Powered by Deep Web Technologies
Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


1

Toxic Substances Control Act Uranium Enrichment Federal Facility...  

Office of Environmental Management (EM)

Toxic Substances Control Act Uranium Enrichment Federal Facility Compliance Agreement Toxic Substances Control Act Uranium Enrichment Federal Facility Compliance Agreement Toxic...

2

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, Major Design Changes...  

Energy Savers [EERE]

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, Major Design Changes Late...Lessons Learned Report, NNSA, Dec 2010 Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, Major Design Changes...

3

Conversion and Blending Facility Highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as uranium hexafluoride. Revision 1  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report describes the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) which will have two missions: (1) convert surplus HEU materials to pure HEU UF{sub 6} and a (2) blend the pure HEU UF{sub 6} with diluent UF{sub 6} to produce LWR grade LEU-UF{sub 6}. The primary emphasis of this blending be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The chemical and isotopic concentrations of the blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. The blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry.

NONE

1995-07-05T23:59:59.000Z

4

Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as metal. Revision 1  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The mission of this Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will be to blend surplus HEU metal and alloy with depleted uranium metal to produce an LEU product. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

NONE

1995-07-05T23:59:59.000Z

5

CRAD, Training- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Training Program at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

6

CRAD, Management- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of Management program at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

7

Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as oxide. Revision 1  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will have two missions: (1) convert HEU materials into pure HEU oxide and (2) blend the pure HEU oxide with depleted and natural uranium oxide to produce an LWR grade LEU product. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. To the extent practical, the chemical and isotopic concentrations of blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. Such blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry. Otherwise, blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

NONE

1995-07-05T23:59:59.000Z

8

New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

Brim, Cornelia P.

2013-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

9

New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

Brim, Cornelia P.

2013-03-04T23:59:59.000Z

10

Environmental monitoring for detection of uranium enrichment operations: Comparison of LEU and HEU facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

In 1994, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiated an ambitious program of worldwide field trials to evaluate the utility of environmental monitoring for safeguards. Part of this program involved two extensive United States field trials conducted at the large uranium enrichment facilities. The Paducah operation involves a large low-enriched uranium (LEU) gaseous diffusion plant while the Portsmouth facilities include a large gaseous diffusion plant that has produced both LEU and high-enriched uranium (HEU) as well as an LEU centrifuge facility. As a result of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, management of the uranium enrichment operations was assumed by the US Enrichment Corporation (USEC). The facilities are operated under contract by Martin Marietta Utility Services. Martin Marietta Energy Systems manages the environmental restoration and waste management programs at Portsmouth and Paducah for DOE. These field trials were conducted. Samples included swipes from inside and outside process buildings, vegetation and soil samples taken from locations up to 8 km from main sites, and hydrologic samples taken on the sites and at varying distances from the sites. Analytical results from bulk analysis were obtained using high abundance sensitivity thermal ionization mm spectrometers (TIMS). Uranium isotopics altered from the normal background percentages were found for all the sample types listed above, even on vegetation 5 km from one of the enrichment facilities. The results from these field trials demonstrate that dilution by natural background uranium does not remove from environmental samples the distinctive signatures that are characteristic of enrichment operations. Data from swipe samples taken within the enrichment facilities were particularly revealing. Particulate analysis of these swipes provided a detailed ``history`` of both facilities, including the assays of the end product and tails for both facilities.

Hembree, D.M. Jr.; Carter, J.A.; Ross, H.H.

1995-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

11

Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as uranyl nitrate hexahydrate. Revision 1  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will have two missions: (1) convert HEU materials to pure HEU uranyl nitrate (UNH) and (2) blend pure HEU UNH with depleted and natural UNH to produce HEU UNH crystals. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. To the extent practical, the chemical and isotopic concentrations of blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. Such blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry. Otherwise, blended LEU Will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

NONE

1995-07-05T23:59:59.000Z

12

CRAD, Criticality Safety- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Criticality Safety program at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Facility.

13

CRAD, Conduct of Operations- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January, 2005 assessment of Conduct of Operations program at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

14

CRAD, Environmental Protection- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of Environmental Compliance program at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

15

CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of Industrial Safety and Industrial Health programs at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

16

CRAD, Emergency Management- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of Emergency Management program at the Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

17

CRAD, Radiological Controls- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Radiation Protection Program at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

18

CRAD, DOE Oversight- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a DOE independent oversight assessment of the Y-12 Site Office's programs for oversight of its contractors at the Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

19

CRAD, Safety Basis- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Safety Basis at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

20

Safeguards by design - industry engagement for new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) has initiated a Safeguards by Design (SBD) effort to encourage the incorporation of international (IAEA) safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign or retrofit the facility at a later date. The main goals of Safeguards by Design are to (1) make the implementation of international safeguards at new civil nuclear facilities more effective and efficient, (2) avoid costly and time-consuming re-design work or retrofits at such facilities and (3) design such facilities in a way that makes proliferation as technically difficult, as time-consuming, and as detectable as possible. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently hosted efforts to facilitate the use of Safeguards by Design for new uranium enrichment facilities currently being planned for construction in the U.S. While SBD is not a NRC requirement, the NRC is aiding the implementation of SBD by coordinating discussions between DOE's NA-24 and industry's facility design teams. More specifically, during their normal course of licensing discussions the NRC has offered industry the opportunity to engage with NA-24 regarding SBD.

Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Grice, Thomas [NRC; Lockwood, Dunbar [DOE/NA-243

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


21

Methods for nondestructive assay holdup measurements in shutdown uranium enrichment facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Measurement surveys of uranium holdup using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques are being conducted for shutdown gaseous diffusion facilities at the Oak Ridge K-25 Site (formerly the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant). When in operation, these facilities processed UF{sub 6} with enrichments ranging from 0.2 to 93 wt % {sup 235}U. Following final shutdown of all process facilities, NDA surveys were initiated to provide process holdup data for the planning and implementation of decontamination and decommissioning activities. A three-step process is used to locate and quantify deposits: (1) high-resolution gamma-ray measurements are performed to generally define the relative abundances of radioisotopes present, (2) sizable deposits are identified using gamma-ray scanning methods, and (3) the deposits are quantified using neutron measurement methods. Following initial quantitative measurements, deposit sizes are calculated; high-resolution gamma-ray measurements are then performed on the items containing large deposits. The quantitative estimates for the large deposits are refined on the basis of these measurements. Facility management is using the results of the survey to support a variety of activities including isolation and removal of large deposits; performing health, safety, and environmental analyses; and improving facility nuclear material control and accountability records. 3 refs., 1 tab.

Hagenauer, R.C.; Mayer, R.L. II.

1991-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

22

Natural phenomena hazards evaluation of equipment and piping of Gaseous Diffusion Plant Uranium Enrichment Facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

In support of the Gaseous Diffusion Plant Safety Analysis Report Upgrade program (GDP SARUP), a natural phenomena hazards evaluation was performed for the main process equipment and piping in the uranium enrichment buildings at Paducah and Portsmouth gaseous diffusion plants. In order to reduce the cost of rigorous analyses, the evaluation methodology utilized a graded approach based on an experience data base collected by SQUG/EPRI that contains information on the performance of industrial equipment and piping during past earthquakes. This method consisted of a screening walkthrough of the facility in combination with the use of engineering judgment and simple calculations. By using these screenings combined with evaluations that contain decreasing conservatism, reductions in the time and cost of the analyses were significant. A team of experienced seismic engineers who were trained in the use of the DOE SQUG/EPRI Walkdown Screening Material was essential to the success of this natural phenomena hazards evaluation.

Singhal, M.K.; Kincaid, J.H.; Hammond, C.R.; Stockdale, B.I.; Walls, J.C. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States). Technical Programs and Services; Brock, W.R.; Denton, D.R. [Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

1995-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

23

Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund's...  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund's Fiscal Year 2008 and 2007 Financial Statement Audit Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund's...

24

NNSA Authorizes Start-Up of Highly Enriched Uranium Materials...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Authorizes Start-Up of Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at Y-12 | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the...

25

IPNS enriched uranium booster target  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Since startup in 1981, IPNS has operated on a fully depleted /sup 238/U target. With the booster as in the present system, high energy protons accelerated to 450 MeV by the Rapid Cycling Synchrotron are directed at the target and by mechanisms of spallation and fission of the uranium, produce fast neutrons. The neutrons from the target pass into adjacent moderator where they slow down to energies useful for spectroscopy. The target cooling systems and monitoring systems have operated very reliably and safely during this period. To provide higher neutron intensity, we have developed plans for an enriched uranium (booster) target. HETC-VIM calculations indicate that the target will produce approx.90 kW of heat, with a nominal x5 gain (k/sub eff/ = 0.80). The neutron beam intensity gain will be a factor of approx.3. Thermal-hydraulic and heat transport calculations indicate that approx.1/2 in. thick /sup 235/U discs are subject to about the same temperatures as the present /sup 238/U 1 in. thick discs. The coolant will be light demineralized water (H/sub 2/O) and the coolant flow rate must be doubled. The broadening of the fast neutron pulse width should not seriously affect the neutron scattering experiments. Delayed neutrons will appear at a level about 3% of the total (currently approx.0.5%). This may affect backgrounds in some experiments, so that we are assessing measures to control and correct for this (e.g., beam tube choppers). Safety analyses and neutronic calculations are nearing completion. Construction of the /sup 235/U discs at the ORNL Y-12 facility is scheduled to begin late 1985. The completion of the booster target and operation are scheduled for late 1986. No enriched uranium target assembly operating at the projected power level now exists in the world. This effort thus represents an important technological experiment as well as being a ''flux enhancer''.

Schulke, A.W. Jr.

1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

26

Uncertainty clouds uranium enrichment corporation's plans  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

An expected windfall to the US Treasury from the sale of the Energy Dept.'s commercial fuel enrichment facilities may evaporate in the next few weeks when the Clinton administration submits its fiscal 1994 budget proposal to Congress, according to congressional and administration officials. Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, DOE is required to lease two uranium enrichment facilities, Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, KY., to the government-owned US Enrichment Corp. (USEC) by July 1. Estimates by OMB and Treasury indicate a potential yearly payoff of $300 million from the government-owned company's sale of fuel for commercial reactors. Those two facilities use a process of gaseous diffusion to enrich uranium to about 3 percent for use as fuel in commercial power plants. DOE has contracts through at least 1996 to provide about 12 million separative work units (SWUs) yearly to US utilities and others world-wide. But under an agreement signed between the US and Russia last August, at least 10 metric tons, or 1.5 million SWUs, of low-enriched uranium (LEU) blended down from Russia warheads is expected to be delivered to the US starting in 1994. It could be sold at $50 to $60 per SWU, far below what DOE currently charges for its SWUs - $135 per SWU for 70 percent of the contract price and $90 per SWU for the remaining 30 percent.

Lane, E.

1993-03-24T23:59:59.000Z

27

Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a legal document. As such, it is written in a legalese that is understood by specialists in international law and treaties, but not by most outside of this field, including designers of nuclear facilities. For this reason, many of the requirements have been simplified and restated. However, in all cases, the relevant source document and passage is noted so that readers may trace the requirement to the source. This is a helpful living guide, since some of these requirements are subject to revision over time. More importantly, the practices by which the requirements are met are continuously modernized by the IAEA and nuclear facility operators to improve not only the effectiveness of international nuclear safeguards, but also the efficiency. As these improvements are made, the following guidelines should be updated and revised accordingly.

Robert Bean; Casey Durst

2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

28

An Optically Stimulated Luminescence Uranium Enrichment Monitor  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has pioneered the use of Optically Stimulated Luminescence (OSL) technology for use in personnel dosimetry and high dose radiation processing dosimetry. PNNL has developed and patented an alumina-based OSL dosimeter that is being used by the majority of medical X-ray and imaging technicians worldwide. PNNL has conceived of using OSL technology to passively measure the level of UF6 enrichment by attaching the prototype OSL monitor to pipes containing UF6 gas within an enrichment facility. The prototype OSL UF6 monitor utilizes a two-element approach with the first element open and unfiltered to measure both the low energy and high energy gammas from the UF6, while the second element utilizes a 3-mm thick tungsten filter to eliminate the low energy gammas and pass only the high energy gammas from the UF6. By placing a control monitor in the room away from the UF6 pipes and other ionizing radiation sources, the control readings can be subtracted from the UF6 pipe monitor measurements. The ratio of the shielded to the unshielded net measurements provides a means to estimate the level of uranium enrichment. PNNL has replaced the commercially available MicroStar alumina-based dosimeter elements with a composite of polyethylene plastic, high-Z glass powder, and BaFBr:Eu OSL phosphor powder at various concentrations. The high-Z glass was added in an attempt to raise the average “Z” of the composite dosimeter and increase the response. Additionally, since BaFBr:Eu OSL phosphor is optimally excited and emits light at different wavelengths compared to alumina, the commercially available MicroStar reader was modified for reading BaFBr:Eu in a parallel effort to increase reader sensitivity. PNNL will present the design and performance of our novel OSL uranium enrichment monitor based on a combination of laboratory and UF6 test loop measurements. PNNL will also report on the optimization effort to achieve the highest possible performance from both the OSL enrichment monitor and the new custom OSL reader modified for this application. This project has been supported by the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Dismantlement and Transparency (DOE/NNSA/NA-241).

Miller, Steven D.; Tanner, Jennifer E.; Simmons, Kevin L.; Conrady, Matthew M.; Benz, Jacob M.; Greenfield, Bryce A.

2010-08-11T23:59:59.000Z

29

Evaporation of Enriched Uranium Solutions Containing Organophosphates  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Savannah River Site has enriched uranium (EU) solution which has been stored for almost 10 years since being purified in the second uranium cycle of the H area solvent extraction process. The preliminary SRTC data, in conjunction with information in the literature, is promising. However, very few experiments have been run, and none of the results have been confirmed with repeat tests. As a result, it is believed that insufficient data exists at this time to warrant Separations making any process or program changes based on the information contained in this report. When this data is confirmed in future testing, recommendations will be presented.

Pierce, R.A.

1999-03-18T23:59:59.000Z

30

Uranium enrichment export control guide: Gaseous diffusion  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This document was prepared to serve as a guide for export control officials in their interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws that relate to the Zangger International Trigger List for gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment process components, equipment, and materials. Particular emphasis is focused on items that are especially designed or prepared since export controls are required for these by States that are party to the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Not Available

1989-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

31

Simulation of transportation of low enriched uranium solutions  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A simulation of the transportation by truck of low enriched uranium solutions has been completed for NEPA purposes at the Savannah River Site. The analysis involves three distinct source terms, and establishes the radiological risks of shipment to three possible destinations. Additionally, loading accidents were analyzed to determine the radiological consequences of mishaps during handling and delivery. Source terms were developed from laboratory measurements of chemical samples from low enriched uranium feed materials being stored at SRS facilities, and from manufacturer data on transport containers. The transportation simulations were accomplished over the INTERNET using the DOE TRANSNET system at Sandia National Laboratory. The HIGHWAY 3.3 code was used to analyze routing scenarios, and the RADTRAN 4 code was used to analyze incident free and accident risks of transporting radiological materials. Loading accidents were assessed using the Savannah River Site AXAIR89Q and RELEASE 2 codes.

Hope, E.P.; Ades, M.J.

1996-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

32

Criteria for the safe storage of enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Uranium storage practices at US Department of Energy (DOE) facilities have evolved over a period spanning five decades of programmatic work in support of the nuclear deterrent mission. During this period, the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee has served as the principal enriched uranium facility for fabrication, chemical processing, metallurgical processing and storage. Recent curtailment of new nuclear weapons production and stockpile reduction has created significant amounts of enriched uranium available as a strategic resource which must be properly and safely stored. This standard specifies criteria associated with the safe storage of enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant. Because programmatic needs, compliance regulations and desirable materials of construction change with time, it is recommended that these standards be reviewed and amended periodically to ensure that they continue to serve their intended purpose.

Cox, S.O.

1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

33

Measurement of uranium enrichment by gamma spectroscopy: result of an experimental design  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

, Gamma Spectrometry, uranium enrichment #12;PAPER Measurement of uranium enrichment by gamma spectroscopy: result of an experimental design Gamma spectroscopy is commonly used in nuclear safeguards to measure uranium enrichment. An experimental

34

The uranium cylinder assay system for enrichment plant safeguards  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Safeguarding sensitive fuel cycle technology such as uranium enrichment is a critical component in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. A useful tool for the nuclear materials accountancy of such a plant would be an instrument that measured the uranium content of UF{sub 6} cylinders. The Uranium Cylinder Assay System (UCAS) was designed for Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) for use in the Rokkasho Enrichment Plant in Japan for this purpose. It uses total neutron counting to determine uranium mass in UF{sub 6} cylinders given a known enrichment. This paper describes the design of UCAS, which includes features to allow for unattended operation. It can be used on 30B and 48Y cylinders to measure depleted, natural, and enriched uranium. It can also be used to assess the amount of uranium in decommissioned equipment and waste containers. Experimental measurements have been carried out in the laboratory and these are in good agreement with the Monte Carlo modeling results.

Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rael, Carlos D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Iwamoto, Tomonori [JNFL; Tamura, Takayuki [JNFL; Aiuchi, Syun [JNFL

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

35

Accelerating the Reduction of Excess Russian Highly Enriched Uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This paper presents the latest information on one of the Accelerated Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Disposition initiatives that resulted from the May 2002 Summit meeting between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir V. Putin. These initiatives are meant to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation objectives by accelerating the disposition of nuclear weapons-useable materials. The HEU Transparency Implementation Program (TIP), within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is working to implement one of the selected initiatives that would purchase excess Russian HEU (93% 235U) for use as fuel in U.S. research reactors over the next ten years. This will parallel efforts to convert the reactors' fuel core from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) material, where feasible. The paper will examine important aspects associated with the U.S. research reactor HEU purchase. In particular: (1) the establishment of specifications for the Russian HEU, and (2) transportation safeguard considerations for moving the HEU from the Mayak Production Facility in Ozersk, Russia, to the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, TN.

Benton, J; Wall, D; Parker, E; Rutkowski, E

2004-02-18T23:59:59.000Z

36

Basic characterization of highly enriched uranium by gamma spectrometry  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Gamma-spectrometric methods suitable for the characterization of highly enriched uranium samples encountered in illicit trafficking of nuclear materials are presented. In particular, procedures for determining the 234U, 235U, 238U, 232U and 236U contents and the age of highly enriched uranium are described. Consequently, the total uranium content and isotopic composition can be calculated. For determining the 238U and 232U contents a low background chamber was used. In addition, age dating of uranium was also performed using low-background spectrometry.

Cong Tam Nguyen; Jozsef Zsigrai

2005-08-25T23:59:59.000Z

37

Basic characterization of highly enriched uranium by gamma spectrometry  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Gamma-spectrometric methods suitable for the characterization of highly enriched uranium samples encountered in illicit trafficking of nuclear materials are presented. In particular, procedures for determining the 234U, 235U, 238U, 232U and 236U contents and the age of highly enriched uranium are described. Consequently, the total uranium content and isotopic composition can be calculated. For determining the 238U and 232U contents a low background chamber was used. In addition, age dating of uranium was also performed using low-background spectrometry.

Nguyen, C T

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

38

Production of Mo-99 using low-enriched uranium silicide  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Over the last several years, uranium silicide fuels have been under development as low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets for Mo-99. The use of LEU silicide is aimed at replacing the UAl{sub x} alloy in the highly-enriched uranium dissolution process. A process to recover Mo-99 from low-enriched uranium silicide is being developed at Argonne National Laboratory. The uranium silicide is dissolved in alkaline hydrogen peroxide. Experiments performed to determine the optimum dissolution procedure are discussed, and the results of dissolving a portion of a high-burnup (>40%) U{sub 3}Si{sub 2} miniplate are presented. Future work related to Mo-99 separation and waste disposal are also discussed.

Hutter, J. C.; Srinivasan, B.; Vicek, M.; Vandegrift, G. F.

1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

39

Examination of the conversion of the U.S. submarine fleet from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

The nuclear reactors used by the U.S. Navy for submarine propulsion are currently fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU), but HEU brings administrative and political challenges. This issue has been studied by the Navy ...

McCord, Cameron (Cameron Liam)

2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

40

The IMCA: A field instrument for uranium enrichment measurements  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The IMCA (Inspection Multi-Channel Analyzer) is a portable gamma-ray spectrometer designed to measure the enrichment of uranium either in a laboratory or in the field. The IMCA consists of a Canberra InSpector Multi-Channel Analyzer, sodium iodide or a planar germanium detector, and special application software. The system possesses a high degree of automation. The IMCA uses the uranium enrichment meter principle, and is designed to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements for the verification of enriched uranium materials. The IMCA is available with MGA plutonium isotopic analysis software or MGAU uranium analysis software as well. In this paper, the authors present a detailed description of the hardware and software of the IMCA system, as well as results from preliminary measurements testing compliance of IMCA with IAEA requirements using uranium standards and UF6 cylinders. Measurements performed on UF6 cylinders in the field under variable environmental conditions (temperatures ranging from 0 to 35 C) have shown that good results can be achieved. The enrichment of UF6 contained in the cylinder is determined by using calibration constants generated from an instrument calibration, using traceable uranium oxide standards, performed in the laboratory under controlled environmental conditions. The IMCA software is designed to make the necessary matrix and container corrections to ensure that accurate results are achieved in the field.

Gardner, G.H.; Koskelo, M.; Moeslinger, M. [Canberra Industries, Meriden, CT (United States); Mayer, R.L. II; McGinnis, B.R. [Lockheed Martin Utility Services, Piketon, OH (United States). Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant; Wishard, B. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

1996-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


41

Office of Environmental Management uranium enrichment decontamination and decommissioning fund financial statements. September 30, 1994 and 1993  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Act) transferred the uranium enrichment enterprise to the United States Enrichment Corporation as of July 1, 1993. However, the Act requires the Department of Energy to retain ownership and responsibility for the costs of environmental cleanup resulting from the Government`s operation of the three gaseous diffusion facilities located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio (diffusion facilities). The Act established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (D&D Fund) to: Pay for the costs of decontamination and decommissioning at the diffusion facilities; Pay the annual costs for remedial action at the diffusion facilities to the extent that the amount in the Fund is sufficient; and Reimburse uranium/thorium licensees for the costs of decontamination, decommissioning, reclamation, and other remedial actions which are incident to sales to the Government.

Marwick, P.

1994-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

42

EIS-0471: Department of Energy Loan Guarantee to Support Proposed Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility in Bonneville County, Idaho  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

This EIS evaluates the environmental impacts of construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility (EREF), a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility to be located in a rural area in western Bonneville County, Idaho. (DOE adopted this EIS issued by NRC on 04/13/2007.)

43

EA-1172: Sale of Surplus Natural and Low Enriched Uranium, Piketon, Ohio  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

This EA evaluates the environmental impacts for the proposal to sell uranium for subsequent enrichment and fabrication into commercial nuclear power reactor fuel.  The uranium is currently stored...

44

High Purity Germanium Gamma-PHA Assay of Uranium in Scrap Cans for 321-M Facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Analytical Development Section of SRTC was requested by the Facilities Disposition Division to determine the holdup of enriched uranium in the 321-M facility as part of an overall deactivation project of the facility. This report includes a description of two efficiency calibration configurations and also the results of the assay. A description of the quality control checks is included as well.

Salaymeh, S.R.

2002-03-22T23:59:59.000Z

45

Development of a low enrichment uranium core for the MIT reactor  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

An investigation has been made into converting the MIT research reactor from using high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU) with a newly developed fuel material. The LEU fuel introduces negative ...

Newton, Thomas Henderson

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

46

Office of Environmental Management Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund financial statements, September 30, 1995 and 1994  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Act) requires the Department of Energy to retain ownership and responsibility for the costs of environmental cleanup resulting from the Government`s operation of the three gaseous diffusion facilities located at the K-25 site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio. The Act transferred the uranium enrichment enterprise to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) as of July 1, 1993, and established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (D&D Fund) to: Pay for the costs of decontamination and decommissioning at the diffusion facilities; pay the annual costs for remedial action at the diffusion facilities to the extent that the amount in the Fund is sufficient; and reimburse uranium/thorium licensees for the costs of decontamination, decommissioning, reclamation, and other remedial actions which are incident to sales to the Government.

NONE

1996-02-21T23:59:59.000Z

47

Low-enriched uranium holdup measurements in Kazakhstan  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Quantification of the residual nuclear material remaining in process equipment has long been a challenge to those who work with nuclear material accounting systems. Fortunately, nuclear material has spontaneous radiation emissions that can be measured. If gamma-ray measurements can be made, it is easy to determine what isotope a deposit contains. Unfortunately, it can be quite difficult to relate this measured signal to an estimate of the mass of the nuclear deposit. Typically, the measurement expert must work with incomplete or inadequate information to determine a quantitative result. Simplified analysis models, the distribution of the nuclear material, any intervening attenuation, background(s), and the source-to-detector distance(s) can have significant impacts on the quantitative result. This presentation discusses the application of a generalized-geometry holdup model to the low-enriched uranium fuel pellet fabrication plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. Preliminary results will be presented. Software tools have been developed to assist the facility operators in performing and documenting the measurements. Operator feedback has been used to improve the user interfaces.

Barham, M.A.; Ceo, R.N.; Smith, S.E. [Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, TN (United States)] [and others

1998-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

48

Thermal hydraulics analysis of the MIT research reactor in support of a low enrichment uranium (LEU) core conversion .  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

??The MIT research reactor (MITR) is converting from the existing high enrichment uranium (HEU) core to a low enrichment uranium (LEU) core using a high-density… (more)

Ko, Yu-Chih, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

49

SciTech Connect: enriched uranium  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr MayAtmosphericNuclear Security Administrationcontroller systemsBi (2) Sr (2) CawithMicrofluidicJournalWhat is aenriched uranium

50

Criticality Safety of Low-Enriched Uranium and High-Enriched Uranium Fuel Elements in Heavy Water Lattices  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The RB reactor was designed as a natural-uranium, heavy water, nonreflected critical assembly in the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1958. From 1962 until 2002, numerous critical experiments were carried out with low-enriched uranium and high-enriched uranium fuel elements of tubular shape, known as the Russian TVR-S fuel assembly type, placed in various heavy water square lattices within the RB cylindrical aluminum tank. Some of these well-documented experiments were selected, described, evaluated, and accepted for inclusion in the 'International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments', contributing to the preservation of a rather small number of heavy water benchmark critical experiments.

Pesic, Milan P

2003-10-15T23:59:59.000Z

51

DESIGN STUDY FOR A LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM CORE FOR THE HIGH FLUX ISOTOPE REACTOR, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2010  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report documents progress made during FY 2010 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. With axial and radial grading of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current level. Studies are reported of support to a thermal hydraulic test loop design, the implementation of finite element, thermal hydraulic analysis capability, and infrastructure tasks at HFIR to upgrade the facility for operation at 100 MW. A discussion of difficulties with preparing a fuel specification for the uranium-molybdenum alloy is provided. Continuing development in the definition of the fuel fabrication process is described.

Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Jolly, Brian C [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL; Renfro, David G [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Pinkston, Daniel [ORNL

2011-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

52

High Accuracy U-235 Enrichment Verification Station for Low Enriched Uranium Alloys  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Y-12 National Security Complex is playing a role in the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) Conversion program sponsored by the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Threat Reduction. The USHPRR program has a goal of converting remaining U.S. reactors that continue to use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The USHPRR program is currently developing a LEU Uranium-Molybdenum (U-Mo) monolithic fuel for use in the U.S. high performance research reactors.Y-12 is supporting both the fuel development and fuel fabrication efforts by fabricating low enriched U-Mo foils from its own source material for irradiation experiments and for optimizing the fabrication process in support of scaling up the process to a commercial production scale. Once the new fuel is qualified, Y-12 will produce and ship U-Mo coupons with verified 19.75% +0.2% - 0.3% U-235 enrichment to be fabricated into fuel elements for the USHPRRs. Considering this small enrichment tolerance and the transition into HEU being set strictly at 20% U-235, a characterization system with a measurement uncertainty of less than or equal to 0.1% in enrichment is desired to support customer requirements and minimize production costs. Typical uncertainty for most available characterization systems today is approximately 1-5%; therefore, a specialized system must be developed which results in a reduced measurement uncertainty. A potential system using a High-Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector has been procured, and tests have been conducted to verify its capabilities with regards to the requirements. Using four U-Mo enrichment standards fabricated with complete isotopic and chemical characterization, infinite thickness and peak-ratio enrichment measurement methods have been considered for use. As a result of inhomogeneity within the U-Mo samples, FRAM, an isotopic analysis software, has been selected for initial testing. A systematic approach towards observing effects on FRAM's enrichment analysis has been conducted with regards to count and dead time.

Lillard, C. R.; Hayward, J. P.; Williamson, M. R.

2012-06-07T23:59:59.000Z

53

Prompt Neutron Decay for Delayed Critical Bare and Natural-Uranium-Reflected Metal Spheres of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Prompt neutron decay at delayed criticality was measured by Oak Ridge National Laboratory for uranium-reflected highly enriched uranium (HEU) and Pu metal spheres (FLATTOP), for an unreflected Pu metal (4.5% {sup 240}Pu) sphere (JEZEBEL) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and for an unreflected HEU metal sphere at Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility. The average prompt neutron decay constants from hundreds of Rossi-{alpha} and randomly pulsed neutron measurements with {sup 252}Cf at delayed criticality are as follows: 3.8458 {+-} 0.0016 x 10{sup 5} s{sup -1}, 2.2139 {+-} 0.0022 x 10{sup 5} s{sup -1}, 6.3126 {+-} 0.0100 x 10{sup 5} s{sup -1}, and 1.1061 {+-} 0.0009 x 10{sup 6} s{sup -1}, respectively. These values agree with previous measurements by LANL for FLATTOP, JEZEBEL, and GODIVA I as follows: 3.82 {+-} 0.02 x 10{sup 5} s{sup -1} for a uranium core; 2.14 {+-} 0.05 x 10{sup 5} s{sup -1} and 2.29 x 10{sup 5} s{sup -1} (uncertainty not reported) for a plutonium core; 6.4 {+-} 0.1 x 10{sup 5} s{sup -1}, and 1.1 {+-} 0.1 x 10{sup 6} s{sup -1}, respectively, but have smaller uncertainties because of the larger number of measurements. For the FLATTOP and JEZEBEL assemblies, the measurements agree with calculations. Traditionally, the calculated decay constants for the bare uranium metal sphere GODIVA I and the Oak Ridge Uranium Metal Sphere were higher than experimental by {approx}10%. Other energy-dependent quantities for the bare uranium sphere agree within 1%.

Mihalczo, John T [ORNL

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

54

Natural uranium/conversion services/enrichment services  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This article is the 1993 uranium market summary. During this reporting period, there were 50 deals in the concentrates market, 26 deals in the UF6 market, and 14 deals for enrichment services. In the concentrates market, the restricted value closed $0.15 higher at $9.85, and the unrestricted value closed down $0.65 at $7.00. In the UF6 market, restricted prices fluctuated and closed higher at $31.00, and unrestricted prices closed at their initial value of $24.75. The restricted transaction value closed at $10.25 and the unrestricted value closed at $7.15. In the enrichment services market, the restricted value moved steadily higher to close at $84.00 per SWU, and the unrestricted value closed at its initial value of $68.00 per SWU.

NONE

1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

55

International Atomic Energy Agency support of research reactor highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel conversion projects  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The IAEA has been involved for more than twenty years in supporting international nuclear non- proliferation efforts associated with reducing the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in international commerce. IAEA projects and activities have directly supported the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) programme, as well as directly assisted efforts to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel. HEU to LEU fuel conversion projects differ significantly depending on several factors including the design of the reactor and fuel, technical needs of the member state, local nuclear infrastructure, and available resources. To support such diverse endeavours, the IAEA tailors each project to address the relevant constraints. This paper presents the different approaches taken by the IAEA to address the diverse challenges involved in research reactor HEU to LEU fuel conversion projects. Examples of conversion related projects in different Member States are fully detailed. (author)

Bradley, E.; Adelfang, P.; Goldman, I.N. [Research Reactors Unit, Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramer Strasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna (Austria)

2008-07-15T23:59:59.000Z

56

Uranium mineralization in fluorine-enriched volcanic rocks  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Several uranium and other lithophile element deposits are located within or adjacent to small middle to late Cenozoic, fluorine-rich rhyolitic dome complexes. Examples studied include Spor Mountain, Utah (Be-U-F), the Honeycomb Hills, Utah (Be-U), the Wah Wah Mountains, Utah (U-F), and the Black Range-Sierra Cuchillo, New Mexico (Sn-Be-W-F). The formation of these and similar deposits begins with the emplacement of a rhyolitic magma, enriched in lithophile metals and complexing fluorine, that rises to a shallow crustal level, where its roof zone may become further enriched in volatiles and the ore elements. During initial explosive volcanic activity, aprons of lithicrich tuffs are erupted around the vents. These early pyroclastic deposits commonly host the mineralization, due to their initial enrichment in the lithophile elements, their permeability, and the reactivity of their foreign lithic inclusions (particularly carbonate rocks). The pyroclastics are capped and preserved by thick topaz rhyolite domes and flows that can serve as a source of heat and of additional quantities of ore elements. Devitrification, vapor-phase crystallization, or fumarolic alteration may free the ore elements from the glassy matrix and place them in a form readily leached by percolating meteoric waters. Heat from the rhyolitic sheets drives such waters through the system, generally into and up the vents and out through the early tuffs. Secondary alteration zones (K-feldspar, sericite, silica, clays, fluorite, carbonate, and zeolites) and economic mineral concentrations may form in response to this low temperature (less than 200 C) circulation. After cooling, meteoric water continues to migrate through the system, modifying the distribution and concentration of the ore elements (especially uranium).

Burt, D.M.; Sheridan, M.F.; Bikun, J.; Christiansen, E.; Correa, B.; Murphy, B.; Self, S.

1980-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

57

CONCEPTUAL PROCESS DESCRIPTION FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM-MOLYBDENUM FUEL  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The National Nuclear Security Agency Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is tasked with minimizing the use of high-enriched uranium (HEU) worldwide. A key component of that effort is the conversion of research reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. The GTRI Convert Fuel Development program, previously known as the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program was initiated in 1978 by the United States Department of Energy to develop the nuclear fuels necessary to enable these conversions. The program cooperates with the research reactors’ operators to achieve this goal of HEU to LEU conversion without reduction in reactor performance. The programmatic mandate is to complete the conversion of all civilian domestic research reactors by 2014. These reactors include the five domestic high-performance research reactors (HPRR), namely: the High Flux Isotope Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory, the National Bureau of Standards Reactor at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Missouri University Research Reactor at the University of Missouri–Columbia, and the MIT Reactor-II at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Characteristics for each of the HPRRs are given in Appendix A. The GTRI Convert Fuel Development program is currently engaged in the development of a novel nuclear fuel that will enable these conversions. The fuel design is based on a monolithic fuel meat (made from a uranium-molybdenum alloy) clad in Al-6061 that has shown excellent performance in irradiation testing. The unique aspects of the fuel design, however, necessitate the development and implementation of new fabrication techniques and, thus, establishment of the infrastructure to ensure adequate fuel fabrication capability. A conceptual fabrication process description and rough estimates of the total facility throughput are described in this document as a basis for establishing preconceptual fabrication facility designs.

Daniel M. Wachs; Curtis R. Clark; Randall J. Dunavant

2008-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

58

Progress in alkaline peroxide dissolution of low-enriched uranium metal and silicide targets  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This paper reports recent progress on two alkaline peroxide dissolution processes: the dissolution of low-enriched uranium metal and silicide (U{sub 3}Si{sub 2}) targets. These processes are being developed to substitute low-enriched for high-enriched uranium in targets used for production of fission-product {sup 99}Mo. Issues that are addressed include (1) dissolution kinetics of silicide targets, (2) {sup 99}Mo lost during aluminum dissolution, (3) modeling of hydrogen peroxide consumption, (4) optimization of the uranium foil dissolution process, and (5) selection of uranium foil barrier materials. Future work associated with these two processes is also briefly discussed.

Chen, L.; Dong, D.; Buchholz, B.A.; Vandegrift, G.F. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States). Chemical Technology Div.; Wu, D. [Univ. of Illinois, Urbana, IL (United States)

1996-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

59

Thermal hydraulic limits analysis for the MIT Research Reactor low enrichment uranium core conversion using statistical propagation of parametric uncertainties  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

The MIT Research Reactor (MITR) is evaluating the conversion from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU) fuel. In addition to the fuel element re-design from 15 to 18 plates per element, a reactor ...

Chiang, Keng-Yen

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

60

Estimate of radiation release from MIT reactor with low enriched uranium (LEU) core during maximum hypothetical accident  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

In accordance with a 1986 NRC ruling, the MIT Research Reactor (MITR) is planning on converting from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) for fuel. A component of the conversion analysis ...

Plumer, Kevin E. (Kevin Edward)

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


61

Validation of NCSSHP for highly enriched uranium systems containing beryllium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This document describes the validation of KENO V.a using the 27-group ENDF/B-IV cross section library for highly enriched uranium and beryllium neutronic systems, and is in accordance with ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983(R1988) requirements for calculational methods. The validation has been performed on a Hewlett Packard 9000/Series 700 Workstation at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Department using the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Software code package. Critical experiments from LA-2203, UCRL-4975, ORNL-2201, and ORNL/ENG-2 have been identified as having the constituents desired for this validation as well as sufficient experimental detail to allow accurate construction of KENO V.a calculational models. The results of these calculations establish the safety criteria to be employed in future calculational studies of these types of systems.

Krass, A.W.; Elliott, E.P.; Tollefson, D.A.

1994-09-29T23:59:59.000Z

62

Signatures and Methods for the Automated Nondestructive Assay of UF6 Cylinders at Uranium Enrichment Plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility’s entire cylinder inventory. These measurements are time-consuming, expensive, and assay only a small fraction of the total cylinder volume. An automated nondestructive assay system capable of providing enrichment measurements over the full volume of the cylinder could improve upon current verification practices in terms of manpower and assay accuracy. Such a station would use sensors that can be operated in an unattended mode at an industrial facility: medium-resolution scintillators for gamma-ray spectroscopy (e.g., NaI(Tl)) and moderated He-3 neutron detectors. This sensor combination allows the exploitation of additional, more-penetrating signatures beyond the traditional 185-keV emission from U-235: neutrons produced from F-19(?,n) reactions (spawned primarily from U 234 alpha emission) and high-energy gamma rays (extending up to 8 MeV) induced by neutrons interacting in the steel cylinder. This paper describes a study of these non-traditional signatures for the purposes of cylinder enrichment verification. The signatures and the radiation sensors designed to collect them are described, as are proof-of-principle cylinder measurements and analyses. Key sources of systematic uncertainty in the non-traditional signatures are discussed, and the potential benefits of utilizing these non-traditional signatures, in concert with an automated form of the traditional 185-keV-based assay, are discussed.

Smith, Leon E.; Mace, Emily K.; Misner, Alex C.; Shaver, Mark W.

2010-08-08T23:59:59.000Z

63

Standard specification for uranium hexafluoride enriched to less than 5 % 235U  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

1.1 This specification covers nuclear grade uranium hexafluoride (UF6) that either has been processed through an enrichment plant, or has been produced by the blending of Highly Enriched Uranium with other uranium to obtain uranium of any 235U concentration below 5 % and that is intended for fuel fabrication. The objectives of this specification are twofold: (1) To define the impurity and uranium isotope limits for Enriched Commercial Grade UF6 so that, with respect to fuel design and manufacture, it is essentially equivalent to enriched uranium made from natural UF6; and (2) To define limits for Enriched Reprocessed UF6 to be expected if Reprocessed UF6 is to be enriched without dilution with Commercial Natural UF6. For such UF6, special provisions, not defined herein, may be needed to ensure fuel performance and to protect the work force, process equipment, and the environment. 1.2 This specification is intended to provide the nuclear industry with a standard for enriched UF6 that is to be used in the pro...

American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

64

Realities of verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Over a two and one-half year period beginning in 1981, representatives of six countries (United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, The Netherlands, and Japan) and the inspectorate organizations of the International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM developed and agreed to a technically sound approach for verifying the absence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This effort, known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP), led to the first international concensus on techniques and requirements for effective verification of the absence of weapons-grade nuclear materials production. Since that agreement, research and development has continued on the radiation detection technology-based technique that technically confirms the HSP goal is achievable. However, the realities of achieving the HSP goal of effective technical verification have not yet been fully attained. Issues such as design and operating conditions unique to each gas centrifuge plant, concern about the potential for sensitive technology disclosures, and on-site support requirements have hindered full implementation and operator support of the HSP agreement. In future arms control treaties that may limit or monitor fissile material production, the negotiators must recognize and account for the realities and practicalities in verifying the absence of HEU production. This paper will describe the experiences and realities of trying to achieve the goal of developing and implementing an effective approach for verifying the absence of HEU production. 3 figs.

Swindle, D.W.

1990-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

65

Environmental Survey preliminary report, Portsmouth Uranium Enrichment Complex, Piketon, Ohio  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report presents the preliminary findings from the first phase of the Environmental Survey of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) Portsmouth Uranium Enrichment Complex (PUEC), conducted August 4 through August 15, 1986. The Survey is being conducted by an interdisciplinary team of environmental specialists, led and managed by the Office of Environment, Safety and Health's Office of Environmental Audit. Team specialists are being supplied by a private contractor. The objective of the Survey is to identify environmental problems and areas of environmental regulation. It is being performed in accordance with the DOE Environmental Survey Manual. This phase of the Survey involves the review of existing site environmental data, observations of the operations performed at PUEC, and interviews with site personnel. The Survey team developed a Sampling and Analysis Plan to assist in further assessing certain of the environmental problems identified during its on-site activities. The Sampling and Analysis Plan will be executed by Argonne National Laboratory. When completed, the results will be incorporated into the PUEC Environmental Survey Interim Report. The Interim Report will reflect the final determinations of the PUEC Survey. 55 refs., 22 figs., 21 tabs.

Not Available

1987-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

66

Candidate processes for diluting the {sup 235}U isotope in weapons-capable highly enriched uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering its surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used to produce nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching uranium in the fissile {sup 235}U isotope from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by diluting its concentration of the fissile {sup 235}U isotope in a uranium blending process, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel.

Snider, J.D.

1996-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

67

Operating limit evaluation for disposal of uranium enrichment plant wastes  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A proposed solid waste landfill at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) will accept wastes generated during normal plant operations that are considered to be non-radioactive. However, nearly all solid waste from any source or facility contains small amounts of radioactive material, due to the presence in most materials of trace quantities of such naturally occurring radionuclides as uranium and thorium. This paper describes an evaluation of operating limits, which are protective of public health and the environment, that would allow waste materials containing small amounts of radioactive material to be sent to a new solid waste landfill at PGDP. The operating limits are expressed as limits on concentrations of radionuclides in waste materials that could be sent to the landfill based on a site-specific analysis of the performance of the facility. These limits are advantageous to PGDP and DOE for several reasons. Most importantly, substantial cost savings in the management of waste is achieved. In addition, certain liabilities that could result from shipment of wastes to a commercial off-site solid waste landfill are avoided. Finally, assurance that disposal operations at the PGDP landfill are protective of public health and the environment is provided by establishing verifiable operating limits for small amounts of radioactive material; rather than relying solely on administrative controls. The operating limit determined in this study has been presented to the Commonwealth of Kentucky and accepted as a condition to be attached to the operating permit for the solid waste landfill.

Lee, D.W.; Kocher, D.C.; Wang, J.C.

1996-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

68

EA-1255: Project Partnership Transportation of Foreign-Owned Enriched Uranium from the Republic of Georgia  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

This EA evaluates the environmental impacts for the proposal to transport 5.26 kilograms of enriched uranium-23 5 in the form of nuclear fuel, from the Republic of Georgia to the United Kingdom.

