Sample records for unclassified cyber security

  1. Evaluation Report on "The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program"

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Industry experts report that security challenges and threats are continually evolving as malicious activity has become more web-based and attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attack methods. In addition, the number of data breaches continues to rise. In an effort to mitigate and address threats and protect valuable information, the Department of Energy anticipated spending about $275 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to implement cyber security measures necessary to protect its information technology resources. These systems and data are designed to support the Department's mission and business lines of energy security, nuclear security, scientific discovery and innovation, and environmental responsibility. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) provides direction to agencies on the management and oversight of information security risks, including design and implementation of controls to protect Federal information and systems. As required by FISMA, the Office of Inspector General conducts an annual independent evaluation to determine whether the Department's unclassified cyber security program adequately protects its information systems and data. This memorandum and the attached report present the results of our evaluation for FY 2009. The Department continued to make incremental improvements in its unclassified cyber security program. Our evaluation disclosed that most sites had taken action to address weaknesses previously identified in our FY 2008 evaluation report. They improved certification and accreditation of systems; strengthened configuration management of networks and systems; performed independent assessments; and, developed and/or refined certain policies and procedures. In addition, the Department instituted a centralized incident response organization designed to eliminate duplicative efforts throughout the Department. As we have noted in previous reports, the Department continued to maintain strong network perimeter defenses against malicious intruders and other externals threats. These are positive accomplishments. However, in our judgment, additional action is required to further enhance the Department's unclassified cyber security program and help reduce risks to its systems and data. For example, our current review identified opportunities for improvements in areas such as security planning and testing, systems inventory, access controls, and configuration management. In particular, we issued a number of findings at sites managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We also identified weaknesses across various Department program elements. Issues that warrant further attention include: (1) Weaknesses such as outdated security plans and not completing annual security control self-assessments were identified at several sites; (2) The Department had not yet resolved systems inventory issues and had yet to deploy a complex-wide automated asset management tool to help track information technology resources and identify interfaces between systems or networks; (3) Although certain improvements had been made to enhance access controls, we noted deficiencies such as a lack of periodic account reviews and inadequate password management at a number of sites; and (4) Previously identified weaknesses in configuration management had been corrected, however, we found problems related to weak administrator account settings and failure to install software patches, as well as incomplete implementation of the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. These internal control weaknesses existed, at least in part, because certain cyber security roles and responsibilities were not clearly delineated. Program officials also had not effectively performed monitoring and review activities essential for evaluating the adequacy of cyber security performance. In some cases, officials had not ensured that weaknesses discovered during audits and other evaluations were recorded and tracked to resolution in the organizations' Plans of Action and Milestones. Our testing disclosed that about 39 p

  2. Evaluation Report on The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    users continues to increase. In response to increasing threats to the Government's computer networks and systems, Congress enacted the Government hformation Security Reform Act...

  3. Cyber Security

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Associate CIO for Cyber Security (IM-30) Rod Turk Deputy Associate CIO for Cyber Security (IM-30) Michael Maraya Incident Management Division (IM-32) Rob Ciochon Director Policy,...

  4. Handling Cyber Security Alerts and Advisories and Reporting Cyber Security Incidents

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2002-03-18T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish Department of Energy (DOE) requirements and responsibilities for reporting cyber security incidents involving classified and unclassified systems and responding to cyber security alerts and advisories; and to implement requirements of DOE N 205.1, Unclassified Cyber Security Program, and DOE M 471.2-2, Classified Information Systems Security Manual. DOE N 205.13, dated 7-6-04, extends this notice until 7-6-05. Cancels DOE M 471.2-2, Chapter III, section 8.

  5. Information Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security Research and Development Information Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security Research and Development GAO recommends that...

  6. Enhance your Cyber Security Knowledge

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Enhance your Cyber Security Knowledge About NPS CS FUNDAMENTALS: Create a strong foundational by increasing the effectiveness of the armed forces of the United States and its allies. Cyber Security-4015 About CISR #12;Cyber Security Adversarial Techniques Cyber Security Defense Cyber Security Fundamentals

  7. Cyber Security Architecture Guidelines

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-03-08T23:59:59.000Z

    This Guide provides supplemental information on the implementation of cyber security architectures throughout the Department of Energy. Canceled by DOE N 205.18

  8. Sandia Energy - Cyber Security for Electric Infrastructure

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Cyber Security for Electric Infrastructure Home Stationary Power Grid Modernization Cyber Security for Electric Infrastructure Cyber Security for Electric Infrastructureashoter2015...

  9. Departmental Cyber Security Management Policy

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-05-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The Departmental Cyber Security Management (DCSM) Policy was developed to further clarify and support the elements of the Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Policy regarding cyber security. Certified 9-23-10. No cancellation.

  10. Metaphors for cyber security.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moore, Judy Hennessey; Parrott, Lori K.; Karas, Thomas H.

    2008-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is based upon a workshop, called 'CyberFest', held at Sandia National Laboratories on May 27-30, 2008. Participants in the workshop came from organizations both outside and inside Sandia. The premise of the workshop was that thinking about cyber security from a metaphorical perspective could lead to a deeper understanding of current approaches to cyber defense and perhaps to some creative new approaches. A wide range of metaphors was considered, including those relating to: military and other types of conflict, biological, health care, markets, three-dimensional space, and physical asset protection. These in turn led to consideration of a variety of possible approaches for improving cyber security in the future. From the proposed approaches, three were formulated for further discussion. These approaches were labeled 'Heterogeneity' (drawing primarily on the metaphor of biological diversity), 'Motivating Secure Behavior' (taking a market perspective on the adoption of cyber security measures) and 'Cyber Wellness' (exploring analogies with efforts to improve individual and public health).

  11. Cyber Security Process Requirements Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2008-08-12T23:59:59.000Z

    The Manual establishes the minimum implementation standards for cyber security management processes throughout the Department. No cancellation.

  12. Security Controls for Unclassified Information Systems Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-01-05T23:59:59.000Z

    The Manual establishes minimum implementation standards for cyber security technical, management, and operational controls that will be followed in all information systems operated by DOE and the information systems. Admin Chg 1 dated 9-1-09. Canceled by DOE O 205.1B.

  13. Security Controls for Unclassified Information Systems Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-01-05T23:59:59.000Z

    The Manual establishes minimum implementation standards for cyber security technical, management, and operational controls that will be followed in all information systems operated by DOE and the information systems. Admin Chg 1 dated 9-1-09; Admin Chg 2 dated 12-22-09. Canceled by DOE O 205.1B.

  14. Security Controls for Unclassified Information Systems Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-01-05T23:59:59.000Z

    The Manual establishes minimum implementation standards for cyber security technical, management, and operational controls that will be followed in all information systems operated by DOE and the information systems. Does not cancel other directives. Canceled by DOE O 205.1B

  15. INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY Security Models

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandhu, Ravi

    INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY 1 Security Models: Past, Present and Future Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair Institute for Cyber Security University of Texas at San Antonio July 2010 ravi.sandhu@utsa.edu www.profsandhu.com © Ravi Sandhu #12;INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY 2 THE BIG

  16. INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY Security Models

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandhu, Ravi

    INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY 1 Security Models: Past, Present and Future Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair Institute for Cyber Security University of Texas at San Antonio July 2009 ravi.sandhu@utsa.edu www.profsandhu.com © Ravi Sandhu #12;INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY 2 THE BIG

  17. Cyber Security | National Security | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power Administration would likeConstitution4Customer-Comments Sign In About |Cyber SecurityCyber

  18. Using Operational Security (OPSEC) to Support a Cyber Security...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Using Operational Security (OPSEC) to Support a Cyber Security Culture in Control Systems Environments Using Operational Security (OPSEC) to Support a Cyber Security Culture in...

  19. Cyber Security Process Requirements Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2008-08-12T23:59:59.000Z

    The Manual establishes the minimum implementation standards for cyber security management processes throughout the Department. No cancellation. Admin Chg 1 dated 9-1-09.

  20. Extension of DOE Directive on Cyber Security

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-06-04T23:59:59.000Z

    DOE N 205.4, Handling Cyber Security Alerts and Advisories and Reporting Cyber Security Incidents, is extended until 6/4/04.

  1. Cyber Security Incident Management Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-01-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes minimum requirements for a structured cyber security incident detection and management process for detecting, identifying, categorizing, containing, reporting, and mitigating cyber security incidents involving DOE information and information systems operated by DOE or by contractors on behalf of the Department. No cancellations.

  2. Cyber Security Incident Management Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-01-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes minimum requirements for a structured cyber security incident detection and management process for detecting, identifying, categorizing, containing, reporting, and mitigating cyber security incidents involving DOE information and information systems operated by DOE or by contractors on behalf of the Department. No cancellations. Admin Chg 1 dated 9-1-09.

  3. UNCLASSIFIED

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    1 Department of Energy Analysis of Economic Impact Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 CFR 810 January 13, 2013 UNCLASSIFIED 2 Executive Summary The Department of...

  4. INL@Work Cyber Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chaffin, May

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    May Chaffin is one of many Idaho National Laboratory researchers who are helping secure the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber attacks. Lots more content like this is available at INL's facebook page http://www.facebook.com/idahonationallaboratory.

  5. Cyber Security Process Requirements Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2008-08-12T23:59:59.000Z

    The Manual establishes minimum implementation standards for cyber security management processes throughout the Department. Admin Chg 1 dated 9-1-09; Admin Chg 2 dated 12-22-09. Canceled by DOE O 205.1B. No cancellations.

  6. INL@Work Cyber Security

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Chaffin, May

    2013-05-28T23:59:59.000Z

    May Chaffin is one of many Idaho National Laboratory researchers who are helping secure the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber attacks. Lots more content like this is available at INL's facebook page http://www.facebook.com/idahonationallaboratory.

  7. Cyber Security Incident Management Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-01-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes minimum requirements for a structured cyber security incident detection and management process for detecting, identifying, categorizing, containing, reporting, and mitigating cyber security incidents involving DOE information and information systems operated by DOE or by contractors on behalf of the Department. Admin Chg 1 dated 9-1-09; Admin Chg 2 dated 12-22-09. Canceled by DOE O 205.1B.

  8. Third Annual Cyber Security and Information

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Krings, Axel W.

    Third Annual Cyber Security and Information Infrastructure Research Workshop May 14-15, 2007 TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIES THAT MEET THE CYBER SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY Frederick Sheldon, Axel Krings, Seong-Moo Yoo, and Ali Mili (Editors) #12;CSIIRW07: Cyber Security and Information

  9. Cyber Security Grand Challenges and Prognosis

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandhu, Ravi

    Cyber Security Grand Challenges and Prognosis Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Institute for Cyber Security Executive Director and Endowed Chair ravi.sandhu@utsa.edu www.profsandhu.com www.ics.utsa.edu © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real Cyber Security Grand Challenges and Prognosis Prof. Ravi

  10. Cyber Security and Resilient Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Anderson

    2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has become a center of excellence for critical infrastructure protection, particularly in the field of cyber security. It is one of only a few national laboratories that have enhanced the nation’s cyber security posture by performing industrial control system (ICS) vendor assessments as well as user on-site assessments. Not only are vulnerabilities discovered, but described actions for enhancing security are suggested – both on a system-specific basis and from a general perspective of identifying common weaknesses and their corresponding corrective actions. These cyber security programs have performed over 40 assessments to date which have led to more robust, secure, and resilient monitoring and control systems for the US electrical grid, oil and gas, chemical, transportation, and many other sectors. In addition to cyber assessments themselves, the INL has been engaged in outreach to the ICS community through vendor forums, technical conferences, vendor user groups, and other special engagements as requested. Training programs have been created to help educate all levels of management and worker alike with an emphasis towards real everyday cyber hacking methods and techniques including typical exploits that are used. The asset owner or end user has many products available for its use created from these programs. One outstanding product is the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems document that provides insight to the user when specifying a new monitoring and control system, particularly concerning security requirements. Employing some of the top cyber researchers in the nation, the INL can leverage this talent towards many applications other than critical infrastructure. Monitoring and control systems are used throughout the world to perform simple tasks such as cooking in a microwave to complex ones such as the monitoring and control of the next generation fighter jets or nuclear material safeguards systems in complex nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It is the intent of this paper to describe the cyber security programs that are currently in place, the experiences and successes achieved in industry including outreach and training, and suggestions about how other sectors and organizations can leverage this national expertise to help their monitoring and control systems become more secure.

  11. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Amin, Saurabh

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    cyber-security analysis of the SCADA system of the Gignac water distributioncyber security of SCADA systems managing other infrastructures (e.g. , oil and natural gas distribution

  12. INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY Application-Centric Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandhu, Ravi

    INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY Application-Centric Security: How to Get There Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair Institute for Cyber Security (ICS) University of Texas at San Antonio Executive Director and Endowed Chair Institute for Cyber Security (ICS) University of Texas at San Antonio

  13. Cyber Security & Smart Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Shapiro, J.

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    of the impacts of long-term power shortages from the destruction of critical electric infrastructure. ? A Hitachi factory north of Tokyo that makes 60% of the world?s supply of airflow sensors was shut down. This caused General Motors to shut a plant... at The University of Texas at Dallas ? Next Generation Control Systems ? Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid ? Active Defense Systems ? System Vulnerability Assessments ? Grid Test Bed ? Integrated Risk Analysis ? Modeling and Simulation...

  14. Department of Energy Cyber Security Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-12-04T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of the DOE Cyber Security Management Program is to protect all DOE cyber information and information systems in order to implement the requirements of applicable laws required to maintain national security and ensure DOE business operations proceed without security events such as interruption or compromise. Cancels DOE O 205.1. Canceled by DOE O 205.1B.

  15. Department of Energy Cyber Security Management Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-03-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of the Department of Energy (DOE) Cyber Security Management Program (hereafter called the Program) is to protect all DOE cyber information and information systems in order to implement the requirements of applicable laws required to maintain national security and ensure DOE business operations proceed without security events such as interruption or compromise. Cancels DOE N 205.1

  16. Cyber Security in Smart Grid Substations

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Utrecht, Universiteit

    Cyber Security in Smart Grid Substations Thijs Baars Lucas van den Bemd Michail Theuns Robin van.089 3508 TB Utrecht The Netherlands #12;CYBER SECURITY IN SMART GRID SUBSTATIONS Thijs Baars T.Brinkkemper@uu.nl Abstract. This report describes the state of smart grid security in Europe, specifically the Netherlands

  17. Microgrid cyber security reference architecture.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Veitch, Cynthia K.; Henry, Jordan M.; Richardson, Bryan T.; Hart, Derek H.

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document describes a microgrid cyber security reference architecture. First, we present a high-level concept of operations for a microgrid, including operational modes, necessary power actors, and the communication protocols typically employed. We then describe our motivation for designing a secure microgrid; in particular, we provide general network and industrial control system (ICS)-speci c vulnerabilities, a threat model, information assurance compliance concerns, and design criteria for a microgrid control system network. Our design approach addresses these concerns by segmenting the microgrid control system network into enclaves, grouping enclaves into functional domains, and describing actor communication using data exchange attributes. We describe cyber actors that can help mitigate potential vulnerabilities, in addition to performance bene ts and vulnerability mitigation that may be realized using this reference architecture. To illustrate our design approach, we present a notional a microgrid control system network implementation, including types of communica- tion occurring on that network, example data exchange attributes for actors in the network, an example of how the network can be segmented to create enclaves and functional domains, and how cyber actors can be used to enforce network segmentation and provide the neces- sary level of security. Finally, we describe areas of focus for the further development of the reference architecture.

  18. Common Cyber Security Vulnerabilities Observed in Control System...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Common Cyber Security Vulnerabilities Observed in Control System Assessments by the INL NSTB Program Common Cyber Security Vulnerabilities Observed in Control System Assessments by...

  19. NNSA Seeking Comments on Consolidated IT and Cyber Security Support...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    NNSA Seeking Comments on Consolidated IT and Cyber Security Support Services Draft NNSA Seeking Comments on Consolidated IT and Cyber Security Support Services Draft July 17, 2013...

  20. Sandia National Laboratories: Cyber Security for Electric Infrastructu...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    SystemsCyber Security for Electric Infrastructure Cyber Security for Electric Infrastructure Electric power systems and power-system operators are more reliant on telemetry,...

  1. Mathematical and Statistical Opportunities in Cyber Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meza, Juan; Campbell, Scott; Bailey, David

    2009-03-23T23:59:59.000Z

    The role of mathematics in a complex system such as the Internet has yet to be deeply explored. In this paper, we summarize some of the important and pressing problems in cyber security from the viewpoint of open science environments. We start by posing the question 'What fundamental problems exist within cyber security research that can be helped by advanced mathematics and statistics'? Our first and most important assumption is that access to real-world data is necessary to understand large and complex systems like the Internet. Our second assumption is that many proposed cyber security solutions could critically damage both the openness and the productivity of scientific research. After examining a range of cyber security problems, we come to the conclusion that the field of cyber security poses a rich set of new and exciting research opportunities for the mathematical and statistical sciences.

  2. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chu, Peter C.

    -Coordinate System Fh is hydrodynamic force (drag, lift) Fv is the bubble force #12;UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Moment, 2004: Triple coordinate transforms for prediction of falling cylinder through the water column. Journal of Applied Mechanics, 71, 292-298. · Chu, P.C., A. Gilles, and C.W. Fan, 2005: Experiment of falling cylinder

  3. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chu, Peter C.

    -Coordinate Hydrodynamic forces (drag and lift) are easily calculated. #12;UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Interfacial. Gilles, 2004: Triple coordinate transforms for prediction of falling cylinder through the water column of falling cylinder through air-water- sediment columns. Journal of Applied Mechanics, in revision. · Chu, P

  4. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chu, Peter C.

    #12;UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED F-Coordinate Hydrodynamic forces (drag and lift) are easily calculated.W. Fan, A.D. Evans, and A. Gilles, 2004: Triple coordinate transforms for prediction of falling cylinder: Prediction of falling cylinder through air-water-sediment columns. Journal of Applied Mechanics, in revision

  5. Cyber Security & Smart Grid 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Shapiro, J.

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    to complexity, proprietary nature and different management teams ? Ripe for exploitation ? Intel, Microsoft, Security vendors are not focused on this technology ? Many are NOT PC?s ? Many can be infected and the devices cannot be cleaned ESL-KT-11...-11-23 CATEE 2011, Dallas, Texas, Nov. 7 ? 9, 2011 Inherent Vulnerabilities ? Two-way communications ? Distributed connectivity ? Customer usage data ? Metering devices ? Weak authentication and access control ? Lack of adequate training ? Lack...

  6. Cyber Security | More Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power Administration would likeConstitution4Customer-Comments Sign In About |Cyber Security

  7. Cyber Security Major R&D Challenges Ram Krishnan

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandhu, Ravi

    1 Cyber Security Major R&D Challenges Ram Krishnan http://engineering.utsa.edu/~krishnan/ Cyber Security Research Institute (CSRI) Cyber Security R&D Workshop April 19-20, 2012 World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! Institute for Cyber Security Prof. Ravi Sandhu conveys his regrets for inability

  8. Cyber Security Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peterson, Dale

    2012-05-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This goal of this project was to develop cyber security audit and attack detection tools for industrial control systems (ICS). Digital Bond developed and released a tool named Bandolier that audits ICS components commonly used in the energy sector against an optimal security configuration. The Portaledge Project developed a capability for the PI Historian, the most widely used Historian in the energy sector, to aggregate security events and detect cyber attacks.

