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Sample records for underground nuclear weapons

  1. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kristensen, Hans M. [Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  2. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  3. Identification of nuclear weapons

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  4. Virtual nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  5. Nuclear weapon detection categorization analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1997-12-01

    This statement of work is for the Proof of Concept for nuclear weapon categories utility in Arms control. The focus of the project will be to collect, analyze and correlate Intrinsic Radiation (INRAD) calculation results for the purpose of defining measurable signatures that differentiate categories of nuclear weapons. The project will support START III negotiations by identifying categories of nuclear weapons. The categories could be used to clarify sub-limits on the total number of nuclear weapons.

  6. Nuclear Weapons Journal

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration wouldMass map shinesSolarNewsusceptometer under pressureNavy TurnsNuclear Weapons Journal

  7. Sandia's Nuclear Weapons Mission

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservation ofAlbuquerque AlbuquerqueCybernetics:DefenseNuclear Weapons Mission Ensuring

  8. Debunking Six Big Myths about Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Debunking Six Big Myths about Nuclear Weapons National Security Science Latest Issue:December 2014 All Issues submit Debunking six big myths about nuclear weapons Are nuclear...

  9. New details on nuclear weapons program bared

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hileman, B.

    1994-07-11

    In a continuing effort to be more candid about Department of Energy nuclear weapons programs, Energy Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary recently declassified a substantial amount of information. On June 27, she revealed details about total US weapons-grade uranium production, testing of a bomb made of reactor-grade plutonium, radiation experiments conducted on humans since the 1920s, and underground and atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. O'Leary explains the new revelations by saying thousands of people in meetings across the country this year have told her that openness in government is very important. DOE is responding today in a manner that both satisfies the strong public interest and respects critical national security requirements.

  10. The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wood, Houston G.; Glaser, Alexander; Kemp, R. Scott

    2014-05-09

    Uranium enrichment by centrifugation is the basis for the quick and efficient production of nuclear fuel-or nuclear weapons.

  11. Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Tang, Alfred

    2008-01-01

    Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

  12. Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Alfred Tang

    2013-06-25

    Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

  13. Deproliferation Dynamics : : Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapons Programs

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mehta, Rupal Naresh

    2014-01-01

    M. 1996. Atomic Bombast: Nuclear Weapon Decision Making in2007. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and InternationalDeterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons. ” Journal of Conflict

  14. Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hart, Mark

    2014-11-20

    Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

  15. Control of Nuclear Weapon Data

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21

    The directive establishes the policy, process and procedures for control of nuclear weapon data to ensure that dissemination of the information is restricted to individuals with appropriate clearances, approved authorization and valid need-to-know in keeping with the Atomic Energy Act (as amended) stipulation of ensuring common defense and security. Supersedes DOE O 5610.2.

  16. Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1991-01-01

    Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

  17. Nuclear Weapons Latency 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sweeney, David J

    2014-07-25

    in certain cases. However, use of MAUA for adversary modeling also significantly increased the number of assumptions necessary. A Latency investigation of South Korean nuclear fuel cycle facility development, a current nonproliferation policy concern...

  18. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-08-05

    The Order defines the Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, which was established to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives.

  19. EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...

  20. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  1. What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    May, Michael M

    2005-01-01

    1990 What Do We Do with Nuclear Weapons Now? by Michael M.for the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy MICHAEL M. MAYan electoral majority in nuclear weapons states. Unlike

  2. Philippine Bases and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Schirmer, Daniel Boone

    1983-01-01

    BASES AN-fJ U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY In 1947, when Unitedcould bring as many nuclear weapons as It wanted onto theinclude opposition to U.S. nuclear weapons and bases In the

  3. Policy Paper 15: Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Waltz, Kenneth N.

    1995-01-01

    Much About North Korean Nuclear Weapons,” unpublished paper,the South and use nuclear weapons in doing so. How concernedout how to use nuclear weapons except for deterrence. Is a

  4. Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Davis, J.C. (Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)); Kay, D.A. (Uranium Institute, London (United Kingdom))

    1992-07-01

    UN inspectors discovered an electromagnetic isotope separation factory that put Iraq just 18-30 months away from having enough material for a bomb. They also found European centrifuge technology and plans for an implosion device. The inspections of Iraq mandated by the United Nations as a cease-fire condition at the end of the Gulf War in February 1991 have revealed a clandestine nuclear materials production and weapons design program of unexpected size and sophistication. The total value of that program, in terms of equipment and personnel deployed between 1981 and 1991, may be on the order of $5-10 billion. The program employed an estimated 7000 scientist and 20,000 workers. 6 refs., 4 figs.

  5. Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    70th anniversary lecture Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of next 70th anniversary lecture Lab's role in the development of nuclear weapons...

  6. National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers October 28, 2013 -...

  7. Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963....

  8. Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production Processes to Their Environmental Consequences Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons...

  9. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2015-01-26

    All nuclear explosives and nuclear explosive operations require special safety, security, and use control consideration because of the potentially unacceptable consequences of an accident or unauthorized act; therefore, a Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program is established to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Supersedes DOE O 452.1D.

  10. Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of Defense

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-05-14

    This Order establishes Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration requirements and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system surety activities in conjunction with the Department of Defense. Supersedes DOE O 452.6.

  11. The history of nuclear weapon safety devices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Plummer, D.W.; Greenwood, W.H.

    1998-06-01

    The paper presents the history of safety devices used in nuclear weapons from the early days of separables to the latest advancements in MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS). Although the paper focuses on devices, the principles of Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety implementation will also be presented.

  12. China’s Nuclear Weapons Program and the Chinese Research, Development, and Acquisition System

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    CHASE, Michael S.; LIEGGI, Stephanie; ERICKSON, Andrew S.; LAFFERTY, Brian

    2014-01-01

    January 2014 China’s Nuclear Weapons Program and the Chineseand processes within the nuclear weapons program may beare possible. Studying the nuclear weapons program is thus

  13. Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-12-17

    This directive establishes requirements and responsibilities to prevent the deliberate unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear explosives and U.S. nuclear weapons. Cancels DOE O 452.4.

  14. Management of the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-06-08

    The Order defines and affirms the authorities and responsibilities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for the management of the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex and emphasizes that the management of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile is the DOE's highest priority for the NNSA and the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. Supersedes DOE O 5600.1.

  15. Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program WHEN: Jan 13, 2015 7:30 PM - 8:00 PM WHERE: Fuller Lodge Central...

  16. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garwin, Richard L., E-mail: RLG2@us.ibm.com [IBM Fellow Emeritus, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, P.O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  17. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and...

  18. GeoffBrumfiel,Washington Nuclear watchdogs and former weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    GeoffBrumfiel,Washington Nuclear watchdogs and former weapons scientists are taking issue is supposed to help scientists assess the nation's ageing nuclear stockpile without testing the weapons to optimize designs for low-yield nuclear weapons,he says.A 1995 Livermore panel on which he sat warned

  19. Just war and nuclear weapons : just war theory and its application to the Korean nuclear weapons issue in Korean Christianity 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Son, Changwan

    2009-01-01

    This thesis is primarily an application of the Christian tradition of Just War to the problems arising from the basing of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and the development of nuclear weapons by the regime in the ...

  20. Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile...

  1. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile...

  2. Date Set for Closure of Russian Nuclear Weapons Plant - NNSA...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Date Set for Closure of Russian Nuclear Weapons Plant - NNSA Is Helping Make It Happen | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission...

  3. NNSA Administrator Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons Complex | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile...

  4. The IAEA: Neutralizing Iraq's nuclear weapons potential

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zifferero, M.

    1993-04-01

    With support from UNSCOM and staff members from several countries, the IAEA has succeeded in identifying and destroying most of Iraq's nuclear weapons potential. IAEA activities in Iraq have also established a sound basis for long-term monitoring of Iraq. This will involve several procedures and techniques, including the periodic monitoring of Iraq's main bodies of water and unannounced visits of resident inspectors to plants, factories, and research centers.

  5. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Immele, John D; Wagner, Richard L

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.

  6. Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of Defense

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-10-19

    The Order prescribes how the Department of Energy participates with the Department of Defense (DoD) to ensure the surety (safety, security and control) of military nuclear weapon systems deployed around the world. The Order establishes National Nuclear Security Administration requirements and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system surety activities in conjunction with the DoD. Cancels DOE O 5610.13. Canceled by DOE O 452.6A.

  7. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-01-22

    This Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts/deliberate unauthorized use. Cancels DOE O 452.4A. Canceled by DOE O 452.4C.

  8. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-11-19

    The Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control (UC) elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts (DUAs), deliberate unauthorized use (DUU), and denial of authorized use (DAU).

  9. A thousand suns : political motivations for nuclear weapons testing

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Raas, Whitney

    2006-01-01

    Nuclear weapon testing is the final step in the nuclear development process, an announcement of ability and strength. The consequences of a nuclear test are far from easy to bear, however: economic sanctions can be crippling ...

  10. DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives "DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship" FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY...

  11. EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    OF ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION SUBJECT: Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for...

  12. Nuclear energy in a nuclear weapon free world

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph

    2009-01-01

    The prospect of a nuclear renaissance has revived a decades old debate over the proliferation and terrorism risks of the use of nuclear power. This debate in the last few years has taken on an added dimension with renewed attention to disarmament. Increasingly, concerns that proliferation risks may reduce the prospects for realizing the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world are being voiced.

  13. IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE An Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a type of nuclear weapon.

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE An Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a type of nuclear weapon. When of an Improvised Nuclear Device? An IND would cause great destruction, death, and injury and have a wide area

  14. Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gsponer, A

    2005-01-01

    The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons range, greatly enhanced coupling to targets, possibility to drive powerful shaped charged jets and forged fragments, enhanced prompt radiation effects, reduced collateral damage and residual radioactivity, etc.

  15. An assessment of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sivels, Ciara (Ciara Brooke)

    2013-01-01

    In February of 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear weapons test. Speculations are that this test was conducted to further develop a warhead small enough to fit on an intercontinental ballistic missile. This test ...

  16. The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-01-01

    This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

  17. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Technical Report) | SciTech Connect

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AND MISCELLANEOUSMATHEMATICS, COMPUTING, AND INFORMATION SCIENCE; EVALUATION; NATIONAL SECURITY; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; US DOD; WEAPONS Word Cloud More Like This Full Text preview...

  18. Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM, DOE O 452.2D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY...

  19. Underground nuclear astrophysics: why and how

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Best, A; Fülöp, Zs; Gyürky, Gy; Laubenstein, M; Napolitani, E; Rigato, V; Roca, V; Szücs, T

    2016-01-01

    The goal of nuclear astrophysics is to measure cross sections of nuclear physics reactions of interest in astrophysics. At stars temperatures, these cross sections are very low due to the suppression of the Coulomb barrier. Cosmic ray induced background can seriously limit the determination of reaction cross sections at energies relevant to astrophysical processes and experimental setups should be arranged in order to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. Placing experiments in underground sites, however, reduces this background opening the way towards ultra low cross section determination. LUNA (Laboratory for Underground Nuclear Astrophysics) was pioneer in this sense. Two accelerators were mounted at the INFN National Laboratories of Gran Sasso (LNGS) allowing to study nuclear reactions close to stellar energies. A summary of the relevant technology used, including accelerators, target production and characterisation, and background treatment is given.

  20. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-12-31

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  1. Reassessing U.S. nuclear weapons policy Harold Brown[1] and John Deutch[2

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Deutch, John

    1 Reassessing U.S. nuclear weapons policy Harold Brown[1] and John Deutch[2] The end of the Cold of terrorism and the risks of nuclear proliferation, call for a reassessment of the role of nuclear weapons the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as a practical means of mobilizing more resolute

  2. Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile without underground testing. Science-based weapons under extreme conditions that approach the high energy density (HED) environments found in a nuclear in HED science and support broader national science goals. Virtually all of the energy from a nuclear

  3. The Association between Cancers and Low Level Radiation: an evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Britton, Julie

    2010-01-01

    and Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant. Rad Res 1989;120:19-Evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility MASTERAT T H E HANFORD NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITY JULIE BRITTON

  4. An analysis of technical and policy drivers in Current U.S. nuclear weapons force structure

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Baker, Amanda, S. B. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    2008-01-01

    U.S. nuclear weapons force structure accounts for the number and types of strategic and nonstrategic weapon systems in various locations that comprise the nuclear arsenal. While exact numbers, locations, and detailed designs ...

  5. The Association between Cancers and Low Level Radiation: an evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Britton, Julie

    2010-01-01

    National Laboratory, and Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant.Laboratory (ORNL), and Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant (ORNL through 1977, and Rocky Flats through 1979. The SMRs

  6. Environmental Restoration Strategic Plan. Remediating the nuclear weapons complex

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-08-01

    With the end of the cold war, the US has a reduced need for nuclear weapons production. In response, the Department of Energy has redirected resources from weapons production to weapons dismantlement and environmental remediation. To this end, in November 1989, the US Department of Energy (DOE) established the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (renamed the Office of Environmental Management in 1994). It was created to bring under a central authority the management of radioactive and hazardous wastes at DOE sites and inactive or shut down facilities. The Environmental Restoration Program, a major component of DOE`s Environmental Management Program, is responsible for the remediation and management of contaminated environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater, sediments) and the decommissioning of facilities and structures at 130 sites in over 30 states and territories.

  7. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1997-01-17

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1. Canceled by DOE O 452.1B.

  8. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-08-06

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1A. Canceled by DOE O 452.1C.

  9. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-09-20

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1B. Canceled by DOE O 452.1D

  10. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-04-14

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1C. Canceled by DOE O 452.1D Admin Chg 1.

  11. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-04-14

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1C. Admin Chg 1, dated 7-10-13, cancels DOE O 452.1D.

  12. From the lab to the battlefield? Nanotechnology and fourth generation nuclear weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gsponer, A

    2002-01-01

    The paper addresses some major implications of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) engineering and nanotechnology for the improvement of existing types of nuclear weapons, and the development of more robust versions of these weapons, as well as for the development of fourth generations nuclear weapons in which nanotechnology will play an essential role.

  13. weapons material | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4)9 FederalRivers andMEDA Station3/%2A| National Nuclear

  14. Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Saunders, Emily C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rowberry, Ariana N. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fearey, Bryan L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-12

    In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

  15. Surface effects of underground nuclear explosions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allen, B.M.; Drellack, S.L. Jr.; Townsend, M.J.

    1997-06-01

    The effects of nuclear explosions have been observed and studied since the first nuclear test (code named Trinity) on July 16, 1945. Since that first detonation, 1,053 nuclear tests have been conducted by the US, most of which were sited underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The effects of underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) on their surroundings have long been the object of much interest and study, especially for containment, engineering, and treaty verification purposes. One aspect of these explosion-induced phenomena is the disruption or alteration of the near-surface environment, also known as surface effects. This report was prepared at the request of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), to bring together, correlate, and preserve information and techniques used in the recognition and documentation of surface effects of UNEs. This report has several main sections, including pertinent background information (Section 2.0), descriptions of the different types of surface effects (Section 3.0), discussion of their application and limitations (Section 4.0), an extensive bibliography and glossary (Section 6.0 and Appendix A), and procedures used to document geologic surface effects at the NTS (Appendix C). Because a majority of US surface-effects experience is from the NTS, an overview of pertinent NTS-specific information also is provided in Appendix B. It is not within the scope of this report to explore new relationships among test parameters, physiographic setting, and the types or degree of manifestation of surface effects, but rather to compile, summarize, and capture surface-effects observations and interpretations, as well as documentation procedures and the rationale behind them.

  16. Underground nuclear power station using self-regulating heat-pipe controlled reactors

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Hampel, Viktor E. (Pleasanton, CA)

    1989-01-01

    A nuclear reactor for generating electricity is disposed underground at the bottom of a vertical hole that can be drilled using conventional drilling technology. The primary coolant of the reactor core is the working fluid in a plurality of thermodynamically coupled heat pipes emplaced in the hole between the heat source at the bottom of the hole and heat exchange means near the surface of the earth. Additionally, the primary coolant (consisting of the working flud in the heat pipes in the reactor core) moderates neutrons and regulates their reactivity, thus keeping the power of the reactor substantially constant. At the end of its useful life, the reactor core may be abandoned in place. Isolation from the atmosphere in case of accident or for abandonment is provided by the operation of explosive closures and mechanical valves emplaced along the hole. This invention combines technology developed and tested for small, highly efficient, space-based nuclear electric power plants with the technology of fast-acting closure mechanisms developed and used for underground testing of nuclear weapons. This invention provides a nuclear power installation which is safe from the worst conceivable reactor accident, namely, the explosion of a nuclear weapon near the ground surface of a nuclear power reactor.

  17. An underground nuclear power station using self-regulating heat-pipe controlled reactors

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Hampel, V.E.

    1988-05-17

    A nuclear reactor for generating electricity is disposed underground at the bottom of a vertical hole that can be drilled using conventional drilling technology. The primary coolant of the reactor core is the working fluid in a plurality of thermodynamically coupled heat pipes emplaced in the hole between the heat source at the bottom of the hole and heat exchange means near the surface of the earth. Additionally, the primary coolant (consisting of the working fluid in the heat pipes in the reactor core) moderates neutrons and regulates their reactivity, thus keeping the power of the reactor substantially constant. At the end of its useful life, the reactor core may be abandoned in place. Isolation from the atmosphere in case of accident or for abandonment is provided by the operation of explosive closures and mechanical valves emplaced along the hole. This invention combines technology developed and tested for small, highly efficient, space-based nuclear electric power plants with the technology of fast- acting closure mechanisms developed and used for underground testing of nuclear weapons. This invention provides a nuclear power installation which is safe from the worst conceivable reactor accident, namely, the explosion of a nuclear weapon near the ground surface of a nuclear power reactor. 5 figs.

  18. EIS-0225: Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS evaluates the potential environemental impact of a proposal to continue operation of the Pantex Plant and associated storage of nuclear weapon components. Alternatives considered include: ...

  19. Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dombey, Norman

    2011-01-01

    Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

  20. Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Norman Dombey

    2011-12-10

    Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

  1. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

  2. A quantitative assessment of nuclear weapons proliferation risk utilizing probabilistic methods

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sentell, Dennis Shannon, 1971-

    2002-01-01

    A comparative quantitative assessment is made of the nuclear weapons proliferation risk between various nuclear reactor/fuel cycle concepts using a probabilistic method. The work presented details quantified proliferation ...

  3. Assurance and assessment techniques for nuclear weapon related software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blackledge, M.A.

    1993-07-01

    Sandia National Laboratories has the qualification evaluation responsibility for the design of certain components intended for use in nuclear weapons. Specific techniques in assurance and assessment have been developed to provide the quality evidence that the software has been properly qualified for use. Qualification Evaluation is a process for assessing the suitability of either a process used to develop or manufacture the product, or the product itself. The qualification process uses a team approach to evaluating a product or process, chaired by a Quality Assurance professional, with other members representing the design organization, the systems organization, and the production agency. Suitable for use implies that adequate and appropriate definition and documentation has been produced and formally released, adequate verification and validation activities have taken place to ensure proper operation, and the software product meets all requirements, explicitly or otherwise.

  4. Assurance and assessment techniques for nuclear weapon related software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blackledge, M.A.

    1993-12-31

    Sandia National Laboratories has the qualification evaluation responsibility for the design of certain components intended for use in nuclear weapons. Specific techniques in assurance and assessment have been developed to provide the quality evidence that the software has been properly qualified for use. Qualification Evaluation is a process for assessing the suitability of either a process used to develop or manufacture the product, or the product itself The qualification process uses a team approach to evaluating a product or process, chaired by a Quality Assurance professional, with other members representing the design organization, the systems organization, and the production agency. Suitable for use implies that adequate and appropriate definition and documentation has been produced and formally released, adequate verification and validation activities have taken place to ensure proper operation, and the software product meets all requirements, explicitly or otherwise.

  5. Assurance and assessment techniques for nuclear weapon related software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blackledge, M.A.

    1993-01-01

    Sandia National Laboratories has the qualification evaluation responsibility for the design of certain components intended for use in nuclear weapons. Specific techniques in assurance and assessment have been developed to provide the quality evidence that the software has been properly qualified for use. Qualification Evaluation is a process for assessing the suitability of either a process used to develop or manufacture the product, or the product itself. The qualification process uses a team approach to evaluating a product or process, chaired by a Quality Assurance professional, with other members representing the design organization, the systems organization, and the production agency. Suitable for use implies that adequate and appropriate definition and documentation has been produced and formally released, adequate verification and validation activities have taken place to ensure proper operation, and the software product meets all requirements, explicitly or otherwise.

  6. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2015-08-28

    The order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control elements of DOE O 452.1E to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts, deliberate unauthorized use, and denial of authorized use. Supersedes DOE O 452.4B, dated 1-22-10.

  7. Underground nuclear energy complexes - technical and economic advantages

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Myers, Carl W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Kunze, Jay F [IDAHO STATE UNIV; Giraud, Kellen M [BABECOCK AND WILCOX; Mahar, James M [IDAHO STATE UNIV

    2010-01-01

    Underground nuclear power plant parks have been projected to be economically feasible compared to above ground instalIations. This paper includes a thorough cost analysis of the savings, compared to above ground facilities, resulting from in-place entombment (decommissioning) of facilities at the end of their life. reduced costs of security for the lifetime of the various facilities in the underground park. reduced transportation costs. and reduced costs in the operation of the waste storage complex (also underground). compared to the fair share of the costs of operating a national waste repository.

  8. Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal Gas &SCE-SessionsSouthReporteeo | National NuclearaCSGF MagazineNuclearChernobyl|Security

  9. Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration would like submitKansas Nuclear Profile 2010MesoscopyStaffEfficiencyIndustry BringEijc p .

  10. NEW - DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    All nuclear explosives and nuclear explosive operations require special safety, security, and use control consideration because of the potentially unacceptable consequences of an accident or unauthorized act; therefore, a Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program is established to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives.

  11. COLLOQUIUM: Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use in an Era of Proliferation...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    5, 2014, 4:00pm to 5:30pm Colloquia MGB Auditorium COLLOQUIUM: Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use in an Era of Proliferation, Cyber Warfare and Terrorism Dr. Bruce G. Blair Princeton...

  12. Proceedings: 17th Asilomar conference on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hickman, R.G.; Meier, C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclear weapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

  13. A system for the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material aboard cargo cotainerships

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gallagher, Shawn P., S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    2005-01-01

    A new approach to the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material aboard cargo containerships is proposed. The ship-based approach removes the constraints of current thinking by addressing the threat of ...

  14. Iraqi nuclear weapons development program. Final report, October 1, 1992--September 30, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-09-30

    This is an abstract of the final report focusing on the collection, collation, analysis, and recording of information pertaining to Iraqi nuclear weapons development and on the long term monitoring of Iraq.

  15. A {open_quotes}New{close_quotes} regime for nuclear weapons and materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-02-15

    In this paper, I discuss the principal ideas that I covered in my presentation on December 8, 1993, at the Future of Foreign Nuclear Materials Symposium held by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I was asked to discuss issues related to military inventories of plutonium, and I took this opportunity to describe a possible declaratory regime that could encompass military as well as civilian inventories of plutonium. The {open_quote}new{close_quotes} in the title does not imply that the regime discussed here is an original idea. Rather, the regime will be {open_quotes}new,{close_quotes} when it is adopted. The regime proposed here and in other works is one in which all stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are declared. Originally, declarations were proposed as a traditional arms control measure. Here, declarations are proposed to support the prevention of misuse of nuclear weapons and materials, including support for the nonproliferation regime. In the following, I discuss: (1) Worldwide inventories of nuclear weapons and materials, including the fact that military plutonium must be viewed as part of that worldwide inventory. (2) Life cycles of nuclear weapons and materials, including the various stages from the creation of nuclear materials for weapons through deployment and retirement of weapons to the final disposition of the materials. (3) Mechanisms for making declarations. (4) Risks and benefits to be derived from declarations. (5) Possibilities for supporting evidence or verification.

  16. Stopping the emergence of nuclear weapon states in the Third World: An examination of the Iraq weapons inspection program. Study project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Block, D.A.

    1993-01-31

    The end of the Gulf War and the implementation of United Nation (UN) resolutions uncovered an Iraqi multi-billion dollar nuclear weapons program. Iraq's ability to pursue this clandestine program for more than a decade, despite periodic inspections, suggest that the myriad of treaties and agreements designed to curb proliferation may be inadequate. Clearly more must be done to deter and counter the spread of these deadly weapon. The UN weapons inspections in Iraq provide insight into possible solutions to the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology in the developing world. This study examines the policy and operational aspects associated with an intrusive United Nations inspection program. In its final analysis, this paper suggests that an effective challenge inspection program is a necessary element in countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Further, it suggests that the UN, as the only internationally accepted enforcement organization, be fully engaged in nonproliferation issues and support the challenge inspection program.

  17. Since leading America's successful effort to develop nuclear weapons in World War II, the U.S. Department of Energy's

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    the risk of terrorists or rogue nations acquiring nuclear weapons, the National Labs are spearheading warheads to commercial-grade fuel for nuclear power plants as part of a program that successfully destroyedSince leading America's successful effort to develop nuclear weapons in World War II, the U

  18. Restructuring the DOE Laboratory Complex to Advance Clean Energy, Environmental Sustainability, and a Global Future without Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Restructuring the DOE Laboratory Complex to Advance Clean Energy, Environmental Sustainability, and a Global Future without Nuclear Weapons - December Commission meeting

  19. LANSCE Weapons Physics

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    7 LANSCE Weapons Physics Fortune 500 companies and weapons designers alike rely on our internationally recognized nuclear physics and materials science expertise as well as our...