69

RUSSIAN-ORIGIN HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENT FROM BULGARIA  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

Kelly Cummins; Igor Bolshinsky; Ken Allen; Tihomir Apostolov; Ivaylo Dimitrov

2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

71

S. 2415: Title I may be cited as the Uranium Enrichment Act of 1990; Title II may be cited as the Uranium Security and Tailings Reclamation Act of 1989; and Title III may be cited as The Solar, Wind, Waste, and Geothermal Power Production Incentives Act of 1990, introduced in the Senate, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, April 4, 1990  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

S. 2415 (which started out as a bill to encourage solar and geothermal power generation) now would amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to redirect uranium enrichment enterprises to further the national interest, respond to competitive market forces, and to ensure the nation's common defense and security. It would establish a United States Enrichment Corporation for the following purposes: to acquire feed materials, enriched uranium, and enrichment facilities; to operate these facilities; to market enriched uranium for governmental purposes and qualified domestic and foreign persons; to conduct research into uranium enrichment; and to operate as a profitable, self-financing, reliable corporation and in a manner consistent with the health and safety of the public. The bill describes powers and duties of the corporation; the organization, finance, and management; decontamination and decommissioning. The second part of the bill would ensure an adequate supply of domestic uranium for defense and power production; provide assistance to the domestic uranium industry; and establish, facilitate, and expedite a comprehensive system for financing reclamation and remedial action at active uranium and thorium processing sites. The third part of the bill would remove the size limitations on power production facilities now part of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. Solar, wind, waste, or geothermal power facilities would no longer have to be less than 80 MW to qualify as a small power production facility.

Not Available

1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

72

Safeguards design strategies: designing and constructing new uranium and plutonium processing facilities in the United States  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) is transforming its outdated and oversized complex of aging nuclear material facilities into a smaller, safer, and more secure National Security Enterprise (NSE). Environmental concerns, worker health and safety risks, material security, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while maintaining the capability for an effective nuclear deterrence by the United States, are influencing this transformation. As part of the nation's Uranium Center of Excellence (UCE), the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will advance the U.S.'s capability to meet all concerns when processing uranium and is located adjacent to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF), designed for consolidated storage of enriched uranium. The HEUMF became operational in March 2010, and the UPF is currently entering its final design phase. The designs of both facilities are for meeting anticipated security challenges for the 21st century. For plutonium research, development, and manufacturing, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico is now under construction. The first phase of the CMRR Project is the design and construction of a Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building. The second phase consists of the design and construction of the Nuclear Facility (NF). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) selected these two sites as part of the national plan to consolidate nuclear materials, provide for nuclear deterrence, and nonproliferation mission requirements. This work examines these two projects independent approaches to design requirements, and objectives for safeguards, security, and safety (3S) systems as well as the subsequent construction of these modern processing facilities. Emphasis is on the use of Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), incorporating Systems Engineering (SE) principles for these two projects.

Scherer, Carolynn P [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Long, Jon D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

73

High Purity Germanium Gamma-PHA Assay of Uranium Storage Pigs for 321-M Facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Analytical Development Section of SRTC was requested by the Facilities Disposition Division (FDD) to determine the holdup of enriched uranium in the 321-M facility as part of an overall deactivation project of the facility. The 321-M facility was used to fabricate enriched uranium fuel assemblies, lithium-aluminum target tubes, neptunium assemblies, and miscellaneous components for the production reactors. The facility also includes the 324-M storage building and the passageway connecting it to 321-M. The results of the holdup assays are essential for determining compliance with the Solid Waste's Waste Acceptance Criteria, Material Control and Accountability, and to meet criticality safety controls. This report describes and documents the use of a portable HPGe detector and EG and G Dart system that contains a high voltage power supply, signal processing electronics, a personal computer with Gamma-Vision software, and space to store and manipulate multiple 4096-channel g-ray spectra to assay for 235U content in 268 uranium shipping and storage pigs. This report includes a description of three efficiency calibration configurations and also the results of the assay. A description of the quality control checks is included as well.

Dewberry, R.A.

2001-09-18T23:59:59.000Z

74

ZPR-3 Assembly 6F : A spherical assembly of highly enriched uranium, depleted uranium, aluminum and steel with an average {sup 235}U enrichment of 47 atom %.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Over a period of 30 years, more than a hundred Zero Power Reactor (ZPR) critical assemblies were constructed at Argonne National Laboratory. The ZPR facilities, ZPR-3, ZPR-6, ZPR-9 and ZPPR, were all fast critical assembly facilities. The ZPR critical assemblies were constructed to support fast reactor development, but data from some of these assemblies are also well suited for nuclear data validation and to form the basis for criticality safety benchmarks. A number of the Argonne ZPR/ZPPR critical assemblies have been evaluated as ICSBEP and IRPhEP benchmarks. Of the three classes of ZPR assemblies, engineering mockups, engineering benchmarks and physics benchmarks, the last group tends to be most useful for criticality safety. Because physics benchmarks were designed to test fast reactor physics data and methods, they were as simple as possible in geometry and composition. The principal fissile species was {sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu. Fuel enrichments ranged from 9% to 95%. Often there were only one or two main core diluent materials, such as aluminum, graphite, iron, sodium or stainless steel. The cores were reflected (and insulated from room return effects) by one or two layers of materials such as depleted uranium, lead or stainless steel. Despite their more complex nature, a small number of assemblies from the other two classes would make useful criticality safety benchmarks because they have features related to criticality safety issues, such as reflection by soil-like material. ZPR-3 Assembly 6 consisted of six phases, A through F. In each phase a critical configuration was constructed to simulate a very simple shape such as a slab, cylinder or sphere that could be analyzed with the limited analytical tools available in the 1950s. In each case the configuration consisted of a core region of metal plates surrounded by a thick depleted uranium metal reflector. The average compositions of the core configurations were essentially identical in phases A - F. ZPR-3 Assembly 6F (ZPR-3/6F), the final phase of the Assembly 6 program, simulated a spherical core with a thick depleted uranium reflector. ZPR-3/6F was designed as a fast reactor physics benchmark experiment with an average core {sup 235}U enrichment of approximately 47 at.%. Approximately 81.4% of the total fissions in this assembly occur above 100 keV, approximately 18.6% occur below 100 keV, and essentially none below 0.625 eV - thus the classification as a 'fast' assembly. This assembly is Fast Reactor Benchmark No. 7 in the Cross Section Evaluation Working Group (CSEWG) Benchmark Specifications and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3/6F began in late December 1956, and the experimental measurements were performed in January 1957. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates, depleted uranium plates, perforated aluminum plates and stainless steel plates loaded into aluminum drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of three columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, three columns of 0.125 in.-wide depleted uranium plates, nine columns of 0.125 in.-wide perforated aluminum plates and one column of stainless steel plates. The maximum length of each column of core material in a drawer was 9 in. (228.6 mm). Because of the goal to produce an approximately spherical core, core fuel and diluent column lengths generally varied between adjacent drawers and frequently within an individual drawer. The axial reflector consisted of depleted uranium plates and blocks loaded in the available space in the front (core) drawers, with the remainder loaded into back drawers behind the front drawers. The radial reflector consisted of blocks of depleted uranium loaded directly into the matrix tubes. The assembly geometry approximated a reflected sphere as closely as the square matrix tubes, the drawers and the shapes of fuel and diluent plates allowed. According to the logbook and loading records for ZPR-3/6F

Lell, R. M.; McKnight, R. D; Schaefer, R. W.; Nuclear Engineering Division

2010-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

75

BLENDING LOW ENRICHED URANIUM WITH DEPLETED URANIUM TO CREATE A SOURCE MATERIAL ORE THAT CAN BE PROCESSED FOR THE RECOVERY OF YELLOWCAKE AT A CONVENTIONAL URANIUM MILL  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Throughout the United States Department of Energy (DOE) complex, there are a number of streams of low enriched uranium (LEU) that contain various trace contaminants. These surplus nuclear materials require processing in order to meet commercial fuel cycle specifications. To date, they have not been designated as waste for disposal at the DOE's Nevada Test Site (NTS). Currently, with no commercial outlet available, the DOE is evaluating treatment and disposal as the ultimate disposition path for these materials. This paper will describe an innovative program that will provide a solution to DOE that will allow disposition of these materials at a cost that will be competitive with treatment and disposal at the NTS, while at the same time recycling the material to recover a valuable energy resource (yellowcake) for reintroduction into the commercial nuclear fuel cycle. International Uranium (USA) Corporation (IUSA) and Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) have entered into a commercial relationship to pursue the development of this program. The program involves the design of a process and construction of a plant at NFS' site in Erwin, Tennessee, for the blending of contaminated LEU with depleted uranium (DU) to produce a uranium source material ore (USM Ore{trademark}). The USM Ore{trademark} will then be further processed at IUC's White Mesa Mill, located near Blanding, Utah, to produce conventional yellowcake, which can be delivered to conversion facilities, in the same manner as yellowcake that is produced from natural ores or other alternate feed materials. The primary source of feed for the business will be the significant sources of trace contaminated materials within the DOE complex. NFS has developed a dry blending process (DRYSM Process) to blend the surplus LEU material with DU at its Part 70 licensed facility, to produce USM Ore{trademark} with a U235 content within the range of U235 concentrations for source material. By reducing the U235 content to source material levels in this manner, the material will be suitable for processing at a conventional uranium mill under its existing Part 40 license to remove contaminants and enable the product to re-enter the commercial fuel cycle. The tailings from processing the USM Ore{trademark} at the mill will be permanently disposed of in the mill's tailings impoundment as 11e.(2) byproduct material. Blending LEU with DU to make a uranium source material ore that can be returned to the nuclear fuel cycle for processing to produce yellowcake, has never been accomplished before. This program will allow DOE to disposition its surplus LEU and DU in a cost effective manner, and at the same time provide for the recovery of valuable energy resources that would be lost through processing and disposal of the materials. This paper will discuss the nature of the surplus LEU and DU materials, the manner in which the LEU will be blended with DU to form a uranium source material ore, and the legal means by which this blending can be accomplished at a facility licensed under 10 CFR Part 70 to produce ore that can be processed at a conventional uranium mill licensed under 10 CFR Part 40.

Schutt, Stephen M.; Hochstein, Ron F.; Frydenlund, David C.; Thompson, Anthony J.

2003-02-27T23:59:59.000Z

76

FEMO, A FLOW AND ENRICHMENT MONITOR FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS AT A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A number of countries have received construction licenses or are contemplating the construction of large-capacity gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The capability to independently verify nuclear material flows is a key component of international safeguards approaches, and the IAEA does not currently have an approved method to continuously monitor the mass flow of 235U in uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas streams. Oak Ridge National Laboratory is investigating the development of a flow and enrichment monitor, or FEMO, based on an existing blend-down monitoring system (BDMS). The BDMS was designed to continuously monitor both 235U mass flow and enrichment of UF6 streams at the low pressures similar to those which exists at GCEPs. BDMSs have been installed at three sites-the first unit has operated successfully in an unattended environment for approximately 10 years. To be acceptable to GCEP operators, it is essential that the instrument be installed and maintained without interrupting operations. A means to continuously verify flow as is proposed by FEMO will likely be needed to monitor safeguards at large-capacity plants. This will enable the safeguards effectiveness that currently exists at smaller plants to be maintained at the larger facilities and also has the potential to reduce labor costs associated with inspections at current and future plants. This paper describes the FEMO design requirements, operating capabilities, and development work required before field demonstration.

Gunning, John E [ORNL; Laughter, Mark D [ORNL; March-Leuba, Jose A [ORNL

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

77

Decommissioning of U.S. uranium production facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

From 1980 to 1993, the domestic production of uranium declined from almost 44 million pounds U{sub 3}O{sub 8} to about 3 million pounds. This retrenchment of the U.S. uranium industry resulted in the permanent closing of many uranium-producing facilities. Current low uranium prices, excess world supply, and low expectations for future uranium demand indicate that it is unlikely existing plants will be reopened. Because of this situation, these facilities eventually will have to be decommissioned. The Uranium Mill Tailings and Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) vests the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with overall responsibility for establishing environmental standards for decommissioning of uranium production facilities. UMTRCA also gave the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the responsibility for licensing and regulating uranium production and related activities, including decommissioning. Because there are many issues associated with decommissioning-environmental, political, and financial-this report will concentrate on the answers to three questions: (1) What is required? (2) How is the process implemented? (3) What are the costs? Regulatory control is exercised principally through the NRC licensing process. Before receiving a license to construct and operate an uranium producing facility, the applicant is required to present a decommissioning plan to the NRC. Once the plan is approved, the licensee must post a surety to guarantee that funds will be available to execute the plan and reclaim the site. This report by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) represents the most comprehensive study on this topic by analyzing data on 33 (out of 43) uranium production facilities located in Colorado, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington.

Not Available

1995-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

78

Long-term criticality control in radioactive waste disposal facilities using depleted uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Plant photosynthesis has created a unique planetary-wide geochemistry - an oxidizing atmosphere with oxidizing surface waters on a planetary body with chemically reducing conditions near or at some distance below the surface. Uranium is four orders of magnitude more soluble under chemically oxidizing conditions than it is under chemically reducing conditions. Thus, uranium tends to leach from surface rock and disposal sites, move with groundwater, and concentrate where chemically reducing conditions appear. Earth`s geochemistry concentrates uranium and can separate uranium from all other elements except oxygen, hydrogen (in water), and silicon (silicates, etc). Fissile isotopes include {sup 235}U, {sup 233}U, and many higher actinides that eventually decay to one of these two uranium isotopes. The potential for nuclear criticality exists if the precipitated uranium from disposal sites has a significant fissile enrichment, mass, and volume. The earth`s geochemistry suggests that isotopic dilution of fissile materials in waste with {sup 238}U is a preferred strategy to prevent long-term nuclear criticality in and beyond the boundaries of waste disposal facilities because the {sup 238}U does not separate from the fissile uranium isotopes. Geological, laboratory, and theoretical data indicate that the potential for nuclear criticality can be minimized by diluting fissile materials with-{sup 238}U to 1 wt % {sup 235}U equivalent.

Forsberg, C.W.

1997-02-19T23:59:59.000Z

79

Examination of the conversion of the U.S. submarine fleet from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium ; Examination of the conversion of the United States submarine fleet from HEU to low LEU .  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

??The nuclear reactors used by the U.S. Navy for submarine propulsion are currently fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU), but HEU brings administrative and political… (more)

McCord, Cameron (Cameron Liam)

2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

80

ZPR-3 Assembly 12 : A cylindrical assembly of highly enriched uranium, depleted uranium and graphite with an average {sup 235}U enrichment of 21 atom %.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Over a period of 30 years, more than a hundred Zero Power Reactor (ZPR) critical assemblies were constructed at Argonne National Laboratory. The ZPR facilities, ZPR-3, ZPR-6, ZPR-9 and ZPPR, were all fast critical assembly facilities. The ZPR critical assemblies were constructed to support fast reactor development, but data from some of these assemblies are also well suited for nuclear data validation and to form the basis for criticality safety benchmarks. A number of the Argonne ZPR/ZPPR critical assemblies have been evaluated as ICSBEP and IRPhEP benchmarks. Of the three classes of ZPR assemblies, engineering mockups, engineering benchmarks and physics benchmarks, the last group tends to be most useful for criticality safety. Because physics benchmarks were designed to test fast reactor physics data and methods, they were as simple as possible in geometry and composition. The principal fissile species was {sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu. Fuel enrichments ranged from 9% to 95%. Often there were only one or two main core diluent materials, such as aluminum, graphite, iron, sodium or stainless steel. The cores were reflected (and insulated from room return effects) by one or two layers of materials such as depleted uranium, lead or stainless steel. Despite their more complex nature, a small number of assemblies from the other two classes would make useful criticality safety benchmarks because they have features related to criticality safety issues, such as reflection by soil-like material. ZPR-3 Assembly 12 (ZPR-3/12) was designed as a fast reactor physics benchmark experiment with an average core {sup 235}U enrichment of approximately 21 at.%. Approximately 68.9% of the total fissions in this assembly occur above 100 keV, approximately 31.1% occur below 100 keV, and essentially none below 0.625 eV - thus the classification as a 'fast' assembly. This assembly is Fast Reactor Benchmark No. 9 in the Cross Section Evaluation Working Group (CSEWG) Benchmark Specifications and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3 Assembly 12 began in late Jan. 1958, and the Assembly 12 program ended in Feb. 1958. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates, depleted uranium plates and graphite plates loaded into stainless steel drawers which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of two columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, seven columns of 0.125 in.-wide depleted uranium plates and seven columns of 0.125 in.-wide graphite plates. The length of each column was 9 in. (228.6 mm) in each half of the core. The graphite plates were included to produce a softer neutron spectrum that would be more characteristic of a large power reactor. The axial blanket consisted of 12 in. (304.8 mm) of depleted uranium behind the core. The thickness of the radial blanket was approximately 12 in. and the length of the radial blanket in each half of the matrix was 21 in. (533.4 mm). The assembly geometry approximated a right circular cylinder as closely as the square matrix tubes allowed. According to the logbook and loading records for ZPR-3/12, the reference critical configuration was loading 10 which was critical on Feb. 5, 1958. The subsequent loadings were very similar but less clean for criticality because there were modifications made to accommodate reactor physics measurements other than criticality. Accordingly, ZPR-3/12 loading 10 was selected as the only configuration for this benchmark. As documented below, it was determined to be acceptable as a criticality safety benchmark experiment. An accurate transformation to a simplified model is needed to make any ZPR assembly a practical criticality-safety benchmark. There is simply too much geometric detail in an exact (as-built) model of a ZPR assembly, even a clean core such as ZPR-3/12 loading 10. The transformation must reduce the detail to a practical level without masking any of the important features of the critical experiment. And it must d

Lell, R. M.; McKnight, R. D.; Perel, R. L.; Wagschal, J. J.; Nuclear Engineering Division; Racah Inst. of Physics

2010-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


81

Containment and storage of uranium hexafluoride at US Department of Energy uranium enrichment plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Isotopically depleted UF{sub 6} (uranium hexafluoride) accumulates at a rate five to ten times greater than the enriched product and is stored in steel vessels at the enrichment plant sites. There are approximately 55,000 large cylinders now in storage at Paducah, Kentucky; Portsmouth, Ohio; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Most of them contain a nominal 14 tons of depleted UF{sub 6}. Some of these cylinders have been in the unprotected outdoor storage environment for periods approaching 40 years. Storage experience, supplemented by limited corrosion data, suggests a service life of about 70 years under optimum conditions for the 48-in. diameter, 5/16-in.-wall pressure vessels (100 psi working pressure), using a conservative industry-established 1/4-in.-wall thickness as the service limit. In the past few years, however, factors other than atmospheric corrosion have become apparent that adversely affect the serviceability of small numbers of the storage containers and that indicate the need for a managed program to ensure maintenance ofcontainment integrity for all the cylinders in storage. The program includes periodic visual inspections of cylinders and storage yards with documentation for comparison with other inspections, a group of corrosion test programs to permit cylinder life forecasts, and identification of (and scheduling for remedial action) situations in which defects, due to handling damage or accelerated corrosion, can seriously shorten the storage life or compromise the containment integrity of individual cylinders. The program also includes rupture testing to assess the effects of certain classes of damage on overall cylinder strength, aswell as ongoing reviews of specifications, procedures, practices, and inspection results to effect improvements in handling safety, containment integrity, and storage life.

Barlow, C.R.; Alderson, J.H.; Blue, S.C.; Boelens, R.A.; Conkel, M.E.; Dorning, R.E.; Ecklund, C.D.; Halicks, W.G.; Henson, H.M.; Newman, V.S.; Philpot, H.E.; Taylor, M.S.; Vournazos, J.P. [Oak Ridge K-25 Site, TN (United States). UEO Enrichment Technical Operations Div.; Russell, J.R. [USDOE Oak Ridge Field Office, TN (United States); Pryor, W.A. [PAI Corp., Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Ziehlke, K.T. [MJB Technical Associates (United States)

1992-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

82

Compact reaction cell for homogenizing and down-blending highly enriched uranium metal  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

The invention is a specialized reaction cell for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide. In a preferred form, the reaction cell comprises a reaction chamber with increasing diameter along its length (e.g. a cylindrical chamber having a diameter of about 2 inches in a lower portion and having a diameter of from about 4 to about 12 inches in an upper portion). Such dimensions are important to achieve the necessary conversion while at the same time affording criticality control and transportability of the cell and product. The reaction chamber further comprises an upper port and a lower port, the lower port allowing for the entry of reactant gases into the reaction chamber, the upper port allowing for the exit of gases from the reaction chamber. A diffuser plate is attached to the lower port of the reaction chamber and serves to shape the flow of gas into the reaction chamber. The reaction cell further comprises means for introducing gases into the reaction chamber and a heating means capable of heating the contents of the reaction chamber. The present invention also relates to a method for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide in the reaction cell of the present invention. The invention is useful for down-blending highly enriched uranium metal by the simultaneous conversion of highly enriched uranium metal and natural or depleted uranium metal to uranium oxide within the reaction cell. 4 figs.

McLean, W. II; Miller, P.E.; Horton, J.A.

1995-05-02T23:59:59.000Z

83

Compact reaction cell for homogenizing and down-blanding highly enriched uranium metal  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

The invention is a specialized reaction cell for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide. In a preferred form, the reaction cell comprises a reaction chamber with increasing diameter along its length (e.g. a cylindrical chamber having a diameter of about 2 inches in a lower portion and having a diameter of from about 4 to about 12 inches in an upper portion). Such dimensions are important to achieve the necessary conversion while at the same time affording criticality control and transportability of the cell and product. The reaction chamber further comprises an upper port and a lower port, the lower port allowing for the entry of reactant gasses into the reaction chamber, the upper port allowing for the exit of gasses from the reaction chamber. A diffuser plate is attached to the lower port of the reaction chamber and serves to shape the flow of gas into the reaction chamber. The reaction cell further comprises means for introducing gasses into the reaction chamber and a heating means capable of heating the contents of the reaction chamber. The present invention also relates to a method for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide in the reaction cell of the present invention. The invention is useful for down-blending highly enriched uranium metal by the simultaneous conversion of highly enriched uranium metal and natural or depleted uranium metal to uranium oxide within the reaction cell.

McLean, II, William (Oakland, CA); Miller, Philip E. (Livermore, CA); Horton, James A. (Livermore, CA)

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

84

Establishing a Cost Basis for Converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor from High Enriched to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Under the auspices of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program, the National Nuclear Security Administration /Department of Energy (NNSA/DOE) has, as a goal, to convert research reactors worldwide from weapons grade to non-weapons grade uranium. The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) is one of the candidates for conversion of fuel from high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). A well documented business model, including tasks, costs, and schedules was developed to plan the conversion of HFIR. Using Microsoft Project, a detailed outline of the conversion program was established and consists of LEU fuel design activities, a fresh fuel shipping cask, improvements to the HFIR reactor building, and spent fuel operations. Current-value costs total $76 million dollars, include over 100 subtasks, and will take over 10 years to complete. The model and schedule follows the path of the fuel from receipt from fuel fabricator to delivery to spent fuel storage and illustrates the duration, start, and completion dates of each subtask to be completed. Assumptions that form the basis of the cost estimate have significant impact on cost and schedule.

Primm, Trent [ORNL; Guida, Tracey [University of Pittsburgh

2010-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

85

Material accountancy in the Ningyo-Toge uranium enrichment pilot plant  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The uranium enrichment pilot plant at PNC Ningyo-Toge Works, Japan, started operation in August 1979. Since then, inspection activities by the government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been carried out. A basic measure of safeguards is evaluation of material unaccounted for (MUF) by closing the material balance. As the plant now produces uranium of <5% enrichment, a material balance is closed only once a year. Until now, eight physical inventories have been taken. This paper describes the operator's procedures for material accountability and the values of MUF reported to the government of Japan and the IAEA.

Akiba, M; Iwamoto, T.; Hori, M.; Ikeda, K.; Tani, A.

1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

86

Licensed fuel facility status report  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

NRC is committed to the periodic publication of licensed fuel facilities inventory difference data, following agency review of the information and completion of any related NRC investigations. Information in this report includes inventory difference data for active fuel fabrication facilities possessing more than one effective kilogram of high enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, plutonium, or uranium-233.

Joy, D.; Brown, C.

1993-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

87

Uranium Enrichment Standards of the Y-12 Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Y-12 National Security Complex has recently fabricated and characterized a new series of metallic uranium standards for use in the Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center (NDSTC). Ten uranium metal disks with enrichments varying from 0.2 to 93.2% {sup 235}U were designed to provide researchers access to a wide variety of measurement scenarios in a single testing venue. Special care was taken in the selection of the enrichments in order to closely bracket the definitions of reactor fuel at 4% {sup 235}U and that of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at 20% {sup 235}U. Each standard is well characterized using analytical chemistry as well as a series of gamma-ray spectrometry measurements. Gamma-ray spectra of these standards are being archived in a reference library for use by customers of the NDSTC. A software database tool has been created that allows for easier access and comparison of various spectra. Information provided through the database includes: raw count data (including background spectra), regions of interest (ROIs), and full width half maximum calculations. Input is being sought from the user community on future needs including enhancements to the spectral database and additional Uranium standards, shielding configurations and detector types. A related presentation are planned for the INMM 53rd Annual Meeting (Hull, et al.), which describe new uranium chemical compound standards and testing opportunities at Y-12 Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center (NDSTC).

Cantrell, J.

2012-05-23T23:59:59.000Z

88

Development of Integrated Online Monitoring Systems for Detection of Diversion at Natural Uranium Conversion Facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Recent work at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has focused on some source term modeling of uranyl nitrate (UN) as part of a comprehensive validation effort employing gamma-ray detector instrumentation for the detection of diversion from declared conversion activities. Conversion, the process by which natural uranium ore (yellowcake) is purified and converted through a series of chemical processes into uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6), has historically been excluded from the nuclear safeguards requirements of the 235U-based nuclear fuel cycle. The undeclared diversion of this product material could potentially provide feedstock for a clandestine weapons program for state or non-state entities. Given the changing global political environment and the increased availability of dual-use nuclear technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency has evolved its policies to emphasize safeguarding this potential feedstock material in response to dynamic and evolving potential diversion pathways. To meet the demand for instrumentation testing at conversion facilities, ORNL developed the Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in a natural uranium conversion plant. This work investigates gamma-ray signatures of UN circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluates detector instrumentation sensitivity to UN for safeguards applications. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the UN gamma-ray signatures for spectrometers based on sodium iodide, lanthanum bromide, and germanium detectors. The results of measurements under static and dynamic operating conditions at concentrations ranging from 10-90g U/L of naturally enriched UN will be presented. A range of gamma-ray lines was examined and self-attenuation factors were calculated, in addition to attenuation for transmission measurement of density, concentration and enrichment. A detailed uncertainty analysis will be presented providing insights into instrumentation limitations to spoofing.

Dewji, Shaheen A [ORNL] [ORNL; Lee, Denise L [ORNL] [ORNL; Croft, Stephen [ORNL] [ORNL; McElroy, Robert Dennis [ORNL] [ORNL; Hertel, Nolan [Georgia Institute of Technology] [Georgia Institute of Technology; Chapman, Jeffrey Allen [ORNL] [ORNL; Cleveland, Steven L [ORNL] [ORNL

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

89

ZPR-3 Assembly 11 : A cylindrical sssembly of highly enriched uranium and depleted uranium with an average {sup 235}U enrichment of 12 atom % and a depleted uranium reflector.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Over a period of 30 years, more than a hundred Zero Power Reactor (ZPR) critical assemblies were constructed at Argonne National Laboratory. The ZPR facilities, ZPR-3, ZPR-6, ZPR-9 and ZPPR, were all fast critical assembly facilities. The ZPR critical assemblies were constructed to support fast reactor development, but data from some of these assemblies are also well suited for nuclear data validation and to form the basis for criticality safety benchmarks. A number of the Argonne ZPR/ZPPR critical assemblies have been evaluated as ICSBEP and IRPhEP benchmarks. Of the three classes of ZPR assemblies, engineering mockups, engineering benchmarks and physics benchmarks, the last group tends to be most useful for criticality safety. Because physics benchmarks were designed to test fast reactor physics data and methods, they were as simple as possible in geometry and composition. The principal fissile species was {sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu. Fuel enrichments ranged from 9% to 95%. Often there were only one or two main core diluent materials, such as aluminum, graphite, iron, sodium or stainless steel. The cores were reflected (and insulated from room return effects) by one or two layers of materials such as depleted uranium, lead or stainless steel. Despite their more complex nature, a small number of assemblies from the other two classes would make useful criticality safety benchmarks because they have features related to criticality safety issues, such as reflection by soil-like material. ZPR-3 Assembly 11 (ZPR-3/11) was designed as a fast reactor physics benchmark experiment with an average core {sup 235}U enrichment of approximately 12 at.% and a depleted uranium reflector. Approximately 79.7% of the total fissions in this assembly occur above 100 keV, approximately 20.3% occur below 100 keV, and essentially none below 0.625 eV - thus the classification as a 'fast' assembly. This assembly is Fast Reactor Benchmark No. 8 in the Cross Section Evaluation Working Group (CSEWG) Benchmark Specificationsa and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3 Assembly 11 began in early January 1958, and the Assembly 11 program ended in late January 1958. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates and depleted uranium plates loaded into stainless steel drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of two columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, six columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) depleted uranium plates and one column of 1.0 in.-wide (25.4 mm) depleted uranium plates. The length of each column was 10 in. (254.0 mm) in each half of the core. The axial blanket consisted of 12 in. (304.8 mm) of depleted uranium behind the core. The thickness of the depleted uranium radial blanket was approximately 14 in. (355.6 mm), and the length of the radial blanket in each half of the matrix was 22 in. (558.8 mm). The assembly geometry approximated a right circular cylinder as closely as the square matrix tubes allowed. According to the logbook and loading records for ZPR-3/11, the reference critical configuration was loading 10 which was critical on January 21, 1958. Subsequent loadings were very similar but less clean for criticality because there were modifications made to accommodate reactor physics measurements other than criticality. Accordingly, ZPR-3/11 loading 10 was selected as the only configuration for this benchmark. As documented below, it was determined to be acceptable as a criticality safety benchmark experiment. A very accurate transformation to a simplified model is needed to make any ZPR assembly a practical criticality-safety benchmark. There is simply too much geometric detail in an exact (as-built) model of a ZPR assembly, even a clean core such as ZPR-3/11 loading 10. The transformation must reduce the detail to a practical level without masking any of the important features of the critical experiment. And it must do this without increasing the total uncertain

Lell, R. M.; McKnight, R. D.; Tsiboulia, A.; Rozhikhin, Y.; National Security; Inst. of Physics and Power Engineering

2010-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

90

SciTech Connect: "enriched uranium"  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr MayAtmosphericNuclear Security Administrationcontroller systems controller systemsisSchedulesenriched uranium" Find + Advanced

91

Uranium Processing Facility Site Readiness Subproject Completed...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

(NNSA) commitment to complete UPF by 2025 and move out of the aging 9212 building facilities it is currently using for a cost not to exceed 6.5 billion. UPF is the...

92

Initial report on characterization of excess highly enriched uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

DOE`s Office of Fissile Materials Disposition assigned to this Y-12 division the task of preparing a report on the 174.4 metric tons of excess highly enriched U. Characterization included identification by category, gathering existing data (assay), defining the likely needed processing steps for prepping for transfer to a blending site, and developing a range of preliminary cost estimates for those steps. Focus is on making commercial reactor fuel as a final disposition path.

NONE

1996-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

93

NNSA helps eliminate highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan...  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

Kazakhstan. The HEU was transported via two air shipments to a secure facility in Russia for permanent disposition. This complex operation was the culmination of a multi-year...

94

Continuing investigations for technology assessment of /sup 99/Mo production from LEU (low enriched Uranium) targets  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Currently much of the world's supply of /sup 99m/Tc for medical purposes is produced from /sup 99/Mo derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). The need for /sup 99m/Tc is continuing to grow, especially in developing countries, where needs and national priorities call for internal production of /sup 99/Mo. This paper presents the results of our continuing studies on the effects of substituting low enriched Uranium (LEU) for HEU in targets for the production of fission product /sup 99/Mo. Improvements in the electrodeposition of thin films of uranium metal are reported. These improvements continue to increase the appeal for the substitution of LEU metal for HEU oxide films in cylindrical targets. The process is effective for targets fabricated from stainless steel or hastaloy. A cost estimate for setting up the necessary equipment to electrodeposit uranium metal on cylindrical targets is reported. Further investigations on the effect of LEU substitution on processing of these targets are also reported. Substitution of uranium silicides for the uranium-aluminum alloy or uranium aluminide dispersed fuel used in other current target designs will allow the substitution of LEU for HEU in these targets with equivalent /sup 99/Mo-yield per target and no change in target geometries. However, this substitution will require modifications in current processing steps due to (1) the insolubility of uranium silicides in alkaline solutions and (2) the presence of significant quantities of silicate in solution. Results to date suggest that both concerns can be handled and that substitution of LEU for HEU can be achieved.

Vandergrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Marshall, S.L.; Vissers, D.R.; Matos, J.E.

1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

95

Evaluation of a RF-Based Approach for Tracking UF6 Cylinders at a Uranium Enrichment Plant  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Approved industry-standard cylinders are used globally to handle and store uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) feed, product, tails, and samples at uranium enrichment plants. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on time-consuming physical inspections to verify operator declarations and detect possible diversion of UF{sub 6}. Development of a reliable, automated, and tamper-resistant system for near real-time tracking and monitoring UF{sub 6} cylinders (as they move within an enrichment facility) would greatly improve the inspector function. This type of system can reduce the risk of false or misreported cylinder tare weights, diversion of nuclear material, concealment of excess production, utilization of undeclared cylinders, and misrepresentation of the cylinders contents. This paper will describe a proof-of-concept approach that was designed to evaluate the feasibility of using radio frequency (RF)-based technologies to track individual UF{sub 6} cylinders throughout a portion of their life cycle, and thus demonstrate the potential for improved domestic accountability of materials, and a more effective and efficient method for application of site-level IAEA safeguards. The evaluation system incorporates RF-based identification devices (RFID) which provide a foundation for establishing a reliable, automated, and near real-time tracking system that can be set up to utilize site-specific, rules-based detection algorithms. This paper will report results from a proof-of-concept demonstration at a real enrichment facility that is specifically designed to evaluate both the feasibility of using RF to track cylinders and the durability of the RF equipment to survive the rigors of operational processing and handling. The paper also discusses methods for securely attaching RF devices and describes how the technology can effectively be layered with other safeguard systems and approaches to build a robust system for detecting cylinder diversion. Additionally, concepts for off-site tracking of cylinders are described.

Pickett, Chris A [ORNL] [ORNL; Younkin, James R [ORNL] [ORNL; Kovacic, Donald N [ORNL] [ORNL; Laughter, Mark D [ORNL] [ORNL; Hines, Jairus B [ORNL] [ORNL; Boyer, Brian [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)] [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Martinez, B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)] [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

96

Uranium-Loaded Water Treatment Resins: 'Equivalent Feed' at NRC and Agreement State-Licensed Uranium Recovery Facilities - 12094  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Community Water Systems (CWSs) are required to remove uranium from drinking water to meet EPA standards. Similarly, mining operations are required to remove uranium from their dewatering discharges to meet permitted surface water discharge limits. Ion exchange (IX) is the primary treatment strategy used by these operations, which loads uranium onto resin beads. Presently, uranium-loaded resin from CWSs and mining operations can be disposed as a waste product or processed by NRC- or Agreement State-licensed uranium recovery facilities if that licensed facility has applied for and received permission to process 'alternate feed'. The disposal of uranium-loaded resin is costly and the cost to amend a uranium recovery license to accept alternate feed can be a strong disincentive to commercial uranium recovery facilities. In response to this issue, the NRC issued a Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) to clarify the agency's policy that uranium-loaded resin from CWSs and mining operations can be processed by NRC- or Agreement State-licensed uranium recovery facilities without the need for an alternate feed license amendment when these resins are essentially the same, chemically and physically, to resins that licensed uranium recovery facilities currently use (i.e., equivalent feed). NRC staff is clarifying its current alternate feed policy to declare IX resins as equivalent feed. This clarification is necessary to alleviate a regulatory and financial burden on facilities that filter uranium using IX resin, such as CWSs and mine dewatering operations. Disposing of those resins in a licensed facility could be 40 to 50 percent of the total operations and maintenance (O and M) cost for a CWS. Allowing uranium recovery facilities to treat these resins without requiring a license amendment lowers O and M costs and captures a valuable natural resource. (authors)

Camper, Larry W.; Michalak, Paul; Cohen, Stephen; Carter, Ted [Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States)

2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

97

Use of the UNCLE Facility to Assess Integrated Online Monitoring Systems for Detection of Diversions at Uranium Conversion Facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Historically, the approach to safeguarding nuclear material in the front end of the fuel cycle was implemented only at the stage when UF6 was declared as feedstock for enrichment plants. Recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication exist. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has developed the Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility to simulate the full-scale operating conditions for a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process conducted in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP) operating at 6000 MTU/year. Monitoring instruments, including the 3He passive neutron detector developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Endress+Hauser Promass 83F Coriolis meter, have been tested at UNCLE and field tested at Springfields. The field trials demonstrated the need to perform full-scale equipment testing under controlled conditions prior to field deployment of operations and safeguards monitoring at additional plants. Currently, UNCLE is testing neutron-based monitoring for detection of noncompliant activities; however, gamma-ray source term monitoring is currently being explored complementary to the neutron detector in order to detect undeclared activities in a more timely manner. The preliminary results of gamma-ray source term modeling and monitoring at UNCLE are being analyzed as part of a comprehensive source term and detector benchmarking effort. Based on neutron source term detection capabilities, alternative gamma-based detection and monitoring methods will be proposed to more effectively monitor NUCP operations in verifying or detecting deviations from declared conversion activities.

Dewji, Shaheen A [ORNL; Chapman, Jeffrey Allen [ORNL; Lee, Denise L [ORNL; Rauch, Eric [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Hertel, Nolan [Georgia Institute of Technology

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

98

NUCLEAR ISOTOPIC DILUTION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BY DRY BLENDING VIA THE RM-2 MILL TECHNOLOGY  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

DOE has initiated numerous activities to focus on identifying material management strategies to disposition various excess fissile materials. In particular the INEEL has stored 1,700 Kg of offspec HEU at INTEC in CPP-651 vault facility. Currently, the proposed strategies for dispositioning are (a) aqueous dissolution and down blending to LEU via facilities at SRS followed by shipment of the liquid LEU to NFS for fabrication into LWR fuel for the TVA reactors and (b) dilution of the HEU to 0.9% for discard as a waste stream that would no longer have a criticality or proliferation risk without being processed through some type of enrichment system. Dispositioning this inventory as a waste stream via aqueous processing at SRS has been determined to be too costly. Thus, dry blending is the only proposed disposal process for the uranium oxide materials in the CPP-651 vault. Isotopic dilution of HEU to typically less than 20% by dry blending is the key to solving the dispositioning issue (i.e., proliferation) posed by HEU stored at INEEL. RM-2 mill is a technology developed and successfully tested for producing ultra-fine particles by dry grinding. Grinding action in RM-2 mill produces a two million-fold increase in the number of particles being blended in a centrifugal field. In a previous study, the concept of achieving complete and adequate blending and mixing (i.e., no methods were identified to easily separate and concentrate one titanium compound from the other) in remarkably short processing times was successfully tested with surrogate materials (titanium dioxide and titanium mono-oxide) with different particle sizes, hardness and densities. In the current project, the RM-2 milling technology was thoroughly tested with mixtures of natural uranium oxide (NU) and depleted uranium oxide (DU) stock to prove its performance. The effects of mill operating and design variables on the blending of NU/DU oxides were evaluated. First, NU and DU both made of the same oxide, UO{sub 3}, was used in the testing. Next, NU made up of UO{sub 3} and DU made up of UO{sub 2} was used in the test work. In every test, the blend achieved was characterized by spatial sampling of the ground product and analyzing for {sup 235}U concentration. The test work proved that these uranium oxide materials can be blended successfully. The spatial concentration was found to be uniform. Next, sintered thorium oxide pellets were used as surrogate for light water breeder reactor pellets (LWBR). To simulate LWBR pellet dispositioning, the thorium oxide pellets were first ground to a powder form and then the powder was blended with NU. In these tests also the concentration of {sup 235}U and {sup 232}Th in blended products fell within established limits proving the success of RM-2 milling technology. RM-2 milling technology is applicable to any dry radioactive waste, especially brittle solids that can be ground up and mixed with the non-radioactive stock.

Raj K. Rajamani; Sanjeeva Latchireddi; Vikas Devrani; Harappan Sethi; Roger Henry; Nate Chipman

2003-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

99

Measurement of the enrichment of uranium in the pipework of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The US and UK have been separately working on the development of a NDA instrument to determine the enrichment of gaseous UF/sub 6/ at low pressures in cascade header pipework in line with the conclusions of the Hexapartite Safeguards Project viz. the instrument is capable of making a ''go/no go'' decision of whether the enrichment is less than/greater than 20%. Recently, there has been a series of very useful technical exchanges of ideas and information between the two countries. This has led to a technical formulation for such an instrumentation based on ..gamma..-ray spectrometry which, although plant-specific in certain features, nevertheless is based on the same physical principles. Experimental results from commercially operating enrichment plants are very encouraging and indicate that a complete measurement including set up time on the pipe should be attainable in about 30 minutes when measuring pipes of diameter around 110 mm. 5 refs., 4 figs.

Packer, T.W.; Lees, E.W.; Close, D.; Nixon, K.V.; Pratt, J.C.; Strittmatter, R.

1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

100

Moderation control in low enriched {sup 235}U uranium hexafluoride packaging operations and transportation  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Moderation control is the basic parameter for ensuring nuclear criticality safety during the packaging and transport of low {sup 235}U enriched uranium hexafluoride before its conversion to nuclear power reactor fuel. Moderation control has permitted the shipment of bulk quantities in large cylinders instead of in many smaller cylinders and, therefore, has resulted in economies without compromising safety. Overall safety and uranium accountability have been enhanced through the use of the moderation control. This paper discusses moderation control and the operating procedures to ensure that moderation control is maintained during packaging operations and transportation.

Dyer, R.H. [USDOE Oak Ridge Operations Office, TN (United States); Kovac, F.M. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Pryor, W.A. [PAI Corp., Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


101

United States Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decomissioning Fund financial statements, September 30, 1996 and 1995  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Act) established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (D and D Fund, or Fund) to pay the costs for decontamination and decommissioning three gaseous diffusion facilities located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio (diffusion facilities). The Act also authorized the Fund to pay remedial action costs associated with the Government`s operation of the facilities and to reimburse uranium and thorium licensees for the costs of decontamination, decommissioning, reclamation, and other remedial actions which are incident to sales to the Government. The report presents the results of the independent certified public accountants` audit of the D and D Fund financial statements as of September 30, 1996. The auditors have expressed an unqualified opinion on the 1996 statement of financial position and the related statements of operations and changes in net position and cash flows.

NONE

1997-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

102

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan will ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated, at a minimum, every 3 years.

Greager, E.M.

1997-12-11T23:59:59.000Z

103

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium uranium extraction facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years.

Wiegand, D.L.

1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

104

EPA Review of Standards for Uranium and Thorium Milling Facilities @ 40 CFR Parts 61 and 192.  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

EPA Review of Standards for Uranium and Thorium Milling Facilities @ 40 CFR Parts 61 of EPA standards for Uranium and Thorium Milling Facilities @ 40 CFR Parts 61 and 192. I have been scientific perspectives related to the adequacy of existing public exposure standards for uranium mills

105

Establishing Specifications for Low Enriched Uranium Fuel Operations Conducted Outside the High Flux Isotope Reactor Site  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has funded staff at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to study the conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from the current, high enriched uranium fuel to low enriched uranium fuel. The LEU fuel form is a metal alloy that has never been used in HFIR or any HFIR-like reactor. This report provides documentation of a process for the creation of a fuel specification that will meet all applicable regulations and guidelines to which UT-Battelle, LLC (UTB) the operating contractor for ORNL - must adhere. This process will allow UTB to purchase LEU fuel for HFIR and be assured of the quality of the fuel being procured.

Pinkston, Daniel [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL; Renfro, David G [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL

2010-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

106

EA-1123: Transfer of Normal and Low-Enriched Uranium Billets to the United Kingdom, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of the proposal to transfer approximately 710,000 kilograms (1,562,000 pounds) of unneeded normal and low-enriched uranium to the United Kingdom; thus,...