  9. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Frandsen, Jannette B.

    G. Jones, and Andrew Huizinga Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego, CA William S, STEVENSON, McDONALD, GRANGER, SULLIVAN, JONES, HUIZINGA ET AL. UNCLASSIFIED 672 further processing of field

  10. INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY The PEI Framework for

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandhu, Ravi

    not the right decision for securing distributed systems © Ravi Sandhu 5 #12;INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY PostINSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY 1 The PEI Framework for Application-Centric Security Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair Institute for Cyber Security University of Texas at San Antonio May

  11. Realizing Scientific Methods for Cyber Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carroll, Thomas E.; Manz, David O.; Edgar, Thomas W.; Greitzer, Frank L.

    2012-07-18T23:59:59.000Z

    There is little doubt among cyber security researchers about the lack of scientic rigor that underlies much of the liter-ature. The issues are manifold and are well documented. Further complicating the problem is insufficient scientic methods to address these issues. Cyber security melds man and machine: we inherit the challenges of computer science, sociology, psychology, and many other elds and create new ones where these elds interface. In this paper we detail a partial list of challenges imposed by rigorous science and survey how other sciences have tackled them, in the hope of applying a similar approach to cyber security science. This paper is by no means comprehensive: its purpose is to foster discussion in the community on how we can improve rigor in cyber security science.

  12. Embracing the Cloud for Better Cyber Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shue, Craig A [ORNL; Lagesse, Brent J [ORNL

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The future of cyber security is inextricably tied to the future of computing. Organizational needs and economic factors will drive computing outcomes. Cyber security researchers and practitioners must recognize the path of computing evolution and position themselves to influence the process to incorporate security as an inherent property. The best way to predict future computing trends is to look at recent developments and their motivations. Organizations are moving towards outsourcing their data storage, computation, and even user desktop environments. This trend toward cloud computing has a direct impact on cyber security: rather than securing user machines, preventing malware access, and managing removable media, a cloud-based security scheme must focus on enabling secure communication with remote systems. This change in approach will have profound implications for cyber security research efforts. In this work, we highlight existing and emerging technologies and the limitations of cloud computing systems. We then discuss the cyber security efforts that would support these applications. Finally, we discuss the implications of these computing architecture changes, in particular with respect to malware and social engineering.

  13. Control Systems Cyber Security Standards Support Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Evans

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Homeland Security’s Control Systems Security Program (CSSP) is working with industry to secure critical infrastructure sectors from cyber intrusions that could compromise control systems. This document describes CSSP’s current activities with industry organizations in developing cyber security standards for control systems. In addition, it summarizes the standards work being conducted by organizations within the sector and provides a brief listing of sector meetings and conferences that might be of interest for each sector. Control systems cyber security standards are part of a rapidly changing environment. The participation of CSSP in the development effort for these standards has provided consistency in the technical content of the standards while ensuring that information developed by CSSP is included.

  14. Cyber Security Indications and Warning System (SV): CRADA 1573.94 Project Accomplishments Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hu, Tan Chang (PI, Sandia); Robinson, David G. (Technical PI)

    2011-09-08T23:59:59.000Z

    As the national focus on cyber security increases, there is an evolving need for a capability to provide for high-speed sensing of events, correlation of events, and decision-making based on the adverse events seen across multiple independent large-scale network environments. The purpose of this Shared Vision project, Cyber Security Indications and Warning System, was to combine both Sandia's and LMC's expertise to discover new solutions to the challenge of protecting our nation's infrastructure assets. The objectives and scope of the proposal was limited to algorithm and High Performance Computing (HPC) model assessment in the unclassified environment within funding and schedule constraints. The interest is the identification, scalability assessment, and applicability of current utilized cyber security algorithms as applied in an HPC environment.

  15. INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY A Hybrid Enforcement Model for

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandhu, Ravi

    -leading research with real-world impact! #12;INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY Super vs Micro-distribution in g-SIS 8INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY A Hybrid Enforcement Model for Group-Centric Secure Information Executive Director and Endowed Professor Institute for Cyber Security University of Texas at San Antonio

  16. SPIDERS JCTD Smart Cyber-Secure Microgrids

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security (SPIDERS) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) is a groundbreaking program to bolster the cyber security and energy efficiency of U.S. military installations and transfer the knowhow to non-military critical infrastructure.

  17. Department of Energy Cyber Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-06T23:59:59.000Z

    Modifications correct changes to the composition of Senior DOE Management organizations, name change from DOE Cyber Incident Response Capability to Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center and transfer of responsibility for communications security and TEMPEST to the Office of Health, Safety and Security.

  18. Mathematical and Statistical Opportunities in Cyber Security Scott Campbell

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bailey, David H.

    Mathematical and Statistical Opportunities in Cyber Security Juan Meza Scott Campbell David Bailey problems exist within cyber security research that can be helped by advanced mathematics and statistics large and complex systems like the Internet. Our second assumption is that many proposed cyber security

  19. CyberPhysical System Security for the Electric Power Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Manimaran, Govindarasu

    INVITED P A P E R Cyber­Physical System Security for the Electric Power Grid Control in power of cyber infrastructure security in conjunction with power application security to pre- vent, mitigate on its cyber infrastructure and its ability to tolerate potential failures. A further exploration

  20. Cyber Security Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit: Bandolier...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    This project of the cyber security audit and attack detection toolkit will employ Bandolier Audit Files for optimizing security configurations and the Portaledge event detection...

  1. Department of Energy Cyber Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-05-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The order sets forth requirements and responsibilities for a Departmental Cyber Security Program. Cancels DOE O 205.1A, DOE M 205.1-4, DOE M 205.1-5, DOE M 205.1-6, DOE M 205.1-7 and DOE M 205.1-8

  2. Department of Energy Cyber Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-05-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The order sets forth requirements and responsibilities for a Departmental Cyber Security Program (CSP) that protects information and information systems for the Department of Energy (DOE). Chg 1 dated 12-7-2012; Chg 2 dated 3-11-2013; Chg 3, dated 4-29-2014, cancels Chg 2.

  3. The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program 2002, IG-0567

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently AskedEnergyIssuesEnergy Solar Decathlon2001 PowerofUse of U.S.

  4. Evaluation Report on The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed offOCHCO2: Final EnvironmentalCounties,United Statesof6Research &andUniversityEnergy2002,

  5. The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program - 2012, IG-0877

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYouTube YouTube Note: Since the.pdfBreakingMayDepartmentTest for Pumping SystemDepartmentDepartment ofEvaluation Report

  6. Cyber Security Companies, governments, and consumers depend on secure and reliable

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hill, Wendell T.

    Cyber Security Companies, governments, and consumers depend on secure and reliable computer-speed computers all introduce new cyber-security challenges. Cyber- security researchers at the University in the software development cycle. e also creates secure authentication protocols for vulnerable distributed

  7. Cyber Security Requirements for Risk Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-02-19T23:59:59.000Z

    The Notice ensures that system owners consistently assess the threats to and vulnerabilities of systems in order to implement adequate security controls. The Notice will also ensure compliance with the requirements of DOE O 205.1, Department of Energy Cyber Security Management Program, dated 3-21-03, and protect DOE information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, or destruction. DOE N 205.15, dated 3/18/05, extends this directive until 3/18/06.

  8. Cyber Security Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit: National SCADA...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit: National SCADA Test Bed May 2008 Cyber Security Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit: National SCADA Test Bed May 2008 This project of the cyber...

  9. Towards Efficient Collaboration in Cyber Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hui, Peter SY; Bruce, Joseph R.; Fink, Glenn A.; Gregory, Michelle L.; Best, Daniel M.; McGrath, Liam R.; Endert, Alexander

    2010-06-03T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber security analysts in different geographical and organizational domains are often largely tasked with similar duties, albeit with domain-specific variations. These analysts necessarily perform much of the same work independently— for instance, analyzing the same list of security bulletins released by largely the same set of software vendors. As such, communication and collaboration between such analysts would be mutually beneficial to the analysts involved, potentially reducing redundancy and offering the opportunity to preemptively alert each other to high-severity security alerts in a more timely fashion. However, several barriers to practical and efficient collaboration exist, and as such, no such framework exists to support such efforts. In this paper, we discuss the inherent difficulties which make efficient collaboration between cyber security analysts a difficult goal to achieve. We discuss preliminary ideas and concepts towards a collaborative cyber-security framework currently under development, whose goal is to facilitate analyst collaboration across these boundaries. While still in its early stages, we describe work-in-progress towards achieving this goal, including motivation, functionality, concepts, and a high-level description of the proposed system architecture.

  10. Primer Control System Cyber Security Framework and Technical Metrics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wayne F. Boyer; Miles A. McQueen

    2008-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Security Division supported development of a control system cyber security framework and a set of technical metrics to aid owner-operators in tracking control systems security. The framework defines seven relevant cyber security dimensions and provides the foundation for thinking about control system security. Based on the developed security framework, a set of ten technical metrics are recommended that allow control systems owner-operators to track improvements or degradations in their individual control systems security posture.

  11. Small-Scale Cyber Security Competitions Mike O'Leary

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    O'Leary, Michael

    Small-Scale Cyber Security Competitions Mike O'Leary Towson University 16th Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education Orlando, FL June 11-13, 2012 M. O'Leary (Towson University) Small the Flag Competition M. O'Leary (Towson University) Small-Scale Cyber Security Competitions CISSE 2012 2

  12. Department of Energy Cyber Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-05-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The order sets forth requirements and responsibilities for a Departmental Cyber Security Program that protects information and information systems for DOE. Cancels DOE O 205.1A, DOE M 205.1-4, DOE M 205.1-5, DOE M 205.1-6, DOE M 205.1-7 and DOE M 205.1-8. Admin Chg 1, dated 12-7-2012.

  13. Department of Energy Cyber Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-05-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The order sets forth requirements and responsibilities for a Departmental Cyber Security Program that protects information and information systems for DOE. Cancels DOE O 205.1A, DOE M 205.1-4, DOE M 205.1-5, DOE M 205.1-6, DOE M 205.1-7 and DOE M 205.1-8. Admin Chg 1, dated 12-7-2012; Chg 2, dated 3-11-13.

  14. Lessons Learned from Cyber Security Assessments of SCADA and...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Enhancing control systems security in the energy sector NSTB September 2006 LESSONS LEARNED FROM CYBER...

  15. Obama's Call for Public-Private Cyber Security Collaboration...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    companies, equipment vendors, and government agencies to create a Control Systems Roadmap to secure the sector's computer control systems against cyber attack. As a result of...

  16. Lessons Learned from Cyber Security Assessments of SCADA and...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Energy Management Systems Results from ten cyber security vulnerability assessments of process control, SCADA, and energy management systems were reviewed to identify common...

  17. Security Informatics Research Challenges for Mitigating Cyber Friendly Fire

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carroll, Thomas E.; Greitzer, Frank L.; Roberts, Adam D.

    2014-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper addresses cognitive implications and research needs surrounding the problem of cyber friendly re (FF). We dene cyber FF as intentional o*ensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintentionally harms the mission e*ectiveness of friendly or neutral forces. We describe examples of cyber FF and discuss how it ts within a general conceptual framework for cyber security failures. Because it involves human failure, cyber FF may be considered to belong to a sub-class of cyber security failures characterized as unintentional insider threats. Cyber FF is closely related to combat friendly re in that maintaining situation awareness (SA) is paramount to avoiding unintended consequences. Cyber SA concerns knowledge of a system's topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the system and its nodes, the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive and o*ensive countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. We describe a test bed designed to support empirical research on factors a*ecting cyber FF. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF, including both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches.

  18. Critical Infrastructure and Cyber Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Doll, Abby; Pirrong, Renee; Jennings, Matthew; Stasny, George; Giblin, Andy; Shaffer, Steph; Anderson, Aimee

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    that employ stealth methods such as steganography, allowing botmasters to exploit public forums and search engines #1; As U.S. national elections draw near, an increase in phishing, scams and malicious code targeting candidates, campaigns, etc.... Chemical Manufacturing The Chemical Manufacturing sector combines organic and inorganic materials to make chemicals used in everyday life and that contribute to the national security, public safety, and economic security. The components...

  19. Lecture 13: Control System Cyber Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    CERN. Geneva

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Today, the industralized world lives in symbiosis with control systems: it depends on power distribution, oil production, public transport, automatic production lines. While the convenience is at hand, still too many control systems are designed without any security in mind, lack basic security protections, and are not even robust enough to withstand basic attacks. The Stuxnet worm attacking Siemens PLCs in 2010 was another close call. Attackers currently enjoy hacking control systems, and aim to switch lights off. This presentation shall recap the current situation and outline why the presenter is still waiting for a change in paradigm. Stefan Lüders, PhD, graduated from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich and joined CERN in 2002. Being initially developer of a common safety system used in all four experiments at the Large Hadron Collider, he gathered expertise in cyber-security issues of control systems. Consequently in 2004, he took over responsibilities in securing CERN's accelerator and...

  20. Help for the Developers of Control System Cyber Security Standards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert P. Evans

    2008-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A Catalog of Control Systems Security: Recommendations for Standards Developers (Catalog), aimed at assisting organizations to facilitate the development and implementation of control system cyber security standards, has been developed. This catalog contains requirements that can help protect control systems from cyber attacks and can be applied to the Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources of the United States and other nations. The requirements contained in the catalog are a compilation of practices or various industry bodies used to increase the security of control systems from both physical and cyber attacks. They should be viewed as a collection of recommendations to be considered and judiciously employed, as appropriate, when reviewing and developing cyber security standards for control systems. The recommendations in the Catalog are intended to be broad enough to provide any industry using control systems the flexibility needed to develop sound cyber security standards specific to their individual security requirements.

  1. Cyber Security Requirements for Wireless Devices and Information Systems

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-02-11T23:59:59.000Z

    The Notice establishes DOE policy requirements and responsibilities for using wireless networks and devices within DOE and implements the requirements of DOE 0 205.1, Department of Energy Cyber Security Management Program, dated 3-21-03, including requirements for cyber resource protection, risk management, program evaluation, and cyber security plan development and maintenance. No cancellation. DOE N 205.15, dated 3/18/05, extends this directive until 3/18/06.

  2. Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for the U.S. Department of Energy's NNSA | UNCLASSIFIED | 1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McDonald, Kirk

    Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for the U.S. Department of Energy's NNSA.S. Department of Energy's NNSA | UNCLASSIFIED | 2 Outline Isotope Production Facility Cutting of Window.S. Department of Energy's NNSA | UNCLASSIFIED | 3 Isotope Production Facility - LANSCE H+ is produced

  3. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems Saurabh Amin

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    random failures and secu- rity attacks. Cyber-security of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA, cyber-security assessment for SCADA systems is performed based on well-defined attacker and defender objectives. The mathematical model of SCADA systems considered in this work has two control levels

  4. October 2014 Mid-South Cyber Security Summit

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dasgupta, Dipankar

    government, industry, and academia. *Source: FCW citation: http://fcw.com/articles/2011/11/10/cybersecurity-workforce-planOctober 2014 Mid-South Cyber Security Summit Achieving Cybersecurity Excellence Through Evolution of the Nation's Cyber Workforce Benjamin Scribner Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity

  5. Cyber-security Research Ethics Dialogue & Strategy Erin Kenneally

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    California at San Diego, University of

    Cyber-security Research Ethics Dialogue & Strategy Workshop Erin Kenneally CAIDA/UC, San Diego La The inaugural Cyber-security Research Ethics Dialogue & Strat- egy Workshop was held on May 23, 2013, in the wake of struggles to resolve the aforementioned mounting tensions, ethics has re-emerged as a crucial

  6. Cyber Security Through Science | More Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power Administration would likeConstitution4Customer-Comments Sign In About |Cyber Security SHARE

  7. Tom Harper receives cyber security award

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of ScienceandMesa del SolStrengthening a solidSynthesisAppliances Tips:Harper receives cyber security

  8. Proceedings Second Annual Cyber Security and Information Infrastructure Research Workshop

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sheldon, Frederick T [ORNL; Krings, Axel [ORNL; Yoo, Seong-Moo [ORNL; Mili, Ali [ORNL; Trien, Joseph P [ORNL

    2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The workshop theme is Cyber Security: Beyond the Maginot Line Recently the FBI reported that computer crime has skyrocketed costing over $67 billion in 2005 alone and affecting 2.8M+ businesses and organizations. Attack sophistication is unprecedented along with availability of open source concomitant tools. Private, academic, and public sectors invest significant resources in cyber security. Industry primarily performs cyber security research as an investment in future products and services. While the public sector also funds cyber security R&D, the majority of this activity focuses on the specific mission(s) of the funding agency. Thus, broad areas of cyber security remain neglected or underdeveloped. Consequently, this workshop endeavors to explore issues involving cyber security and related technologies toward strengthening such areas and enabling the development of new tools and methods for securing our information infrastructure critical assets. We aim to assemble new ideas and proposals about robust models on which we can build the architecture of a secure cyberspace including but not limited to: * Knowledge discovery and management * Critical infrastructure protection * De-obfuscating tools for the validation and verification of tamper-proofed software * Computer network defense technologies * Scalable information assurance strategies * Assessment-driven design for trust * Security metrics and testing methodologies * Validation of security and survivability properties * Threat assessment and risk analysis * Early accurate detection of the insider threat * Security hardened sensor networks and ubiquitous computing environments * Mobile software authentication protocols * A new "model" of the threat to replace the "Maginot Line" model and more . . .

  9. Cyber safety : a systems thinking and systems theory approach to managing cyber security risks

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Salim, Hamid M

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    If we are to manage cyber security risks more effectively in today's complex and dynamic Web 2.0 environment, then a new way of thinking is needed to complement traditional approaches. According to Symantec's 2014 Internet ...

  10. Norwich University Applied Research Institutes Cyber Security Education/Training and Exercises

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dasgupta, Dipankar

    Training Emergency Management for IT Professionals Cyber Security Exercise Development Tools ­ Cyber Smart for cybersecurity event response #12;Cyber Exercising · What is unique about cybersecurity? · More akin to Warfare

  11. Ninth Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Ninth Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference Apr 08 2014 04-08-2014 08:30 AM - 04-10-2014 04:00 PM Multiple speakers, multiple disciplines, multiple affiliations...

  12. Process Control System Cyber Security Standards - An Overview

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert P. Evans

    2006-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The use of cyber security standards can greatly assist in the protection of process control systems by providing guidelines and requirements for the implementation of computer-controlled systems. These standards are most effective when the engineers and operators, using the standards, understand what each standard addresses. This paper provides an overview of several standards that deal with the cyber security of process measurements and control systems.

  13. Controlled Unclassified Information

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    3-1 Chapter 13 Controlled Unclassified Information This chapter describes the security procedures adopted by DOE HQ to implement the requirements of the following DOE regulations...