  20. The origin of Iraq's nuclear weapons program: Technical reality and Western hypocrisy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Erkman, S; Hurni, J P; Klement, S; Erkman, Suren; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Klement, Stephan

    2005-01-01

    This report is based on a series of papers written between 1980 and 2005 on the origin of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, which was known to one of the authors in the late 1970s already, as well as to a number of other physicists, who independently tried without success to inform their governments and the public. It is concluded that at no point did the Western governments effectively try to stop Iraq's nuclear weapons program, which suggests that its existence was useful as a foreign policy tool, as is confirmed by its use as a major justification to wage two wars on Iraq.

  1. DOE (Department of Energy) nuclear weapon R and T (research, development, and testing): Objectives, roles, and responsibilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Otey, G.R.

    1989-07-01

    An overview of the DOE nuclear weapons research, development, and testing program is given along with a description of the program objectives and the roles and responsibilities of the various involved organizations. The relationship between the DoD and DOE is described and the division of responsibilities for weapon development as well as the coordinated planning and acquisition activities are reviewed. Execution of the RD T program at the nuclear weapons laboratories is outlined. 24 refs., 3 figs.

  2. The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garaizar, X

    2010-01-06

    In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

  3. DRAFT - DOE O 452.2C, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    The Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control (UC) elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts (DUAs), deliberate unauthorized use (DUU), and denial of authorized use (DAU).

  4. Some thoughts on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Krikorian N.H.; Hawkins, H.T.

    1996-05-01

    This paper discusses factors controlling the dissemination of nuclear technologies and especially fissile materials.

  5. REGIONAL THERMOHYDROLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN UNDERGROUND REPOSITORY FOR NUCLEAR WASTES IN HARD ROCK

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, J.S.Y.

    2014-01-01

    underground repository for nuclear waste in hard rock, LBL-and Vath, J.E. , Nuclear waste projections and source-termthe Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management, Material

  6. Evaluating the Effects of Underground Nuclear Testing Below the Water Table on Groundwater and Radionuclide Migration in the

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Evaluating the Effects of Underground Nuclear Testing Below the Water Table on Groundwater, using FEHM, evaluate perturbed groundwater behavior associated with underground nuclear tests to an instantaneous pressurization event caused by a nuclear test when different permeability and porosity

  7. The B61-based "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator:" Clever retrofit or headway towards fourth-generation nuclear weapons?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gsponer, A

    2005-01-01

    It is scientifically and technically possible to build an earth penetrating device that could bury a B61-7 warhead 30 meters into concrete, or 150 meters into earth, before detonating it. The device (based on knowledge and technology that is available since 50 years) would however by large and cumbersome. Better penetrator materials, components able to withstand larger stresses, higher impact velocities, and/or high-explosive driven penetration aids, can only marginally improve the device. It is conclude that the robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP) program may be as much motivated by the development of new technology directly applicable to next generation nuclear weapons, and by the political necessity to periodically reasses the role and utility of nuclear weapons, then by the perceived military need of a weapon able to destroy deeply buried targets.

  8. Philippine Bases and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Schirmer, Daniel Boone

    1983-01-01

    questions for both Philippine and U.S. citiiens. AfterOF NUCLEAR WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES by Jorge Emmanuel (With ane ES S INTRODUCTION: PHILIPPINE BASES AN-fJ U.S. NUCLEAR

  9. Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

  10. Quality by design in the nuclear weapons complex

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ikle, D.N.

    1988-04-01

    Modern statistical quality control has evolved beyond the point at which control charts and sampling plans are sufficient to maintain a competitive position. The work of Genichi Taguchi in the early 1970's has inspired a renewed interest in the application of statistical methods of experimental design at the beginning of the manufacturing cycle. While there has been considerable debate over the merits of some of Taguchi's statistical methods, there is increasing agreement that his emphasis on cost and variance reduction is sound. The key point is that manufacturing processes can be optimized in development before they get to production by identifying a region in the process parameter space in which the variance of the process is minimized. Therefore, for performance characteristics having a convex loss function, total product cost is minimized without substantially increasing the cost of production. Numerous examples of the use of this approach in the United States and elsewhere are available in the literature. At the Rocky Flats Plant, where there are severe constraints on the resources available for development, a systematic development strategy has been developed to make efficient use of those resources to statistically characterize critical production processes before they are introduced into production. This strategy includes the sequential application of fractional factorial and response surface designs to model the features of critical processes as functions of both process parameters and production conditions. This strategy forms the basis for a comprehensive quality improvement program that emphasizes prevention of defects throughout the product cycle. It is currently being implemented on weapons programs in development at Rocky Flats and is in the process of being applied at other production facilities in the DOE weapons complex. 63 refs.

  11. Towards a mutually reinforcing future : opportunities to integrate nuclear weapons stewardship and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-07-01

    2010 NPR and President Obama's 2009 Prague Speech highlighted two key objectives with an inherent underlying tension: (1) Moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons; and (2) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Objective 1 depends, inter alia, upon reductions in stockpiles at home and abroad and maintaining stability. Objective 2 depends upon needed investments in modernization and life extension. Objectives being pursued predominantly in parallel by largely separate communities.

  12. Deproliferation Dynamics : : Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapons Programs

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mehta, Rupal Naresh

    2014-01-01

    prefers to stop the expansion of the nuclear club. 11 At thenuclear assistance, US military and economic assistance allowed for the expansion

  13. Report to Congress on stockpile reliability, weapon remanufacture, and the role of nuclear testing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, G.H.; Brown, P.S.; Alonso, C.T.

    1987-10-01

    This report analyzes two issues: (1) ''whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability,'' or (2) ''whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems.'' Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al., has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the US Congress for more restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations. Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, ''Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories.'' Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.

  14. Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod; Whitney, Paul D.

    2010-04-16

    A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferation risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.

  15. Approaches to integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-06-01

    Historically, U.S. arms control policy and the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise have been reactive to each other, rather than interdependent and mutually reinforcing. One element of the divergence has been the long timescale necessary to plan and create substantive changes in the infrastructure vs. the inherent unpredictability of arms control outcomes. We explore several examples that illustrate this tension, some of the costs and implications associated with this reactive paradigm, and illustrate that, while the nuclear weapons enterprise has long considered the implications of arms control in sizing capacity of its missions, it has not substantively considered arms control in construction requirement for capabilities and products. Since previous arms control agreements have limited numbers and types of deployed systems, with delivery systems as the object of verification, this disconnect has not been forefront. However, as future agreements unfold, the warhead itself may become the treaty limited item and the object of verification. Such a scenario might offer both the need and the opportunity to integrate nuclear weapons and arms control requirements in unprecedented ways. This paper seeks to inspire new thinking on how such integration could be fostered and the extent to which it can facilitate significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles.

  16. Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reitter, T.A.; McCallen, D.B.; Kang, S.W.

    1982-06-01

    The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given.

  17. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDid youOxygenLaboratoryInnovationEmployee &andHomelandPrograms Nuclear

  18. Sandia starts silicon wafer production for three nuclear weapon programs |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal ofNational Nuclear Security Administration signs MOU with

  19. Advancing Methods for Determining the Source of HEU Used in Terrorist Nuclear Weapon 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    LaFleur, Adrienne; Charlton, William

    2007-09-17

    stream_source_info 2007 LaFleur Thesis.pdf.txt stream_content_type text/plain stream_size 58569 Content-Encoding UTF-8 stream_name 2007 LaFleur Thesis.pdf.txt Content-Type text/plain; charset=UTF-8... RESEARCH SCHOLAR A Senior Scholars Thesis by ADRIENNE MARIE LAFLEUR iii ABSTRACT Advancing Methods for Determining the Source of HEU Used in Terrorist Nuclear Weapon (April 2007) Adrienne M. LaFleur Department of Nuclear Engineering Texas A...

  20. Nuclear Safety Design Principles & the Concept of Independence: Insights from Nuclear Weapon Safety for Other High-Consequence Applications.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brewer, Jeffrey D.

    2014-05-01

    Insights developed within the U.S. nuclear weapon system safety community may benefit system safety design, assessment, and management activities in other high consequence domains. The approach of assured nuclear weapon safety has been developed that uses the Nuclear Safety Design Principles (NSDPs) of incompatibility, isolation, and inoperability to design safety features, organized into subsystems such that each subsystem contributes to safe system responses in independent and predictable ways given a wide range of environmental contexts. The central aim of the approach is to provide a robust technical basis for asserting that a system can meet quantitative safety requirements in the widest context of possible adverse or accident environments, while using the most concise arrangement of safety design features and the fewest number of specific adverse or accident environment assumptions. Rigor in understanding and applying the concept of independence is crucial for the success of the approach. This paper provides a basic description of the assured nuclear weapon safety approach, in a manner that illustrates potential application to other domains. There is also a strong emphasis on describing the process for developing a defensible technical basis for the independence assertions between integrated safety subsystems.

  1. North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moon, Duk-ho

    2003-12-01

    A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

  2. Progress toward mutual reciprocal inspections of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, M.W. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Gosnell, T.B. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1995-08-01

    In March 1994, the United States and the Russian Federation announced their intention to conduct mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI) to confirm inventories of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons. Subsequent interactions between the two countries have established the basis for an MRI regime, covering instrumentation, candidate sites for MRI, and protection of information deemed sensitive by the countries. This paper discusses progress made toward MRI, stressing measurement technologies and observables, as well as prospects for MRI implementation. An analysis is presented of observables that might be exploited to provide assurance that the material being measured could have come from a dismantled weapon rather than other sources. Instrumentation to exploit these observables will also be discussed, as will joint US/Russian efforts to demonstrate such instrumentation. Progress toward a so-called ``program of cooperation`` between the two countries in protecting each other`s sensitive information will be reviewed. All of these steps are essential components of an eventual comprehensive regime for controlling fissile materials from weapons.

  3. nuclear weapons

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

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  4. Nuclear Weapons in Regional Contexts: The Cases of Argentina and Brazil

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Junior, Olival Freire; Moreira, Ildeu C; Barros, Fernando de Souza

    2015-01-01

    South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both countries, lasted a long time. After WWII these countries took part in the race to obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game. In the mid 1980s, the end of military dictatorships and the successful establishing of democratic institutions put an end to the race. Thus regional and national interests in addition to the establishment of democracies in Latin America have been responsible for the building of trust between the two countries. Meaningful international initiatives are once again needed in the framework of worldwide cooperation. This cooperation is better developed when democratic regimes are in place.

  5. Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mishra, Sitakanta; Ahmed, Mansoor

    2014-04-01

    In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measures to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.

  6. Hydrologic resources management program and underground test area operable unit fy 1997

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D. F., LLNL

    1998-05-01

    This report present the results of FY 1997 technical studies conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) as part of the Hydrology and Radionuclide Migration Program (HRMP) and Underground Test Area Operable Unit (UGTA). The HRMP is sponsored by the US Department of Energy to assess the environmental (radiochemical and hydrologic) consequences of underground nuclear weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site.

  7. Los Alamos neutron science center nuclear weapons stewardship and unique national scientific capabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schoenberg, Kurt F

    2010-12-15

    This presentation gives an overview of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and its contributions to science and the nuclear weapons program. LANSCE is made of multiple experimental facilities (the Lujan Center, the Weapons Neutron Research facility (WNR), the Ultra-Cold Neutron facility (UCN), the proton Radiography facility (pRad) and the Isotope Production Facility (IPF)) served by the its kilometer long linear accelerator. Several research areas are supported, including materials and bioscience, nuclear science, materials dynamics, irradiation response and medical isotope production. LANSCE is a national user facility that supports researchers worldwide. The LANSCE Risk Mitigation program is currently in progress to update critical accelerator equipment to help extend the lifetime of LANSCE as a key user facility. The Associate Directorate of Business Sciences (ADBS) plays an important role in the continued success of LANSCE. This includes key procurement support, human resource support, technical writing support, and training support. LANSCE is also the foundation of the future signature facility MARIE (Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes).

  8. Technology diffusion of a different nature: Applications of nuclear safeguards technology to the chemical weapons verification regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kadner, S.P. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Reisman, A. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Turpen, E. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Cambridge, MA (United States)

    1996-10-01

    The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

  9. Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese, and United States nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands: A bibliography

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schultz, V. ); Schultz, S.C. ); Robison, W.L. )

    1991-05-01

    A considerable literature exists on the Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese and their atolls; however, this literature consists of a large number of governmental documents that are relatively unknown and difficult to locate. This is particularly true of the documents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and those related to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. Because a comprehensive bibliography on the impact of nuclear weapons testing on the Marshallese and their atolls does not exist, the preparation of a bibliography that includes sufficient information to locate all types of reports seems justified. This document is the bibliography.

  10. Mobile Pit verification system design based on passive special nuclear material verification in weapons storage facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Paul, J. N.; Chin, M. R.; Sjoden, G. E.

    2013-07-01

    A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reaction rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)

  11. ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear-fusion energy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gsponer, A; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre

    2004-01-01

    This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of "points" highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and fo...

  12. American perspectives on security : energy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism : 2010.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.; Silva, Carol L.

    2011-03-01

    We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclear weapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

  13. A Passive Tamper Indicating Enclosure For Use Within A Nuclear Weapons Monitoring Regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    White, Helen; Tanner, Jennifer E.; Allen, Keir; Benz, Jacob M.; McOmish, Sarah; Simmons, Kevin L.

    2012-10-01

    AWE and PNNL are engaged in a technical collaboration investigating techniques to enhance continuity of knowledge over Treaty Accountable Items, with emphasis on a verified nuclear weapons dismantlement process. Tamper Indicating Enclosures (TIE) will likely be deployed as part of a chain of custody regime to indicate an unauthorised attempt to access a Treaty Accountable Item, or secure authenticated monitoring equipment. In 2011, the collaboration presented a paper at the INMM annual conference held in Palm Desert, CA titled “Passive Tamper Indicating Enclosures Incorporating Embedded Optical Fibre”, which discussed the concept of integrating optical fibres into TIEs for use as a passive tamper indicating mechanism. This paper provides an update on the Fibre Optic based TIE and introduces a second passive TIE concept based on the use of Poly(Methyl MethAcrylate) (PMMA). Concepts relating to deployment, tamper indication, and unique identification will be discussed.

  14. The meteorological monitoring audit, preventative maintenance and quality assurance programs at a former nuclear weapons facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Maxwell, D.R.

    1995-12-31

    The purposes of the meteorological monitoring audit, preventative maintenance, and quality assurance programs at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Site), are to (1) support Emergency Preparedness (EP) programs at the Site in assessing the transport, dispersion, and deposition of effluents actually or potentially released into the atmosphere by Site operations; and (2) provide information for onsite and offsite projects concerned with the design of environmental monitoring networks for impact assessments, environmental surveillance activities, and remediation activities. The risk from the Site includes chemical and radioactive emissions historically related to nuclear weapons component production activities that are currently associated with storage of large quantities of radionuclides (plutonium) and radioactive waste forms. The meteorological monitoring program provides information for site-specific weather forecasting, which supports Site operations, employee safety, and Emergency Preparedness operations.

  15. Low Prevalence of Chronic Beryllium Disease among Workers at a Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Arjomandi, M; Seward, J P; Gotway, M B; Nishimura, S; Fulton, G P; Thundiyil, J; King, T E; Harber, P; Balmes, J R

    2010-01-11

    To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclear weapons research and development facility. We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with HRCT (N=49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and transbronchial biopsies. The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 yrs and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 yrs. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or HRCT); three others had evidence of probable CBD. These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD.

  16. Physical and Mathematical Description of Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) Signatures

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mattingly, J.K.; Mihalczo, J.T.; Mullens, J.A.; Valentine, T.E.

    1997-09-26

    This report describes all time and frequency analysis parameters measured with the new Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) processor with three input channels: (1) the 252Cf source ionization chamber (2) a detection channel; and (3) a second detection channel for active measurements. An intuitive and physical description of the various functions is given as well as a brief mathematical description and a brief description of how the data are acquired. If the fill five channel capability is used, the number of functions increases in number but not in type. The parameters provided by this new NWIS processor can be divided into two general classes: time analysis signatures including multiplicities and frequency analysis signatures. Data from measurements with an 18.75 kg highly enriched uranium (93.2 wt 0/0, 235U) metai casting for storage are presented to illustrate the various time and frequency analysis parameters.

  17. Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Underground Nuclear Tests - 2011, Part 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pawloski, G A

    2012-01-30

    This report evaluates collapse evolution for selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) underground nuclear tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly called the Nevada Test Site). The work is being done to support several different programs that desire access to the ground surface above expended underground nuclear tests. The programs include: the Borehole Management Program, the Environmental Restoration Program, and the National Center for Nuclear Security Gas-Migration Experiment. Safety decisions must be made before a crater area, or potential crater area, can be reentered for any work. Evaluation of cavity collapse and crater formation is input into the safety decisions. Subject matter experts from the LLNL Containment Program who participated in weapons testing activities perform these evaluations. Information used included drilling and hole construction, emplacement and stemming, timing and sequence of the selected test and nearby tests, geology, yield, depth of burial, collapse times, surface crater sizes, cavity and crater volume estimations, ground motion, and radiological release information. Both classified and unclassified data were reviewed. The evaluations do not include the effects of erosion that may modify the collapse craters over time. They also do not address possible radiation dangers that may be present. Various amounts of information are available for these tests, depending on their age and other associated activities. Lack of data can hamper evaluations and introduce uncertainty. We make no attempt to quantify this uncertainty. Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Underground Nuclear Tests - 2011 was published on March 2, 2011. This report, considered Part 2 of work undertaken in calendar year 2011, compiles evaluations requested after the March report. The following unclassified summary statements describe collapse evolution and crater stability in response to a recent request to review 6 LLNL test locations in Yucca Flat, Rainier Mesa, and Pahute Mesa. They include: Baneberry in U8d; Clearwater in U12q; Wineskin in U12r, Buteo in U20a and Duryea in nearby U20a1; and Barnwell in U20az.

  18. Dose reduction through robotics and automation of nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage procedures at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Thompson, David Andrew

    1996-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War and subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile now greatly exceeds any foreseeable future need (Quirck et al., 1993). To compensate for this excess, an estimated 20...

  19. Historical Exposures to Chemicals at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant: A Pilot Retrospective Exposure Assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Janeen Denise Robertson

    1999-02-01

    In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

  20. Electromagnetic Signature Technique as a Promising Tool to Verify Nuclear Weapons Storage and Dismantlement under a Nuclear Arms Control Regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bunch, Kyle J.; Williams, Laura S.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep

    2012-08-01

    The 2010 ratification of the New START Treaty has been widely regarded as a noteworthy national security achievement for both the Obama administration and the Medvedev-Putin regime, but deeper cuts are envisioned under future arms control regimes. Future verification needs will include monitoring the storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondaries, and other materials. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under future arms control regimes will pose new challenges. Since acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes, non-nuclear non-sensitive signatures may provide a significant verification tool without the use of additional information barriers. The use of electromagnetic signatures to monitor nuclear material storage containers is a promising technology with the potential to fulfill these challenging requirements. Research performed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to confirm the presence of specific components on a “yes/no” basis without revealing classified information. Arms control inspectors might use this technique to verify the presence or absence of monitored items, including both nuclear and non-nuclear materials. Although additional research is needed to study signature aspects such as uniqueness and investigate container-specific scenarios, the technique potentially offers a rapid and cost-effective tool to verify reduction and dismantlement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.

  1. Radionuclide Partitioning in an Underground Nuclear Test Cavity

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rose, T P; Hu, Q; Zhao, P; Conrado, C L; Dickerson, R; Eaton, G F; Kersting, A B; Moran, J E; Nimz, G; Powell, B A; Ramon, E C; Ryerson, F J; Williams, R W; Wooddy, P T; Zavarin, M

    2009-01-09

    In 2004, a borehole was drilled into the 1983 Chancellor underground nuclear test cavity to investigate the distribution of radionuclides within the cavity. Sidewall core samples were collected from a range of depths within the re-entry hole and two sidetrack holes. Upon completion of drilling, casing was installed and a submersible pump was used to collect groundwater samples. Test debris and groundwater samples were analyzed for a variety of radionuclides including the fission products {sup 99}Tc, {sup 125}Sb, {sup 129}I, {sup 137}Cs, and {sup 155}Eu, the activation products {sup 60}Co, {sup 152}Eu, and {sup 154}Eu, and the actinides U, Pu, and Am. In addition, the physical and bulk chemical properties of the test debris were characterized using Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) and Electron Microprobe measurements. Analytical results were used to evaluate the partitioning of radionuclides between the melt glass, rubble, and groundwater phases in the Chancellor test cavity. Three comparative approaches were used to calculate partitioning values, though each method could not be applied to every nuclide. These approaches are based on: (1) the average Area 19 inventory from Bowen et al. (2001); (2) melt glass, rubble, and groundwater mass estimates from Zhao et al. (2008); and (3) fission product mass yield data from England and Rider (1994). The U and Pu analyses of the test debris are classified and partitioning estimates for these elements were calculated directly from the classified Miller et al. (2002) inventory for the Chancellor test. The partitioning results from this study were compared to partitioning data that were previously published by the IAEA (1998). Predictions of radionuclide distributions from the two studies are in agreement for a majority of the nuclides under consideration. Substantial differences were noted in the partitioning values for {sup 99}Tc, {sup 125}Sb, {sup 129}I, and uranium. These differences are attributable to two factors: chemical volatility effects that occur during the initial plasma condensation, and groundwater remobilization that occurs over a much longer time frame. Fission product partitioning is very sensitive to the early cooling history of the test cavity because the decay of short-lived (t{sub 1/2} < 1 hour) fission-chain precursors occurs on the same time scale as melt glass condensation. Fission product chains that include both volatile and refractory elements, like the mass 99, 125, and 129 chains, can show large variations in partitioning behavior depending on the cooling history of the cavity. Uranium exhibits similar behavior, though the chemical processes are poorly understood. The water temperature within the Chancellor cavity remains elevated (75 C) more than two decades after the test. Under hydrothermal conditions, high solubility chemical species such as {sup 125}Sb and {sup 129}I are readily dissolved and transported in solution. SEM analyses of melt glass samples show clear evidence of glass dissolution and secondary hydrothermal mineral deposition. Remobilization of {sup 99}Tc is also expected during hydrothermal activity, but moderately reducing conditions within the Chancellor cavity appear to limit the transport of {sup 99}Tc. It is recommended that the results from this study should be used together with the IAEA data to update the range in partitioning values for contaminant transport models at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly known as the Nevada Test Site).

  2. A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gsponer, A; Vitale, B; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Vitale, Bruno

    2002-01-01

    It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing arguments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable -- although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections.

  3. Modeling to Support Groundwater Contaminant Boundaries for the Shoal Underground Nuclear Test

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    K. Pohlmann; G. Pohll; J. Chapman; A. Hassan; R. Carroll; C. Shirley

    2004-03-01

    The purpose of this work is to characterize groundwater flow and contaminant transport at the Shoal underground nuclear test through numerical modeling using site-specific hydrologic data. The ultimate objective is the development of a contaminant boundary, a model-predicted perimeter defining the extent of radionuclide-contaminated groundwater from the underground test throughout 1,000 years at a prescribed level of confidence. This boundary will be developed using the numerical models described here, after they are approved for that purpose by DOE and NDEP.

  4. The distribution and history of nuclear weapons related contamination in sediments from the Ob River, Siberia as determined by isotopic ratios of Plutonium, Neptunium, and Cesium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kenna, Timothy C

    2002-01-01

    This thesis addresses the sources and transport of nuclear weapons related contamination in the Ob River region, Siberia. In addition to being one of the largest rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean, the bulk of the former ...

  5. Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bunch, Kyle J. [United States Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Office of Verification and Transparency Technologies, Washington, DC (United States); Jones, Anthony M. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Ramuhalli, Pradeep [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Benz, Jacob M. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Denlinger, Laura Schmidt [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-05-04

    The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.

  6. Broken Arrows: Radiological hazards from nuclear warhead accidents (the Minot USAF base nuclear weapons incident)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Liolios, Theodore

    2009-01-01

    According to numerous press reports, in 2007 at Minot US Air Force Base six AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles mistakenly armed with W80-1 thermonuclear warheads were loaded on a B-52H heavy bomber in place of six unarmed AGM-129 missiles that were awaiting transport to Barksdale US Air Force Base for disposal. The live nuclear missiles were not reported missing, and stood unsecured and unguarded while mounted to the aircraft for a period of 36 hours. The present work investigates the radiological hazards associated with a worst-case postulated accident that would disperse the nuclear material of the six warheads in large metropolitan cities. Using computer simulations approximate estimates are derived for the ensuing cancer mortality and land contamination after the accident. Health, decontamination and evacuation costs are also estimated in the framework of the linear risk model.

  7. President Obama Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal of HonorPosterNational Nuclear SecuritySecurity

  8. Evaluation of groundwater flow and transport at the Shoal underground nuclear test: An interim report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pohll, G.; Chapman, J.; Hassan, A.; Papelis, C.; Andricevic, R.; Shirley, C.

    1998-07-01

    Since 1962, all United States nuclear tests have been conducted underground. A consequence of this testing has been the deposition of large amounts of radioactive materials in the subsurface, sometimes in direct contact with groundwater. The majority of this testing occurred on the Nevada Test Site, but a limited number of experiments were conducted in other locations. One of these is the subject of this report, the Project Shoal Area (PSA), located about 50 km southeast of Fallon, Nevada. The Shoal test consisted of a 12-kiloton-yield nuclear detonation which occurred on October 26, 1963. Project Shoal was part of studies to enhance seismic detection of underground nuclear tests, in particular, in active earthquake areas. Characterization of groundwater contamination at the Project Shoal Area is being conducted by the US Department of Energy (DOE) under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) with the State of Nevada Department of Environmental Protection and the US Department of Defense (DOD). This order prescribes a Corrective Action Strategy (Appendix VI), which, as applied to underground nuclear tests, involves preparing a Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP), Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD), Corrective Action Plan, and Closure Report. The scope of the CAIP is flow and transport modeling to establish contaminant boundaries that are protective of human health and the environment. This interim report describes the current status of the flow and transport modeling for the PSA.