107

The US uranium revitalization, Tailings Reclamation and Enrichment Act, Title 1  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

On November 4, 1987, the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources reported out to the Senate bill number S.1846 (Uranium Revitalization, Tailings Reclamation and Enrichment Act of 1987). In early 1988, the bill was reintroduced as S.2097, withut some of its earlier provisions that had caused jurisdictional conflict with the Senate Finance Committee. One of the deleted provisions comprised most of Title I of S.1846, dealing primarily with establishing a fee on the use of imported uranium by US utilities. These provisions were reintroduced by amendment on the floor of the Senate on March 30, 1988. In a key vote, a motion to block the reintroduction of the deleted provisions was defeated by a 47-45 margin. The full bill S.2097, again with uranium import provisions, was subsequently passed by a vote of 62-28 in the Senate. The bill now goes to the US House of Representatives for its consideration.

NONE

1988-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

108

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility | Y-12 National Security Complex  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunDatastreamsmmcrcalgovInstrumentsruc DocumentationP-SeriesFlickr FlickrGuidedCH2MLLC High-Rate,Highlights Highlights Below is aHighly

109

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, Major Design Changes  

Office of Environmental Management (EM)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) " ,"ClickPipelinesProvedDecember 2005DepartmentDecemberGlossaryEnergy and Commerceof Energy

110

Toxic Substances Control Act Uranium Enrichment Federal Facility Compliance  

Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:YearRound-Up from theDepartment of EnergyThe Sun and ItsXVIIofPotential

111

Design Study for a Low-Enriched Uranium Core for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual report for FY 2009  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report documents progress made during FY 2009 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. With axial and radial grading of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in reactor performance from the current level. Results of selected benchmark studies imply that calculations of LEU performance are accurate. Studies are reported of the application of a silicon coating to surrogates for spheres of uranium-molybdenum alloy. A discussion of difficulties with preparing a fuel specification for the uranium-molybdenum alloy is provided. A description of the progress in developing a finite element thermal hydraulics model of the LEU core is provided.

Chandler, David [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Guida, Tracey [University of Pittsburgh; Jolly, Brian C [ORNL

2010-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

112

Experimental critical parameters of enriched uranium solution in annular tank geometries  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A total of 61 critical configurations are reported for experiments involving various combinations of annular tanks into which enriched uranium solution was pumped. These experiments were performed at two widely separated times in the 1980s under two programs at the Rocky Flats Plant`s Critical Mass Laboratory. The uranyl nitrate solution contained about 370 g of uranium per liter, but this concentration varied a little over the duration of the studies. The uranium was enriched to about 93% [sup 235]U. All tanks were typical of sizes commonly found in nuclear production plants. They were about 2 m tall and ranged in diameter from 0.6 m to 1.5 m. Annular thicknesses and conditions of neutron reflection, moderation, and absorption were such that criticality would be achieved with these dimensions. Only 13 of the entire set of 74 experiments proved to be subcritical when tanks were completely filled with solution. Single tanks of several radial thicknesses were studied as well as small line arrays (1 x 2 and 1 x 3) of annular tanks. Many systems were reflected on four sides and the bottom by concrete, but none were reflected from above. Many experiments also contained materials within and outside the annular regions that contained strong neutron absorbers. One program had such a thick external moderator/absorber combination that no reflector was used at all.

Rothe, R.E.

1996-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

113

Minimum mass of moderator required for criticality of homogeneous low-enriched uranium systems  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A parametric calculational analysis has been performed in order to estimate the minimum mass of moderator required for criticality of homogeneous low-enriched uranium systems. The analysis was performed using a version of the SCALE-4.0 code system and the 27-group ENDF/B-IV cross-section library. Water-moderated uranyl fluoride (UO[sub 2]F[sub 2] and H[sub 2]O) and hydrofluoric-acid-moderated uranium hexaflouride (UF[sub 6] and HF) systems were considered in the analysis over enrichments of 1.4 to 5 wt % [sup 235]U. Estimates of the minimum critical volume, minimum critical mass of uranium, and the minimum mass of moderator required for criticality are presented. There was significant disagreement between the values generated in this study when compared with a similar undocumented study performed in 1983 using ANISN and the Knight-modified Hansen-Roach cross sections. An investigation into the cause of the disagreement was made, and the results are presented.

Jordan, W.C.; Turner, J.C.

1992-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

114

Minimum mass of moderator required for criticality of homogeneous low-enriched uranium systems  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A parametric calculational analysis has been performed in order to estimate the minimum mass of moderator required for criticality of homogeneous low-enriched uranium systems. The analysis was performed using a version of the SCALE-4.0 code system and the 27-group ENDF/B-IV cross-section library. Water-moderated uranyl fluoride (UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} and H{sub 2}O) and hydrofluoric-acid-moderated uranium hexaflouride (UF{sub 6} and HF) systems were considered in the analysis over enrichments of 1.4 to 5 wt % {sup 235}U. Estimates of the minimum critical volume, minimum critical mass of uranium, and the minimum mass of moderator required for criticality are presented. There was significant disagreement between the values generated in this study when compared with a similar undocumented study performed in 1983 using ANISN and the Knight-modified Hansen-Roach cross sections. An investigation into the cause of the disagreement was made, and the results are presented.

Jordan, W.C.; Turner, J.C.

1992-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

115

EIS-0329: Proposed Construction, Operation, Decontamination/Decommissioning of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facilities  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

This EIS analyzes DOE's proposal to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF 6) conversion facilities, at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky.

116

Design Study for a Low-enriched Uranium Core for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2007  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report documents progress made during fiscal year 2007 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium fuel (LEU). Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. A high volume fraction U/Mo-in-Al fuel could attain the same neutron flux performance as with the current, HEU fuel but materials considerations appear to preclude production and irradiation of such a fuel. A diffusion barrier would be required if Al is to be retained as the interstitial medium and the additional volume required for this barrier would degrade performance. Attaining the high volume fraction (55 wt. %) of U/Mo assumed in the computational study while maintaining the current fuel plate acceptance level at the fuel manufacturer is unlikely, i.e. no increase in the percentage of plates rejected for non-compliance with the fuel specification. Substitution of a zirconium alloy for Al would significantly increase the weight of the fuel element, the cost of the fuel element, and introduce an as-yet untried manufacturing process. A monolithic U-10Mo foil is the choice of LEU fuel for HFIR. Preliminary calculations indicate that with a modest increase in reactor power, the flux performance of the reactor can be maintained at the current level. A linearly-graded, radial fuel thickness profile is preferred to the arched profile currently used in HEU fuel because the LEU fuel media is a metal alloy foil rather than a powder. Developments in analysis capability and nuclear data processing techniques are underway with the goal of verifying the preliminary calculations of LEU flux performance. A conceptual study of the operational cost of an LEU fuel fabrication facility yielded the conclusion that the annual fuel cost to the HFIR would increase significantly from the current, HEU fuel cycle. Though manufacturing can be accomplished with existing technology, several engineering proof-of-principle tests would be required. The RERTR program is currently conducting a series of generic fuel qualification tests at the Advanced Test Reactor. A review of these tests and a review of the safety basis for the current, HEU fuel cycle led to the identification of a set of HFIR-specific fuel qualification tests. Much additional study is required to formulate a HFIR-specific fuel qualification plan from this set. However, one such test - creating a graded fuel profile across a flat foil - has been initiated with promising results.

Primm, Trent [ORNL; Ellis, Ronald James [ORNL; Gehin, Jess C [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL

2007-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

117

Validation of the Monte Carlo Criticality Program KENO V. a for highly-enriched uranium systems  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A series of calculations based on critical experiments have been performed using the KENO V.a Monte Carlo Criticality Program for the purpose of validating KENO V.a for use in evaluating Y-12 Plant criticality problems. The experiments were reflected and unreflected systems of single units and arrays containing highly enriched uranium metal or uranium compounds. Various geometrical shapes were used in the experiments. The SCALE control module CSAS25 with the 27-group ENDF/B-4 cross-section library was used to perform the calculations. Some of the experiments were also calculated using the 16-group Hansen-Roach Library. Results are presented in a series of tables and discussed. Results show that the criteria established for the safe application of the KENO IV program may also be used for KENO V.a results.

Knight, J.R.

1984-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

118

Disposition of highly enriched uranium obtained from the Republic of Kazakhstan. Environmental assessment  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This EA assesses the potential environmental impacts associated with DOE`s proposal to transport 600 kg of Kazakhstand-origin HEU from Y-12 to a blending site (B&W Lynchburg or NFS Erwin), transport low-enriched UF6 blending stock from a gaseous diffusion plant to GE Wilmington and U oxide blending stock to the blending site, blending the HEU and uranium oxide blending stock to produce LEU in the form of uranyl nitrate, and transport the uranyl nitrate from the blending site to USEC Portsmouth.

NONE

1995-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

119

Report of Survey of Oak Ridge Isotope Enrichment (Calutron) Facility...  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

of excess facilities addressed in DOE Order 430.1B Chg 2, REAL PROPERTY & ASSET MANAGEMENT, using the associated guidance for facility transition, deactivation,...

120

Results from a "Proof-of-Concept" Demonstration of RF-Based Tracking of UF6 Cylinders during a Processing Operation at a Uranium Enrichment Plant  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Approved industry-standard cylinders are used globally for processing, storing, and transporting uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) at uranium enrichment plants. To ensure that cylinder movements at enrichment facilities occur as declared, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must conduct time-consuming periodic physical inspections to validate facility records, cylinder identity, and containment. By using a robust system design that includes the capability for real-time unattended monitoring (of cylinder movements), site-specific rules-based event detection algorithms, and the capability to integrate with other types of monitoring technologies, one can build a system that will improve overall inspector effectiveness. This type of monitoring system can provide timely detection of safeguard events that could be used to ensure more timely and appropriate responses by the IAEA. It also could reduce reliance on facility records and have the additional benefit of enhancing domestic safeguards at the installed facilities. This paper will discuss the installation and evaluation of a radio-frequency- (RF-) based cylinder tracking system that was installed at a United States Enrichment Corporation Centrifuge Facility. This system was installed primarily to evaluate the feasibility of using RF technology at a site and the operational durability of the components under harsh processing conditions. The installation included a basic system that is designed to support layering with other safeguard system technologies and that applies fundamental rules-based event processing methodologies. This paper will discuss the fundamental elements of the system design, the results from this site installation, and future efforts needed to make this technology ready for IAEA consideration.

Pickett, Chris A [ORNL] [ORNL; Kovacic, Donald N [ORNL] [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL] [ORNL; Younkin, James R [ORNL] [ORNL; Hines, Jairus B [ORNL] [ORNL; Laughter, Mark D [ORNL] [ORNL; Morgan, Jim [Innovative Solutions] [Innovative Solutions; Carrick, Bernie [USEC] [USEC; Boyer, Brian [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)] [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Whittle, K. [USEC] [USEC

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


121

A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

1986-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

122

Process for producing enriched uranium having a {sup 235}U content of at least 4 wt. % via combination of a gaseous diffusion process and an atomic vapor laser isotope separation process to eliminate uranium hexafluoride tails storage  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

An uranium enrichment process capable of producing an enriched uranium, having a {sup 235}U content greater than about 4 wt. %, is disclosed which will consume less energy and produce metallic uranium tails having a lower {sup 235}U content than the tails normally produced in a gaseous diffusion separation process and, therefore, eliminate UF{sub 6} tails storage and sharply reduce fluorine use. The uranium enrichment process comprises feeding metallic uranium into an atomic vapor laser isotope separation process to produce an enriched metallic uranium isotopic mixture having a {sup 235} U content of at least about 2 wt. % and a metallic uranium residue containing from about 0.1 wt. % to about 0.2 wt. % {sup 235} U; fluorinating this enriched metallic uranium isotopic mixture to form UF{sub 6}; processing the resultant isotopic mixture of UF{sub 6} in a gaseous diffusion process to produce a final enriched uranium product having a {sup 235}U content of at least 4 wt. %, and up to 93.5 wt. % or higher, of the total uranium content of the product, and a low {sup 235}U content UF{sub 6} having a {sup 235}U content of about 0.71 wt. % of the total uranium content of the low {sup 235}U content UF{sub 6}; and converting this low {sup 235}U content UF{sub 6} to metallic uranium for recycle to the atomic vapor laser isotope separation process. 4 figs.

Horton, J.A.; Hayden, H.W. Jr.

1995-05-30T23:59:59.000Z

123

Process for producing enriched uranium having a .sup.235 U content of at least 4 wt. % via combination of a gaseous diffusion process and an atomic vapor laser isotope separation process to eliminate uranium hexafluoride tails storage  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

An uranium enrichment process capable of producing an enriched uranium, having a .sup.235 U content greater than about 4 wt. %, is disclosed which will consume less energy and produce metallic uranium tails having a lower .sup.235 U content than the tails normally produced in a gaseous diffusion separation process and, therefore, eliminate UF.sub.6 tails storage and sharply reduce fluorine use. The uranium enrichment process comprises feeding metallic uranium into an atomic vapor laser isotope separation process to produce an enriched metallic uranium isotopic mixture having a .sup.235 U content of at least about 2 wt. % and a metallic uranium residue containing from about 0.1 wt. % to about 0.2 wt. % .sup.235 U; fluorinating this enriched metallic uranium isotopic mixture to form UF.sub.6 ; processing the resultant isotopic mixture of UF.sub.6 in a gaseous diffusion process to produce a final enriched uranium product having a .sup.235 U content of at least 4 wt. %, and up to 93.5 wt. % or higher, of the total uranium content of the product, and a low .sup.235 U content UF.sub.6 having a .sup.235 U content of about 0.71 wt. % of the total uranium content of the low .sup.235 U content UF.sub.6 ; and converting this low .sup.235 U content UF.sub.6 to metallic uranium for recycle to the atomic vapor laser isotope separation process.

Horton, James A. (Livermore, CA); Hayden, Jr., Howard W. (Oakridge, TN)

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

124

Using low-enriched uranium in research reactors: The RERTR program  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The goal of the RERTR program is to minimize and eventually eliminate use of highway enriched uranium (HEU) in research and test reactors. The program has been very successful, and has developed low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel materials and designs which can be used effectively in approximately 90 percent of the research and test reactors which used HEU when the program began. This progress would not have been possible without active international cooperation among fuel developers, commercial vendors, and reactor operators. The new tasks which the RERTR program is undertaking at this time include development of new and better fuels that will allow use of LEU fuels in all research and test reactors; cooperation with Russian laboratories, which will make it possible to minimize and eventually eliminate use of HEU in research reactors throughout the world, irrespective of its origin; and development of an LEU-based process for the production of {sup 99}Mo. Continuation and intensification of international cooperation are essential to the achievement of the ultimate goals of the RERTR program.

Travelli, A.

1994-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

125

Report of Survey of Oak Ridge Isotope Enrichment (Calutron) Facility Building 9204-3  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

The purpose of this document is to report the results of a survey conducted at the Isotope Enrichment Facility (IEF, Calutron, Building 9204-3) on the Y-12 Plant property at the Oak Ridge Site. The...

126

RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

JOE,J.

2007-07-08T23:59:59.000Z

127

Enrichment of specific protozoan populations during in situ bioremediation of uranium-contaminated groundwater  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The importance of bacteria in the anaerobic bioremediation of groundwater polluted with organic and/or metal contaminants is well-recognized and in some instances so well understood that modeling of the in situ metabolic activity of the relevant subsurface microorganisms in response to changes in subsurface geochemistry is feasible. However, a potentially significant factor influencing bacterial growth and activity in the subsurface that has not been adequately addressed is protozoan predation of the microorganisms responsible for bioremediation. In field experiments at a uranium-contaminated aquifer located in Rifle, CO, acetate amendments initially promoted the growth of metal-reducing Geobacter species followed by the growth of sulfate-reducers, as previously observed. Analysis of 18S rRNA gene sequences revealed a broad diversity of sequences closely related to known bacteriovorous protozoa in the groundwater prior to the addition of acetate. The bloom of Geobacter species was accompanied by a specific enrichment of sequences most closely related to the amoeboid flagellate, Breviata anathema, which at their peak accounted for over 80% of the sequences recovered. The abundance of Geobacter species declined following the rapid emergence of B. anathema. The subsequent growth of sulfate-reducing Peptococcaceae was accompanied by another specific enrichment of protozoa, but with sequences most similar to diplomonadid flagellates from the family Hexamitidae, which accounted for up to 100% of the sequences recovered during this phase of the bioremediation. These results suggest a prey-predator response with specific protozoa responding to increased availability of preferred prey bacteria. Thus, quantifying the influence of protozoan predation on the growth, activity, and composition of the subsurface bacterial community is essential for predictive modeling of in situ uranium bioremediation strategies.

Holmes, Dawn; Giloteaux, L.; Williams, Kenneth H.; Wrighton, Kelly C.; Wilkins, Michael J.; Thompson, Courtney A.; Roper, Thomas J.; Long, Philip E.; Lovley, Derek

2013-07-28T23:59:59.000Z

128

Development of a core design optimization tool and analysis in support of the planned LEU conversion of the MIT Research Reactor (MITR-II) ; Development of a core design optimization tool and analysis in support of the planned low enriched uranium conversion of the MIT Research Reactor (MITR-II) .  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

??The MIT Research Reactor (MITR-II) is currently undergoing analysis for the planned conversion from high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU), as part… (more)

Connaway, Heather M. (Heather Moira)

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

129

Validity of Hansen-Roach cross sections in low-enriched uranium systems  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Within the nuclear criticality safety community, the Hansen-Roach 16 group cross section set has been the standard'' for use in k{sub eff} calculations over the past 30 years. Yet even with its widespread acceptance, there are still questions about its validity and adequacy, about the proper procedure for calculating the potential scattering cross section, {sigma}{sub p}, for uranium and plutonium, and about the concept of resonance self shielding and its impact on cross sections. This paper attempts to address these questions. It provides a brief background on the Hansen-Roach cross sections. Next is presented a review of resonances in cross sections, self shielding of these resonances, and the use of {sigma}{sub p} to characterize resonance self shielding. Three prescriptions for calculating {sigma}{sub p} are given. Finally, results of several calculations of k{sub eff} on low-enriched uranium systems are provided to confirm the validity of the Hansen-Roach cross sections when applied to such systems.

Busch, R.D. (New Mexico Univ., Albuquerque, NM (United States)); O'Dell, R.D. (Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States))

1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

130

Licensed fuel facility status report. Inventory difference data, July 1, 1991--June 30, 1992: Volume 12  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

NRC is committed to the periodic publication of licensed fuel facilities inventory difference data, following agency review of the information and completion of any related NRC investigations. Information in this report includes inventory difference data for active fuel fabrication facilities possessing more than one effective kilogram of high enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, plutonium, or uranium-233.

Joy, D.; Brown, C.

1993-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

131

Licensed fuel facility status report: Inventory difference data, July 1, 1990--June 30, 1991. Volume 11  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

NRC is committed to the periodic publication of licensed fuel facilities inventory difference data, following agency review of the information and completion of any related NRC investigations. Information in this report includes inventory difference data for active fuel fabrication facilities possessing more than one effective kilogram of high enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, plutonium, or uranium-233.

Not Available

1992-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

132

E-Print Network 3.0 - anthropogenic uranium enrichments Sample...  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

Ecology ; Engineering 99 geology and Ranger 1 open-pit uranium mine in Australia Summary: Uranium geology and mining Ranger 1 open-pit uranium mine in Australia Mikael Hk UHDSG...

133

Surface water transport and distribution of uranium in contaminated sediments near a nuclear weapons processing facility  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

The extent of remobilization of uranium from contaminated soils adjacent to a nuclear weapons processing facility during episodic rain events was investigated. In addition, information on the solid phase associations of U in floodplain and suspended...

Batson, Vicky Lynn

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

134

EIS-0359: Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Paducah, Kentucky Site  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

This site-specific EIS considers the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning of the proposed depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6) conversion facility at three locations within the Paducah site; transportation of depleted uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility; transportation and sale of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) produced as a conversion co-product; and neutralization of HF to calcium fluoride and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold.

135

Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

2008-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

136

Financial Assurance for In Situ Uranium Facilities (Texas)  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

Owners or operators are required to provide financial assurance for in situ uranium sites. This money is required for: decommissioning, decontamination, demolition, and waste disposal for buildings...

137

REMOVAL OF SOLIDS FROM HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SOLUTIONS USING THE H-CANYON CENTRIFUGE  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Prior to the dissolution of Pu-containing materials in HB-Line, highly enriched uranium (HEU) solutions stored in Tanks 11.1 and 12.2 of H-Canyon must be transferred to provide storage space. The proposed plan is to centrifuge the solutions to remove solids which may present downstream criticality concerns or cause operational problems with the 1st Cycle solvent extraction due to the formation of stable emulsions. An evaluation of the efficiency of the H-Canyon centrifuge concluded that a sufficient amount (> 90%) of the solids in the Tank 11.1 and 12.2 solutions will be removed to prevent any problems. We based this conclusion on the particle size distribution of the solids isolated from samples of the solutions and the calculation of particle settling times in the centrifuge. The particle size distributions were calculated from images generated by scanning electron microscopy (SEM). The mean particle diameters for the distributions were 1-3 {micro}m. A significant fraction (30-50%) of the particles had diameters which were < 1 {micro}m; however, the mass of these solids is insignificant (< 1% of the total solids mass) when compared to particles with larger diameters. It is also probable that the number of submicron particles was overestimated by the software used to generate the particle distribution due to the morphology of the filter paper used to isolate the solids. The settling times calculated for the H-Canyon centrifuge showed that particles with diameters less than 1 to 0.5 {micro}m will not have sufficient time to settle. For this reason, we recommend the use of a gelatin strike to coagulate the submicron particles and facilitate their removal from the solution; although we have no experimental basis to estimate the level of improvement. Incomplete removal of particles with diameters < 1 {micro}m should not cause problems during purification of the HEU in the 1st Cycle solvent extraction. Particles with diameters > 1 {micro}m account for > 99% of the solid mass and will be efficiently removed by the centrifuge; therefore, the formation of emulsions during solvent extraction operations is not an issue. Under the current processing plan, the solutions from Tanks 11.1 and 12.2 will be transferred to the enriched uranium storage (EUS) tank following centrifugation. The solution from Tanks 11.1 and 12.2 may remain in the EUS tank for an extended time prior to purification. The effects of extended storage on the solution were not evaluated as part of this study.

Rudisill, T; Fernando Fondeur, F

2009-01-15T23:59:59.000Z

138

Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Design with Two-Dimensional Grading for the High Flux Isotope Reactor  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

An engineering design study of the conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel is ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The computational models developed during fiscal year 2010 to search for an LEU fuel design that would meet the requirements for the conversion and the results obtained with these models are documented and discussed in this report. Estimates of relevant reactor performance parameters for the LEU fuel core are presented and compared with the corresponding data for the currently operating HEU fuel core. The results obtained indicate that the LEU fuel design would maintain the current performance of the HFIR with respect to the neutron flux to the central target region, reflector, and beam tube locations under the assumption that the operating power for the reactor fueled with LEU can be increased from the current value of 85 MW to 100 MW.

Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL

2011-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

139

Fission Yield Measurements from Highly Enriched Uranium Irradiated Inside a Boron Carbide Capsule  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A boron carbide capsule was previously designed and tested by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and Washington State University (WSU) for spectral-tailoring in mixed spectrum reactors. The presented work used this B4C capsule to create a fission product sample from the irradiation of highly enriched uranium (HEU) with a fast fission neutron spectrum. An HEU foil was irradiated inside of the capsule in WSU’s 1 MW TRIGA reactor at full power for 200 min to produce 5.8 × 1013 fissions. After three days of cooling, the sample was shipped to PNNL for radiochemical separations and analysis by gamma and beta spectroscopy. Fission yields for products were calculated from the radiometric measurements and compared to measurements from thermal neutron induced fission (analyzed in parallel with the non-thermal sample at PNNL) and published evaluated fast-pooled and thermal nuclear data. Reactor dosimetry measurements were also completed to fully characterize the neutron spectrum and total fluence of the irradiation.

Metz, Lori A.; Friese, Judah I.; Finn, Erin C.; Greenwood, Lawrence R.; Kephart, Rosara F.; Hines, Corey C.; King, Matthew D.; Henry, Kelley; Wall, Donald E.

2013-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

140

The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including unenriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to diver

Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

2008-12-23T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


141

Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Conversion Activities for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2011  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report describes progress made during FY11 in ORNL activities to support converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum (UMo) alloy. With both radial and axial contouring of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current levels achieved with HEU fuel. Studies are continuing to demonstrate that the fuel thermal safety margins can be preserved following conversion. Studies are also continuing to update other aspects of the reactor steady state operation and accident response for the effects of fuel conversion. Technical input has been provided to Oregon State University in support of their hydraulic testing program. The HFIR conversion schedule was revised and provided to the GTRI program. In addition to HFIR conversion activities, technical support was provided directly to the Fuel Fabrication Capability program manager.

Renfro, David G [ORNL; Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Griffin, Frederick P [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL

2012-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

142

Preliminary Evaluation of Alternate Designs for HFIR Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Engineering design studies of the feasibility of conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel are ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as part of an effort sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)/Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The fuel type selected by the program for the conversion of the five high-power research reactors in the U.S. that still use HEU fuel is a new U-Mo monolithic fuel. Studies by ORNL have previously indicated that HFIR can be successfully converted using the new fuel provided (1) the reactor power can be increased from 85 MW to 100 MW and (2) the fuel can be fabricated to a specific reference design. Fabrication techniques for the new fuel are under development by the program but are still immature, especially for the “complex” aspects of the HFIR fuel design. In FY 2012, the program underwent a major shift in focus to emphasize developing and qualifying processes for the fabrication of reliable and affordable LEU fuel. In support of this new focus and in an effort to ensure that the HFIR fuel design is as suitable for reliable fabrication as possible, ORNL undertook the present study to propose and evaluate several alternative design features. These features include (1) eliminating the fuel zone axial contouring in the previous reference design by substituting a permanent neutron absorber in the lower unfueled region of all of the fuel plates, (2) relocating the burnable neutron absorber from the fuel plates of the inner fuel element to the side plates of the inner fuel element (the fuel plates of the outer fuel element do not contain a burnable absorber), (3) relocating the fuel zone inside the fuel plate to be centered on the centerline of the depth of the plate, and (4) reshaping the radial contour of the relocated fuel zone to be symmetric about this centerline. The present studies used current analytical tools to evaluate the various alternate designs for cycle length, scientific performance (e.g., neutron scattering), and steady-state and transient thermal performance using both safety limit and nominal parameter assumptions. The studies concluded that a new reference design combining a permanent absorber in the lower unfueled region of all of the fuel plates, a burnable absorber in the inner element side plates, and a relocated and reshaped (but still radially contoured) fuel zone will allow successful conversion of HFIR. Future collaboration with the program will reveal whether the new reference design can be fabricated reliably and affordably. Following this feedback, additional studies using state-of-the-art developmental analytical tools are proposed to optimize the design of the fuel zone radial contour and the amount and location of both types of neutron absorbers to further flatten thermal peaks while maximizing the performance of the reactor.

Renfro, David [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Cook, David [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Jain, Prashant [ORNL; Valentine, Jennifer [ORNL

2014-10-30T23:59:59.000Z

143

Design Study for a Low-Enriched Uranium Core for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2006  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Neutronics and thermal-hydraulics studies show that, for equivalent operating power [85 MW(t)], a low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel cycle based on uranium-10 wt % molybdenum (U-10Mo) metal foil with radially, “continuously graded” fuel meat thickness results in a 15% reduction in peak thermal flux in the beryllium reflector of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) as compared to the current highly enriched uranium (HEU) cycle. The uranium-235 content of the LEU core is almost twice the amount of the HEU core when the length of the fuel cycle is kept the same for both fuels. Because the uranium-238 content of an LEU core is a factor of 4 greater than the uranium-235 content, the LEU HFIR core would weigh 30% more than the HEU core. A minimum U-10Mo foil thickness of 84 ?m is required to compensate for power peaking in the LEU core although this value could be increased significantly without much penalty. The maximum U-10Mo foil thickness is 457?m. Annual plutonium production from fueling the HFIR with LEU is predicted to be 2 kg. For dispersion fuels, the operating power for HFIR would be reduced considerably below 85 MW due to thermal considerations and due to the requirement of a 26-d fuel cycle. If an acceptable fuel can be developed, it is estimated that $140 M would be required to implement the conversion of the HFIR site at Oak Ridge National Laboratory from an HEU fuel cycle to an LEU fuel cycle. To complete the conversion by fiscal year 2014 would require that all fuel development and qualification be completed by the end of fiscal year 2009. Technological development areas that could increase the operating power of HFIR are identified as areas for study in the future.

Primm, R. T. [ORNL] [ORNL; Ellis, R. J. [ORNL] [ORNL; Gehin, J. C. [ORNL] [ORNL; Clarno, K. T. [ORNL] [ORNL; Williams, K. A. [ORNL] [ORNL; Moses, D. L. [ORNL] [ORNL

2006-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

144

Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio, Site  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This document is a site-specific environmental impact statement (EIS) for construction and operation of a proposed depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF{sub 6}) conversion facility at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Portsmouth site in Ohio (Figure S-1). The proposed facility would convert the DUF{sub 6} stored at Portsmouth to a more stable chemical form suitable for use or disposal. The facility would also convert the DUF{sub 6} from the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) site near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In a Notice of Intent (NOI) published in the Federal Register on September 18, 2001 (Federal Register, Volume 66, page 48123 [66 FR 48123]), DOE announced its intention to prepare a single EIS for a proposal to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two DUF{sub 6} conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky, in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (United States Code, Title 42, Section 4321 et seq. [42 USC 4321 et seq.]) and DOE's NEPA implementing procedures (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 1021 [10 CFR Part 1021]). Subsequent to award of a contract to Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (hereafter referred to as UDS), Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on August 29, 2002, for design, construction, and operation of DUF{sub 6} conversion facilities at Portsmouth and Paducah, DOE reevaluated its approach to the NEPA process and decided to prepare separate site-specific EISs. This change was announced in a Federal Register Notice of Change in NEPA Compliance Approach published on April 28, 2003 (68 FR 22368); the Notice is included as Attachment B to Appendix C of this EIS. This EIS addresses the potential environmental impacts from the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the proposed conversion facility at three alternative locations within the Portsmouth site; from the transportation of all ETTP cylinders (DUF{sub 6}, low-enriched UF6 [LEU-UF{sub 6}], and empty) to Portsmouth; from the transportation of depleted uranium conversion products to a disposal facility; and from the transportation, sale, use, or disposal of the fluoride-containing conversion products (hydrogen fluoride [HF] or calcium fluoride [CaF{sub 2}]). An option of shipping the ETTP cylinders to Paducah is also considered. In addition, this EIS evaluates a no action alternative, which assumes continued storage of DUF{sub 6} in cylinders at the Portsmouth and ETTP sites. A separate EIS (DOE/EIS-0359) evaluates potential environmental impacts for the proposed Paducah conversion facility.

N /A

2003-11-28T23:59:59.000Z

145

EVALUATION OF FLOWSHEET CHANGES FOR THE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BLENDDOWN PROGRAM  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

H Canyon is considering a flowsheet change for Plutonium (Pu) Contaminated Scrap (PuCS) material. The proposed change is to route dissolved PuCS material directly to a uranium (U) storage tank. As a result, the PuCS solution will bypass Head End and First U Cycle, and will be purified by solvent extraction in Second U Cycle. The PuCS solution contains appreciable amounts of boron (B) and fluoride (F{sup -}), which are currently at trace levels in the U storage tank. Though unlikely, if the B concentration in the U storage tank were to reach 1.8 g B/g U, the entire contents of the U storage tank would likely require a second pass through Second U Cycle to provide sufficient decontamination to meet the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Blend Grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) specification for B, which is 30 {micro}g/g U. In addition, Second U Cycle is expected to provide sufficient decontamination of F{sup -} and Pu regardless of the amount of PuCS solution sent to the storage tank. Though aluminum (Al) is not present in the PuCS solution, B can be credited as a complexant of F{sup -}. Both stability constants from the literature and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) corrosion studies were documented to demonstrate that B complexation of F{sup -} in nitric acid solutions is sufficient to prevent excessive corrosion. Though B and Al complex F{sup -} to a similar degree, neither completely eliminates the presence of free F{sup -} in solution. Therefore, a limited amount of corrosion is expected even with complexed F{sup -} solutions. Tanks maintained at ambient temperature are not expected to experience significant corrosion. However, the Low Activity Waste (LAW) evaporators may be subjected to a corrosion rate of about 25 mils per year (mpy) as they reach their highest F{sup -} concentrations. The feed adjustment evaporator would only be subjected to the corrosion rate of about 25 mpy in the latter stages of the PuCS campaign. An issue that must be addressed as part of the proposed PuCS flowsheet change is that B has limited solubility in concentrated nitric acid solutions. As the proposed PuCS campaign progresses, the B concentration will increase in the U storage tank, in Second U Cycle feed, and in the 1DW stream sent to the LAW evaporators. Limitations on the B concentration in the LAW evaporators will be needed to prevent formation of boron-containing solids.

Crowder, M.; Rudisill, T.; Laurinat, J.; Mickalonis, J.

2007-10-22T23:59:59.000Z

146

Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Paducah, Kentucky, Site  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This document is a site-specific environmental impact statement (EIS) for construction and operation of a proposed depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF{sub 6}) conversion facility at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Paducah site in northwestern Kentucky (Figure S-1). The proposed facility would convert the DUF{sub 6} stored at Paducah to a more stable chemical form suitable for use or disposal. In a Notice of Intent (NOI) published in the ''Federal Register'' (FR) on September 18, 2001 (''Federal Register'', Volume 66, page 48123 [66 FR 48123]), DOE announced its intention to prepare a single EIS for a proposal to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two DUF{sub 6} conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky, in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (''United States Code'', Title 42, Section 4321 et seq. [42 USC 4321 et seq.]) and DOE's NEPA implementing procedures (''Code of Federal Regulations'', Title 10, Part 1021 [10 CFR Part 1021]). Subsequent to award of a contract to Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (hereafter referred to as UDS), Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on August 29, 2002, for design, construction, and operation of DUF{sub 6} conversion facilities at Portsmouth and Paducah, DOE reevaluated its approach to the NEPA process and decided to prepare separate site-specific EISs. This change was announced in a ''Federal Register'' Notice of Change in NEPA Compliance Approach published on April 28, 2003 (68 FR 22368); the Notice is included as Attachment B to Appendix C of this EIS. This EIS addresses the potential environmental impacts from the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the proposed conversion facility at three alternative locations within the Paducah site; from the transportation of depleted uranium conversion products to a disposal facility; and from the transportation, sale, use, or disposal of the fluoride-containing conversion products (hydrogen fluoride [HF] or calcium fluoride [CaF{sub 2}]). Although not part of the proposed action, an option of shipping all cylinders (DUF{sub 6}, low-enriched UF{sub 6} [LEU-UF{sub 6}], and empty) stored at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to Paducah rather than to Portsmouth is also considered. In addition, this EIS evaluates a no action alternative, which assumes continued storage of DUF{sub 6} in cylinders at the Paducah site. A separate EIS (DOE/EIS-0360) evaluates the potential environmental impacts for the proposed Portsmouth conversion facility.

N /A

2003-11-28T23:59:59.000Z

147

Transmutation Analysis of Enriched Uranium and Deep Burn High Temperature Reactors  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

High temperature reactors (HTRs) have been under consideration for production of electricity, process heat, and for destruction of transuranics for decades. As part of the transmutation analysis efforts within the Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCR&D) campaign, a need was identified for detailed discharge isotopics from HTRs for use in the VISION code. A conventional HTR using enriched uranium in UCO fuel was modeled having discharge burnup of 120 GWd/MTiHM. Also, a deep burn HTR (DB-HTR) was modeled burning transuranic (TRU)-only TRU-O2 fuel to a discharge burnup of 648 GWd/MTiHM. For each of these cases, unit cell depletion calculations were performed with SCALE/TRITON. Unit cells were used to perform this analysis using SCALE 6.1. Because of the long mean free paths (and migration lengths) of neutrons in HTRs, using a unit cell to represent a whole core can be non-trivial. The sizes of these cells were first set by using Serpent calculations to match a spectral index between unit cell and whole core domains. In the case of the DB-HTR, the unit cell which was arrived at in this way conserved the ratio of fuel to moderator found in a single block of fuel. In the conventional HTR case, a larger moderator-to-fuel ratio than that of a single block was needed to simulate the whole core spectrum. Discharge isotopics (for 500 nuclides) and one-group cross-sections (for 1022 nuclides) were delivered to the transmutation analysis team. This report provides documentation for these calculations. In addition to the discharge isotopics, one-group cross-sections were provided for the full list of 1022 nuclides tracked in the transmutation library.

Michael A. Pope

2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

148

Fuel-cycle facilities: preliminary safety and environmental information document. Volume VII  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Information is presented concerning the mining and milling of uranium and thorium; uranium hexafluoride conversion; enrichment; fuel fabrication; reprocessing; storage options; waste disposal options; transportation; heavy-water-production facilities; and international fuel service centers.

Not Available

1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

149

Monte Carlo modeling and analyses of YALINA booster subcritical assembly, Part III : low enriched uranium conversion analyses.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This study investigates the performance of the YALINA Booster subcritical assembly, located in Belarus, during operation with high (90%), medium (36%), and low (21%) enriched uranium fuels in the assembly's fast zone. The YALINA Booster is a zero-power, subcritical assembly driven by a conventional neutron generator. It was constructed for the purpose of investigating the static and dynamic neutronics properties of accelerator driven subcritical systems, and to serve as a fast neutron source for investigating the properties of nuclear reactions, in particular transmutation reactions involving minor-actinides. The first part of this study analyzes the assembly's performance with several fuel types. The MCNPX and MONK Monte Carlo codes were used to determine effective and source neutron multiplication factors, effective delayed neutron fraction, prompt neutron lifetime, neutron flux profiles and spectra, and neutron reaction rates produced from the use of three neutron sources: californium, deuterium-deuterium, and deuterium-tritium. In the latter two cases, the external neutron source operates in pulsed mode. The results discussed in the first part of this report show that the use of low enriched fuel in the fast zone of the assembly diminishes neutron multiplication. Therefore, the discussion in the second part of the report focuses on finding alternative fuel loading configurations that enhance neutron multiplication while using low enriched uranium fuel. It was found that arranging the interface absorber between the fast and the thermal zones in a circular rather than a square array is an effective method of operating the YALINA Booster subcritical assembly without downgrading neutron multiplication relative to the original value obtained with the use of the high enriched uranium fuels in the fast zone.

Talamo, A.; Gohar, Y. (Nuclear Engineering Division) [Nuclear Engineering Division

2011-05-12T23:59:59.000Z

150

Laser and gas centrifuge enrichment  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Principles of uranium isotope enrichment using various laser and gas centrifuge techniques are briefly discussed. Examples on production of high enriched uranium are given. Concerns regarding the possibility of using low end technologies to produce weapons grade uranium are explained. Based on current assessments commercial enrichment services are able to cover the global needs of enriched uranium in the foreseeable future.

Heinonen, Olli [Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)

2014-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

151

Uranium Ore Uranium is extracted  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Milling of Uranium Ore Uranium is extracted from ore with strong acids or bases. The uranium is concentrated in a solid substance called"yellowcake." Chemical Conversion Plants convert the uranium in yellowcake to uranium hexafluoride (UF6 ), a compound that can be made into nuclear fuel. Enrichment

152

EIS-0089: PUREX Plant and Uranium Oxide Plant Facilities, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

The U.S. Department of Energy developed this statement to evaluate the environmental impacts of resumption of operations of the PUREX/Uranium Oxide facilities at the Hanford Site to produce plutonium and other special nuclear materials for national defense needs.

153

Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) facility preclosure work plan  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The dangerous waste permit identification number (WA7890008967)was issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Washington State Department of Ecology. This identification number encompasses a number of treatment, storage, and/or disposal units within the Hanford Facility. One of these treatment, storage, and/or disposal units is the PUREX Facility,currently undergoing a phased closure. The PUREX Facility Preclosure Work Plan submittal differs from closure plans previously submitted by the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office to the Washington State Department of Ecology,in that the closure process occurs in three distinct phases as part of the decommissioning process (i.e., transition,surveillance and maintenance, and disposition). Final closure will occur during the disposition phase. This phased decommissioning process is implemented because development of a complete closure plan during the transition phase is impractical and future land use determinations have not been identified. The objective of the transition phase is to place the PUREX Facility in a safe configuration with respect to human health and the environment. Following the transition phase activities, the PUREX Facility will begin the surveillance and maintenance phase of 10 or more years until disposition phase activities commence. The closure plan for the PUREX facility will be prepared during the disposition phase. For purposes of this documentation, the PUREX Facility does not include the PUREX Storage Tunnels. The PUREX Storage Tunnels are an operating storage unit(DOE/RL-94-24).

Bhatia, R.K., Westinghouse Hanford

1996-07-09T23:59:59.000Z

154

Uranium Processing Facility Site Readiness Subproject Completed on Time and  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr MayAtmosphericNuclear SecurityTensile Strain Switched Ferromagnetism inS-4500II Field Emission SEM with EDAXUpdatedEnergyUranium

155

Uranium Processing Facility team signs partnering agreement | National  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr MayAtmosphericNuclear SecurityTensile Strain Switched Ferromagnetism inS-4500II Field Emission SEM with EDAXUpdatedEnergyUraniumNuclear

156

Free Air CO2 Enrichment (FACE) Data from the Duke Forest FACE Facility  

DOE Data Explorer [Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)]

DOE has conducted trace gas enrichment experiments since the mid 1990s. The FACE Data Management System is a central repository and archive for Free-Air Carbon Dioxide Enrichment (FACE) data, as well as for the related open-top chamber (OTC) experiments. FACE Data Management System is located at DOEĆs Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC). While the data from the various FACE sites, each one a unique user facility, are centralized at CDIAC, each of the FACE sites presents its own view of its activities and information. For that reason, DOE Data Explorer users are advised to see both the central repository at http://public.ornl.gov/face/index.shtml and the individual home pages of each site. The Duke University FACE website actually presents information on several FACE experiments. The Forest-Atmosphere Carbon Transfer and Storage (FACTS-I) facility is located in the Blackwood Division of the Duke Forest. It consists of four free-air CO2 enrichment (FACE) plots that provide elevated atmospheric CO2 concentration and four plots that provide ambient CO2 control. The system has been in operation since June, 1994 in the prototype plot, and since August, 1996 in the three additional plots. The prototype plot and its reference were halved with a barrier inserted in the soil in 1998 to conduct, together with five additional plot pairs, CO2 X soil nutrient enrichment experiments. The rest of the plots were partitioned in early 2005 and incorporated into the CO2 X nutrient experiment. To increase statistical power, four additional ambient plots were established in January, 2005, halved, and one half of each fertilized. [copied from http://face.env.duke.edu/description.cfm] The Duke FACE home page makes information available from both completed and ongoing projects, provides a searchable database of publications and presentations, and data, images, and links to related websites.

157

Compton DIV: Using a Compton-Based Gamma-Ray Imager for Design Information Verification of Uranium Enrichment Plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A feasibility study has been performed to determine the potential usefulness of Compton imaging as a tool for design information verification (DIV) of uranium enrichment plants. Compton imaging is a method of gamma-ray imaging capable of imaging with a 360-degree field of view over a broad range of energies. These systems can image a room (with a time span on the order of one hour) and return a picture of the distribution and composition of radioactive material in that room. The effectiveness of Compton imaging depends on the sensitivity and resolution of the instrument as well the strength and energy of the radioactive material to be imaged. This study combined measurements and simulations to examine the specific issue of UF{sub 6} gas flow in pipes, at various enrichment levels, as well as hold-up resulting from the accumulation of enriched material in those pipes. It was found that current generation imagers could image pipes carrying UF{sub 6} in less than one hour at moderate to high enrichment. Pipes with low enriched gas would require more time. It was also found that hold-up was more amenable to this technique and could be imaged in gram quantities in a fraction of an hour. another questions arises regarding the ability to separately image two pipes spaced closely together. This depends on the capabilities of the instrument in question. These results are described in detail. In addition, suggestions are given as to how to develop Compton imaging as a tool for DIV.

