporated. Techniques are also developed for conveying uncertainty information visually, so that the stochastic and subjective constituents of the uncertainty, as well as the ratio of knowledge about the two, are readily apparent. The techniques demonstrated have the capability to process uncertainty information for independent, uncorrelated data, and for some types of dependent and correlated data. Example applications are suggested, illustrative problems are worked, and graphical results are given.

  16. ADAPT (Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees) Beta Version 0.9

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (OSTI)

    2010-01-07

    The purpose of the ADAPT code is to generate Dynamic Event Trees (DET) using a user specified simulator. ADAPT can utilize any simulation tool which meets a minimal set of requirements. ADAPT is based on the concept of DET which use explicit modeling of the deterministic dynamic processes that take place during a nuclear reactor plant system evolution along with stochastic modeling. When DET are used to model different aspects of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA),more » all accident progression scenarios starting from an initiating event are considered simultaneously. The DET branching occurs at user specified times and/or when an action is required by the system and/or the operator. These outcomes then decide how the dynamic system variables will evolve in time for each DET branch. Since two different outcomes at a DET branching may lead to completely different paths for system evolution, the next branching for these paths may occur not only at different times, but can be based on different branching criteria. The computational infrastructure allows for flexibility in ADAPT to link with different system simulation codes, parallel processing of the scenarios under consideration, on-line scenario management (initiation as well as termination) and user friendly graphical capabilities. The ADAPT system is designed for a distributed computing environment; the scheduler can track multiple concurrent branches simultaneously. The scheduler is modularized so that the DET branching strategy can be modified (e.g. biasing towards the worse case scenario/event). Independent database systems store data from the simulation tasks and the DET structure so that the event tree can be constructed and analyzed later. ADAPT is provided with a user-friendly client which can easily sort through and display the results of an experiment, precluding the need for the user to manually inspect individual simulator runs.« less

  17. Study of a Station Blackout Event in the PWR Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ching-Hui Wu; Tsu-Jen Lin; Tsu-Mu Kao [Institute of Nuclear Energy Research P.O. Box 3-3, Longtan, 32500, Taiwan (China)

    2002-07-01

    On March 18, 2001, a PWR nuclear power plant located in the Southern Taiwan occurred a Station Blackout (SBO) event. Monsoon seawater mist caused the instability of offsite power grids. High salt-contained mist caused offsite power supply to the nuclear power plant very unstable, and forced the plant to be shutdown. Around 24 hours later, when both units in the plant were shutdown, several inadequate high cycles of bus transfer between 345 kV and 161 kV startup transformers degraded the emergency 4.16 kV switchgears. Then, in the Train-A switchgear room of Unit 1 occurred a fire explosion, when the degraded switchgear was hot shorted at the in-coming 345 kV breaker. Inadequate configuration arrangement of the offsite power supply to the emergency 4.16 kV switchgears led to loss of offsite power (LOOP) events to both units in the plant. Both emergency diesel generators (EDG) of Unit 1 could not be in service in time, but those of Unit 2 were running well. The SBO event of Unit 1 lasted for about two hours till the fifth EDG (DG-5) was lined-up to the Train-B switchgear. This study investigated the scenario of the SBO event and evaluated a risk profile for the SBO period. Guidelines in the SBO event, suggested by probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) procedures were also reviewed. Many related topics such as the re-configuration of offsite power supply, the addition of isolation breakers of the emergency 4.16 kV switchgears, the betterment of DG-5 lineup design, and enhancement of the reliability of offsite power supply to the PWR plant, etc., will be in further studies. (authors)

  18. Quantification of margins and uncertainty for risk-informed decision analysis.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alvin, Kenneth Fredrick

    2010-09-01

    QMU stands for 'Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties'. QMU is a basic framework for consistency in integrating simulation, data, and/or subject matter expertise to provide input into a risk-informed decision-making process. QMU is being applied to a wide range of NNSA stockpile issues, from performance to safety. The implementation of QMU varies with lab and application focus. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program develops validated computational simulation tools to be applied in the context of QMU. QMU provides input into a risk-informed decision making process. The completeness aspect of QMU can benefit from the structured methodology and discipline of quantitative risk assessment (QRA)/probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). In characterizing uncertainties it is important to pay attention to the distinction between those arising from incomplete knowledge ('epistemic' or systematic), and those arising from device-to-device variation ('aleatory' or random). The national security labs should investigate the utility of a probability of frequency (PoF) approach in presenting uncertainties in the stockpile. A QMU methodology is connected if the interactions between failure modes are included. The design labs should continue to focus attention on quantifying uncertainties that arise from epistemic uncertainties such as poorly-modeled phenomena, numerical errors, coding errors, and systematic uncertainties in experiment. The NNSA and design labs should ensure that the certification plan for any RRW is supported by strong, timely peer review and by an ongoing, transparent QMU-based documentation and analysis in order to permit a confidence level necessary for eventual certification.