  9. Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    , and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. The program provides this capability of the energy from a nuclear weapon is generated while in the high energy density (HED) state. High thermonuclear ignition to the national nuclear weapons program was one of the earliest motivations of the ICF

  10. Underground collocation of nuclear power plant reactors and repository to facilitate the post-renaissance expansion of nuclear power

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Myers, Carl W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Elkins, Ned Z [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01

    Underground collocation of nuclear power reactors and the nuclear waste management facilities supporting those reactors, termed an underground nuclear park (UNP), appears to have several advantages compared to the conventional approach to siting reactors and waste management facilities. These advantages include the potential to lower reactor capital and operating cost, lower nuclear waste management cost, and increase margins of physical security and safety. Envirorunental impacts related to worker health, facility accidents, waste transportation, and sabotage and terrorism appear to be lower for UNPs compared to the current approach. In-place decommissioning ofUNP reactors appears to have cost, safety, envirorunental and waste disposal advantages. The UNP approach has the potential to lead to greater public acceptance for the deployment of new power reactors. Use of the UNP during the post-nuclear renaissance time frame has the potential to enable a greater expansion of U.S. nuclear power generation than might otherwise result. Technical and economic aspects of the UNP concept need more study to determine the viability of the concept.

  11. Underground infrastructure damage for a Chicago scenario

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dey, Thomas N; Bos, Rabdall J

    2011-01-25

    Estimating effects due to an urban IND (improvised nuclear device) on underground structures and underground utilities is a challenging task. Nuclear effects tests performed at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) during the era of nuclear weapons testing provides much information on how underground military structures respond. Transferring this knowledge to answer questions about the urban civilian environment is needed to help plan responses to IND scenarios. Explosions just above the ground surface can only couple a small fraction of the blast energy into an underground shock. The various forms of nuclear radiation have limited penetration into the ground. While the shock transmitted into the ground carries only a small fraction of the blast energy, peak stresses are generally higher and peak ground displacement is lower than in the air blast. While underground military structures are often designed to resist stresses substantially higher than due to the overlying rocks and soils (overburden), civilian structures such as subways and tunnels would generally only need to resist overburden conditions with a suitable safety factor. Just as we expect the buildings themselves to channel and shield air blast above ground, basements and other underground openings as well as changes of geology will channel and shield the underground shock wave. While a weaker shock is expected in an urban environment, small displacements on very close-by faults, and more likely, soils being displaced past building foundations where utility lines enter could readily damaged or disable these services. Immediately near an explosion, the blast can 'liquefy' a saturated soil creating a quicksand-like condition for a period of time. We extrapolate the nuclear effects experience to a Chicago-based scenario. We consider the TARP (Tunnel and Reservoir Project) and subway system and the underground lifeline (electric, gas, water, etc) system and provide guidance for planning this scenario.

  12. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  13. Trace Fission Product Ratios for Nuclear Forensics Attribution of Weapons-Grade Plutonium from Fast Breeder Reactor Blankets 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Osborn, Jeremy

    2014-08-13

    for the 500-MWe Indian PFBR was obtained from Chirayath et al.22 and essential parameters are listed in Table II. There is an active core, one meter in height, which consists of an inner core and outer core of MOX “driver” fuel. The MOX fuel of the active...-Particle MOX – Mixed Oxide MWd/kg – Megawatt-day per kilogram of heavy metal MWe – Megawatt electric NPT – Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ORNL – Oak Ridge National Laboratory PFBR – Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor PHWR...

  14. Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Walter, Andrew

    2009-06-01

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

  15. President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon ...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing...

  16. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 94, No. 5, pp. 18791889, October 2004 Lop Nor Revisited: Underground Nuclear Explosion Locations, 19761996,

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Waldhauser, Felix

    Lop Nor Revisited: Underground Nuclear Explosion Locations, 1976­1996, from Double-Difference Analysis locations of 19 underground nuclear explosions (13 in vertical shafts, and 6 in horizontal tunnels) carried to calibrate IMS stations for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear

  17. On the public perception of the risks from nuclear weapons: Would oralloy be more acceptable than plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kunsman, D.M.

    1993-03-01

    We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant difference between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.

  18. On the public perception of the risks from nuclear weapons: Would oralloy be more acceptable than plutonium?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kunsman, D.M.

    1993-03-01

    We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant difference between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.

  19. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  20. Modeling to Support Groundwater Contaminant Boundaries for the Shoal Underground Nuclear Test

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    K. Pohlmann; G. Pohll; J. Chapman; A. Hassan; R. Carroll; C. Shirley

    2004-03-01

    Groundwater flow and radionuclide transport at the Shoal underground nuclear test are characterized using three-dimensional numerical models, based on site-specific hydrologic data. The objective of this modeling is to provide the flow and transport models needed to develop a contaminant boundary defining the extent of radionuclide-contaminated groundwater at the site throughout 1,000 years at a prescribed level of confidence. This boundary will then be used to manage the Project Shoal Area for the protection of the public and the environment.

  1. Opportunities for Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute developing computer-aided design programs for pharmaceutical drug discovery. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-09-23

    The goal of this study is to determine whether physicists at the Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute can profitably service the need for computer aided drug design (CADD) programs. The Russian physicists` primary competitive advantage is their ability to write particularly efficient code able to work with limited computing power; a history of working with very large, complex modeling systems; an extensive knowledge of physics and mathematics, and price competitiveness. Their primary competitive disadvantage is their lack of biology, and cultural and geographic issues. The first phase of the study focused on defining the competitive landscape, primarily through interviews with and literature searches on the key providers of CADD software. The second phase focused on users of CADD technology to determine deficiencies in the current product offerings, to understand what product they most desired, and to define the potential demand for such a product.

  2. Underground Infrastructure Impacts Due to a Surface Burst Nuclear Device in an Urban Canyon Environment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bos, Randall J.; Dey, Thomas N.; Runnels, Scott R.

    2012-07-03

    Investigation of the effects of a nuclear device exploded in a urban environment such as the Chicago studied for this particular report have shown the importance on the effects from the urban canyons so typical of today's urban environment as compared to nuclear test event effects observed at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and the Pacific Testing Area on which many of the typical legacy empirical codes are based on. This report first looks at the some of the data from nuclear testing that can give an indication of the damage levels that might be experienced due to a nuclear event. While it is well known that a above ground blast, even a ground burst, very poorly transmits energy into the ground ( < 1%) and the experimental results discussed here are for fully coupled detonations, these results do indicate a useful measure of the damage that might be expected. The second part of the report looks at effects of layering of different materials that typically would make up the near ground below surface environment that a shock would propagate through. As these simulations support and is widely known in the community, the effects of different material compositions in these layers modify the shock behavior and especially modify the energy dispersal and coupling into the basement structures. The third part of the report looks at the modification of the underground shock effects from a surface burst 1 KT device due to the presence of basements under the Chicago buildings. Without direct knowledge of the basement structure, a simulated footprint of a uniform 20m depth was assumed underneath each of the NGI defined buildings in the above ground environment. In the above ground case, the underground basement structures channel the energy along the line of site streets keeping the shock levels from falling off as rapidly as has been observed in unobstructed detonations. These simulations indicate a falloff of factors of 2 per scaled length as compared to 10 for the unobstructed case. Again, as in the above ground case, the basements create significant shielding causing the shock profile to become more square and reducing the potential for damage diagonal to the line of sight streets. The results for a 1KT device is that the heavily damaged zone (complete destruction) will extend out to 50m from the detonation ({approx}100m for 10KT). The heavily to moderately damaged zone will extend out to 100m ({approx}200m for 10KT). Since the destruction will depend on geometric angle from the detonation and also the variability of response for various critical infrastructure, for planning purposes the area out to 100m from the detonation should be assumed to be non-operational. Specifically for subway tunnels, while not operational, they could be human passable for human egress in the moderately damaged area. The results of the simulations presented in this report indicate only the general underground infrastructure impact. Simulations done with the actual basement geometry would be an important improvement. Equally as important or even more so, knowing the actual underground material configurations and material composition would be critical information to refine the calculations. Coupling of the shock data into structural codes would help inform the emergency planning and first response communities on the impact to underground structures and the state of buildings after the detonation.

  3. Analysis and section of processes for the disposition of excess fissile material from nuclear weapon dismantlement in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Myers, B.R.; Armantrout, G.A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Erickson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1995-02-01

    The end of the cold war and the acceleration of nuclear disarmament efforts by the United States (US) and Russia are generating large quantities of surplus fissile nuclear materials that are no longer needed for military purposes. The safe and secure disposition of this surplus material to prevent theft or reuse in weapons has become a high priority for the US Department of Energy (USDOE). Many options exist for storage and disposition (use or disposal) of these surplus materials. The criteria, which have been developed from the basis for a preliminary ``screening`` of options, to eliminate from further consideration those options that do not meet minimal requirements. Factors, or attributes, contained in the screening and selection criteria include: (1) resistance to theft and diversion by unauthorized parties, (2) resistance to retrieval, extraction, and reuse by the host nation, (3) technical viability, (4) environmental, safety, and health impacts, (5) cost effectiveness, (6) timeliness, (7) fostering of progress and cooperation with Russia and others, (8) public and institutional acceptance, and (9) additional benefits. The evaluation of environmental impacts, in accordance with the US National Environmental Policy Ac (NEPA) process, is an integral part of the overall evaluation process. Because of the variety of physical and chemical forms of the nuclear material inventory, and because of the large number of possible disposition technologies and final forms, several hundred possible pathways to disposition have been defined and have undergone a systematic selection process. Also, because nuclear material disposition will have far ranging impacts, extensive public, in the form of public and stakeholder, input was integral to the selection process.

  4. Supercritical-fluid carbon dioxide (SCCO{sub 2}) cleaning of nuclear weapon components

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Taylor, C.M.V.; Sivils, L.D.; Rubin, J.B.

    1998-05-01

    Supercritical fluid carbon dioxide (SCCO{sub 2}) has been evaluated as a cleaning solvent for the cleaning of plutonium (Pu) metal parts. The results of the evaluation show that SCCO{sub 2} is an effective alternative to halogenated solvents that are conventionally used for removing organic and inorganic contaminants from the surface of these parts. The cleaning process was demonstrated at the laboratory scale for steel and uranium substrates and has been found to be compatible with Pu. The efficacy of this cleaning method is found to be dependent on process conditions of pressure, temperature, fluid-flow rate, as well as cleaning time. Process parameters of P > 2,500 psi, T > 40 C, and moderate fluid flow rates, produced good cleaning results in less than 10 minutes using a simple flow-through process configuration. Within the parameter range studied, cleaning efficiency generally improved with increasing process pressure and flow rate. SCCO{sub 2} cleaning is suitable for a variety of component cleaning tasks and is adaptable to precision cleaning requirements. The SCCO{sub 2} cleaning process is currently being developed for deployment for weapons production at LANL.

  5. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal of HonorPosterNationalPrograms |National NuclearNuclear Security

  6. US weapons secrets revealed

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Norris, R.S.; Arkin, W.M.

    1993-03-01

    Extraordinary details have only recently been revealed about the struggle over the control of early U.S. nuclear weapons and their initial deployments abroad. The information comes from a newly declassified top secret report, part of a larger study, The History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972, commissioned by Defense Secretary James R. Schlisinger in summer 1974.

  7. Assessment of hydrologic transport of radionuclides from the Gnome underground nuclear test site, New Mexico

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Earman, S.; Chapman, J.; Pohlmann, K.; Andricevic, R.

    1996-09-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is operating an environmental restoration program to characterize, remediate, and close non-Nevada Test Site locations that were used for nuclear testing. Evaluation of radionuclide transport by groundwater from these sites is an important part of the preliminary site risk analysis. These evaluations are undertaken to allow prioritization of the test areas in terms of risk, provide a quantitative basis for discussions with regulators and the public about future work at the sites, and provide a framework for assessing data needs to be filled by site characterization. The Gnome site in southeastern New Mexico was the location of an underground detonation of a 3.5-kiloton nuclear device in 1961, and a hydrologic tracer test using radionuclides in 1963. The tracer test involved the injection of tritium, {sup 90}Sr, and {sup 137}Cs directly into the Culebra Dolomite, a nine to ten-meter-thick aquifer located approximately 150 in below land surface. The Gnome nuclear test was carried out in the Salado Formation, a thick salt deposit located 200 in below the Culebra. Because salt behaves plastically, the cavity created by the explosion is expected to close, and although there is no evidence that migration has actually occurred, it is assumed that radionuclides from the cavity are released into the overlying Culebra Dolomite during this closure process. Transport calculations were performed using the solute flux method, with input based on the limited data available for the site. Model results suggest that radionuclides may be present in concentrations exceeding drinking water regulations outside the drilling exclusion boundary established by DOE. Calculated mean tritium concentrations peak at values exceeding the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency drinking water standard of 20,000 pCi/L at distances of up to almost eight kilometers west of the nuclear test.

  8. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-14

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  9. Picture of the Week: From nuclear weapons testing to stockpile stewardship

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration wouldMass mapSpeeding access| DepartmentPeerFederal FleetUp inrd IEEE(Journal13 A9 From nuclear

  10. Sandia California works on nuclear weapon W80-4 Life Extension Program |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal of HonorPosterNationalProgramsSSGF MagazineNational Nuclear

  11. New - DOE O 452.4C, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    The order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control elements of DOE O 452.1E to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts, deliberate unauthorized use, and denial of authorized use. Cancels DOE O 452.4B, dated 1-22-10.

  12. Preliminary results of calculations for heavy-water nuclear-power-plant reactors employing {sup 235}U, {sup 233}U, and {sup 232}Th as a fuel and meeting requirements of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ioffe, B. L.; Kochurov, B. P. [Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics (Russian Federation)

    2012-02-15

    A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of {sup 235}U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving {sup 233}U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.

  13. Review: Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer by Helen Caldicott

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mirza, Umar Karim

    2007-01-01

    and the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation make itto a discussion of nuclear weapons proliferation. In the

  14. Review: Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer by Helen Caldicott

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mirza, Umar Karim

    2007-01-01

    the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation make it ato a discussion of nuclear weapons proliferation. In the

  15. Proceedings of the seventh symposium on containment of underground nuclear explosions. Volume 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Olsen, C.W.

    1993-12-31

    This is Volume 2 of two unclassified volumes of a meeting of workers at all levels in the science and technology of containment. Papers on containment and related geological, geophysical, engineering, chemical, and computational topics were included. Particular topics in this volume include: Low-yield test beds, modeling and residual stress, material properties, collapse phenomena and shock diagnostics, stemming practices and performance, geophysics, and geosciences and weapons destruction. Individual papers are indexed separately on the data base.

  16. Deterrence versus Preemption: Assessing U.S. Nuclear Policy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schwartz, Stephen (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

    2003-03-19

    Since coming into office in 2001, the Bush administration has enacted a series of controversial policies designed to create a more robust and more usable nuclear arsenal. From requiring new nuclear strike capabilities (including against non-nuclear countries), to threatening preemptive attacks, to investing billions of dollars in rebuilding the nuclear weapons production complex, the administration is systematically strengthening the role nuclear weapons play in defending the United States and its interests around the world. This presentation examines those policies and the thinking that underlies them. It questions the effectiveness of the administration's approach and explores some of the unintended consequences vis-a-vis U.S. policy toward North Korea, Iraq, Pakistan, and others. Finally, it takes a detailed look at current efforts to develop a new low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapon to destroy hardened underground facilities, assessing the feasibility of such a device and the potential effects of its use.

  17. The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kroenig, Matthew

    2006-01-01

    ambitions: The spread of nuclear weapons 1989-1990. Boulder:Determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation. UnpublishedWhy nations forgo nuclear weapons. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s

  18. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-01-01

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o`clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course.

  19. Modeling Groundwater Flow and Transport of Radionuclides at Amchitka Island's Underground Nuclear Tests: Milrow, Long Shot, and Cannikin

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ahmed Hassan; Karl Pohlmann; Jenny Chapman

    2002-11-19

    Since 1963, all United States nuclear tests have been conducted underground. A consequence of this testing has been the deposition of large amounts of radioactive material in the subsurface, sometimes in direct contact with groundwater. The majority of this testing occurred on the Nevada Test Site (NTS), but a limited number of experiments were conducted in other locations. One of these locations, Amchitka Island, Alaska is the subject of this report. Three underground nuclear tests were conducted on Amchitka Island. Long Shot was an 80-kiloton-yield test conducted at a depth of 700 meters (m) on October 29, 1965 (DOE, 2000). Milrow had an announced yield of about 1,000 kilotons, and was detonated at a depth of 1,220 m on October 2, 1969. Cannikin had an announced yield less than 5,000 kilotons, and was conducted at a depth of 1,790 m on November 6, 1971. The purpose of this work is to provide a portion of the information needed to conduct a human-health risk assessment of the potential hazard posed by the three underground nuclear tests on Amchitka Island. Specifically, the focus of this work is the subsurface transport portion, including the release of radionuclides from the underground cavities and their movement through the groundwater system to the point where they seep out of the ocean floor and into the marine environment. This requires a conceptual model of groundwater flow on the island using geologic, hydrologic, and chemical information, a numerical model for groundwater flow, a conceptual model of contaminant release and transport properties from the nuclear test cavities, and a numerical model for contaminant transport. Needed for the risk assessment are estimates of the quantity of radionuclides (in terms of mass flux) from the underground tests on Amchitka that could discharge to the ocean, the time of possible discharge, and the location in terms of distance from shoreline. The radionuclide data presented here are all reported in terms of normalized masses to avoid presenting classified information. As only linear processes are modeled, the results can be readily scaled by the true classified masses for use in the risk assessment. The modeling timeframe for the risk assessment was set at 1,000 years, though some calculations are extended to 2,000 years. This first section of the report endeavors to orient the reader with the environment of Amchitka and the specifics of the underground nuclear tests. Of prime importance are the geologic and hydrologic conditions of the subsurface. A conceptual model for groundwater flow beneath the island is then developed and paired with an appropriate numerical modeling approach in section 2. The parameters needed for the model, supporting data for them, and data uncertainties are discussed at length. The calibration of the three flow models (one for each test) is then presented. At this point the conceptual radionuclide transport model is introduced and its numerical approach described in section 3. Again, the transport parameters and their supporting data and uncertainties are the focus. With all of the processes and parameters in place, the first major modeling phase can be discussed in section 4. In this phase, a parametric uncertainty analysis is performed to determine the sensitivity of the transport modeling results to the uncertainties present in the parameters. This analysis is motivated by the recognition of substantial uncertainty in the subsurface conditions on the island and the need to incorporate that uncertainty into the modeling. The conclusion of the first phase determines the parameters to hold as uncertain through the main flow and transport modeling. This second, main phase of modeling is presented in section 5, with the contaminant breakthrough behavior of each test site addressed. This is followed by a sensitivity analysis in section 6, regarding the importance of additional processes that could not be supported in the main modeling effort due to lack of data. Finally, the results for the individual sites are compared, the sensitivities discussed,

  20. Disposition of excess weapons plutonium from dismantled weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of various nuclear arms reduction agreements, US and Russia have been actively dismantling tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. As a result,large quantities of fissile materials, including more than 100 (tonnes?) of weapons-grade Pu, have become excess to both countries` military needs. To meet nonproliferation goals and to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, this excess weapons Pu must be placed in secure storage and then, in timely manner, either used in nuclear reactors as fuel or discarded in geologic repositories as solid waste. This disposition in US and Russia must be accomplished in a safe, secure manner and as quickly as practical. Storage of this Pu is a prerequisite to any disposition process, but the length of storage time is unknown. Whether by use as fuel or discard as solid waste, disposition of that amount of Pu will require decades--and perhaps longer, if disposition operations encounter delays. Neither US nor Russia believes that long-term secure storage is a substitute for timely disposition of excess Pu, but long-term, safe, secure storage is a critical element of all excess Pu disposition activities.

  1. Characterization of U/Pu Particles Originating From the Nuclear Weapon Accidents at Palomares, Spain, 1966 And Thule, Greenland, 1968

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lind, O.C.; Salbu, B.; Janssens, K.; Proost, K.; Garcia-Leon, M.; Garcia-Tenorio, R.

    2007-07-10

    Following the USAF B-52 bomber accidents at Palomares, Spain in 1966 and at Thule, Greenland in 1968, radioactive particles containing uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) were dispersed into the environment. To improve long-term environmental impact assessments for the contaminated ecosystems, particles from the two sites have been isolated and characterized with respect to properties influencing particle weathering rates. Low [239]Pu/[235]U (0.62-0.78) and [240]Pu/[239]Pu (0.055-0.061) atom ratios in individual particles from both sites obtained by Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) show that the particles contain highly enriched U and weapon-grade Pu. Furthermore, results from electron microscopy with Energy Dispersive X-ray analysis (EDX) and synchrotron radiation (SR) based micrometer-scale X-ray fluorescence ({micro}-XRF) 2D mapping demonstrated that U and Pu coexist throughout the 1-50 {micro}m sized particles, while surface heterogeneities were observed in EDX line scans. SR-based micrometer-scale X-ray Absorption Near Edge Structure Spectroscopy ({micro}-XANES) showed that the particles consisted of an oxide mixture of U (predominately UO[2] with the presence ofU[3][8]) and Pu ((III)/(IV), (V)/(V) or (III), (IV) and (V)). Neither metallic U or Pu nor uranyl or Pu(VI) could be observed. Characteristics such as elemental distributions, morphology and oxidation states are remarkably similar for the Palomares and Thule particles, reflecting that they originate from similar source and release scenarios. Thus, these particle characteristics are more dependent on the original material from which the particles are derived (source) and the formation of particles (release scenario) than the environmental conditions to which the particles have been exposed since the late 1960s.

  2. REVIEW OF INDUSTRIES AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR TECHNOLOGIES APPLICABLE TO DEACTIVATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reilkoff, T. E.; Hetland, M. D.; O'Leary, E. M.

    2002-02-25

    The Deactivation and Decommissioning Focus Area's (DDFA's) mission is to develop, demonstrate, and deploy improved deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) technologies. This mission requires that emphasis be continually placed on identifying technologies currently employed or under development in other nuclear as well as nonnuclear industries and government agencies. In support of DDFA efforts to clean up the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) radiologically contaminated surplus facilities using technologies that improve worker safety, reduce costs, and accelerate cleanup schedules, a study was conducted to identify innovative technologies developed for use in nonnuclear arenas that are appropriate for D&D applications.

  3. Computational Nuclear Forensics Analysis of Weapons-grade Plutonium Separated from Fuel Irradiated in a Thermal Reactor 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Coles, Taylor Marie

    2014-04-27

    of bundle 16.4 kg Weight of U per bundle 13.4 kg Active Core Length 500 cm II.C. Monte Carlo N-Particle Code For the thesis work presented here, a code called Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) was used. The manual describes MCNP as "a general... Working Group LWR- Light Water Reactor MCNP- Monte Carlo Neutral Particle MOX- Mixed Oxide NPT- Non-Proliferation Treaty NSG- Nuclear Suppliers Group ORNL- Oak Ridge National Laboratory PHWR- Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor PUREX- Plutonium Uranium...

  4. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

  5. Subsurface Completion Report for Amchitka Underground Nuclear Test Sites: Long Shot, Milrow, and Cannikin, Rev. No.: 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Echelard, Tim

    2006-09-01

    Three underground nuclear tests were conducted on Amchitka Island, Alaska, in 1965, 1969, and 1971. The effects of the Long Shot, Milrow, and Cannikin tests on the environment were extensively investigated during and following the detonations, and the area continues to be monitored today. This report is intended to document the basis for the Amchitka Underground Nuclear Test Sites: Long Shot, Milrow, and Cannikin (hereafter referred to as ''Amchitka Site'') subsurface completion recommendation of No Further Remedial Action Planned with Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance, and define the long-term surveillance and maintenance strategy for the subsurface. A number of factors were considered in evaluating and selecting this recommendation for the Amchitka Site. Historical studies and monitoring data, ongoing monitoring data, the results of groundwater modeling, and the results of an independent stakeholder-guided scientific investigation were also considered in deciding the completion action. Water sampling during and following the testing showed no indication that radionuclides were released to the near surface, or marine environment with the exception of tritium, krypton-85, and iodine-131 found in the immediate vicinity of Long Shot surface ground zero. One year after Long Shot, only tritium was detectable (Merritt and Fuller, 1977). These tritium levels, which were routinely monitored and have continued to decline since the test, are above background levels but well below the current safe drinking water standard. There are currently no feasible means to contain or remove radionuclides in or around the test cavities beneath the sites. Surface remediation was conducted in 2001. Eleven drilling mud pits associated with the Long Shot, Milrow and Cannikin sites were remediated. Ten pits were remediated by stabilizing the contaminants and constructing an impermeable cap over each pit. One pit was remediated by removing all of the contaminated mud for consolidation in another pit. In addition to the mud pits, the hot mix plant was also remediated. Ongoing monitoring data does not indicate that radionuclides are currently seeping into the marine environment. Additionally, the groundwater modeling results indicate no seepage is expected for tens to thousands of years. If seepage does occur in the future, however, the rich, diverse ecosystems around the island could be at risk, as well as people eating foods from the area. An independent science study was conducted by the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP) in accordance with the Amchitka Independent Science Plan (2003). The study report was published on August 1, 2005. The CRESP study states ''our geophysical and biological analyses did not find evidence of risk from radionuclides from the consumption of marine foods, nor indication of any current radionuclide contaminated migration into the marine environment from the Amchitka test shots''. The study also found evidence supporting the groundwater modeling conclusions of very slow contaminant transport (CRESP, 2005). While no further action is recommended for the subsurface of the Amchitka Site, long-term stewardship of Amchitka Island will be instituted and will continue into the future. This will include institutional controls management and enforcement, post-completion monitoring, performance of five-year reviews, public participation, and records management. Long-term stewardship will be the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management. The Department of Energy is recommending completion of the investigation phase of the Amchitka Sites. The recommended remedy for the Amchitka Site is No Further Action with Long-Term Monitoring and Surveillance. The future long-term stewardship actions will be governed by a Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Plan. This Plan is currently being developed with input from the State, landowner, and other interested or affected stakeholders.