  14. Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for the U.S. Department of Energy's NNSA UNCLASSIFIED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    , LLC for the U.S. Department of Energy's NNSA Ocean routes for commerce #12;Operated by Los AlamosOperated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for the U.S. Department of Energy's NNSA UNCLASSIFIED #12;Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for the U.S. Department of Energy's NNSA

  15. Cyber Security Testing and Training Programs for Industrial Control Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Daniel Noyes

    2012-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Service providers rely on industrial control systems (ICS) to manage the flow of water at dams, open breakers on power grids, control ventilation and cooling in nuclear power plants, and more. In today's interconnected environment, this can present a serious cyber security challenge. To combat this growing challenge, government, private industry, and academia are working together to reduce cyber risks. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a key contributor to the Department of Energy National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), both of which focus on improving the overall security posture of ICS in the national critical infrastructure. In support of the NSTB, INL hosts a dedicated SCADA testing facility which consists of multiple control systems supplied by leading national and international manufacturers. Within the test bed, INL researchers systematically examine control system components and work to identify vulnerabilities. In support of the CSSP, INL develops and conducts training courses which are designed to increase awareness and defensive capabilities for IT/Control System professionals. These trainings vary from web-based cyber security trainings for control systems engineers to more advanced hands-on training that culminates with a Red Team/ Blue Team exercise that is conducted within an actual control systems environment. INL also provides staffing and operational support to the DHS Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) Security Operations Center which responds to and analyzes control systems cyber incidents across the 18 US critical infrastructure sectors.

  16. Cyber-Physical Systems Security for Smart Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cyber-Physical Systems Security for Smart Grid Future Grid Initiative White Paper Power Systems-Physical Systems Security for Smart Grid Prepared for the Project "The Future Grid to Enable Sustainable Energy as one of nine white papers in the project "The Future Grid to Enable Sustainable Energy Systems

  17. Cyber-Physical Systems Security for Smart Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cyber-Physical Systems Security for Smart Grid Future Grid Initiative White Paper Power Systems-Physical Systems Security for Smart Grid Prepared for the Project "The Future Grid to Enable Sustainable Energy Acknowledgements This white paper was developed as one of nine white papers in the project "The Future Grid

  18. Cyber Security via Minority Games with Epistatic Signaling (Extended Abstract)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mishra, Bud

    Cyber Security via Minority Games with Epistatic Signaling (Extended Abstract) W. Casey, L. Metcalf occurs when deceptions are employed in order to breach the security of the system, thus making the entire profiles (e.g., the distribution of players employing various kinds of vulnerability and threat predictions

  19. Cyber Security Challenges in Using Cloud Computing in the Electric Utility Industry

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Akyol, Bora A.

    2012-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document contains introductory material that discusses cyber security challenges in using cloud computing in the electric utility industry.

  20. Gamification for Measuring Cyber Security Situational Awareness

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fink, Glenn A.; Best, Daniel M.; Manz, David O.; Popovsky, V. M.; Endicott-Popovsky, Barbara E.

    2013-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber defense competitions arising from U.S. service academy exercises, offer a platform for collecting data that can inform research that ranges from characterizing the ideal cyber warrior to describing behaviors during certain challenging cyber defense situations. This knowledge could lead to better preparation of cyber defenders in both military and civilian settings. This paper describes how one regional competition, the PRCCDC, a participant in the national CCDC program, conducted proof of concept experimentation to collect data during the annual competition for later analysis. The intent is to create an ongoing research agenda that expands on this current work and incorporates augmented cognition and gamification methods for measuring cybersecurity situational awareness under the stress of cyber attack.

  1. Cyber Security and Trust Research & DevelopmentCyber Security and Trust Research & Development http://www.ISTS.dartmouth.eduhttp://www.ISTS.dartmouth.edu

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pellacini, Fabio

    Cyber Security and Trust Research & DevelopmentCyber Security and Trust Research & Development http of a discrete distribution: www.ISTS.dartmouth.edu Entropy reminder INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY TECHNOLOGY STUDIES to packets & provide a visual summary? www.ISTS.dartmouth.edu Motivation INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY

  2. Cyber-Physical Security via Geometric Control: Distributed Monitoring and Malicious Attacks

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bullo, Francesco

    Cyber-Physical Security via Geometric Control: Distributed Monitoring and Malicious Attacks Fabio and extends our results on the security of cyber-physical systems based on geometric control theory: (i) we, and by various industrial security incidents [6], cyber-physical systems are prone to failures and attacks

  3. RT-Based Administrative Models for Community Cyber Security Information Sharing

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandhu, Ravi

    RT-Based Administrative Models for Community Cyber Security Information Sharing Ravi Sandhu, Khalid Zaman Bijon, Xin Jin, and Ram Krishnan Institute for Cyber Security & Department of Computer Science Institute for Cyber Security & Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Texas at San

  4. Towards Efficient Collaboration in Cyber Security Peter Hui Joe Bruce Glenn Fink

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    . INTRODUCTION Although distributed geographically and often across different organizations, cyber-securityTowards Efficient Collaboration in Cyber Security Peter Hui Joe Bruce Glenn Fink Michelle Gregory University aendert@cs.vt.edu ABSTRACT Cyber security analysts in different geographical and organizational

  5. Sandia Energy - Cyber Security for Electric Infrastructure

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Scienceand RequirementsCoatings Initiated at PNNL's SequimReactors To ReceiveCyber HomeCyberCyber

  6. Cyber Security Evaluation of II&C Technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ken Thomas

    2014-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is a research and development program sponsored by the Department of Energy, which is conducted in close collaboration with industry to provide the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe and economical operation of current nuclear power plants The LWRS Program serves to help the US nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. Within the LWRS Program, the Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II&C) Systems Technologies Pathway conducts targeted research and development (R&D) to address aging and reliability concerns with the legacy instrumentation and control and related information systems of the U.S. operating light water reactor (LWR) fleet. The II&C Pathway is conducted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Cyber security is a common concern among nuclear utilities and other nuclear industry stakeholders regarding the digital technologies that are being developed under this program. This concern extends to the point of calling into question whether these types of technologies could ever be deployed in nuclear plants given the possibility that the information in them can be compromised and the technologies themselves can potentially be exploited to serve as attack vectors for adversaries. To this end, a cyber security evaluation has been conducted of these technologies to determine whether they constitute a threat beyond what the nuclear plants already manage within their regulatory-required cyber security programs. Specifically, the evaluation is based on NEI 08-09, which is the industry’s template for cyber security programs and evaluations, accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as responsive to the requirements of the nuclear power plant cyber security regulation found in 10 CFR 73.54. The evaluation was conducted by a cyber security team with expertise in nuclear utility cyber security programs and experience in conducting these evaluations. The evaluation has determined that, for the most part, cyber security will not be a limiting factor in the application of these technologies to nuclear power plant applications.

  7. Process Control System Cyber Security Standards - An Overview

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert P. Evans; V Stanley Scown; Rolf Carlson; Shabbir Shamsuddin; George Shaw; Jeff Dagle; Paul W Oman; Jeannine Schmidt

    2005-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The use of cyber security standards can greatly assist in the protection of critical infrastructure by providing guidelines and requisite imperatives in the implementation of computer-controlled systems. These standards are most effective when the engineers and operators using the standards understand what each of the standards addresses and does not address. This paper provides a review and comparison of ten documents dealing with control system cyber security. It is not meant to be a complete treatment of all applicable standards; rather, this is an exemplary analysis showing the benefits of comparing and contrasting differing documents.

  8. A Hierarchical Security Architecture for Cyber-Physical Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Quanyan Zhu; Tamer Basar

    2011-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Security of control systems is becoming a pivotal concern in critical national infrastructures such as the power grid and nuclear plants. In this paper, we adopt a hierarchical viewpoint to these security issues, addressing security concerns at each level and emphasizing a holistic cross-layer philosophy for developing security solutions. We propose a bottom-up framework that establishes a model from the physical and control levels to the supervisory level, incorporating concerns from network and communication levels. We show that the game-theoretical approach can yield cross-layer security strategy solutions to the cyber-physical systems.

  9. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Amin, Saurabh

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    her students on security of process control systems. I amcyber-security tools for process control systems. In theon the security mechanisms of process control systems, few

  10. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Amin, Saurabh

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Analysis of Information Security Games, Proceedings of theon the Economics of Information Security WEIS’, Hanover, NH,on the Economics of Information Security’. Anderson, R. and

  11. A Cooperative Cyber Defense for Securing Critical Infrastructures

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Fulp, Errin W.

    .g., the numerous private companies that make up North America's electrical power grids) that share computationalA Cooperative Cyber Defense for Securing Critical Infrastructures Glenn A. Fink glenn networked relationships. At electrical substations, it is common to find equipment from several companies

  12. A Comparison of Cross-Sector Cyber Security Standards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert P. Evans

    2005-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report presents a review and comparison (commonality and differences) of three cross-sector cyber security standards and an internationally recognized information technology standard. The comparison identifies the security areas covered by each standard and reveals where the standards differ in emphasis. By identifying differences in the standards, the user can evaluate which standard best meets their needs. For this report, only cross-sector standards were reviewed.

  13. MODELING SECURITY IN CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Burmester, Mike

    network at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, was infected [39]. There have been the behavior of the adversary is controlled by a threat model that captures both the cyber aspects (with-physical systems, threat models, protocols for treaty verification. 1. Introduction The rapid growth of information

  14. CS2SAT: THE CONTROL SYSTEMS CYBER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOL

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kathleen A. Lee

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Security Division has developed the Control System Cyber Security Self-Assessment Tool (CS2SAT) that provides users with a systematic and repeatable approach for assessing the cyber-security posture of their industrial control system networks. The CS2SAT was developed by cyber security experts from Department of Energy National Laboratories and with assistance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The CS2SAT is a desktop software tool that guides users through a step-by-step process to collect facility-specific control system information and then makes appropriate recommendations for improving the system’s cyber-security posture. The CS2SAT provides recommendations from a database of industry available cyber-security practices, which have been adapted specifically for application to industry control system networks and components. Each recommendation is linked to a set of actions that can be applied to remediate-specific security vulnerabilities.

  15. Automatic Labeling for Entity Extraction in Cyber Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bridges, Robert A [ORNL] [ORNL; Jones, Corinne L [ORNL] [ORNL; Iannacone, Michael D [ORNL] [ORNL; Testa, Kelly M [ORNL] [ORNL; Goodall, John R [ORNL] [ORNL

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Timely analysis of cyber-security information necessitates automated information extraction from unstructured text. While state-of-the-art extraction methods produce extremely accurate results, they require ample training data, which is generally unavailable for specialized applications, such as detecting security related entities; moreover, manual annotation of corpora is very costly and often not a viable solution. In response, we develop a very precise method to automatically label text from several data sources by leveraging related, domain-specific, structured data and provide public access to a corpus annotated with cyber-security entities. Next, we implement a Maximum Entropy Model trained with the average perceptron on a portion of our corpus (~750,000 words) and achieve near perfect precision, recall, and accuracy, with training times under 17 seconds.

  16. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    : UISC CONOPS OPR: Deputy Director, J-36 RELEASED BY: Director, J-3 DISTRIBUTION: Unlimited RELEASED DATE concept, termed Unclassified Information Sharing Capability (UISC). The UISC Concept of Operations (CONOPS, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. 2. Applicability. This CONOPS is for use by any US

  17. GridStat – Cyber Security and Regional Deployment Project Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Clements, Samuel L.

    2009-02-18T23:59:59.000Z

    GridStat is a developing communication technology to provide real-time data delivery services to the electric power grid. It is being developed in a collaborative effort between the Electrical Power Engineering and Distributed Computing Science Departments at Washington State University. Improving the cyber security of GridStat was the principle focus of this project. A regional network was established to test GridStat’s cyber security mechanisms in a realistic environment. The network consists of nodes at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and Washington State University. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was tasked with performing the security assessment, the results of which detailed a number or easily resolvable and previously unknown issues, as well as a number of difficult and previously known issues. Going forward we recommend additional development prior to commercialization of GridStat. The development plan is structured into three domains: Core Development, Cyber Security and Pilot Projects. Each domain contains a number of phased subtasks that build upon each other to increase the robustness and maturity of GridStat.

  18. PowerCyber: A Cyber-Physical Security Testbed for Smart Grid PI: Manimaran Govindarasu (gmani@iastate.edu)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Manimaran, Govindarasu

    /Opal-RT, provide ability to simulate large power systems with monitoring, protecIon, control modeling bulk power system for cyber security experimentaIons. powercyber power system wherein, vulnerability analysis, system impact studies, risk assessment

  19. Ideal Based Cyber Security Technical Metrics for Control Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    W. F. Boyer; M. A. McQueen

    2007-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Much of the world's critical infrastructure is at risk from attack through electronic networks connected to control systems. Security metrics are important because they provide the basis for management decisions that affect the protection of the infrastructure. A cyber security technical metric is the security relevant output from an explicit mathematical model that makes use of objective measurements of a technical object. A specific set of technical security metrics are proposed for use by the operators of control systems. Our proposed metrics are based on seven security ideals associated with seven corresponding abstract dimensions of security. We have defined at least one metric for each of the seven ideals. Each metric is a measure of how nearly the associated ideal has been achieved. These seven ideals provide a useful structure for further metrics development. A case study shows how the proposed metrics can be applied to an operational control system.

  20. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Amin, Saurabh

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    J. [2004], Low-latency cryptographic protection for SCADAlatency high-integrity security retrofit for lecacy SCADA

  1. Two-Tier Hierarchical Cyber-Physical Security Analysis Framework For Smart Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kundur, Deepa

    Two-Tier Hierarchical Cyber-Physical Security Analysis Framework For Smart Grid Jin Wei and Deepa consequence of cyber and/or physical disruption) using distributed control. In particular, we consider, USA Abstract--We propose a two-tier hierarchical cyber-physical framework for analyzing transient

  2. The Role of Signal Processing in meeting Cyber-Security and Privacy Challenges

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Paris-Sud XI, Université de

    1 The Role of Signal Processing in meeting Cyber-Security and Privacy Challenges Lalitha Sankar Spaces Image Classification/ Location Privacy Modify Control Messages Security Privacy Fig. 1. Illustration of several classes of cyber-security and privacy threats in networks and distributed data systems

  3. Lori Garver, NASA Deputy Administrator NASA Cyber Security Awareness Month Symposium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    us of the importance of constant vigilance to ensure on-line safety and security both at work the CIO community does everything they can to protect our cyber security ­ the power actually does restLori Garver, NASA Deputy Administrator NASA Cyber Security Awareness Month Symposium NASA

  4. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  5. Cyber Assessment Methods for SCADA Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    2005-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought to light threats and vulnerabilities that face the United States. In response, the U.S. Government is directing the effort to secure the nation's critical infrastructure by creating programs to implement the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (1). One part of this effort involves assessing Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. These systems are essential to the control of critical elements of our national infrastructure, such as electric power, oil, and gas production and distribution. Since their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States, one of the main objectives of this program is to identify vulnerabilities and encourage the public and private sectors to work together to design secure control systems that resolve these weaknesses. This paper describes vulnerability assessment methodologies used in ongoing research and assessment activities designed to identify and resolve vulnerabilities so as to improve the security of the nation's critical infrastructure.

  6. Cyber Assessment Methods For SCADA Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    May Robin Permann; Kenneth Rohde

    2005-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought to light threats and vulnerabilities that face the United States. In response, the U.S. Government is directing the effort to secure the nation's critical infrastructure by creating programs to implement the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (1). One part of this effort involves assessing Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. These systems are essential to the control of critical elements of our national infrastructure, such as electric power, oil, and gas production and distribution. Since their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States, one of the main objectives of this program is to identify vulnerabilities and encourage the public and private sectors to work together to design secure control systems that resolve these weaknesses. This paper describes vulnerability assessment methodologies used in ongoing research and assessment activities designed to identify and resolve vulnerabilities so as to improve the security of the nation's critical infrastructure.

  7. Survey Paper Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges q

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Wenye

    importantly, with the integration of advanced computing and communication technologies, the Smart GridSurvey Paper Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges q Wenye Wang , Zhuo Lu Accepted 29 December 2012 Available online 17 January 2013 Keywords: Smart Grid Cyber security Attacks

  8. On the Exact Solution to a Smart Grid Cyber-Security Analysis Problem

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johansson, Karl Henrik

    terminal units (RTUs), SCADA systems measure data such as trans- mission line power flows, bus power1 On the Exact Solution to a Smart Grid Cyber-Security Analysis Problem Kin Cheong Sou, Henrik Sandberg and Karl Henrik Johansson Abstract--This paper considers a smart grid cyber-security problem

  9. A quantitative man-machine model for cyber security efficiency analysis

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Jung, Sung-Oh

    2007-04-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The analysis of security defense processes is of utmost importance in the management of various cyber-security attacks, which are increasing in scope and rapidity. Organizations need to optimize their resources based on a sound understanding...

  10. On the Design and Execution of Cyber-Security User Studies: Methodology, Challenges, and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yang, Junfeng

    On the Design and Execution of Cyber-Security User Studies: Methodology, Challenges, and Lessons by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), and which surveyed 523 security executives and law enforcement

  11. The Impact of Secure OSs on Internet Security: What Cyber-Insurers Need to Know

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pal, Ranjan

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In recent years, researchers have proposed \\emph{cyber-insurance} as a suitable risk-management technique for enhancing security in Internet-like distributed systems. However, amongst other factors, information asymmetry between the insurer and the insured, and the inter-dependent and correlated nature of cyber risks have contributed in a big way to the failure of cyber-insurance markets. Security experts have argued in favor of operating system (OS) platform switching (ex., from Windows to Unix-based OSs) or secure OS adoption as being one of the techniques that can potentially mitigate the problems posing a challenge to successful cyber-insurance markets. In this regard we model OS platform switching dynamics using a \\emph{social gossip} mechanism and study three important questions related to the nature of the dynamics, for Internet-like distributed systems: (i) which type of networks should cyber-insurers target for insuring?, (ii) what are the bounds on the asymptotic performance level of a network, wher...

  12. Comparison of two methods to quantify cyber and physical security effectiveness.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wyss, Gregory Dane; Gordon, Kristl A.

    2005-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the increasing reliance on cyber technology to operate and control physical security system components, there is a need for methods to assess and model the interactions between the cyber system and the physical security system to understand the effects of cyber technology on overall security system effectiveness. This paper evaluates two methodologies for their applicability to the combined cyber and physical security problem. The comparison metrics include probabilities of detection (P{sub D}), interruption (P{sub I}), and neutralization (P{sub N}), which contribute to calculating the probability of system effectiveness (P{sub E}), the probability that the system can thwart an adversary attack. P{sub E} is well understood in practical applications of physical security but when the cyber security component is added, system behavior becomes more complex and difficult to model. This paper examines two approaches (Bounding Analysis Approach (BAA) and Expected Value Approach (EVA)) to determine their applicability to the combined physical and cyber security issue. These methods were assessed for a variety of security system characteristics to determine whether reasonable security decisions could be made based on their results. The assessments provided insight on an adversary's behavior depending on what part of the physical security system is cyber-controlled. Analysis showed that the BAA is more suited to facility analyses than the EVA because it has the ability to identify and model an adversary's most desirable attack path.

  13. Probabilistic Characterization of Adversary Behavior in Cyber Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meyers, C A; Powers, S S; Faissol, D M

    2009-10-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this SMS effort is to provide a probabilistic characterization of adversary behavior in cyber security. This includes both quantitative (data analysis) and qualitative (literature review) components. A set of real LLNL email data was obtained for this study, consisting of several years worth of unfiltered traffic sent to a selection of addresses at ciac.org. The email data was subjected to three interrelated analyses: a textual study of the header data and subject matter, an examination of threats present in message attachments, and a characterization of the maliciousness of embedded URLs.