Burks, M; Verbeke, J; Dougan, A; Wang, T; Decman, D

2009-07-04T23:59:59.000Z

158

RERTR program activities related to the development and application of new LEU fuels. [Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor; low-enriched uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The statue of the U.S. Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program is reviewed. After a brief outline of RERTR Program objectives and goals, program accomplishments are discussed with emphasis on the development, demonstration and application of new LEU fuels. Most program activities have proceeded as planned, and a combination of two silicide fuels (U/sub 3/Si/sub 2/-Al and U/sub 3/Si-Al) holds excellent promise for achieving the long-term program goals. Current plans and schedules project the uranium density of qualified RERTR fuels for plate-type reactors to grow by approximately 1 g U/cm/sup 3/ each year, from the current 1.7 g U/cm/sup 3/ to the 7.0 g U/cm/sup 3/ which will be reached in late 1988. The technical needs of research and test reactors for HEU exports are also forecasted to undergo a gradual but dramatic decline in the coming years.

Travelli, A.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

159

Parametric Evaluation of Active Neutron Interrogation for the Detection of Shielded Highly-Enriched Uranium in the Field  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Parametric studies using numerical simulations are being performed to assess the performance capabilities and limits of active neutron interrogation for detecting shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU). Varying the shield material, HEU mass, HEU depth inside the shield, and interrogating neutron source energy, the simulations account for both neutron and photon emission signatures from the HEU with resolution in both energy and time. The results are processed to represent different irradiation timing schemes and several different classes of radiation detectors, and evaluated using a statistical approach considering signal intensity over background. This paper describes the details of the modeling campaign and some preliminary results, weighing the strengths of alternative measurement approaches for the different irradiation scenarios.

D. L. Chcihester; E. H. Seabury; S. J. Thompson; R. R. C. Clement

2011-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

160

Monte Carlo analysis of the slightly enriched uranium-D/sub 2/O critical experiment LTRIIA (AWBA Development Program)  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Savannah River Laboratory LTRIIA slightly-enriched uranium-D/sub 2/O critical experiment was analyzed with ENDF/B-IV data and the RCP01 Monte Carlo program, which modeled the entire assembly in explicit detail. The integral parameters delta/sup 25/ and delta/sup 28/ showed good agreement with experiment. However, calculated K/sub eff/ was 2 to 3% low, due primarily to an overprediction of U238 capture. This is consistent with results obtained in similar analyses of the H/sub 2/O-moderated TRX critical experiments. In comparisons with the VIM and MCNP2 Monte Carlo programs, good agreement was observed for calculated reeaction rates in the B/sup 2/=0 cell.

Hardy, J. Jr.; Shore, J.M.

1981-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


161

Verification of the MCU precision code and ROSFOND neutron data in application to the calculations of criticality of fast reactors with highly enriched uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Calculation of 335 critical assemblies (benchmark experiments) with the core of highly enriched uranium and reflectors of various materials is performed. The statistical analysis of the results shows that, for all 16 materials studied, the absolute value of the most probable deviation of the calculated value of K{sub eff} from the experimental one does not exceed 0.005.

Alekseev, N. I.; Kalugin, M. A.; Kulakov, A. S.; Novosel’tsev, A. P.; Sergeev, G. S.; Shkarovskiy, D. A.; Yudkevich, M. S., E-mail: umark@adis.vver.kiae.ru [National Research Center Kurchatov Institute (Russian Federation)

2014-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

162

Validation of SCALE 4. 0 -- CSAS25 module and the 27-group ENDF/B-IV cross-section library for low-enriched uranium systems  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A version of KENO V.a and the 27-group library in SCALE-4.0 were validated for use in evaluating the nuclear criticality safety of low-enriched uranium systems. A total of 59 critical systems were analyzed. A statistical analysis of the results was performed, and subcritical acceptanced criteria are established.

Jordan, W.C.

1993-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

163

Validation of SCALE 4.0 -- CSAS25 module and the 27-group ENDF/B-IV cross-section library for low-enriched uranium systems  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A version of KENO V.a and the 27-group library in SCALE-4.0 were validated for use in evaluating the nuclear criticality safety of low-enriched uranium systems. A total of 59 critical systems were analyzed. A statistical analysis of the results was performed, and subcritical acceptanced criteria are established.

Jordan, W.C.

1993-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

164

Decommissioning and waste disposal methods for an uranium mill facility in Spain  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

In the south of Spain on the outskirts of the town of Andujar an inactive uranium mill tailings pile is being stabilized in place. Mill equipment, buildings and process facilities have been dismantled and demolished and the resulting metal wastes and debris will be placed in the pile. The tailings mass is being reshaped by flattening the sideslopes and a cover system will be placed over the pile. This paper describes the technical procedures used for the remediation and closure of the Andujar mill site and in particular discusses the approaches used for the dismantling and demolition of the processing facilities and the disposal of the metal wastes and demolition debris.

Santiago, J.L. [ENRESA, Madrid (Spain); Sanchez, M. [INITEC, Madrid (Spain)

1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

165

Assumptions and Criteria for Performing a Feasability Study of the Conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Core to Use Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A computational study will be initiated during fiscal year 2006 to examine the feasibility of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor from highly enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium. The study will be limited to steady-state, nominal operation, reactor physics and thermal-hydraulic analyses of a uranium-molybdenum alloy that would be substituted for the current fuel powder--U{sub 3}O{sub 8} mixed with aluminum. The purposes of this document are to (1) define the scope of studies to be conducted, (2) define the methodologies to be used to conduct the studies, (3) define the assumptions that serve as input to the methodologies, (4) provide an efficient means for communication with the Department of Energy and American research reactor operators, and (5) expedite review and commentary by those parties.

Primm, R.T., III; Ellis, R.J.; Gehin, J.C.; Moses, D.L.; Binder, J.L.; Xoubi, N. (U. of Cincinnati)

2006-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

166

Free Air CO2 Enrichment (FACE) Research Data from the Nevada Desert FACE Facility (NDFF)  

DOE Data Explorer [Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)]

DOE has conducted trace gas enrichment experiments since the mid 1990s. The FACE Data Management System is a central repository and archive for Free-Air Carbon Dioxide Enrichment (FACE) data, as well as for the related open-top chamber (OTC) experiments. FACE Data Management System is located at the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC). While the data from the various FACE sites, each one a unique user facility, are centralized at CDIAC, each of the FACE sites presents its own view of its activities and information. For that reason, DOE Data Explorer users are advised to see both the central repository at http://public.ornl.gov/face/index.shtml and the individual home pages of each site. NDFF whole-ecosystem manipulation is a flagship experiment of the Terrestrial Carbon Process (TCP) research program of the US Dept. of Energy. It is also a core project of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (IGBP) and a contribution to the US Global Change Research Program. The NDFF was developed in conjunction with the National Science Foundation (NSF) and DOE-EPSCoR programs. FACE (Free-Air-Carbon dioxide-Enrichment) technology allows researchers to elevate the carbon dioxide level in large study plots while minimizing ecosystem disturbance. At the NDFF the concentration of CO2 was elevated by 50 percent above the present atmospheric levels in three plots in the Mojave Desert ecosystem, while six other plots remained at the current level. This experimental design provided a large area in which integrated teams of scientists could describe and quantify processes regulating carbon, nutrient, and water balances in desert ecosystems.

167

Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund's Fiscal Year 2011 Financial Statement Audit  

Energy Savers [EERE]

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Office of Inspector GeneralDepartment of EnergyofProject is on Track|Solar DecathlonManufacturing LoanMaterialUranium

168

Treatment of Uranium and Plutonium Solutions Generated in the Atalante Facility, France - 12004  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Atalante complex operated by the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) at the Rhone Valley Research Center consolidates research programs on actinide chemistry, especially separation chemistry, processing for recycling spent fuel, and fabrication of actinide targets for innovative concepts in future nuclear systems. The design of future systems (Generation IV reactors, material recycling) will increase the uranium and plutonium flows in the facility, making it important to anticipate the stepped-up activity and provide Atalante with equipment dedicated to processing these solutions to obtain a mixed uranium-plutonium oxide that will be stored pending reuse. Ongoing studies for integral recycling of the actinides have highlighted the need for reserving equipment to produce actinides mixed oxide powder and also minor actinides bearing oxide for R and D purpose. To meet this double objective a new shielded line should be built in the facility and should be operational 6 years after go decision. The main functions of the new unit would be to receive, concentrate and store solutions, purify them, ensure group conversion of actinides and conversion of excess uranium. This new unit will be constructed in a completely refurbished building devoted to subcritical and safe geometry of the process equipments. (author)

Lagrave, Herve [French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission - CEA, Rhone Valley Research Center, BP 17171, 30207 Bagnols-sur-Ceze Cedex (France)

2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

169

Assessment of enriched uranium storage safety issues at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This document is an assessment of the technical safety issues pertaining to the storage of EU at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. The purpose of the assessment is to serve as the basis for defining the technical standards for storage of EU at Y-12. A formal assessment of the Y-12 materials acceptance criteria for EU is currently being conducted by a task force cochaired by B. G. Eddy of DOE Oak Ridge Operations and S. 0. Cox of Y-12 Defense Programs. The mission of this technical assessment for storage is obviously dependent on results of the acceptance assessment. Clearly, the two efforts require coordination to avoid inconsistencies. In addition, both these Assessments must be consistent with the Environmental Assessment for EU storage at Y-12.1 Both the Storage Assessment and the Criteria for Acceptance must take cognizance of the fact that a portion of the EU to be submitted for storage in the future is expected to be derived from foreign sources and to include previously irradiated uranium containing significant levels of transuranics, radioactive daughter products, and unstable uranium isotopes that do not occur in the EU stream of the DOE weapons complex. National security considerations may dictate that these materials be accepted despite the fact that they fail to conform to the Acceptance Criteria. This document will attempt to address the complexities inherent in this situation.

NONE

1996-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

170

Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

Not Available

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

171

Disposition of PUREX facility tanks D5 and E6 uranium and plutonium solutions. Final report  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Approximately 9 kilograms of plutonium and 5 metric tons of uranium in a 1 molar nitric acid solution are being stored in two PUREX facility vessels, tanks D5 and E6. The plutonium was accumulated during cleanup activities of the plutonium product area of the PUREX facility. Personnel at PUREX recently completed a formal presentation to the Surplus Materials Peer Panel (SMPP) regarding disposition of the material currently in these tanks. The peer panel is a group of complex-wide experts who have been chartered by EM-64 (Office of Site and Facility Transfer) to provide a third party independent review of disposition decisions. The information presented to the peer panel is provided in the first section of this report. The panel was generally receptive to the information provided at that time and the recommendations which were identified.

Harty, D.P.

1993-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

172

Fire hazards analysis for the uranium oxide (UO{sub 3}) facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) documents the deactivation end-point status of the UO{sub 3} complex fire hazards, fire protection and life safety systems. This FHA has been prepared for the Uranium Oxide Facility by Westinghouse Hanford Company in accordance with the criteria established in DOE 5480.7A, Fire Protection and RLID 5480.7, Fire Protection. The purpose of the Fire Hazards Analysis is to comprehensively and quantitatively assess the risk from a fire within individual fire areas in a Department of Energy facility so as to ascertain whether the objectives stated in DOE Order 5480.7, paragraph 4 are met. Particular attention has been paid to RLID 5480.7, Section 8.3, which specifies the criteria for deactivating fire protection in decommission and demolition facilities.

Wyatt, D.M.

1994-12-06T23:59:59.000Z

173

Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years.

Lohrasbi, J.; Johnson, D.L. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); De Lorenzo, D.S. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, NM (United States)

1993-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

174

The New Generation of Uranium In Situ Recovery Facilities: Design Improvements Should Reduce Radiological Impacts Relative to First Generation Uranium Solution Mining Plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

In the last few years, there has been a significant increase in the demand for Uranium as historical inventories have been consumed and new reactor orders are being placed. Numerous mineralized properties around the world are being evaluated for Uranium recovery and new mining / milling projects are being evaluated and developed. Ore bodies which are considered uneconomical to mine by conventional methods such as tunneling or open pits, can be candidates for non-conventional recovery techniques, involving considerably less capital expenditure. Technologies such as Uranium In Situ Leaching / In Situ Recovery (ISL / ISR - also referred to as 'solution mining'), have enabled commercial scale mining and milling of relatively small ore pockets of lower grade, and are expected to make a significant contribution to overall world wide uranium supplies over the next ten years. Commercial size solution mining production facilities have operated in the US since the mid 1970's. However, current designs are expected to result in less radiological wastes and emissions relative to these 'first' generation plants (which were designed, constructed and operated through the 1980's). These early designs typically used alkaline leach chemistries in situ including use of ammonium carbonate which resulted in groundwater restoration challenges, open to air recovery vessels and high temperature calcining systems for final product drying vs the 'zero emissions' vacuum dryers as typically used today. Improved containment, automation and instrumentation control and use of vacuum dryers in the design of current generation plants are expected to reduce production of secondary waste byproduct material, reduce Radon emissions and reduce potential for employee exposure to uranium concentrate aerosols at the back end of the milling process. In Situ Recovery in the U.S. typically involves the circulation of groundwater, fortified with oxidizing (gaseous oxygen e.g) and complexing agents (carbon dioxide, e.g) into an ore body, solubilizing the uranium in situ, and then pumping the solutions to the surface where they are fed to a processing plant ( mill). Processing involves ion exchange and may also include precipitation, drying or calcining and packaging operations depending on facility specifics. This paper presents an overview of the ISR process and the health physics monitoring programs developed at a number of commercial scale ISL / ISR Uranium recovery and production facilities as a result of the radiological character of these processes. Although many radiological aspects of the process are similar to that of conventional mills, conventional-type tailings as such are not generated. However, liquid and solid byproduct materials may be generated and impounded. The quantity and radiological character of these by products are related to facility specifics. Some special monitoring considerations are presented which are required due to the manner in which radon gas is evolved in the process and the unique aspects of controlling solution flow patterns underground. The radiological character of these processes are described using empirical data collected from many operating facilities. Additionally, the major aspects of the health physics and radiation protection programs that were developed at these first generation facilities are discussed and contrasted to circumstances of the current generation and state of the art of uranium ISR technologies and facilities. In summary: This paper has presented an overview of in situ Uranium recovery processes and associated major radiological aspects and monitoring considerations. Admittedly, the purpose was to present an overview of those special health physics considerations dictated by the in situ Uranium recovery technology, to point out similarities and differences to conventional mill programs and to contrast these alkaline leach facilities to modern day ISR designs. As evidenced by the large number of ISR projects currently under development in the U.S. and worldwide, non conventional Uranium recovery techniques

Brown, S.H. [CHP, SHB INC., Centennial, Colorado (United States)

2008-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

175

Direct fissile assay of enriched uranium using random self-interrogation and neutron coincidence response  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

Apparatus and method for the direct, nondestructive evaluation of the .sup.235 U nuclide content of samples containing UF.sub.6, UF.sub.4, or UO.sub.2 utilizing the passive neutron self-interrogation of the sample resulting from the intrinsic production of neutrons therein. The ratio of the emitted neutron coincidence count rate to the total emitted neutron count rate is determined and yields a measure of the bulk fissile mass. The accuracy of the method is 6.8% (1.sigma.) for cylinders containing UF.sub.6 with enrichments ranging from 6% to 98% with measurement times varying from 3-6 min. The samples contained from below 1 kg to greater than 16 kg. Since the subject invention relies on fast neutron self-interrogation, complete sampling of the UF.sub.6 takes place, reducing difficulties arising from inhomogeneity of the sample which adversely affects other assay procedures.

Menlove, Howard O. (Los Alamos, NM); Stewart, James E. (Los Alamos, NM)

1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

176

Direct fissile assay of enriched uranium using random self-interrogation and neutron coincidence response  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

Apparatus and method for the direct, nondestructive evaluation of the /sup 235/U nuclide content of samples containing UF/sub 6/, UF/sub 4/, or UO/sub 2/ utilizing the passive neutron self-interrogation of the sample resulting from the intrinsic production of neutrons therein. The ratio of the emitted neutron coincidence count rate to the total emitted neutron count rate is determined and yields a measure of the bulk fissile mass. The accuracy of the method is 6.8% (1sigma) for cylinders containing UF/sub 6/ with enrichments ranging from 6% to 98% with measurement times varying from 3-6 min. The samples contained from below 1 kg to greater than 16 kg. Since the subject invention relies on fast neutron self-interrogation, complete sampling of the UF/sub 6/ takes place, reducing difficulties arising from inhomogeneity of the sample which adversely affects other assay procedures. 4 figs., 1 tab.

Menlove, H.O.; Stewart, J.E.

1985-02-04T23:59:59.000Z

177

Successful Completion of the Largest Shipment of Russian Research Reactor High-Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Czech Republic to Russian Federation  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

On December 8, 2007, the largest shipment of high-enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel was successfully made from a Russian-designed nuclear research reactor in the Czech Republic to the Russian Federation. This accomplishment is the culmination of years of planning, negotiations, and hard work. The United States, Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency have been working together on the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program in support of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. In February 2003, RRRFR Program representatives met with the Nuclear Research Institute in Rež, Czech Republic, and discussed the return of their high-enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation for reprocessing. Nearly 5 years later, the shipment was made. This paper discusses the planning, preparations, coordination, and cooperation required to make this important international shipment.

Michael Tyacke; Dr. Igor Bolshinsky; Jeff Chamberlin

2008-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

178

Characterization of uranium in surface-waters collected at the Rocky Flats Facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) is a Department of Energy (DOE) facility where plutonium and uranium components were manufactured for nuclear weapons. During plant operations radioactivity was inadvertently released into the environment. This study was initiated to characterize the uranium present in surface-waters at RFP. Three drainage basins and natural ephemeral streams transverse RFP. The Woman Creek drainage basin traverses and drains the southern portion of the site. The Rock Creek drainage basin drains the northwestern portion of the plant complex. The Walnut Creek drainage basin traverses the western, northern, and northeastern portions of the RFP site. Dams, detention ponds, diversion structures, and ditches have been constructed at RFP to control the release of plant discharges and surface (storm water) runoff. The ponds located downstream of the plant complex on North Walnut Creek are designated A-1 through A-4. Ponds on South Walnut Creek are designated B-1 through B-5. The ponds in the Woman Creek drainage basin are designated C-1 and C-2. Water samples were collected from each pond and the uranium was characterized by TIMS measurement techniques.

Efurd, D.W.; Rokop, D.J.; Aguilar, R.D.; Roensch, F.R.; Perrin, R.E.; Banar, J.C.

1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

179

Chapter 4. Uranium Mine and Extraction Facility Reclamation This chapter is not intended to serve as guidance, or to supplement EPA or other agency environmental  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

4-1 Chapter 4. Uranium Mine and Extraction Facility Reclamation This chapter is not intended, it is an outline of practices which may or have been used for uranium site restoration. Mining reclamation for uranium mining sites. The existence of bonding requirements and/or financial guarantees in the cases where

180

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE'S H-CANYON FACILITY: RECOVERY AND DOWN BLEND URANIUM FOR BENEFICIAL USE  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

For over fifty years, the H Canyon facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has performed remotely operated radiochemical separations of irradiated targets to produce materials for national defense. Although the materials production mission has ended, the facility continues to play an important role in the stabilization and safe disposition of proliferable nuclear materials. As part of the US HEU Disposition Program, SRS has been down blending off-specification (off-spec) HEU to produce LEU since 2003. Off-spec HEU contains fission products not amenable to meeting the American Society for Testing and Material (ASTM) commercial fuel standards prior to purification. This down blended HEU material produced 301 MT of ~5% enriched LEU which has been fabricated into light water reactor fuel being utilized in Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reactors in Tennessee and Alabama producing economic power. There is still in excess of ~10 MT of off-spec HEU throughout the DOE complex or future foreign and domestic research reactor returns that could be recovered and down blended for beneficial use as either ~5% enriched LEU, or for use in subsequent LEU reactors requiring ~19.75% enriched LEU fuel.

Magoulas, V.

2013-05-27T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


181

EA-1977: Acceptance and Disposition of Used Nuclear Fuel Containing U.S.-Origin Highly Enriched Uranium from the Federal Republic of Germany  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

This environmental assessment (EA) will evaluate the potential environmental impacts of a DOE proposal to accept used nuclear fuel from the Federal Republic of Germany at DOE’s Savannah River Site (SRS) for processing and disposition. This used nuclear fuel is composed of kernels containing thorium and U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) embedded in small graphite spheres that were irradiated in nuclear reactors used for research and development purposes.

182

Decommissioning of facilities and encapsulation of wastes for an uranium mill site in Spain  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

In the south of Spain on the outskirts of the town of Andujar an inactive uranium mill tailings site is being remediated in place. Mill equipment, buildings and process facilities have been dismantled and demolished and the resulting metal wastes and debris have been placed in the tailings pile. The tailings mass has been reshaped by flattening the sideslopes to improve stability and a cover system has been placed over the pile. Remedial action works started in February 1991 and will be completed by March 1994. This paper describes the progress of the remediation works for the closure of the Andujar mill site and in particular discusses the approaches used for the dismantling and demolition of the processing facilities and the stabilization of the tailings pile.

Santiago, J.L. [Enresa, Madrid (Spain); Sanchez, M. [Initec, Madrid (Spain)

1994-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

183

Feasibility studies to establish at the Kazakhstan Ulba metallurgical plant the manufacturing capability to produce low-enriched uranium certified reference materials  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

One of the salient features of the transition plan that the United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) is presently implementing in the Former Soviet Union countries is the availability of uranium certified reference materials for calibration of nondestructive assay (NDA) measurement equipment. To address this challenge, DOE/NNSA and U.S. national laboratories have focused their cooperative efforts on establishing a reliable source for manufacturing, certifying, and supplying of such standards. The Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP), Kazakhstan, which processes large quantities of low-enriched uranium to produce ceramic fuel pellets for nuclear-powered reactors, is well situated to become a key supplier of low-enriched uranium certified reference materials for the country and Central Asia region. We have recently completed Phase I of a feasibility study to establish at UMP capabilities of manufacturing these standards. In this paper we will discuss details of a proposed methodology for uranium down-blending, material selection and characterization, and a proposed methodology of measurement by destructive (DA) and non-destructive (NDA) analysis to form a database for material certification by the competent State authorities in the Republic of Kazakhstan. In addition, we will discuss the prospect for manufacturing of such standards at UMP.

Kuzminski, Jozef [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Nesuhoff, J [NBL; Cratto, P [NBL; Pfennigwerth, G [Y12 NATIONAL SEC. COMPLEX; Mikhailenko, A [ULBA METALLURGICAL PLANT; Maliutina, I [ULBA METALLURGICAL PLANT; Nations, J [GREGG PROTECTION SERVICES

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

184

Radio-Ecological Conditions of Groundwater in the Area of Uranium Mining and Milling Facility - 13525  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Manmade chemical and radioactive contamination of groundwater is one of damaging effects of the uranium mining and milling facilities. Groundwater contamination is of special importance for the area of Priargun Production Mining and Chemical Association, JSC 'PPMCA', because groundwater is the only source of drinking water. The paper describes natural conditions of the site, provides information on changes of near-surface area since the beginning of the company, illustrates the main trends of contaminators migration and assesses manmade impact on the quality and mode of near-surface and ground waters. The paper also provides the results of chemical and radioactive measurements in groundwater at various distances from the sources of manmade contamination to the drinking water supply areas. We show that development of deposits, mine water discharge, leakages from tailing dams and cinder storage facility changed general hydro-chemical balance of the area, contributed to new (overlaid) aureoles and flows of scattering paragenetic uranium elements, which are much smaller in comparison with natural ones. However, increasing flow of groundwater stream at the mouth of Sukhoi Urulyungui due to technological water infiltration, mixing of natural water with filtration streams from industrial reservoirs and sites, containing elevated (relative to natural background) levels of sulfate-, hydro-carbonate and carbonate- ions, led to the development and moving of the uranium contamination aureole from the undeveloped field 'Polevoye' to the water inlet area. The aureole front crossed the southern border of water inlet of drinking purpose. The qualitative composition of groundwater, especially in the southern part of water inlet, steadily changes for the worse. The current Russian intervention levels of gross alpha activity and of some natural radionuclides including {sup 222}Rn are in excess in drinking water; regulations for fluorine and manganese concentrations are also in excess. Possible ways to improve the situation are considered. (authors)

Titov, A.V.; Semenova, M.P.; Seregin, V.A.; Isaev, D.V.; Metlyaev, E.G. [FSBU SRC A.I.Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Center of FMBA of Russia, Zhivopisnaya Street, 46, Moscow (Russian Federation)] [FSBU SRC A.I.Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Center of FMBA of Russia, Zhivopisnaya Street, 46, Moscow (Russian Federation); Glagolev, A.V.; Klimova, T.I.; Sevtinova, E.B. [FSESP 'Hydrospecgeologiya' (Russian Federation)] [FSESP 'Hydrospecgeologiya' (Russian Federation); Zolotukhina, S.B.; Zhuravleva, L.A. [FSHE 'Centre of Hygiene and Epidemiology no. 107' under FMBA of Russia (Russian Federation)] [FSHE 'Centre of Hygiene and Epidemiology no. 107' under FMBA of Russia (Russian Federation)

2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

185

H. R. 4934: This title may be cited as the Uranium Revitalization, Tailings Reclamation and Enrichment Act of 1988. Introduced in the House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, June 28, 1988  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

H.R. 4934 is a bill to provide for a viable domestic uranium industry, to establish a program to fund reclamation and other remedial actions with respect to mill tailings at active uranium and thorium sites, to establish a wholly-owned Government corporation to manage the Nation's uranium enrichment enterprise, operating as a continuing, commercial enterprise on a profitable and efficient basis, and for other purposes.

Not Available

1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

186

Reactor Physics Methods and Preconceptual Core Design Analyses for Conversion of the Advanced Test Reactor to Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2012  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Under the current long-term DOE policy and planning scenario, both the ATR and the ATRC will be reconfigured at an appropriate time within the next several years to operate with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This will be accomplished under the auspices of the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program, administered by the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). At a minimum, the internal design and composition of the fuel element plates and support structure will change, to accommodate the need for low enrichment in a manner that maintains total core excess reactivity at a suitable level for anticipated operational needs throughout each cycle while respecting all control and shutdown margin requirements and power distribution limits. The complete engineering design and optimization of LEU cores for the ATR and the ATRC will require significant multi-year efforts in the areas of fuel design, development and testing, as well as a complete re-analysis of the relevant reactor physics parameters for a core composed of LEU fuel, with possible control system modifications. Ultimately, revalidation of the computational physics parameters per applicable national and international standards against data from experimental measurements for prototypes of the new ATR and ATRC core designs will also be required for Safety Analysis Report (SAR) changes to support routine operations with LEU. This report is focused on reactor physics analyses conducted during Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 to support the initial development of several potential preconceptual fuel element designs that are suitable candidates for further study and refinement during FY-2013 and beyond. In a separate, but related, effort in the general area of computational support for ATR operations, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is conducting a focused multiyear effort to introduce modern high-fidelity computational reactor physics software and associated validation protocols to replace several obsolete components of the current analytical tool set used for ATR neutronics support. This aggressive computational and experimental campaign will have a broad strategic impact on the operation of the ATR, both in terms of improved computational efficiency and accuracy for support of ongoing DOE programs as well as in terms of national and international recognition of the ATR National Scientific User Facility (NSUF). It will also greatly facilitate the LEU conversion effort, since the upgraded computational capabilities are now at a stage where they can be, and in fact have been, used for the required physics analysis from the beginning. In this context, extensive scoping neutronics analyses were completed for six preconceptual candidate LEU fuel element designs for the ATR (and for its companion critical facility, ATRC). Of these, four exhibited neutronics performance in what is believed to be an acceptable range. However, there are currently some concerns with regard to fabricability and mechanical performance that have emerged for one of the four latter concepts. Thus three concepts have been selected for more comprehensive conceptual design analysis during the upcoming fiscal year.

David W. Nigg; Sean R. Morrell

2012-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

187

NNSA Authorizes Start-Up of Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "ofEarlyEnergyDepartmentNationalRestart of the Review of the Yucca0 NationalJ Page420120Nuclear SecurityY-12

188

Toxic Substances Control Act Uranium Enrichment Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement, February 20, 1992  

Office of Environmental Management (EM)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "of Energy Power.pdf11-161-LNGInternationalTechnologyDepartment ofChairs' Meeting October Thomas L. McCall,

189

Toxic Substances Control Act Uranium Enrichment Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement, February 20, 1992  

Office of Environmental Management (EM)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "of Energy Power.pdf11-161-LNGInternationalTechnologyDepartment ofChairs' Meeting October Thomas L. McCall,

190

Toxic Substances Control Act Uranium Enrichment Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement, February 20, 1992 Summary  

Office of Environmental Management (EM)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "of Energy Power.pdf11-161-LNGInternationalTechnologyDepartment ofChairs' Meeting October Thomas L.

191

Toxic Substances Control Act Uranium Enrichment Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement, February 20, 1992 Summary  

Office of Environmental Management (EM)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "of Energy Power.pdf11-161-LNGInternationalTechnologyDepartment ofChairs' Meeting October Thomas L.Toxic

192

SUB-LEU-METAL-THERM-001 SUBCRITICAL MEASUREMENTS OF LOW ENRICHED TUBULAR URANIUM METAL FUEL ELEMENTS BEFORE & AFTER IRRADIATION  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

With the shutdown of the Hanford PUREX (Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant) reprocessing plant in the 1970s, adequate storage capacity for spent Hanford N Reactor fuel elements in the K and N Reactor pools became a concern. To maximize space utilization in the pools, accounting for fuel burnup was considered. Calculations indicated that at typical fuel exposures for N Reactor, the spent-fuel critical mass would be twice the critical mass for green fuel. A decision was reached to test the calculational result with a definitive experiment. If the results proved positive, storage capacity could be increased and N Reactor operation could be prolonged. An experiment to be conducted in the N Reactor spent-fuel storage pool was designed and assembled and the services of the Battelle Northwest Laboratories (BNWL) (now Pacific Northwest National Laboratory [PNNL]) critical mass laboratory were procured for the measurements. The experiments were performed in April 1975 in the Hanford N Reactor fuel storage pool. The fuel elements were MKIA fuel assemblies, comprising two concentric tubes of low-enriched metallic uranium. Two separate sets of measurements were performed: one with ''green'' (fresh) fuel and one with spent fuel. Both the green and spent fuel, were measured in the same geometry. The spent-fuel MKIA assemblies had an average burnup of 2865 MWd (megawatt days)/t. A constraint was imposed restricting the measurements to a subcritical limit of k{sub eff} = 0.97. Subcritical count rate data was obtained with pulsed-neutron and approach-to-critical measurements. Ten (10) configurations with green fuel and nine (9) configurations with spent fuel are described and evaluated. Of these, 3 green fuel and 4 spent fuel loading configurations were considered to serve as benchmark models. However, shortcomings in experimental data failed to meet the high standards for a benchmark problem. Nevertheless, the data provided by these subcritical measurements can supply useful information to analysts evaluating spent fuel subcriticality. The original purpose of the subcritical measurements was to validate computer model predictions that spent N Reactor fuel of a particular, typical exposure (2740 MWd/t) had a critical mass equal to twice that of unexposed fuel of the same type. The motivation for performing this work was driven by the need to increase spent fuel storage limits. These subcritical measurements confirmed the computer model predictions.

SCHWINKENDORF, K.N.

2006-05-12T23:59:59.000Z

193

A review of the Y-12 Plant discharge of enriched uranium to the sanitary sewer (DEUSS)  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant is situated adjacent to the Oak Ridge city limits and is operated by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The Y-12 Plant is located on 4,860 acres, which is collectively referred to as the Y-12 Plant site. Among the missions for which the facility is in existence are producing nuclear weapons components, supporting weapon design laboratories, and processing special nuclear materials (SNM). The Y-12 Plant is under the regulatory guidance of DOE Order 5400.5 and has complied with the technical requirements governing SNM since its issue. However, an in-depth review with appropriate documentation had not been performed, prior to the effect presented herein, to substantiate this claim. As a result of the solid waste issue, it was determined that other types of waste should be formally reviewed for content with respect to SNM. Therefore, a project was formed to investigate the conveyance of SNM through the sanitary sewer system. It is emphasized that this project addresses only effluent from the sanitary sewer system and not the storm sewer system. The project reviewed sanitary sewer data both for the Y-12 Plant and the Y-12 Plant site.

Not Available

1991-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

194

Standard guide for establishing a quality assurance program for uranium conversion facilities  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

1.1 This guide provides guidance and recommended practices for establishing a comprehensive quality assurance program for uranium conversion facilities. 1.2 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate health and safety practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use. 1.3 The basic elements of a quality assurance program appear in the following order: FUNCTION SECTION Organization 5 Quality Assurance Program 6 Design Control 7 Instructions, Procedures & Drawings 8 Document Control 9 Procurement 10 Identification and Traceability 11 Processes 12 Inspection 13 Control of Measuring and Test Equipment 14 Handling, Storage and Shipping 15 Inspection, Test and Operating Status 16 Control of Nonconforming Items 17 Corrective Actions 18 Quality Assurance Records 19 Audits 20 TABLE 1 NQA-1 Basic Requirements Relat...

American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

195

Uranium industry annual 1996  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Uranium Industry Annual 1996 (UIA 1996) provides current statistical data on the US uranium industry`s activities relating to uranium raw materials and uranium marketing. The UIA 1996 is prepared for use by the Congress, Federal and State agencies, the uranium and nuclear electric utility industries, and the public. Data on uranium raw materials activities for 1987 through 1996 including exploration activities and expenditures, EIA-estimated reserves, mine production of uranium, production of uranium concentrate, and industry employment are presented in Chapter 1. Data on uranium marketing activities for 1994 through 2006, including purchases of uranium and enrichment services, enrichment feed deliveries, uranium fuel assemblies, filled and unfilled market requirements, uranium imports and exports, and uranium inventories are shown in Chapter 2. A feature article, The Role of Thorium in Nuclear Energy, is included. 24 figs., 56 tabs.

NONE

1997-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

196

SUB-LEU-METAL-THERM-001 SUBCRITICAL MEASUREMENTS OF LOW ENRICHED TUBULAR URANIUM METAL FUEL ELEMENTS BEFORE & AFTER IRRADIATION  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

With the shutdown of the Hanford PUREX (Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant) reprocessing plant in the 1970s, adequate storage capacity for spent Hanford N Reactor fuel elements in the K and N Reactor pools became a concern. To maximize space utilization in the pools, accounting for fuel burnup was considered. Fuel that had experienced a neutron environment in a reactor is known as spent, exposed, or irradiated fuel. In contrast fuel that has not yet been placed in a reactor is known as green, unexposed, or unirradiated fuel. Calculations indicated that at typical fuel exposures for N Reactor, the spent-fuel critical mass would be twice the critical mass for green fuel. A decision was reached to test the calculational result with a definitive experiment. If the results proved positive, storage capacity could be increased and N Reactor operation could be prolonged. An experiment to be conducted in the N Reactor spent-fuel storage pool was designed and assembled (References 1 and 2) and the services of the Battelle Northwest Laboratories (BNWL) (now Pacific Northwest National Laboratory [PNNL]) critical mass laboratory were procured for the measurements (Reference 3). The experiments were performed in April 1975 in the Hanford N Reactor fuel storage pool. The fuel elements were MKIA fuel assemblies, comprised of two concentric tubes of low-enriched metallic uranium. Two separate sets of measurements were performed: one with unirradiated fuel and one with irradiated fuel. Both the unirradiated and irradiated fuel, were measured in the same geometry. The spent-fuel MKIA assemblies had an average burnup of 2865 MWd (megawatt days)/t. A constraint was imposed restricting the measurements to a subcritical limit of k{sub eff} = 0.97. Subcritical count rate data was obtained with pulsed-neutron and approach-to-critical measurements. Ten (10) configurations with green fuel and nine (9) configurations with spent fuel are described and evaluated. Of these, three (3) green fuel and four (4) spent fuel loading configurations were considered to serve as benchmark models. However, shortcomings in experimental data, such as the uncertainty in fuel exposure impact on reactivity and the pulse neutron data evaluation methodology, failed to meet the high standards for a benchmark problem. Nevertheless, the data provided by these subcritical measurements supply useful information to analysts evaluating spent fuel subcriticality. The original purpose of the subcritical measurements was to validate computer model predictions that spent N Reactor fuel of a particular, typical exposure (2740 MWd/t) had a critical mass equal to twice that of unexposed fuel of the same type. The motivation for performing this work was driven by the need to increase spent fuel storage limits. These subcritical measurements confirmed the computer model predictions.

TOFFER, H.

2006-07-18T23:59:59.000Z

197

Contaminant distributions at typical U.S. uranium milling facilities and their effect on remedial action decisions  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Past operations at uranium processing sites throughout the US have resulted in local contamination of soils and ground water by radionuclides, toxic metals, or both. Understanding the origin of contamination and how the constituents are distributed is a basic element for planning remedial action decisions. This report describes the radiological and nonradiological species found in ground water at a typical US uranium milling facility. The report will provide the audience with an understanding of the vast spectrum of contaminants that must be controlled in planning solutions to the long-term management of these waste materials.

Hamp, S. [USDOE Albuquerque Operations Office, NM (United States). Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Project Office; Jackson, T.J. [Geraghty and Miller, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Dotson, P.W. [Roy F. Weston, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

1995-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

198

Safeguards assessment of gamma-ray detection for process monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities.  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

??Conversion, the process by which natural uranium ore (yellowcake) is puri?ed and converted through a series of chemical processes into uranium hexa?uoride gas (UF6), has… (more)

Dewji, Shaheen Azim

2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

199

New generation enrichment monitoring technology for gas centrifuge enrichment plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The continuous enrichment monitor, developed and fielded in the 1990s by the International Atomic Energy Agency, provided a go-no-go capability to distinguish between UF{sub 6} containing low enriched (approximately 4% {sup 235}U) and highly enriched (above 20% {sup 235}U) uranium. This instrument used the 22-keV line from a {sup 109}Cd source as a transmission source to achieve a high sensitivity to the UF{sub 6} gas absorption. The 1.27-yr half-life required that the source be periodically replaced and the instrument recalibrated. The instrument's functionality and accuracy were limited by the fact that measured gas density and gas pressure were treated as confidential facility information. The modern safeguarding of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant producing low-enriched UF{sub 6} product aims toward a more quantitative flow and enrichment monitoring concept that sets new standards for accuracy stability, and confidence. An instrument must be accurate enough to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of material, have virtually zero false alarms, and protect the operator's proprietary process information. We discuss a new concept for advanced gas enrichment assay measurement technology. This design concept eliminates the need for the periodic replacement of a radioactive source as well as the need for maintenance by experts. Some initial experimental results will be presented.

Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Alexandrov, Boian S. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hill, Thomas R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Macarthur, Duncan W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marks, Thomas [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Moss, Calvin E. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sheppard, Gregory A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2008-06-13T23:59:59.000Z

200

Experiments and Simulations of the Use of Time-Correlated Thermal Neutron Counting to Determine the Multiplication of an Assembly of Highly Enriched Uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A series of experiments and numerical simulations using thermal-neutron time-correlated measurements has been performed to determine the neutron multiplication, M, of assemblies of highly enriched uranium available at Idaho National Laboratory. The experiments used up to 14.4 kg of highly-enriched uranium, including bare assemblies and assemblies reflected with high-density polyethylene, carbon steel, and tungsten. A small 252Cf source was used to initiate fission chains within the assembly. Both the experiments and the simulations used 6-channel and 8-channel detector systems, each consisting of 3He proportional counters moderated with polyethylene; data was recorded in list mode for analysis. 'True' multiplication values for each assembly were empirically derived using basic neutron production and loss values determined through simulation. A total of one-hundred and sixteen separate measurements were performed using fifty-seven unique measurement scenarios, the multiplication varied from 1.75 to 10.90. This paper presents the results of these comparisons and discusses differences among the various cases.

David L. Chichester; Mathew T. Kinlaw; Scott M. Watson; Jeffrey M. Kalter; Eric C. Miller; William A. Noonan

2014-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


201

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Excess Uranium Management: Effects of DOE...  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

Excess Uranium Management: Effects of DOE Transfers of Excess Uranium on Domestic Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries; Request for Information AGENCY: Office of...

202

Application of the HGSYSTEM/UF{sub 6} model to simulate atmospheric dispersion of UF{sub 6} releases from uranium enrichment plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Uranium hexafluoride is a dense, reactive gas used in Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs) to make uranium enriched in the {sup 235}U isotope. Large quantities of UF{sub 6} exist at the GDPs in the form of in-process gas and as a solid in storage cylinders; smaller amounts exist as hot liquid during transfer operations. If liquid UF{sub 6} is released to the environment, it immediately flashes to a solid and a dense gas that reacts rapidly with water vapor in the air to form solid particles of uranyl fluoride and hydrogen fluoride gas. Preliminary analyses were done on various accidental release scenarios to determine which scenarios must be considered in the safety analyses for the GDPS. These scenarios included gas releases due to failure of process equipment and liquid/gas releases resulting from a breach of transfer piping from a cylinder. A major goal of the calculations was to estimate the response time for mitigating actions in order to limit potential off-site consequences of these postulated releases. The HGSYSTEM/UF{sub 6} code was used to assess the consequences of these release scenarios. Inputs were developed from release calculations which included two-phase, choked flow followed by expansion to atmospheric pressure. Adjustments were made to account for variable release rates and multiple release points. Superpositioning of outputs and adjustments for exposure time were required to evaluate consequences based on health effects due to exposures to uranium and HF at a specific location.

Goode, W.D. Jr.; Bloom, S.G.; Keith, K.D. Jr.

1995-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

203

WISE Uranium Project - Fact Sheet  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

t in the depleted uranium. For this purpose, we first need to calculate the mass balance of the enrichment process. We then calculate the inhalation doses from the depleted uranium and compare the dose contributions from the nuclides of interest. Mass balance for uranium enrichment at Paducah [DOE_1984, p.35] Feed Product Tails Other Mass [st] 758002 124718 621894 11390 Mass fraction 100.00% 16.45% 82.04% 1.50% Concentration of plutonium in tails (depleted uranium) from enrichment of reprocessed uranium, assuming that all plutonium were transfered to the tails: Concentration of neptunium in tails from enrichment of reprocessed uranium uranium, assuming that all neptunium were transfered to the tails: - 2 - Schematic of historic uranium enrichment process at Paducah [DOE_1999b] - -7 For comparison, we first calculate the inhalation dose from depleted uranium produced from natural uranium. We assume that the short-lived decay products have reached secular equilibrium with th

Hazards From Depleted

204

Progress in developing processes for converting {sup 99}Mo production from high- to low-enriched uranium--1998.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

During 1998, the emphasis of our activities was focused mainly on target fabrication. Successful conversion requires a reliable irradiation target; the target being developed uses thin foils of uranium metal, which can be removed from the target hardware for dissolution and processing. This paper describes successes in (1) improving our method for heat-treating the uranium foil to produce a random-small grain structure, (2) improving electrodeposition of zinc and nickel fission-fragment barriers onto the foil, and (3) showing that these fission fragment barriers should be stable during transport of the targets following irradiation. A method was also developed for quantitatively electrodepositing uranium and plutonium contaminants in the {sup 99}Mo. Progress was also made in broadening international cooperation in our development activities.

Conner, C.

1998-10-28T23:59:59.000Z

205

In-Situ Measurements of Low Enrichment Uranium Holdup Process Gas Piping at K-25 - Paper for Waste Management Symposia 2010 East Tennessee Technology Park Oak Ridge, Tennessee  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This document is the final version of a paper submitted to the Waste Management Symposia, Phoenix, 2010, abstract BJC/OR-3280. The primary document from which this paper was condensed is In-Situ Measurement of Low Enrichment Uranium Holdup in Process Gas Piping at K-25 Using NaI/HMS4 Gamma Detection Systems, BJC/OR-3355. This work explores the sufficiency and limitations of the Holdup Measurement System 4 (HJVIS4) software algorithms applied to measurements of low enriched uranium holdup in gaseous diffusion process gas piping. HMS4 has been used extensively during the decommissioning and demolition project of the K-25 building for U-235 holdup quantification. The HMS4 software is an integral part of one of the primary nondestructive assay (NDA) systems which was successfully tested and qualified for holdup deposit quantification in the process gas piping of the K-25 building. The initial qualification focused on the measurement of highly enriched UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} deposits. The purpose of this work was to determine if that qualification could be extended to include the quantification of holdup in UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} deposits of lower enrichment. Sample field data are presented to provide evidence in support of the theoretical foundation. The HMS4 algorithms were investigated in detail and found to sufficiently compensate for UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} source self-attenuation effects, over the range of expected enrichment (4-40%), in the North and East Wings of the K-25 building. The limitations of the HMS4 algorithms were explored for a described set of conditions with respect to area source measurements of low enriched UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} deposits when used in conjunction with a 1 inch by 1/2 inch sodium iodide (NaI) scintillation detector. The theoretical limitations of HMS4, based on the expected conditions in the process gas system of the K-25 building, are related back to the required data quality objectives (DQO) for the NBA measurement system established for the K-25 demolition project. The combined review of the HMS software algorithms and supporting field measurements lead to the conclusion that the majority of process gas pipe measurements are adequately corrected for source self-attenuation using HMS4. While there will be instances where the UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} holdup mass presents an infinitely thick deposit to the NaI-HMS4 system these situations are expected to be infrequent. This work confirms that the HMS4 system can quantify UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} holdup, in its current configuration (deposition, enrichment, and geometry), below the DQO levels for the K-25 building decommissioning and demolition project. For an area measurement of process gas pipe in the K-25 building, if an infinitely thick UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} deposit is identified in the range of enrichment of {approx}4-40%, the holdup quantity exceeds the corresponding DQO established for the K-25 building demolition project.