  6. Destroyer of Worlds: War and Apocalypse in the Nuclear Epoch

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sivak, Andrew Mark

    2015-01-01

    and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. New York:idealistic “taboo” against nuclear weapons use normativelyand the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (New York:

  7. Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Norbo Underground Nuclear Test in U8c, Nevada Nuclear Security Site, and the Impact on Stability of the Ground Surface

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pawloski, G A

    2012-06-18

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.

  8. Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    community face is the possibility that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NNSA, through its Office of...

  9. A STUDY OF REGIONAL TEMPERATURE AND THERMOHYDROLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN UNDERGROUND REPOSITORY FOR NUCLEAR WASTES IN HARD ROCK

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, J.S.Y.

    2010-01-01

    Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management. Subground reportfor the isolation of nuclear waste. TID-28818, October 1978.and J. E. Vath. Nuclear waste projections and source-term

  10. Focus Article Nuclear winter

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Robock, Alan

    the climatic effects of nuclear war. Smoke from the fires started by nuclear weapons, especially the black in recorded human history. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the world has fallen from 70,000 at its the United States and the Soviet Union, smoke from the fires started by nuclear weapons, especially the black

  11. weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 20123/%2Anational lab8/%2A en6/%2A enw80|

  12. Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal Gas &SCE-SessionsSouthReport forRetirementAdministrationWayne Jones | National|

  13. DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Flats nuclear weapons production site to the Department of the Interior's (DOI) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for use as a National Wildlife Refuge. After more than a...

  14. Annular Core Research Reactor - Critical to Science-Based Weapons...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    to science-based weapons design and certification. The ACRR is a pool-type research reactor (Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility) that has been in operation since the 1970s...

  15. Stockpile Stewardship: How we Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent without Testing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2014-09-04

    In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun, the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.

  16. Long-Term Planning for Nuclear Energy Systems Under Deep Uncertainty

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kim, Lance Kyungwoo

    2011-01-01

    and Demand for Nuclear Weapons . . . 4.3 ProliferationZero: Is Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Too Difficult?Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton University Press,

  17. Spin-On for the Renaissance? The Current State of China's Nuclear Industry

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yuan, Jing-dong

    2010-01-01

    by Beijing to keep its nuclear weapons segment separate fromment of the country’s nuclear weapons capability. It was notprocesses. Fuel Supply As a nuclear weapons state, China has

  18. The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kroenig, Matthew

    2006-01-01

    nature of the nuclear recipient’s security environment. ThisKeywords: Nuclear weapons proliferation; security; securitynature of the nuclear recipient’s security environment. This

  19. nuclear weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust,Field-effectWorkingLosThe 26th AnnualHistoryMIII:National1-2130nsc |safeguards

  20. Loose Nukes: Nuclear Material Security in G.P.Gilfoyle

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Nuclear Weapons 101 2. What are loose nukes and why should you care? 3. What nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC), conventional and special weapons. #12;Nuclear Weapons 101 · Fissile of plutonium or 25 kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is needed is needed to produce a weapon. #12;Nuclear

  1. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    a weapon. NYSSAPS - April 24, 2010 ­ p. #12;Nuclear Weapons 101 - Basic Weapons Designs A uranium, gun-type nuclear weapon - High explosive pushes highly-enriched uranium at high speed down the gun tube Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

  2. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Seminar - June 29, 2011 ­ p. #12;Nuclear Weapons 101 - Basic Weapons Designs Uranium, gun-type weapon Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. Testing The Test

  3. EM Takes Safe, Unique Approach to Underground Demolition at Hanford...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    largest of Hanford's experimental reactors used for developing and testing alternative fuels for the commercial nuclear power industry. Preparations to remove the underground...

  4. Imaging the ionization track of alpha recoils for the directional detection of weapons grade plutonium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Koch, William Lawrence

    2013-01-01

    Since the dawn of the nuclear weapons era, political, military, and scientific leaders around the world have been working to contain the proliferation of Special Nuclear Material and explosively fissile material. This paper ...

  5. Office of Test and Evaluation | National Nuclear Security Administrati...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    weapons stockpile are safe, secure, and reliable by: Providing for development of engineering tools and manufacturing capabilities to support the life cycle of a nuclear weapon...

  6. Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Salut Underground Nuclear Test in U20ak, Nevada National Security Site, and the Impact of Stability of the Ground Surface

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pawloski, G A

    2012-04-25

    At the request of Jerry Sweeney, the LLNL Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Salut underground nuclear test in U20ak to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Review of the Salut site is complicated because the test experienced a subsurface, rather than surface, collapse. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Salut detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeologogy due to the nuclear detonation. Sweeney's proposal requires physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site), and focuses on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow, and deep geophysical surveys.

  7. Alan Roback Policy Implications of Nuclear Winter

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Robock, Alan

    and noncombatant nations alike. Nevertheless, nations of the world continue to produce nuclear weapons and make plans for their use. The number of nations with nuclear weapons continues to grow. Although the recent. The principal political implication of nuclear winter is that nuclear weapons cannot be used as an instrument

  8. National Center for Nuclear Security - NCNS

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2015-01-09

    As the United States embarks on a new era of nuclear arms control, the tools for treaty verification must be accurate and reliable, and must work at stand-off distances. The National Center for Nuclear Security, or NCNS, at the Nevada National Security Site, is poised to become the proving ground for these technologies. The center is a unique test bed for non-proliferation and arms control treaty verification technologies. The NNSS is an ideal location for these kinds of activities because of its multiple environments; its cadre of experienced nuclear personnel, and the artifacts of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons explosions. The NCNS will provide future treaty negotiators with solid data on verification and inspection regimes and a realistic environment in which future treaty verification specialists can be trained. Work on warhead monitoring at the NCNS will also support future arms reduction treaties.

  9. National Center for Nuclear Security - NCNS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2014-11-12

    As the United States embarks on a new era of nuclear arms control, the tools for treaty verification must be accurate and reliable, and must work at stand-off distances. The National Center for Nuclear Security, or NCNS, at the Nevada National Security Site, is poised to become the proving ground for these technologies. The center is a unique test bed for non-proliferation and arms control treaty verification technologies. The NNSS is an ideal location for these kinds of activities because of its multiple environments; its cadre of experienced nuclear personnel, and the artifacts of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons explosions. The NCNS will provide future treaty negotiators with solid data on verification and inspection regimes and a realistic environment in which future treaty verification specialists can be trained. Work on warhead monitoring at the NCNS will also support future arms reduction treaties.

  10. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    a weapon. Catholic University - April 6, 2011 ­ p. #12;Nuclear Weapons 101 - Basic Weapons Designs Uranium, gun-type weapon - High explo- sive fires highly-enriched uranium slug down the gun tube Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

  11. Evaluation of the Non-Transient Hydrologic Source Term from the CAMBRIC Underground Nuclear Test in Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tompson, A B; Maxwell, R M; Carle, S F; Zavarin, M; Pawloski, G A; Shumaker, D E

    2005-08-05

    Hydrologic Source Term (HST) calculations completed in 1998 at the CAMBRIC underground nuclear test site were LLNL's first attempt to simulate a hydrologic source term at the NTS by linking groundwater flow and transport modeling with geochemical modeling (Tompson et al., 1999). Significant effort was applied to develop a framework that modeled in detail the flow regime and captured all appropriate chemical processes that occurred over time. However, portions of the calculations were simplified because of data limitations and a perceived need for generalization of the results. For example: (1) Transient effects arising from a 16 years of pumping at the site for a radionuclide migration study were not incorporated. (2) Radionuclide fluxes across the water table, as derived from infiltration from a ditch to which pumping effluent was discharged, were not addressed. (3) Hydrothermal effects arising from residual heat of the test were not considered. (4) Background data on the ambient groundwater flow direction were uncertain and not represented. (5) Unclassified information on the Radiologic Source Term (RST) inventory, as tabulated recently by Bowen et al. (2001), was unavailable; instead, only a limited set of derived data were available (see Tompson et al., 1999). (6) Only a small number of radionuclides and geochemical reactions were incorporated in the work. (7) Data and interpretation of the RNM-2S multiple well aquifer test (MWAT) were not available. As a result, the current Transient CAMBRIC Hydrologic Source Term project was initiated as part of a broader Phase 2 Frenchman Flat CAU flow and transport modeling effort. The source term will be calculated under two scenarios: (1) A more specific representation of the transient flow and radionuclide release behavior at the site, reflecting the influence of the background hydraulic gradient, residual test heat, pumping experiment, and ditch recharge, and taking into account improved data sources and modeling approaches acquired or developed since the previous work (as in Pawloski et al., 2001, at the CHESHIRE site). This will be referred to as the transient CAMBRIC source term. (2) A generic release model made under steady-state flow conditions, in the absence of any transient effect, at the same site with the same RST for use in the development of simple release models at the other nine underground test sites in the Frenchman Flat CAU. This will be referred to as the steady state (non-transient) source term. The purpose of this report is to summarize the results of our steady state source term simulations. Additional details pertaining to these results, the transient model results, and the overall strategy, rationale, and assumptions used in the models will be documented in a separate report.

  12. The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kroenig, Matthew

    2006-01-01

    Without the bomb: The politics of nuclear nonproliferation.impact of nuclear weapons on international politics. Statesnuclear/missile ties and balance of power politics. The

  13. UNIT GUIDE 2014/15 SPAI30029 Dilemmas of a Nuclear-Armed World

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bristol, University of

    that derive from the existence of nuclear weapons in the world. Throughout this unit, we will examine how your attached to the presence of nuclear weapons appear to you. Those dilemmas are not exclusively strategic nuclear weapons programs affect democratic accountability? How does the invention of nuclear weapons

  14. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  15. Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1980-12-18

    The order establishes the DOE program to prevent accidental or unauthorized nuclear explosive detonations, and to define responsibilities for DOE participation in the Department of Defense program for nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety. Does not cancel other directives.

  16. January 3, 2007 National Nuclear Security AdministrationNational Nuclear Security Administration

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Learned, John

    & Objectives Reduce the threat to national security posed by nuclear weapons proliferation: Objectives: Develop and demonstrate technologies for detecting the stages of a foreign nuclear weapons · Detection of nuclear weapon and material smuggling Nonproliferation R&D #12;4 Nuclear Detonation Detection

  17. Proceedings of the Tungsten Workshop for Hard Target Weapons Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mackiewicz-Ludtka, G.; Hayden, H.W.; Davis, R.M.

    1995-06-01

    The purpose of this meeting was to review and exchange information and provide technical input for improving technologies relevant to the Hard Target Weapons Program. This workshop was attended by representatives from 17 organizations, including 4 Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, 8 industrial companies, and 5 laboratories within DOE. Hard targets are defined as reinforced underground structures that house enemy forces, weapon systems, and support equipment. DOE-ORO and Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems) have been involved in advanced materials research and development (R&D) for several DOE and DoD programs. These programs are conducted in close collaboration with Eglin AFB, Department of the Army`s Picatinny Arsenal, and other DoD agencies. As part of this ongoing collaboration, Eglin AFB and Oak Ridge National Laboratory planned and conducted this workshop to support the Hard Target Weapons Program. The objectives of this workshop were to (1) review and identify the technology base that exists (primarily due to anti-armor applications) and assess the applicability of this technology to the Hard Target Weapons Program requirements; (2) determine future directions to establish the W materials, processing, and manufacturing technologies suitable for use in fixed, hard target penetrators; and (3) identify and prioritize the potential areas for technical collaboration among the participants.

  18. Underground Exploration

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Technical Review Board October 1993 Yucca Mountain at #12;Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board Dr. John E of major geologic units and vertical fault zones at the Yucca Mountain site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Figure 2 -- Cutaway schematic rendering of Yucca Mountain geologic block showing currently proposed

  19. Department of Energy/ National Nuclear Security Administration FY 2007 Congressional Budget

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Department of Energy/ National Nuclear Security Administration FY 2007 Congressional Budget Volume..................................................................................................................25 Weapons Activities..............................................................................................................................51 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

  20. L Al N l D t N dLos Alamos Nuclear Data Needs and Activities From Experiment

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Danon, Yaron

    Associated with Nuclear WeaponsAssociated with Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) · responsible for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the i ' l k ilnation's nuclear weapons) · Assess impacts of urban detonation of nuclear weapon to aid decision making in Operated by Los Alamos

  1. CRAD, Configuration Management- Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Configuration Management program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Weapons Facility.

  2. Issues in the use of Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel in VVER-1000 Nuclear Reactors: Comparison of UO2 and MOX Fuels

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carbajo, J.J.

    2005-05-27

    The purpose of this report is to quantify the differences between mixed oxide (MOX) and low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and to assess in reasonable detail the potential impacts of MOX fuel use in VVER-1000 nuclear power plants in Russia. This report is a generic tool to assist in the identification of plant modifications that may be required to accommodate receiving, storing, handling, irradiating, and disposing of MOX fuel in VVER-1000 reactors. The report is based on information from work performed by Russian and U.S. institutions. The report quantifies each issue, and the differences between LEU and MOX fuels are described as accurately as possible, given the current sources of data.

  3. Today and Future Neutrino Experiments at Krasnoyarsk Nuclear Reactor

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yu. V. Kozlov; S. V. Khalturtsev; I. N. Machulin; A. V. Martemyanov; V. P. Martemyanov; A. A. Sabelnikov; V. G. Tarasenkov; E. V. Turbin; V. N. Vyrodov; L. A. Popeko; A. V. Cherny; G. A. Shishkina

    1999-12-22

    The results of undergoing experiments and new experiment propositions at Krasnoyarsk underground nuclear reactor are presented

  4. Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-07-10

    The Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety (NES) elements of DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations (NEOs).

  5. Nuclear Materials Science

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    comprises the core actinide materials science and metallurgical capability within the nuclear weapons production and surveillance communities. Contact Us Group Leader David...

  6. Policy Paper 37: Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kaneko, Kumao; Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Choi, Jor-Shan; Fei, Edward

    1998-01-01

    the accumulation of stockpiles of plutonium. Japan, based ons increasing stockpile of separated plutonium. Korea, theplutonium in deployed weapons, in weapons marked for dismantling, in scrap at the nuclear weapons production complexes, and in stockpiles

  7. Going underground. [Review

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-10-01

    Underground space is increasingly used for energy-saving and secure storage that is often less expensive and more aesthetically pleasing than conventional facilities. Petroleum, pumped hydro, water, and sewage are among the large-scale needs that can be met by underground storage. Individual buildings can store chilled water underground for summer cooling. Windowless aboveground buildings are suitable and even more efficient if they are underground. The discovery of ancient underground cities indicates that the concept can be reapplied to relieve urban centers and save energy as is already done to a large extent in China and elsewhere. A national commitment to solar energy will benefit from increased use of underground space. Kansas City is among several cities which are developing the subsurface with success, businesses and schools having found the underground environment to have many benefits. More construction experience is needed, however, to help US lenders overcome their reluctance to finance earth-sheltered projects. (DCK)

  8. First Characterization of the Ultra-Shielded Chamber in the Low-noise Underground Laboratory (LSBB) of Rustrel Pays d'Apt

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    G. Waysand; D. Bloyet; J. P. Bongiraud; J. I. Collar; C. Dolabdjian; Ph. Le Thiec

    1999-10-13

    In compliance with international agreements on nuclear weapons limitation, the French ground-based nuclear arsenal has been decommissioned in its totality. One of its former underground missile control centers, located in Rustrel, 60 km east of Avignon (Provence) has been converted into the ``Laboratoire Souterrain \\`a Bas Bruit de Rustrel-Pays d'Apt'' (LSBB). The deepest experimental hall (500 m of calcite rock overburden) includes a 100 m$^{2}$ area of sturdy flooring suspended by and resting on shock absorbers, entirely enclosed in a 28 m-long, 8 m-diameter, 1 cm-thick steel Faraday cage. This results in an unparalleled combination of shielding against cosmic rays, acoustic, seismic and electromagnetic noise, which can be exploited for rare event searches using ultra low-temperature and superconducting detectors. The first characterization measurements in this unique civilian site are reported. For more info see http://home.cern.ch/collar/RUSTREL/rustrel.html

  9. Research and Development | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    NNSA reduces the threat to national security posed by nuclear weapons proliferation and possible detonation or the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through the long-term...

  10. The role of the DOE weapons laboratories in a changing national security environment: CNSS papers No. 8, April 1988

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hecker, S.S.

    1988-01-01

    The contributions of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons laboratories to the nation's security are reviewed in testimony before the Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems of the House Armed Services Committee. Also presented are contributions that technology will make in maintaining the strategic balance through deterrence, treaty verification, and a sound nuclear weapons complex as the nation prepares for significant arms control initiatives. The DOE nuclear weapons laboratories can contribute to the broader context of national security, one that recognizes that military strength can be maintained over the long term only if it is built upon the foundations of economic strength and energy security. 9 refs.

  11. Development of a Bayesian Network to monitor the probability of nuclear proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Holcombe, Robert (Robert Joseph)

    2008-01-01

    Nuclear Proliferation is a complex problem that has plagued national security strategists since the advent of the first nuclear weapons. As the cost to produce nuclear weapons has continued to decline and the availability ...

  12. Audit Report: IG-0484 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    IG-0484 Audit Report: IG-0484 September 22, 2000 Management of the Nuclear Weapons Production Infrastructure Since the cessation of underground testing of nuclear weapons in the...

  13. The Department of PhysicsPRESENTS Nuclear Physics & Society

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    on nuclear physics and public policy for anyone who wants to better understand nuclear power nuclear weapons P.M. Applications of Nuclear Physics on Earth: Nuclear power, weapons, and nuclear medicine. TopicsThe Department of PhysicsPRESENTS Nuclear Physics & Society A free, four-day short course

  14. Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richardson, J

    2009-01-21

    The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

  15. Low energy neutron background in deep underground laboratories

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Andreas Best; Joachim Gorres; Matthias Junker; Karl-Ludwig Kratz; Matthias Laubenstein; Alexander Long; Stefano Nisi; Karl Smith; Michael Wiescher

    2015-09-02

    The natural neutron background influences the maximum achievable sensitivity in most deep underground nuclear, astroparticle and double-beta decay physics experiments. Reliable neutron flux numbers are an important ingredient in the design of the shielding of new large-scale experiments as well as in the analysis of experimental data. Using a portable setup of He-3 counters we measured the thermal neutron flux at the Kimballton Underground Research Facility, the Soudan Underground Laboratory, on the 4100 ft and the 4850 ft levels of the Sanford Underground Research Facility, at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and at the Gran Sasso National Laboratory. Absolute neutron fluxes at these laboratories are presented.

  16. Low energy neutron background in deep underground laboratories

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Best, Andreas; Junker, Matthias; Kratz, Karl-Ludwig; Laubenstein, Matthias; Long, Alexander; Nisi, Stefano; Smith, Karl; Wiescher, Michael

    2015-01-01

    The natural neutron background influences the maximum achievable sensitivity in most deep underground nuclear, astroparticle and double-beta decay physics experiments. Reliable neutron flux numbers are an important ingredient in the design of the shielding of new large-scale experiments as well as in the analysis of experimental data. Using a portable setup of He-3 counters we measured the thermal neutron flux at the Kimballton Underground Research Facility, the Soudan Underground Laboratory, on the 4100 ft and the 4850 ft levels of the Sanford Underground Research Facility, at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and at the Gran Sasso National Laboratory. Absolute neutron fluxes at these laboratories are presented.

  17. Los Alamos National Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administrat...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    package in nuclear weapons. This laboratory possesses unique capabilities in neutron scattering, enhanced surveillance, radiography, and plutonium science and...

  18. Working toward a world without nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Drell, Sidney D. [SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory and the Hoover Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, California (United States)

    2014-05-09

    Limiting the number of warheads is a good beginning, but getting to the end state calls for new thinking. Six specific steps can start us down that path.

  19. Working toward a world without nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Drell, Sidney D. [Stanford University, Stanford, California, US (United States)] [Stanford University, Stanford, California, US (United States)

    2010-07-01

    Limiting the number of warheads is a good beginning, but getting to the end state calls for new thinking. Six specific steps can start us down that path.

  20. Working toward a world without nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Drell, Sidney D. [Stanford University, Stanford, California, US (United States)] [Stanford University, Stanford, California, US (United States)

    2010-07-15

    Limiting the number of warheads is a good beginning, but getting to the end state calls for new thinking. Six specific steps can start us down that path.

  1. AEC and control of nuclear weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach HomeA Better Anode Design to Improve4AJ01) (See Energy Level79AJ01) (NotAdvanced70.4BOppenheimercontrol

  2. weapons material protection | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4)9 FederalRivers andMEDA Station3/%2A

  3. Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National Nuclear

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust,Field-effectWorking With WIPPfinalUnexpectedofWyko NT33004. Uranium4.

  4. Nuclear Physics and National Security in an Age of Terrorism

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    235 neutrons A Chain Reaction #12;Nuclear Weapons 101 · A uranium, gun-type nuclear weapon - High (Tumbler Snapper). The fireball is about 20 m across. #12;HEU Gun-Type Design The figure to the right shows, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. How do we assess the threat? 1. Nuclear Weapons 101 2. Catching

  5. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Weapons Designs Uranium, gun-type weapon - High explo- sive fires highly-enriched uranium slug down Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. Testing

  6. WEAPONS ON CAMPUS Authority: Chief of Police

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Scharf, Fred

    05.501 WEAPONS ON CAMPUS Authority: Chief of Police History: Established September 14, 2006 Source of weapons on UNCW property. II. Policy A. The University of North Carolina system of campuses is classified be unlawful for any person to possess the following weapons on UNCW property: 1. Dynamite cartridge, bomb

  7. Nuclear Test-Experimental Science: Annual report, fiscal year 1988

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Struble, G.L.; Donohue, M.L.; Bucciarelli, G.; Hymer, J.D.; Kirvel, R.D.; Middleton, C.; Prono, J.; Reid, S.; Strack, B.

    1988-01-01

    Fiscal year 1988 has been a significant, rewarding, and exciting period for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's nuclear testing program. It was significant in that the Laboratory's new director chose to focus strongly on the program's activities and to commit to a revitalized emphasis on testing and the experimental science that underlies it. It was rewarding in that revolutionary new measurement techniques were fielded on recent important and highly complicated underground nuclear tests with truly incredible results. And it was exciting in that the sophisticated and fundamental problems of weapons science that are now being addressed experimentally are yielding new challenges and understanding in ways that stimulate and reward the brightest and best of scientists. During FY88 the program was reorganized to emphasize our commitment to experimental science. The name of the program was changed to reflect this commitment, becoming the Nuclear Test-Experimental Science (NTES) Program.

  8. Opportunities exist for the diversion of weapons-usable material at the front end of the fuel cycle, during which

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Laughlin, Robert B.

    of proliferation: The more places in which this work is done, the harder it is to monitor. Weapons have been, and the technology seems to be not that hard to master or acquire. BURTON RICHTER Reducing Proliferation Risk if it comes without a great increase in the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. FALL 2008 45 T he

  9. Chemistry and materials science progress report. Weapons-supporting research and laboratory directed research and development: FY 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-04-01

    This report covers different materials and chemistry research projects carried out a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory during 1995 in support of nuclear weapons programs and other programs. There are 16 papers supporting weapons research and 12 papers supporting laboratory directed research.

  10. Hegemony and nuclear proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Miller, Nicholas L. (Nicholas LeSuer)

    2014-01-01

    Contrary to longstanding of predictions of nuclear tipping points, the number of states interested in nuclear weapons has sharply declined in recent decades. In contrast to existing explanations, this dissertation argues ...

  11. Introduction to Pits and Weapons Systems (U)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kautz, D.

    2012-07-02

    A Nuclear Explosive Package includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components. This is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield and it converts mechanical energy into nuclear energy. The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to electromagnetic energy. Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility: casting, forming, machining and welding. Some of the materials used in pits include: Plutonium, Uranium, Stainless Steel, Beryllium, Titanium, and Aluminum. Gloveboxes are used for three reasons: (1) Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides - (a) Plutonium is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides, (b) While not the 'Most dangerous material in the world' of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled; (2) Protect plutonium from reactive materials - (a) Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen, (b) As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control, (c) As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product; and (3) Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: {alpha}, {gamma}, and {eta} are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as {sup 241}Am and {sup 238}Pu.

  12. NNSA Labs host U.S. and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Labs host U.S. and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Non-Nuclear Weapon State Representatives | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS...

  13. FACT SHEET SandiaNational LaboratoriesThe U.S. NUclear

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Napp, Nils

    FACT SHEET SandiaNational LaboratoriesThe U.S. NUclear WeapoNS complex Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is responsible for the non-nuclear compo- nents and systems integration of U.S. nuclear weapons. Often called the engineer- ing laboratory of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, it grew out of Z Division

  14. THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND NEXT STEPS TO REDUCE THE DANGER

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Laughlin, Robert B.

    nuclear facility in South Africa, where hundreds of kilograms of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU nuclear weapon and every cache of potential nuclear bomb material worldwide is secured against the kinds terrorism. Do terrorists want nuclear weapons? For a small set of terrorists, the answer is clearly "yes

  15. Not So Permafrost Viewport for Nuclear Fusion

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Not So Permafrost Under Fire Viewport for Nuclear Fusion Hassle-Free Uranium 1663 LOS ALAMOS nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons brought the war to a rapid and decisive close, and played an important ceased nuclear testing and the Laboratory entered an era of stockpile stewardship. Today, the Laboratory

  16. Builders go underground

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McGrath, D.J.