  14. Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1999-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

    To provide interim Department of Energy (DOE) requirements and responsibilities for unclassified visits and assignment by foreign nationals to DOE facilities for unclassified activities. This Notice supplements DOE P 142.1 dated 7-14-99, which sets overall Departmental policy on unclassified foreign visits and assignments. It is a complement to existing counterintelligence and security orders and policies. DOE N 251.53, dated 05/14/03, extends this directive until canceled. Cancels: DOE 1240.2B

  15. Smart Grid Embedded Cyber Security: Ensuring Security While Promoting Interoperability

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ragsdale, G.

    -25, 2010 Implementing TCG Standards Within Systems ? Trusted Platform Module (TPM) ? Provides root of trust ? Secure storage ? Signing & hashing functions ? Tamper detection ? Accelerates cryptography ? TPM software stack ? Implements TCG stack... Update Session Security (symmetric key) Code and Data Integrity (memory hash) ?Secure secret storage ?TPM chip root trust secret ?Owner root trust secret ?Memory hash signature ?Standard encryption algorithm ?Standard hashing algorithm ?Tamper detection...

  16. Secure control systems with application to cyber-physical systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dong, Jin [ORNL] [ORNL; Djouadi, Seddik M [ORNL] [ORNL; Nutaro, James J [ORNL] [ORNL; Kuruganti, Phani Teja [ORNL] [ORNL

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Control systems are computer-based systems with networked units consisting of sensors, actuators, control processing units, and communication devices. The role of control system is to interact, monitor, and control physical processes. Reactive power control is a fundamental issue in ensuring the security of the power network. It is claimed that Synchronous Condensers (SC) have been used at both distribution and transmission voltage levels to improve stability and to maintain voltages within desired limits under changing load conditions and contingency situations. Performance of PI controller corresponding to various tripping faults are analyzed for SC systems. Most of the eort in protecting these systems has been in protection against random failures or reliability. However, besides failures these systems are subject to various signal attacks for which new analysis are discussed here. When a breach does occur, it is necessary to react in a time commensurate with the physical dynamics of the system as it responds to the attack. Failure to act swiftly enough may result in undesirable, and possibly irreversible, physical eects. Therefore, it is meaningful to evaluate the security of a cyber-physical system, especially to protect it from cyber-attack. Illustrative numerical examples are provided together with an application to the SC systems.

  17. Towards an Experimental Testbed Facility for Cyber-Physical Security Research

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Edgar, Thomas W.; Manz, David O.; Carroll, Thomas E.

    2012-01-07T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are under great scrutiny due to large Smart Grid investments and recent high profile security vulnerabilities and attacks. Research into improved security technologies, communication models, and emergent behavior is necessary to protect these systems from sophisticated adversaries and new risks posed by the convergence of CPSs with IT equipment. However, cyber-physical security research is limited by the lack of access to universal cyber-physical testbed facilities that permit flexible, high-fidelity experiments. This paper presents a remotely-configurable and community-accessible testbed design that integrates elements from the virtual, simulated, and physical environments. Fusing data between the three environments enables the creation of realistic and scalable environments where new functionality and ideas can be exercised. This novel design will enable the research community to analyze and evaluate the security of current environments and design future, secure, cyber-physical technologies.

  18. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Unclassified Cyber Security Program - 2011, OAS-M-12-01

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently AskedEnergyIssuesEnergy Solar Decathlon2001 PowerofUse ofManagement8

  19. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Unclassified Cyber Security Program - 2012, OAS-L-13-01

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently AskedEnergyIssuesEnergy Solar Decathlon2001 PowerofUse ofManagement82 OAS-L-13-01

  20. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Unclassified Cyber Security Program Â… 2013

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently AskedEnergyIssuesEnergy Solar Decathlon2001 PowerofUse ofManagement82

  1. Control Systems Cyber Security: Defense-in-Depth Strategies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mark Fabro

    2007-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Information infrastructures across many public and private domains share several common attributes regarding IT deployments and data communications. This is particularly true in the control systems domain. A majority of the systems use robust architectures to enhance business and reduce costs by increasing the integration of external, business, and control system networks. However, multi-network integration strategies often lead to vulnerabilities that greatly reduce the security of an organization, and can expose mission-critical control systems to cyber threats. This document provides guidance and direction for developing ‘defense-in-depth’ strategies for organizations that use control system networks while maintaining a multi-tier information architecture that requires: • Maintenance of various field devices, telemetry collection, and/or industrial-level process systems • Access to facilities via remote data link or modem • Public facing services for customer or corporate operations • A robust business environment that requires connections among the control system domain, the external Internet, and other peer organizations.

  2. Control Systems Cyber Security:Defense in Depth Strategies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    David Kuipers; Mark Fabro

    2006-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Information infrastructures across many public and private domains share several common attributes regarding IT deployments and data communications. This is particularly true in the control systems domain. A majority of the systems use robust architectures to enhance business and reduce costs by increasing the integration of external, business, and control system networks. However, multi-network integration strategies often lead to vulnerabilities that greatly reduce the security of an organization, and can expose mission-critical control systems to cyber threats. This document provides guidance and direction for developing ‘defense-in-depth’ strategies for organizations that use control system networks while maintaining a multi-tier information architecture that requires: Maintenance of various field devices, telemetry collection, and/or industrial-level process systems Access to facilities via remote data link or modem Public facing services for customer or corporate operations A robust business environment that requires connections among the control system domain, the external Internet, and other peer organizations.

  3. Cyber-Security Considerations for the Smart Grid

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Clements, Samuel L.; Kirkham, Harold

    2010-07-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The electrical power grid is evolving into the “smart grid”. The goal of the smart grid is to improve efficiency and availability of power by adding more monitoring and control capabilities. These new technologies and mechanisms are certain to introduce vulnerabilities into the power grid. In this paper we provide an overview of the cyber security state of the electrical power grid. We highlight some of the vulnerabilities that already exist in the power grid including limited capacity systems, implicit trust and the lack of authentication. We also address challenges of complexity, scale, added capabilities and the move to multipurpose hardware and software as the power grid is upgraded. These changes create vulnerabilities that did not exist before and bring increased risks. We conclude the paper by showing that there are a number mitigation strategies that can help keep the risk at an acceptable level.

  4. Strategic philanthropy for cyber security : an extended cost-benefit analysis framework to study cybersecurity

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cho, Yiseul

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The international climate of cyber security is dramatically changing and thus unpredictable. As such, agile yet sustainable solutions are needed, along with an effective and a pragmatic evaluation framework to assess and ...

  5. Jack N. Summe Director, Navy Insider Threat to Cyber Security (ITCS)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Jack N. Summe Director, Navy Insider Threat to Cyber Security (ITCS) Mr. Jack Summe currently Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) from 2003-2005. A native of Warsaw, Indiana, he holds a bachelor

  6. Cyber Friendly Fire: Research Challenges for Security Informatics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Greitzer, Frank L.; Carroll, Thomas E.; Roberts, Adam D.

    2013-06-06T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper addresses cognitive implications and research needs surrounding the problem of cyber friendly fire (FF). We define cyber FF as intentional offensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintention-ally harms the mission effectiveness of friendly or neutral forces. Just as with combat friendly fire, maintaining situation awareness (SA) is paramount to avoiding cyber FF incidents. Cyber SA concerns knowledge of a system’s topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the system and its nodes, the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive and offensive countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. Mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF— including both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches—are discussed.

  7. S3A: Secure System Simplex Architecture for Enhanced Security of Cyber-Physical Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mohan, Sibin; Betti, Emiliano; Yun, Heechul; Sha, Lui; Caccamo, Marco

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Until recently, cyber-physical systems, especially those with safety-critical properties that manage critical infrastructure (e.g. power generation plants, water treatment facilities, etc.) were considered to be invulnerable against software security breaches. The recently discovered 'W32.Stuxnet' worm has drastically changed this perception by demonstrating that such systems are susceptible to external attacks. Here we present an architecture that enhances the security of safety-critical cyber-physical systems despite the presence of such malware. Our architecture uses the property that control systems have deterministic execution behavior, to detect an intrusion within 0.6 {\\mu}s while still guaranteeing the safety of the plant. We also show that even if an attack is successful, the overall state of the physical system will still remain safe. Even if the operating system's administrative privileges have been compromised, our architecture will still be able to protect the physical system from coming to harm.

  8. Cyber Science and Security - An R&D Partnership at LLNL

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brase, J; Henson, V

    2011-03-11T23:59:59.000Z

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has established a mechanism for partnership that integrates the high-performance computing capabilities of the National Labs, the network and cyber technology expertise of leading information technology companies, and the long-term research vision of leading academic cyber programs. The Cyber Science and Security Center is designed to be a working partnership among Laboratory, Industrial, and Academic institutions, and provides all three with a shared R&D environment, technical information sharing, sophisticated high-performance computing facilities, and data resources for the partner institutions and sponsors. The CSSC model is an institution where partner organizations can work singly or in groups on the most pressing problems of cyber security, where shared vision and mutual leveraging of expertise and facilities can produce results and tools at the cutting edge of cyber science.

  9. Three Tenets for Secure Cyber-Physical System Design and Jeff Hughesa

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cybenko, George

    at designing systems that are "provably" secure according to some idealized formal model of security. In factThree Tenets for Secure Cyber-Physical System Design and Assessment Jeff Hughesa George Cybenkob a design and assessment. Called The Three Tenets, this originally empirical approach has been used

  10. Study of Security Attributes of Smart Grid Systems- Current Cyber Security Issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wayne F. Boyer; Scott A. McBride

    2009-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides information for a report to congress on Smart Grid security as required by Section 1309 of Title XIII of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The security of any future Smart Grid is dependent on successfully addressing the cyber security issues associated with the nation’s current power grid. Smart Grid will utilize numerous legacy systems and technologies that are currently installed. Therefore, known vulnerabilities in these legacy systems must be remediated and associated risks mitigated in order to increase the security and success of the Smart Grid. The implementation of Smart Grid will include the deployment of many new technologies and multiple communication infrastructures. This report describes the main technologies that support Smart Grid and summarizes the status of implementation into the existing U.S. electrical infrastructure.

  11. Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Cyber Security...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    the Nation's Energy Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks Working to Achieve Cybersecurity in the Energy Sector Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity - 2011...

  12. Fuzzy Logic Based Anomaly Detection for Embedded Network Security Cyber Sensor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ondrej Linda; Todd Vollmer; Jason Wright; Milos Manic

    2011-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Resiliency and security in critical infrastructure control systems in the modern world of cyber terrorism constitute a relevant concern. Developing a network security system specifically tailored to the requirements of such critical assets is of a primary importance. This paper proposes a novel learning algorithm for anomaly based network security cyber sensor together with its hardware implementation. The presented learning algorithm constructs a fuzzy logic rule based model of normal network behavior. Individual fuzzy rules are extracted directly from the stream of incoming packets using an online clustering algorithm. This learning algorithm was specifically developed to comply with the constrained computational requirements of low-cost embedded network security cyber sensors. The performance of the system was evaluated on a set of network data recorded from an experimental test-bed mimicking the environment of a critical infrastructure control system.

  13. Cyber Security for Power Grids Frank Mueller, Subhashish Bhattacharya, Christopher Zimmer

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mueller, Frank

    systems. 1 Introduction The power grid in the US is one-century old and aging in terms of infrastructure methods to remove bugs as well as security vulnerabilities in soft- ware for intelligent power devicesCyber Security for Power Grids Frank Mueller, Subhashish Bhattacharya, Christopher Zimmer Dept

  14. A Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Glantz, Clifford S.; Coles, Garill A.; Bass, Robert B.

    2004-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A cyber security self-assessment method (the Method) has been developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The development of the Method was sponsored and directed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Members of the Nuclear Energy Institute Cyber Security Task Force also played a substantial role in developing the Method. The Method's structured approach guides nuclear power plants in scrutinizing their digital systems, assessing the potential consequences to the plant of a cyber exploitation, identifying vulnerabilities, estimating cyber security risks, and adopting cost-effective protective measures. The focus of the Method is on critical digital assets. A critical digital asset is a digital device or system that plays a role in the operation, maintenance, or proper functioning of a critical system (i.e., a plant system that can impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness). A critical digital asset may have a direct or indirect connection to a critical system. Direct connections include both wired and wireless communication pathways. Indirect connections include sneaker-net pathways by which software or data are manually transferred from one digital device to another. An indirect connection also may involve the use of instructions or data stored on a critical digital asset to make adjustments to a critical system. The cyber security self-assessment begins with the formation of an assessment team, and is followed by a six-stage process.

  15. Modeling and simulation for cyber-physical system security research, development and applications.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pollock, Guylaine M.; Atkins, William Dee; Schwartz, Moses Daniel; Chavez, Adrian R.; Urrea, Jorge Mario; Pattengale, Nicholas; McDonald, Michael James; Cassidy, Regis H.; Halbgewachs, Ronald D.; Richardson, Bryan T.; Mulder, John C.

    2010-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper describes a new hybrid modeling and simulation architecture developed at Sandia for understanding and developing protections against and mitigations for cyber threats upon control systems. It first outlines the challenges to PCS security that can be addressed using these technologies. The paper then describes Virtual Control System Environments (VCSE) that use this approach and briefly discusses security research that Sandia has performed using VCSE. It closes with recommendations to the control systems security community for applying this valuable technology.

  16. T3: Secure, Scalable, Distributed Data Movement and Remote System Control for Enterprise Level Cyber Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, Gregory S.; Nickless, William K.; Thiede, David R.; Gorton, Ian; Pitre, Bill J.; Christy, Jason E.; Faultersack, Elizabeth M.; Mauth, Jeffery A.

    2009-07-20T23:59:59.000Z

    Enterprise level cyber security requires the deployment, operation, and monitoring of many sensors across geographically dispersed sites. Communicating with the sensors to gather data and control behavior is a challenging task when the number of sensors is rapidly growing. This paper describes the system requirements, design, and implementation of T3, the third generation of our transport software that performs this task. T3 relies on open source software and open Internet standards. Data is encoded in MIME format messages and transported via NNTP, which provides scalability. OpenSSL and public key cryptography are used to secure the data. Robustness and ease of development are increased by defining an internal cryptographic API, implemented by modules in C, Perl, and Python. We are currently using T3 in a production environment. It is freely available to download and use for other projects.

  17. Proceedings of Student-Faculty Research Day, CSIS, Pace University, May 3rd A Frame Problem Approach for Adaptive Cyber Security Design

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Tappert, Charles

    Problem Approach for Adaptive Cyber Security Design R. Shaikh, T. Bryla, and S. Ahmed Pace University entails the motivation and efforts to integrate the Frame Problem approach to the distributed cyber in the context of network security counteraction against cyber-attacks. A simple simulator is designed

  18. The 2011 Military Communications Conference -Track 3 -Cyber Security and Network Operations From Security to Vulnerability: Data Authentication

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Wenye

    lines and transform ers [5], to perform critical functions of energy transmission and distributionThe 2011 Military Communications Conference - Track 3 - Cyber Security and Network Operations From Wang· Zhuo Lu* Jianfeng Mat "Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, NC State University

  19. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System CONTACT INFORMATION UPDATE REPORTING IDENTIFICATION SYMBOL (RIS) RIS: Address: Facility Name: CONTACTS Name Email:...

  20. Cyber-Security of Networked Control Systems Karl Henrik Johansson

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johansson, Karl Henrik

    to cyber-threats with many poten@al points of aRacks · How systems · ARack on power network state es@mator · Stealthy minimum-effort a) but no disclosure resources ·If the zero is unstable, then the plant state can be moved

  1. Improving Cyber-Security of Smart Grid Systems via Anomaly Detection and Linguistic Domain Knowledge

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ondrej Linda; Todd Vollmer; Milos Manic

    2012-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The planned large scale deployment of smart grid network devices will generate a large amount of information exchanged over various types of communication networks. The implementation of these critical systems will require appropriate cyber-security measures. A network anomaly detection solution is considered in this work. In common network architectures multiple communications streams are simultaneously present, making it difficult to build an anomaly detection solution for the entire system. In addition, common anomaly detection algorithms require specification of a sensitivity threshold, which inevitably leads to a tradeoff between false positives and false negatives rates. In order to alleviate these issues, this paper proposes a novel anomaly detection architecture. The designed system applies the previously developed network security cyber-sensor method to individual selected communication streams allowing for learning accurate normal network behavior models. Furthermore, the developed system dynamically adjusts the sensitivity threshold of each anomaly detection algorithm based on domain knowledge about the specific network system. It is proposed to model this domain knowledge using Interval Type-2 Fuzzy Logic rules, which linguistically describe the relationship between various features of the network communication and the possibility of a cyber attack. The proposed method was tested on experimental smart grid system demonstrating enhanced cyber-security.

  2. A Secured Health Care Application Architecture for Cyber-Physical Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Jin; Lee, Sungyoung; Shu, Lei; Xia, Feng

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber-physical systems (CPS) can be viewed as a new generation of systems with integrated control, communication and computational capabilities. Like the internet transformed how humans interact with one another, cyber-physical systems will transform how people interact with the physical world. Currently, the study of CPS is still in its infancy and there exist many research issues and challenges ranging from electricity power, health care, transportation and smart building etc. In this paper, an introduction of CPeSC3 (cyber physical enhanced secured wireless sensor networks (WSNs) integrated cloud computing for u-life care) architecture and its application to the health care monitoring and decision support systems is given. The proposed CPeSC3 architecture is composed of three main components, namely 1) communication core, 2) computation core, and 3) resource scheduling and management core. Detailed analysis and explanation are given for relevant models such as cloud computing, real time scheduling and secu...

  3. Fact Sheet: Cyber Security Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,OfficeEnd ofEvaluations in Covered Facilities | DepartmentFactLead-acidofCyber

  4. Control Systems Cyber Security: Defense in Depth Strategies | Department of

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613PortsmouthBartlesvilleAbout » Contact Us Contact UsEnergyOak7.2Energy Cyber

  5. Office of Cyber and Security Assessments | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613 122Commercial602 1,39732onMake YourDepartment ofC T O B EOff-GridCyber

  6. Cyber Security Expert Jim Mellander Retires from NERSC

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    to enhance cybersecurity at Berkeley Lab and NERSC. He's also written several notable security software programs, including Update, a UNIX-based sniffer detector; Kazaa...

  7. LESSONS LEARNED FROM CYBER SECURITY ASSESSMENTS OF SCADA AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ray Fink

    2006-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The results from ten cyber security vulnerability assessments of process control, SCADA and energy management systems, or components of those systems were reviewed to identify common problem areas. The common vulnerabilities ranged from conventional IT security issues to specific weaknesses in control system protocols. In each vulnerability category, relative measures were assigned to the severity of the vulnerability and ease with which an attacker could exploit the vulnerability. Suggested mitigations are identified in each category. Recommended mitigations having the highest impact on reducing vulnerability are listed for asset owners and system vendors.

  8. Cyber Friendly Fire

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Greitzer, Frank L.; Carroll, Thomas E.; Roberts, Adam D.