Rasmussen B.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

206

Spatial correction factors for YALINA Booster facility loaded with medium and low enriched fuels  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Bell and Glasstone spatial correction factor is used in analyses of subcritical assemblies to correct the experimental reactivity as function of the detector position. Besides the detector position, several other parameters affect the correction factor: the energy weighting function of the detector, the detector size, the energy-angle distribution of source neutrons, and the reactivity of the subcritical assembly. This work focuses on the dependency of the correction factor on the detector material and it investigates the YALINA Booster subcritical assembly loaded with medium (36%) and low (10%) enriched fuels. (authors)

Talamo, A.; Gohar, Y. [Argonne National Laboratory, 9700 S. Cass Ave, Argonne, IL 60439 (United States); Bournos, V.; Fokov, Y.; Kiyavitskaya, H.; Routkovskaya, C. [Joint Inst. for Power and Nuclear Research-Sosny, 99 Academician A.K.Krasin Str, Minsk 220109 (Belarus)

2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

207

RERTR 2009 (Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors)  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Threat Reduction in cooperation with the China Atomic Energy Authority and International Atomic Energy Agency hosted the 'RERTR 2009 International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors.' The meeting was organized by Argonne National Laboratory, China Institute of Atomic Energy and Idaho National Laboratory and was held in Beijing, China from November 1-5, 2009. This was the 31st annual meeting in a series on the same general subject regarding the conversion of reactors within the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program develops technology necessary to enable the conversion of civilian facilities using high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and targets.

Totev, T.; Stevens, J.; Kim, Y. S.; Hofman, G.; Matos, J.; Hanan, N.; Garner, P.; Dionne, B.; Olson, A.; Feldman, E.; Dunn, F.; Nuclear Engineering Division; Atomic Research Center; Inst. of Nuclear Physics; LLNL; INL; Korea Atomic Energy Research Inst.; Comisi?n Nacional de Energ?a At?mica; Nuclear Reactor Lab.; Inst. of Atomic Energy-Poland; AECL-Canada; Hungarian Academy of Sciences KFKI Atomic Energy Research Inst.; Japan Atomic Energy Agency; Nuclear Power Inst. of China; Kyoto Univ. Research Reactor Inst.

2010-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

208

Gamma/neutron time-correlation for special nuclear material characterization %3CU%2B2013%3E active stimulation of highly enriched uranium.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A series of simulations and experiments were undertaken to explore and evaluate the potential for a novel new technique for fissile material detection and characterization, the timecorrelated pulse-height (TCPH) method, to be used concurrent with active stimulation of potential nuclear materials. In previous work TCPH has been established as a highly sensitive method for the detection and characterization of configurations of fissile material containing Plutonium in passive measurements. By actively stimulating fission with the introduction of an external radiation source, we have shown that TCPH is also an effective method of detecting and characterizing configurations of fissile material containing Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). The TCPH method is shown to be robust in the presence of the proper choice of external radiation source. An evaluation of potential interrogation sources is presented.

Marleau, Peter; Nowack, Aaron B.; Clarke, Shaun D. [University of Michigan; Monterial, Mateusz [University of Michigan; Paff, Marc [University of Michigan; Pozzi, Sara A. [University of Michigan

2013-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

209

Radiochronological Age of a Uranium Metal Sample from an Abandoned Facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A piece of scrap uranium metal bar buried in the dirt floor of an old, abandoned metal rolling mill was analyzed using multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectroscopy (MC-ICP-MS). The mill rolled uranium rods in the 1940s and 1950s. Samples of the contaminated dirt in which the bar was buried were also analyzed. The isotopic composition of uranium in the bar and dirt samples were both the same as natural uranium, though a few samples of dirt also contained recycled uranium; likely a result of contamination with other material rolled at the mill. The time elapsed since the uranium metal bar was last purified can be determined by the in-growth of the isotope {sup 230}Th from the decay of {sup 234}U, assuming that only uranium isotopes were present in the bar after purification. The age of the metal bar was determined to be 61 years at the time of this analysis and corresponds to a purification date of July 1950 {+-} 1.5 years.

Meyers, L A; Williams, R W; Glover, S E; LaMont, S P; Stalcup, A M; Spitz, H B

2012-03-16T23:59:59.000Z

210

The study of material accountancy procedures for uranium in a whole nuclear fuel cycle  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Material accountancy procedures for uranium under a whole nuclear fuel cycle were studied by taking into consideration the material accountancy capability associated with realistic measurement uncertainties. The significant quantity used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for low-enriched uranium is 75 kg U-235 contained. A loss of U-235 contained in uranium can be detected by either of the following two procedures: one is a traditional U-235 isotope balance, and the other is a total uranium element balance. Facility types studied in this paper were UF6 conversion, gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing, plutonium conversion, and MOX fuel production in Japan, where recycled uranium is processed in addition to natural uranium. It was found that the material accountancy capability of a total uranium element balance was almost always higher than that of a U-235 isotope balance under normal accuracy of weight, concentration, and enrichment measurements. Changing from the traditional U-235 isotope balance to the total uranium element balance for these facilities would lead to a gain of U-235 loss detection capability through material accountancy and to a reduction in the required resources of both the IAEA and operators.

Nakano, Hiromasa; Akiba, Mitsunori [Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., Tokyo (Japan)

1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

211

Fast facility spent-fuel and waste assay instrument. [Fluorinel Dissolution and Fuel Storage (FAST) Facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A delayed-neutron assay instrument was installed in the Fluorinel Dissolution and Fuel Storage Facility at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The dual-assay instrument is designed to measure both spent fuel and waste solids that are produced from fuel processing. A set of waste standards, fabricated by Los Alamos using uranium supplied by Exxon Nuclear Idaho Company, was used to calibrate the small-sample assay region of the instrument. Performance testing was completed before installation of the instrument to determine the effects of uranium enrichment, hydrogenous materials, and neutron poisons on assays. The unit was designed to measure high-enriched uranium samples in the presence of large neutron backgrounds. Measurements indicate that the system can assay low-enriched uranium samples with moderate backgrounds if calibrated with proper standards.

Eccleston, G.W.; Johnson, S.S.; Menlove, H.O.; Van Lyssel, T.; Black, D.; Carlson, B.; Decker, L.; Echo, M.W.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

212

Wetland and Sensitive Species Survey Report for Y-12: Proposed Uranium Processing Facility (UPF)  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report summarizes the results of an environmental survey conducted at sites associated with the proposed Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in September-October 2009. The survey was conducted in order to evaluate potential impacts of the overall project. This project includes the construction of a haul road, concrete batch plant, wet soil storage area and dry soil storage area. The environmental surveys were conducted by natural resource experts at ORNL who routinely assess the significance of various project activities on the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Natural resource staff assistance on this project included the collection of environmental information that can aid in project location decisions that minimize impacts to sensitive resource such as significant wildlife populations, rare plants and wetlands. Natural resources work was conducted in various habitats, corresponding to the proposed areas of impact. Thc credentials/qualifications of the researchers are contained in Appendix A. The proposed haul road traverses a number of different habitats including a power-line right-of-way. wetlands, streams, forest and mowed areas. It extends from what is known as the New Salvage Yard on the west to the Polaris Parking Lot on the east. This haul road is meant to connect the proposed concrete batch plant to the UPF building site. The proposed site of the concrete batch plant itself is a highly disturbed fenced area. This area of the project is shown in Fig. 1. The proposed Wet Soils Disposal Area is located on the north side of Bear Creek Road at the former Control Burn Study Area. This is a second growth arce containing thick vegetation, and extensive dead and down woody material. This area of the project is shown in Fig. 2. Thc dry soils storage area is proposed for what is currently known as the West Borrow Area. This site is located on the west side of Reeves Road south of Bear Creek Road. The site is an early successional field. This area of the project is shown in Fig. 2.

Giffen, N.; Peterson, M.; Reasor, S.; Pounds, L.; Byrd, G.; Wiest, M. C.; Hill, C. C.

2009-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

213

Uranium Industry Annual, 1992  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Uranium Industry Annual provides current statistical data on the US uranium industry for the Congress, Federal and State agencies, the uranium and electric utility industries, and the public. The feature article, ``Decommissioning of US Conventional Uranium Production Centers,`` is included. Data on uranium raw materials activities including exploration activities and expenditures, resources and reserves, mine production of uranium, production of uranium concentrate, and industry employment are presented in Chapter 1. Data on uranium marketing activities including domestic uranium purchases, commitments by utilities, procurement arrangements, uranium imports under purchase contracts and exports, deliveries to enrichment suppliers, inventories, secondary market activities, utility market requirements, and uranium for sale by domestic suppliers are presented in Chapter 2.

Not Available

1993-10-28T23:59:59.000Z

214

Pyroprocessing of Fast Flux Test Facility Nuclear Fuel  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Used nuclear fuel from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) was recently transferred to the Idaho National Laboratory and processed by pyroprocessing in the Fuel Conditioning Facility. Approximately 213 kg of uranium from sodium-bonded metallic FFTF fuel was processed over a one year period with the equipment previously used for the processing of EBR-II used fuel. The peak burnup of the FFTF fuel ranged from 10 to 15 atom% for the 900+ chopped elements processed. Fifteen low-enriched uranium ingots were cast following the electrorefining and distillation operations to recover approximately 192 kg of uranium. A material balance on the primary fuel constituents, uranium and zirconium, during the FFTF campaign will be presented along with a brief description of operating parameters. Recoverable uranium during the pyroprocessing of FFTF nuclear fuel was greater than 95% while the purity of the final electrorefined uranium products exceeded 99%.

B.R. Westphal; G.L. Fredrickson; G.G. Galbreth; D. Vaden; M.D. Elliott; J.C. Price; E.M. Honeyfield; M.N. Patterson; L. A. Wurth

2013-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

215

Pyroprocessing of fast flux test facility nuclear fuel  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Used nuclear fuel from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) was recently transferred to the Idaho National Laboratory and processed by pyroprocessing in the Fuel Conditioning Facility. Approximately 213 kg of uranium from sodium-bonded metallic FFTF fuel was processed over a one year period with the equipment previously used for the processing of EBR-II used fuel. The peak burnup of the FFTF fuel ranged from 10 to 15 atom% for the 900+ chopped elements processed. Fifteen low-enriched uranium ingots were cast following the electrorefining and distillation operations to recover approximately 192 kg of uranium. A material balance on the primary fuel constituents, uranium and zirconium, during the FFTF campaign will be presented along with a brief description of operating parameters. Recoverable uranium during the pyroprocessing of FFTF nuclear fuel was greater than 95% while the purity of the final electro-refined uranium products exceeded 99%. (authors)

Westphal, B.R.; Wurth, L.A.; Fredrickson, G.L.; Galbreth, G.G.; Vaden, D.; Elliott, M.D.; Price, J.C.; Honeyfield, E.M.; Patterson, M.N. [Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID, 83415 (United States)

2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

216

EIS-0084: Incineration Facility for Radioactively Contaminated PCBs and Other Wastes, Oak Ridge, Tennessee  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Uranium Enrichment and Assessment prepared this statement to assess the environmental impacts of the construction and operation of the proposed Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, an incineration facility to dispose of radioactively contaminated polychlorinated biophenyls, as well as combustible waste from the Paducah, Portsmouth and Oak Ridge facilities.

217

Uranium industry annual 1994  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Uranium Industry Annual 1994 (UIA 1994) provides current statistical data on the US uranium industry`s activities relating to uranium raw materials and uranium marketing during that survey year. The UIA 1994 is prepared for use by the Congress, Federal and State agencies, the uranium and nuclear electric utility industries, and the public. It contains data for the 10-year period 1985 through 1994 as collected on the Form EIA-858, ``Uranium Industry Annual Survey.`` Data collected on the ``Uranium Industry Annual Survey`` (UIAS) provide a comprehensive statistical characterization of the industry`s activities for the survey year and also include some information about industry`s plans and commitments for the near-term future. Where aggregate data are presented in the UIA 1994, care has been taken to protect the confidentiality of company-specific information while still conveying accurate and complete statistical data. A feature article, ``Comparison of Uranium Mill Tailings Reclamation in the United States and Canada,`` is included in the UIA 1994. Data on uranium raw materials activities including exploration activities and expenditures, EIA-estimated resources and reserves, mine production of uranium, production of uranium concentrate, and industry employment are presented in Chapter 1. Data on uranium marketing activities, including purchases of uranium and enrichment services, and uranium inventories, enrichment feed deliveries (actual and projected), and unfilled market requirements are shown in Chapter 2.

NONE

1995-07-05T23:59:59.000Z

218

Detection of illicit HEU production in gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants using neutron counting techniques on product cylinders  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Innovative and novel safeguards approaches are needed for nuclear energy to meet global energy needs without the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. Part of these efforts will include creating verification techniques that can monitor uranium enrichment facilities for illicit production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU). Passive nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques will be critical in preventing illicit HEU production because NDA offers the possibility of continuous and unattended monitoring capabilities with limited impact on facility operations. Gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) are commonly used to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) for reactor fuel. In a GCEP, gaseous UF{sub 6} spins at high velocities in centrifuges to separate the molecules containing {sup 238}U from those containing the lighter {sup 235}U. Unfortunately, the process for creating LEU is inherently the same as HEU, creating a proliferation concern. Insuring that GCEPs are producing declared enrichments poses many difficult challenges. In a GCEP, large cascade halls operating thousands of centrifuges work together to enrich the uranium which makes effective monitoring of the cascade hall economically prohibitive and invasive to plant operations. However, the enriched uranium exiting the cascade hall fills product cylinders where the UF{sub 6} gas sublimes and condenses for easier storage and transportation. These product cylinders hold large quantities of enriched uranium, offering a strong signal for NDA measurement. Neutrons have a large penetrability through materials making their use advantageous compared to gamma techniques where the signal is easily attenuated. One proposed technique for detecting HEU production in a GCEP is using neutron coincidence counting at the product cylinder take off stations. This paper discusses findings from Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) code simulations that examine the feasibility of such a detector.

Freeman, Corey R [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Geist, William H [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

219

CURRENT STATUS AND RECLAMATION PLAN OF FORMER URANIUM MINING AND MILLING FACILITIES AT NINGYO-TOGE IN JAPAN  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) conducted research and development projects on uranium exploration in Japan from 1956 to 1987. Several mine facilities, such as waste rock yards and a mill tailing pond, were retained around Ningyo-toge after the projects ended. Although there is no legal issue in the mine in accordance with related law and agreements at present, JNC has a notion that it is important to reduce the burden of waste management on future generations. Thus, the Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering Center of JNC proposed a reclamation plan for these facilities with fundamental policy, an example of safety analysis and timetables. The plan has mainly three phases: Phase I is the planning stage, and this paper corresponds to this: Phase II is the stage to perform various tests for safety analysis and site designing: Phase III is the stage to accomplish measures. Preliminarily safety analyses suggested that our supposed cover designs for both waste rock and m ill tailing are enough to keep dose limit of 1mSv/y at site boundaries. The plan is primarily based on the Japanese Mine Safety Law, also refers to ICRP recommendations, IAEA reports, measures implemented overseas, etc. because this is the first case in Japan. For the accomplishment of this plan, it is important to establish a close relationship with local communities and governments, and to maintain a policy of open-to-public.

Sato, Kazuhiko; Tokizawa, Takayuki

2003-02-27T23:59:59.000Z

220

Enrichment Assay Methods for a UF6 Cylinder Verification Station  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility’s entire cylinder inventory. These enrichment assay methods interrogate only a small fraction of the total cylinder volume, and are time-consuming and expensive to execute for inspectors. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing an unattended measurement system capable of automated enrichment measurements over the full volume of Type 30B and Type 48 cylinders. This Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) could be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. The focus of this paper is the development of nondestructive assay (NDA) methods that combine “traditional” enrichment signatures (e.g. 185-keV emission from U-235) and more-penetrating “non-traditional” signatures (e.g. high-energy neutron-induced gamma rays spawned primarily from U-234 alpha emission) collected by medium-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers (i.e. sodium iodide or lanthanum bromide). The potential of these NDA methods for the automated assay of feed, tail and product cylinders is explored through MCNP modeling and with field measurements on a cylinder population ranging from 0.2% to 5% in U-235 enrichment.

Smith, Leon E.; Jordan, David V.; Misner, Alex C.; Mace, Emily K.; Orton, Christopher R.

2010-11-30T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


221

Proceedings of a workshop on uses of depleted uranium in storage, transportation and repository facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A workshop on the potential uses of depleted uranium (DU) in the repository was organized to coordinate the planning of future activities. The attendees, the original workshop objective and the agenda are provided in Appendices A, B and C. After some opening remarks and discussions, the objectives of the workshop were revised to: (1) exchange information and views on the status of the Department of Energy (DOE) activities related to repository design and planning; (2) exchange information on DU management and planning; (3) identify potential uses of DU in the storage, transportation, and disposal of high-level waste and spent fuel; and (4) define the future activities that would be needed if potential uses were to be further evaluated and developed. This summary of the workshop is intended to be an integrated resource for planning of any future work related to DU use in the repository. The synopsis of the first day`s presentations is provided in Appendix D. Copies of slides from each presenter are presented in Appendix E.

NONE

1997-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

222

Reduced-Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program: Environmental assessment  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The principal program objective and principal part of the proposed action is to improve the proliferation resistance of nuclear fuels used in research and test reactors by providing the technical means (through technical development, design, and testing) for reducing the uranium enrichment requirements of these fuels to substantially less than the 90 to 93% enrichment currently used. Operator acceptance of the reduced-enrichment-uranium (REU) fuel alternative will require minimizing of reactor performance reduction, fuel cycle cost increases, the number of new safety and licensing issues raised, and reactor and facility modifications. The other part of the proposed action is to assure the capability for commercial production and supply of REU fuel for use both in the US and abroad. The RERTR Program scope is limited to generic design studies, technical support to reactor operating organizations in preparing for conversions to REU fuels, fuel development, fuel demonstrations, and technical support for commercialization of REU fuels. This environmental assessment addresses the environmental consequences of RERTR Program activities and of specific conversions of typical reactors (the Ford Nuclear Reactor and one or two other to-be-designated demonstrations) to REU-fuel cycles, including domestic and international shipments of enriched uranium pertinent to the conduct of RERTR Program activities.

Not Available

1980-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

223

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory Site Report on the Production and Use of Recycled Uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Recent allegations regarding radiation exposure to radionuclides present in recycled uranium sent to the gaseous diffusion plants prompted the Department of Energy to undertake a system-wide study of recycled uranium. Of particular interest, were the flowpaths from site to site operations and facilities in which exposure to plutonium, neptunium and technetium could occur, and to the workers that could receive a significant radiation dose from handling recycled uranium. The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory site report is primarily concerned with two locations. Recycled uranium was produced at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant where highly enriched uranium was recovered from spent fuel. The other facility is the Specific Manufacturing Facility (SMC) where recycled, depleted uranium is manufactured into shapes for use by their customer. The SMC is a manufacturing facility that uses depleted uranium metal as a raw material that is then rolled and cut into shapes. There are no chemical processes that might concentrate any of the radioactive contaminant species. Recyclable depleted uranium from the SMC facility is sent to a private metallurgical facility for recasting. Analyses on the recast billets indicate that there is no change in the concentrations of transuranics as a result of the recasting process. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant was built to recover high-enriched uranium from spent nuclear fuel from test reactors. The facility processed diverse types of fuel which required uniquely different fuel dissolution processes. The dissolved fuel was passed through three cycles of solvent extraction which resulted in a concentrated uranyl nitrate product. For the first half of the operating period, the uranium was shipped as the concentrated solution. For the second half of the operating period the uranium solution was thermally converted to granular, uranium trioxide solids. The dose reconstruction project has evaluated work exposure and exposure to the public as the result of normal operations and accidents that occurred at the INEEL. As a result of these studies, the maximum effective dose equivalent from site activities did not exceed seventeen percent of the natural background in Eastern Idaho. There was no year in which the radiation dose to the public exceeded the applicable limits for that year. Worker exposure to recycled uranium was minimized by engineering features that reduced the possibility of direct exposure.

L. C. Lewis; D. C. Barg; C. L. Bendixsen; J. P. Henscheid; D. R. Wenzel; B. L. Denning

2000-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

224

Occupational exposures to uranium: processes, hazards, and regulations  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The United States Uranium Registry (USUR) was formed in 1978 to investigate potential hazards from occupational exposure to uranium and to assess the need for special health-related studies of uranium workers. This report provides a summary of Registry work done to date. The history of the uranium industry is outlined first, and the current commercial uranium industry (mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication) is described. This description includes information on basic processes and areas of greatest potential radiological exposure. In addition, inactive commercial facilities and other uranium operations are discussed. Regulation of the commercial production industry for uranium fuel is reported, including the historic development of regulations and the current regulatory agencies and procedures for each phase of the industry. A review of radiological health practices in the industry - facility monitoring, exposure control, exposure evaluation, and record-keeping - is presented. A discussion of the nonradiological hazards of the industry is provided, and the final section describes the tissue program developed as part of the Registry.

Stoetzel, G.A.; Fisher, D.R.; McCormack, W.D.; Hoenes, G.R.; Marks, S.; Moore, R.H.; Quilici, D.G.; Breitenstein, B.D.

1981-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

225

URANIUM MILLING ACTIVITIES AT SEQUOYAH FUELS CORPORATION  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (SFC) describes previous operations at its Gore, Oklahoma, uranium conversion facility as: (1) the recovery of uranium by concentration and purification processes; and (2) the conversion of concentrated and purified uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride (UF 6), or the reduction of depleted uranium tetrafluoride (UF 4) to UF 6. SFC contends that these

unknown authors

226

NNSA and Kazakhstan Complete Operation to Eliminate Highly Enriched...  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

Kazakhstan Complete Operation to Eliminate Highly Enriched Uranium | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the...

227

Enrichment Assay Methods Development for the Integrated Cylinder Verification System  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility's entire product-cylinder inventory. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing a concept to automate the verification of enrichment plant cylinders to enable 100 percent product-cylinder verification and potentially, mass-balance calculations on the facility as a whole (by also measuring feed and tails cylinders). The Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) could be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. The three main objectives of this FY09 project are summarized here and described in more detail in the report: (1) Develop a preliminary design for a prototype NDA system, (2) Refine PNNL's MCNP models of the NDA system, and (3) Procure and test key pulse-processing components. Progress against these tasks to date, and next steps, are discussed.

Smith, Leon E.; Misner, Alex C.; Hatchell, Brian K.; Curtis, Michael M.

2009-10-22T23:59:59.000Z

228

Standard test methods for chemical, mass spectrometric, spectrochemical, nuclear, and radiochemical analysis of uranium hexafluoride  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

1.1 These test methods cover procedures for subsampling and for chemical, mass spectrometric, spectrochemical, nuclear, and radiochemical analysis of uranium hexafluoride UF6. Most of these test methods are in routine use to determine conformance to UF6 specifications in the Enrichment and Conversion Facilities. 1.2 The analytical procedures in this document appear in the following order: Note 1—Subcommittee C26.05 will confer with C26.02 concerning the renumbered section in Test Methods C761 to determine how concerns with renumbering these sections, as analytical methods are replaced with stand-alone analytical methods, are best addressed in subsequent publications. Sections Subsampling of Uranium Hexafluoride 7 - 10 Gravimetric Determination of Uranium 11 - 19 Titrimetric Determination of Uranium 20 Preparation of High-Purity U3O 8 21 Isotopic Analysis 22 Isotopic Analysis by Double-Standard Mass-Spectrometer Method 23 - 29 Determination of Hydrocarbons, Chlorocarbons, and Partially Substitut...

American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

229

A Robust Infrastructure Design for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Unattended Online Enrichment Monitoring  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

An online enrichment monitor (OLEM) is being developed to continuously measure the relative isotopic composition of UF6 in the unit header pipes of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP). From a safeguards perspective, OLEM will provide early detection of a facility being misused for production of highly enriched uranium. OLEM may also reduce the number of samples collected for destructive assay and if coupled with load cell monitoring can provide isotope mass balance verification. The OLEM design includes power and network connections for continuous monitoring of the UF6 enrichment and state of health of the instrument. Monitoring the enrichment on all header pipes at a typical GCEP could require OLEM detectors on each of the product, tails, and feed header pipes. If there are eight process units, up to 24 detectors may be required at a modern GCEP. Distant locations, harsh industrial environments, and safeguards continuity of knowledge requirements all place certain demands on the network robustness and power reliability. This paper describes the infrastructure and architecture of an OLEM system based on OLEM collection nodes on the unit header pipes and power and network support nodes for groupings of the collection nodes. A redundant, self-healing communications network, distributed backup power, and a secure communications methodology. Two candidate technologies being considered for secure communications are the Object Linking and Embedding for Process Control Unified Architecture cross-platform, service-oriented architecture model for process control communications and the emerging IAEA Real-time And INtegrated STream-Oriented Remote Monitoring (RAINSTORM) framework to provide the common secure communication infrastructure for remote, unattended monitoring systems. The proposed infrastructure design offers modular, commercial components, plug-and-play extensibility for GCEP deployments, and is intended to meet the guidelines and requirements for unattended and remotely monitored safeguards systems.

Younkin, James R [ORNL; Rowe, Nathan C [ORNL; Garner, James R [ORNL

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

230

Determination of the 235U Mass and Enrichment within Small UF6 Cylinders via a Neutron Coincidence Well Counting System  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The construction of three new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States has sparked renewed interest in the development and enhancement of methods to determine the enrichment and fissile mass content of UF6 cylinders. We describe the design and examine the expected performance of a UF6 bottle counter developed for the assay of Type 5A cylinders. The counter, as designed and subsequently constructed, is a tall passive neutron well counter with a clam-shell configuration and graphite end plugs operated in fast neutron mode. Factory performance against expectation is described. The relatively high detection efficiency and effectively 4 detection geometry provide a near-ideal measurement configuration, making the UF6 bottle counter a valuable tool for the evaluation of the neutron coincidence approach to UF6 cylinder assay. The impacts of non-uniform filling, voids, enrichment, and mixed enrichments are examined

McElroy, Robert Dennis [ORNL; Croft, Dr. Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Young, Brian M [Canberra Industries, Inc., Meriden, CT; Venkataraman, Ram [Canberra Industries, Inc., Meriden, CT

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

231

Status Report on the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM) for UF6 Cylinder Assay  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) system being developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It was designed to determine {sup 235}U mass and enrichment of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) in product, feed, and tails cylinders (i.e., 30B and 48Y cylinders). These cylinders are found in the nuclear fuel cycle at uranium conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication facilities. The PNEM is a {sup 3}He-based neutron detection system that consists of two briefcase-sized detector pods. A photograph of the system during characterization at LANL is shown in Fig. 1. Several signatures are currently being studied to determine the most effective measurement and data reduction technique for unfolding {sup 235}U mass and enrichment. The system collects total neutron and coincidence data for both bare and cadmium-covered detector pods. The measurement concept grew out of the success of the Uranium Cylinder Assay System (UCAS), which is an operator system at Rokkasho Enrichment Plant (REP) that uses total neutron counting to determine {sup 235}U mass in UF{sub 6} cylinders. The PNEM system was designed with higher efficiency than the UCAS in order to add coincidence counting functionality for the enrichment determination. A photograph of the UCAS with a 48Y cylinder at REP is shown in Fig. 2, and the calibration measurement data for 30B product and 48Y feed and tails cylinders is shown in Fig. 3. The data was collected in a low-background environment, meaning there is very little scatter in the data. The PNEM measurement concept was first presented at the 2010 Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Annual Meeting. The physics design and uncertainty analysis were presented at the 2010 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Symposium, and the mechanical and electrical designs and characterization measurements were published in the ESARDA Bulletin in 2011.

Miller, Karen A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-05-02T23:59:59.000Z

232

Decommissioning the UHTREX Reactor Facility at Los Alamos, New Mexico  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Ultra-High Temperature Reactor Experiment (UHTREX) facility was constructed in the late 1960s to advance high-temperature and gas-cooled reactor technology. The 3-MW reactor was graphite moderated and helium cooled and used 93% enriched uranium as its fuel. The reactor was run for approximately one year and was shut down in February 1970. The decommissioning of the facility involved removing the reactor and its associated components. This document details planning for the decommissioning operations which included characterizing the facility, estimating the costs of decommissioning, preparing environmental documentation, establishing a system to track costs and work progress, and preplanning to correct health and safety concerns in the facility. Work to decommission the facility began in 1988 and was completed in September 1990 at a cost of $2.9 million. The facility was released to Department of Energy for other uses in its Los Alamos program.

Salazar, M.; Elder, J.

1992-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

233

Implementation of conduct of operations at Paducah uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) sampling and transfer facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This paper describes the initial planning and actual field activities associated with the implementation of {open_quotes}Conduct of Operations{close_quotes}. Conduct of Operations is an operating philosophy that was developed through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Conduct of Operations covers many operating practices and is intended to provide formality and discipline to all aspects of plant operation. The implementation of these operating principles at the UF{sub 6} Sampling and Transfer Facility resulted in significant improvements in facility operations.

Penrod, S.R. [Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., KY (United States)

1991-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

234

Implementation of conduct of operations at Paducah uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) sampling and transfer facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This paper describes the initial planning and actual field activities associated with the implementation of {open_quotes}Conduct of Operations{close_quotes}, Conduct of Operations is an operating philosophy that was developed through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Conduct of Operations covers many operating practices and is intended to provide formality and discipline to all aspects of plant operation. The implementation of these operating principles at the UF{sub 6} Sampling and Transfer Facility resulted in significant improvements in facility operations.

Penrod, S.R. [Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., KY (United States)

1991-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

235

Transient analysis for the tajoura critical facility with IRT-2M HEU fuel and IRT-4M leu fuel : ANL independent verification results.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Calculations have been performed for postulated transients in the Critical Facility at the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in Libya. These calculations have been performed at the request of staff of the Renewable Energy and Water Desalinization Research Center (REWDRC) who are performing similar calculations. The transients considered were established during a working meeting between ANL and REWDRC staff on October 1-2, 2005 and subsequent email correspondence. Calculations were performed for the current high-enriched uranium (HEU) core and the proposed low-enriched uranium (LEU) core. These calculations have been performed independently from those being performed by REWDRC and serve as one step in the verification process.

Garner, P. L.; Hanan, N. A.

2005-12-02T23:59:59.000Z

236

Biological assessment of the effects of construction and operation of a depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion facility at the Paducah, Kentucky, site.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF{sub 6}) Management Program evaluated alternatives for managing its inventory of DUF{sub 6} and issued the ''Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride'' (DUF{sub 6} PEIS) in April 1999 (DOE 1999). The DUF{sub 6} inventory is stored in cylinders at three DOE sites: Paducah, Kentucky; Portsmouth, Ohio; and East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In the Record of Decision for the DUF{sub 6} PEIS, DOE stated its decision to promptly convert the DUF6 inventory to a more stable chemical form. Subsequently, the U.S. Congress passed, and the President signed, the ''2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States'' (Public Law No. 107-206). This law stipulated in part that, within 30 days of enactment, DOE must award a contract for the design, construction, and operation of a DUF{sub 6} conversion plant at the Department's Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, sites, and for the shipment of DUF{sub 6} cylinders stored at ETTP to the Portsmouth site for conversion. This biological assessment (BA) has been prepared by DOE, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act of 1974, to evaluate potential impacts to federally listed species from the construction and operation of a conversion facility at the DOE Paducah site.

Van Lonkhuyzen, R.

2005-09-09T23:59:59.000Z

237

Safety Evaluation Report for the Claiborne Enrichment Center, Homer, Louisiana (Docket No. 70-3070)  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report documents the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff review and safety evaluation of the Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (LES, the applicant) application for a license to possess and use byproduct, source, and special nuclear material and to enrich natural uranium to a maximum of 5 percent U-235 by the gas centrifuge process. The plant, to be known as the Claiborne Enrichment Center (CEC), would be constructed near the town of Homer in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana. At full production in a given year, the plant will receive approximately 4,700 tonnes of feed UF{sub 6} and produce 870 tonnes of low-enriched UF{sub 6}, and 3,830 tonnes of depleted UF{sub 6} tails. Facility construction, operation, and decommissioning are expected to last 5, 30, and 7 years, respectively. The objective of the review is to evaluate the potential adverse impacts of operation of the facility on worker and public health and safety under both normal operating and accident conditions. The review also considers the management organization, administrative programs, and financial qualifications provided to assure safe design and operation of the facility. The NRC staff concludes that the applicant`s descriptions, specifications, and analyses provide an adequate basis for safety review of facility operations and that construction and operation of the facility does not pose an undue risk to public health and safety.

Not Available

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

238

From the Lab to the real world : sources of error in UF {sub 6} gas enrichment monitoring  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities is a serious concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards methods have changed over the years, most recently switching to an improved safeguards model that calls for new technologies to help keep up with the increasing size and complexity of today’s gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). One of the primary goals of the IAEA is to detect the production of uranium at levels greater than those an enrichment facility may have declared. In order to accomplish this goal, new enrichment monitors need to be as accurate as possible. This dissertation will look at the Advanced Enrichment Monitor (AEM), a new enrichment monitor designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Specifically explored are various factors that could potentially contribute to errors in a final enrichment determination delivered by the AEM. There are many factors that can cause errors in the determination of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) gas enrichment, especially during the period when the enrichment is being measured in an operating GCEP. To measure enrichment using the AEM, a passive 186-keV (kiloelectronvolt) measurement is used to determine the {sup 235}U content in the gas, and a transmission measurement or a gas pressure reading is used to determine the total uranium content. A transmission spectrum is generated using an x-ray tube and a “notch” filter. In this dissertation, changes that could occur in the detection efficiency and the transmission errors that could result from variations in pipe-wall thickness will be explored. Additional factors that could contribute to errors in enrichment measurement will also be examined, including changes in the gas pressure, ambient and UF{sub 6} temperature, instrumental errors, and the effects of uranium deposits on the inside of the pipe walls will be considered. The sensitivity of the enrichment calculation to these various parameters will then be evaluated. Previously, UF{sub 6} gas enrichment monitors have required empty pipe measurements to accurately determine the pipe attenuation (the pipe attenuation is typically much larger than the attenuation in the gas). This dissertation reports on a method for determining the thickness of a pipe in a GCEP when obtaining an empty pipe measurement may not be feasible. This dissertation studies each of the components that may add to the final error in the enrichment measurement, and the factors that were taken into account to mitigate these issues are also detailed and tested. The use of an x-ray generator as a transmission source and the attending stability issues are addressed. Both analytical calculations and experimental measurements have been used. For completeness, some real-world analysis results from the URENCO Capenhurst enrichment plant have been included, where the final enrichment error has remained well below 1% for approximately two months.

Lombardi, Marcie L.

2012-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

239

Recovery and Blend-Down Uranium for Beneficial use in Commercial Reactors - 13373  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

In April 2001 the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) signed an Interagency Agreement to transfer approximately 33 MT of off-specification (off-spec) highly enriched uranium (HEU) from DOE to TVA for conversion to commercial reactor fuel. Since that time additional surplus off-spec HEU material has been added to the program, making the total approximately 46 MT off-spec HEU. The disposition path for approximately half (23 MT) of this 46 MT of surplus HEU material, was down blending through the H-canyon facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The HEU is purified through the H-canyon processes, and then blended with natural uranium (NU) to form low enriched uranium (LEU) solution with a 4.95% U-235 isotopic content. This material was then transported to a TVA subcontractor who converted the solution to uranium oxide and then fabricated into commercial light water reactor (LWR) fuel. This fuel is now powering TVA reactors and supplying electricity to approximately 1 million households in the TVA region. There is still in excess of approximately 10 to 14 MT of off-spec HEU throughout the DOE complex or future foreign and domestic research reactor returns that could be recovered and down blended for use in either currently designed light water reactors, ?5% enriched LEU, or be made available for use in subsequent advanced 'fast' reactor fuel designs, ?19% LEU. (authors)

Magoulas, Virginia [Savannah River National Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC 29808 (United States)] [Savannah River National Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC 29808 (United States)

2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

240

Certification of U.S. instrumentation in Russian nuclear processing facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Agreements between the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (R.F.) require the down-blending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian Federation nuclear weapons. The Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) was jointly developed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to continuously monitor the enrichments and flow rates in the HEU blending operations at the R.F. facilities. A significant requirement of the implementation of the BDMS equipment in R.F. facilities concerned the certification of the BDMS equipment for use in a Russian nuclear facility. This paper discusses the certification of the BDMS for installation in R.F. facilities, and summarizes the lessons learned from the process that can be applied to the installation of other U.S. equipment in Russian nuclear facilities.

D.H. Powell; J.N. Sumner

2000-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


241

Enhancing Staging Capabilities at the Device Assembly Facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The radioactive material limits allowed by the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Device Assembly Facility (DAF) can support larger quantities than the floor space will accommodate. In order to maximize the full staging bunker capability, National Security Technologies, LLC, (NSTec) is developing a plan to take advantage of these high inventory limits and evaluate staging options such as shelves, racks, and mezzanines. This plan will investigate cost and evaluate U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex-wide alternatives used at other sites (Highly Enriched Uranium Manufacturing Facility, Pantex, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, etc.) that addressed similar situations.

Kanning, R. A.; Long, R. G.; Garcia, B. O.; Williams, V. D.

2013-06-08T23:59:59.000Z

242

Secretary Chu, HEUMF and Dr. Chris Keim - Or: History continues with Highly Enriched Uranium facility (title as it appeared in The Oak Ridger)  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr MayAtmosphericNuclear Security Administrationcontroller systemsBi (2) Sr (2)ScienceScientistsON THE5,to Visit PantexforChu, HEUMF

243

Uranium industry annual 1993  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Uranium production in the United States has declined dramatically from a peak of 43.7 million pounds U{sub 3}O{sub 8} (16.8 thousand metric tons uranium (U)) in 1980 to 3.1 million pounds U{sub 3}O{sub 8} (1.2 thousand metric tons U) in 1993. This decline is attributed to the world uranium market experiencing oversupply and intense competition. Large inventories of uranium accumulated when optimistic forecasts for growth in nuclear power generation were not realized. The other factor which is affecting U.S. uranium production is that some other countries, notably Australia and Canada, possess higher quality uranium reserves that can be mined at lower costs than those of the United States. Realizing its competitive advantage, Canada was the world`s largest producer in 1993 with an output of 23.9 million pounds U{sub 3}O{sub 8} (9.2 thousand metric tons U). The U.S. uranium industry, responding to over a decade of declining market prices, has downsized and adopted less costly and more efficient production methods. The main result has been a suspension of production from conventional mines and mills. Since mid-1992, only nonconventional production facilities, chiefly in situ leach (ISL) mining and byproduct recovery, have operated in the United States. In contrast, nonconventional sources provided only 13 percent of the uranium produced in 1980. ISL mining has developed into the most cost efficient and environmentally acceptable method for producing uranium in the United States. The process, also known as solution mining, differs from conventional mining in that solutions are used to recover uranium from the ground without excavating the ore and generating associated solid waste. This article describes the current ISL Yang technology and its regulatory approval process, and provides an analysis of the factors favoring ISL mining over conventional methods in a declining uranium market.

Not Available

1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

244

India's Worsening Uranium Shortage  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

As a result of NSG restrictions, India cannot import the natural uranium required to fuel its Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs); consequently, it is forced to rely on the expediency of domestic uranium production. However, domestic production from mines and byproduct sources has not kept pace with demand from commercial reactors. This shortage has been officially confirmed by the Indian Planning Commission’s Mid-Term Appraisal of the country’s current Five Year Plan. The report stresses that as a result of the uranium shortage, Indian PHWR load factors have been continually decreasing. The Uranium Corporation of India Ltd (UCIL) operates a number of underground mines in the Singhbhum Shear Zone of Jharkhand, and it is all processed at a single mill in Jaduguda. UCIL is attempting to aggrandize operations by establishing new mines and mills in other states, but the requisite permit-gathering and development time will defer production until at least 2009. A significant portion of India’s uranium comes from byproduct sources, but a number of these are derived from accumulated stores that are nearing exhaustion. A current maximum estimate of indigenous uranium production is 430t/yr (230t from mines and 200t from byproduct sources); whereas, the current uranium requirement for Indian PHWRs is 455t/yr (depending on plant capacity factor). This deficit is exacerbated by the additional requirements of the Indian weapons program. Present power generation capacity of Indian nuclear plants is 4350 MWe. The power generation target set by the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is 20,000 MWe by the year 2020. It is expected that around half of this total will be provided by PHWRs using indigenously supplied uranium with the bulk of the remainder provided by breeder reactors or pressurized water reactors using imported low-enriched uranium.

Curtis, Michael M.

2007-01-15T23:59:59.000Z

245

Biological assessment of the effects of construction and operation of adepleted uranium hexafluoride conversion facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio,site.  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF{sub 6}) Management Program evaluated alternatives for managing its inventory of DUF{sub 6} and issued the ''Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride'' (DUF{sub 6} PEIS) in April 1999 (DOE 1999). The DUF{sub 6} inventory is stored in cylinders at three DOE sites: Paducah, Kentucky; Portsmouth, Ohio; and East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. In the Record of Decision for the DUF{sub 6} PEIS, DOE stated its decision to promptly convert the DUF{sub 6} inventory to a more stable chemical form. Subsequently, the U.S. Congress passed, and the President signed, the ''2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States'' (Public Law No. 107-206). This law stipulated in part that, within 30 days of enactment, DOE must award a contract for the design, construction, and operation of a DUF{sub 6} conversion plant at the Department's Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, sites, and for the shipment of DUF{sub 6} cylinders stored at ETTP to the Portsmouth site for conversion. This biological assessment (BA) has been prepared by DOE, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Endangered Species Act of 1974, to evaluate potential impacts to federally listed species from the construction and operation of a conversion facility at the DOE Portsmouth site. The Indiana bat is known to occur in the area of the Portsmouth site and may potentially occur on the site during spring or summer. Evaluations of the Portsmouth site indicated that most of the site was found to have poor summer habitat for the Indiana bat because of the small size, isolation, and insufficient maturity of the few woodlands on the site. Potential summer habitat for the Indiana bat was identified outside the developed area bounded by Perimeter Road, within the corridors along Little Beaver Creek, the Northwest Tributary stream, and a wooded area east of the X-100 facility. However, no Indiana bats were collected during surveys of these areas in 1994 and 1996. Locations A, B, and C do not support suitable habitat for the Indiana bat and would be unlikely to be used by Indiana bats. Indiana bat habitat also does not occur at Proposed Areas 1 and 2. Although Locations A and C contain small wooded areas, the small size and lack of suitable maturity of these areas indicate that they would provide poor habitat for Indiana bats. Trees that may be removed during construction would not be expected to be used for summer roosting by Indiana bats. Disturbance of Indiana bats potentially roosting or foraging in the vicinity of the facility during operations would be very unlikely, and any disturbance would be expected to be negligible. On the basis of these considerations, DOE concludes that the proposed action is not likely to adversely affect the Indiana bat. No critical habitat exists for this species in the action area. Although the timber rattlesnake occurs in the vicinity of the Portsmouth site, it has not been observed on the site. In addition, habitat for the timber rattlesnake is not present on the Portsmouth site. Therefore, DOE concludes that the proposed action would not affect the timber rattlesnake.