    1982-01-01

    The appeal of earth-sheltered housing increased last year when 1000 new underground houses brought the national total to about 5000. Innovative construction and management techniques help, such as the Terra-Dome's moldset and equipment, which the company sells to builders under a license arrangement. Attention is given to aesthetic appeal as well as to energy savings. The Everstrong company builds all-wood underground houses to cut down on humidity and increase resistance to natural disasters. Tight mortgage money has been a serious problem for underground as well as conventional builders. (DCK)

  17. Nuclear Celebrations

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hacker, Randi; Tsutsui, William

    2006-11-01

    Broadcast Transcript: The North Korean situation is frightening for many reasons but none, perhaps, more eerily disturbing than images of North Koreans celebrating in brightly colored costumes just days after the nation's underground nuclear test...

  18. List of Major Information Systems,National Nuclear Security Administra...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    emerging information networking technology to production processes in support of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. National Nuclear Security Administration ADaPT Network...

  19. Identification and Characterization of Hydrogeologic Units at the Nevada Test Site Using Geophysical Logs: Examples from the Underground Test Area Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lance Prothro, Sigmund Drellack, Margaret Townsend

    2009-03-25

    The diverse and complex geology of the Nevada Test Site region makes for a challenging environment for identifying and characterizing hydrogeologic units penetrated by wells drilled for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Underground Test Area (UGTA) Environmental Restoration Sub-Project. Fortunately, UGTA geoscientists have access to large and robust sets of subsurface geologic data, as well as a large historical knowledge base of subsurface geological analyses acquired mainly during the underground nuclear weapons testing program. Of particular importance to the accurate identification and characterization of hydrogeologic units in UGTA boreholes are the data and interpretation principles associated with geophysical well logs. Although most UGTA participants and stakeholders are probably familiar with drill hole data such as drill core and cuttings, they may be less familiar with the use of geophysical logs; this document is meant to serve as a primer on the use of geophysical logs in the UGTA project. Standard geophysical logging tools used in the UGTA project to identify and characterize hydrogeologic units are described, and basic interpretation principles and techniques are explained. Numerous examples of geophysical log data from a variety of hydrogeologic units encountered in UGTA wells are presented to highlight the use and value of geophysical logs in the accurate hydrogeologic characterization of UGTA wells.

  20. Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy: Neutronic Design Aspects of a Hybrid Fusion-Fission Nuclear Energy System

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kramer, Kevin James

    2010-01-01

    of Con- trolled Nuclear Fusion, CONF-760975-P3, pages 1061–more effective solution, nuclear fusion. Fission Energy Thethe development of nuclear fusion weapons, humankind has

  1. weapons

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4)9 FederalRivers andMEDA Station3/%2A ¡BLM3/%2A

  2. Massive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Robock, Alan

    that nuclear war could be winnable, and preceded the first significant reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has produced greater risks of a regional nuclear conflict. At the same timeMassive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict Michael J. Mills* , Owen B

  3. Weapons Program Associate Directors named

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservationBio-Inspired SolarAbout /Two0Photos and Videos/01/2012 Page 1WaterWaterComingWeapons

  4. Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition NNSS Capabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pat Arnold

    2011-12-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has tasked the WDD working group to disposition the large inventory of legacy classified weapon components scattered across the complex.

  5. A simple method for rapidly processing HEU from weapons returns

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McLean, W. II; Miller, P.E.

    1994-01-01

    A method based on the use of a high temperature fluidized bed for rapidly oxidizing, homogenizing and down-blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons is presented. This technology directly addresses many of the most important issues that inhibit progress in international commerce in HEU; viz., transaction verification, materials accountability, transportation and environmental safety. The equipment used to carry out the oxidation and blending is simple, inexpensive and highly portable. Mobile facilities to be used for point-of-sale blending and analysis of the product material are presented along with a phased implementation plan that addresses the conversion of HEU derived from domestic weapons and related waste streams as well as material from possible foreign sources such as South Africa or the former Soviet Union.

  6. Impacts of a nuclear war in South Asia on rice production in Mainland China

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Robock, Alan

    of nuclear weapons by the superpowers would be so catastrophic that we avoided such a tragedy for the first four decades after the invention of nuclear weapons. The realization, based on research con- ducted-size (15 kt) nuclear weapons to at- tack the other's most populated urban areas. Based on the analysis

  7. Sensitive Change Detection for Remote Monitoring of Nuclear Treaties

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    is examined in case studies involving underground nuclear testing and location of clandestine uranium mining studies involving the location of underground nuclear explosions and detection of uranium mining sites

  8. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    planning and oversight for programs funded by the Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Non- proliferation, for Weapons Ac- tivities and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Federal employees at the NNSA service379 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Federal Funds General and special

  9. Print this Page Close The nuclear deal

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    league. B At least in the eyes of the United States, India is now a nuclear weapons state. The gamble 'Entity List', which was drawn up outside the non-proliferation laws after our nuclear weapon testsPrint this Page Close The nuclear deal July 20, 2005 | 19:05 ISTT P Sreenivasan | y assuming

  10. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    and oversight for programs funded by the Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Non- proliferation, and Naval pro- gram direction for Weapons Activities and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Federal employees361 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Federal Funds General and special

  11. Sandia National Laboratories | National Nuclear Security Administratio...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    nuclear weapons Bay Area national labs team to tackle long-standing automotive hydrogen storage challenge Sandia National Laboratories chemist Mark Allendorf, shown here at...

  12. Research and Development | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile through well-managed scientific research, technology development, and advantageous international collaborations. The Office of...

  13. Contained Firing Facility | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    nuclear weapon W80-4 Life Extension Program Bay Area national labs team to tackle long-standing automotive hydrogen storage challenge Stewardship Science Academic Alliances Awards...

  14. Igniting the Light Elements: The Los Alamos Thermonuclear Weapon Project, 1942-1952

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anne C. Fitzpatrick

    1999-07-01

    The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors--fusion (or hydrogen) devices--are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the US Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's ''large technological systems'' thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the ''Super''--the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period--and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to scientific, politician, and military participants in this project. I analyze how and when participants in the H-bomb project recognized both blatant and subtle problems facing the project, how scientists solved them, and the relationship this process had to official nuclear weapons policies. Consequently, I show how the practice of nuclear weapons science in the postwar period became an extremely complex, technologically-based endeavor.

  15. John T. Mihalczo PhD. in Nuclear Engineering : University of Tennessee, 1970

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    security by affecting safer assembly and handling of nuclear weapons components materials. The technologies in nuclear criticality safety, nuclear weapons identification, nuclear materials processing, and nuclearJohn T. Mihalczo PhD. in Nuclear Engineering : University of Tennessee, 1970 Masters in Physics

  16. Joint Venture Established Between Russian Weapons Plant And the...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Weapons Plant And the Largest Dialysis Provider in the U.S. Press Release Sep 20, 2001 Joint Venture Established Between Russian Weapons Plant And the Largest Dialysis...

  17. Reducing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    This Site Budget IG Web Policy Privacy No Fear Act Accessibility FOIA Sitemap Federal Government The White House DOE.gov USA.gov Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA...

  18. COLLOQUIUM: Nuclear Famine: The Threat to Humanity from Nuclear Weapons |

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room News PublicationsAudits &BradburyMay 1, 2013, 4:15pm Colloquia MBGLabPrinceton Plasma

  19. Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal of HonorPoster Session |SecurityNSDDfor 5thSafeguardsTesting

  20. SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal of HonorPosterNationalPrograms |NationalSpringThree labsC,

  1. Audit Report National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i n c i p a l De p u tCorporationIt'sDOE PhasedareU.S.

  2. Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJesseworkSURVEY UNIVERSE The 2014 survey

  3. Reducing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile | National Nuclear Security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservation of Fe(II) by Carbon-RichProtonAbout Us Hanford SiteRecoveryWater

  4. 'Naked' Crystals go Underground

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hans Volker Klapdor-Kleingrothaus

    2003-07-26

    On May 5, 2003 in the GRAN SASSO Underground Laboratory the first naked high-purity Germanium detectors were installed successfully in liquid nitrogen in the GENIUS-Test-Facility (GENIUS-TF). This is the first time ever that this novel technique for extreme background reduction in searches for rare decays is going to be tested under realistic background conditions.

  5. Nuclear Proliferation and the Deterrence of Conventional War: Justin Pollard

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sadoulet, Elisabeth

    Nuclear Proliferation and the Deterrence of Conventional War: A Proposal Justin Pollard April 2009) Introduction It seems counterintuitive to think that the spread of nuclear weapons could make the world a safer of ubiquitous nuclear armament is a more dangerous and unstable one. Certainly, a weapon of the nuclear

  6. Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas sampling Nondestructive laser welding process far less expensive, no underground testing. June 8, 2012 Nondestructive Laser...

  7. Program Mission Campaigns are multi-year, multi-functional efforts involving, to varying degrees, every site in the nuclear

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    degrees, every site in the nuclear weapons complex. They provide specialized scientific knowledge and technical support to the directed stockpile work on the nuclear weapons stockpile. Deliverables are defined/scheduled in each campaign plan and then coordinated with several key nuclear weapons complex directives, including

  8. Nuclear Science Center - 5 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Unknown

    2009-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy ...

  9. Materials and Sensor R&D to Transform the Nuclear Stockpile:...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    the nuclear stockpile. Risks include material supply issues, ever-increasing lifecycle costs, and loss of technical expertise across the weapons complex. For example, non-nuclear...

  10. Radiocesium Discharges and Subsequent Environmental Transport at the Major U.S. Weapons Production Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garten, Jr. C.T.; Hamby, D.M.; Schreckhise, R.G.

    1999-11-14

    Radiocesium is one of the more prevalent radionuclides in the environment as a result of weapons production related atomic projects in the United States and the former Soviet Union. Radiocesium discharges during the 1950's account for a large fraction of the historical releases from U.S. weapons production facilities. Releases of radiocesium to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems during the early ,years of nuclear weapons production provided the opportunity to conduct multidisciplinary studies on the transport mechanisms of this potentially hazardous radionuclide. The major U.S. Department of Energy facilities (Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, and Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina) are located in regions of the country that have different geographical characteristics. The facility siting provided diverse backgrounds for the development of an understanding of environmental factors contributing to the fate and transport of radiocesium. In this paper, we summarize the significant environmental releases of radiocesium in the early -years of weapons production and then discuss the historically significant transport mechanisms for r37Cs at the three facilities that were part of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

  11. Examination of the proposed conversion of the U.S. Navy nuclear fleet from highly enriched Uranium to low enriched Uranium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McCord, Cameron (Cameron Liam)

    2013-01-01

    .The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons creates a loophole that allows a non-nuclear-weapon country to avoid international safeguards governing fissile materials if it claims that the materials will be used ...

  12. Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D.

    2012-06-18

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  13. Matrices: A Secret Weapon Algebra 5/Trig

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lega, Joceline

    Matrices: A Secret Weapon Algebra 5/Trig May 4, 2010 In this worksheet we will learn how to use zero standing for a blank space. This is displayed at the top of page 784. This can be made more

  14. The Sanford underground research facility at Homestake

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Heise, J.

    2014-06-24

    The former Homestake gold mine in Lead, South Dakota is being transformed into a dedicated laboratory to pursue underground research in rare-process physics, as well as offering research opportunities in other disciplines such as biology, geology and engineering. A key component of the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) is the Davis Campus, which is in operation at the 4850-foot level (4300 m.w.e) and currently hosts three projects: the LUX dark matter experiment, the MAJORANA DEMONSTRATOR neutrinoless double-beta decay experiment and the CUBED low-background counter. Plans for possible future experiments at SURF are well underway and include long baseline neutrino oscillation experiments, future dark matter experiments as well as nuclear astrophysics accelerators. Facility upgrades to accommodate some of these future projects have already started. SURF is a dedicated facility with significant expansion capability.

  15. Economical wind protection - underground

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kiesling, E.W.

    1980-01-01

    Earth-sheltered buildings inherently posess near-absolute occupant protection from severe winds. They should sustain no structural damage and only minimal facial damage. Assuming that the lower-hazard risk attendant to this type of construction results in reduced insurance-premium rates, the owner accrues economic benefits from the time of construction. Improvements to aboveground buildings, in contrast, may not yield early economic benefits in spite of a favorable benefit-to-cost ratio. This, in addition to sensitivity to initial costs, traditionalism in residential construction, and lack of professional input to design, impede the widespread use of underground improvements and the subsequent economic losses from severe winds. Going underground could reverse the trend. 7 references.

  16. Underground waste barrier structure

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Saha, Anuj J. (Hamburg, NY); Grant, David C. (Gibsonia, PA)

    1988-01-01

    Disclosed is an underground waste barrier structure that consists of waste material, a first container formed of activated carbonaceous material enclosing the waste material, a second container formed of zeolite enclosing the first container, and clay covering the second container. The underground waste barrier structure is constructed by forming a recessed area within the earth, lining the recessed area with a layer of clay, lining the clay with a layer of zeolite, lining the zeolite with a layer of activated carbonaceous material, placing the waste material within the lined recessed area, forming a ceiling over the waste material of a layer of activated carbonaceous material, a layer of zeolite, and a layer of clay, the layers in the ceiling cojoining with the respective layers forming the walls of the structure, and finally, covering the ceiling with earth.

  17. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Designs Uranium, gun-type weapon - High explo- sive fires highly-enriched uranium slug down the gun tube Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban

  18. Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Luke, S J

    2011-12-20

    This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the genetic information associated with the various pathogens. In addition, it has been determined that a suitable information barrier could be applied to this technology when the verification regime has been defined. Finally, the report posits a path forward for additional development of information barriers in a biological weapons verification regime. This path forward has shown that a new analysis approach coined as Information Loss Analysis might need to be pursued so that a numerical understanding of how information can be lost in specific measurement systems can be achieved.

  19. Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-04-14

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety (NES) elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations (NEOs). Cancels DOE O 452.2C. Admin Chg 1, dated 7-10-13, cancels DOE O 452.2D.

  20. Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2015-01-26

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety (NES) elements of DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, or successor directive, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations (NEOs). Supersedes DOE O 452.2D and DOE M 452.2-1A.

  1. Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-04-14

    This Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations. Cancels DOE O 452.2C. Admin Chg 1, 7-10-13

  2. Nuclear proliferation after the Cold War

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reiss, M.; Litwak, R.S.

    1994-01-01

    Today, former Soviet republics threaten to gain control over nuclear weapons sited on their territories, and reports on North Korea, Pakistan, India, and Iraq reveal current or recent weapon development programs. This document offers a timely assessment of the prospects for nuclear nonproliferation.

  3. NEW - DOE O 452.2E, Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety (NES) elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, or successor directive, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations (NEOs).

  4. EMMA a new underground cosmic-ray experiment T. Enqvista

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Usoskin, Ilya G.

    ¨asalmi, Finland b Sodankyl¨a Geophysical Observatory (SGO), University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland c Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority ­ STUK, Helsinki, Finland d Centre for Underground Physics at Pyh¨asalmi (CUPP), University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland e Department of Physics, University of Jyv¨askyl¨a (JYFL), Jyv

  5. EMMA an underground cosmic-ray experiment T. Enqvista

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Usoskin, Ilya G.

    . Trzaskad , I. Usoskinf , a Centre for Underground Physics at Pyh¨asalmi (CUPP), University of Oulu, Finland¨askyl¨a, Finland e Kurchatov Institute, Moscow, Russia f Sodankyl¨a Geophysical Observatory (SGO), University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland g Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Helsinki, Finland A new cosmic

  6. The Sanford Underground Research Facility at Homestake

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Heise, Jaret

    2015-01-01

    The former Homestake gold mine in Lead, South Dakota has been transformed into a dedicated facility to pursue underground research in rare-process physics, as well as offering research opportunities in other disciplines such as biology, geology and engineering. A key component of the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) is the Davis Campus, which is in operation at the 4850-foot level (4300 m.w.e.) and currently hosts two main physics projects: the LUX dark matter experiment and the MAJORANA DEMONSTRATOR neutrinoless double-beta decay experiment. In addition, two low-background counters currently operate at the Davis Campus in support of current and future experiments. Expansion of the underground laboratory space is underway at the 4850L Ross Campus in order to maintain and enhance low-background assay capabilities as well as to host a unique nuclear astrophysics accelerator facility. Plans to accommodate other future experiments at SURF are also underway and include the next generation of direct-sea...

  7. The Sanford Underground Research Facility at Homestake

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Jaret Heise

    2015-03-05

    The former Homestake gold mine in Lead, South Dakota has been transformed into a dedicated facility to pursue underground research in rare-process physics, as well as offering research opportunities in other disciplines such as biology, geology and engineering. A key component of the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) is the Davis Campus, which is in operation at the 4850-foot level (4300 m.w.e.) and currently hosts two main physics projects: the LUX dark matter experiment and the MAJORANA DEMONSTRATOR neutrinoless double-beta decay experiment. In addition, two low-background counters currently operate at the Davis Campus in support of current and future experiments. Expansion of the underground laboratory space is underway at the 4850L Ross Campus in order to maintain and enhance low-background assay capabilities as well as to host a unique nuclear astrophysics accelerator facility. Plans to accommodate other future experiments at SURF are also underway and include the next generation of direct-search dark matter experiments and the Fermilab-led international long-baseline neutrino program. Planning to understand the infrastructure developments necessary to accommodate these future projects is well advanced and in some cases have already started. SURF is a dedicated research facility with significant expansion capability.

  8. Underground coal gasification. Presentations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    2007-07-01

    The 8 presentations are: underground coal gasification (UCG) and the possibilities for carbon management (J. Friedmann); comparing the economics of UCG with surface gasification technologies (E. Redman); Eskom develops UCG technology project (C. Gross); development and future of UCG in the Asian region (L. Walker); economically developing vast deep Powder River Basin coals with UCG (S. Morzenti); effectively managing UCG environmental issues (E. Burton); demonstrating modelling complexity of environmental risk management; and UCG research at the University of Queensland, Australia (A.Y. Klimenko).

  9. Underground house book

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Campbell, S.

    1980-01-01

    Aesthetics, attitudes, and acceptance of earth-covered buildings are examined initially, followed by an examination of land, money, water, earth, design, heat, and interior factors. Contributions made by architect Frank Lloyd Wright are discussed and reviewed. Contemporary persons, mostly designers, who contribute from their experiences with underground structures are Andy Davis; Rob Roy; Malcolm Wells; John Barnard, Jr.; Jeff Sikora; and Don Metz. A case study to select the site, design, and prepare to construct Earthtech 6 is described. Information is given in appendices on earth-protected buildings and existing basements; financing earth-sheltered housing; heating-load calculations and life-cycle costing; and designer names and addresses. (MCW)

  10. Saving an Underground Reservoir 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wythe, Kathy

    2006-01-01

    significant part of the region?s agricultural economy. Though the area has few rivers and lakes, underneath it lies a supply of water that has provided groundwater for developing this economy. This underground water, the Ogallala Aquifer, is a finite... resource. The amount of water seeping back into the aquifer is much less than the water taken out, especially in the southern half of the aquifer, which spreads out from western Kansas to the High Plains of Texas. ?Water levels are declining 2 to 4...

  11. Investigation of processes for converting weapons plutonium into MOX fuel at the TOMOX facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Polyakov, A.S.; Rovnyi, S.; Skiba, O.V.; Lloubtsev, R.I. [Minotom, Moxcow (Russian Federation)] [and others

    1996-12-31

    On November 12, 1992, the governments of France and Russia signed a cooperation agreement on civil uses of nuclear materials from Russian weapons. This agreement includes the AIDA/mixed-oxide (MOX) program for converting dismantled Russian weapons plutonium into MOX fuel to supply existing and future Russian VVER and BN reactors. AIDA/MOX covers six areas: strategic approaches, the neutronic aspects of loading reactors with military plutonium, the chemistry of alloyed plutonium and conversion into sinterable oxide, MOX fuel fabrication, possible reprocessing of MOX fuel, and incineration of weapons plutonium in new reactors. The short-term use of existing reactors requires a facility for converting weapons plutonium to MOX fuel; the TOMOX-1300 facility should be capable of processing 1300 kg of weapons plutonium annually to fabricate 26.5 tonnes of MOX fuel (1.5 t for the BN-600 reactor and 25 t for four VVER-1000 reactors). Research and development (R&D) undertaken from 1992 to 1996 by several Russian institutes under Minatom and by various Commissariat A l`Energie Atomique (CEA) divisions to select the processes to be implemented in the TOMOX plant is presented and analyzed in this paper.

  12. Y-12 employees receive awards recognizing excellence in nuclear...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    receive ... Y-12 employees receive awards recognizing excellence in nuclear weapons program Posted: October 6, 2014 - 9:09am Defense Programs 2013 Award of Excellence recipient...

  13. National Nuclear Security Administration ENERGY U.S. DEPARTMENT...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    safeguards play a central role in international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. IAEA safeguards provide assurances to the international community that...

  14. Nuclear proliferation and testing: A tale of two treaties

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Corden, Pierce S.; Hafemeister, David

    2014-04-01

    Despite progress in reducing stockpiles after the end of the Cold War, the disturbing actions of some nations could spread nuclear weapon capabilities and enlarge existing arsenals.

  15. Depleted argon from underground sources

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Back, H.O.; /Princeton U.; Alton, A.; /Augustana U. Coll.; Calaprice, F.; Galbiati, C.; Goretti, A.; /Princeton U.; Kendziora, C.; /Fermilab; Loer, B.; /Princeton U.; Montanari, D.; /Fermilab; Mosteiro, P.; /Princeton U.; Pordes, S.; /Fermilab

    2011-09-01

    Argon is a powerful scintillator and an excellent medium for detection of ionization. Its high discrimination power against minimum ionization tracks, in favor of selection of nuclear recoils, makes it an attractive medium for direct detection of WIMP dark matter. However, cosmogenic {sup 39}Ar contamination in atmospheric argon limits the size of liquid argon dark matter detectors due to pile-up. The cosmic ray shielding by the earth means that Argon from deep underground is depleted in {sup 39}Ar. In Cortez Colorado a CO{sub 2} well has been discovered to contain approximately 500ppm of argon as a contamination in the CO{sub 2}. In order to produce argon for dark matter detectors we first concentrate the argon locally to 3-5% in an Ar, N{sub 2}, and He mixture, from the CO{sub 2} through chromatographic gas separation. The N{sub 2} and He will be removed by continuous cryogenic distillation in the Cryogenic Distillation Column recently built at Fermilab. In this talk we will discuss the entire extraction and purification process; with emphasis on the recent commissioning and initial performance of the cryogenic distillation column purification.

  16. Jiangmen Underground Neutrino Observatory

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Miao He; for the JUNO collaboration

    2014-12-13

    The Jiangmen Underground Neutrino Observatory (JUNO) is a multipurpose neutrino-oscillation experiment designed to determine the neutrino mass hierarchy and to precisely measure oscillation parameters by detecting reactor antineutrinos, observe supernova neutrinos, study the atmospheric, solar neutrinos and geo-neutrinos, and perform exotic searches, with a 20 kiloton liquid scintillator detector of unprecedented $3\\%$ energy resolution (at 1 MeV) at 700-meter deep underground and to have other rich scientific possibilities. Currently MC study shows a sensitivity of the mass hierarchy to be $\\overline{\\Delta\\chi^2}\\sim 11$ and $\\overline{\\Delta\\chi^2}\\sim 16$ in a relative and an absolute measurement, respectively. JUNO has been approved by Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2013, and an international collaboration was established in 2014. The civil construction is in preparation and the R$\\&$D of the detectors are ongoing. A new offline software framework was developed for the detector simulation, the event reconstruction and the physics analysis. JUNO is planning to start taking data around 2020.

  17. Nuclear bargaining : using carrots and sticks in nuclear counter-proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Reardon, Robert J

    2010-01-01

    This dissertation explores how states can use positive inducements and negative sanctions to successfully bargain with nuclear proliferators and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It seeks to answer the following ...

  18. Pantex Takes a Green Approach to Cleaning Weapons Parts | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Takes a Green Approach to Cleaning Weapons Parts At NNSA's Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, a new green approach to cleaning weapons parts was brought online recently at the...

  19. Operation Greenhouse. Scientific Director's report of atomic weapon tests at Eniwetok, 1951. Annex 1. 6. Blast measurements. Part 5. Measurement of density, temperature, and material velocity in an air shock produced by a nuclear explosion

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Porzel, F.B.; Whitener, J.E.

    1985-09-01

    The results from laboratory tests and test firing were quite encouraging. It was concluded that: (1) the beta densitometer is a feasible device for the measurement of density as a function of time in the shock wave from a nuclear explosion. It is limited to pressure levels of 6 or 8 psi for bombs in the range of 50 kt, but is capable of higher-pressure levels on larger bombs where the interference from gamma rays is less serious; (2) dust-loading behind the shock wave is a major perturbation to the ideal hydrodynamics and can change the density by as large a factor as the shock itself; (3) the rise time at distances of 7,500 feet on Easy Shot was sharp within a resolution of approximately 0.2 msec; and (4) the field calibration used on Operation Greenhouse appeared reasonably accurate and was worthy of subsequent development.

  20. Why is weapons grade plutonium more hazardous to work with than highly enriched uranium?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Costigan, Stephen A.; Schake, Bradley S.