    2011-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber friendly fire (FF) is a new concept that has been brought to the attention of Department of Defense (DoD) stakeholders through two workshops that were planned and conducted by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and research conducted for AFRL by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. With this previous work in mind, we offer a definition of cyber FF as intentional offensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintentionally harms the mission effectiveness of friendly or neutral forces. Just as with combat friendly fire, a fundamental need in avoiding cyber FF is to maintain situation awareness (SA). We suggest that cyber SA concerns knowledge of a system's topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the system (and that populate the nodes), the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive (and offensive) countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. A training implication is to raise awareness and understanding of these critical knowledge units; an approach to decision aids and/or visualizations is to focus on supporting these critical knowledge units. To study cyber FF, we developed an unclassified security test range comprising a combination of virtual and physical devices that present a closed network for testing, simulation, and evaluation. This network offers services found on a production network without the associated costs of a real production network. Containing enough detail to appear realistic, this virtual and physical environment can be customized to represent different configurations. For our purposes, the test range was configured to appear as an Internet-connected Managed Service Provider (MSP) offering specialized web applications to the general public. The network is essentially divided into a production component that hosts the web and network services, and a user component that hosts thirty employee workstations and other end devices. The organization's network is separated from the Internet by a Cisco ASA network security device that both firewalls and detects intrusions. Business sensitive information is stored in various servers. This includes data comprising thousands of internal documents, such as finance and technical designs, email messages for the organization's employees including the CEO, CFO, and CIO, the organization's source code, and Personally Identifiable client data. Release of any of this information to unauthorized parties would have a significant, detrimental impact on the organization's reputation, which would harm earnings. The valuable information stored in these servers pose obvious points of interest for an adversary. We constructed several scenarios around this environment to support studies in cyber SA and cyber FF that may be run in the test range. We describe mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF including both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches. Finally, we discuss possible future research directions.

  9. CyberSafety: On the Interactions between CyberSecurity and the

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johnson, Chris

    into the infrastructures that support safety-critical systems. These include network management tools, operating systems security concerns. Malware has been detected in power distribution, healthcare, military and transportation infrastructures. Most previous attacks do not seem to have deliberately targeted critical applications. However

  10. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID, VOL. 4, NO. 2, JUNE 2013 847 Cyber-Physical Security Testbeds: Architecture,

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Manimaran, Govindarasu

    also incorporating simulation mechanisms to model power systems, cyber network dynamics, and security current issues and future ideas can be evaluated. This paper provides an overview of a smart grid security are then evaluated based on the physical system's voltage and rotor angle stability. Index Terms

  11. My RESEARCH INTERESTS concentrate on: Design and implementation of novel cyber-physical systems with an enhanced functionality, security and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Reznik, Leon

    . Melton and L. Reznik GPU-Based Simulation of Spiking Neural Networks with Real-Time Performance and High with an enhanced functionality, security and reliability and built upon sensor and control network platforms and reliability to security and safety Example : Integral quality evaluation procedures in cyber-physical systems

  12. IEC 61850 and IEC 62351 Cyber Security Acceleration Workshop

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Clements, Samuel L.; Edgar, Thomas W.; Manz, David O.

    2012-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this workshop was to identify and discuss concerns with the use and adoption of IEC 62351 security standard for IEC 61850 compliant control system products. The industry participants discussed performance, interoperability, adoption, challenges, business cases, and future issues.

  13. NERSC Cyber Security Challenges That Require DOE Development and Support

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Geddes, Cameron Guy Robinson

    ) is to accelerate the pace of scientific discovery by providing high performance computing, information, data, and impacts the productivity of the DOE Science community. In particular, NERSC and other high performance computing (HPC) centers have special security challenges that are unlikely to be met unless DOE funds

  14. Improving Control System Cyber-State Awareness using Known Secure Sensor Measurements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ondrej Linda; Milos Manic; Miles McQueen

    2012-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Abstract—This paper presents design and simulation of a low cost and low false alarm rate method for improved cyber-state awareness of critical control systems - the Known Secure Sensor Measurements (KSSM) method. The KSSM concept relies on physical measurements to detect malicious falsification of the control systems state. The KSSM method can be incrementally integrated with already installed control systems for enhanced resilience. This paper reviews the previously developed theoretical KSSM concept and then describes a simulation of the KSSM system. A simulated control system network is integrated with the KSSM components. The effectiveness of detection of various intrusion scenarios is demonstrated on several control system network topologies.

  15. 2014 Headquarters Facilities Master Security Plan - Chapter 14...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    4, Cyber Security 2014 Headquarters Facilities Master Security Plan - Chapter 14, Cyber Security June 2014 2014 Headquarters Facilities Master Security Plan - Chapter 14, Cyber...

  16. Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-09-25T23:59:59.000Z

    To prevent unauthorized dissemination of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI). Cancels DOE 5635.4 and DOE 5650.3A

  17. A Cyber Security Study of a SCADA Energy Management System: Stealthy Deception Attacks on the State Estimator

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Teixeira, André; Sandberg, Henrik; Johansson, Karl H

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The electrical power network is a critical infrastructure in today's society, so its safe and reliable operation is of major concern. State estimators are commonly used in power networks, for example, to detect faulty equipment and to optimally route power flows. The estimators are often located in control centers, to which large numbers of measurements are sent over unencrypted communication channels. Therefore cyber security for state estimators becomes an important issue. In this paper we analyze the cyber security of state estimators in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) for energy management systems (EMS) operating the power network. Current EMS state estimation algorithms have bad data detection (BDD) schemes to detect outliers in the measurement data. Such schemes are based on high measurement redundancy. Although these methods may detect a set of basic cyber attacks, they may fail in the presence of an intelligent attacker. We explore the latter by considering scenarios where stealthy de...

  18. Comprehensive, Multi-Source Cyber-Security Data Set

    DOE Data Explorer [Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)]

    Kent, Alexander D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    This data set represents 58 consecutive days of de-identified event data collected from five sources within Los Alamos National Laboratory’s corporate, internal computer network. The data sources include Windows-based authentication events from both individual computers and centralized Active Directory domain controller servers; process start and stop events from individual Windows computers; Domain Name Service (DNS) lookups as collected on internal DNS servers; network flow data as collected on at several key router locations; and a set of well-defined red teaming events that present bad behavior within the 58 days. In total, the data set is approximately 12 gigabytes compressed across the five data elements and presents 1,648,275,307 events in total for 12,425 users, 17,684 computers, and 62,974 processes. Specific users that are well known system related (SYSTEM, Local Service) were not de-identified though any well-known administrators account were still de-identified. In the network flow data, well-known ports (e.g. 80, 443, etc) were not de-identified. All other users, computers, process, ports, times, and other details were de-identified as a unified set across all the data elements (e.g. U1 is the same U1 in all of the data). The specific timeframe used is not disclosed for security purposes. In addition, no data that allows association outside of LANL’s network is included. All data starts with a time epoch of 1 using a time resolution of 1 second. In the authentication data, failed authentication events are only included for users that had a successful authentication event somewhere within the data set.

  19. M&Ms4Graphs: Multi-scale, Multi-dimensional Graph Analytics Tools for Cyber-Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    . "Statistical and Hierarchical Graph Analysis for Cyber Security." SIAM Conference on Discrete Mathematics effort is made possible by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory through funding provided by the U.S. Department of Energy. For more information on the science you see here, please contact: Sutanay Choudhury

  20. NERSC Cyber Security Challenges That Require DOE Development andSupport

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Draney, Brent; Campbell, Scott; Walter, Howard

    2007-01-16T23:59:59.000Z

    Traditional security approaches do not adequately addressall the requirements of open, scientific computing facilities. Many ofthe methods used for more restricted environments, including almost allcorporate/commercial systems, do not meet the needs of today's science.Use of only the available "state of the practice" commercial methods willhave adverse impact on the ability of DOE to accomplish its sciencegoals, and impacts the productivity of the DOE Science community. Inparticular, NERSC and other high performance computing (HPC) centers havespecial security challenges that are unlikely to be met unless DOE fundsdevelopment and support of reliable and effective tools designed to meetthe cyber security needs of High Performance Science. The securitychallenges facing NERSC can be collected into three basic problem sets:network performance and dynamics, application complexity and diversity,and a complex user community that can have transient affiliations withactual institutions. To address these problems, NERSC proposes thefollowing four general solutions: auditing user and system activityacross sites; firewall port configuration in real time;cross-site/virtual organization identity management and access control;and detecting security issues in application middleware. Solutions arealsoproposed for three general long term issues: data volume,application complexity, and information integration.

  1. Cyber Security

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Strategic Programs Division IM-52 George Dudley Director Associate CIO for IT Policy & Governance (IM-20) LeAnn Oliver Porfolio & Analysis Division (IM-21) Robin Crisp Director...

  2. Cyber Security

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Programs Division IM-52 Al Gallo (Acting) Director Associate CIO for IT Policy & Governance (IM-20) LeAnn Oliver Porfolio & Analysis Division (IM-21) Robin Crisp Director...

  3. Cyber Security

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Enterprise Services Division (IM-33) Michael Maraya Director (Acting) Associate CIO for Technology & Innovation (IM-50) Peter Tseronis Emerging Technology Division IM-51 Frank...

  4. Cyber Security

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Crisp Director Policy & Performance Management Division (IM-22) Denise Hill Director Records & Privacy Management Division (IM-23) Troy Manigault Director Associate CIO for IT...

  5. Cyber Security

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Management Office (IM-62) VACANT Director IT Service Management Division (IM-621) Bryan Long Director Infrastructure Division (IM-622) Greg Doan Director Applications Support...

  6. Cyber Security

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613PortsmouthBartlesvilleAbout » Contact UsDepartment of Energy Cut Gas CostsAssociate

  7. Cyber Security

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYouTube YouTube Note: Since the YouTube platformBuildingCoalComplex(GC-72)ColumbiaCurrentEnergyTroy Manigault

  8. Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1999-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

    International cooperation and collaboration is an important element in the effective planning and implementation of many Department of Energy (DOE) programs. DOE and its international partners benefit from the exchange of information that results from a managed process of unclassified visits and assignments by foreign nationals. These visits and assignments must be conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. and DOE national security policies, requirements, and objectives including export control laws and regulations. Canceled by DOE O 142.3. Does not cancel other directives.

  9. Quantifying Availability in SCADA Environments Using the Cyber Security Metric MFC

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Aissa, Anis Ben [Université de Tunis El Manar, Tunisia; Rabai, Latifa Ben Arfa [Université de Tunis, Tunisia; Abercrombie, Robert K [ORNL; Sheldon, Frederick T [ORNL; Mili, Ali [New Jersey Insitute of Technology

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are distributed networks dispersed over large geographic areas that aim to monitor and control industrial processes from remote areas and/or a centralized location. They are used in the management of critical infrastructures such as electric power generation, transmission and distribution, water and sewage, manufacturing/industrial manufacturing as well as oil and gas production. The availability of SCADA systems is tantamount to assuring safety, security and profitability. SCADA systems are the backbone of the national cyber-physical critical infrastructure. Herein, we explore the definition and quantification of an econometric measure of availability, as it applies to SCADA systems; our metric is a specialization of the generic measure of mean failure cost.

  10. Bioinformatics | Computer Engineering | Cyber Security | Electrical Engineering | Industrial Engineering | Manufacturing Engineering Organizational Behavior | Power Electronics and Systems | Telecommunication Networks | Wireless Innovation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Aronov, Boris

    or in Westchester and Long Island. The degree earned and the body of knowledge is exactly the same as those receivedBioinformatics | Computer Engineering | Cyber Security | Electrical Engineering | Industrial Engineering | Manufacturing Engineering Organizational Behavior | Power Electronics and Systems

  11. Experiences and Challenges with Using Cert Data to Analyze International Cyber Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Madnick, Stuart

    With the increasing interconnection of computer networks and sophistication of cyber attacks, it is important to understand the dynamics of such situations, especially in regards to cyber international relations. The ...

  12. Control Systems Security Center Comparison Study of Industrial Control System Standards against the Control Systems Protection Framework Cyber-Security Requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert P. Evans

    2005-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber security standards, guidelines, and best practices for control systems are critical requirements that have been delineated and formally recognized by industry and government entities. Cyber security standards provide a common language within the industrial control system community, both national and international, to facilitate understanding of security awareness issues but, ultimately, they are intended to strengthen cyber security for control systems. This study and the preliminary findings outlined in this report are an initial attempt by the Control Systems Security Center (CSSC) Standard Awareness Team to better understand how existing and emerging industry standards, guidelines, and best practices address cyber security for industrial control systems. The Standard Awareness Team comprised subject matter experts in control systems and cyber security technologies and standards from several Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories, including Argonne National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories. This study was conducted in two parts: a standard identification effort and a comparison analysis effort. During the standard identification effort, the Standard Awareness Team conducted a comprehensive open-source survey of existing control systems security standards, regulations, and guidelines in several of the critical infrastructure (CI) sectors, including the telecommunication, water, chemical, energy (electric power, petroleum and oil, natural gas), and transportation--rail sectors and sub-sectors. During the comparison analysis effort, the team compared the requirements contained in selected, identified, industry standards with the cyber security requirements in ''Cyber Security Protection Framework'', Version 0.9 (hereafter referred to as the ''Framework''). For each of the seven sector/sub-sectors listed above, one standard was selected from the list of standards identified in the identification effort. The requirements in these seven standards were then compared against the requirements given in the Framework. This comparison identified gaps (requirements not covered) in both the individual industry standards and in the Framework. In addition to the sector-specific standards reviewed, the team compared the requirements in the cross-sector Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society (ISA) Technical Reports (TR) 99 -1 and -2 to the Framework requirements. The Framework defines a set of security classes separated into families as functional requirements for control system security. Each standard reviewed was compared to this template of requirements to determine if the standard requirements closely or partially matched these Framework requirements. An analysis of each class of requirements pertaining to each standard reviewed can be found in the comparison results section of this report. Refer to Appendix A, ''Synopsis of Comparison Results'', for a complete graphical representation of the study's findings at a glance. Some of the requirements listed in the Framework are covered by many of the standards, while other requirements are addressed by only a few of the standards. In some cases, the scope of the requirements listed in the standard for a particular industry greatly exceeds the requirements given in the Framework. These additional families of requirements, identified by the various standards bodies, could potentially be added to the Framework. These findings are, in part, due to the maturity both of the security standards themselves and of the different industries current focus on security. In addition, there are differences in how communication and control is used in different industries and the consequences of disruptions via security breaches to each particular industry that could affect how security requirements are prioritized. The differences in the requirements listed in the Framework and in the various industry standards are due, in part, to differences in the level and purpose of the standards. While the requir

  13. arvutimnguritus world cyber: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    cyber-insurer, thereby making 74 SESSION: CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY IN A SMART GRID ENVIROMENT 1 Cyber-Security of SCADA Systems Fission and Nuclear Technologies Websites...

  14. alleged russian cyber: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    cyber-insurer, thereby making 69 SESSION: CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY IN A SMART GRID ENVIROMENT 1 Cyber-Security of SCADA Systems Fission and Nuclear Technologies Websites...

  15. Cyber-Physical System Security With Deceptive Virtual Hosts for Industrial Control Networks

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Vollmer, Todd; Manic, Milos

    2014-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A challenge facing industrial control network administrators is protecting the typically large number of connected assets for which they are responsible. These cyber devices may be tightly coupled with the physical processes they control and human induced failures risk dire real-world consequences. Dynamic virtual honeypots are effective tools for observing and attracting network intruder activity. This paper presents a design and implementation for self-configuring honeypots that passively examine control system network traffic and actively adapt to the observed environment. In contrast to prior work in the field, six tools were analyzed for suitability of network entity information gathering. Ettercap, anmore »established network security tool not commonly used in this capacity, outperformed the other tools and was chosen for implementation. Utilizing Ettercap XML output, a novel four-step algorithm was developed for autonomous creation and update of a Honeyd configuration. This algorithm was tested on an existing small campus grid and sensor network by execution of a collaborative usage scenario. Automatically created virtual hosts were deployed in concert with an anomaly behavior (AB) system in an attack scenario. Virtual hosts were automatically configured with unique emulated network stack behaviors for 92% of the targeted devices. The AB system alerted on 100% of the monitored emulated devices.« less

  16. Cyber-Physical System Security With Deceptive Virtual Hosts for Industrial Control Networks

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Vollmer, Todd; Manic, Milos

    2014-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A challenge facing industrial control network administrators is protecting the typically large number of connected assets for which they are responsible. These cyber devices may be tightly coupled with the physical processes they control and human induced failures risk dire real-world consequences. Dynamic virtual honeypots are effective tools for observing and attracting network intruder activity. This paper presents a design and implementation for self-configuring honeypots that passively examine control system network traffic and actively adapt to the observed environment. In contrast to prior work in the field, six tools were analyzed for suitability of network entity information gathering. Ettercap, an established network security tool not commonly used in this capacity, outperformed the other tools and was chosen for implementation. Utilizing Ettercap XML output, a novel four-step algorithm was developed for autonomous creation and update of a Honeyd configuration. This algorithm was tested on an existing small campus grid and sensor network by execution of a collaborative usage scenario. Automatically created virtual hosts were deployed in concert with an anomaly behavior (AB) system in an attack scenario. Virtual hosts were automatically configured with unique emulated network stack behaviors for 92% of the targeted devices. The AB system alerted on 100% of the monitored emulated devices.

  17. Cyber Security Analysis of State Estimators in Electric Power Systems Andre Teixeira, Saurabh Amin, Henrik Sandberg, Karl H. Johansson, and Shankar S. Sastry

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johansson, Karl Henrik

    Cyber Security Analysis of State Estimators in Electric Power Systems Andr´e Teixeira, Saurabh Amin security of state estimators in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems operating in power random outliers in the measurement data. Such schemes are based on high measurement redundancy. Although

  18. Challenges for Cyber-Physical Systems: Security, Timing Analysis and Soft Error Protection

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mueller, Frank

    from cyber attacks. While this assumption may not be sound, substations themselves are a more likely link at a substation) could allow attackers to affect power devices. Some protection could be provided to invest in research on the protection of the power grid, both from the perspective of cyber attacks

  19. ABB and Energy Utilities Form Consortium to Fund SCADA/EMS Cyber...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Utilities Form Consortium to Fund SCADAEMS Cyber Security Assessment at National SCADA Test Bed ABB and Energy Utilities Form Consortium to Fund SCADAEMS Cyber Security...

  20. Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-06-18T23:59:59.000Z

    To define a program for unclassified foreign national access to Department of Energy sites, information, and technologies. This Order cancels DOE P 142.1, Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments, dated 7-14-99; DOE N 142.1, Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments, dated 7-14-99; Secretarial Memorandum Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments, dated 7-14-99; Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, Departmental Use of Foreign Access Central Tracking System, dated 11-05-01; Memorandum from Kyle E. McSlarrow, Interim Guidance for Implementation of the Department's Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments Program, dated 12-17-02; and Secretarial Memorandum, Policy Exclusion for Unclassified Foreign National's Access to Department of Energy Facilities in Urgent or Emergency Medical Situations, dated 4-10-01. Cancels: DOE P 142.1 and DOE N 142.1

  1. Status Report on Protected Domains for Cyber Infrastructure Management

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Irvine, Cynthia E.

    through the use of distributed, highly secure, protected domains. Instead of creating a costly physically, Network Security, Information Assurance 1 Introduction Currently, our national cyber infrastructure to the President for Cyber Space Security and Chairman, President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board

  2. Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference (PBNC 2012), BEXCO, Busan, Korea, March 18 ~ 23, 2012 CHALLENGES OF CYBER SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kim, Kwangjo

    .kim@kustar.ac.ae Abstract Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) become one of the most important infrastructures in providing improvement. 1. Introduction Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) become one of the most important infrastructures PBNC 2012 CHALLENGES OF CYBER SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Kwangjo Kim KAIST, Daejeon, Korea

  3. 2014 HEADQUARTERS FACILITIES MASTER SECURITY PLAN - CHAPTER 13...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    HEADQUARTERS FACILITIES MASTER SECURITY PLAN - CHAPTER 13, CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION 2014 HEADQUARTERS FACILITIES MASTER SECURITY PLAN - CHAPTER 13, CONTROLLED...