  19. High energy arcing fault fires in switchgear equipment : a literature review.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nowlen, Steven Patrick; Brown, Jason W.; Wyant, Francis John

    2008-10-01

    In power generating plants, switchgear provide a means to isolate and de-energize specific electrical components and buses in order to clear downstream faults, perform routine maintenance, and replace necessary electrical equipment. These protective devices may be categorized by the insulating medium, such as air or oil, and are typically specified by voltage classes, i.e. low, medium, and high voltage. Given their high energy content, catastrophic failure of switchgear by means of a high energy arcing fault (HEAF) may occur. An incident such as this may lead to an explosion and fire within the switchgear, directly impact adjacent components, and possibly render dependent electrical equipment inoperable. Historically, HEAF events have been poorly documented and discussed in little detail. Recent incidents involving switchgear components at nuclear power plants, however, were scrupulously investigated. The phenomena itself is only understood on a very elementary level from preliminary experiments and theories; though many have argued that these early experiments were inaccurate due to primitive instrumentation or poorly justified methodologies and thus require re-evaluation. Within the past two decades, however, there has been a resurgence of research that analyzes previous work and modern technology. Developing a greater understanding of the HEAF phenomena, in particular the affects on switchgear equipment and other associated switching components, would allow power generating industries to minimize and possibly prevent future occurrences, thereby reducing costs associated with repair and downtime. This report presents the findings of a literature review focused on arc fault studies for electrical switching equipment. The specific objective of this review was to assess the availability of the types of information needed to support development of improved treatment methods in fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for nuclear power plant applications.

  20. Acute ethanol intake induces superoxide anion generation and mitogen-activated protein kinase phosphorylation in rat aorta: A role for angiotensin type 1 receptor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Yogi, Alvaro; Callera, Glaucia E.; Mecawi, André S.; Batalhão, Marcelo E.; Carnio, Evelin C.; Antunes-Rodrigues, José; Queiroz, Regina H.; Touyz, Rhian M.; Tirapelli, Carlos R.

    2012-11-01

    Ethanol intake is associated with increase in blood pressure, through unknown mechanisms. We hypothesized that acute ethanol intake enhances vascular oxidative stress and induces vascular dysfunction through renin–angiotensin system (RAS) activation. Ethanol (1 g/kg; p.o. gavage) effects were assessed within 30 min in male Wistar rats. The transient decrease in blood pressure induced by ethanol was not affected by the previous administration of losartan (10 mg/kg; p.o. gavage), a selective AT{sub 1} receptor antagonist. Acute ethanol intake increased plasma renin activity (PRA), angiotensin converting enzyme (ACE) activity, plasma angiotensin I (ANG I) and angiotensin II (ANG II) levels. Ethanol induced systemic and vascular oxidative stress, evidenced by increased plasma thiobarbituric acid-reacting substances (TBARS) levels, NAD(P)H oxidase‐mediated vascular generation of superoxide anion and p47phox translocation (cytosol to membrane). These effects were prevented by losartan. Isolated aortas from ethanol-treated rats displayed increased p38MAPK and SAPK/JNK phosphorylation. Losartan inhibited ethanol-induced increase in the phosphorylation of these kinases. Ethanol intake decreased acetylcholine-induced relaxation and increased phenylephrine-induced contraction in endothelium-intact aortas. Ethanol significantly decreased plasma and aortic nitrate levels. These changes in vascular reactivity and in the end product of endogenous nitric oxide metabolism were not affected by losartan. Our study provides novel evidence that acute ethanol intake stimulates RAS activity and induces vascular oxidative stress and redox-signaling activation through AT{sub 1}-dependent mechanisms. These findings highlight the importance of RAS in acute ethanol-induced oxidative damage. -- Highlights: ► Acute ethanol intake stimulates RAS activity and vascular oxidative stress. ► RAS plays a role in acute ethanol-induced oxidative damage via AT{sub 1} receptor activation. ► Translocation of p47phox and MAPKs phosphorylation are downstream effectors. ► Acute ethanol consumption increases the risk for acute vascular injury.