    2015-08-01

    Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons grade plutonium have assumed positions of dominant importance among the actinide elements because of their successful uses as explosive ingredients in nuclear weapons and the place they hold as key materials in the development of industrial use of nuclear power. While most chemists are familiar with the practical interest concerning HEU and WG Pu, fewer know the subtleties among their hazards. In this study, a primer is provided regarding the hazards associated with working with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides. The care that must be taken to safely handle these materials is emphasized and the extent of the hazards is described. The controls needed to work with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides are differentiated. Given the choice, one would rather work with HEU metal and oxides than WG Pu metal and oxides.

  1. Why is weapons grade plutonium more hazardous to work with than highly enriched uranium?

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Costigan, Stephen A.; Schake, Bradley S.

    2015-08-01

    Highly Enriched Uranium and Weapons grade plutonium have assumed positions of dominant importance among the actinide elements because of their successful uses as explosive ingredients in nuclear weapons and the place they hold as key materials in the development of industrial use of nuclear power. While most chemists are familiar with the practical interest concerning HEU and WG Pu, fewer know the subtleties among their hazards. In this study, a primer is provided regarding the hazards associated with working with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides. The care that must be taken to safely handle these materials is emphasizedmore »and the extent of the hazards is described. The controls needed to work with HEU and WG Pu metals and oxides are differentiated. Given the choice, one would rather work with HEU metal and oxides than WG Pu metal and oxides.« less

  2. Water intrusion in underground structures

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nazarchuk, Alex

    2008-01-01

    This thesis presents a study of the permissible groundwater infiltration rates in underground structures, the consequences of this leakage and the effectiveness of mitigation measures. Design guides and codes do not restrict, ...

  3. US nuclear warhead facility profiles

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cochran, T.B.; Arkin, W.A.; Norris, R.S.; Hoenig, M.M.

    1987-01-01

    US Nuclear Warhead Facility Profiles is the third volume of the Nuclear Weapons Databook, a series published by the Natural Resources Defense Council. This volume reviews the different facilities in the US nuclear warhead complex. Because of the linkage between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, the authors cover not only those facilities associated mainly with nuclear power research, but also those well known for weapons development. They are: the Argonne National Laboratory; the Hanford Reservation; the Oak Ridge National Laboratory; the Pantex plant; the Los Alamos Test Site; the Rocky Flats plant; the Sandia National Laboratories; and a host of others. Information on each facility is organized into a standard format that makes the book easy to use. The reader will find precise information ranging from a facility's address to its mission, management, establishment, budget, and staff. An additional, more in-depth presentation covers the activities and technical process of each facility. Maps, pictures, and figures complement the text.

  4. The Chemical Weapons Convention -- Legal issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1997-08-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the US system of constitutional law. Its promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world`s arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by US business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the US consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the SU through a federal implementing statute.

  5. Underground Coal Thermal Treatment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    P. Smith; M. Deo; E. Eddings; A. Sarofim; K. Gueishen; M. Hradisky; K. Kelly; P. Mandalaparty; H. Zhang

    2011-10-30

    The long-term objective of this work is to develop a transformational energy production technology by insitu thermal treatment of a coal seam for the production of substitute natural gas (SNG) while leaving much of the coalâ??s carbon in the ground. This process converts coal to a high-efficiency, low-GHG emitting gas fuel. It holds the potential of providing environmentally acceptable access to previously unusable coal resources. This topical report discusses the development of experimental capabilities, the collection of available data, and the development of simulation tools to obtain process thermo-chemical and geo-thermal parameters in preparation for the eventual demonstration in a coal seam. It also includes experimental and modeling studies of CO{sub 2} sequestration. Efforts focused on: â?¢ Constructing a suite of three different coal pyrolysis reactors. These reactors offer the ability to gather heat transfer, mass transfer and kinetic data during coal pyrolysis under conditions that mimic in situ conditions (Subtask 6.1). â?¢ Studying the operational parameters for various underground thermal treatment processes for oil shale and coal and completing a design matrix analysis for the underground coal thermal treatment (UCTT). This analysis yielded recommendations for terms of targeted coal rank, well orientation, rubblization, presence of oxygen, temperature, pressure, and heating sources (Subtask 6.2). â?¢ Developing capabilities for simulating UCTT, including modifying the geometry as well as the solution algorithm to achieve long simulation times in a rubblized coal bed by resolving the convective channels occurring in the representative domain (Subtask 6.3). â?¢ Studying the reactive behavior of carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) with limestone, sandstone, arkose (a more complex sandstone) and peridotite, including mineralogical changes and brine chemistry for the different initial rock compositions (Subtask 6.4). Arkose exhibited the highest tendency of participating in mineral reactions, which can be attributed to the geochemical complexity of its initial mineral assemblage. In experiments with limestone, continuous dissolution was observed with the release of CO{sub 2} gas, indicated by the increasing pressure in the reactor (formation of a gas chamber). This occurred due to the lack of any source of alkali to buffer the solution. Arkose has the geochemical complexity for permanent sequestration of CO{sub 2} as carbonates and is also relatively abundant. The effect of including NH{sub 3} in the injected gas stream was also investigated in this study. Precipitation of calcite and trace amounts of ammonium zeolites was observed. A batch geochemical model was developed using Geochemists Workbench (GWB). Degassing effect in the experiments was corrected using the sliding fugacity model in GWB. Experimental and simulation results were compared and a reasonable agreement between the two was observed.

  6. Measures to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tanzman, E.; Kellman, B.

    1999-11-05

    This seminar is another excellent opportunity for those involved in preventing chemical weapons production and use to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. The author is grateful to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for inviting him to address this distinguished seminar. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the position of the government of the US nor or of any other institution. In 1993, as the process of CWC ratification was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law would cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Convention would be carried out. As a result the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was prepared and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Manual was reviewed by the Committee of Legal Experts on National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Mica. In February 1998, the second edition of the Manual was published in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The second edition 1998 clarified the national implementation options to reflect post-entry-into-force thinking, added extensive references to national implementing measures that had been enacted by various States Parties, and included a prototype national implementing statute developed by the authors to provide a starting point for those whose national implementing measures were still under development. Last month, the Web Edition of the Manual was completed. It's internet address, or URL, is http://www.cwc.anl.gov/.

  7. Hanford struggles with transition. [Forum on future of DOE weapons site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    King, H.; Rubin, D.K.

    1993-09-27

    Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary kicked off a precedent-setting forum on the future of the US Energy Dept's largest and most environmentally troubled weapon plant site by announcing sweeping management changes and a Clinton administration commitment to new projects there. O'Leary announced changes in traditional contractor and management relationships at Hanford. She claimed these have created massive red tape that has already delayed the estimated $57-billion cleanup of hazardous and radioactive waste stored at the site over the last 50 years. The secretary also announced that starting Oct. 1, all Hanford subcontractors will report to Westinghouse Hanford Co., the overall management and operations contractor. She also outlined new safety initiatives for site wastes stored in 177 underground tanks, many of them badly deteriorated.

  8. Long-Term Planning for Nuclear Energy Systems Under Deep Uncertainty

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kim, Lance Kyungwoo

    2011-01-01

    Following the discovery of nuclear fission in the late 1930’products produced by a nuclear fission re- action present apathways to a nuclear fission weapon. In a nutshell, the

  9. Monitoring under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement : the prospects of antineutrino detection as an IAEA verification metric for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in the United States

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Copeland, Christopher Michael, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    2012-01-01

    After the end of World War II, the world entered an even more turbulent period as it faced the beginnings of the Cold War, during which the prospect of mutually assured destruction between the world's largest nuclear weapon ...

  10. Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Joeck, N

    2007-02-05

    The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

  11. Limiting the Nuclear Club--Iraq, North Korea, et al. Jonathan I. Katz

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Katz, Jonathan I.

    proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first conclusion is that proliferation is easy and inevitable. The secondLimiting the Nuclear Club--Iraq, North Korea, et al. Jonathan I. Katz Washington University, St development of nuclear weapons in 1949. Two plausible conclusions may be drawn from this history of the first

  12. Department of Energy Releases Global Nuclear Energy Partnership...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Plan outlines a path forward to enable worldwide increase in the use of safe, emissions-free nuclear energy without contributing to the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities in...

  13. High-value use of weapons-plutonium by burning in molten salt accelerator-driven subcritical systems or reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowman, C.D.; Venneri, F.

    1993-11-01

    The application of thermal-spectrum molten-salt reactors and accelerator-driven subcritical systems to the destruction of weapons-return plutonium is considered from the perspective of deriving the maximum societal benefit. The enhancement of electric power production from burning the fertile fuel {sup 232}Th with the plutonium is evaluated. Also the enhancement of destruction of the accumulated waste from commercial nuclear reactors is considered using the neutron-rich weapons plutonium. Most cases examined include the concurrent transmutation of the long-lived actinide and fission product waste ({sup 99}Tc, {sup 129}I, {sup 135}Cs, {sup 126}Sn and {sup 79}Se).

  14. Bonus-- Cameras Designed to Strengthen Nuclear Security Can Also Detect Cancer

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Technologies that are improving our ability to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and material are also saving lives on a daily basis.

  15. Nuclear conflict and ozone depletion Quick summary

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Toohey, Darin W.

    Nuclear conflict and ozone depletion Quick summary o Regional nuclear war could cause global which traps pollutants o Nuclear weapons cause explosions, which then causes things around the vicinity to start burning, which in turn releases black carbon; it is not the nuclear material or fallout causing

  16. 1

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    From nuclear weapons testing to stockpile stewardship July 26, 2015 View larger version On Sept. 23, 1992, the last full-scale underground test of a nuclear weapon was conducted by...

  17. Underground Storage Tanks: New Fuels and Compatibility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Breakout Session 1C—Fostering Technology Adoption I: Building the Market for Renewables with High Octane Fuels Underground Storage Tanks: New Fuels and Compatibility Ryan Haerer, Program Analyst, Alternative Fuels, Office of Underground Storage Tanks, Environmental Protection Agency

  18. Nuclear Waste Partnership (NWP) Corrective Action Plan - Truck...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    - Truck Fire and Radiological Release Phase I Nuclear Waste Partnership (NWP) Corrective Action Plan - Truck Fire and Radiological Release Phase I Submittal of the Underground Salt...

  19. India and Pakistan`s nuclear arms race: Out of the closet but not in the street

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Albright, D.

    1993-06-01

    CIA Director James Woolsey testified before the Senate on February 24, 1993, {open_quotes}The arms race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.{close_quotes} Currently, both countries are dependent on relatively crude nuclear bombs that do not appear to have been deployed. According to US officials, because of fears of accidental nuclear detonation, both sides would only assemble their nuclear weapons when absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, according to Woolsey, both nations {open_quotes}could, on short notice, assemble nuclear weapons.{close_quotes} Each has combat aircraft that could deliver these bombs in a crisis. India and Pakistan continue to improve their nuclear weapons. Unless their programs are stopped, they might succeed in moving from large, cumbersome bombs to miniaturized, easily armed and fuzed weapons able to be permanently deployed on attack aircraft or ballistic missiles, which are being developed or sought by both countries.

  20. A Safer Nuclear Enterprise - Application to Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES)(U)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Morris, Tommy J. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-05

    Activities and infrastructure that support nuclear weapons are facing significant challenges. Despite an admirable record and firm commitment to make safety a primary criterion in weapons design, production, handling, and deployment - there is growing apprehension about terrorist acquiring weapons or nuclear material. At the NES Workshop in May 2012, Scott Sagan, who is a proponent of the normal accident cycle, presented. Whether a proponent of the normal accident cycle or High Reliability Organizations - we have to be diligent about our safety record. Constant vigilance is necessary to maintain our admirable safety record and commitment to Nuclear Explosive Safety.

  1. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) : are we safer?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brune, Nancy E.

    2010-07-01

    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is designed to make world safer by reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. U.S. also seeks to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforce regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities. But recent studies suggest that nuclear proliferation is a direct response to the perceived threat of U.S. conventional capabilities not U.S. nuclear stockpile. If this is true, then the intent of the NPR to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons and strengthen conventional military capabilities may actually make the world less safe. First stated objective of NPR is to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and move step by step toward eliminating them. Second stated objective is a reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong deterrent which forms the basis of U.S. assurances to allies and partners. The pathway - made explicit throughout the NPR - for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures is to give conventional forces and capabilities and missile defenses (e.g. non-nuclear elements) a greater share of the deterrence burden.

  2. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Graham, Thomas Jr. [7609 Glenbrook Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  3. Nuclear and Alternative Energy Supply Options for an Environmentally Constrained World: A Long-Term Perspective. Final draft, 11.14.01

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Conference "Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Can We Have One Without the Other?" Washington Mitigation Challenge Under IS92a Nuclear Power in Climate Change Mitigation and Associated Nuclear Weapons Risks Alternatives for Achieving Deep Reductions of CO2 Emissions in Power Generation Thermonuclear

  4. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program (Informational Purposes Only)

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-11-21

    This draft has been scheduled for final review before the Directives Review Board on 12-4-2014. All major comments and concerns should be provided to your DRB representative, following your organization process. If you do not know who your representative is, please see the list of DRB members at https://www.directives.doe.gov/beta/references/directives-review-board. If your office is represented by Ingrid Kolb, Director, Office of Management, please submit your major concerns and comments to the DRB Liaison, Camille Beben (Camille.Beben@hq.doe.gov; 202-586-4014). All major comments and concerns should be submitted by COB 12-2-2014.

  5. Gordon Assesses Security At Nuclear Weapons Complex News.....

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    impacts of heightened security levels. In response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., Gordon immediately ordered all NNSA sites and facilities to...

  6. Deproliferation Dynamics : : Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapons Programs

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mehta, Rupal Naresh

    2014-01-01

    developing a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment capability,working on uranium conversion, gas- centrifuge enrichment,separation, uranium conversion, and gas centrifuges

  7. Deproliferation Dynamics : : Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapons Programs

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mehta, Rupal Naresh

    2014-01-01

    Safeguards; Spent fuel reprocessing facility decommissioned.plans to build a spent fuel reprocessing plant (Blanc 2008).reprocessing plant (with a second plant in production) that could extract plutonium from the spent reactor fuel.

  8. EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustments (BillionProvedTravel TravelChallengesOhio andTechnologiesLand Rights-of-Way-EERE2 EEREAbout

  9. Y-12 employees receive awards recognizing excellence in nuclear weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservationBio-Inspired SolarAboutXu Named Mineralogical Society ofSiteComplex help

  10. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDid youOxygenLaboratoryInnovationEmployee &andHomelandPrograms

  11. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDid youOxygenLaboratoryInnovationEmployee &andHomelandProgramsSafety

  12. Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergy A plug-inPPLforLDRDEnergyTurbineProcesses to Their Environmental Consequences |

  13. EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i n c iGoldendale Energy Project BonnevilleHigh-LevelSiteForeign Research

  14. Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 2012 Guidance/%2A0348Diversity in0/%2A en

  15. Briefing, Classification of Nuclear Weapons-Related Information |

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i n c i p a l De pEnergy Industrialof Energy 7:30PMBrett

  16. Weapons Intern Program participants visit Pantex | National Nuclear

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust,Field-effectWorking WithTelecentricN AProject AssessmentWe the Geeks: Women Role Models

  17. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum12, 2015 Infographiclighbulbs - high-resolution JPG20, 2008 Notice of7,

  18. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum12, 2015 Infographiclighbulbs - high-resolution JPG20, 2008 Notice of7,Issues |

  19. National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested Parties -Department of EnergyNEW1forEnergyatEnergy 6Workers |

  20. Gordon Assesses Security At Nuclear Weapons Complex News...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration would likeUniverse (Journalvivo Low-Dose Low LETUsefulJorgeAtl anta, Georgia, March 19-23,

  1. NNSA Administrator Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJessework usesof Energy Moving Basic NERSCKey StaffNEWT NEWT NEWT2,NNMCAB|

  2. NNSA implements nondestructive gas sampling technique for nuclear weapon

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

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  3. Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963.

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE: Alternative Fuelsof Energy Services » ProgramPolicy andResearch & Development

  4. Sandia completes major overhaul of key nuclear weapons test facilities |

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

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  5. Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

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  6. Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration would likeUniverseIMPACTThousand CubicResourcelogo and-Eearnstakes part inNeutronLosSecurity

  7. High Temperature Superconducting Underground Cable

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Farrell, Roger, A.

    2010-02-28

    The purpose of this Project was to design, build, install and demonstrate the technical feasibility of an underground high temperature superconducting (HTS) power cable installed between two utility substations. In the first phase two HTS cables, 320 m and 30 m in length, were constructed using 1st generation BSCCO wire. The two 34.5 kV, 800 Arms, 48 MVA sections were connected together using a superconducting joint in an underground vault. In the second phase the 30 m BSCCO cable was replaced by one constructed with 2nd generation YBCO wire. 2nd generation wire is needed for commercialization because of inherent cost and performance benefits. Primary objectives of the Project were to build and operate an HTS cable system which demonstrates significant progress towards commercial progress and addresses real world utility concerns such as installation, maintenance, reliability and compatibility with the existing grid. Four key technical areas addressed were the HTS cable and terminations (where the cable connects to the grid), cryogenic refrigeration system, underground cable-to-cable joint (needed for replacement of cable sections) and cost-effective 2nd generation HTS wire. This was the world’s first installation and operation of an HTS cable underground, between two utility substations as well as the first to demonstrate a cable-to-cable joint, remote monitoring system and 2nd generation HTS.

  8. July 2014 | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    B53 case on display in Texas "The Last of the Big Dogs" has a new home after Pantex workers recently delivered one of the few remaining B53 nuclear weapons cases to the Freedom...

  9. The nuclear materials control technology briefing book

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hartwell, J.K.; Fernandez, S.J.

    1992-03-01

    As national and international interests in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, intensify, it becomes ever more important that contributors be aware of the technologies available for the measurement and control of the nuclear materials important to nuclear weapons development. This briefing book presents concise, nontechnical summaries of various special nuclear material (SNM) and tritium production monitoring technologies applicable to the control of nuclear materials and their production. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates a multinational, on-site-inspector-based safeguards program in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), many (but not all) of the technologies reported in this document are in routine use or under development for IAEA safeguards.

  10. Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Functional Area Qualification Standard

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-05-27

    A Nuclear Explosive Safety Study (NESS) is performed on all DOE Nuclear Explosive Operations (NEOs) in accordance with DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program; DOE O 452.2D, Nuclear Explosive Safety; and DOE M 452.2-2, Nuclear Explosive Safety Evaluation Processes.

  11. Nuclear Energy Governance and the Politics of Social Justice: Technology, Public Goods, and Redistribution in Russia and France

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Grigoriadis, Theocharis N

    2009-01-01

    does not prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons andNuclear Policy in the 21 st Century Environment", ProliferationNuclear Policy in the 21 st Century Environment", Proliferation

  12. Inertial Confinement Fusion R&D and Nuclear Proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert J. Goldston

    2011-04-28

    In a few months, or a few years, the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory may achieve fusion gain using 192 powerful lasers to generate x-rays that will compress and heat a small target containing isotopes of hydrogen. This event would mark a major milestone after decades of research on inertial confinement fusion (ICF). It might also mark the beginning of an accelerated global effort to harness fusion energy based on this science and technology. Unlike magnetic confinement fusion (ITER, 2011), in which hot fusion fuel is confined continuously by strong magnetic fields, inertial confinement fusion involves repetitive fusion explosions, taking advantage of some aspects of the science learned from the design and testing of hydrogen bombs. The NIF was built primarily because of the information it would provide on weapons physics, helping the United States to steward its stockpile of nuclear weapons without further underground testing. The U.S. National Academies' National Research Council is now hosting a study to assess the prospects for energy from inertial confinement fusion. While this study has a classified sub-panel on target physics, it has not been charged with examining the potential nuclear proliferation risks associated with ICF R&D. We argue here that this question urgently requires direct and transparent examination, so that means to mitigate risks can be assessed, and the potential residual risks can be balanced against the potential benefits, now being assessed by the NRC. This concern is not new (Holdren, 1978), but its urgency is now higher than ever before.

  13. J. David Janiec Director for the Weapons and Energetics

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    support, evaluation; in-service engineering for weapons, and to maintain and operate required facilities for Experimentation, Tactics and Joint Test and Evaluation Development in the Network Centric Warfare Office as the Director for Weapons Systems from 1996-1999, the Head of the Fuze and Proximity Sensors Division from 1994

  14. January 5, 2015 Policy on Firearms, Other Lethal Weapons,

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    January 5, 2015 Policy on Firearms, Other Lethal Weapons, Fireworks and Dangerous Objects the possession, use or storage of firearms, other lethal weapons, fireworks, and other dangerous objects. Definitions Firearm means any device, regardless of its name, that is designed to expel a projectile

  15. Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    . The technology was first used on a W76 Retrofit Evaluation System Test unit on May 3, 2012. Significant Cost Savings The cost savings are realized because the technology is nondestructive, allowing weapon components New weapons assessment technology engineered: nondestructive laser welding process far less expensive

  16. The Sanford Underground Research Facility at Homestake (SURF)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lesko, K. T. [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2015-01-01

    The former Homestake gold mine in Lead, South Dakota is being transformed into a dedicated laboratory to pursue underground research in rare-process physics, as well as offering research opportunities in other disciplines. A key component of the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) is the Davis Campus, which is in operation at the 4850-foot level (4300 m.w.e) and currently hosts three projects: the LUX dark matter experiment, the Majorana Demonstrator neutrinoless double-beta decay experiment and the Berkeley and CUBED low-background counters. Plans for possible future experiments at SURF are well underway and include long baseline neutrino oscillation experiments, future dark matter experiments as well as nuclear astrophysics accelerators. Facility upgrades to accommodate some of these future projects have already started. SURF is a dedicated facility with significant expansion capability. These plans include a Generation-2 Dark Matter experiment and the US flagship neutrino experiment, LBNE.

  17. The Sanford Underground Research Facility at Homestake (SURF)

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Lesko, K. T.

    2015-03-24

    The former Homestake gold mine in Lead, South Dakota is being transformed into a dedicated laboratory to pursue underground research in rare-process physics, as well as offering research opportunities in other disciplines. A key component of the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) is the Davis Campus, which is in operation at the 4850-foot level (4300 m.w.e) and currently hosts three projects: the LUX dark matter experiment, the Majorana Demonstrator neutrinoless double-beta decay experiment and the Berkeley and CUBED low-background counters. Plans for possible future experiments at SURF are well underway and include long baseline neutrino oscillation experiments, future dark mattermore »experiments as well as nuclear astrophysics accelerators. Facility upgrades to accommodate some of these future projects have already started. SURF is a dedicated facility with significant expansion capability. These plans include a Generation-2 Dark Matter experiment and the US flagship neutrino experiment, LBNE.« less

  18. Nuclear Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Atkins-Duffin, C E

    2008-12-10

    With an explosion equivalent of about 20kT of TNT, the Trinity test was the first demonstration of a nuclear weapon. Conducted on July 16, 1945 in Alamogordo, NM this site is now a Registered National Historic Landmark. The concept and applicability of nuclear power was demonstrated on December 20, 1951 with the Experimental Breeder Reactor Number One (EBR-1) lit four light bulbs. This reactor is now a Registered National Historic Landmark, located near Arco, ID. From that moment forward it had been clearly demonstrated that nuclear energy has both peaceful and military applications and that the civilian and military fuel cycles can overlap. For the more than fifty years since the Atoms for Peace program, a key objective of nuclear policy has been to enable the wider peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Volumes have been written on the impact of these two actions on the world by advocates and critics; pundits and practioners; politicians and technologists. The nations of the world have woven together a delicate balance of treaties, agreements, frameworks and handshakes that are representative of the timeframe in which they were constructed and how they have evolved in time. Collectively these vehicles attempt to keep political will, nuclear materials and technology in check. This paper captures only the briefest abstract of the more significant aspects on the Nonproliferation Regime. Of particular relevance to this discussion is the special nonproliferation sensitivity associated with the uranium isotope separation and spent fuel reprocessing aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

  19. Modeling of the performance of weapons MOX fuel in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alvis, J.; Bellanger, P.; Medvedev, P.G.; Peddicord, K.L.; Gellene, G.I.

    1999-05-01

    Both the Russian Federation and the US are pursing mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel in light water reactors (LWRs) for the disposition of excess plutonium from disassembled nuclear warheads. Fuel performance models are used which describe the behavior of MOX fuel during irradiation under typical power reactor conditions. The objective of this project is to perform the analysis of the thermal, mechanical, and chemical behavior of weapons MOX fuel pins under LWR conditions. If fuel performance analysis indicates potential questions, it then becomes imperative to assess the fuel pin design and the proposed operating strategies to reduce the probability of clad failure and the associated release of radioactive fission products into the primary coolant system. Applying the updated code to anticipated fuel and reactor designs, which would be used for weapons MOX fuel in the US, and analyzing the performance of the WWER-100 fuel for Russian weapons plutonium disposition are addressed in this report. The COMETHE code was found to do an excellent job in predicting fuel central temperatures. Also, despite minor predicted differences in thermo-mechanical behavior of MOX and UO{sub 2} fuels, the preliminary estimate indicated that, during normal reactor operations, these deviations remained within limits foreseen by fuel pin design.

  20. The Underground Corrosion of Selected Type 300 Stainless Steels After 34 Years

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. S. Yoder; M. K. Adler Flitton

    2009-03-01

    Recently, interest in long-term underground corrosion has greatly increased because of the ongoing need to dispose of nuclear waste. Additionally, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 requires disposal of high-level nuclear waste in an underground repository. Current contaminant release and transport models use limited available short-term underground corrosion rates when considering container and waste form degradation. Consequently, the resulting models oversimplify the complex mechanisms of underground metal corrosion. The complexity of stainless steel corrosion mechanisms and the processes by which corrosion products migrate from their source are not well depicted by a corrosion rate based on general attack. The research presented here is the analysis of austenitic stainless steels after 33½ years of burial. In this research, the corrosion specimens were analyzed using applicable ASTM standards as well as microscopic and X-ray examination to determine the mechanisms of underground stainless steel corrosion. As presented, the differences in the corrosion mechanisms vary with the type of stainless steel and the treatment of the samples. The uniqueness of the long sampling time allows for further understanding of the actual stainless steel corrosion mechanisms, and when applied back into predictive models, will assist in reduction of the uncertainty in parameters for predicting long-term fate and transport.