  4. Toward a Cyber-Physical Topology Language: Applications to NERC CIP Audit

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sanders, William H.

    . For example, the NISTIR Guidelines for Smart-Grid Cyber Security state that "increasing the complexity

  5. Developmental Integrative BiologyCyber Security UNT is recognized by the National Security Agency and the Department of

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Tarau, Paul

    security. Information and computer security, trust and information assurance, systems architecture to identify and address a range of changing information sources and security vulnerabilities. UNT brings experts to address next generation challenges. The UNT-based Center for Information and Computer Security

  6. Elisa Bertino Cyber Center

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ginzel, Matthew

    on Information and System Security, ACM Transactions on Web, Acta Informatica, the Parallel and Distributed Society Tsutomu Kanai Award "For pioneering and innovative research contributions to secure distributed Elisa Bertino Director, Cyber Center bertino@purdue.edu 765-496-2399 Elisa Bertino is professor

  7. PIA - WEB Unclassified Business Operations General Support System...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Unclassified Business Operations General Support System PIA - WEB Unclassified Business Operations General Support System PIA - WEB Unclassified Business Operations General Support...

  8. PIA - WEB Unclassified Business Operations General Support System...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    WEB Unclassified Business Operations General Support System PIA - WEB Unclassified Business Operations General Support System PIA - WEB Unclassified Business Operations General...

  9. An inter-realm, cyber-security infrastructure for virtual supercomputing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Al-Muhtadi, J. (Jalal); Feng, W. C. (Wu-Chun); Fisk, M. E. (Mike E. )

    2001-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Virtual supercomputing, (ise ., high-performance grid computing), is poised to revolutionize the way we think about and use computing. However, the security of the links interconnecting the nodes within such an environment will be its Achilles heel, particularly when secure communication is required to tunnel through heterogeneous domains. In this paper we examine existing security mechanisms, show their inadequacy, and design a comprehensive cybersecurity infrastructure that meets the security requirements of virtual supercomputing. Keywords Security, virtual supercomputing, grid computing, high-performance computing, GSS-API, SSL, IPsec, component-based software, dynamic reconfiguration.

  10. Office of Cyber Assessments | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    program of announced and unannounced testing for DOE network vulnerabilities through scanning and penetration testing. Performs complex-wide reviews of cyber security topical...

  11. DOE Issues Energy Sector Cyber Organization NOI

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    cooperatively with DOE and other federal agencies to enhance cyber security of the bulk power electric grid and energy infrastructure. Approximately 8.5 million is expected to...

  12. CYBER SECURITY THREATS TO SAFETY-CRITICAL, SPACE-BASED INFRASTRUCTURES

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johnson, Chris

    into advanced air-traffic management applications, rail signalling systems, energy distribution software etc of a combined safety and security risk assessment methodology. The aim is to identify attack scenarios, the inclusion of a combined safety-security risk based methodology for the identification of attack scenarios

  13. ITL BULLETIN FOR OCTOBER 2010 CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES FOR THE SMART GRID: PROTECTING THE

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR ELECTRIC POWER Shirley Radack, Editor Computer Security Division Information effort is under way to transform the U.S. electric power infrastructure into an advanced digital and availability of the electric power infrastructure. These technologies must be designed and implemented early

  14. The Data and Application Security and Privacy (DASPY) Challenge

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandhu, Ravi

    Computer security Information security = Computer security + Communications security Information Computer security Information security = Computer security + Communications security Information Cyber security (defensive) goals have evolved Computer security Information security = Computer

  15. Enforcement Letter, Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC | Department...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    security incidents involving the unclassified waste stream and discrepancies in the inventory of accountable nuclear material at DOE's Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak...

  16. Summary of The 3rd Control System Cyber-Security (CS)2/HEP Workshop

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lüders, S

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Over the last decade modern accelerator and experiment control systems have increasingly been based on commercial-off-the-shelf products (VME crates, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, etc.), on Windows or Linux PCs, and on communication infrastructures using Ethernet and TCP/IP. Despite the benefits coming with this (r)evolution, new vulnerabilities are inherited, too: Worms and viruses spread within seconds via the Ethernet cable, and attackers are becoming interested in control systems. The Stuxnet worm of 2010 against a particular Siemens PLC is a unique example for a sophisticated attack against control systems [1]. Unfortunately, control PCs cannot be patched as fast as office PCs. Even worse, vulnerability scans at CERN using standard IT tools have shown that commercial automation systems lack fundamental security precautions: Some systems crashed during the scan, others could easily be stopped or their process data being ...

  17. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilAElectronic Input Options Gary L. Hirsch SNLMay 20102UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials

  18. Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-10-14T23:59:59.000Z

    The order defines a program for unclassified foreign national access to DOE sites, information, technologies, and equipment. Cancels DOE O 142.3.

  19. UNCLASSIFIED

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over OurThe Iron Spin TransitionProgram | Department HomeDialoguet eUNCLASSI H E

  20. UNCLASSIFIED

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over OurThe Iron Spin TransitionProgram | Department HomeDialoguet eUNCLASSI H E, i m - 5

  1. UNCLASSIFIED

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over OurThe Iron Spin TransitionProgram | Department HomeDialoguet eUNCLASSI H E, i m -

  2. UNCLASSIFIED

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysisDarby Dietrich5 | NUMBER643 DOE NNSAOak 1

  3. Simulation of PKI-Enabled Communication for Identity Management Using CyberCIEGE

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    , authentication, provenance, and access control. Keywords-network cyber security; identity management; information environment, players1 are guided through a series of scenarios that highlight various cyber security education colleges. CyberCIEGE was created by the Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR

  4. 7 Key Challenges for Visualization in Cyber Network Defense

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Best, Daniel M.; Endert, Alexander; Kidwell, Dan

    2014-12-02T23:59:59.000Z

    In this paper we present seven challenges, informed by two user studies, to be considered when developing a visualization for cyber security purposes. Cyber security visualizations must go beyond isolated solutions and “pretty picture” visualizations in order to make impact to users. We provide an example prototype that addresses the challenges with a description of how they are met. Our aim is to assist in increasing utility and adoption rates for visualization capabilities in cyber security.

  5. Developing a Power Measurement Framework for Cyber Defense

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pouchard, Line

    substations and hydroelectric facilities is a normal part of guerilla warfare [3]. Cyber attack of EDS systems, they have become more vulnerable to cyber-attacks as well. As part of a systems health monitoring approach, Experimentation, Security. Keywords Energy Delivery Systems, malware, rootkits, cyber-attacks, Power Distribution

  6. Deception used for Cyber Defense of Control Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wayne F. Boyer; Miles A. McQueen

    2009-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Control system cyber security defense mechanisms may employ deception to make it more difficult for attackers to plan and execute successful attacks. These deceptive defense mechanisms are organized and initially explored according to a specific deception taxonomy and the seven abstract dimensions of security previously proposed as a framework for the cyber security of control systems.

  7. Strengthening Cyber Security

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently AskedEnergyIssues DOE's NuclearSpurringSteam SystemsStrategic Programs4 E n E rgyB

  8. Cyber Threats to Nuclear Infrastructures

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Anderson; Paul Moskowitz; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Curtis St. Michel

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear facility personnel expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against both natural and man-made threats. Historically, most attention has been placed on physical security. Recently however, the threat of cyber-related attacks has become a recognized and growing world-wide concern. Much attention has focused on the vulnerability of the electric grid and chemical industries to cyber attacks, in part, because of their use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Lessons learned from work in these sectors indicate that the cyber threat may extend to other critical infrastructures including sites where nuclear and radiological materials are now stored. In this context, this white paper presents a hypothetical scenario by which a determined adversary launches a cyber attack that compromises the physical protection system and results in a reduced security posture at such a site. The compromised security posture might then be malevolently exploited in a variety of ways. The authors conclude that the cyber threat should be carefully considered for all nuclear infrastructures.

  9. Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-06-18T23:59:59.000Z

    The order defines a program for unclassified foreign national access to Department of Energy sites, information, and technologies. The page change streamlines the HQs Management Panel review process to include reviews by HSS, IN, and a representative of the cognizant under secretary for access requests involving foreign nationals. Cancels Secretarial Memorandum, Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments, dated 7-14-99; Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, Departmental Use of Foreign Access Central Tracking System, dated 11-05-01; Memorandum from Kyle E. McSlarrow, Interim Guidance for Implementation of the Department's Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments Program, dated 12-17-02; and Secretarial Memorandum, Policy Exclusion for Unclassified Foreign National's Access to Department of Energy Facilities in Urgent or Emergency Medical Situations, dated 4-10-01. Cancels: DOE P 142.1 and DOE N 142.1

  10. Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1988-02-03T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish Department of Energy (DOE) policy and procedures for the protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI). This directive does not cancel another directive. Chg 1 dated 4-24-92.

  11. Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1992-04-24T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish Department of Energy (DOE) policy and procedures for the protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UNCI). Canceled by DOE O 471.1 of 9-25-1995.

  12. Identification of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1992-06-08T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish policy and procedures for identifying Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UNCI) and for reviewing and marking documents and material containing UNCI. Cancels DOE O 5650.3. Canceled by DOE O 471.1 of 9-25-95.

  13. Cyber Incidents Involving Control Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert J. Turk

    2005-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Analysis Function of the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center (CSSC) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has prepared this report to document cyber security incidents for use by the CSSC. The description and analysis of incidents reported herein support three CSSC tasks: establishing a business case; increasing security awareness and private and corporate participation related to enhanced cyber security of control systems; and providing informational material to support model development and prioritize activities for CSSC. The stated mission of CSSC is to reduce vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyber attack on control systems. As stated in the Incident Management Tool Requirements (August 2005) ''Vulnerability reduction is promoted by risk analysis that tracks actual risk, emphasizes high risk, determines risk reduction as a function of countermeasures, tracks increase of risk due to external influence, and measures success of the vulnerability reduction program''. Process control and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, with their reliance on proprietary networks and hardware, have long been considered immune to the network attacks that have wreaked so much havoc on corporate information systems. New research indicates this confidence is misplaced--the move to open standards such as Ethernet, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, and Web technologies is allowing hackers to take advantage of the control industry's unawareness. Much of the available information about cyber incidents represents a characterization as opposed to an analysis of events. The lack of good analyses reflects an overall weakness in reporting requirements as well as the fact that to date there have been very few serious cyber attacks on control systems. Most companies prefer not to share cyber attack incident data because of potential financial repercussions. Uniform reporting requirements will do much to make this information available to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and others who require it. This report summarizes the rise in frequency of cyber attacks, describes the perpetrators, and identifies the means of attack. This type of analysis, when used in conjunction with vulnerability analyses, can be used to support a proactive approach to prevent cyber attacks. CSSC will use this document to evolve a standardized approach to incident reporting and analysis. This document will be updated as needed to record additional event analyses and insights regarding incident reporting. This report represents 120 cyber security incidents documented in a number of sources, including: the British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) Industrial Security Incident Database, the 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, the KEMA, Inc., Database, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Energy Incident Database, the INL Cyber Incident Database, and other open-source data. The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database was also interrogated but, interestingly, failed to yield any cyber attack incidents. The results of this evaluation indicate that historical evidence provides insight into control system related incidents or failures; however, that the limited available information provides little support to future risk estimates. The documented case history shows that activity has increased significantly since 1988. The majority of incidents come from the Internet by way of opportunistic viruses, Trojans, and worms, but a surprisingly large number are directed acts of sabotage. A substantial number of confirmed, unconfirmed, and potential events that directly or potentially impact control systems worldwide are also identified. Twelve selected cyber incidents are presented at the end of this report as examples of the documented case studies (see Appendix B).

  14. Cyber-Physical Systems under Attack Models, Fundamental limitations, and Monitor Design

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hu, Fei

    , FL, Dec 11, 2011 F. Pasqualetti, F. D¨orfler, F. Bullo Cyber-Physical Systems Under Attack Security are cyber-physical systems: power generation and distribution networks water networks and mass-efficient buildings (heat transfer) F. Pasqualetti, F. D¨orfler, F. Bullo Cyber-Physical Systems Under Attack Security

  15. Naval Postgraduate School Cyber Academic Group Graduation Checklist for MS Cyber Systems and Operations (CSO) Degree

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Environment (3-2) ________ ___CY4700 Cyber Wargame: Blue Force Operations (2-5) ________ ___CY4710 Cyber Planned Qtr ___NW3230 Strategy & Policy (4-2) ________ ___NW3275 Joint Maritime Operations Part 1 (4-0) ________ ___NW3276 Joint Maritime Operations Part 2 (2-2) ________ ___NW3285 National Security Decision Making (4

  16. ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS SCHEDULE 18: SECURITY, EMERGENCY PLANNING...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    include the various files created by the Department to control and protect safeguards and security interests (e.g., classified information, sensitive unclassified information,...

  17. Sandia Energy - The Center for SCADA Security Assets

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    The Center for SCADA Security Assets Home Stationary Power Safety, Security & Resilience of Energy Infrastructure Grid Modernization Cyber Security for Electric Infrastructure...

  18. rtino is prof of Cyber Ce

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Holland, Jeffrey

    Program Technolo Worksho Bertino is Compute systems Compute to secure rtino is prof of Cyber Ce internatio Database Indexing Intelligen Services the Very on the e Security& on Web, Program VLDB, A Data Eng distributed fessor of Co enter and R nce and Se mputer Scien EC laborator maden) in S ers Universi arch

  19. IEEE Communications Magazine August 2012 530163-6804/12/$25.00 2012 IEEE CYBER SECURITY FOR SMART GRID COMMUNICATIONS

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Zhang, Yan

    FOR SMART GRID COMMUNICATIONS Daojing He, Chun Chen, and Jiajun Bu, Zhejiang University Sammy Chan, City University Secure Service Provision in Smart Grid Communications INTRODUCTION An increasing demand grids. As the world's largest engineered system, the smart grid will expand the current capabilities

  20. attacks security mechanisms: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Catherine 2009-05-15 232 SESSION: CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY IN A SMART GRID ENVIROMENT 1 Cyber-Security of SCADA Systems Fission and Nuclear Technologies Websites...

  1. Analysis of operations and cyber security policies for a system of cooperating Flexible Alternating Current Transmission System (FACTS) devices.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Phillips, Laurence R.; Tejani, Bankim; Margulies, Jonathan; Hills, Jason L.; Richardson, Bryan T.; Baca, Micheal J.; Weiland, Laura

    2005-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (FACTS) devices are installed on electric power transmission lines to stabilize and regulate power flow. Power lines protected by FACTS devices can increase power flow and better respond to contingencies. The University of Missouri Rolla (UMR) is currently working on a multi-year project to examine the potential use of multiple FACTS devices distributed over a large power system region in a cooperative arrangement in which the FACTS devices work together to optimize and stabilize the regional power system. The report describes operational and security challenges that need to be addressed to employ FACTS devices in this way and recommends references, processes, technologies, and policies to address these challenges.

  2. A Game Theoretic Approach to Cyber Attack Prediction

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peng Liu

    2005-11-28T23:59:59.000Z

    The area investigated by this project is cyber attack prediction. With a focus on correlation-based prediction, current attack prediction methodologies overlook the strategic nature of cyber attack-defense scenarios. As a result, current cyber attack prediction methodologies are very limited in predicting strategic behaviors of attackers in enforcing nontrivial cyber attacks such as DDoS attacks, and may result in low accuracy in correlation-based predictions. This project develops a game theoretic framework for cyber attack prediction, where an automatic game-theory-based attack prediction method is proposed. Being able to quantitatively predict the likelihood of (sequences of) attack actions, our attack prediction methodology can predict fine-grained strategic behaviors of attackers and may greatly improve the accuracy of correlation-based prediction. To our best knowledge, this project develops the first comprehensive framework for incentive-based modeling and inference of attack intent, objectives, and strategies; and this project develops the first method that can predict fine-grained strategic behaviors of attackers. The significance of this research and the benefit to the public can be demonstrated to certain extent by (a) the severe threat of cyber attacks to the critical infrastructures of the nation, including many infrastructures overseen by the Department of Energy, (b) the importance of cyber security to critical infrastructure protection, and (c) the importance of cyber attack prediction to achieving cyber security.

  3. Reducing Cyber Risk to Critical Infrastructure: NIST Framework...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    of Control Systems (650 KB PDF) The Vulnerability Analysis of Energy Delivery Control Systems Report Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security (3.4 MB PDF) A Guide to...

  4. PSERC Webinar Series: Issues in Designing the Future Grid - Cyber...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Cyber-Physical Systems Security for the Smart Grid - February 7, 2012 PSERC is offering a free, public webinar series from January to May 2012 entitled "Issues in Designing the...

  5. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chu, Peter C.

    and Atmosphere Exchange · DMS (CH3SCH3) changes the radiation budget in the atmosphere and in turn changes

  6. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    US Army Corps of Engineers

    current and future operational missions. b. The prescriptive reductions to our Research, Development execution of current spend plans. Further delays will increasingly minimize flexibility and reduce our resulting in potentially wasteful spending and have other serious effects that we will only uncover

  7. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chu, Peter C.

    CONOPS · Transfer Alignment · Maintain Ready Condition · Cockpit Displays ­ Launch Acceptable Region

  8. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chu, Peter C.

    Multiplier · 3rd world countries · Non-government factions · Terrorists Widely Available · Over 50 Countries

  9. Sandia National Laboratories: Energy Security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    States. I&C systems monitor the safe, reliable and secure generation and delivery of electricity and could have potential cyber vulnerabilities. At Sandia National Laboratories,...

  10. Unclassified Foreign National Visits & Assignments Questionnaire

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA group current C3E AmbassadorsUS-EU-Japan Working Unclassified Foreign National

  11. Data Intensive Architecture for Scalable Cyber Analytics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Olsen, Bryan K.; Johnson, John R.; Critchlow, Terence J.

    2011-12-19T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber analysts are tasked with the identification and mitigation of network exploits and threats. These compromises are difficult to identify due to the characteristics of cyber communication, the volume of traffic, and the duration of possible attack. In this paper, we describe a prototype implementation designed to provide cyber analysts an environment where they can interactively explore a month’s worth of cyber security data. This prototype utilized On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) techniques to present a data cube to the analysts. The cube provides a summary of the data, allowing trends to be easily identified as well as the ability to easily pull up the original records comprising an event of interest. The cube was built using SQL Server Analysis Services (SSAS), with the interface to the cube provided by Tableau. This software infrastructure was supported by a novel hardware architecture comprising a Netezza TwinFin® for the underlying data warehouse and a cube server with a FusionIO drive hosting the data cube. We evaluated this environment on a month’s worth of artificial, but realistic, data using multiple queries provided by our cyber analysts. As our results indicate, OLAP technology has progressed to the point where it is in a unique position to provide novel insights to cyber analysts, as long as it is supported by an appropriate data intensive architecture.