  1. Drilling and Production Testing the Methane Hydrate Resource Potential Associated with the Barrow Gas Fields

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Steve McRae; Thomas Walsh; Michael Dunn; Michael Cook

    2010-02-22

    In November of 2008, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the North Slope Borough (NSB) committed funding to develop a drilling plan to test the presence of hydrates in the producing formation of at least one of the Barrow Gas Fields, and to develop a production surveillance plan to monitor the behavior of hydrates as dissociation occurs. This drilling and surveillance plan was supported by earlier studies in Phase 1 of the project, including hydrate stability zone modeling, material balance modeling, and full-field history-matched reservoir simulation, all of which support the presence of methane hydrate in association with the Barrow Gas Fields. This Phase 2 of the project, conducted over the past twelve months focused on selecting an optimal location for a hydrate test well; design of a logistics, drilling, completion and testing plan; and estimating costs for the activities. As originally proposed, the project was anticipated to benefit from industry activity in northwest Alaska, with opportunities to share equipment, personnel, services and mobilization and demobilization costs with one of the then-active exploration operators. The activity level dropped off, and this benefit evaporated, although plans for drilling of development wells in the BGF's matured, offering significant synergies and cost savings over a remote stand-alone drilling project. An optimal well location was chosen at the East Barrow No.18 well pad, and a vertical pilot/monitoring well and horizontal production test/surveillance well were engineered for drilling from this location. Both wells were designed with Distributed Temperature Survey (DTS) apparatus for monitoring of the hydrate-free gas interface. Once project scope was developed, a procurement process was implemented to engage the necessary service and equipment providers, and finalize project cost estimates. Based on cost proposals from vendors, total project estimated cost is $17.88 million dollars, inclusive of design work, permitting, barging, ice road/pad construction, drilling, completion, tie-in, long-term production testing and surveillance, data analysis and technology transfer. The PRA project team and North Slope have recommended moving forward to the execution phase of this project.

  2. System Effectiveness

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H

    2011-01-01

    An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. It is critical that a nuclear facility conduct a thorough self-assessment of the material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system to evaluate system effectiveness. Self-assessment involves vulnerability analysis and performance testing of the MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. Analysis of the MPC&A system is necessary to understand the limits and vulnerabilities of the system to internal threats. Self-assessment helps the facility be prepared to respond to internal threats and reduce the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear material. MSET is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's MPC&A system. MSET analyzes the effectiveness of an MPC&A system based on defined performance metrics for MPC&A functions based on U.S. and international best practices and regulations. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time and reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential performance improvement or system upgrade can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance. The analyses reveal where performance degradation has the greatest detrimental impact on total system risk and where performance improvements have the greatest reduction in system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction actually achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk.

  3. Estimation of the Alpha Factor Parameters for the Emergency Diesel Generators of Ulchin Unit 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dae Il Kang; Sang Hoon Han

    2006-07-01

    Up to the present, the generic values of the Common cause failure (CCF) event parameters have been used in most PSA projects for the Korean NPPs. However, the CCF analysis should be performed with plant specific information to meet Category II of the ASME PRA Standard. Therefore, we estimated the Alpha factor parameters of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) for Ulchin Unit 3 by using the International Common-Cause Failure data Exchange (ICDE) database. The ICDE database provides the member countries with only the information needed for an estimation of the CCF parameters. The Ulchin Unit A3, pressurized water reactor, has two onsite EDGs and one alternate AC (AAC) diesel generator. The onsite EDGs of Unit 3 and 4 and the AAC are manufactured by the same company, but they are designed differently. The estimation procedure of the Alpha factor used in this study follows the approach of the NUREG/CR-5485. Since we did not find any qualitative difference between the target systems (two EDGs of Ulchin Unit 3) and the original systems (ICDE database), the applicability factor of each CCF event in the ICDE database was assumed to be 1. For the case of three EDGs including the AAC, five CCF events for the EDGs in the ICDE database were identified to be screened out. However, the detailed information for the independent events in the ICDE database is not presented. Thus, we assumed that the applicability factors for the CCF events to be screened out were, to be conservative, 0.5 and those of the other CCF events were 1. The study results show that the estimated Alpha parameters by using the ICDE database are lower than the generic values of the NUREG/CR-5497. The EDG system unavailability of the 1 out of 3 success criterion except for the supporting systems was calculated as 2.76 E-3. Compared with the system unavailability estimated by using the data of NUREG/CR-5497, it is decreased by 31.2%. (authors)

  4. IMPLEMENTING THE NFPA 805 PROCESS: Observations of a Technical Reviewer

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Short, Steven M.; Coles, Garill A.; Bohlander, Karl L.; Layton, Robert F.; Ivans, William J.; dePeralta, Fleurdeliza A.; Lowry, Peter P.