  1. European underground laboratories: An overview

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lino Miramonti

    2005-03-31

    Underground laboratories are complementary to those where the research in fundamental physics is made using accelerators. This report focus on the logistic and on the background features of the most relevant laboratories in Europe, stressing also on the low background facilities available. In particular the report is focus on the laboratories involved in the new Europeean project ILIAS with the aim to support the European large infrastructures operating in the astroparticle physics area.

  2. Investigating leaking underground storage tanks 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Upton, David Thompson

    1989-01-01

    general methodology for many geologic regions where stratigraphic and hydrogeologic conditions are likely to be similar. Ultimately, the goal of any investigator or owner is to obtain the necessary information in order to satisfy the concerns... INVESTIGATING LEAKING UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS A Thesis by DAVID THOMPSON UPTON Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE August 1989...

  3. Safety aspects of ground testing for large nuclear rockets

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Goldman, M.I.

    1988-02-01

    Present nuclear rocket reactors under test in Nevada are operated at nominal power levels of 1000 Mw. It does not seem unreasonable in the future to anticipate reactors with power levels in the range up to 5,000 Mw for space applications. It has been shown that the normal testing of large nuclear rocket engines at NRDS could impose some restrictions on the fuel performance which would not otherwise be required by space flight operation. The only apparent alternative would require a capability for decontaminating effluent gases prior to release to the atmosphere. In addition to the source restrictions, tests will almost certainly be controlled by wind and atmospheric stability conditions, and the requirements for monitoring and control of off-site exposures will be much more stringent than those presently in force. An analysis of maximum accidents indicates that projections of present credible occurrences cannot be tolerated in larger engine tests. The apparent alternatives to a significant (order of magnitude or better) reduction in credible accident consequences, are the establishment of an underground test facility, a facility in an area equivalent to the Pacific weapons proving ground, or in space.

  4. Nuclear Physics and National Security in an Age of Jerry Gilfoyle

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    A uranium, gun-type nuclear weapon - High explosive pushes highly-enriched uranium at high speed down/2 #12;HEU Gun-Type Design The figure to the right shows the `Little Boy' design of the nu- clear bomb, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. How do we assess the threat? 1. Nuclear Weapons 101 2. Catching

  5. International Nuclear Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Doyle, James E.

    2012-08-14

    This presentation discusses: (1) Definitions of international nuclear security; (2) What degree of security do we have now; (3) Limitations of a nuclear security strategy focused on national lock-downs of fissile materials and weapons; (4) What do current trends say about the future; and (5) How can nuclear security be strengthened? Nuclear security can be strengthened by: (1) More accurate baseline inventories; (2) Better physical protection, control and accounting; (3) Effective personnel reliability programs; (4) Minimize weapons-usable materials and consolidate to fewer locations; (5) Consider local threat environment when siting facilities; (6) Implement pledges made in the NSS process; and (7) More robust interdiction, emergency response and special operations capabilities. International cooperation is desirable, but not always possible.

  6. Los Alamos conducts important hydrodynamic experiment in Nevada

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    model and assess weapon performance in the absence of full-scale underground nuclear testing," said Webster. Nicknamed "Leda," it provides key data for Stockpile Stewardship LOS...

  7. Macroencapsulation Equivalency Guidance for Classified Weapon Components and NNSSWAC Compliance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Poling, J.

    2012-05-15

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex has a surplus of classified legacy weapon components generated over the years with no direct path for disposal. The majority of the components have been held for uncertainty of future use or no identified method of sanitization or disposal. As more weapons are retired, there is an increasing need to reduce the amount of components currently in storage or on hold. A process is currently underway to disposition and dispose of the legacy/retired weapons components across the DOE complex.

  8. Underground Storage Tank Integrated Demonstration (UST-ID). Technology summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-02-01

    The DOE complex currently has 332 underground storage tanks (USTs) that have been used to process and store radioactive and chemical mixed waste generated from weapon materials production. Very little of the over 100 million gallons of high-level and low-level radioactive liquid waste has been treated and disposed of in final form. Two waste storage tank design types are prevalent across the DOE complex: single-shell wall and double-shell wall designs. They are made of stainless steel, concrete, and concrete with carbon steel liners, and their capacities vary from 5000 gallons (19 m{sup 3}) to 10{sup 6} gallons (3785 m{sup 3}). The tanks have an overburden layer of soil ranging from a few feet to tens of feet. Responding to the need for remediation of tank waste, driven by Federal Facility Compliance Agreements (FFCAs) at all participating sites, the Underground Storage Tank Integrated Demonstration (UST-ID) Program was created by the US DOE Office of Technology Development in February 1991. Its mission is to focus the development, testing, and evaluation of remediation technologies within a system architecture to characterize, retrieve, treat to concentrate, and dispose of radioactive waste stored in USTs at DOE facilities. The ultimate goal is to provide safe and cost-effective solutions that are acceptable to the public and the regulators. The UST-ID has focused on five DOE locations: the Hanford Site, which is the host site, in Richland, Washington; the Fernald Site in Fernald, Ohio; the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory near Idaho Falls, Idaho; the Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Savannah River Site in Savannah River, South Carolina.

  9. Performance testing and Bayesian Reliability Analysis of small diameter, high power electric heaters for the simulation of nuclear fuel rod temperatures 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    O'Kelly, David Sean

    2000-01-01

    The conversion of plutonium from a nuclear weapon to nuclear reactor fuel requires an evaluation of the residual gallium as a potential corrosive material within an operating nuclear fuel element. Homogeneous trace levels of gallium may remain...

  10. Oregon Underground Injection Control Program Authorized Injection...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    Systems Webpage Jump to: navigation, search OpenEI Reference LibraryAdd to library Web Site: Oregon Underground Injection Control Program Authorized Injection Systems Webpage...

  11. ,"Washington Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data 1","Washington Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)",1,"Annual",2014 ,"Release...

  12. ,"Washington Natural Gas Underground Storage Capacity (MMcf)...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data 1","Washington Natural Gas Underground Storage Capacity (MMcf)",1,"Annual",2014 ,"Release...

  13. Oregon Underground Injection Control Registration Geothermal...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    Underground Injection Control Registration Geothermal Heating Systems (DEQ Form UICGEO-1004(f)) Jump to: navigation, search OpenEI Reference LibraryAdd to library Form: Oregon...

  14. ,"Ohio Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)"

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  15. ,"California Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  16. ,"Kentucky Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  17. ,"Maryland Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  18. ,"Nebraska Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  19. ,"Oregon Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  20. ,"Pennsylvania Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals ...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  1. ,"Tennessee Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  2. ,"Minnesota Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  3. ,"Texas Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)"

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  4. ,"Wyoming Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  5. ,"Colorado Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  6. ,"Alabama Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  7. ,"Missouri Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  8. ,"Arkansas Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  9. ,"Virginia Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  10. ,"Louisiana Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  11. ,"Montana Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  12. ,"Kansas Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  13. ,"Oklahoma Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  14. ,"Indiana Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  15. ,"Mississippi Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  16. ,"Alaska Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  17. ,"Utah Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)"

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  18. ,"Michigan Natural Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf...

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Gas Underground Storage Withdrawals (MMcf)" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  19. ,"Texas Natural Gas Underground Storage Capacity (MMcf)"

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data 1","Texas Natural Gas Underground Storage Capacity (MMcf)",1,"Annual",2014 ,"Release Date:","9...

  20. Washington Environmental Permit Handbook - Underground Injection...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    Washington Environmental Permit Handbook - Underground Injection Control Registration webpage Jump to: navigation, search OpenEI Reference LibraryAdd to library Web Site:...

  1. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D

    2012-08-15

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  2. Arms Control: US and International efforts to ban biological weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-12-01

    The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

  3. Paradigms of Development and Employment of Weapon Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gillespie, Daniel M.

    2008-10-23

    Weapons procurement decisions are extremely complex, with an unmanageable quantity of variables to take into account. The human brain, unable to process such a complex problem in a strictly rational way, seeks mechanisms ...

  4. EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri

  5. WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (WIPP): THE NATIONS' SOLUTION TO NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL ISSUES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lopez, Tammy Ann

    2014-07-17

    In the southeastern portion of my home state of New Mexico lies the Chihuahauan desert, where a transuranic (TRU), underground disposal site known as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) occupies 16 square miles. Full operation status began in March 1999, the year I graduated from Los Alamos High School, in Los Alamos, NM, the birthplace of the atomic bomb and one of the nation’s main TRU waste generator sites. During the time of its development and until recently, I did not have a full grasp on the role Los Alamos was playing in regards to WIPP. WIPP is used to store and dispose of TRU waste that has been generated since the 1940s because of nuclear weapons research and testing operations that have occurred in Los Alamos, NM and at other sites throughout the United States (U.S.). TRU waste consists of items that are contaminated with artificial, man-made radioactive elements that have atomic numbers greater than uranium, or are trans-uranic, on the periodic table of elements and it has longevity characteristics that may be hazardous to human health and the environment. Therefore, WIPP has underground rooms that have been carved out of 2,000 square foot thick salt formations approximately 2,150 feet underground so that the TRU waste can be isolated and disposed of. WIPP has operated safely and successfully until this year, when two unrelated events occurred in February 2014. With these events, the safety precautions and measures that have been operating at WIPP for the last 15 years are being revised and improved to ensure that other such events do not occur again.

  6. Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology Evaluation and Training Range

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kevin Larry Young

    2009-05-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a long history for providing technology evaluation and training for military and other federal level Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response agencies. Currently there are many federal organizations and commercial companies developing technologies related to detecting, assessing, mitigating and protecting against hazards associated with a WMD event. Unfortunately, very few locations exist within the United States where WMD response technologies are realistically field tested and evaluated using real chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. This is particularly true with biological and radiological hazards. Related to this lack of adequate WMD, multi-hazard technology testing capability is the shortage of locations where WMD response teams can train using actual chemical, biological, and radiological material or highly realistic simulates. In response to these technology evaluation and training needs, the INL has assembled a consortium of subject matter experts from existing programs and identified dedicated resources for the purpose of establishing an all-hazards, WMD technology evaluation and training range. The author describes the challenges associated with creating the all-hazards WMD technology evaluation and training range and lists the technical, logistical and financial benefits of an all-hazards technology evaluation and training range. Current resources and capabilities for conducting all-hazard technology evaluation and training at the INL are identified. Existing technology evaluation and training programs at the INL related to radiological, biological and chemical hazards are highlighted, including successes and lessons learned. Finally, remaining gaps in WMD technology evaluation and training capabilities are identified along with recommendations for closing those gaps.

  7. Underground storage tank management plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1994-09-01

    The Underground Storage Tank (UST) Management Program at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant was established to locate UST systems in operation at the facility, to ensure that all operating UST systems are free of leaks, and to establish a program for the removal of unnecessary UST systems and upgrade of UST systems that continue to be needed. The program implements an integrated approach to the management of UST systems, with each system evaluated against the same requirements and regulations. A common approach is employed, in accordance with Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regulations and guidance, when corrective action is mandated. This Management Plan outlines the compliance issues that must be addressed by the UST Management Program, reviews the current UST inventory and compliance approach, and presents the status and planned activities associated with each UST system. The UST Management Plan provides guidance for implementing TDEC regulations and guidelines for petroleum UST systems. (There are no underground radioactive waste UST systems located at Y-12.) The plan is divided into four major sections: (1) regulatory requirements, (2) implementation requirements, (3) Y-12 Plant UST Program inventory sites, and (4) UST waste management practices. These sections describe in detail the applicable regulatory drivers, the UST sites addressed under the Management Program, and the procedures and guidance used for compliance with applicable regulations.

  8. ,"Underground Natural Gas Storage by Storage Type"

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Sourcekey","N5030US2","N5010US2","N5020US2","N5070US2","N5050US2","N5060US2" "Date","U.S. Natural Gas Underground Storage Volume (MMcf)","U.S. Total Natural Gas in Underground...

  9. Examination of the role of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: a systems analysis approach

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Martz, Joseph C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stevens, Patrice A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Branstetter, Linda [SNL; Hoover, Edward [SNL; O' Brien, Kevin [SNL; Slavin, Adam [SNL; Caswell, David [STANFORD UNIV

    2010-01-01

    Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spread of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.

  10. EA-1943: Long Baseline Neutrino Facility/Deep Underground Neutrino...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    DUNE) at Fermilab, Batavia, Illinois and the Sanford Underground Research Facility, Lead, South Dakota EA-1943: Long Baseline Neutrino FacilityDeep Underground Neutrino...

  11. DOE - Office of Legacy Management -- Hoe Creek Underground Coal...

    Office of Legacy Management (LM)

    Hoe Creek Underground Coal Gasification Site - 045 FUSRAP Considered Sites Site: Hoe Creek Underground Coal Gasification Site (045) Designated Name: Alternate Name: Location:...

  12. Pore Models Track Reactions in Underground Carbon Capture

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Pore Models Track Reactions in Underground Carbon Capture Pore Models Track Reactions in Underground Carbon Capture September 25, 2014 | Tags: Advanced Scientific Computing...

  13. Underground Flow Measurement and Particle Release Test | Department...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Underground Flow Measurement and Particle Release Test Underground Flow Measurement and Particle Release Test This document was used to determine facts and conditions during the...

  14. The Governance of Nuclear Technology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vergino, E S; May, M

    2003-09-22

    Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech in 1953 is remembered for engaging the world, and the Soviet Union in particular, in a dialogue about arms control and the formulation of a nuclear regime in which national and international security concerns growing from this unprecedented emerging and frightening new weapons capability would be addressed while tapping the civilian promise of nuclear applications for the good of mankind. Out of it came a series of initiatives, leading fifteen years later to the NPT, intended to allow the growth and spread of the beneficial uses of nuclear know-how while constraining the incentives and capabilities for nuclear weapons. The last 50 years has seen a gradual spread in nations with nuclear weapons, other nations with nuclear knowledge and capabilities, and still others with nuclear weapon intentions. Still most nations of the world have forgone weapon development, most have signed and abided by the NPT, and some that have had programs or even weapons, have turned these capabilities off. Yet despite this experience, and despite a relatively successful record up to a few years ago, there is today a clear and generally recognized crisis in nuclear governance, a crisis that affects the future of all the cross-cutting civilian/security issues we have cited. The crux of this crisis is a lack of consensus among the major powers whose support of international efforts is necessary for effective governance of nuclear activities. The lack of consensus focuses on three challenges: what to do about non-compliance, what to do about non-adherence, and what to do about the possible leakage of nuclear materials and technologies to terrorist groups. Short of regaining consensus on the priority to be given to nuclear material and technology controls, it is unlikely that any international regime to control nuclear materials and technologies, let alone oversee a growth in the nuclear power sector, will be successful in the tough cases where it needs to be successful. Regaining that consensus on the other hand means alleviating some fundamental insecurity on the part of states, and weakening the hold that terrorist groups have on some state governments. This in turn requires that some fundamental issues be addressed, with recognition that these are part of a suite of complex and dynamic interactions. Among these issues are: How will states provide for their own security and other central interests while preventing further proliferation, protecting against the use of nuclear weapons, and yet allowing for the possible expansion of nuclear power?; How best can states with limited resources to fight terrorist activities and safeguard nuclear materials be assisted in securing their materials and technologies?; What is the future role of international inspections? Does the IAEA remain the right organization to carry out these tasks? If not, what are the desired characteristics of a successor agency and can there be agreement on one?; How confident can we be of nonproliferation as latent nuclear weapon capabilities spread? The policies to address these and other issues must explicitly deal with NPT members who do not observe their obligations; NPT non-members; illicit trade in SNM and weapon technologies and the possibility of a regional nuclear war.

  15. Cooperative Studies in the Utilization and Storage of Excess Weapons-Grade Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bolyatko, V. V.

    1998-01-29

    This technical report is a tangible and verifiable deliverable associated with the Nuclear Group subproject “Cooperative Studies in the Utilization and Storage of Excess Weapons-grade Plutonium.” This report is an assessment ofthe work performed by the Russian party from 1 October 1995 through 30 September 1996 regarding milestones defined in the contract between the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and the Texas Engineering Experiment Station (TEES). In these interactions, TEES serves as agent of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) in the capacity oflead institution for the Nuclear Group of the ANRCP. The official Statement ofWork dated 8 April 1996 enumerates specific milestones and deliverables. In its present form, this report is an edited version ofthe translation submitted to TEES by MEPhI on 7 October 1996. The principal investigators for this subproject are Dr. Paul Nelson of TEES and Dr. Victor Bolyatko of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute.

  16. Y-12 National Security Complex | National Nuclear Security Administrat...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) serves as the nation's only source of enriched uranium nuclear weapons components and provides enriched uranium for the U.S. Navy. Y-12 is a...

  17. The National Nuclear Security Administration's B61 Spin Rocket...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Laboratories are refurbishing the Spin Rocket Motor, a 1:rime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the originai motor produced i2 i906 and the version last produced...

  18. Excess Plutonium: Weapons Legacy or National Asset?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Klipa, G.; Boeke, S.; Hottel, R.

    2002-02-27

    The Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative was established in January, 2000, to accelerate the work of achieving integration and cutting long-term costs associated with the management of nuclear materials. As part of that initiative, the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (EM), has established Nuclear Material Management Groups for the management of excess nuclear materials. As one of these groups, the Plutonium Material Management Group (PMMG) has been chartered to serve as DOE's complex wide resource and point of contact for technical coordination and program planning support in the safe and efficient disposition of the nations excess Plutonium 239. This paper will explain the mission, goals, and objectives of the PMMG. In addition, the paper will provide a broad overview of the status of the plutonium inventories throughout the DOE complex. The DOE currently manages approximately 99.5 MT of plutonium isotopes. Details of the various categories of plutonium, from material designated for national security needs through material that has been declared excess, will be explained. For the plutonium that has been declared excess, the various pathways to disposition (including reuse, recycling, sale, transfer, treatment, consumption, and disposal) will be discussed. At this time 52.5 MT of plutonium has been declared excess and the method of disposition for that material is the subject of study and evaluation within DOE. The role of the PMMG in those evaluations will be outlined.

  19. ReseaRch at the University of Maryland Nuclear Safety Research at the University of Maryland

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hill, Wendell T.

    been a complicated rise and fall for nuclear technology. The proliferation of nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons was followed by controversial accidents and regulation. Today, nuclear power is considered that analyze the risks involved in the use of nuclear energy. Understanding and Using Radiation The ionizing

  20. Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign The Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield (ICF) Campaign supports the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    , and effective nuclear weapons stockpile without underground testing. It supports stockpile assessment and information are directly applicable to assessing the health of our nuclear weapons and making decisions (SSP) has been developing advanced simulation capabilities to model nuclear weapons with sufficient

  1. Toxic hazards of underground excavation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, R.; Chitnis, V.; Damasian, M.; Lemm, M.; Popplesdorf, N.; Ryan, T.; Saban, C.; Cohen, J.; Smith, C.; Ciminesi, F.

    1982-09-01

    Inadvertent intrusion into natural or man-made toxic or hazardous material deposits as a consequence of activities such as mining, excavation or tunnelling has resulted in numerous deaths and injuries in this country. This study is a preliminary investigation to identify and document instances of such fatal or injurious intrusion. An objective is to provide useful insights and information related to potential hazards due to future intrusion into underground radioactive-waste-disposal facilities. The methodology used in this study includes literature review and correspondence with appropriate government agencies and organizations. Key categories of intrusion hazards are asphyxiation, methane, hydrogen sulfide, silica and asbestos, naturally occurring radionuclides, and various mine or waste dump related hazards.

  2. Rocky Flats Plant: Test bed for transitioning from weapons production mission to environmental restoration, waste management, and economic development missions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Benjamin, A.; Murthy, K.S.; Krenzer, R.W.; Williams, R.E.; Detamore, J.A.; Brown, C.M.; Francis, G.E.; Lucerna, J.J.

    1993-01-07

    Redirection of Rocky Flats Plant`s (RF) mission is an inevitable result of changes in the worldwide social, political, and environmental factors. These changes were exemplified in the cancellation of the W-88 Warhead in January 1992, by the President of the United States. These unprecedented changes have altered the RF`s traditional nuclear weapons production mission to the transition mission, i.e., cleanup, preparation for deactivation and decontamination, decommissioning, dismantlement and demolition, and when appropriate, economic development, of the facilities. The purpose of this paper is to describe the essentials of the technical approach and management actions advanced by EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc., to organize, staff, direct, and control the activities necessary to transition the RF from its historical weapons production mission to the transition mission.

  3. Rocky Flats Plant: Test bed for transitioning from weapons production mission to environmental restoration, waste management, and economic development missions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Benjamin, A.; Murthy, K.S.; Krenzer, R.W.; Williams, R.E.; Detamore, J.A.; Brown, C.M.; Francis, G.E.; Lucerna, J.J.

    1993-01-07

    Redirection of Rocky Flats Plant's (RF) mission is an inevitable result of changes in the worldwide social, political, and environmental factors. These changes were exemplified in the cancellation of the W-88 Warhead in January 1992, by the President of the United States. These unprecedented changes have altered the RF's traditional nuclear weapons production mission to the transition mission, i.e., cleanup, preparation for deactivation and decontamination, decommissioning, dismantlement and demolition, and when appropriate, economic development, of the facilities. The purpose of this paper is to describe the essentials of the technical approach and management actions advanced by EG G Rocky Flats, Inc., to organize, staff, direct, and control the activities necessary to transition the RF from its historical weapons production mission to the transition mission.

  4. Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division annual report, FY 1983

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Heiken, J.H.; Lindberg, H.A. (eds.)

    1984-05-01

    This report describes progress in the major research and development programs carried out in FY 1983 by the Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division. It covers radiochemical diagnostics of weapons tests; weapons radiochemical diagnostics research and development; other unclassified weapons research; stable and radioactive isotope production, separation, and applications (including biomedical applications); element and isotope transport and fixation; actinide and transition metal chemistry; structural chemistry, spectroscopy, and applications; nuclear structure and reactions; irradiation facilities; advanced analytical techniques; development and applications; atmospheric chemistry and transport; and earth and planetary processes.

  5. Aerial of Nuclear Science Reactor 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Unknown

    2011-08-17

    Small graphite-moderated and gas-cooled reactors have been around since the beginning of the atomic age. Though their existence in the past has been associated with nuclear weapons programs, they are capable of being used in civilian power programs...

  6. Scientific Solutions to Nuclear Waste Environmental Challenges

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, Bradley R.

    2014-01-30

    The Hidden Cost of Nuclear Weapons The Cold War arms race drove an intense plutonium production program in the U.S. This campaign produced approximately 100 tons of plutonium over 40 years. The epicenter of plutonium production in the United States was the Hanford site, a 586 square mile reservation owned by the Department of Energy and located on the Colombia River in Southeastern Washington. Plutonium synthesis relied on nuclear reactors to convert uranium to plutonium within the reactor fuel rods. After a sufficient amount of conversion occurred, the rods were removed from the reactor and allowed to cool. They were then dissolved in an acid bath and chemically processed to separate and purify plutonium from the rest of the constituents in the used reactor fuel. The acidic waste was then neutralized using sodium hydroxide and the resulting mixture of liquids and precipitates (small insoluble particles) was stored in huge underground waste tanks. The byproducts of the U.S. plutonium production campaign include over 53 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste stored in 177 large underground tanks at Hanford and another 34 million gallons stored at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. This legacy nuclear waste represents one of the largest environmental clean-up challenges facing the world today. The nuclear waste in the Hanford tanks is a mixture of liquids and precipitates that have settled into sludge. Some of these tanks are now over 60 years old and a small number of them are leaking radioactive waste into the ground and contaminating the environment. The solution to this nuclear waste challenge is to convert the mixture of solids and liquids into a durable material that won't disperse into the environment and create hazards to the biosphere. What makes this difficult is the fact that the radioactive half-lives of some of the radionuclides in the waste are thousands to millions of years long. (The half-life of a radioactive substance is the amount of time it takes for one-half of the material to undergo radioactive decay.) In general, the ideal material would need to be durable for approximately 10 half-lives to allow the activity to decay to negligible levels. However, the potential health effects of each radionuclide vary depending on what type of radiation is emitted, the energy of that emission, and the susceptibility for the human body to accumulate and concentrate that particular element. Consequently, actual standards tend to be based on limiting the dose (energy deposited per unit mass) that is introduced into the environment. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the responsibility to establish standards for nuclear waste disposal to protect the health and safety of the public. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed the EPA to establish radiation protection standards for the Yucca Mountain geologic repository for nuclear wastes. The standards for Yucca Mountain were promulgated in 2008, and limit the dose to 15 millirem per year for the first 10,000 years, and 100 milirem per year between 10,000 years and 1 million years (40 CFR Part 197; http://www.epa.gov/radiation/yucca/2008factsheet.html). So, the challenge is two-fold: (1) develop a material (a waste form) that is capable of immobilizing the waste over geologic time scales, and (2) develop a process to convert the radioactive sludge in the tanks into this durable waste form material. Glass: Hard, durable, inert, and with infinite chemical versatility Molten glass is a powerful solvent liquid, which can be designed to dissolve almost anything. When solidified, it can be one of the most chemically inert substances known to man. Nature's most famous analogue to glass is obsidian, a vitreous product of volcanic activity; formations over 17 million years old have been found. Archaeologists have found man-made glass specimens that are five thousand years old.

  7. DOE weapons laboratories' contributions to the nation's defense technology base

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hecker, S.S.