  12. Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information Manual

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

    This Manual provides detailed requirements to supplement DOE O 471.1A, Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. Change 1, dated 10/23/01, was added to the Manual to clarify when and how encryption requirements for Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information may be waived. Canceled by DOE O 471.1B.

  13. Senior Advisor for Cyber Security

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The mission of the Office of Electricity and Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) is to lead national efforts to modernize the electric grid; increase grid capacity and reliability; improve energy...

  14. Mission Assurance and Cyber Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Memphis, University of

    , IPSes, TLS ZigBee X10 Wifi Smart Meter SubstationDistribution FAN/AMI Field Area Network SAN Substation assets Take action by remapping our business processes What is your attack surface look like? What threats ride on the ubiquitous attack surfaces of our infrastructure) #12;mccuskero@sonalysts.com 16 What

  15. Chapter_14_Cyber_Security

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T, Inc.'sEnergyTexas1. Feedstock & ProductionChapter 6 --30 QERQER-2636124

  16. Cyber Security Standards.PDF

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,Office of Policy, OAPM | Department of Energy Current5 by ISA -Department of1

  17. cyber | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved: 5-13-14Russian NuclearNational5/%2A en Office ofcontractingcyber |

  18. Secure Pairing of Constrained Wireless Devices: Challenges and Pitfalls

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Carver, Jeffrey C.

    and Privacy in Emerging Systems (SPIES) lab. He works in the broad areas of computer and network security.S. Program in Cyber-Security. Saxena is serving as an Associate Editor for flagship security journals, IEEE

  19. The Economic Consequences of Sharing Security Information Esther Gal-Or1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Camp, L. Jean

    Information technology (IT) security has emerged as an important issue in the last decade. To promote the disclosure and sharing of cyber-security information amongst firms, the US federal government has encouraged-commerce con- tinues to grow, so does cyber crime. According to Jupiter Media Metrix, cyber-security issues

  20. Computer Security Incident Handling Guide

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    States Computer Emergency Readiness Team National Cyber Security Division Department of Homeland Security of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD Karen Scarfone Scarfone Cybersecurity C O M P U T E R S E C U R I

  1. Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order provides requirements and responsibilities for identifying and protecting the unauthorized dissemination of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. Cancels DOE O 471.1A and DOE M 471.1-1.

  2. A cognitive and economic decision theory for examining cyber defense strategies.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bier, Asmeret Brooke

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber attacks pose a major threat to modern organizations. Little is known about the social aspects of decision making among organizations that face cyber threats, nor do we have empirically-grounded models of the dynamics of cooperative behavior among vulnerable organizations. The effectiveness of cyber defense can likely be enhanced if information and resources are shared among organizations that face similar threats. Three models were created to begin to understand the cognitive and social aspects of cyber cooperation. The first simulated a cooperative cyber security program between two organizations. The second focused on a cyber security training program in which participants interact (and potentially cooperate) to solve problems. The third built upon the first two models and simulates cooperation between organizations in an information-sharing program.

  3. Safeguards and Security and Cyber Security RM

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic2 OPAM615_CostNSARDevelopmental AssignmentAprilAND POWERADVANCEDSafeguards and

  4. A Method for Estimating the Financial Impact of Cyber Information Security Breaches Utilizing the Common Vulnerability Scoring System and Annual Loss Expectancy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lindsey, Michael B.

    2010-05-14T23:59:59.000Z

    Information security is relatively new field that is experiencing rapid growth in terms of malicious attack frequency and the amount of capital that firms must spend on attack defense. This rise in security expenditures has prompted corporate...

  5. Calendar Year 2001 | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Evaluation Report: IG-0519 Evaluation of the Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program August 30, 2001 Audit Report: IG-0518 Evaluation of Classified Information Systems...

  6. Wayne Meitzler PNNL Component Security R&D Program Manager

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Perkins, Richard A.

    Wayne Meitzler PNNL Component Security R&D Program Manager Wayne Meitzler, as Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Component Security R&D Program Manager, has over 15 years of cyber security R systems. In the 90s, Wayne was one of the early cyber security R&D leaders at PNNL, and his research

  7. Modeling Complex Control Systems to Identify Remotely Accessible Devices Vulnerable to Cyber Attack1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Krings, Axel W.

    : Security, Vulnerabilities, Cyber Attack, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Electric Power Management present a model developed for Electric Power Management Systems (EPMS) and Supervisory Control and Data vulnerable to cyber attack. We use graph theory to model electric power control and protection devices

  8. Impact Analysis of Transient Stability Due to Cyber Attack on FACTS Devices

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kundur, Deepa

    vulnerabilities that threat- en the security of cyber-physical power system span across generation, transmission that the losses caused by cyber attack on power grid infrastructure will increase significantly, if no proper. Butler-Purry Electrical and Computer Engineering Department Texas A&M University College Station, TX, USA

  9. Taxonomies of Cyber Adversaries and Attacks: A Survey of Incidents and Approaches

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meyers, C A; Powers, S S; Faissol, D M

    2009-10-08T23:59:59.000Z

    In this paper we construct taxonomies of cyber adversaries and methods of attack, drawing from a survey of the literature in the area of cyber crime. We begin by addressing the scope of cyber crime, noting its prevalence and effects on the US economy. We then survey the literature on cyber adversaries, presenting a taxonomy of the different types of adversaries and their corresponding methods, motivations, maliciousness, and skill levels. Subsequently we survey the literature on cyber attacks, giving a taxonomy of the different classes of attacks, subtypes, and threat descriptions. The goal of this paper is to inform future studies of cyber security on the shape and characteristics of the risk space and its associated adversaries.

  10. SECURE SEMANTIC COMPUTING KEVIN W. HAMLEN and BHAVANI THURAISINGHAM

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hamlen, Kevin W.

    and development of secure semantic computing technologies is therefore an important emerging category of security specifications with semantic web technologies. Second, we examine data mining technologies for cyber-security

  11. UNCLASSIFIED TPBAR RELEASES, INCLUDING TRITIUM TTQP-1-091 Rev 14

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gruel, Robert L.; Love, Edward F.; Thornhill, Cheryl K.

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides a listing of unclassified tritium release values that should be assumed for unclassified analysis. Much of the information is brought forth from the related documents listed in Section 5.0 to provide a single-source listing of unclassified release values. This information has been updated based on current design analysis and available experimental data.

  12. Reduction in Work Force Unclassified Staff Office of Human Resources

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Howat, Ian M.

    Reduction in Work Force ­ Unclassified Staff 9.15 Office of Human Resources Applies to: Regular by the Health System. Health System employees should contact their human resource department for further information. The Ohio State University ­ Office of Human Resources Page 1 of 1 Policy 9.15 Reduction in Work

  13. Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order provides requirements and responsibilities for identifying and protecting the unauthorized dissemination of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. Extended until 7-7-06 by DOE N 251.64, dated 7-7-05. Cancels DOE O 471.1. Canceled by DOE O 471.1B dated 3-1-10.

  14. September 27 29, 2010, Baltimore Convention Center Focusing on Emerging Automation Specifications and Use Cases, Software Assurance, Healthcare IT, Cyber Security, and Regulatory Compliance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    September 27 ­ 29, 2010, Baltimore Convention Center Focusing on Emerging Automation Specifications Annual IT Security Automation Conference, hosted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology Systems Agency, will focus on the breadth and depth of automation principles and technologies designed

  15. Audit Report on "Protection of the Department of Energy's Unclassified Sensitive Electronic Information"

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2009-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy and its contractors store and process massive quantities of sensitive information to accomplish national security, energy, science, and environmental missions. Sensitive unclassified data, such as personally identifiable information (PII), official use only, and unclassified controlled nuclear information require special handling and protection to prevent misuse of the information for inappropriate purposes. Industry experts have reported that more than 203 million personal privacy records have been lost or stolen over the past three years, including information maintained by corporations, educational institutions, and Federal agencies. The loss of personal and other sensitive information can result in substantial financial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience to individuals and organizations. Therefore, strong protective measures, including data encryption, help protect against the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. Prior reports involving the loss of sensitive information have highlighted weaknesses in the Department's ability to protect sensitive data. Our report on Security Over Personally Identifiable Information (DOE/IG-0771, July 2007) disclosed that the Department had not fully implemented all measures recommended by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and required by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to protect PII, including failures to identify and encrypt PII maintained on information systems. Similarly, the Government Accountability Office recently reported that the Department had not yet installed encryption technology to protect sensitive data on the vast majority of laptop computers and handheld devices. Because of the potential for harm, we initiated this audit to determine whether the Department and its contractors adequately safeguarded sensitive electronic information. The Department had taken a number of steps to improve protection of PII. Our review, however, identified opportunities to strengthen the protection of all types of sensitive unclassified electronic information and reduce the risk that such data could fall into the hands of individuals with malicious intent. In particular, for the seven sites we reviewed: (1) Four sites had either not ensured that sensitive information maintained on mobile devices was encrypted. Or, they had improperly permitted sensitive unclassified information to be transmitted unencrypted through email or to offsite backup storage facilities; (2) One site had not ensured that laptops taken on foreign travel, including travel to sensitive countries, were protected against security threats; and, (3) Although required by the OMB since 2003, we learned that programs and sites were still working to complete Privacy Impact Assessments - analyses designed to examine the risks and ramifications of using information systems to collect, maintain, and disseminate personal information. Our testing revealed that the weaknesses identified were attributable, at least in part, to Headquarters programs and field sites that had not implemented existing policies and procedures requiring protection of sensitive electronic information. In addition, a lack of performance monitoring contributed to the inability of the Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ensure that measures were in place to fully protect sensitive information. As demonstrated by previous computer intrusion-related data losses throughout the Department, without improvements, the risk or vulnerability for future losses remains unacceptably high. In conducting this audit, we recognized that data encryption and related techniques do not provide absolute assurance that sensitive data is fully protected. For example, encryption will not necessarily protect data in circumstances where organizational access controls are weak or are circumvented through phishing or other malicious techniques. However, as noted by NIST, when used appropriately, encryption is an effective tool that can, as part of an overall risk-management strat

  16. Cyber Physical Systems: Design Challenges Edward A. Lee

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    , such as distributed micro power generation coupled into the power grid, where tim- ing precision and security issuesCyber Physical Systems: Design Challenges Edward A. Lee Electrical Engineering and Computer is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage

  17. Cyber threat metrics.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frye, Jason Neal; Veitch, Cynthia K.; Mateski, Mark Elliot; Michalski, John T.; Harris, James Mark; Trevino, Cassandra M.; Maruoka, Scott

    2012-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Threats are generally much easier to list than to describe, and much easier to describe than to measure. As a result, many organizations list threats. Fewer describe them in useful terms, and still fewer measure them in meaningful ways. This is particularly true in the dynamic and nebulous domain of cyber threats - a domain that tends to resist easy measurement and, in some cases, appears to defy any measurement. We believe the problem is tractable. In this report we describe threat metrics and models for characterizing threats consistently and unambiguously. The purpose of this report is to support the Operational Threat Assessment (OTA) phase of risk and vulnerability assessment. To this end, we focus on the task of characterizing cyber threats using consistent threat metrics and models. In particular, we address threat metrics and models for describing malicious cyber threats to US FCEB agencies and systems.

  18. Computer Security Incident Handling Guide

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gaithersburg, MD Tom Millar United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team National Cyber Security Division National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD Karen Scarfone Scarfone Cybersecurity C O M

  19. Risk assessment for physical and cyber attacks on critical infrastructures.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, Bryan J.; Sholander, Peter E.; Phelan, James M.; Wyss, Gregory Dane; Varnado, G. Bruce; Depoy, Jennifer Mae

    2005-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Assessing the risk of malevolent attacks against large-scale critical infrastructures requires modifications to existing methodologies. Existing risk assessment methodologies consider physical security and cyber security separately. As such, they do not accurately model attacks that involve defeating both physical protection and cyber protection elements (e.g., hackers turning off alarm systems prior to forced entry). This paper presents a risk assessment methodology that accounts for both physical and cyber security. It also preserves the traditional security paradigm of detect, delay and respond, while accounting for the possibility that a facility may be able to recover from or mitigate the results of a successful attack before serious consequences occur. The methodology provides a means for ranking those assets most at risk from malevolent attacks. Because the methodology is automated the analyst can also play 'what if with mitigation measures to gain a better understanding of how to best expend resources towards securing the facilities. It is simple enough to be applied to large infrastructure facilities without developing highly complicated models. Finally, it is applicable to facilities with extensive security as well as those that are less well-protected.

  20. PACIFIC NORTHWEST CYBER SUMMIT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lesperance, Ann M.; Matlock, Gordon W.; Becker-Dippmann, Angela S.; Smith, Karen S.

    2013-08-07T23:59:59.000Z

    On March 26, 2013, the Snohomish County Public Utility District (PUD) and the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) jointly hosted the Pacific Northwest Cyber Summit with the DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, the White House, Washington State congressional delegation, Washington State National Guard, and regional energy companies.

  1. Methodology for prioritizing cyber-vulnerable critical infrastructure equipment and mitigation strategies.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dawson, Lon Andrew; Stinebaugh, Jennifer A.

    2010-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Cyber Security Division (NSCD), Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), contracted Sandia National Laboratories to develop a generic methodology for prioritizing cyber-vulnerable, critical infrastructure assets and the development of mitigation strategies for their loss or compromise. The initial project has been divided into three discrete deliverables: (1) A generic methodology report suitable to all Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) Sectors (this report); (2) a sector-specific report for Electrical Power Distribution; and (3) a sector-specific report for the water sector, including generation, water treatment, and wastewater systems. Specific reports for the water and electric sectors are available from Sandia National Laboratories.

  2. PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: SPRO Physical Security Major Application

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Deanna Harvey, Program Analyst Allen Rome, Cyber Security Program Manger Chris Shipp, Information System Security Manager (504) 734-4339 Rick.Shutt@spr.doe.gov (504) 734-4316...

  3. Rethinking the Cyber Threat A Framework and Path Forward

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bernstein, Phil

    Rethinking the Cyber Threat A Framework and Path Forward SCOTT CHARNEY Corporate Vice President ..................................................................................................................................................5 Understanding the Cyber Threat .................................................................................................................5 Rethinking the Cyber Threat

  4. Office of Headquarters Security Operations

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Headquarters Security Operations strengthens national security by protecting personnel, facilities, property, classified information, and sensitive unclassified information for DOE Headquarters facilities in the National Capital Area under normal and abnormal (i.e., emergency) conditions; managing access authorization functions for Headquarters; ensuring that executives and dignitaries are fully protected, and supporting efforts to ensure the continuity of government in all circumstances as mandated by Presidential Decision Directive.

  5. Recommended Practice: Creating Cyber Forensics Plans for Control Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eric Cornelius; Mark Fabro

    2008-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber forensics has been in the popular mainstream for some time, and has matured into an information-technology capability that is very common among modern information security programs. The goal of cyber forensics is to support the elements of troubleshooting, monitoring, recovery, and the protection of sensitive data. Moreover, in the event of a crime being committed, cyber forensics is also the approach to collecting, analyzing, and archiving data as evidence in a court of law. Although scalable to many information technology domains, especially modern corporate architectures, cyber forensics can be challenging when being applied to non-traditional environments, which are not comprised of current information technologies or are designed with technologies that do not provide adequate data storage or audit capabilities. In addition, further complexity is introduced if the environments are designed using proprietary solutions and protocols, thus limiting the ease of which modern forensic methods can be utilized. The legacy nature and somewhat diverse or disparate component aspects of control systems environments can often prohibit the smooth translation of modern forensics analysis into the control systems domain. Compounded by a wide variety of proprietary technologies and protocols, as well as critical system technologies with no capability to store significant amounts of event information, the task of creating a ubiquitous and unified strategy for technical cyber forensics on a control systems device or computing resource is far from trivial. To date, no direction regarding cyber forensics as it relates to control systems has been produced other than what might be privately available from commercial vendors. Current materials have been designed to support event recreation (event-based), and although important, these requirements do not always satisfy the needs associated with incident response or forensics that are driven by cyber incidents. To address these issues and to accommodate for the diversity in both system and architecture types, a framework based in recommended practices to address forensics in the control systems domain is required. This framework must be fully flexible to allow for deployment into any control systems environment regardless of technologies used. Moreover, the framework and practices must provide for direction on the integration of modern network security technologies with traditionally closed systems, the result being a true defense-in-depth strategy for control systems architectures. This document takes the traditional concepts of cyber forensics and forensics engineering and provides direction regarding augmentation for control systems operational environments. The goal is to provide guidance to the reader with specifics relating to the complexity of cyber forensics for control systems, guidance to allow organizations to create a self-sustaining cyber forensics program, and guidance to support the maintenance and evolution of such programs. As the current control systems cyber security community of interest is without any specific direction on how to proceed with forensics in control systems environments, this information product is intended to be a first step.

  6. Human dimensions in cyber operations research and development priorities.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Forsythe, James Chris; Silva, Austin Ray; Stevens-Adams, Susan Marie; Bradshaw, Jeffrey [Institute for Human and Machine Cognition

    2012-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Within cyber security, the human element represents one of the greatest untapped opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of network defenses. However, there has been little research to understand the human dimension in cyber operations. To better understand the needs and priorities for research and development to address these issues, a workshop was conducted August 28-29, 2012 in Washington DC. A synthesis was developed that captured the key issues and associated research questions. Research and development needs were identified that fell into three parallel paths: (1) human factors analysis and scientific studies to establish foundational knowledge concerning factors underlying the performance of cyber defenders; (2) development of models that capture key processes that mediate interactions between defenders, users, adversaries and the public; and (3) development of a multi-purpose test environment for conducting controlled experiments that enables systems and human performance measurement. These research and development investments would transform cyber operations from an art to a science, enabling systems solutions to be engineered to address a range of situations. Organizations would be able to move beyond the current state where key decisions (e.g. personnel assignment) are made on a largely ad hoc basis to a state in which there exist institutionalized processes for assuring the right people are doing the right jobs in the right way. These developments lay the groundwork for emergence of a professional class of cyber defenders with defined roles and career progressions, with higher levels of personnel commitment and retention. Finally, the operational impact would be evident in improved performance, accompanied by a shift to a more proactive response in which defenders have the capacity to exert greater control over the cyber battlespace.

  7. Sandia Energy - Cyber

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Scienceand RequirementsCoatings Initiated at PNNL's SequimReactors To ReceiveCyber Home

  8. Cyber and physical infrastructure interdependencies.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Phillips, Laurence R.; Kelic, Andjelka; Warren, Drake E.

    2008-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The goal of the work discussed in this document is to understand the risk to the nation of cyber attacks on critical infrastructures. The large body of research results on cyber attacks against physical infrastructure vulnerabilities has not resulted in clear understanding of the cascading effects a cyber-caused disruption can have on critical national infrastructures and the ability of these affected infrastructures to deliver services. This document discusses current research and methodologies aimed at assessing the translation of a cyber-based effect into a physical disruption of infrastructure and thence into quantification of the economic consequences of the resultant disruption and damage. The document discusses the deficiencies of the existing methods in correlating cyber attacks with physical consequences. The document then outlines a research plan to correct those deficiencies. When completed, the research plan will result in a fully supported methodology to quantify the economic consequences of events that begin with cyber effects, cascade into other physical infrastructure impacts, and result in degradation of the critical infrastructure's ability to deliver services and products. This methodology enables quantification of the risks to national critical infrastructure of cyber threats. The work addresses the electric power sector as an example of how the methodology can be applied.