Van Lonkhuyzen, R.

2005-09-09T23:59:59.000Z

246

EIS-0360: Depleted Uranium Oxide Conversion Product at the Portsmouth, Ohio Site  

Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

This site-specific EIS analyzes the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning of the proposed depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF6) conversion facility at three alternative locations within the Paducah site; transportation of all cylinders (DUF6, enriched, and empty) currently stored at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to Portsmouth; construction of a new cylinder storage yard at Portsmouth (if required) for ETTP cylinders; transportation of depleted uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility; transportation and sale of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) produced as a conversion coproduct; and neutralization of HF to calcium fluoride and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold.

247

Microbial Janitors: Enabling natural microbes to clean up uranium contamination  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Microbial Janitors: Enabling natural microbes to clean up uranium contamination Oak Ridge to the development of the atomic bomb. Uranium enrichment activities on the Oak Ridge Reservation in the 1940s until then the uranium and nitrate contamination has spread through the ground and now covers an area of about 7 km

248

Developing a classroom science enrichment programme for gifted primary school boys in Saudi Arabia.  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

??Enrichment is one of the important educational facilities that are provided for gifted students. However, the research on gifted enrichment programmes still requires further exploration… (more)

Alarfaj, Abdulhamid

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

249

Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

project, The impacts from normal (accident-free) transportation, inclu- ding handling and air pollution would be about 1,9x10-2 fatalities. The combined impact for the total...

250

Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

dose calculated by GENH. Latent cancer fatalities were calculated by applying this dose to all workers assuming that they are located 1,000 m away (or at the site bounda if...

251

Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

fuel or the blending of HEU to LEU as metal. Under dl blending dtematives, the maximum radiation dose to the maximy exposed individual of the public is 2.0 millirem (mrem)...

252

Uranium Mining, Conversion, and Enrichment Industries  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "ofEarly Career Scientists' Research Petroleum ReserveDepartment ofEnergy,Potomac RiverNiketa KumarUraniumi

253

Heterogeneous modeling of the uranium in situ recovery: Kinetic versus solubility Jrmy. Nosa,1, 2  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Heterogeneous modeling of the uranium in situ recovery: Kinetic versus solubility control Jérémy Mines, Tour AREVA, 1 place Jean Millier, 92084 Paris La Défense Cedex, France The uranium in situ, into the deposit to selectively dissolve uranium. The solution enriched in uranium is pumped out and processed

Boyer, Edmond

254

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.

Hase, Kevin R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hawkins Erpenbeck, Heather [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

255

Proceedings of the 1988 International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The international effort to develop and implement new research reactor fuels utilizing low-enriched uranium, instead of highly- enriched uranium, continues to make solid progress. This effort is the cornerstone of a widely shared policy aimed at reducing, and possibly eliminating, international traffic in highly-enriched uranium and the nuclear weapon proliferation concerns associated with this traffic. To foster direct communication and exchange of ideas among the specialists in this area, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program, at Argonne National Laboratory, sponsored this meeting as the eleventh of a series which began 1978. Individual papers presented at the meeting have been cataloged separately.

Not Available

1993-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

256

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Metal blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Blending HEU (highly enriched uranium) with less-enriched uranium to form LEU has been proposed as a disposition option. Five technologies are being assessed for blending HEU. This document provides data to be used in environmental impact analysis for the HEU-LEU disposition option that uses metal blending with an oxide waste product. It is divided into: mission and assumptions, conversion and blending facility descriptions, process descriptions and requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards discussion, and intersite transportation.

NONE

1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

257

Uranium hexafluoride handling. Proceedings  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The United States Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Field Office, and Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., are co-sponsoring this Second International Conference on Uranium Hexafluoride Handling. The conference is offered as a forum for the exchange of information and concepts regarding the technical and regulatory issues and the safety aspects which relate to the handling of uranium hexafluoride. Through the papers presented here, we attempt not only to share technological advances and lessons learned, but also to demonstrate that we are concerned about the health and safety of our workers and the public, and are good stewards of the environment in which we all work and live. These proceedings are a compilation of the work of many experts in that phase of world-wide industry which comprises the nuclear fuel cycle. Their experience spans the entire range over which uranium hexafluoride is involved in the fuel cycle, from the production of UF{sub 6} from the naturally-occurring oxide to its re-conversion to oxide for reactor fuels. The papers furnish insights into the chemical, physical, and nuclear properties of uranium hexafluoride as they influence its transport, storage, and the design and operation of plant-scale facilities for production, processing, and conversion to oxide. The papers demonstrate, in an industry often cited for its excellent safety record, continuing efforts to further improve safety in all areas of handling uranium hexafluoride. Selected papers were processed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database.

Not Available

1991-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

258

Scrap uranium recycling via electron beam melting  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A program is underway at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to recycle scrap uranium metal. Currently, much of the material from forging and machining processes is considered radioactive waste and is disposed of by oxidation and encapsulation at significant cost. In the recycling process, uranium and uranium alloys in various forms will be processed by electron beam melting and continuously cast into ingots meeting applicable specifications for virgin material. Existing vacuum processing facilities at LLNL are in compliance with all current federal and state environmental, safety and health regulations for the electron beam melting and vaporization of uranium metal. One of these facilities has been retrofitted with an auxiliary electron beam gun system, water-cooled hearth, crucible and ingot puller to create an electron beam melt furnace. In this furnace, basic process R&D on uranium recycling will be performed with the goal of eventual transfer of this technology to a production facility.

McKoon, R.

1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

259

Determination of the Relative Amount of Fluorine in Uranium Oxyfluoride Particles using Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry and Optical Spectroscopy  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Both nuclear forensics and environmental sampling depend upon laboratory analysis of nuclear material that has often been exposed to the environment after it has been produced. It is therefore important to understand how those environmental conditions might have changed the chemical composition of the material over time, particularly for chemically sensitive compounds. In the specific case of uranium enrichment facilities, uranium-bearing particles stem from small releases of uranium hexafluoride, a highly reactive gas that hydrolyzes upon contact with moisture from the air to form uranium oxyfluoride (UO{sub 2}F{sub 2}) particles. The uranium isotopic composition of those particles is used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify whether a facility is compliant with its declarations. The present study, however, aims to demonstrate how knowledge of time-dependent changes in chemical composition, particle morphology and molecular structure can contribute to an even more reliable interpretation of the analytical results. We prepared a set of uranium oxyfluoride particles at the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM, European Commission, Belgium) and followed changes in their composition, morphology and structure with time to see if we could use these properties to place boundaries on the particle exposure time in the environment. Because the rate of change is affected by exposure to UV-light, humidity levels and elevated temperatures, the samples were subjected to varying conditions of those three parameters. The NanoSIMS at LLNL was found to be the optimal tool to measure the relative amount of fluorine in individual uranium oxyfluoride particles. At PNNL, cryogenic laser-induced time-resolved U(VI) fluorescence microspectroscopy (CLIFS) was used to monitor changes in the molecular structure.

Kips, R; Kristo, M J; Hutcheon, I D; Amonette, J; Wang, Z; Johnson, T; Gerlach, D; Olsen, K B

2009-05-29T23:59:59.000Z

260

Composition of the U.S. DOE Depleted Uranium Inventory  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

about 2.75 wt% U-235. For further enrichment, the material was shipped to the Oak Ridge and Portsmouth plants. In addition to natural uranium, also uranium recycled from spent fuel was fed into the Paducah enrichment cascade (Table 2 and Fig. 2). The recycled uranium introduced various isotopes not found in natural uranium into the cascade: fission products, such as Technetium-99; transuranics, such as Neptunium-237 and Plutonium-239; and the artificial uranium isotope of Uranium-236. The spent fuel, from which uranium was recycled, originated from the Hanford and Savannah River military plutonium production reactors. This uranium was recycled, although its assay of U-235 was somewhat lower than in natural uranium (Table 2). This obviously must be seen in the context of the Cold War era, when uranium was a scarce resource. Due to the low burn-up of the military reactors, concentrations of artificial U-236 are comparatively low in this recycled uranium. The recycled uranium represents

Concentration Of Less

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


261

Uranium from seawater  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A novel process for recovering uranium from seawater is proposed and some of the critical technical parameters are evaluated. The process, in summary, consists of two different options for contacting adsorbant pellets with seawater without pumping the seawater. It is expected that this will reduce the mass handling requirements, compared to pumped seawater systems, by a factor of approximately 10/sup 5/, which should also result in a large reduction in initial capital investment. Activated carbon, possibly in combination with a small amount of dissolved titanium hydroxide, is expected to be the preferred adsorbant material instead of the commonly assumed titanium hydroxide alone. The activated carbon, after exposure to seawater, can be stripped of uranium with an appropriate eluant (probably an acid) or can be burned for its heating value (possible in a power plant) leaving the uranium further enriched in its ash. The uranium, representing about 1% of the ash, is then a rich ore and would be recovered in a conventional manner. Experimental results have indicated that activated carbon, acting alone, is not adequately effective in adsorbing the uranium from seawater. We measured partition coefficients (concentration ratios) of approximately 10/sup 3/ in seawater instead of the reported values of 10/sup 5/. However, preliminary tests carried out in fresh water show considerable promise for an extraction system that uses a combination of dissolved titanium hydroxide (in minute amounts) which forms an insoluble compound with the uranyl ion, and the insoluble compound then being sorbed out on activated carbon. Such a system showed partition coefficients in excess of 10/sup 5/ in fresh water. However, the system was not tested in seawater.

Gregg, D.; Folkendt, M.

1982-09-21T23:59:59.000Z

262

The ultimate disposition of depleted uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Depleted uranium (DU) is produced as a by-product of the uranium enrichment process. Over 340,000 MTU of DU in the form of UF{sub 6} have been accumulated at the US government gaseous diffusion plants and the stockpile continues to grow. An overview of issues and objectives associated with the inventory management and the ultimate disposition of this material is presented.

Lemons, T.R. [Uranium Enrichment Organization, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

1991-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

263

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES AT SAVANNAH RIVER SITE'S H CANYON FACILITY  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Savannah River Site's (SRS) H Canyon Facility is the only large scale, heavily shielded, nuclear chemical separations plant still in operation in the U.S. The facility's operations historically recovered uranium-235 (U-235) and neptunium-237 (Np-237) from aluminum-clad, enriched-uranium fuel tubes from Site nuclear reactors and other domestic and foreign research reactors. Today the facility, in conjunction with HB Line, is working to provide the initial feed material to the Mixed Oxide Facility also located on SRS. Many additional campaigns are also in the planning process. Furthermore, the facility has started to integrate collaborative research and development (R&D) projects into its schedule. H Canyon can serve as the appropriate testing location for many technologies focused on monitoring the back end of the fuel cycle, due to the nature of the facility and continued operation. H Canyon, in collaboration with the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), has been working with several groups in the DOE complex to conduct testing demonstrations of novel technologies at the facility. The purpose of conducting these demonstrations at H Canyon will be to demonstrate the capabilities of the emerging technologies in an operational environment. This paper will summarize R&D testing activities currently taking place in H Canyon and discuss the possibilities for future collaborations.

Sexton, L.; Fuller, Kenneth

2013-07-09T23:59:59.000Z

264

Uranium industry annual 1997  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report provides statistical data on the U.S. uranium industry`s activities relating to uranium raw materials and uranium marketing.

NONE

1998-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

265

URANIUM IN ALKALINE ROCKS  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Greenland," in Uranium Exploration Geology, Int. AtomicOklahoma," 1977 Nure Geology Uranium Symposium, Igneous HostMcNeil, M. , 1977. "Geology of Brazil's Uranium and Thorium

Murphy, M.

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

266

A Robust and Flexible Design for GCEP Unattended Online Enrichment Monitoring: An OLEM Collection Node Network  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Oak Ridge National Laoratory (ORNL) has engineered an on-line enrichment monitor (OLEM) to continuously measure U-235 emissions from the UF6 gas flowing through a unit header pipe of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) as a component of the International Atomic Energy Agency s (IAEA) new generation of technology to support enrichment plant safeguards1. In contrast to other enrichment monitoring approaches, OLEM calibrates and corrects for the pressure and temperature dependent UF6 gas-density without external radiation sources by using the inherent unit header pipe pressure dynamics and combining U-235 gamma-ray spectrometery using a shielded NaI detector with gas pressure and temperature data near the spectrum measurement point to obtain the enrichment of the gas as a function of time. From a safeguards perspective, OLEM can provide early detection of a GCEP being misused for production of highly enriched uranium, but would not detect directly the isolation and use of a cascade within the production unit to produce HEU. OLEM may also reduce the number of samples collected for destructive assay and, if coupled with load cell monitoring, could support isotope mass balance verification and unattended cylinder verification. The earlier paper presented OLEM as one component along with shared load cells and unattended cylinder verification, in the IAEA emering toolbox for unattended instruments at GCEPs1 and described the OLEM concept and how previous modeling studies and field measurements helped confirm the viability of a passive on-line enrichment monitor for meeting IAEA objectives and to support the development of performance targets. Phase I of the United States Support Program (USSP) OLEM project completed a preliminary hardware, software and communications design; phase II will build and test field prototypes in controlled laboratory settings and then at an operational facility. That paper also discussed many of the OLEM collection node commercial off the shelf (COTS) components and summarized the OLEM collection node data security provisions. This paper will discuss a secure and redundant network of OLEM collection nodes, auxiliary detection units and supporting junction boxes distributed throughout a facility for monitoring enrichment on product, feed and tails unit header pipes; the purpose and capability of the built-in Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS) network gateway; and a network approach for obtaining reliable and authenticated pressure measurements.

Younkin, James R [ORNL] [ORNL; March-Leuba, Jose A [ORNL] [ORNL; Garner, James R [ORNL] [ORNL

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

267

Student Science Enrichment Training Program  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Funds are requested for the science enrichment training program (emphasis on chemistry and computer science), which will be held at Claflin College during the 1990 and 1991 summers, concomitant with summer school. The thirty participants will include high school students and some college freshmen; the students will come from rural South Carolina schools with limited science and computer facilities. Focus will be on high ability minority students.

Sandhu, S.S.

1990-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

268

Y-12 Uranium Exposure Study  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Following the recent restart of operations at the Y-12 Plant, the Radiological Control Organization (RCO) observed that the enriched uranium exposures appeared to involve insoluble rather than soluble uranium that presumably characterized most earlier Y-12 operations. These observations necessitated changes in the bioassay program, particularly the need for routine fecal sampling. In addition, it was not reasonable to interpret the bioassay data using metabolic parameter values established during earlier Y-12 operations. Thus, the recent urinary and fecal bioassay data were interpreted using the default guidance in Publication 54 of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP); that is, inhalation of Class Y uranium with an activity median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) of 1 {micro}m. Faced with apparently new workplace conditions, these actions were appropriate and ensured a cautionary approach to worker protection. As additional bioassay data were accumulated, it became apparent that the data were not consistent with Publication 54. Therefore, this study was undertaken to examine the situation.

Eckerman, K.F.; Kerr, G.D.

1999-08-05T23:59:59.000Z

269

The geochemistry of uranium in the Orca Basin  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

no uranium enrichment, with concentrations ranging from 2. 1 to 4. gppm, reflective of normal Gulf of Mexico sediments. This is the result of two dominant processes operating within the basin. First, the sharp pycnocline at the brine/seawater interface... . . . . . . . . , . . . , 37 xi Figure Page 16 Ores Basin Seismic Reflection Profile A 40 17 Ores Basin Seismic Reflection Profile B 42 18 Proposed Mechanism of Uranium Uptake in the Atlantis II Deep 59 INTRODUCTION Economic Status of Uranium in the United States...

Weber, Frederick Fewell

1979-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

270

Enclosure 1 -CCP-AK-INL-004, Table 5-2 (1 page) Table 5-2. Isotopic Compositions of Rocky Flats Plutonium and Uranium  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Flats Plutonium and Uranium Weapons-Grade Plutonium Enriched Uranium Depleted Uranium Plutonium-238 0.01 ­ 0.05% Uranium-234 0.1 ­ 1.02% Uranium-234 0.0006% Plutonium-239 92.8 ­ 94.4% Uranium-235 90 ­ 94% Uranium-235 0.2 ­ 0.3% Plutonium-240 4.85 ­ 6.5% Uranium-236 0.4 ­ 0.5% Uranium-238 99.7 ­ 99.8% Plutonium

271

Evapotranspiration And Geochemical Controls On Groundwater Plumes At Arid Sites: Toward Innovative Alternate End-States For Uranium Processing And Tailings Facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Management of legacy tailings/waste and groundwater contamination are ongoing at the former uranium milling site in Tuba City AZ. The tailings have been consolidated and effectively isolated using an engineered cover system. For the existing groundwater plume, a system of recovery wells extracts contaminated groundwater for treatment using an advanced distillation process. The ten years of pump and treat (P&T) operations have had minimal impact on the contaminant plume – primarily due to geochemical and hydrological limits. A flow net analysis demonstrates that groundwater contamination beneath the former processing site flows in the uppermost portion of the aquifer and exits the groundwater as the plume transits into and beneath a lower terrace in the landscape. The evaluation indicates that contaminated water will not reach Moenkopi Wash, a locally important stream. Instead, shallow groundwater in arid settings such as Tuba City is transferred into the vadose zone and atmosphere via evaporation, transpiration and diffuse seepage. The dissolved constituents are projected to precipitate and accumulate as minerals such as calcite and gypsum in the deep vadose zone (near the capillary fringe), around the roots of phreatophyte plants, and near seeps. The natural hydrologic and geochemical controls common in arid environments such as Tuba City work together to limit the size of the groundwater plume, to naturally attenuate and detoxify groundwater contaminants, and to reduce risks to humans, livestock and the environment. The technical evaluation supports an alternative beneficial reuse (“brownfield”) scenario for Tuba City. This alternative approach would have low risks, similar to the current P&T scenario, but would eliminate the energy and expense associated with the active treatment and convert the former uranium processing site into a resource for future employment of local citizens and ongoing benefit to the Native American Nations.

Looney, Brian B.; Denham, Miles E.; Eddy-Dilek, Carol A.; Millings, Margaret R.; Kautsky, Mark

2014-01-08T23:59:59.000Z

272

Refurbishment of uranium hexafluoride cylinder storage yards C-745-K, L, M, N, and P and construction of a new uranium hexafluoride cylinder storage yard (C-745-T) at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Kentucky  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) is a uranium enrichment facility owned by the US Department of Energy (DOE). A residual of the uranium enrichment process is depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Depleted UF6, a solid at ambient temperature, is stored in 32,200 steel cylinders that hold a maximum of 14 tons each. Storage conditions are suboptimal and have resulted in accelerated corrosion of cylinders, increasing the potential for a release of hazardous substances. Consequently, the DOE is proposing refurbishment of certain existing yards and construction of a new storage yard. This environmental assessment (EA) evaluates the impacts of the proposed action and no action and considers alternate sites for the proposed new storage yard. The proposed action includes (1) renovating five existing cylinder yards; (2) constructing a new UF6 storage yard; handling and onsite transport of cylinders among existing yards to accommodate construction; and (4) after refurbishment and construction, restacking of cylinders to meet spacing and inspection requirements. Based on the results of the analysis reported in the EA, DOE has determined that the proposed action is not a major Federal action that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment within the context of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Therefore, DOE is issuing a Finding of No Significant Impact. Additionally, it is reported in this EA that the loss of less than one acre of wetlands at the proposed project site would not be a significant adverse impact.

NONE

1996-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

273

Effect of reduced enrichment on the fuel cycle for research reactors  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The new fuels developed by the RERTR Program and by other international programs for application in research reactors with reduced uranium enrichment (<20% EU) are discussed. It is shown that these fuels, combined with proper fuel-element design and fuel-management strategies, can provide at least the same core residence time as high-enrichment fuels in current use, and can frequently significantly extend it. The effect of enrichment reduction on other components of the research reactor fuel cycle, such as uranium and enrichment requirements, fuel fabrication, fuel shipment, and reprocessing are also briefly discussed with their economic implications. From a systematic comparison of HEU and LEU cores for the same reference research reactor, it is concluded that the new fuels have a potential for reducing the research reactor fuel cycle costs while reducing, at the same time, the uranium enrichment of the fuel.

Travelli, A.

1982-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

274

Chapter 5. Conclusion Uranium, a naturally occurring element, contributes to low levels of natural background radiation in the  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

are extracted from the earth. Protore is mined uranium ore that is not rich enough to meet the market demand conventional open-pit and underground uranium mining include overburden (although most overburden is not necessarily enriched in uranium as is protore), unreclaimed protore, waste rock, evaporites from mine water

275

The non-aqueous chemistry of uranium has been an active area of exploration in recent decades1,2  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

-purity depleted uranium produced as a by-product of nuclear isotope enrichment programmes. The early actinideThe non-aqueous chemistry of uranium has been an active area of exploration in recent decades1 for uranium will be created in part by the quest of researchers to understand the properties and potential

Cai, Long

276

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING USING LOCATION SPECIFIC AIR MONITORING IN BULK HANDLING FACILITIES  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Since the introduction of safeguards strengthening measures approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (1992-1997), international nuclear safeguards inspectors have been able to utilize environmental sampling (ES) (e.g. deposited particulates, air, water, vegetation, sediments, soil and biota) in their safeguarding approaches at bulk uranium/plutonium handling facilities. Enhancements of environmental sampling techniques used by the IAEA in drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities will soon be able to take advantage of a recent step change improvement in the gathering and analysis of air samples at these facilities. Location specific air monitoring feasibility tests have been performed with excellent results in determining attribute and isotopic composition of chemical elements present in an actual test-bed sample. Isotopic analysis of collected particles from an Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) collection, was performed with the standard bulk sampling protocol used throughout the IAEA network of analytical laboratories (NWAL). The results yielded bulk isotopic values expected for the operations. Advanced designs of air monitoring instruments such as the ACE may be used in gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) to detect the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or enrichments not declared by a State. Researchers at Savannah River National Laboratory in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory are developing the next generation of ES equipment for air grab and constant samples that could become an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. Location specific air monitoring to be used to establish a baseline environmental signature of a particular facility employed for comparison of consistencies in declared operations will be described in this paper. Implementation of air monitoring will be contrasted against the use of smear ES when used during unannounced inspections, design information verification, limited frequency unannounced access, and complementary access visits at bulk handling facilities. Analysis of technical features required for tamper indication and resistance will demonstrate the viability of successful application of the system in taking ES within a bulk handling location. Further exploration of putting this technology into practice is planned to include mapping uranium enrichment facilities for the identification of optimal for installation of air monitoring devices.

Sexton, L.; Hanks, D.; Degange, J.; Brant, H.; Hall, G.; Cable-Dunlap, P.; Anderson, B.

2011-06-07T23:59:59.000Z

277

Removal of uranium from uranium-contaminated soils -- Phase 1: Bench-scale testing. Uranium in Soils Integrated Demonstration  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

To address the management of uranium-contaminated soils at Fernald and other DOE sites, the DOE Office of Technology Development formed the Uranium in Soils Integrated Demonstration (USID) program. The USID has five major tasks. These include the development and demonstration of technologies that are able to (1) characterize the uranium in soil, (2) decontaminate or remove uranium from the soil, (3) treat the soil and dispose of any waste, (4) establish performance assessments, and (5) meet necessary state and federal regulations. This report deals with soil decontamination or removal of uranium from contaminated soils. The report was compiled by the USID task group that addresses soil decontamination; includes data from projects under the management of four DOE facilities [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and the Savannah River Plant (SRP)]; and consists of four separate reports written by staff at these facilities. The fundamental goal of the soil decontamination task group has been the selective extraction/leaching or removal of uranium from soil faster, cheaper, and safer than current conventional technologies. The objective is to selectively remove uranium from soil without seriously degrading the soil`s physicochemical characteristics or generating waste forms that are difficult to manage and/or dispose of. Emphasis in research was placed more strongly on chemical extraction techniques than physical extraction techniques.

Francis, C. W.

1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

278

Documented Safety Analysis Addendum for the Neutron Radiography Reactor Facility Core Conversion  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Neutron Radiography Reactor Facility (NRAD) is a Training, Research, Isotope Production, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor which was installed in the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Hot Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) in the mid 1970s. The facility provides researchers the capability to examine both irradiated and non-irradiated materials in support of reactor fuel and components programs through non-destructive neutron radiography examination. The facility has been used in the past as one facet of a suite of reactor fuels and component examination facilities available to researchers at the INL and throughout the DOE complex. The facility has also served various commercial research activities in addition to the DOE research and development support. The reactor was initially constructed using Fuel Lifetime Improvement Program (FLIP)- type highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel obtained from the dismantled Puerto Rico Nuclear Center (PRNC) reactor. In accordance with international non-proliferation agreements, the NRAD core will be converted to a low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and will continue to utilize the PRNC control rods, control rod drives, startup source, and instrument console as was previously used with the HEU core. The existing NRAD Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was created and maintained in the preferred format of the day, combining sections of both DOE-STD-3009 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.70. An addendum was developed to cover the refueling and reactor operation with the LEU core. This addendum follows the existing SAR format combining required formats from both the DOE and NRC. This paper discusses the project to successfully write a compliant and approved addendum to the existing safety basis documents.

Boyd D. Christensen

2009-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

279

Nuclear-fuel-cycle risk assessment: descriptions of representative non-reactor facilities. Sections 1-14  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Fuel Cycle Risk Assessment Program was initiated to provide risk assessment methods for assistance in the regulatory process for nuclear fuel cycle facilities other than reactors. This report, the first from the program, defines and describes fuel cycle elements that are being considered in the program. One type of facility (and in some cases two) is described that is representative of each element of the fuel cycle. The descriptions are based on real industrial-scale facilities that are current state-of-the-art, or on conceptual facilities where none now exist. Each representative fuel cycle facility is assumed to be located on the appropriate one of four hypothetical but representative sites described. The fuel cycles considered are for Light Water Reactors with once-through flow of spent fuel, and with plutonium and uranium recycle. Representative facilities for the following fuel cycle elements are described for uranium (or uranium plus plutonium where appropriate): mining, milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, mixed-oxide fuel refabrication, fuel reprocessing, spent fuel storage, high-level waste storage, transuranic waste storage, spent fuel and high-level and transuranic waste disposal, low-level and intermediate-level waste disposal, and transportation. For each representative facility the description includes: mainline process, effluent processing and waste management, facility and hardware description, safety-related information and potential alternative concepts for that fuel cycle element. The emphasis of the descriptive material is on safety-related information. This includes: operating and maintenance requirements, input/output of major materials, identification and inventories of hazardous materials (particularly radioactive materials), unit operations involved, potential accident driving forces, containment and shielding, and degree of hands-on operation.

Schneider, K.J.

1982-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

280

Depleted uranium disposal options evaluation  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, has chartered a study to evaluate alternative management strategies for depleted uranium (DU) currently stored throughout the DOE complex. Historically, DU has been maintained as a strategic resource because of uses for DU metal and potential uses for further enrichment or for uranium oxide as breeder reactor blanket fuel. This study has focused on evaluating the disposal options for DU if it were considered a waste. This report is in no way declaring these DU reserves a ``waste,`` but is intended to provide baseline data for comparison with other management options for use of DU. To PICS considered in this report include: Retrievable disposal; permanent disposal; health hazards; radiation toxicity and chemical toxicity.

Hertzler, T.J.; Nishimoto, D.D.; Otis, M.D. [Science Applications International Corp., Idaho Falls, ID (United States). Waste Management Technology Div.

1994-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


281

Reduced enrichment for research and test reactors: Proceedings  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The international effort to develop new research reactor fuel materials and designs based on the use of low-enriched uranium, instead of highly-enriched uranium, has made much progress during the eight years since its inception. To foster direct communication and exchange of ideas among the specialist in this area, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program, at the Argonne National Laboratory, sponsored this meeting as the ninth of a series which began in 1978. All previous meetings of this series are listed on the facing page. The focus of this meeting was on the LEU fuel demonstration which was in progress at the Oak Ridge Research (ORR) reactor, not far from where the meeting was held. The visit to the ORR, where a silicide LEU fuel with 4.8 g A/cm/sup 3/ was by then in routine use, illustrated how far work has progressed.

Not Available

1988-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

282

Investigation of the low enrichment conversion of the Texas A and M Nuclear Science Center Reactor  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The use of highly enriched uranium as a fuel research reactors is of concern due to the possibility of diversion for nuclear weapons applications. The Texas A M TRIGA reactor currently uses 70% enriched uranium in a FLIP (Fuel Life Improvement Program) fuel element manufactured by General Atomics. Thus fuel also contains 1.5 weight percent of erbium as a burnable poison to prolong useful core life. US university reactors that use highly enriched uranium will be required to covert to 20% or less enrichment to satisfy Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements for the next core loading if the fuel is available. This investigation examined the feasibility of a material alternate to uranium-zirconium hydride for LEU conversion of a TRIGA reactor. This material is a beryllium oxide uranium dioxide based fuel. The theoretical aspects of core physics analyses were examined to assess the potential advantages of the alternative fuel. A basic model was developed for the existing core configuration since it is desired to use the present fuel element grid for the replacement core. The computing approach was calibrated to the present core and then applied to a core of BeO-UO{sub 2} fuel elements. Further calculations were performed for the General Atomics TRIGA low-enriched uranium zirconium hydride fuel.

Reuscher, J.A.

1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

283

GLOBAL MONITORING OF URANIUM HEXIFLORIDE CYLINDERS NEXT STEPS IN DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION PLAN  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Over 40 industrial facilities world-wide use standardized uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) cylinders for transport, storage and in-process receiving in support of uranium conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication processes. UF{sub 6} is processed and stored in the cylinders, with over 50,000 tU of UF{sub 6} transported each year in these International Organization for Standardization (ISO) qualified containers. Although each cylinder is manufactured to an ISO standard that calls for a nameplate with the manufacturer's identification number (ID) and the owner's serial number engraved on it, these can be quite small and difficult to read. Recognizing that each facility seems to use a different ID, a cylinder can have several different numbers recorded on it by means of metal plates, sticky labels, paint or even marker pen as it travels among facilities around the world. The idea of monitoring movements of UF{sub 6} cylinders throughout the global uranium fuel cycle has become a significant issue among industrial and safeguarding stakeholders. Global monitoring would provide the locations, movements, and uses of cylinders in commercial nuclear transport around the world, improving the efficiency of industrial operations while increasing the assurance that growing nuclear commerce does not result in the loss or misuse of cylinders. It should be noted that a unique ID (UID) attached to a cylinder in a verifiable manner is necessary for safeguarding needs and ensuring positive ID, but not sufficient for an effective global monitoring system. Modern technologies for tracking and inventory control can pair the UID with sensors and secure data storage for content information and complete continuity of knowledge over the cylinder. This paper will describe how the next steps in development of an action plan for employing a global UF{sub 6} cylinder monitoring network could be cultivated using four primary UID functions - identification, tracking, controlling, and accounting.

Hanks, D.

2010-06-09T23:59:59.000Z

284

Characterization of past and present solid waste streams from the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

During the next two decades the transuranic wastes, now stored in the burial trenches and storage facilities at the Hanford Site, are to be retrieved, processed at the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility, and shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal. Over 7% of the transuranic waste to be retrieved for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant has been generated at the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant. The purpose of this report is to characterize the radioactive solid wastes generated by PUREX using process knowledge, existing records, and oral history interviews. The PUREX Plant is currently operated by the Westinghouse Hanford Company for the US Department of Energy and is now in standby status while being prepared for permanent shutdown. The PUREX Plant is a collection of facilities that has been used primarily to separate plutonium for nuclear weapons from spent fuel that had been irradiated in the Hanford Site`s defense reactors. Originally designed to reprocess aluminum-clad uranium fuel, the plant was modified to reprocess zirconium alloy clad fuel elements from the Hanford Site`s N Reactor. PUREX has provided plutonium for research reactor development, safety programs, and defense. In addition, the PUREX was used to recover slightly enriched uranium for recycling into fuel for use in reactors that generate electricity and plutonium. Section 2.0 provides further details of the PUREX`s physical plant and its operations. The PUREX Plant functions that generate solid waste are as follows: processing operations, laboratory analyses and supporting activities. The types and estimated quantities of waste resulting from these activities are discussed in detail.

Pottmeyer, J.A.; Weyns, M.I.; Lorenzo, D.S.; Vejvoda, E.J. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc., NM (US); Duncan, D.R. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (US)

1993-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

285

A "Proof-of-Concept" Demonstration of RF-Based Technologies for UF6 Cylinder Tracking at Centrifuge Enrichment Plant  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This effort describes how radio-frequency (RF) technology can be integrated into a uranium enrichment facility's nuclear materials accounting and control program to enhance uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinder tracking and thus provide benefits to both domestic and international safeguards. Approved industry-standard cylinders are used to handle and store UF6 feed, product, tails, and samples at uranium enrichment plants. In the international arena, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on time-consuming manual cylinder inventory and tracking techniques to verify operator declarations and to detect potential diversion of UF6. Development of a reliable, automated, and tamper-resistant process for tracking and monitoring UF6 cylinders would greatly reduce the risk of false or misreported cylinder tare weights, diversion of nuclear material, concealment of excess production, utilization of undeclared cylinders, and misrepresentation of the cylinders contents. This paper will describe a "proof-of concept" system that was designed show the feasibility of using RF based technologies to track individual UF6 cylinders throughout their entire life cycle, and thus ensure both increased domestic accountability of materials and a more effective and efficient method for application of IAEA international safeguards at the site level. The proposed system incorporates RF-based identification devices, which provide a mechanism for a reliable, automated, and tamper-resistant tracking network. We explore how securely attached RF tags can be integrated with other safeguards technologies to better detect diversion of cylinders. The tracking system could also provide a foundation for integration of other types of safeguards that would further enhance detection of undeclared activities.

Pickett, Chris A [ORNL] [ORNL; Younkin, James R [ORNL] [ORNL; Kovacic, Donald N [ORNL] [ORNL; Dixon, E. T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)] [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Martinez, B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)] [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

286

TO: Reid Rosnick, Radiation Protection Division, Environmental Protection Agency FROM: Sarah M. Fields, Uranium Watch  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

: Sarah M. Fields, Uranium Watch DATE: November 25, 2009 RE: EPA REVIEW OF 40 CFR PART 61, SUBPART W -- RADON NESHAP FOR OPERATING URANIUM RECOVERY FACILITIES Below are some issues that the Environmental radionuclide NESHAPS in a timely manner. · Failure to properly implement radionuclide NESHAPS for uranium mills

287

Fermi Surface of Uranium at Ambient Pressure Gregory S. Boebinger, National High Magnetic Field Laboratory  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Fermi Surface of ­Uranium at Ambient Pressure Gregory S. Boebinger, National High Magnetic Field Laboratory DMR-Award 0654118 DC Field Facility User Program The fermi surface of ­Uranium has been measured surface of alpha-uranium at ambient pressure, Phys. Rev. B Rapid Commun., 80, 241101 (2009). B//c-axis B

Weston, Ken

288

The development of uranium foil farication technology utilizing twin roll method for Mo-99 irradiation target  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

MDS Nordion in Canada, occupying about 75% of global supply of Mo-99 isotope, has provided the irradiation target of Mo-99 using the rod-type UAl sub x alloys with HEU(High Enrichment Uranium). ANL (Argonne National Laboratory) through co-operation with BATAN in Indonesia, leading RERTR (Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors) program substantially for nuclear non-proliferation, has designed and fabricated the annular cylinder of uranium targets, and successfully performed irradiation test, in order to develop the fabrication technology of fission Mo-99 using LEU(Low Enrichment Uranium). As the uranium foils could be fabricated in laboratory scale, not in commercialized scale by hot rolling method due to significant problems in foil quality, productivity and economic efficiency, attention has shifted to the development of new technology. Under these circumstances, the invention of uranium foil fabrication technology utilizing twin-roll casting method in KAERI is found to be able to fabricate LEU or...

Kim, C K; Park, H D

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

289

Systems studies on the extraction of uranium from seawater  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

This report summarizes the work done at MIT during FY 1981 on the overall system design of a uranium-from-seawater facility. It consists of a sequence of seven major chapters, each of which was originally prepared as a ...

Driscoll, Michael J.

1981-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

290

Safeguards on uranium ore concentrate? the impact of modern mining and milling process  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Increased purity in uranium ore concentrate not only raises the question as to whether Safeguards should be applied to the entirety of uranium conversion facilities, but also as to whether some degree of coverage should be moved back to uranium ore concentrate production at uranium mining and milling facilities. This paper looks at uranium ore concentrate production across the globe and explores the extent to which increased purity is evident and the underlying reasons. Potential issues this increase in purity raises for IAEA's strategy on the Starting Point of Safeguards are also discussed.

Francis, Stephen [National Nuclear Laboratory, Chadwick House, Birchwood Park, Warrington WA3 6AE (United Kingdom)

2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

291

Final Environmental Impact Statement for the construction and operation of Claiborne Enrichment Center, Homer, Louisiana (Docket No. 70-3-70). Volume 2, Public comments and NRC response  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) (Volume 1), was prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in accordance with regulation 10 CFR Part 51, which implements the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), to assess the potential environmental impacts for licensing the construction and operation of a proposed gaseous centrifuge enrichment facility to be built in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana by Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (LES). The proposed facility would have a production capacity of about 866 metric tons annually of up to 5 weight percent enriched UF{sub 6}, using a proven centrifuge technology. Included in the assessment are co on, both normal operations and potential accidents (internal and external events), and the eventual decontamination and decommissioning of the site. In order to help assure that releases from the operation of the facility and potential impacts on the public are as low as reasonably achievable, an environmental monitoring program was developed by LES to detect significant changes in the background levels of uranium around the site. Other issues addressed include the purpose and need for the facility, the alternatives to the proposed action, potential disposition of the tails, the site selection process, and environmental justice. The NRC staff concludes that the facility can be constructed and operated with small and acceptable impacts on the public and the environment, and proposes to issue a license to the applicant, Louisiana Energy Services, to authorize construction and operation of the proposed facility. The letters in this Appendix have been divided into three sections. Section One contains letters to which the NRC responded by addressing specific comments. Section Two contains the letters that concerned the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs. Section Three is composed of letters that required no response. These letters were generally in support of the facility.

Zeitoun, A. [Science Applications International Corp., Germantown, MD (United States)

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

292

Automated UF6 Cylinder Enrichment Assay: Status of the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA) Project: POTAS Phase II  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) intends to automate the UF6 cylinder nondestructive assay (NDA) verification currently performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at enrichment plants. PNNL is proposing the installation of a portal monitor at a key measurement point to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the data along with operator inputs in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until inspector arrival. This report summarizes the status of the research and development of an enrichment assay methodology supporting the cylinder verification concept. The enrichment assay approach exploits a hybrid of two passively-detected ionizing-radiation signatures: the traditional enrichment meter signature (186-keV photon peak area) and a non-traditional signature, manifested in the high-energy (3 to 8 MeV) gamma-ray continuum, generated by neutron emission from UF6. PNNL has designed, fabricated, and field-tested several prototype assay sensor packages in an effort to demonstrate proof-of-principle for the hybrid assay approach, quantify the expected assay precision for various categories of cylinder contents, and assess the potential for unsupervised deployment of the technology in a portal-monitor form factor. We refer to recent sensor-package prototypes as the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA). The report provides an overview of the assay signatures and summarizes the results of several HEVA field measurement campaigns on populations of Type 30B UF6 cylinders containing low-enriched uranium (LEU), natural uranium (NU), and depleted uranium (DU). Approaches to performance optimization of the assay technique via radiation transport modeling are briefly described, as are spectroscopic and data-analysis algorithms.

Jordan, David V.; Orton, Christopher R.; Mace, Emily K.; McDonald, Benjamin S.; Kulisek, Jonathan A.; Smith, Leon E.

2012-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

293

US-Russian collaboration in MPC & A enhancements at the Elektrostal Uranium Fuel-Fabrication Plant  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Enhancement of the nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting of (MPC&A) at the Elektrostal Machine-Building Plant (ELEMASH) has proceeded in two phases. Initially, Elektrostal served as the model facility at which to test US/Russian collaboration and to demonstrate MPC&A technologies available for safeguards enhancements at Russian facilities. This phase addressed material control and accounting (MC&A) in the low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel-fabrication processes and the physical protection (PP) of part of the (higher-enrichment) breeder-fuel process. The second phase, identified later in the broader US/Russian agreement for expanded MPC&A cooperation. includes implementation of appropriate MC&A and PP systems in the breeder-fuel fabrication processes. Within the past year, an automated physical protection system has been installed and demonstrated in building 274, and an automated MC&A system has been designed and is being installed and will be tested in the LEU process. Attention has now turned to assuring longterm sustainability for the first phase and beginning MPC&A upgrades for the second phase. Sustainability measures establish the infrastructure for operation, maintenance, and repair of the installed systems-with US support for the lifetime of the US/Russian Agreement, but evolving toward full Russian operation of the system over the long term. For phase 2, which will address higher enrichments, projects have been identified to characterize the facilities, design MPC&A systems, procure appropriate equipment, and install and test final systems. One goal in phase 2 will be to build on initial work to create shared, plant-wide MPC&A assets for operation, maintenance, and evaluation of all safeguards systems.

Smith, H.; Murray, W.; Whiteson, R. [and others

1997-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

294

Process for reducing beta activity in uranium  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

This invention is a method for lowering the beta radiation hazards associated with the casting of uranium. The method reduces the beta radiation emitted from the as-cast surfaces of uranium ingots. The method also reduces the amount of beta radiation emitters retained on the interiors of the crucibles that have been used to melt the uranium charges and which have undergone cleaning in a remote handling facility. The lowering of the radioactivity is done by scavenging the beta emitters from the molten uranium with a molten mixture containing the fluorides of magnesium and calcium. The method provides a means of collection and disposal of the beta emitters in a manner that reduces radiation exposure to operating personnel in the work area where the ingots are cast and processed.

Briggs, Gifford G. (Cincinnatti, OH); Kato, Takeo R. (Cincinnatti, OH); Schonegg, Edward (Cleves, OH)

1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

295

Process for reducing beta activity in uranium  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

This invention is a method for lowering the beta radiation hazards associated with the casting of uranium. The method reduces the beta radiation emitted from the as-cast surfaces of uranium ingots. The method also reduces the amount of beta radiation emitters retained on the interiors of the crucibles that have been used to melt the uranium charges and which undergone cleaning in a remote handling facility. The lowering of the radioactivity is done by scavenging the beta emitters from the molten uranium with a molten mixture containing the fluorides of magnesium and calcium. The method provides a means of collection and disposal of the beta emitters in a manner that reduces radiation exposure to operating personnel in the work area where the ingots are cast and processed. 5 tabs.

Briggs, G.G.; Kato, T.R.; Schonegg, E.

1985-04-11T23:59:59.000Z

296

Reports on investigations of uranium anomalies. National Uranium Resource Evaluation  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

During the National Uranium Resource Evaluation (NURE) program, conducted for the US Department of Energy (DOE) by Bendix Field Engineering Corporation (BFEC), radiometric and geochemical surveys and geologic investigations detected anomalies indicative of possible uranium enrichment. Data from the Aerial Radiometric and Magnetic Survey (ARMS) and the Hydrogeochemical and Stream-Sediment Reconnaissance (HSSR), both of which were conducted on a national scale, yielded numerous anomalies that may signal areas favorable for the occurrence of uranium deposits. Results from geologic evaluations of individual 1/sup 0/ x 2/sup 0/ quadrangles for the NURE program also yielded anomalies, which could not be adequately checked during scheduled field work. Included in this volume are individual reports of field investigations for the following six areas which were shown on the basis of ARMS, HSSR, and (or) geologic data to be anomalous: (1) Hylas zone and northern Richmond basin, Virginia; (2) Sischu Creek area, Alaska; (3) Goodman-Dunbar area, Wisconsin; (4) McCaslin syncline, Wisconsin; (5) Mt. Withington Cauldron, Socorro County, New Mexico; (6) Lake Tecopa, Inyo County, California. Field checks were conducted in each case to verify an indicated anomalous condition and to determine the nature of materials causing the anomaly. The ultimate objective of work is to determine whether favorable conditions exist for the occurrence of uranium deposits in areas that either had not been previously evaluated or were evaluated before data from recent surveys were available. Most field checks were of short duration (2 to 5 days). The work was done by various investigators using different procedures, which accounts for variations in format in their reports. All papers have been abstracted and indexed.