    1988-04-01

    The question of how the Department of Energy (DOE) weapons laboratories can contribute to a stronger defense technology base is addressed in testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The importance of the defense technology base is described, the DOE technology base is also described, and some technology base management and institutional issues are discussed. Suggestions are given for promoting a more stable, long-term relationship between the DOE weapons laboratories and the Department of Defense. 12 refs., 2 figs.

  8. Underground fire at Auchengeich Colliery Lanarkshire 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rogers, T. A.

    MINISTRY OF POWER UNDERGROUND FIRE AT AUCHENGEICH COLLIERY LANARKSHIRE REPORT On the causes of, and the circumstances attending, the fire which occurred at Auchengeich Colliery, Lanarkshire on 18th September, 1959 by T. ...

  9. The Basics of Underground Natural Gas Storage

    Annual Energy Outlook [U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)]

    Two of the most important characteristics of an underground storage reservoir are its capacity to hold natural gas for future use and the rate at which gas inventory can be...

  10. The Underground Economy of Fake Antivirus Software

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Steigerwald, Douglas; Vigna, Giovanni; Kruegel, Christopher; Kemmerer, Richard; Abman, Ryan; Stone-Gross, Brett

    2011-01-01

    Report on Rogue Security Software. In Whitepaper, 2009. 11.1 The Underground Economy of Fake Antivirus Software 17. J.Fake Antivirus Software. http://www. pcworld.com/

  11. Reevaluating nuclear safety and security in a post 9/11 era.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Booker, Paul M.; Brown, Lisa M.

    2005-07-01

    This report has the following topics: (1) Changing perspectives on nuclear safety and security; (2) Evolving needs in a post-9/11 era; (3) Nuclear Weapons--An attractive terrorist target; (4) The case for increased safety; (5) Evolution of current nuclear weapons safety and security; (6) Integrated surety; (7) The role of safety and security in enabling responsiveness; (8) Advances in surety technologies; and (9) Reevaluating safety.

  12. A Sustainable Nuclear Fuel Cycle Based on Laser Inertial Fusion Energy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moses, E; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Storm, E; Latkowski, J; Farmer, J; Abbott, R; Kramer, K; Peterson, P; Shaw, H; Lehman II, R

    2009-05-22

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF), a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, will soon be completed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in 2010, using laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 35 MJ are expected soon thereafter. They propose that a laser system capable of generating fusion yields of 35 to 75 MJ at 10 to 15 Hz (i.e., {approx} 350- to 1000-MW fusion and {approx} 1.3 to 3.6 x 10{sup 20} n/s), coupled to a compact subdritical fission blanket, could be used to generate several GW of thermal power (GWth) while avoiding carbon dioxide emissions, mitigating nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizing the concerns associated with nuclear safety and long-term nuclear waste disposition. this Laser Inertial Fusion Energy (LIFE) based system is a logical extension of the NIF laser and the yields expec ted from the early ignition experiments on NIF. The LIFE concept is a once-through,s elf-contained closed fuel cycle and would have the following characteristics: (1) eliminate the need for spent fuel chemical separation facilities; (4) maintain the fission blanket subcritical at all times (k{sub eff} < 0.90); and (5) minimize future requirements for deep underground geological waste repositories and minimize actinide content in the end-of-life nuclear waste below the Department of Energy's (DOE's) attractiveness Level E (the lowest). Options to burn natural or depleted U, Th, U/Th mixtures, Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) without chemical separations of weapons-attractive actinide streams, and excess weapons Pu or highly enriched U (HEU) are possible and under consideration. Because the fission blanket is always subcritical and decay heat removal is possible via passive mechanisms, the technology is inherently safe. Many technical challenges must be met, but a LIFE solution could provide a sustainable path for worldwide growth of nuclear powr for electricity production and hydrogen generation.

  13. Evaluation of alternatives for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dyer, J.S.; Butler, J.C. [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States); Edmunds, T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)] [and others

    1997-04-04

    The Department of Energy Record of Decision (ROD) selected alternatives for disposition of surplus, weapons grade plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns addressed included economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The analysis reported here was conducted in parallel with technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses; it uses multiattribute utility theory to combine these considerations in order to facilitate an integrated evaluation of alternatives. This analysis is intended to provide additional insight regarding alternative evaluation and to assist in understanding the rationale for the choice of alternatives recommended in the ROD. Value functions were developed for objectives of disposition, and used to rank alternatives. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the ranking of alternatives for the base case was relatively insensitive to changes in assumptions over reasonable ranges. The analyses support the recommendation of the ROD to pursue parallel development of the vitrification immobilization alternative and the use of existing light water reactors alternative. 27 refs., 109 figs., 20 tabs.

  14. Development of nuclear diagnostics for the National Ignition Facility ,,invited...

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Development of nuclear diagnostics for the National Ignition Facility ,,invited... V. Yu. Glebov, D 87185 S. P. Padalino SUNY Geneseo, Geneseo, New York 14454 C. Horsfield Atomic Weapons Establishment of nuclear diagnostics in ICF experiments. In 2005, the suite of nuclear-ignition diagnostics for the NIF

  15. A P-5 Nuclear Dialogue: Concept, Building Blocks, and Implementation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    #12;A P-5 Nuclear Dialogue: Concept, Building Blocks, and Implementation Paul I. Bernstein, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate affirmed "America's intention to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" and stated

  16. The Security of Russia's Nuclear Arsenal: The Human Factor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ball, D.Y.

    1999-10-12

    Assertions by the Russian military that all of their nuclear weapons are secure against theft and that nuclear units within the military are somehow insulated from the problems plaguing the Russian military should not be accepted uncritically. Accordingly, we should not give unwarranted credence to the pronouncements of military figures like Cal.-Gen. Igor Valynkin, Chief of the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, which oversees the country's nuclear arsenal. He contends that ''Russian nuclear weapons are under reliable supervision'' and that ''talk about the unreliability of our control over nuclear weapons has only one pragmatic goal--to convince international society that the country is incapable of maintaining nuclear safety and to introduce international oversight over those weapons, as it is done, for example, in Iraq.'' While the comparison to Iraq is preposterous, many analysts might agree with Valynkin's sanguine appraisal of the security of Russia's nuclear weapons. In contrast, I argue that the numerous difficulties confronting the military as a whole should cause concern in the West over the security of the Russian nuclear arsenal.

  17. No end in sight for nuclear squabble The decision on a site for a controversial nuclear fusion project has been delayed

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    No end in sight for nuclear squabble The decision on a site for a controversial nuclear fusion supply, and fusion reactors would not produce fissile materials that could be used in nuclear weapons, with green groups pointing out that in 1950 scientists working on nuclear fusion said they needed another 50

  18. Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mian, Zia

    2014-05-09

    India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also for nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.

  19. Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division annual report FY 1986, October 1985-September 1986

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Heiken, J.H. (ed.)

    1987-06-01

    This report describes progress in the major research and development programs carried out in FY 1986 by the Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division. The report includes articles on radiochemical diagnostics and weapons tests; weapons radiochemical diagnostics research and development; other unclassified weapons research; stable and radioactive isotope production and separation; chemical biology and nuclear medicine; element and isotope transport and fixation; actinide and transition metal chemistry; structural chemistry, spectroscopy, and applications; nuclear structure and reactions; irradiation facilities; advanced concepts and technology; and atmospheric chemistry.

  20. More arms, less stability: Nuclear, chemical, and missile proliferation in the Asia-Pacific. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mack, A.

    1991-04-01

    In the wake of the Gulf War, the Bush Administration has reaffirmed its determination to seek controls over weapons of mass destruction in the Third World, in particular nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (CBW); and over ballistic missiles, one possible delivery system for nuclear and CBW systems. Attention over the past eight months has naturally focused on the Middle East, but the Asia-Pacific region contains a number of countries which are alleged to have CW and BW programs. One country, North Korea, is far closer to manufacturing nuclear weapons than Iraq was.

  1. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Alsaed, Abdelhalim Ali

    1996-01-01

    We have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. We have designed three transition cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. We found that four...

  2. Navy's Superlaser Is More Than a Weapon (Wired.com) | Jefferson...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    wired.comdangerroom201011navys-super-laser-wont-just-be-a-weapon Submitted: Wednesday, November 10, 2010...

  3. The London Underground map The famous London Underground map shows the Thames

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Jenny, Bernhard

    of graphic information design. London Transport, of course, continues improving and extending the diagram mapThe London Underground map The famous London Underground map shows the Thames and named metro, was that it brought order into London's intricate geography. Garland 1998:7-8 writes: "Above any consideration

  4. Environmental Radiation Dose Reconstruction for U.S. and Russian Weapons Production Facilities: Hanford and Mayak

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ansbaugh, Lynn R.; Degteva, M. O.; Kozheurov, V. P.; Napier, Bruce A.; Tolstykh, E. I.; Vorobiova, M. I.

    2003-05-01

    Another way to look at Cold War legacies is to examine the major environmental releases that resulted from past operation of Cold War-related facilities for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Examining these historical releases and the resultant radiation dose to individuals living near these facilities is called environmental dose reconstruction. Dose reconstructions have been performed or are underway at most large Cold War installations in the United States, such as the Hanford facility; several are also underway in other countries, such as at the Mayak facility in Russia. The efforts in the United States are mostly based on historical operating records and current conditions, which are used to estimate environmental releases, transport, and human exposure. The Russian efforts are largely based on environmental measurements and measurements of human subjects; environmental transport modelling, when conducted, is used to organize and validate the measurements. Past operation of Cold War-related facilities for the manufacture of nuclear weapons has resulted in major releases of radionuclides into the environment. Reconstruction of the historical releases and the resultant radiation dose to individuals in the public living near these facilities is called environmental dose reconstruction. Dose reconstructions have been performed or are underway at most large Cold War installations in the United States; several are also underway in other countries. The types of activity performed, the operating histories, and the radionuclide releases vary widely across the different facilities. The U.S. Hanford Site and the Russian Mayak Production Association are used here to illustrate the nature of the assessed problems and the range of approaches developed to solve them.

  5. Nuclear proliferation: Lessons learned from the Iraqi case. Master's thesis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dixon, T.A.

    1992-12-01

    The nuclear weapons inspection regime implemented in Iraq following the United Nations coalition victory in Desert Storm is the most intrusive in history. Important conclusions about the current non-proliferation regime can therefore be determined from a study of Iraq's progress. This thesis examines Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The supply side of the equation is also studied, with a concentration upon the contributions of NATO nations. The strategic culture of Iraq is discussed, in an effort to discover why Iraq sought nuclear weapons. Finally, policy prescriptions are advanced. The current non-proliferation regime needs to be improved if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be halted, or even slowed. The most promising way to improve this regime is to involve the U.N. Special Commission and the U.N. Security Council in the management of the problem of nuclear proliferation.... Iraq, Strategic culture, Non-Proliferation treaty, International atomic energy agency, Nuclear weapons, Middle east security, Nuclear suppliers group, United Nations.

  6. Ira Helfand, MD International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Robock, Alan

    the urgent need to move with all possible speed to the negotiation of a nuclear weapons conventionIra Helfand, MD International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War Physicians for Social Responsibility NUCLEAR FAMINE: A BILLION PEOPLE AT RISK Global Impacts of Limited Nuclear War on Agriculture

  7. Nuclear fuel cycle assessment of India: a technical study for U.S.-India cooperation 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Woddi, Taraknath Venkat Krishna

    2008-10-10

    to change the long-standing U.S. policy of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons by denying nuclear technology transfer to non-NPT signatory states. The nuclear tests in 1998 have convinced the world community that India would never relinquish its nuclear...

  8. Defining nuclear security in the 21st century

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Doyle, James E

    2009-01-01

    A conference devoted to Reducing the Risks from Radioactive and Nuclear Materials presupposes that such risks exist. Few would disagree, but what are they? While debate on the nature and severity of risks associated with nuclear energy will always remain, it is easy to define a set of risks that are almost universally acknowledged. These include: (1) Nuclear warfare between states; (2) Continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials to states and non-state actors; (3) Terrorists or non-state actor acquisition or use nuclear weapons or nuclear materials; (4) Terrorists or non-state actors attack on a nuclear facility; and (5) Loss or diversion of nuclear weapons or materials by a state to unauthorized uses. These are listed in no particular order of likelihood or potential consequence. They are also very broadly stated, each one could be broken down into a more detailed set of discrete risks or threats. The fact that there is a strong consensus on the existence of these risks is evidence that we remain in an era of nuclear insecurity. This becomes even clearer when we note that most major trends influencing the probability of these risks continue to run in a negative direction.

  9. Twelve Year Study of Underground Corrosion of Activated Metals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    M. Kay Adler Flitton; Timothy S. Yoder

    2012-03-01

    The subsurface radioactive disposal facility located at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Idaho site contains neutron-activated metals from non-fuel nuclear-reactor-core components. A long-term corrosion study is being conducted to obtain site-specific corrosion rates to support efforts to more accurately estimate the transfer of activated elements in an arid vadose zone environment. The study uses non-radioactive metal coupons representing the prominent neutron-activated material buried at the disposal location, namely, two types of stainless steels, welded stainless steel, welded nickel-chromium steel alloy, zirconium alloy, beryllium, and aluminum. Additionally, carbon steel (the material used in cask disposal liners and other disposal containers) and duplex stainless steel (high-integrity containers) are also included in the study. This paper briefly describes the test program and presents the corrosion rate results through twelve years of underground exposure.

  10. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons (Informational Purposes Only)

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2015-02-24

    This draft has been scheduled for final review before the Directives Review Board on 3-5-15. All major comments and concerns should be provided to your DRB representative, following your organization process. If you do not know who your representative is, please see the list of DRB members at https://www.directives.doe.gov/beta/references/directives-review-board. If your office is represented by Ingrid Kolb, Director, Office of Management, please submit your major concerns and comments to the DRB Liaison, Camille Beben (Camille.Beben@hq.doe.gov; 202-586-1014). All major comments and concerns should be submitted by COB 3-3-15.

  11. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons - DOE

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust, High-ThroughputUpcomingmagnetoresistanceand Governmentm D m

  12. U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust,Field-effectWorking With WIPP UPDATE: AprilCubic Feet)Million CubicMonth

  13. Method for making generally cylindrical underground openings

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Routh, J.W.

    1983-05-26

    A rapid, economical and safe method for making a generally cylindrical underground opening such as a shaft or a tunnel is described. A borehole is formed along the approximate center line of where it is desired to make the underground opening. The borehole is loaded with an explodable material and the explodable material is detonated. An enlarged cavity is formed by the explosive action of the detonated explodable material forcing outward and compacting the original walls of the borehole. The enlarged cavity may be increased in size by loading it with a second explodable material, and detonating the second explodable material. The process may be repeated as required until the desired underground opening is made. The explodable material used in the method may be free-flowing, and it may be contained in a pipe.

  14. Atmospheric fogging in underground mine airways

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gillies, A.D.S.; Schimmelpfennig

    1983-04-01

    Loss of visibility due to the occurrence of atmospheric fogging in underground mine airways can lead to longer travel times and loss of production efficiency, an increase in the frequency of vehicular and foot traffic accidents and difficulty in checking rock surfaces for instability and loose material. Where hot and humid surface air meets colder underground air, conditions for fog formation may be present. Further, suspended particulate matter from diesel exhausts or stoping operations together with slow movement of air along passageways may contribute to formation. This study describes an investigation being undertaken with the cooperation of Kennecott's Ozark Lead Co. to identify causes of the problem.

  15. Potential underground risks associated with CAES.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kirk, Matthew F.; Webb, Stephen Walter; Broome, Scott Thomas; Pfeifle, Thomas W.; Grubelich, Mark Charles; Bauer, Stephen J.

    2010-10-01

    CAES in geologic media has been proposed to help 'firm' renewable energy sources (wind and solar) by providing a means to store energy when excess energy was available, and to provide an energy source during non-productive renewable energy time periods. Such a storage media may experience hourly (perhaps small) pressure swings. Salt caverns represent the only proven underground storage used for CAES, but not in a mode where renewable energy sources are supported. Reservoirs, both depleted natural gas and aquifers represent other potential underground storage vessels for CAES, however, neither has yet to be demonstrated as a functional/operational storage media for CAES.

  16. Cost and code study of underground buildings

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sterling, R.L.

    1981-01-01

    Various regulatory and financial implications for earth-sheltered houses and buildings are discussed. Earth-sheltered houses are covered in the most detail including discussions of building-code restrictions, HUD Minimum Property Standards, legal aspects, zoning restrictions, taxation, insurance, and home financing. Examples of the initial-cost elements in earth-sheltered houses together with projected life-cycle costs are given and compared to more-conventional energy-conserving houses. For larger-scale underground buildings, further information is given on building code, fire protection, and insurance provisions. Initial-cost information for five large underground buildings is presented together with energy-use information where available.

  17. Visit to the Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2009-03-31

    U.S. Department of Energy scientists and administrators join members of the National Science Foundation and South Dakotas Sanford Underground Laboratory for the deepest journey yet to the proposed site of the Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory (DUSEL).

  18. Visit to the Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2009-01-01

    U.S. Department of Energy scientists and administrators join members of the National Science Foundation and South Dakotas Sanford Underground Laboratory for the deepest journey yet to the proposed site of the Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory (DUSEL).

  19. Vibration from underground railways: considering piled foundations and twin tunnels

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kuo, Kirsty Alison

    2011-02-08

    Accurate predictions of ground-borne vibration levels in the vicinity of an underground railway are greatly sought after in modern urban centers. Yet the complexity involved in simulating the underground environment means that it is necessary...

  20. Numerical Simulations of Leakage from Underground LPG Storage Caverns

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yamamoto, Hajime; Pruess, Karsten

    2004-01-01

    U. Case History: Blowout at an LPG Storage Cavern in Sweden,and Heads at an Underground LPG Storage Cavern Site, Journalof Leakage from Underground LPG Storage Caverns Hajime

  1. Accident Investigation of the February 5, 2014, Underground Salt...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    5, 2014, Underground Salt Haul Truck Fire at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Carlsbad NM Accident Investigation of the February 5, 2014, Underground Salt Haul Truck Fire at the...

  2. Forced cooling of underground electric power transmission lines : design manual

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Jay A.

    1978-01-01

    The methodology utilized for the design of a forced-cooled pipe-type underground transmission system is presented. The material is divided into three major parts: (1) The Forced-cooled Pipe-Type Underground Transmission ...

  3. TABLE OF CONTENTS Underground Construction (Tunnels), Shafts and Caissons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    US Army Corps of Engineers

    EM 385-1-1 30 Nov 14 26-i Section 26 TABLE OF CONTENTS Underground Construction (Tunnels), Shafts ......................................................................................................... 26-16 26.F Shafts-1 SECTION 26 Underground Construction (Tunnels), Shafts and Caissons 26. General. This section applies

  4. Visit to the Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2010-01-08

    U.S. Department of Energy scientists and administrators join members of the National Science Foundation and South Dakotas Sanford Underground Laboratory for the deepest journey yet to the proposed site of the Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory (DUSEL).

  5. Crystalline ceramics: Waste forms for the disposal of weapons plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W. [New Mexico Univ., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Weber, W.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

    1995-05-01

    At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (i) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (ii) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass ``logs``; (iii) deep borehole disposal (National Academy of Sciences Report, 1994). The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramics apatite, pyrochlore, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium.

  6. Comments on implementation: Contingency options for chemical weapons demilitarization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Aroesty, J.

    1991-01-01

    The author discusses the need to formulate contingency options for complying with U.S./U.S.S.R. chemical weapon (C.W.) demilitarization timetables that start in 1992. These timetables could be overly optimistic in the face of emerging environmental concerns and potential political, technical, and operational difficulties. A similar approach may also be relevant to the situation in Iraq, where several years are likely to pass before a suitable C.W. destruction system is available for use.

  7. FAQS Qualification Card - Weapon Quality Assurance | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum12, 2015Executive Order 13514ConstructionWeapon Quality Assurance FAQS

  8. FAQS Reference Guide - Weapon Quality Assurance | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum12, 2015Executive Order 13514ConstructionWeaponTraining FAQS Reference

  9. Summary report of the screening process to determine reasonable alternatives for long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-03-29

    Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials (primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium) have become surplus to national defense needs both in the US and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety and health consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. As announced in the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the Department of Energy is currently conducting an evaluation process for disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials determined surplus to National Security needs, and long-term storage of national security and programmatic inventories, and surplus weapons-usable fissile materials that are not able to go directly from interim storage to disposition. An extensive set of long-term storage and disposition options was compiled. Five broad long-term storage options were identified; thirty-seven options were considered for plutonium disposition; nine options were considered for HEU disposition; and eight options were identified for Uranium-233 disposition. Section 2 discusses the criteria used in the screening process. Section 3 describes the options considered, and Section 4 provides a detailed summary discussions of the screening results.

  10. Feasibility of very deep borehole disposal of US nuclear defense wastes

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dozier, Frances Elizabeth

    2011-01-01

    This thesis analyzes the feasibility of emplacing DOE-owned defense nuclear waste from weapons production into a permanent borehole repository drilled ~4 km into granite basement rock. Two canister options were analyzed ...

  11. Use of a High-Purity Germanium Semiconductor Detector for Rapid Post-Nuclear Event Forensics 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Horowitz, Steven Michael

    2015-07-27

    This thesis investigates the ability of a high-purity germanium detector to perform post-detonation forensics on the debris from several types of nuclear weapons 24 hours after detonation. The ultimate result of this ...

  12. Nuclear deterrence in South Asia

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hagerty, D.T.

    1995-12-31

    Did India and Pakistan nearly fight a nuclear war in 1990? In a provocative 1993 article, Seymour M. Hersh claims that they did. During a crisis with India over the rapidly escalating insurgency in Kashmir, Pakistan openly deployed its main armored tank units along the Indian border and, in secret, placed its nuclear-weapons arsenal on alert. As a result, the Bush Administration became convinced that the world was on the edge of a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India. Universe of cases is admittedly small, but my argument is supported by recent research indicating that preemptive attacks of any kind have been historically rarer than conventionally believed. The nuclear era has seen two instances of preventive attacks against nuclear facilities-the 1981 Israeli bombing of Iraq`s Osirak nuclear facility and the allied coalition`s 1991 air war against Iraq-but both of these actions were taken without fear of nuclear reprisal. In situations where nuclear retaliation has been a possibility, no leader of nuclear weapon state has chosen to launch a preemptive first strike. 97 refs.

  13. The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

    2008-12-23

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including unenriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to diver

  14. Physical protection technologies for the reconfigured weapons complex

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-08-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was a memtier of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Safeguards and Security (S&S) team providing assistance to the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Weapons Complex Reconfigaration. New and improved S&S concepts, approaches and technologies were needed to support both new and upgraded facilities. Physical protection technologies used in these facilities were to use proven state-of-the-art systems in such areas as image processing, alarm communications and display, entry control, contraband detection, intrusion detection and video assessment, access delay, automation and robotics, and various insider protection systems. Factors considered in the selection of these technologies were protection against the design basis threat, reducing S&S life-cycle costs, automation of S&S functions to minimize operational costs, access to critical assets and exposure of people to hazardous environments, increasing the amount of delay to an outsider adversary and having reliable and maintainable systems. This paper will discuss the S&S issues, requirements, technology opportunities and needs. Physical protection technologies and systems considered in the design effort of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration facilities will be reviewed.

  15. Underground Structure Monitoring with Wireless Sensor Networks

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Liu, Yunhao

    University of Science and Technology {limo, liu}@cse.ust.hk ABSTRACT Environment monitoring in coal mines to better serve people by automatically monitoring and interacting with physical environments. EnvironmentUnderground Structure Monitoring with Wireless Sensor Networks Mo Li, Yunhao Liu Hong Kong

  16. Underground Energy Storage Program. 1983 annual summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kannberg, L.D.

    1984-06-01

    The Underground Energy Storage Program approach, structure, history, and milestones are described. Technical activities and progress in the Seasonal Thermal Energy Storage and Compressed Air Energy Storage components of the program are then summarized, documenting the work performed and progress made toward resolving and eliminating technical and economic barriers associated with those technologies. (LEW)

  17. Underground natural gas storage reservoir management

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ortiz, I.; Anthony, R.

    1995-06-01

    The objective of this study is to research technologies and methodologies that will reduce the costs associated with the operation and maintenance of underground natural gas storage. This effort will include a survey of public information to determine the amount of natural gas lost from underground storage fields, determine the causes of this lost gas, and develop strategies and remedial designs to reduce or stop the gas loss from selected fields. Phase I includes a detailed survey of US natural gas storage reservoirs to determine the actual amount of natural gas annually lost from underground storage fields. These reservoirs will be ranked, the resultant will include the amount of gas and revenue annually lost. The results will be analyzed in conjunction with the type (geologic) of storage reservoirs to determine the significance and impact of the gas loss. A report of the work accomplished will be prepared. The report will include: (1) a summary list by geologic type of US gas storage reservoirs and their annual underground gas storage losses in ft{sup 3}; (2) a rank by geologic classifications as to the amount of gas lost and the resultant lost revenue; and (3) show the level of significance and impact of the losses by geologic type. Concurrently, the amount of storage activity has increased in conjunction with the net increase of natural gas imports as shown on Figure No. 3. Storage is playing an ever increasing importance in supplying the domestic energy requirements.

  18. New model more accurately tracks gases for underground nuclear...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    knowledge about atmospheric conditions (e.g., the barometric pressure that creates a vacuum) and seasonal variabilities in different regions. This team's research investigated...

  19. Underground Facility at Nevada National Security Site | National Nuclear

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust,Field-effectWorking With WIPPfinal designUltrafastUncovering theand Astrophysics

  20. New model more accurately tracks gases for underground nuclear explosion

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJessework usesofPublications64 2.251 2.211NewNew exhibitNew