    2015-04-26

    In June 2004 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) amended its fire protection requirements to permit existing nuclear power reactor licensees to voluntarily adopt fire protection requirements contained in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805. NFPA 805 is a performance-based standard for nuclear power plant fire protection that is an alternative to the deterministic, prescriptive fire protection requirements, such as 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, that was issued in 1980. One aspect of implementing NFPA 805 is that the licensee adopts the performance goals, objectives, and criteria for nuclear safety specified in the Standard. These goals, objectives, and criteria can be met through the implementation of deterministic approaches or performance-based approaches, including engineering analyses, probabilistic risk assessment, and fire modeling. Licensees voluntarily adopting the fire protection requirements in NFPA 805 must submit a license amendment request (LAR) to the NRC. The LAR provides the new proposed fire protection licensing basis, including the methodology and results of required evaluations and analyses that show how the NFPA 805 performance criteria are met. As of August 2014, licensees have submitted LARs for 26 nuclear power plants, representing 42 nuclear reactor units. Of these, 7 nuclear power plants, representing 10 nuclear reactor units, have been issued a safety evaluation (SE) by the NRC approving transition of their fire protection licensing basis to one that complies with NFPA 805. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) supports the NRC staff’s technical review of the LARs in the areas of fundamental fire protection, safe shutdown analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). PNNL, of course, cannot speak for the nuclear industry and its choice of implementation strategies or the NRC staff’s assessment of the approaches being taken to adopt NFPA 805. However, as a reviewer of the technical details of these submittals, PNNL is in a position to observe the array of implementation tactics taken in these submittals, and observe different ways licensees are making the NFPA 805 process work. For example, we see differences in how fire areas are being transitioned, the kinds of plant modifications being implemented, the changes being made to plant procedures, the number and types of recovery actions being credited, and the kinds and extent of detailed modeling being performed in support of the Fire PRAs. As a caveat, we note that it is probably too early to comment on the overall success or limitations of the NFPA 805 process or provide lessons learned for the future. Furthermore, it is not our intention to endorse any particular approach taken in a submittal over another or to critique the industry or the regulator. Rather our goal in this paper is to summarize a set of interesting and useful differences across submittals that may provide context for further future discussions about what we (i.e., reviewers, industry, and regulators) have learned in being part of the NFPA process; and how to best use that information to inform future NFPA 805 activities or other risk-informed endeavors.

  5. Fragility Analysis Methodology for Degraded Structures and Passive Components in Nuclear Power Plants - Illustrated using a Condensate Storage Tank

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nie, J.; Braverman, J.; Hofmayer, C.; Choun, Y.; Kim, M.; Choi, I.

    2010-06-30

    The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is conducting a five-year research project to develop a realistic seismic risk evaluation system which includes the consideration of aging of structures and components in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The KAERI research project includes three specific areas that are essential to seismic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA): (1) probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, (2) seismic fragility analysis including the effects of aging, and (3) a plant seismic risk analysis. Since 2007, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has entered into a collaboration agreement with KAERI to support its development of seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures and components. The collaborative research effort is intended to continue over a five year period. The goal of this collaboration endeavor is to assist KAERI to develop seismic fragility analysis methods that consider the potential effects of age-related degradation of structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The research results of this multi-year collaboration will be utilized as input to seismic PRAs. In the Year 1 scope of work, BNL collected and reviewed degradation occurrences in US NPPs and identified important aging characteristics needed for the seismic capability evaluations. This information is presented in the Annual Report for the Year 1 Task, identified as BNL Report-81741-2008 and also designated as KAERI/RR-2931/2008. The report presents results of the statistical and trending analysis of this data and compares the results to prior aging studies. In addition, the report provides a description of U.S. current regulatory requirements, regulatory guidance documents, generic communications, industry standards and guidance, and past research related to aging degradation of SSCs. In the Year 2 scope of work, BNL carried out a research effort to identify and assess degradation models for the long-term behavior of dominant materials that are determined to be risk significant to NPPs. Multiple models have been identified for concrete, carbon and low-alloy steel, and stainless steel. These models are documented in the Annual Report for the Year 2 Task, identified as BNL Report-82249-2009 and also designated as KAERI/TR-3757/2009. This report describes the research effort performed by BNL for the Year 3 scope of work. The objective is for BNL to develop the seismic fragility capacity for a condensate storage tank with various degradation scenarios. The conservative deterministic failure margin method has been utilized for the undegraded case and has been modified to accommodate the degraded cases. A total of five seismic fragility analysis cases have been described: (1) undegraded case, (2) degraded stainless tank shell, (3) degraded anchor bolts, (4) anchorage concrete cracking, and (5)a perfect combination of the three degradation scenarios. Insights from these fragility analyses are also presented.