Goodknight, C.S.; Burger, J.A. (comps.) [comps.

1982-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

297

Radiological safety training for uranium facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This handbook contains recommended training materials consistent with DOE standardized core radiological training material. These materials consist of a program management guide, instructor`s guide, student guide, and overhead transparencies.

NONE

1998-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

298

Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "ofEarlyEnergy 0611__Joint_DOE_GoJ_AMS_Data_v3.pptx More Documents &DOE.F 1325.8CHANGE NOTICE NO. 1DOE

299

Uranium enrichment decontamination and decommissioning fund, 1995 report  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report describes strategies for the decontamination and decommissioning of gaseous diffusion plants. Progress in remedial action activities are discussed.

NONE

1996-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

300

The Office of Environmental Management Uranium Enrichment D&D...  

Energy Savers [EERE]

and Staffing Plan Report - Portsmouth Paducah Project Office Above on the left is K-25, at Oak Ridge before and after the 844,000 sq-ft demolition. In addition, on the...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


301

Oak Ridge, Tenn. Selected as Uranium Enrichment Site | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "ofEarlyEnergyDepartment ofDepartment ofofOxford SiteToledoSampling at theOfficials to discuss NPT

302

Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Program | National Nuclear Security  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunDatastreamsmmcrcalgovInstrumentsruc DocumentationP-SeriesFlickr FlickrGuidedCH2MLLC High-Rate,Highlights Highlights Below is

303

US, Kazakhstan Cooperate to Eliminate Highly Enriched Uranium | National  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunDatastreamsmmcrcalgovInstrumentsrucLasDelivered energy consumption by sectorlong version) The0 -ITER's centralNewUSUS

304

Italy Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals | National Nuclear  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunDatastreamsmmcrcalgovInstrumentsruc DocumentationP-SeriesFlickrinformation for andFuel-Efficient Engines |Iron isCancerFuelIt

305

Chapter 20 - Uranium Enrichment Decontamination & Decommissioning Fund  

Energy Savers [EERE]

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious RankCombustion |Energyon ArmedWaste andAccessCO2 Injection Begins8: Variable Frequency Drive2: Commercial

306

Special Nuclear Materials: EM Manages Plutonium, Highly Enriched Uranium  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "ofEarly Career Scientists' Research |RegulationRenewable EnergySouthwest MichiganNovember 27, 2006November

307

Belgium Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium Removals | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "ofEarlyEnergyDepartment ofDepartment ofofOxford SiteToledoSampling atSFO |Alternate| National

308

NNSA and Kazakhstan Complete Operation to Eliminate Highly Enriched Uranium  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "ofEarlyEnergyDepartment ofDepartment ofofOxfordVeterans |NuclearOffice of GeneralLaboratory |Nuclear|

309

GTRI's Convert Program: Minimizing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium |  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunDatastreamsmmcrcalgovInstrumentsruc DocumentationP-SeriesFlickr Flickr Editor's note:ComputingFusionSanGE Global40-DOPGTC

310

German Pebble Bed Research Reactor Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Fuel  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunDatastreamsmmcrcalgovInstrumentsruc DocumentationP-SeriesFlickr Flickr Editor'sshortGeothermal Heat PumpsChad Simmons Gerdenis Kodis

311

Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund's Fiscal Year  

Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious RankCombustion |Energy Usage »of EnergyTheTwo New12.'6/0.2 ...... 13:27DepartmentUpdatingMaterial2008

312

A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded emissions), long term care, reduced access to 'dirty' bomb materials, the social and political costs of siting new facilities and the psychological impact of no solution to the nuclear waste problem, were taken into account, the costs would be far lower than those of the present fuel cycle. (authors)

Parker, Frank L. [Vanderbilt University (United States)

2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

313

Criticality safety concerns of uranium deposits in cascade equipment  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Paducah and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants enrich uranium in the {sup 235}U isotope by diffusing gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) through a porous barrier. The UF{sub 6} gaseous diffusion cascade utilized several thousand {open_quotes}stages{close_quotes} of barrier to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU). Historically, Portsmouth has enriched the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant`s product (typically 1.8 wt% {sup 235}U) as well as natural enrichment feed stock up to 97 wt%. Due to the chemical reactivity of UF{sub 6}, particularly with water, the formation of solid uranium deposits occur at a gaseous diffusion plant. Much of the equipment operates below atmospheric pressure, and deposits are formed when atmospheric air enters the cascade. Deposits may also be formed from UF{sub 6} reactions with oil, UF{sub 6} reactions with the metallic surfaces of equipment, and desublimation of UF{sub 6}. The major deposits form as a result of moist air in leakage due to failure of compressor casing flanges, blow-off plates, seals, expansion joint convolutions, and instrument lines. This report describes criticality concerns and deposit disposition.

Plaster, M.J. [Lockheed Martin Utility Services, Inc., Piketon, OH (United States)

1996-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

314

Environmental site description for a Uranium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (U-AVLIS) production plant at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Uranium enrichment in the United States has utilized a diffusion process to preferentially enrich the U-235 isotope in the uranium product. In the 1970s, the US Department of Energy (DOE) began investigating more efficient and cost-effective enrichment technologies. In January 1990, the Secretary of Energy approved a plan for the demonstration and deployment of the Uranium Atomic Vapor Laser isotope Separation (U-AVLIS) technology with the near-term goal to provide the necessary information to make a deployment decision by November 1992. Initial facility operation is anticipated for 1999. A programmatic document for use in screening DOE sites to locate a U-AVLIS production plant was developed and implemented in two parts. The first part consisted of a series of screening analyses, based on exclusionary and other criteria, that identified a reasonable number of candidate sites. The final evaluation, which included sensitivity studies, identified the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant (ORGDP) site, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) site, and the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) site as having significant advantages over the other sites considered. This environmental site description (ESD) provides a detailed description of the PORTS site and vicinity suitable for use in an environmental impact statement (EIS). This report is based on existing literature, data collected at the site, and information collected by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) staff during site visits. The organization of the ESD is as follows. Topics addressed in Sec. 2 include a general site description and the disciplines of geology, water resources, biotic resources, air resources, noise, cultural resources, land use. Socioeconomics, and waste management. Identification of any additional data that would be required for an EIS is presented in Sec. 3.

Marmer, G.J.; Dunn, C.P.; Filley, T.H.; Moeller, K.L.; Pfingston, J.M.; Policastro, A.J.; Cleland, J.H.

1991-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

315

FSAR fire accident analysis for a plutonium facility  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for a plutonium facility as required by DOE Orders 5480.23 and 5480.22 has recently been completed and approved. The facility processes and stores radionuclides such as Pu-238, Pu-239, enriched uranium, and to a lesser degree other actinides. This facility produces heat sources. DOE Order 5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94 require analysis of different types of accidents (operational accidents such as fires, explosions, spills, criticality events, and natural phenomena such as earthquakes). The accidents that were analyzed quantitatively, or the Evaluation Basis Accidents (EBAs), were selected based on a multi-step screening process that utilizes extensively the Hazards Analysis (HA) performed for the facility. In the HA, specific accident scenarios, with estimated frequency and consequences, were developed for each identified hazard associated with facility operations and activities. Analysis of the EBAs and comparison of their consequences to the evaluation guidelines established the safety envelope for the facility and identified the safety-class structures, systems, and components. This paper discusses the analysis of the fire EBA. This fire accident was analyzed in relatively great detail in the FSAR because of its potential off-site consequences are more severe compared to other events. In the following, a description of the scenario is first given, followed by a brief summary of the methodology for calculating the source term. Finally, the author discuss how a key parameter affecting the source term, the leakpath factor, was determined, which is the focus of this paper.

Lam, K.

1997-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

316

In-line assay monitor for uranium hexafluoride  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

An in-line assay monitor for determining the content of uranium-235 in a uranium hexafluoride gas isotopic separation system is provided which removes the necessity of complete access to the operating parameters of the system for determining the uranium-235 content. The monitor is intended for uses such as safeguard applications to assure that weapons grade uranium is not being produced in an enrichment cascade. The method and monitor for carrying out the method involve cooling of a radiation pervious chamber connected in fluid communication with the selected point in the system to withdraw a specimen and solidify the specimen in the chamber. The specimen is irradiated by means of an ionizing radiation source of energy different from that of the 185 keV gamma emissions from the uranium-235 present in the specimen. Simultaneously, the gamma emissions from the uranium-235 of the specimen and the source emissions transmitted through the sample are counted and stored in a multiple channel analyzer. The uranium-235 content of the specimen is determined from the comparison of the accumulated 185 keV energy counts and the reference energy counts. The latter is used to measure the total uranium isotopic content of the specimen. The process eliminates the necessity of knowing the system operating conditions and yet obtains the necessary data without need for large scintillation crystals and sophisticated mechanical designs.

Wallace, Steven A. (Knoxville, TN)

1981-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

317

Final Uranium Leasing Program Programmatic Environmental Impact...  

Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

Final Uranium Leasing Program Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) Final Uranium Leasing Program Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) Uranium Leasing...

318

Depleted Uranium Technical Brief  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Depleted Uranium Technical Brief United States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air and Radiation Washington, DC 20460 EPA-402-R-06-011 December 2006 #12;#12;Depleted Uranium Technical Brief EPA of Radiation and Indoor Air Radiation Protection Division ii #12;iii #12;FOREWARD The Depleted Uranium

319

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: UNH blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than is the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This report provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate blending option to produce oxide for disposal. This the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) alternative will have two missions (1) convert HEU materials into HEU uranyl nitrate (UNH) and (2) blend the HEU uranyl nitrate with depleted and natural assay uranyl nitrate to produce an oxide that can be stored until an acceptable disposal approach is available. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

NONE

1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

320

Preliminary study on weapon grade uranium utilization in molten salt reactor miniFUJI  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Preliminary study on weapon grade uranium utilization in 25MWth and 50MWth of miniFUJI MSR (molten salt reactor) has been carried out. In this study, a very high enriched uranium that we called weapon grade uranium has been employed in UF{sub 4} composition. The {sup 235}U enrichment is 90 - 95 %. The results show that the 25MWth miniFUJI MSR can get its criticality condition for 1.56 %, 1.76%, and 1.96% of UF{sub 4} with {sup 235}U enrichment of at least 93%, 90%, and 90%, respectively. In contrast, the 50 MWth miniFUJI reactor can be critical for 1.96% of UF{sub 4} with {sup 235}U enrichment of at smallest amount 95%. The neutron spectra are almost similar for each power output.

Aji, Indarta Kuncoro [Department of Physics, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Institut Teknologi Bandung (Indonesia); Waris, A., E-mail: awaris@fi.itb.ac.id [Nuclear Physics and Biophysics Research Division, Department of Physics, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Jl. Ganesa No. 10 Bandung 40132 (Indonesia)

2014-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


321

Corrosion Evaluation of RERTR Uranium Molybdenum Fuel  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

As part of the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) mandate to replace the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, research into the development of LEU fuel for research reactors has been active since the late 1970’s. Originally referred to as the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) program the new effort named Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is nearing the goal of replacing the standard aluminum clad dispersion highly enriched uranium aluminide fuel with a new LEU fuel. The five domestic high performance research reactors undergoing this conversion are High Flux Isotope reactor (HFIR), Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Reactor, Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor II (MITR-II). The design of these reactors requires a higher neutron flux than other international research reactors, which to this point has posed unique challenges in the design and development of the new mandated LEU fuel. The new design utilizes a monolithic fuel configuration in order to obtain sufficient 235U within the LEU stoichoimetry to maintain the fission reaction within the domestic test reactors. The change from uranium aluminide dispersion fuel type to uranium molybdenum (UMo) monolithic configuration requires examination of possible corrosion issues associated with the new fuel meat. A focused analysis of the UMo fuel under potential corrosion conditions, within the ATR and under aqueous storage indicates a slow and predictable corrosion rate. Additional corrosion testing is recommended for the highest burn-up fuels to confirm observed corrosion rate trends. This corrosion analysis will focus only on the UMo fuel and will address corrosion of ancillary components such as cladding only in terms of how it affects the fuel. The calculations and corrosion scenarios are weighted with a conservative bias to provide additional confidence with the results. The actual corrosion rates of UMo fuel is very likely to be lower than assumed within this report which can be confirmed with additional testing.

A K Wertsching

2012-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

322

Method for converting uranium oxides to uranium metal  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

A process is described for converting scrap and waste uranium oxide to uranium metal. The uranium oxide is sequentially reduced with a suitable reducing agent to a mixture of uranium metal and oxide products. The uranium metal is then converted to uranium hydride and the uranium hydride-containing mixture is then cooled to a temperature less than -100.degree. C. in an inert liquid which renders the uranium hydride ferromagnetic. The uranium hydride is then magnetically separated from the cooled mixture. The separated uranium hydride is readily converted to uranium metal by heating in an inert atmosphere. This process is environmentally acceptable and eliminates the use of hydrogen fluoride as well as the explosive conditions encountered in the previously employed bomb-reduction processes utilized for converting uranium oxides to uranium metal.

Duerksen, Walter K. (Norris, TN)

1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

323

Optical Constants ofOptical Constants of Uranium Nitride Thin FilmsUranium Nitride Thin Films  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Optical Constants ofOptical Constants of Uranium Nitride Thin FilmsUranium Nitride Thin FilmsDelta--Beta Scatter Plot at 220 eVBeta Scatter Plot at 220 eV #12;Why Uranium Nitride?Why Uranium Nitride? UraniumUranium, uranium,Bombard target, uranium, with argon ionswith argon ions Uranium atoms leaveUranium atoms leave

Hart, Gus

324

Experimental partitioning of uranium between liquid iron sulfide and liquid silicate: Implications for radioactivity in the Earth's core  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Experimental partitioning of uranium between liquid iron sulfide and liquid silicate: Implications Measurable uranium (U) is found in metal sulfide liquids in equilibrium with molten silicate at conditions shows that K is depleted in the Earth by $50%, while U and Th are slightly enriched (Palme and O

Minarik, William

325

Welding of uranium and uranium alloys  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The major reported work on joining uranium comes from the USA, Great Britain, France and the USSR. The driving force for producing this technology base stems from the uses of uranium as a nuclear fuel for energy production, compact structures requiring high density, projectiles, radiation shielding, and nuclear weapons. This review examines the state-of-the-art of this technology and presents current welding process and parameter information. The welding metallurgy of uranium and the influence of microstructure on mechanical properties is developed for a number of the more commonly used welding processes.

Mara, G.L.; Murphy, J.L.

1982-03-26T23:59:59.000Z

326

Depleted uranium plasma reduction system study  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A system life-cycle cost study was conducted of a preliminary design concept for a plasma reduction process for converting depleted uranium to uranium metal and anhydrous HF. The plasma-based process is expected to offer significant economic and environmental advantages over present technology. Depleted Uranium is currently stored in the form of solid UF{sub 6}, of which approximately 575,000 metric tons is stored at three locations in the U.S. The proposed system is preconceptual in nature, but includes all necessary processing equipment and facilities to perform the process. The study has identified total processing cost of approximately $3.00/kg of UF{sub 6} processed. Based on the results of this study, the development of a laboratory-scale system (1 kg/h throughput of UF6) is warranted. Further scaling of the process to pilot scale will be determined after laboratory testing is complete.

Rekemeyer, P.; Feizollahi, F.; Quapp, W.J.; Brown, B.W.

1994-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

327

Development of Novel Sorbents for Uranium Extraction from Seawater  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

As the uranium resource in terrestrial ores is limited, it is difficult to ensure a long-term sustainable nuclear energy technology. The oceans contain approximately 4.5 billion tons of uranium, which is one thousand times the amount of uranium in terrestrial ores. Development of technologies to recover the uranium from seawater would greatly improve the uranium resource availability, sustaining the fuel supply for nuclear energy. Several methods have been previously evaluated including solvent extraction, ion exchange, flotation, biomass collection, and adsorption; however, none have been found to be suitable for reasons such as cost effectiveness, long term stability, and selectivity. Recent research has focused on the amidoxime functional group as a promising candidate for uranium sorption. Polymer beads and fibers have been functionalized with amidoxime functional groups, and uranium adsorption capacities as high as 1.5 g U/kg adsorbent have recently been reported with these types of materials. As uranium concentration in seawater is only ~3 ppb, great improvements to uranium collection systems must be made in order to make uranium extraction from seawater economically feasible. This proposed research intends to develop transformative technologies for economic uranium extraction from seawater. The Lin group will design advanced porous supports by taking advantage of recent breakthroughs in nanoscience and nanotechnology and incorporate high densities of well-designed chelators into such nanoporous supports to allow selective and efficient binding of uranyl ions from seawater. Several classes of nanoporous materials, including mesoporous silica nanoparticles (MSNs), mesoporous carbon nanoparticles (MCNs), meta-organic frameworks (MOFs), and covalent-organic frameworks (COFs), will be synthesized. Selective uranium-binding liagnds such as amidoxime will be incorporated into the nanoporous materials to afford a new generation of sorbent materials that will be evaluated for their uranium extraction efficiency. The initial testing of these materials for uranium binding will be carried out in the Lin group, but more detailed sorption studies will be carried out by Dr. Taylor-Pashow of Savannah River National Laboratory in order to obtain quantitative uranyl sorption selectivity and kinetics data for the proposed materials. The proposed nanostructured sorbent materials are expected to have higher binding capacities, enhanced extraction kinetics, optimal stripping efficiency for uranyl ions, and enhanced mechanical and chemical stabilities. This transformative research will significantly impact uranium extraction from seawater as well as benefit DOE’s efforts on environmental remediation by developing new materials and providing knowledge for enriching and sequestering ultralow concentrations of other metals.

Lin, Wenbin; Taylor-Pashow, Kathryn

2014-01-08T23:59:59.000Z

328

EPA Update: NESHAP Uranium Activities  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

for underground uranium mining operations (Subpart B) EPA regulatory requirements for operating uranium mill for Underground Uranium Mining Operations (Subpart B) #12;5 EPA Regulatory Requirements for Underground Uranium uranium mines include: · Applies to 10,000 tons/yr ore production, or 100,000 tons/mine lifetime · Ambient

329

Interacting delayed critical 38.1-cm-diam uranium (93.2) metal cylinders at large distance  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A delayed critical experiment was performed with two 38.10-cm-diam, {approximately}7.62-cm-thick unmoderated and unreflected uranium metal cylinders to study the interaction of two loosely coupled large flat cylinders. Previously tightly coupled, two component uranium metal assemblies of 27.93-cm-diam cylinders had been assembled to delayed criticality and the results reported. For this experiment, the uranium metal density was 18.75 g U/cm{sup 3}, and the enrichment was 93.15 wt% {sup 235}U. The two right circular cylinders were coaxial and separated 1.3 m; thus the fractional solid angle subtended by one cylinder as seen from the other is {approximately}5 X 10{sup -3}. This delayed critical configuration is a useful experiment for assessing the convergence of Monte Carlo calculations of the neutron multiplication factor because it is a very loosely coupled system, a problem that has been designated as {open_quotes}k{sub eff} of the world{close_quotes}. The neutron multiplication factor of one of the interacting cylinders is 0.994, and the solid angle seen by the other cylinder is such that very few neutrons starting in one cylinder reach the other cylinder. This assembly was configured on a vertical assembly machine in the east cell of the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility in 1965 and was unreported until this paper. The east cell of this facility is a 10.6- x 10.6- x 9.1-m room with thick concrete walls. The lower cylinder of this assembly was located 3.5 m from the 1.5-m-thick west wall, 3.9 m from the 0.61-m-thick north wall, and 2.8 m above the concrete floor. The calculation of two such loosely coupled cylinders by Monte Carlo methods can be a problem because the interaction between cylinders is so small.

Mihalczo, J.T. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, TN (United States)

1996-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

330

Uranium hexafluoride public risk  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The limiting value for uranium toxicity in a human being should be based on the concentration of uranium (U) in the kidneys. The threshold for nephrotoxicity appears to lie very near 3 {mu}g U per gram kidney tissue. There does not appear to be strong scientific support for any other improved estimate, either higher or lower than this, of the threshold for uranium nephrotoxicity in a human being. The value 3 {mu}g U per gram kidney is the concentration that results from a single intake of about 30 mg soluble uranium by inhalation (assuming the metabolism of a standard person). The concentration of uranium continues to increase in the kidneys after long-term, continuous (or chronic) exposure. After chronic intakes of soluble uranium by workers at the rate of 10 mg U per week, the concentration of uranium in the kidneys approaches and may even exceed the nephrotoxic limit of 3 {mu}g U per gram kidney tissue. Precise values of the kidney concentration depend on the biokinetic model and model parameters assumed for such a calculation. Since it is possible for the concentration of uranium in the kidneys to exceed 3 {mu}g per gram tissue at an intake rate of 10 mg U per week over long periods of time, we believe that the kidneys are protected from injury when intakes of soluble uranium at the rate of 10 mg U per week do not continue for more than two consecutive weeks. For long-term, continuous occupational exposure to low-level, soluble uranium, we recommend a reduced weekly intake limit of 5 mg uranium to prevent nephrotoxicity in workers. Our analysis shows that the nephrotoxic limit of 3 {mu}g U per gram kidney tissues is not exceeded after long-term, continuous uranium intake at the intake rate of 5 mg soluble uranium per week.

Fisher, D.R.; Hui, T.E.; Yurconic, M.; Johnson, J.R.

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

331

Fundamental study on recovery uranium oxide from HEPA filters  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Large numbers of spent HEPA filters are produced at uranium fuel fabrication facilities. Uranium oxide particles have been collected on these filters. Then, a spent HEPA filter treatment system was developed from the viewpoint of recovering the UO{sub 2} and minimizing the volume. The system consists of a mechanical separation process and a chemical dissolution process. This paper describes the results of fundamental experiments on recovering UO{sub 2} from HEPA filters.

Izumida, T. [Hitachi Ltd., Ibaraki (Japan). Hitachi Works; Matsumoto, H.; Tsuchiya, H.; Iba, H. [Hitachi Nuclear Engineering Co., Ltd., Ibaraki (Japan); Noguchi, Y. [Radioactive Waste Management Center, Tokyo (Japan)

1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

332

Occupational dose reduction at Department of Energy contractor facilities: Bibliography of selected readings in radiation protection and ALARA  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This bibliography contains abstracts relating to various aspects of ALARA program implementation and dose reduction activities, with a focus on DOE facilities. Abstracts included in this bibliography were selected from proceedings of technical meetings, journals, research reports, searches of the DOE Energy, Science and Technology Database (in general, the citation and abstract information is presented as obtained from this database), and reprints of published articles provided by the authors. Facility types and activities covered in the scope of this report include: radioactive waste, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, spent fuel storage and reprocessing, facility decommissioning, hot laboratories, tritium production, research, test and production reactors, weapons fabrication and testing, fusion, uranium and plutonium processing, radiography, and aocelerators. Information on improved shielding design, decontamination, containments, robotics, source prevention and control, job planning, improved operational and design techniques, as well as on other topics, has been included. In addition, DOE/EH reports not included in previous volumes of the bibliography are in this volume (abstracts 611 to 684). This volume (Volume 5 of the series) contains 217 abstracts. An author index and a subject index are provided to facilitate use. Both indices contain the abstract numbers from previous volumes, as well as the current volume. Information that the reader feels might be included in the next volume of this bibliography should be submitted to the BNL ALARA Center.

Dionne, B.J.; Sullivan, S.G.; Baum, J.W.

1993-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

333

The Enriched Xenon Observatory  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Enriched Xenon Observatory (EXO) experiment will search for neutrinoless double beta decay of {sup 136}Xe. The EXO Collaboration is actively pursuing both liquid-phase and gas-phase Xe detector technologies with scalability to the ton-scale. The search for neutrinoless double beta decay of {sup 136}Xe is especially attractive because of the possibility of tagging the resulting Ba daughter ion, eliminating all sources of background other than the two neutrino decay mode. EXO-200, the first phase of the project, is a liquid Xe time projection chamber with 200 kg of Xe enriched to 80% in {sup 136}Xe. EXO-200, which does not include Ba-tagging, will begin taking data in 2009, with two-year sensitivity to the half-life for neutrinoless double beta decay of 6.4x10{sup 25} years. This corresponds to an effective Majorana neutrino mass of 0.13 to 0.19 eV.

Dolinski, M. J. [Stanford University Physics Department, 382 Via Pueblo Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-4060 (United States)

2009-12-17T23:59:59.000Z

334

Uranium Mill Tailings Management  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This book presents the papers given at the Fifth Symposium on Uranium Mill Tailings Management. Advances made with regard to uranium mill tailings management, environmental effects, regulations, and reclamation are reviewed. Topics considered include tailings management and design (e.g., the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Project, environmental standards for uranium mill tailings disposal), surface stabilization (e.g., the long-term stability of tailings, long-term rock durability), radiological aspects (e.g. the radioactive composition of airborne particulates), contaminant migration (e.g., chemical transport beneath a uranium mill tailings pile, the interaction of acidic leachate with soils), radon control and covers (e.g., radon emanation characteristics, designing surface covers for inactive uranium mill tailings), and seepage and liners (e.g., hydrologic observations, liner requirements).

Nelson, J.D.

1982-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

335

Process for continuous production of metallic uranium and uranium alloys  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

A method is described for forming metallic uranium, or a uranium alloy, from uranium oxide in a manner which substantially eliminates the formation of uranium-containing wastes. A source of uranium dioxide is first provided, for example, by reducing uranium trioxide (UO{sub 3}), or any other substantially stable uranium oxide, to form the uranium dioxide (UO{sub 2}). This uranium dioxide is then chlorinated to form uranium tetrachloride (UCl{sub 4}), and the uranium tetrachloride is then reduced to metallic uranium by reacting the uranium chloride with a metal which will form the chloride of the metal. This last step may be carried out in the presence of another metal capable of forming one or more alloys with metallic uranium to thereby lower the melting point of the reduced uranium product. The metal chloride formed during the uranium tetrachloride reduction step may then be reduced in an electrolysis cell to recover and recycle the metal back to the uranium tetrachloride reduction operation and the chlorine gas back to the uranium dioxide chlorination operation. 4 figs.

Hayden, H.W. Jr.; Horton, J.A.; Elliott, G.R.B.

1995-06-06T23:59:59.000Z

336

Process for continuous production of metallic uranium and uranium alloys  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

A method is described for forming metallic uranium, or a uranium alloy, from uranium oxide in a manner which substantially eliminates the formation of uranium-containing wastes. A source of uranium dioxide is first provided, for example, by reducing uranium trioxide (UO.sub.3), or any other substantially stable uranium oxide, to form the uranium dioxide (UO.sub.2). This uranium dioxide is then chlorinated to form uranium tetrachloride (UCl.sub.4), and the uranium tetrachloride is then reduced to metallic uranium by reacting the uranium chloride with a metal which will form the chloride of the metal. This last step may be carried out in the presence of another metal capable of forming one or more alloys with metallic uranium to thereby lower the melting point of the reduced uranium product. The metal chloride formed during the uranium tetrachloride reduction step may then be reduced in an electrolysis cell to recover and recycle the metal back to the uranium tetrachloride reduction operation and the chlorine gas back to the uranium dioxide chlorination operation.

Hayden, Jr., Howard W. (Oakridge, TN); Horton, James A. (Livermore, CA); Elliott, Guy R. B. (Los Alamos, NM)

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

337

Preparation of uranium compounds  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

UI.sub.3(1,4-dioxane).sub.1.5 and UI.sub.4(1,4-dioxane).sub.2, were synthesized in high yield by reacting turnings of elemental uranium with iodine dissolved in 1,4-dioxane under mild conditions. These molecular compounds of uranium are thermally stable and excellent precursor materials for synthesizing other molecular compounds of uranium including alkoxide, amide, organometallic, and halide compounds.

Kiplinger, Jaqueline L; Montreal, Marisa J; Thomson, Robert K; Cantat, Thibault; Travia, Nicholas E

2013-02-19T23:59:59.000Z

338

Student science enrichment training program  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This is a report on the Student Science Enrichment Training Program, with special emphasis on chemical and computer science fields. The residential summer session was held at the campus of Claflin College, Orangeburg, SC, for six weeks during 1993 summer, to run concomitantly with the college`s summer school. Fifty participants selected for this program, included high school sophomores, juniors and seniors. The students came from rural South Carolina and adjoining states which, presently, have limited science and computer science facilities. The program focused on high ability minority students, with high potential for science engineering and mathematical careers. The major objective was to increase the pool of well qualified college entering minority students who would elect to go into science, engineering and mathematical careers. The Division of Natural Sciences and Mathematics and engineering at Claflin College received major benefits from this program as it helped them to expand the Departments of Chemistry, Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science as a result of additional enrollment. It also established an expanded pool of well qualified minority science and mathematics graduates, which were recruited by the federal agencies and private corporations, visiting Claflin College Campus. Department of Energy`s relationship with Claflin College increased the public awareness of energy related job opportunities in the public and private sectors.

Sandhu, S.S.

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

339

THE ENERGY SPECTRA OF URANIUM ATOMS SPUTTERED FROM URANIUM METAL AND URANIUM DIOXIDE TARGETS  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

THE ENERGY SPECTRA OF URANIUM ATOMS SPUTTERED FROM URANIUM METAL AND URANIUM DIOXIDE TARGETS Thesis. I have benefitted from conversations with many persons w~ile engaged in this project. I would like

Winfree, Erik

340

Uranium hexafluoride liquid thermal expansion, elusive eutectic with hydrogen fluoride, and very first production using chlorine trifluoride  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Three unusual incidents and case histories involving uranium hexafluoride in the enrichment facilities of the USA in the late 1940`s and early 1950`s are presented. The history of the measurements of the thermal expansion of liquids containing fluorine atoms within the molecule is reviewed with special emphasis upon uranium hexafluoride. A comparison is made between fluorinated esters, fluorocarbons, and uranium hexafluoride. The quantitative relationship between the thermal expansion coefficient, a, of liquids and the critical temperature, T{sub c} is presented. Uranium hexafluoride has an a that is very high in a temperature range that is used by laboratory and production workers - much higher than any other liquid measured. This physical property of UF{sub 6} has resulted in accidents involving filling the UF{sub 6} containers too full and then heating with a resulting rupture of the container. Such an incident at a uranium gaseous diffusion plant is presented. Production workers seldom {open_quotes}see{close_quotes} uranium hexafluoride. The movement of UF{sub 6} from one container to another is usually trailed by weight, not sight. Even laboratory scientists seldom {open_quotes}see{close_quotes} solid or liquid UF{sub 6} and this can be a problem at times. This inability to {open_quotes}see{close_quotes} the UF{sub 6}-HF mixtures in the 61.2{degrees}C to 101{degrees}C temperature range caused a delay in the understanding of the phase diagram of UF{sub 6}-HF which has a liquid - liquid immiscible region that made the eutectic composition somewhat elusive. Transparent fluorothene tubes solved the problem both for the UF{sub 6}-HF phase diagram as well as the UF{sub 6}-HF-CIF{sub 3} phase diagram with a miscibility gap starting at 53{degrees}C. The historical background leading to the first use of CIF{sub 3} to produce UF{sub 6} in both the laboratory and plant at K-25 is presented.

Rutledge, G.P. [Central Environmental, Inc., Anchorage, AK (United States)

1991-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


341

Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Reimold, Benjamin A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ward, Steven L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Howell, John [GLASGOW UNIV.

2010-09-13T23:59:59.000Z

342

Oxygen enriched fireflooding  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Both pure oxygen and enriched air have been considered in fireflooding for enhanced oil recovery. Laboratory and field testing have conclusively shown that oxygen is practical and cost effective for this application. For reservoirs that require a large volume of high pressure gas, oxygen is cheaper than air simply based on compression costs. Additional process benefits with oxygen include: Faster Oil Production; Lower Injection Pressure; Greater Well Spacing; Increased Carbon Dioxide Partial Pressure; Lower Gas-to-Oil Ratios; and Purer Produced Gas. These features provide a compelling case for oxygen, once the safety and materials compatibility issues are properly addressed.

Shahani, G.H.; Gunardson, H.H. [Air Products and Chemicals, Allentown, PA (United States)

1995-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

343

DUSCOBS - a depleted-uranium silicate backfill for transport, storage, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A Depleted Uranium Silicate COntainer Backfill System (DUSCOBS) is proposed that would use small, isotopically-depleted uranium silicate glass beads as a backfill material inside storage, transport, and repository waste packages containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The uranium silicate glass beads would fill all void space inside the package including the coolant channels inside SNF assemblies. Based on preliminary analysis, the following benefits have been identified. DUSCOBS improves repository waste package performance by three mechanisms. First, it reduces the radionuclide releases from SNF when water enters the waste package by creating a local uranium silicate saturated groundwater environment that suppresses (1) the dissolution and/or transformation of uranium dioxide fuel pellets and, hence, (2) the release of radionuclides incorporated into the SNF pellets. Second, the potential for long-term nuclear criticality is reduced by isotopic exchange of enriched uranium in SNF with the depleted uranium (DU) in the glass. Third, the backfill reduces radiation interactions between SNF and the local environment (package and local geology) and thus reduces generation of hydrogen, acids, and other chemicals that degrade the waste package system. In addition, the DUSCOBS improves the integrity of the package by acting as a packing material and ensures criticality control for the package during SNF storage and transport. Finally, DUSCOBS provides a potential method to dispose of significant quantities of excess DU from uranium enrichment plants at potential economic savings. DUSCOBS is a new concept. Consequently, the concept has not been optimized or demonstrated in laboratory experiments.

Forsberg, C.W.; Pope, R.B.; Ashline, R.C.; DeHart, M.D.; Childs, K.W.; Tang, J.S.

1995-11-30T23:59:59.000Z

344

Challenges using a {sup 252}Cf shuffler instrument in a plant environment to measure mixtures of uranium and plutonium transuranic waste  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

An active-passive {sup 252}Cf shuffler instrument, installed and certified several years ago at Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium facility, has now been calibrated for different matrices to measure Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)-destined transuranic (TRU) waste. Little or no data currently exist for these types of measurements in plant environments where sudden large changes in the neutron background radiation can significantly distort the results. Measurements and analyses of twenty-two 55-gallon drums, consisting of mixtures of varying quantities of uranium and plutonium in mostly noncombustible matrices, have been recently completed at the plutonium facility. The calibration and measurement techniques, including the method used to separate out the plutonium component, will be presented and discussed. Calculations used to adjust for differences in uranium enrichment from that of the calibration standards will be shown. Methods used to determine various sources of both random and systematic error will be indicated. Particular attention will be directed to those problems identified as arising from the plant environment. The results of studies to quantify the aforementioned distortion effects in the data will be presented. Various solution scenarios will be outlined, along with those adopted here.

Hurd, J.R.

1999-08-29T23:59:59.000Z

345

CHARACTERIZATION OF URANIUM, URANIUM OXIDE AND SILICON MULTILAYER THIN FILMS  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

CHARACTERIZATION OF URANIUM, URANIUM OXIDE AND SILICON MULTILAYER THIN FILMS by David T. Oliphant. Woolley Dean, College of Physical and Mathematical Sciences #12;ABSTRACT CHARACTERIZATION OF URANIUM, URANIUM OXIDE AND SILICON MULTILAYER THIN FILMS David T. Oliphant Department of Physics and Astronomy

Hart, Gus

346

Uranium dioxide electrolysis  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

This is a single stage process for treating spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors. The spent nuclear fuel, uranium oxide, UO.sub.2, is added to a solution of UCl.sub.4 dissolved in molten LiCl. A carbon anode and a metallic cathode is positioned in the molten salt bath. A power source is connected to the electrodes and a voltage greater than or equal to 1.3 volts is applied to the bath. At the anode, the carbon is oxidized to form carbon dioxide and uranium chloride. At the cathode, uranium is electroplated. The uranium chloride at the cathode reacts with more uranium oxide to continue the reaction. The process may also be used with other transuranic oxides and rare earth metal oxides.

Willit, James L. (Batavia, IL); Ackerman, John P. (Prescott, AZ); Williamson, Mark A. (Naperville, IL)

2009-12-29T23:59:59.000Z

347

a. ASTM Standard C787-11, Standard Specification for Uranium...  

Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

in support of a request for proposals to design, build, and operate facilities to convert depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF 6 ) to more chemically stable forms. On page C-8 in the...

348

Selective Extraction of Uranium from Liquid or Supercritical Carbon Dioxide  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Current liquid-liquid extraction processes used in recycling irradiated nuclear fuel rely on (1) strong nitric acid to dissolve uranium oxide fuel, and (2) the use of aliphatic hydrocarbons as a diluent in formulating the solvent used to extract uranium. The nitric acid dissolution process is not selective. It dissolves virtually the entire fuel meat which complicates the uranium extraction process. In addition, a solvent washing process is used to remove TBP degradation products, which adds complexity to the recycling plant and increases the overall plant footprint and cost. A liquid or supercritical carbon dioxide (l/sc -CO2) system was designed to mitigate these problems. Indeed, TBP nitric acid complexes are highly soluble in l/sc -CO2 and are capable of extracting uranium directly from UO2, UO3 and U3O8 powders. This eliminates the need for total acid dissolution of the irradiated fuel. Furthermore, since CO2 is easily recycled by evaporation at room temperature and pressure, it eliminates the complex solvent washing process. In this report, we demonstrate: (1) A reprocessing scheme starting with the selective extraction of uranium from solid uranium oxides into a TBP-HNO3 loaded Sc-CO2 phase, (2) Back extraction of uranium into an aqueous phase, and (3) Conversion of recovered purified uranium into uranium oxide. The purified uranium product from step 3 can be disposed of as low level waste, or mixed with enriched uranium for use in a reactor for another fuel cycle. After an introduction on the concept and properties of supercritical fluids, we first report the characterization of the different oxides used for this project. Our extraction system and our online monitoring capability using UV-Vis absorbance spectroscopy directly in sc-CO2 is then presented. Next, the uranium extraction efficiencies and kinetics is demonstrated for different oxides and under different physical and chemical conditions: l/sc -CO2 pressure and temperature, TBP/HNO3 complex used, reductant or complexant used for selectivity, and ionic liquids used as supportive media. To complete the extraction and recovery cycle, we then demonstrate uranium back extraction from the TBP loaded sc-CO2 phase into an aqueous phase and the characterization of the uranium complex formed at the end of this process. Another aspect of this project was to limit proliferation risks by either co-extracting uranium and plutonium, or by leaving plutonium behind by selectively extracting uranium. We report that the former is easily achieved, since plutonium is in the tetravalent or hexavalent oxidation state in the oxidizing environment created by the TBP-nitric acid complex, and is therefore co-extracted. The latter is more challenging, as a reductant or complexant to plutonium has to be used to selectively extract uranium. After undertaking experiments on different reducing or complexing systems (e.g., AcetoHydroxamic Acid (AHA), Fe(II), ascorbic acid), oxalic acid was chosen as it can complex tetravalent actinides (Pu, Np, Th) in the aqueous phase while allowing the extraction of hexavalent uranium in the sc-CO2 phase. Finally, we show results using an alternative media to commonly used aqueous phases: ionic liquids. We show the dissolution of uranium in ionic liquids and its extraction using sc-CO2 with and without the presence of AHA. The possible separation of trivalent actinides from uranium is also demonstrated in ionic liquids using neodymium as a surrogate and diglycolamides as the extractant.

Farawila, Anne F.; O'Hara, Matthew J.; Wai, Chien M.; Taylor, Harry Z.; Liao, Yu-Jung

2012-07-31T23:59:59.000Z

349

Selective leaching of uranium from uranium-contaminated soils: Progress report 1  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Three soils and a sediment contaminated with uranium were used to determine the effectiveness of sodium carbonate and citric acid leaching to decontaminated or remove uranium to acceptable regulatory levels. Two of the soils were surface soils from the DOE facility formerly called the Feed Materials Production Center (FMPC) at Fernald, Ohio. This facility is presently called the Femald Environmental Management Project (FEMP). Carbonate extractions generally removed from 70 to 90% of the uranium from the Fernald storage pad soil. Uranium was slightly more difficult to extract from the Fernald incinerator and the Y-12 landfarm soils. Very small amounts of uranium could be extracted from the storm sewer sediment. Extraction with carbonate at high solution-to-soil ratios were as effective as extractions at low solution-to-soil ratios, indicating attrition by the paddle mixer was not significantly different than that provided in a rotary extractor. Also, pretreatments such as milling or pulverizing the soil sample did not appear to increase extraction efficiency when carbonate extractions were carried out at elevated temperatures (60[degree]C) or long extraction times (23 h). Adding KMnO[sub 4] in the carbonate extraction appeared to increase extraction efficiency from the Fernald incinerator soil but not the Fernald storage pad soil. The most effective leaching rates (> 90 % from both Fernald soils) were obtained using a citrate/dithionite extraction procedure designed to remove amorphous (noncrystalline) iron/aluminum sesquioxides from surfaces of clay minerals. Citric acid also proved to be a very good extractant for uranium.

Francis, C.W.; Mattus, A.J.; Farr, L.L.; Elless, M.P.; Lee, S.Y.

1993-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

350

Selective leaching of uranium from uranium-contaminated soils: Progress report 1  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Three soils and a sediment contaminated with uranium were used to determine the effectiveness of sodium carbonate and citric acid leaching to decontaminated or remove uranium to acceptable regulatory levels. Two of the soils were surface soils from the DOE facility formerly called the Feed Materials Production Center (FMPC) at Fernald, Ohio. This facility is presently called the Femald Environmental Management Project (FEMP). Carbonate extractions generally removed from 70 to 90% of the uranium from the Fernald storage pad soil. Uranium was slightly more difficult to extract from the Fernald incinerator and the Y-12 landfarm soils. Very small amounts of uranium could be extracted from the storm sewer sediment. Extraction with carbonate at high solution-to-soil ratios were as effective as extractions at low solution-to-soil ratios, indicating attrition by the paddle mixer was not significantly different than that provided in a rotary extractor. Also, pretreatments such as milling or pulverizing the soil sample did not appear to increase extraction efficiency when carbonate extractions were carried out at elevated temperatures (60{degree}C) or long extraction times (23 h). Adding KMnO{sub 4} in the carbonate extraction appeared to increase extraction efficiency from the Fernald incinerator soil but not the Fernald storage pad soil. The most effective leaching rates (> 90 % from both Fernald soils) were obtained using a citrate/dithionite extraction procedure designed to remove amorphous (noncrystalline) iron/aluminum sesquioxides from surfaces of clay minerals. Citric acid also proved to be a very good extractant for uranium.

Francis, C.W.; Mattus, A.J.; Farr, L.L.; Elless, M.P.; Lee, S.Y.

1993-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

351

Occupational dose reduction at Department of Energy contractor facilities: Bibliography of selected readings in radiation protection and ALARA; Volume 5  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Promoting the exchange of information related to implementation of the As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) philosophy is a continuing objective for the Department of Energy (DOE). This report was prepared by the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) ALARA Center for the DOE Office of Health. It contains the fifth in a series of bibliographies on dose reduction at DOE facilities. The BNL ALARA Center was originally established in 1983 under the sponsorship of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to monitor dose-reduction research and ALARA activities at nuclear power plants. This effort was expanded in 1988 by the DOE`s Office of Environment, Safety and Health, to include DOE nuclear facilities. This bibliography contains abstracts relating to various aspects of ALARA program implementation and dose-reduction activities, with a specific focus on DOE facilities. Abstracts included in this bibliography were selected from proceedings of technical meetings, journals, research reports, searches of the DOE Energy, Science and Technology Database (in general, the citation and abstract information is presented as obtained from this database), and reprints of published articles provided by the authors. Facility types and activities covered in the scope of this report include: radioactive waste, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, spent fuel storage and reprocessing, facility decommissioning, hot laboratories, tritium production, research, test and production reactors, weapons fabrication and testing, fusion, uranium and plutonium processing, radiography, and accelerators. Information on improved shielding design, decontamination, containments, robotics, source prevention and control, job planning, improved operational and design techniques, as well as on other topics, has been included. In addition, DOE/EH reports not included in previous volumes of the bibliography are in this volume (abstracts 611 to 684). This volume (Volume 5 of the series) contains 217 abstracts.

Dionne, B.J.; Sullivan, S.G.; Baum, J.W. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

352

The Soviet uranium industry and exports of nuclear materials and services  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The USSR has been offering Western countries, through long-term contracts, services in the processing and enrichment of uranium for their nuclear power industries since 1973. Although known for some time from Western sources, this was confirmed by Boris Semyenov, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, in 1989. Other sources state that the first service contract was signed in 1971, with initial deliveries beginning in 1973, and that altogether, there are now about 10-12 long-term contracts with firms in various Western European countries that extend to the year 2000 or in some cases to 2010. Although these services are said to remain the mainstay of business with the capitalist countries of the West, the export of enriched uranium materials produced from domestic ore began in 1988. Clients include firms in both the US and Western Europe. Evidently, the severe balance-of-payments problems in Soviet foreign trade operations in recent years have led the Soviets to push alternatives to oil exports as much as possible, notably metals and minerals and chemicals and fertilizers, and this has now extended to the Soviet uranium industry. The paper discusses the USSR uranium industry, uranium mining, uranium enrichment, and plutonium production.

Sagers, M.J.

1990-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

353

Study of Transients in an Enrichment Closed Loop  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

In the present thesis a mathematic model is presented in order to describe the dynamic behavior inside a closed enrichment loop, the latter representing a single stage of an uranium gaseous diffusion enrichment cascade.The analytical model is turned into a numerical model, and implemented through a computational code.For the verification of the model, measurements were taken in an experimental circuit using air as the process fluid.This circuit was instrumented so as to register its characteristic thermohydraulic variables.The measured transients were simulated, comparing the numerical results with the experimental measurements.A good agreement between the characteristic setting times and the thermohydraulic parameters evolution was observed.Besides, other transients of two species separation were numerically analyzed, including setting times of each magnitude, behavior of each one of them during different transients, and redistribution of concentrations.

Fernandino, M

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

354

Depleted uranium management alternatives  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report evaluates two management alternatives for Department of Energy depleted uranium: continued storage as uranium hexafluoride, and conversion to uranium metal and fabrication to shielding for spent nuclear fuel containers. The results will be used to compare the costs with other alternatives, such as disposal. Cost estimates for the continued storage alternative are based on a life-cycle of 27 years through the year 2020. Cost estimates for the recycle alternative are based on existing conversion process costs and Capital costs for fabricating the containers. Additionally, the recycle alternative accounts for costs associated with intermediate product resale and secondary waste disposal for materials generated during the conversion process.

Hertzler, T.J.; Nishimoto, D.D.

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

355

Safeguards Verification Measurements using Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Laser Ablation Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) is a new verification measurement technology under development at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). LAARS uses three lasers to ablate and then measure the relative isotopic abundance of uranium compounds. An ablation laser is tightly focused on uranium-bearing solids, producing a small atomic uranium vapor plume. Two collinear wavelength-tuned spectrometry lasers transit through the plume and the absorbance of U-235 and U-238 isotopes are measured to determine U-235 enrichment. The measurement is independent of chemical form and degree of dilution with nuisance dust and other materials. LAARS has high relative precision and detection limits approaching the femtogram range for U-235. The sample is scanned and assayed point-by-point at rates reaching 1 million measurements/hour, enabling LAARS to detect and analyze uranium in trace samples. The spectrometer is assembled using primarily commercially available components and features a compact design and automated analysis.Two specific gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) applications of the spectrometer are currently under development: 1) LAARS-Environmental Sampling (ES), which collects and analyzes aerosol particles for GCEP misuse detection and 2) LAARS-Destructive Assay (DA), which enables onsite enrichment DA sample collection and analysis for protracted diversion detection. The two applications propose game-changing technological advances in GCEP safeguards verification.

Anheier, Norman C.; Cannon, Bret D.; Kulkarni, Gourihar R.; Munley, John T.; Nelson, Danny A.; Qiao, Hong (Amy) [Amy; Phillips, Jon R.

2012-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

356

Irradiation behavior of miniature experimental uranium silicide fuel plates  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Uranium silicides, because of their relatively high uranium density, were selected as candidate dispersion fuels for the higher fuel densities required in the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program. Irradiation experience with this type of fuel, however, was limited to relatively modest fission densities in the bulk from, on the order of 7 x 10/sup 20/ cm/sup -3/, far short of the approximately 20 x 10/sup 20/ cm/sup -3/ goal established for the RERTR program. The purpose of the irradiation experiments on silicide fuels on the ORR, therefore, was to investigate the intrinsic irradiation behavior of uranium silicide as a dispersion fuel. Of particular interest was the interaction between the silicide particles and the aluminum matrix, the swelling behavior of the silicide particles, and the maximum volume fraction of silicide particles that could be contained in the aluminum matrix.

Hofman, G.L.; Neimark, L.A.; Mattas, R.F.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

357

Fernald vacuum transfer system for uranium materials repackaging  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP) is the site of a former Department of Energy (DOE) uranium processing plant. When production was halted, many materials were left in an intermediate state. Some of this product material included enriched uranium compounds that had to be repackaged for shipment of off-site storage. This paper provides an overview, technical description, and status of a new application of existing technology, a vacuum transfer system, to repackage the uranium bearing compounds for shipment. The vacuum transfer system provides a method of transferring compounds from their current storage configuration into packages that meet the Department of Transportation (DOT) shipping requirements for fissile materials. This is a necessary activity, supporting removal of nuclear materials prior to site decontamination and decommissioning, key to the Fernald site's closure process.

Kaushiva, Shirley; Weekley, Clint; Molecke, Martin; Polansky, Gary

2002-02-24T23:59:59.000Z

358

Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-04-05T23:59:59.000Z

359

Safety analysis--200 Area Savannah River Site: Separations Area operations Building 211-H Outside Facilities. Supplement 11, Revision 1  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The H-Area Outside Facilities are located in the 200-H Separations Area and are comprised of a number of processes, utilities, and services that support the separations function. Included are enriched uranium loadout, bulk chemical storage, water handling, acid recovery, general purpose evaporation, and segregated solvent facilities. In addition, services for water, electricity, and steam are provided. This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents an analysis of the H-Area Outside Facilities and is one of a series of documents for the Separations Area as specified in the SR Implementation Plan for DOE order 5481.1A. The primary purpose of the analysis was to demonstrate that the facility can be operated without undue risk to onsite or offsite populations, to the environment, and to operating personnel. In this report, risks are defined as the expected frequencies of accidents, multiplied by the resulting radiological consequences in person-rem. Following the summary description of facility and operations is the site evaluation including the unique features of the H-Area Outside Facilities. The facility and process design are described in Chapter 3.0 and a description of operations and their impact is given in Chapter 4.0. The accident analysis in Chapter 5.0 is followed by a list of safety related structures and systems (Chapter 6.0) and a description of the Quality Assurance program (Chapter 7.0). The accident analysis in this report focuses on estimating the risk from accidents as a result of operation of the facilities. The operations were evaluated on the basis of three considerations: potential radiological hazards, potential chemical toxicity hazards, and potential conditions uniquely different from normal industrial practice.

Not Available

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

360

Ultraslow Wave Nuclear Burning of Uranium-Plutonium Fissile Medium on Epithermal Neutrons  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

For a fissile medium, originally consisting of uranium-238, the investigation of fulfillment of the wave burning criterion in a wide range of neutron energies is conducted for the first time, and a possibility of wave nuclear burning not only in the region of fast neutrons, but also for cold, epithermal and resonance ones is discovered for the first time. For the first time the results of the investigation of the Feoktistov criterion fulfillment for a fissile medium, originally consisting of uranium-238 dioxide with enrichments 4.38%, 2.00%, 1.00%, 0.71% and 0.50% with respect to uranium-235, in the region of neutron energies 0.015-10.0eV are presented. These results indicate a possibility of ultraslow wave neutron-nuclear burning mode realization in the uranium-plutonium media, originally (before the wave initiation by external neutron source) having enrichments with respect to uranium-235, corresponding to the subcritical state, in the regions of cold, thermal, epithermal and resonance neutrons. In order to validate the conclusions, based on the slow wave neutron-nuclear burning criterion fulfillment depending on the neutron energy, the numerical modeling of ultraslow wave neutron-nuclear burning of a natural uranium in the epithermal region of neutron energies (0.1-7.0eV) was conducted for the first time. The presented simulated results indicate the realization of the ultraslow wave neutron-nuclear burning of the natural uranium for the epithermal neutrons.

V. D. Rusov; V. A. Tarasov; M. V. Eingorn; S. A. Chernezhenko; A. A. Kakaev; V. M. Vashchenko; M. E. Beglaryan

2014-09-29T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


361

Measurement and Analysis of Fission Rates in a Spherical Mockup of Uranium and Polyethylene  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

Measurements of the reaction rate distribution were carried out using two kinds of Plate Micro Fission Chamber(PMFC). The first is a depleted uranium chamber and the second an enriched uranium chamber. The material in the depleted uranium chamber is strictly the same as the material in the uranium assembly. With the equation solution to conduct the isotope contribution correction, the fission rate of 238U and 235U were obtained from the fission rate of depleted uranium and enriched uranium. And then, the fission count of 238U and 235U in an individual uranium shell was obtained. In this work, MCNP5 and continuous energy cross sections ENDF/BV.0 were used for the analysis of fission rate distribution and fission count. The calculated results were compared with the experimental ones. The calculation of fission rate of DU and EU were found to agree with the measured ones within 10% except at the positions in polyethylene region and the two positions near the outer surface. Beacause the fission chamber was not co...

Tong-Hua, Zhu; Xin-Xin, Lu; Rong, Liu; Zi-Jie, Han; Li, Jiang; Mei, Wang

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

362

Method for the recovery of uranium values from uranium tetrafluoride  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

The invention is a novel method for the recovery of uranium from dry, particulate uranium tetrafluoride. In one aspect, the invention comprises reacting particulate uranium tetrafluoride and calcium oxide in the presence of gaseous oxygen to effect formation of the corresponding alkaline earth metal uranate and alkaline earth metal fluoride. The product uranate is highly soluble in various acidic solutions wherein the product fluoride is virtually insoluble therein. The product mixture of uranate and alkaline earth metal fluoride is contacted with a suitable acid to provide a uranium-containing solution, from which the uranium is recovered. The invention can achieve quantitative recovery of uranium in highly pure form.

Kreuzmann, Alvin B. (Cincinnati, OH)

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

363

Method for the recovery of uranium values from uranium tetrafluoride  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

The invention is a novel method for the recovery of uranium from dry, particulate uranium tetrafluoride. In one aspect, the invention comprises reacting particulate uranium tetrafluoride and calcium oxide in the presence of gaseous oxygen to effect formation of the corresponding alkaline earth metal uranate and alkaline earth metal fluoride. The product uranate is highly soluble in various acidic solutions whereas the product fluoride is virtually insoluble therein. The product mixture of uranate and alkaline earth metal fluoride is contacted with a suitable acid to provide a uranium-containing solution, from which the uranium is recovered. The invention can achieve quantitative recovery of uranium in highly pure form.

Kreuzmann, A.B.

1982-10-27T23:59:59.000Z

364

Reliability Engineering Approach to Probabilistic Proliferation Resistance Analysis of the Example Sodium Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

HEU (235U ? 20%) 25 kg Indirect use nuclear material U (235U depleted U) Th 20 tons a For Pu containing less than 80% 238Pu. b Including low enriched, natural and depleted uranium... Highly Enriched Uranium HM Heavy Metal IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IC Product Prep Injection Caster Furnace IS&NP International Safeguards and Nonproliferation KMP Key Measurement Point MBA Material Balance Area MCNP Monte...

Cronholm, Lillian Marie

2012-10-19T23:59:59.000Z

365

PUREX facility hazards assessment  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This report documents the hazards assessment for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (PUREX) located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site. Operation of PUREX is the responsibility of Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC). This hazards assessment was conducted to provide the emergency planning technical basis for PUREX. DOE Order 5500.3A requires an emergency planning hazards assessment for each facility that has the potential to reach or exceed the lowest level emergency classification. In October of 1990, WHC was directed to place PUREX in standby. In December of 1992 the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management authorized the termination of PUREX and directed DOE-RL to proceed with shutdown planning and terminal clean out activities. Prior to this action, its mission was to reprocess irradiated fuels for the recovery of uranium and plutonium. The present mission is to establish a passively safe and environmentally secure configuration at the PUREX facility and to preserve that condition for 10 years. The ten year time frame represents the typical duration expended to define, authorize and initiate follow-on decommissioning and decontamination activities.

Sutton, L.N.

1994-09-23T23:59:59.000Z

366

Environmental assessment for device assembly facility operations, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada. Final report  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), has prepared an environmental assessment (EA), (DOE/EA-0971), to evaluate the impacts of consolidating all nuclear explosive operations at the newly constructed Device Assembly Facility (DAF) in Area 6 of the Nevada Test Site. These operations generally include assembly, disassembly or modification, staging, transportation, testing, maintenance, repair, retrofit, and surveillance. Such operations have previously been conducted at the Nevada Test Site in older facilities located in Area 27. The DAF will provide enhanced capabilities in a state-of-the-art facility for the safe, secure, and efficient handling of high explosives in combination with special nuclear materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium). Based on the information and analyses in the EA, DOE has determined that the proposed action would not constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.). Therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required, and DOE is issuing this finding of no significant impact.

NONE

1995-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

367

The ultimate disposition of depleted uranium  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Significant amounts of the depleted uranium (DU) created by past uranium enrichment activities have been sold, disposed of commercially, or utilized by defense programs. In recent years, however, the demand for DU has become quite small compared to quantities available, and within the US Department of Energy (DOE) there is concern for any risks and/or cost liabilities that might be associated with the ever-growing inventory of this material. As a result, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), was asked to review options and to develop a comprehensive plan for inventory management and the ultimate disposition of DU accumulated at the gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs). An Energy Systems task team, under the chairmanship of T. R. Lemons, was formed in late 1989 to provide advice and guidance for this task. This report reviews options and recommends actions and objectives in the management of working inventories of partially depleted feed (PDF) materials and for the ultimate disposition of fully depleted uranium (FDU). Actions that should be considered are as follows. (1) Inspect UF{sub 6} cylinders on a semiannual basis. (2) Upgrade cylinder maintenance and storage yards. (3) Convert FDU to U{sub 3}O{sub 8} for long-term storage or disposal. This will include provisions for partial recovery of costs to offset those associated with DU inventory management and the ultimate disposal of FDU. Another recommendation is to drop the term tails'' in favor of depleted uranium'' or DU'' because the tails'' label implies that it is waste.'' 13 refs.

Not Available

1990-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

368

Relative performance properties of the ORNL Advanced Neutron Source Reactor with reduced enrichment fuels  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Three cores for the Advanced Neutron Source reactor, differing in size, enrichment, and uranium density in the fuel meat, have been analyzed. Performance properties of the reduced enrichment cores are compared with those of the HEU reference configuration. Core lifetime estimates suggest that none of these configurations will operate for the design goal of 17 days at 330 MW. With modes increases in fuel density and/or enrichment, however, the operating lifetimes of the HEU and MEU designs can be extended to the desired length. Achieving this lifetime with LEU fuel in any of the three studies cores, however, will require the successful development of denser fuels and/or structural materials with thermal neutron absorption cross sections substantially less than that of Al-6061. Relative to the HEU reference case, the peak thermal neutron flux in cores with reduced enrichment will be diminished by about 25--30%.

Bretscher, M.M.; Deen, J.R.; Hanan, N.A.; Matos, J.E.; Mo, S.C.; Pond, R.B.; Travelli, A.; Woodruff, W.L.

1994-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

369

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center at the Device Assembly Facility, Nevada National Security Site: Status and Capabilities, Summary Report  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) was officially opened on August 29, 2011. Located within the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), the NCERC has become a consolidation facility within the United States for critical configuration testing, particularly those involving highly enriched uranium (HEU). The DAF is a Department of Energy (DOE) owned facility that is operated by the National Nuclear Security Agency/Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). User laboratories include the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Personnel bring their home lab qualifications and procedures with them to the DAF, such that non-site specific training need not be repeated to conduct work at DAF. The NNSS Management and Operating contractor is National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec) and the NNSS Safeguards and Security contractor is Wackenhut Services. The complete report provides an overview and status of the available laboratories and test bays at NCERC, available test materials and test support configurations, and test requirements and limitations for performing sub-critical and critical tests. The current summary provides a brief summary of the facility status and the method by which experiments may be introduced to NCERC.

S. Bragg-Sitton; J. Bess; J. Werner

2011-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

370

Facility Microgrids  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Microgrids are receiving a considerable interest from the power industry, partly because their business and technical structure shows promise as a means of taking full advantage of distributed generation. This report investigates three issues associated with facility microgrids: (1) Multiple-distributed generation facility microgrids' unintentional islanding protection, (2) Facility microgrids' response to bulk grid disturbances, and (3) Facility microgrids' intentional islanding.

Ye, Z.; Walling, R.; Miller, N.; Du, P.; Nelson, K.

2005-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

371

Process for electrolytically preparing uranium metal  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

A process for making uranium metal from uranium oxide by first fluorinating uranium oxide to form uranium tetrafluoride and next electrolytically reducing the uranium tetrafluoride with a carbon anode to form uranium metal and CF.sub.4. The CF.sub.4 is reused in the fluorination reaction rather than being disposed of as a hazardous waste.

Haas, Paul A. (Knoxville, TN)

1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

372

Controlling uranium reactivity March 18, 2008  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

for the last decade. Most of their work involves depleted uranium, a more common form of uraniumMarch 2008 Controlling uranium reactivity March 18, 2008 Uranium is an often misunderstood metal uranium research. In reality, uranium presents a wealth of possibilities for funda- mental chemistry. Many

Meyer, Karsten

373

DOE Signs Advanced Enrichment Technology License and Facility Lease |  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) "of EnergyEnergyENERGYWomentheATLANTA, GA - U.S. Department ofThe U.S. DepartmentContract at

374

Influence of uranium hydride oxidation on uranium metal behaviour  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This work addresses concerns that the rapid, exothermic oxidation of active uranium hydride in air could stimulate an exothermic reaction (burning) involving any adjacent uranium metal, so as to increase the potential hazard arising from a hydride reaction. The effect of the thermal reaction of active uranium hydride, especially in contact with uranium metal, does not increase in proportion with hydride mass, particularly when considering large quantities of hydride. Whether uranium metal continues to burn in the long term is a function of the uranium metal and its surroundings. The source of the initial heat input to the uranium, if sufficient to cause ignition, is not important. Sustained burning of uranium requires the rate of heat generation to be sufficient to offset the total rate of heat loss so as to maintain an elevated temperature. For dense uranium, this is very difficult to achieve in naturally occurring circumstances. Areas of the uranium surface can lose heat but not generate heat. Heat can be lost by conduction, through contact with other materials, and by convection and radiation, e.g. from areas where the uranium surface is covered with a layer of oxidised material, such as burned-out hydride or from fuel cladding. These rates of heat loss are highly significant in relation to the rate of heat generation by sustained oxidation of uranium in air. Finite volume modelling has been used to examine the behaviour of a magnesium-clad uranium metal fuel element within a bottle surrounded by other un-bottled fuel elements. In the event that the bottle is breached, suddenly, in air, it can be concluded that the bulk uranium metal oxidation reaction will not reach a self-sustaining level and the mass of uranium oxidised will likely to be small in relation to mass of uranium hydride oxidised. (authors)

Patel, N.; Hambley, D. [National Nuclear Laboratory (United Kingdom); Clarke, S.A. [Sellafield Ltd (United Kingdom); Simpson, K.

2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

375

Analysis of the effectiveness of gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235U enrichment of declared UF6 containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive assay (DA) of samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements. These improvements could reduce the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also explore how a few advanced safeguards systems could be assembled for unattended operation. The analysis will focus on how unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections (IDS) can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear materials when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems.

Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinjoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

376

Uranium-titanium-niobium alloy  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

A uranium alloy having small additions of Ti and Nb shows improved strength and ductility in cross section of greater than one inch over prior uranium alloy having only Ti as an alloying element.

Ludtka, Gail M. (Oak Ridge, TN); Ludtka, Gerard M. (Oak Ridge, TN)

1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

377

Uranium deposits of Brazil  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Brazil is a country of vast natural resources, including numerous uranium deposits. In support of the country`s nuclear power program, Brazil has developed the most active uranium industry in South America. Brazil has one operating reactor (Angra 1, a 626-MWe PWR), and two under construction. The country`s economic challenges have slowed the progress of its nuclear program. At present, the Pocos de Caldas district is the only active uranium production. In 1990, the Cercado open-pit mine produced approximately 45 metric tons (MT) U{sub 3}O{sub 8} (100 thousand pounds). Brazil`s state-owned uranium production and processing company, Uranio do Brasil, announced it has decided to begin shifting its production from the high-cost and nearly depleted deposits at Pocos de Caldas, to lower-cost reserves at Lagoa Real. Production at Lagoa Real is schedules to begin by 1993. In addition to these two districts, Brazil has many other known uranium deposits, and as a whole, it is estimated that Brazil has over 275,000 MT U{sub 3}O{sub 8} (600 million pounds U{sub 3}O{sub 8}) in reserves.

NONE

1991-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

378

A framework for nuclear facility safeguard evaluation using probabilistic methods and expert elicitation  

E-Print Network [OSTI]

With the advancement of the next generation of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, concerns of the effectiveness of nuclear facility safeguards have been increasing due to the inclusion of highly enriched material and reprocessing ...

Iamsumang, Chonlagarn

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

379

Nuclear reactor fuel structure containing uranium alloy wires embedded in a metallic matrix plate  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

A flat or curved plate structure, to be used as fuel in a nuclear reactor, comprises elongated fissionable wires or strips embedded in a metallic continuous non-fissionable matrix plate. The wires or strips are made predominantly of a malleable uranium alloy, such as uranium silicide, uranium gallide or uranium germanide. The matrix plate is made predominantly of aluminum or an aluminum alloy. The wires or strips are located in a single row at the midsurface of the plate, parallel with one another and with the length dimension of the plate. The wires or strips are separated from each other, and from the surface of the plate, by sufficient thicknesses of matrix material, to provide structural integrity and effective fission product retention, under neutron irradiation. This construction makes it safely feasible to provide a high uranium density, so that the uranium enrichment with uranium 235 may be reduced below about 20%, to deter the reprocessing of the uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

Travelli, A.

1985-10-25T23:59:59.000Z

380

Nuclear reactor fuel structure containing uranium alloy wires embedded in a metallic matrix plate  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A flat or curved plate structure, to be used as fuel in a nuclear reactor, comprises elongated fissionable wires or strips embedded in a metallic continuous non-fissionable matrix plate. The wires or strips are made predominantly of a malleable uranium alloy, such as uranium silicide, uranium gallide or uranium germanide. The matrix plate is made predominantly of aluminum or an aluminum alloy. The wires or strips are located in a single row at the midsurface of the plate, parallel with one another and with the length dimension of the plate. The wires or strips are separated from each other, and from the surface of the plate, by sufficient thicknesses of matrix material, to provide structural integrity and effective fission product retention, under neutron irradiation. This construction makes it safely feasible to provide a high uranium density, so that the uranium enrichment with uranium 235 may be reduced below about 20%, to deter the reprocessing of the uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

Travelli, Armando (Hinsdale, IL)

1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


381

Fuel development activities of the US RERTR Program. [Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Progress in the development and irradiation testing of high-density fuels for use with low-enriched uranium in research and test reactors is reported. Swelling and blister-threshold temperature data obtained from the examination of miniature fuel plates containing UAl/sub x/, U/sub 3/O/sub 8/, U/sub 3/Si/sub 2/, or U/sub 3/Si dispersed in an aluminum matrix are presented. Combined with the results of metallurgical examinations, these data show that these four fuel types will perform adequately to full burnup of the /sup 235/U contained in the low-enriched fuel. The exothermic reaction of the uranium-silicide fuels with aluminum has been found to occur at about the same temperature as the melting of the aluminum matrix and cladding and to be essentially quenched by the melting endotherm. A new series of miniature fuel plate irradiations is also discussed.

Snelgrove, J.L.; Domagala, R.F.; Wiencek, T.C.; Copeland, G.L.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

382

Uranium immobilization and nuclear waste  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Considerable information useful in nuclear waste storage can be gained by studying the conditions of uranium ore deposit formation. Further information can be gained by comparing the chemistry of uranium to nuclear fission products and other radionuclides of concern to nuclear waste disposal. Redox state appears to be the most important variable in controlling uranium solubility, especially at near neutral pH, which is characteristic of most ground water. This is probably also true of neptunium, plutonium, and technetium. Further, redox conditions that immobilize uranium should immobilize these elements. The mechanisms that have produced uranium ore bodies in the Earth's crust are somewhat less clear. At the temperatures of hydrothermal uranium deposits, equilibrium models are probably adequate, aqueous uranium (VI) being reduced and precipitated by interaction with ferrous-iron-bearing oxides and silicates. In lower temperature roll-type uranium deposits, overall equilibrium may not have been achieved. The involvement of sulfate-reducing bacteria in ore-body formation has been postulated, but is uncertain. Reduced sulfur species do, however, appear to be involved in much of the low temperature uranium precipitation. Assessment of the possibility of uranium transport in natural ground water is complicated because the system is generally not in overall equilibrium. For this reason, Eh measurements are of limited value. If a ground water is to be capable of reducing uranium, it must contain ions capable of reducing uranium both thermodynamically and kinetically. At present, the best candidates are reduced sulfur species.

Duffy, C.J.; Ogard, A.E.

1982-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

383

Safeguards Verification Measurements using Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Laser Ablation Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) is a new verification measurement technology under development at the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). LAARS uses three lasers to ablate and then measure the relative isotopic abundance of uranium compounds. An ablation laser is tightly focused on uranium-bearing solids producing a small plume containing uranium atoms. Two collinear wavelength-tuned spectrometry lasers transit through the plume and the absorbance of U-235 and U-238 isotopes are measured to determine U-235 enrichment. The measurement has high relative precision and detection limits approaching the femtogram range for uranium. It is independent of chemical form and degree of dilution with nuisance dust and other materials. High speed sample scanning and pinpoint characterization allow measurements on millions of particles/hour to detect and analyze the enrichment of trace uranium in samples. The spectrometer is assembled using commercially available components at comparatively low cost, and features a compact and low power design. Future designs can be engineered for reliable, autonomous deployment within an industrial plant environment. Two specific applications of the spectrometer are under development: 1) automated unattended aerosol sampling and analysis and 2) on-site small sample destructive assay measurement. The two applications propose game-changing technological advances in gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) safeguards verification. The aerosol measurement instrument, LAARS-environmental sampling (ES), collects aerosol particles from the plant environment in a purpose-built rotating drum impactor and then uses LAARS-ES to quickly scan the surface of the impactor to measure the enrichments of the captured particles. The current approach to plant misuse detection involves swipe sampling and offsite analysis. Though this approach is very robust it generally requires several months to obtain results from a given sample collection. The destructive assay instrument, LAARS-destructive assay (DA), uses a simple purpose-built fixture with a sampling planchet to collect adsorbed UF6 gas from a cylinder valve or from a process line tap or pigtail. A portable LAARS-DA instrument scans the microgram quantity of uranium collected on the planchet and the assay of the uranium is measured to ~0.15% relative precision. Currently, destructive assay samples for bias defect measurements are collected in small sample cylinders for offsite mass spectrometry measurement.

Anheier, Norman C.; Cannon, Bret D.; Qiao, Hong (Amy) [Amy; Phillips, Jon R.

2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

384

Parametric Thermal Models of the Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT)  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This work supports the restart of transient testing in the United States using the Department of Energy’s Transient Reactor Test Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory. It also supports the Global Threat Reduction Initiative by reducing proliferation risk of high enriched uranium fuel. The work involves the creation of a nuclear fuel assembly model using the fuel performance code known as BISON. The model simulates the thermal behavior of a nuclear fuel assembly during steady state and transient operational modes. Additional models of the same geometry but differing material properties are created to perform parametric studies. The results show that fuel and cladding thermal conductivity have the greatest effect on fuel temperature under the steady state operational mode. Fuel density and fuel specific heat have the greatest effect for transient operational model. When considering a new fuel type it is recommended to use materials that decrease the specific heat of the fuel and the thermal conductivity of the fuel’s cladding in order to deal with higher density fuels that accompany the LEU conversion process. Data on the latest operating conditions of TREAT need to be attained in order to validate BISON’s results. BISON’s models for TREAT (material models, boundary convection models) are modest and need additional work to ensure accuracy and confidence in results.

Bradley K. Heath

2014-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

385

Corrosion-resistant uranium  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

The present invention is directed to the protecting of uranium and uranium alloy articles from corrosion by providing the surfaces of the articles with a layer of an ion-plated metal selected from aluminum and zinc to a thickness of at least 60 microinches and then converting at least the outer surface of the ion-plated layer of aluminum or zinc to aluminum chromate or zinc chromate. This conversion of the aluminum or zinc to the chromate form considerably enhances the corrosion resistance of the ion plating so as to effectively protect the coated article from corrosion.

Hovis, V.M. Jr.; Pullen, W.C.; Kollie, T.G.; Bell, R.T.

1981-10-21T23:59:59.000Z

386

Corrosion-resistant uranium  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

The present invention is directed to the protecting of uranium and uranium alloy articles from corrosion by providing the surfaces of the articles with a layer of an ion-plated metal selected from aluminum and zinc to a thickness of at least 60 microinches and then converting at least the outer surface of the ion-plated layer of aluminum or zinc to aluminum chromate or zinc chromate. This conversion of the aluminum or zinc to the chromate form considerably enhances the corrosion resistance of the ion plating so as to effectively protect the coated article from corrosion.

Hovis, Jr., Victor M. (Kingston, TN); Pullen, William C. (Knoxville, TN); Kollie, Thomas G. (Oak Ridge, TN); Bell, Richard T. (Knoxville, TN)

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

387

Uranium Marketing Annual Report -  

Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Update (EIA)

AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE:1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel),Feet) Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul(Summary) " ,"ClickPipelines About U.S. NaturalA. Michael SchaalNovember1. Foreign sales of uranium froma. Uranium

388

High loading uranium fuel plate  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

Two embodiments of a high uranium fuel plate are disclosed which contain a meat comprising structured uranium compound confined between a pair of diffusion bonded ductile metal cladding plates uniformly covering the meat, the meat having a uniform high fuel loading comprising a content of uranium compound greater than about 45 Vol. % at a porosity not greater than about 10 Vol. %. In a first embodiment, the meat is a plurality of parallel wires of uranium compound. In a second embodiment, the meat is a dispersion compact containing uranium compound. The fuel plates are fabricated by a hot isostatic pressing process.

Wiencek, Thomas C. (Bolingbrook, IL); Domagala, Robert F. (Indian Head Park, IL); Thresh, Henry R. (Palos Heights, IL)

1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

389

Facility Safety  

Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

1996-10-24T23:59:59.000Z

390

Facility Safety  

Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

1995-11-16T23:59:59.000Z

391

Facility Operations 1993 fiscal year work plan: WBS 1.3.1  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The Facility Operations program is responsible for the safe, secure, and environmentally sound management of several former defense nuclear production facilities, and for the nuclear materials in those facilities. As the mission for Facility Operations plants has shifted from production to support of environmental restoration, each plant is making a transition to support the new mission. The facilities include: K Basins (N Reactor fuel storage); N Reactor; Plutonium-Uranium Reduction Extraction (PUREX) Plant; Uranium Oxide (UO{sub 3}) Plant; 300 Area Fuels Supply (N Reactor fuel supply); Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP).

Not Available

1992-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

392

International Facility Management Association Strategic Facility  

Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

Facility Management Association Strategic Facility Planning: A WhIte PAPer Strategic Facility Planning: A White Paper on Strategic Facility Planning 2009 | International...

393

Enrichment of light hydrocarbon mixture  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Light hydrocarbon enrichment is accomplished using a vertically oriented distillation column having a plurality of vertically oriented, nonselective micro/mesoporous hollow fibers. Vapor having, for example, both propylene and propane is sent upward through the distillation column in between the hollow fibers. Vapor exits neat the top of the column and is condensed to form a liquid phase that is directed back downward through the lumen of the hollow fibers. As vapor continues to ascend and liquid continues to countercurrently descend, the liquid at the bottom of the column becomes enriched in a higher boiling point, light hydrocarbon (propane, for example) and the vapor at the top becomes enriched in a lower boiling point light hydrocarbon (propylene, for example). The hollow fiber becomes wetted with liquid during the process.

Yang; Dali (Los Alamos, NM); Devlin, David (Santa Fe, NM); Barbero, Robert S. (Santa Cruz, NM); Carrera, Martin E. (Naperville, IL); Colling, Craig W. (Warrenville, IL)

2010-08-10T23:59:59.000Z

394

Enrichment of light hydrocarbon mixture  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

Light hydrocarbon enrichment is accomplished using a vertically oriented distillation column having a plurality of vertically oriented, nonselective micro/mesoporous hollow fibers. Vapor having, for example, both propylene and propane is sent upward through the distillation column in between the hollow fibers. Vapor exits neat the top of the column and is condensed to form a liquid phase that is directed back downward through the lumen of the hollow fibers. As vapor continues to ascend and liquid continues to countercurrently descend, the liquid at the bottom of the column becomes enriched in a higher boiling point, light hydrocarbon (propane, for example) and the vapor at the top becomes enriched in a lower boiling point light hydrocarbon (propylene, for example). The hollow fiber becomes wetted with liquid during the process.

Yang, Dali (Los Alamos, NM); Devlin, David (Santa Fe, NM); Barbero, Robert S. (Santa Cruz, NM); Carrera, Martin E. (Naperville, IL); Colling, Craig W. (Warrenville, IL)

2011-11-29T23:59:59.000Z

395

Fabrication of Cerium Oxide and Uranium Oxide Microspheres for Space Nuclear Power Applications  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Cerium oxide and uranium oxide microspheres are being produced via an internal gelation sol-gel method to investigate alternative fabrication routes for space nuclear fuels. Depleted uranium and non-radioactive cerium are being utilized as surrogates for plutonium-238 (Pu-238) used in radioisotope thermoelectric generators and for enriched uranium required by nuclear thermal rockets. While current methods used to produce Pu-238 fuels at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) involve the generation of fine powders that pose a respiratory hazard and have a propensity to contaminate glove boxes, the sol-gel route allows for the generation of oxide microsphere fuels through an aqueous route. The sol-gel method does not generate fine powders and may require fewer processing steps than the LANL method with less operator handling. High-quality cerium dioxide microspheres have been fabricated in the desired size range and equipment is being prepared to establish a uranium dioxide microsphere production capability.

Jeffrey A. Katalenich; Michael R. Hartman; Robert C. O'Brien

2013-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

396

NNSA B-Roll: MOX Facility  

ScienceCinema (OSTI)

In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

None

2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

397

Monitoring large enrichment plants using thermal imagery from commercial satellites: A case study  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Thermal imagery from commercial satellites is an interesting candidate technology for use as a verification tool for the purpose of monitoring certain types of fissile material production sites. Examples of its potential treaty applications include the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) or a Fissile Material Production Moratorium. To help determine the capabilities and limitations of such imagery as a monitoring tool, the author has examined archived LANDSAT-5 images of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, a large US uranium-enrichment facility in Ohio. This analysis indicates that large-scale gaseous diffusion plants can very likely be recognized as operational with thermal imagery throughout most of the year in clear weather conditions. It may also be possible to identify certain other large-scale qualitative changes in operations, such as the shut-down of a single process building in a plant, by a comparison of its temperature with the temperatures of neighboring operational process buildings. However, uncertainties in the current data set prevent a definitive conclusion regarding the latter capability. This study identifies intrinsic weaknesses, including vulnerability to countermeasures, that prevent thermal imagery from satellites from being a robust standalone verification tool, even for very large enrichment plants. Nonetheless, the imagery may be useful as a trigger for an on-site inspection, to alert and train inspectors prior to an inspection, and possibly to reduce the frequency of on-site inspections required at a given site. It could have some immediate utility for monitoring the two large gaseous diffusion plants the US and the French plant at Tricastin, and possibly for determining the operational status of two gaseous diffusion plants in China as well--a total of five plants worldwide. The ease of acquisition and modest cost of thermal commercial imagery further increase its attractiveness as a verification tool. In addition to these basic results, the author considers the influence on performance of improvements in spatial resolution in the thermal band expected from new and future platforms. He also discusses the effects of external factors such as convective cooling of the roofs, solar heating, the atmosphere, emissivity changes, and deliberate countermeasures--all of which can adversely affect measurements.

Adam Bernstein

2000-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

398

Neutron-Rich Isotope Production Using a Uranium Carbide Carbon Nanotubes SPES Target Prototype  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The SPES (Selective Production of Exotic Species) project, under development at the Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare - Laboratori Nazionali di Legnaro (INFN-LNL), is a new-generation Isotope Separation On-Line (ISOL) facility for the production of radioactive ion beams by means of the proton-induced fission of uranium. In the framework of the research on the SPES target, seven uranium carbide discs, obtained by reacting uranium oxide with graphite and carbon nanotubes, were irradiated with protons at the Holifield Radioactive Ion Beam Facility (HRIBF) of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). In the following, the yields of several fission products obtained during the experiment are presented and discussed. The experimental results are then compared to those obtained using a standard uranium carbide target. The reported data highlights the capability of the new type of SPES target to produce and release isotopes of interest for the nuclear physics community.

Corradetti, Stefano [ORNL; Biasetto, Lisa [INFN, Laboratori Nazionali di Legnaro, Italy; Manzolaro, Mattia [INFN, Laboratori Nazionali di Legnaro, Italy; Scarpa, Daniele [ORNL; Carturan, S. [INFN, Laboratori Nazionali di Legnaro, Italy; Andrighetto, Alberto [INFN, Laboratori Nazionali di Legnaro, Italy; Prete, Gianfranco [ORNL; Vasquez, Jose L [ORNL; Zanonato, P. [Dipartimento di Scienze Chimiche, Padova, Italy; Colombo, P. [Dipartimento di Ingegneria Meccanica, Padova, Italy; Jost, Carola [University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK); Stracener, Daniel W [ORNL

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

399

Method of preparation of uranium nitride  

DOE Patents [OSTI]

Method for producing terminal uranium nitride complexes comprising providing a suitable starting material comprising uranium; oxidizing the starting material with a suitable oxidant to produce one or more uranium(IV)-azide complexes; and, sufficiently irradiating the uranium(IV)-azide complexes to produce the terminal uranium nitride complexes.

Kiplinger, Jaqueline Loetsch; Thomson, Robert Kenneth James

2013-07-09T23:59:59.000Z

400

D0 Decomissioning : Storage of Depleted Uranium Modules Inside D0 Calorimeters after the Termination of D0 Experiment  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

Dzero liquid Argon calorimeters contain hadronic modules made of depleted uranium plates. After the termination of DO detector's operation, liquid Argon will be transferred back to Argon storage Dewar, and all three calorimeters will be warmed up. At this point, there is no intention to disassemble the calorimeters. The depleted uranium modules will stay inside the cryostats. Depleted uranium is a by-product of the uranium enrichment process. It is slightly radioactive, emits alpha, beta and gamma radiation. External radiation hazards are minimal. Alpha radiation has no external exposure hazards, as dead layers of skin stop it; beta radiation might have effects only when there is a direct contact with skin; and gamma rays are negligible - levels are extremely low. Depleted uranium is a pyrophoric material. Small particles (such as shavings, powder etc.) may ignite with presence of Oxygen (air). Also, in presence of air and moisture it can oxidize. Depleted uranium can absorb moisture and keep oxidizing later, even after air and moisture are excluded. Uranium oxide can powder and flake off. This powder is also pyrographic. Uranium oxide may create health problems if inhaled. Since uranium oxide is water soluble, it may enter the bloodstream and cause toxic effects.

Sarychev, Michael; /Fermilab

2011-09-21T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "uranium enrichment facility" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


401

Proceedings of the 1990 International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The global effort to reduce, and possibly, eliminate the international traffic in highly-enriched uranium caused by its use in research reactors requires extensive cooperation and free exchange of information among all participants. To foster this free exchange of information, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program, at Argonne National Laboratory, sponsored this meeting as the thirteenth of a series which began in 1978. The common effort brought together, past, a large number of specialists from many countries. On hundred twenty-three participants from 26 countries, including scientists, reactor operators, and personnel from commercial fuel suppliers, research centers, and government organizations, convened in Newport, Rhode Island to discuss their results, their activities, and their plans relative to converting research reactors to low-enriched fuels. As more and more reactors convert to the use of low-enriched uranium, the emphasis of our effort has begun to shift from research and development to tasks more directly related to implementation of the new fuels and technologies that have been developed, and to refinements of those fuels and technologies. It is appropriate, for this reason, that the emphasis of this meeting was placed on safety and on conversion experiences. This individual papers in this report have been cataloged separately.

Not Available

1993-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

402

A more accurate and penetrating method to measure the enrichment and mass of UF6 storage containers using passive neutron self-interrogation  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

This paper describes an unattended mode neutron measurement that can provide the enrichment of the uranium in UF{sub 6} cylinders. The new passive neutron measurement provides better penetration into the uranium mass than prior gamma-ray enrichment measurement methods. The Passive Neutron Enrichment Monitor (PNEM) provides a new measurement technique that uses passive neutron totals and coincidence counting together with neutron self-interrogation to measure the enrichment in the cylinders. The measurement uses the neutron rates from two detector pods. One of the pods has a bare polyethylene surface next to the cylinder and the other polyethylene surface is covered with Cd to prevent thermal neutrons from returning to the cylinder. The primary neutron source from the enriched UF{sub 6} is the alpha-particle decay from the {sub 234}U that interacts with the fluorine to produce random neutrons. The singles neutron counting rate is dominated by the {sub 234}U neutrons with a minor contribution from the induced fissions in the {sub 235}U. However, the doubles counting rate comes primarily from the induced fissions (i.e., multiplication) in the {sub 235}U in enriched uranium. The PNEM concept makes use of the passive neutrons that are initially produced from the {sub 234}U reactions that track the {sub 235}U enrichment during the enrichment process. The induced fission reactions from the thermal-neutron albedo are all from the {sub 235}U and provide a measurement of the {sub 235}U. The Cd ratio has the desirable feature that all of the thermal-neutron-induced fissions in {sub 235}U are independent of the original neutron source. Thus, the ratio is independent of the uranium age, purity, and prior reactor history.

Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

403

Mobile Pit verification system design based on passive special nuclear material verification in weapons storage facilities  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reaction rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)

Paul, J. N.; Chin, M. R.; Sjoden, G. E. [Nuclear and Radiological Engineering Program, George W. Woodruff School of Mechanical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 770 State St, Atlanta, GA 30332-0745 (United States)

2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

404

Stimulating the In Situ Activity of Geobacter Species to Remove Uranium from the Groundwater of a Uranium-Contaminated Aquifer  

SciTech Connect (OSTI)

The potential for removing uranium from contaminated groundwater by stimulating the in situ activity of dissimilatory metal-reducing microorganisms was evaluated in a uranium-contaminated aquifer located in Rifle, Colo. Acetate (1 to 3 mM) was injected into the subsurface over a 3-month period via an injection gallery composed of 20 injection wells, which was installed upgradient from a series of 15 monitoring wells. U(VI) concentrations decreased in as little as 9 days after acetate injection was initiated, and within 50 days uranium had declined below the prescribed treatment level of 0.18 _M in some of the monitoring wells. Analysis of 16S ribosomal DNA (rDNA) sequences and phospholipid fatty acid profiles demonstrated that the initial loss of uranium from the groundwater was associated with an enrichment of Geobacter species in the treatment zone. Fe(II) in the groundwater also increased during this period, suggesting that U(VI) reduction was coincident with Fe(III) reduction. As the acetate injection continued over 50 days there was a loss of sulfate from the groundwater and an accumulation of sulfide and the composition of the microbial community changed. Organisms with 16S rDNA sequences most closely related to those of sulfate reducers became predominant, and Geobacter species became a minor component of the community. This apparent switch from Fe(III) reduction to sulfate reduction as the terminal electron accepting process for the oxidation of the injected acetate was associated with an increase in uranium concentration in the groundwater. These results demonstrate that in situ bioremediation of uranium-contaminated groundwater is feasible but suggest that the strategy should be optimized to better maintain long-term activity of Geobacter species.

Anderson, R. T.; Vrionis, Helen A.; Ortiz-Bernad, Irene; Resch, Charles T.; Long, Philip E.; Dayvault, R. D.; Karp, Ken; Marutzky, Sammy J.; Metzler, Donald R.; Peacock, Aaron D.; White, David C.; Lowe, Mary; Lovley, Derek R.

2003-10-01T23:59:59.000Z