  6. Improving Limit Surface Search Algorithms in RAVEN Using Acceleration Schemes: Level II Milestone

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alfonsi, Andrea; Rabiti, Cristian; Mandelli, Diego; Cogliati, Joshua Joseph; Sen, Ramazan Sonat; Smith, Curtis Lee

    2015-07-01

    The RAVEN code is becoming a comprehensive tool to perform Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA); Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) and Propagation; and Verification and Validation (V&V). The RAVEN code is being developed to support the Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) pathway by developing an advanced set of methodologies and algorithms for used in advanced risk analysis. The RISMC approach uses system simulator codes applied to stochastic analysis tools. The fundamental idea behind this coupling approach to perturb (by employing sampling strategies) timing and sequencing of events, internal parameters of the system codes (i.e., uncertain parameters of the physics model) and initial conditions to estimate values ranges and associated probabilities of figure of merits of interest for engineering and safety (e.g. core damage probability, etc.). This approach applied to complex systems such as nuclear power plants requires performing a series of computationally expensive simulation runs. The large computational burden is caused by the large set of (uncertain) parameters characterizing those systems. Consequently exploring the uncertain/ parametric domain, with a good level of confidence, is generally not affordable, considering the limited computational resources that are currently available. In addition, the recent tendency to develop newer tools, characterized by higher accuracy and larger computational resources (if compared with the presently used legacy codes, that have been developed decades ago), has made this issue even more compelling. In order to overcome to these limitations, the strategy for the exploration of the uncertain/parametric space needs to use at best the computational resources focusing the computational effort in those regions of the uncertain/parametric space that are “interesting” (e.g., risk-significant regions of the input space) with respect the targeted Figure Of Merits (FOM): for example, the failure of the system, subject of the analysis. These methodologies are named, in the RAVEN environment, adaptive sampling strategies. These methodologies infer system responses from surrogate models constructed from already existing samples (produced using high fidelity simulations) and suggest the most relevant location (coordinate in the input space) of the next sampling point to be explored in the uncertain/parametric domain. When using those methodologies, it is possible to understand features of the system response with a small number of carefully selected samples. This report focuses on the development and improvement of the limit surface search. The limit surface is an important concept in system reliability analysis. Without going into the details, which will be covered later in the report, the limit surface could be briefly described as an hyper-surface in the system uncertainty/parametric space separating the regions leading to a prescribed system outcome. For example, if the uncertainty/parametric space is the one generated by the reactor power level and the duration of the batteries, the system is a nuclear power plant and the system outcome discriminating variable is the clad failure in a station blackout scenario, then the limit surface separates the combinations of reactor power level and battery duration that lead to clad failure form the one the does not.

  7. Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H

    2011-01-01

    An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. The material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system. The MSET process is divided into four distinct and separate parts: (1) Completion of the questionnaire that assembles information about the operations of every aspect of the MPC&A system; (2) Conversion of questionnaire data into numeric values associated with risk; (3) Analysis of the numeric data utilizing the MPC&A fault tree and the SAPHIRE computer software; and (4) Self-assessment using the MSET reports to perform the effectiveness evaluation of the facility's MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. If the need for system improvements or upgrades is indicated when the system is analyzed, MSET provides the capability to evaluate potential or actual system improvements or upgrades. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time. The system can be reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential system improvement can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance and reveals where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk. The functional model, the system risk assessment tool, and the facility evaluation questionnaire are valuable educational tools for MPC&A personnel. These educational tools provide a framework for ongoing dialogue between organizations regarding the design, development, implementation, operation, assessment, and sustainability of MPC&A systems. An organization considering the use of MSET as an analytical tool for evaluating the effectiveness of its MPC&A system will benefit from conducting a complete MSET exercise at an existing nuclear facility.