  9. Exhibit G (Rev 10, 10/24/12) Security Requirements Subcontract No. 241314 Page 1 of 32

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    ) .........................................................................................6 3.1 Work site, Security Area, Badge and Data Information ....................................... 6/A..................................................................21 G6.0 Information Security (Feb 2012..........................................................................................24 G7.0 Cyber Information Security (Feb 2012

  10. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Amin, Saurabh

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    buildings and smart structures portend immense datavehicles and buildings equipped with smart meters). Thebuilding’s occupants). The operating systems of upcoming infrastructures such as smart

  11. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Amin, Saurabh

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    optimal control and stabilization for linear systems with bounded controloptimal switching control for abstract linear systems onoptimal control for discrete-time, linear dynamical systems in which control

  12. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Amin, Saurabh

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Attacks Against Water SCADA Systems . . . . . . . . . .2 d (bottom) [simulated results]. . Gignac SCADA supervisoryGignac canal network and SCADA system . . . . . . . . .

  13. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Amin, Saurabh

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Studi Di Milano, Italy. Saberi, A. , Stoorvogel, A. A. andand Michel [1995]; Saberi et al. [1999]; Toivonen [1983];

  14. On Cyber Security for Networked Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Amin, Saurabh

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    critical infrastructure systems, such as electric powerinfrastructures, for e.g. , the next generation electric power

  15. Cyber Assessment Methods for SCADA Security

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,Office of Policy, OAPM | Department of Energy Current5 by ISA - The

  16. Cyber and Security Assessments | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE: Alternative FuelsNovember 13, 2014Contributing DataDepartment of Energy CurrentCurrent

  17. Security and Cyber Guidance | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed offOCHCO Overview OCHCO OverviewRepository |Complex"DepartmentProgram under ARRAServices »

  18. OpenEI Community - cyber security

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are beingZealand Jump to: navigation, searchOfRoseConcernsCompany Oil and GasOff thedrivingGivenGhost"overview/0

  19. Strengthening Cyber Security | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYouTube YouTube Note: Since the.pdfBreakingMayDepartment of StaffingStorage Water HeatersYears 2003

  20. Strengthening Cyber Security | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn'tOriginEducationVideoStrategic Safety Goals Strategic Safety Goals JulyIntegratedDepartmentE n

  1. Information Technology Security for Small Business

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Magee, Joseph W.

    Information Technology Security for Small Business (video script) Descriptive Text for the Visually symbolic of information technology security and cyber crime. Narration: "No matter how well you protect, "Information Technology Security for Small Business" and "It's not just good business. It's essential business

  2. Guide to Critical Infrastructure Protection Cyber Vulnerability...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Infrastructure Protection Cyber Vulnerability Assessment More Documents & Publications Wireless System Considerations When Implementing NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection...

  3. Gone Rogue: An Analysis of Rogue Security Software Campaigns (Invited Paper)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yang, Junfeng

    victims. A troubling, recent example of this trend is cyber- criminals distributing rogue security or no protection. While the technical and economical aspects of rogue security software (e.g., its distribution programs are distributed by cyber- criminals to generate a financial profit. In fact, after the initial

  4. BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORYS CAPABILITIES FOR ADVANCED ANALYSES OF CYBER THREATS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DePhillips M. P.

    2014-06-06T23:59:59.000Z

    BNL has several ongoing, mature, and successful programs and areas of core scientific expertise that readily could be modified to address problems facing national security and efforts by the IC related to securing our nation’s computer networks. In supporting these programs, BNL houses an expansive, scalable infrastructure built exclusively for transporting, storing, and analyzing large disparate data-sets. Our ongoing research projects on various infrastructural issues in computer science undoubtedly would be relevant to national security. Furthermore, BNL frequently partners with researchers in academia and industry worldwide to foster unique and innovative ideas for expanding research opportunities and extending our insights. Because the basic science conducted at BNL is unique, such projects have led to advanced techniques, unlike any others, to support our mission of discovery. Many of them are modular techniques, thus making them ideal for abstraction and retrofitting to other uses including those facing national security, specifically the safety of the nation’s cyber space.

  5. The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) has created the ISSE) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have designated NPS as a Center of Academic Excellence in Information developments where cyber security is a concern. Information Systems Security Engineering (ISSE) Certificate

  6. Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector- January 2006

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This document, the Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector, outlines a coherent plan for improving cyber security in the energy sector. It is the result of an unprecedented...

  7. Cyberspace security system

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Abercrombie, Robert K; Sheldon, Frederick T; Ferragut, Erik M

    2014-06-24T23:59:59.000Z

    A system evaluates reliability, performance and/or safety by automatically assessing the targeted system's requirements. A cost metric quantifies the impact of failures as a function of failure cost per unit of time. The metrics or measurements may render real-time (or near real-time) outcomes by initiating active response against one or more high ranked threats. The system may support or may be executed in many domains including physical domains, cyber security domains, cyber-physical domains, infrastructure domains, etc. or any other domains that are subject to a threat or a loss.

  8. Minimax Control For Cyber-Physical Systems under Network Packet Scheduling Attacks

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johansson, Karl Henrik

    Minimax Control For Cyber-Physical Systems under Network Packet Scheduling Attacks Yasser Shoukry. Unfortunately, this re- liance on networks also brings new security vulnerabilities for con- trol systems. We and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwith- standing any copyright notation thereon. The views

  9. Towards a Framework for Cyber Attack Impact Analysis of the Electric Smart Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kundur, Deepa

    ? Is the information available through advanced cyber infrastructure worth the increased security risk? Vulnerability analysis for electric power utilities has begun to aid in answering these questions [11]­[13]. However influenced by the needs of electric power utilities. Section II introduces and motivates the problem of smart

  10. Emergent Behavior in Cybersecurity Example 2: Program VerificationExample 1: Cyber Epidemics

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Xu, Shouhuai

    Emergent Behavior in Cybersecurity Example 2: Program VerificationExample 1: Cyber Epidemics Informal Definition and Implication Abstract We argue that emergent behavior is inherent to cybersecurity: Cryptographic properties exhibit emergent behavior because there are functions that can be securely computed

  11. Lemnos Interoperable Security Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    John Stewart; Ron Halbgewachs; Adrian Chavez; Rhett Smith; David Teumim

    2012-01-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The manner in which the control systems are being designed and operated in the energy sector is undergoing some of the most significant changes in history due to the evolution of technology and the increasing number of interconnections to other system. With these changes however come two significant challenges that the energy sector must face; 1) Cyber security is more important than ever before, and 2) Cyber security is more complicated than ever before. A key requirement in helping utilities and vendors alike in meeting these challenges is interoperability. While interoperability has been present in much of the discussions relating to technology utilized within the energy sector and especially the Smart Grid, it has been absent in the context of cyber security. The Lemnos project addresses these challenges by focusing on the interoperability of devices utilized within utility control systems which support critical cyber security functions. In theory, interoperability is possible with many of the cyber security solutions available to utilities today. The reality is that the effort required to achieve cyber security interoperability is often a barrier for utilities. For example, consider IPSec, a widely-used Internet Protocol to define Virtual Private Networks, or â?? tunnelsâ?ť, to communicate securely through untrusted public and private networks. The IPSec protocol suite has a significant number of configuration options and encryption parameters to choose from, which must be agreed upon and adopted by both parties establishing the tunnel. The exercise in getting software or devices from different vendors to interoperate is labor intensive and requires a significant amount of security expertise by the end user. Scale this effort to a significant number of devices operating over a large geographical area and the challenge becomes so overwhelming that it often leads utilities to pursue solutions from a single vendor. These single vendor solutions may inadvertently lock utilities into proprietary and closed systems Lemnos is built on the successes of Open PCS Security Architecture for Interoperable Design (OPSAID), a previous DOE National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) project. It enhances security interoperability by identifying basic cyber security functions based on utility requirements and then selecting open source solutions, namely Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFCs, to support these functions. Once identified, specific configuration parameters for each RFC suitable for the electric utility control system environment are identified and documented. These configuration parameters are referred to as Interoperable Configuration Profiles (ICP) and their effectiveness within the utility control systems environment is verified with comprehensive testing as the final step in the process. The project focused on development of ICPs for four security protocols (IPsec, SSH, LDAP, and Syslog) which represent fundamental building blocks which can be utilized for securing utility control systems. These ICPs are product agnostic and can be applied modularly to any device (router, substation gateway, intelligent electronic device, etc.) within the utility control system as the end user deems necessary for their unique system architecture. The Lemnos Interoperable Security Program is a public-private partnership under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability's Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program and supports The Roadmap to Secure Energy Delivery Systems. In addition to EnerNex, the core team supporting the effort includes Tennessee Valley Authority, Sandia National Laboratories, and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. Adding to the core team effort is collaboration from additional industry participants in the project including the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Alien Vault, Cisco, Encore Networks, GarrettCom, Industrial Defender, N-Dimension Solutions, Phoenix Contact, RuggedCom, and Siemens.

  12. Safeguards and Security and Cyber Security RM | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn'tOrigin ofEnergy atLLC - FE DKT. 10-160-LNG - ORDERSTATE0-1 CHAPTER1the1-2009 May

  13. Information Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security Research and

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYouTube YouTube Note: Since the.pdfBreaking of BlytheDepartment of EnergyTreatmentInformationPlanDevelopment |

  14. Information Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security Research and

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport(Fact Sheet),EnergyImprovementINDIANManagement Governance

  15. DOE and Industry Showcase New Control Systems Security Technologies...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    and technologies designed to secure the nation's energy infrastructure from cyber attack on Tuesday through Thursday, March 23-25. Visit Booth 231 at the DistribuTECH 2010...

  16. A Scalable Framework for Cyber Attack Discovery and Situational...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Scalable Framework for Cyber Attack Discovery and Situational Understanding (SITU) May 15, 2013 Problem Statement: Cyber attacks cost commercial and governmental organizations vast...

  17. Protecting Intelligent Distributed Power Grids Against Cyber...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    will help protect intelligent distributed power grids from cyber attacks. Intelligent power grids are interdependent energy management systems-encompassing generation,...

  18. Assessment of current cybersecurity practices in the public domain : cyber indications and warnings domain.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hamlet, Jason R.; Keliiaa, Curtis M.

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report assesses current public domain cyber security practices with respect to cyber indications and warnings. It describes cybersecurity industry and government activities, including cybersecurity tools, methods, practices, and international and government-wide initiatives known to be impacting current practice. Of particular note are the U.S. Government's Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) and 'Einstein' programs, which are serving to consolidate the Government's internet access points and to provide some capability to monitor and mitigate cyber attacks. Next, this report catalogs activities undertaken by various industry and government entities. In addition, it assesses the benchmarks of HPC capability and other HPC attributes that may lend themselves to assist in the solution of this problem. This report draws few conclusions, as it is intended to assess current practice in preparation for future work, however, no explicit references to HPC usage for the purpose of analyzing cyber infrastructure in near-real-time were found in the current practice. This report and a related SAND2010-4766 National Cyber Defense High Performance Computing and Analysis: Concepts, Planning and Roadmap report are intended to provoke discussion throughout a broad audience about developing a cohesive HPC centric solution to wide-area cybersecurity problems.

  19. Graph anomalies in cyber communications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vander Wiel, Scott A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Storlie, Curtis B [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandine, Gary [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hagberg, Aric A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fisk, Michael [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-11T23:59:59.000Z

    Enterprises monitor cyber traffic for viruses, intruders and stolen information. Detection methods look for known signatures of malicious traffic or search for anomalies with respect to a nominal reference model. Traditional anomaly detection focuses on aggregate traffic at central nodes or on user-level monitoring. More recently, however, traffic is being viewed more holistically as a dynamic communication graph. Attention to the graph nature of the traffic has expanded the types of anomalies that are being sought. We give an overview of several cyber data streams collected at Los Alamos National Laboratory and discuss current work in modeling the graph dynamics of traffic over the network. We consider global properties and local properties within the communication graph. A method for monitoring relative entropy on multiple correlated properties is discussed in detail.

  20. August 2012 CIP Report Focuses on Smart Grid Security

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The August 2012 issue of The CIP Report from George Mason University's Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security highlights the significance and challenges to securing the smart grid. The report includes an overview of smart grid security by Deputy Assistant Secretary Hank Kenchington and the findings for reducing cyber risks from the Workshop on Securing the Smart Grid: Best Practices in Supply Chain Security, Integrity, and Resilience.

  1. Accumulating Automata and Cascaded Equations Automata for Communicationless Information Theoretically Secure Multi-Party Computation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    number 428/11), Cabarnit Cyber Security MAGNET Consortium, Grant from the Institute for Future Defense;1 Introduction Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a powerful concept in secure distributed computing Theoretically Secure Multi-Party Computation (Preliminary Report) Shlomi Dolev1 and Niv Gilboa2 and Ximing Li1 1

  2. Engineering Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Engineering Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems Future Grid Thrust Area 6 White Paper Power Systems Engineering Research Center Empowering Minds to Engineer the Future Electric Energy System #12;Thrust Area 6 White Paper Engineering Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems Project Team Thomas J. Overbye University

  3. Cyber-Physical System Verification Embedded Systems Group

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Berns, Karsten

    (Felipe Bichued) 21 Introducing Simulation of Hybrid Systems with the Modelica Tool 32 #12;Cyber Physical

  4. AC 2010-2361: REU PROGRAM IN TELEMATICS AND CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS: SHARING STRATEGIES, EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS LEARNED

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mahmud, Syed Masud

    AC 2010-2361: REU PROGRAM IN TELEMATICS AND CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS: SHARING STRATEGIES, EXPERIENCE processing, embedded systems, in-vehicle networking, performance analysis of networking protocols, secure of Electrical and Computer Engineer of Wayne State University. His research interests lie in distributed

  5. A Framework for Modeling Cyber-Physical Switching Attacks in Smart Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Liu, Shan; Mashayekh, Salman; Kundur, Deepa; Zourntos, Takis; Butler-Purry, Karen

    2014-01-02T23:59:59.000Z

    and demonstrate how existence of the switching vulnerability is dependent on the local structure of the power grid. We identify and demonstrate how through successful cyber intrusion and local knowledge of the grid an opponent can compute and apply a coordinated... providing opponent(s) opportunities for remotely controlling physical power system components such as modern circuit breakers possibly via illicit security breaches and intrusion. Thus, our vulnerability is applicable to a smart grid system with remotely...

  6. Running Amok in Labyrinthine Systems: The Cyber-Behaviorist Origins of Soft Torture

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lemov, Rebecca

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Labyrinthine Systems: The Cyber-Behaviorist Origins of SoftLabyrinthine Systems: The Cyber-Behaviorist Origins of Soft

  7. Control Systems Security Test Center - FY 2004 Program Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert E. Polk; Alen M. Snyder

    2005-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In May 2004, the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center (CSSC) was established at Idaho National Laboratory to execute assessment activities to reduce the vulnerability of the nation’s critical infrastructure control systems to terrorist attack. The CSSC implements a program to accomplish the five goals presented in the US-CERT National Strategy for Control Systems Security. This report summarizes the first year funding of startup activities and program achievements that took place in FY 2004 and early FY 2005. This document was prepared for the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center of the National Cyber Security Division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS has been tasked under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to coordinate the overall national effort to enhance the protection of the national critical infrastructure. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-7 directs federal departments to identify and prioritize the critical infrastructure and protect it from terrorist attack. The US-CERT National Strategy for Control Systems Security was prepared by the National Cyber Security Division to address the control system security component addressed in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. The US-CERT National Strategy for Control Systems Security identified five high-level strategic goals for improving cyber security of control systems.

  8. Protecting Intelligent Distributed Power Grids against Cyber Attacks

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dong Wei; Yan Lu; Mohsen Jafari; Paul Skare; Kenneth Rohde

    2010-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Like other industrial sectors, the electrical power industry is facing challenges involved with the increasing demand for interconnected operations and control. The electrical industry has largely been restructured due to deregulation of the electrical market and the trend of the Smart Grid. This moves new automation systems from being proprietary and closed to the current state of Information Technology (IT) being highly interconnected and open. However, while gaining all of the scale and performance benefits of IT, existing IT security challenges are acquired as well. The power grid automation network has inherent security risks due to the fact that the systems and applications for the power grid were not originally designed for the general IT environment. In this paper, we propose a conceptual layered framework for protecting power grid automation systems against cyber attacks. The following factors are taken into account: (1) integration with existing, legacy systems in a non-intrusive fashion; (2) desirable performance in terms of modularity, scalability, extendibility, and manageability; (3) alignment to the 'Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector' and the future smart grid. The on-site system test of the developed prototype security system is briefly presented as well.

  9. Addressing the Challenges of Anomaly Detection for Cyber Physical Energy Grid Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ferragut, Erik M [ORNL; Laska, Jason A [ORNL; Melin, Alexander M [ORNL; Czejdo, Bogdan [ORNL

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The consolidation of cyber communications networks and physical control systems within the energy smart grid introduces a number of new risks. Unfortunately, these risks are largely unknown and poorly understood, yet include very high impact losses from attack and component failures. One important aspect of risk management is the detection of anomalies and changes. However, anomaly detection within cyber security remains a difficult, open problem, with special challenges in dealing with false alert rates and heterogeneous data. Furthermore, the integration of cyber and physical dynamics is often intractable. And, because of their broad scope, energy grid cyber-physical systems must be analyzed at multiple scales, from individual components, up to network level dynamics. We describe an improved approach to anomaly detection that combines three important aspects. First, system dynamics are modeled using a reduced order model for greater computational tractability. Second, a probabilistic and principled approach to anomaly detection is adopted that allows for regulation of false alerts and comparison of anomalies across heterogeneous data sources. Third, a hierarchy of aggregations are constructed to support interactive and automated analyses of anomalies at multiple scales.

  10. Approaches for scalable modeling and emulation of cyber systems : LDRD final report.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mayo, Jackson R.; Minnich, Ronald G.; Armstrong, Robert C.; Rudish, Don W.

    2009-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The goal of this research was to combine theoretical and computational approaches to better understand the potential emergent behaviors of large-scale cyber systems, such as networks of {approx} 10{sup 6} computers. The scale and sophistication of modern computer software, hardware, and deployed networked systems have significantly exceeded the computational research community's ability to understand, model, and predict current and future behaviors. This predictive understanding, however, is critical to the development of new approaches for proactively designing new systems or enhancing existing systems with robustness to current and future cyber threats, including distributed malware such as botnets. We have developed preliminary theoretical and modeling capabilities that can ultimately answer questions such as: How would we reboot the Internet if it were taken down? Can we change network protocols to make them more secure without disrupting existing Internet connectivity and traffic flow? We have begun to address these issues by developing new capabilities for understanding and modeling Internet systems at scale. Specifically, we have addressed the need for scalable network simulation by carrying out emulations of a network with {approx} 10{sup 6} virtualized operating system instances on a high-performance computing cluster - a 'virtual Internet'. We have also explored mappings between previously studied emergent behaviors of complex systems and their potential cyber counterparts. Our results provide foundational capabilities for further research toward understanding the effects of complexity in cyber systems, to allow anticipating and thwarting hackers.

  11. Running head: A Systematic Approach to Secure System Design 1 Towards a More Systematic Approach to Secure Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Aickelin, Uwe

    advice given to software system designers. A set of thirty nine cyber-security experts took part ratings of their components. We show that when aggregated, a coherent consensus view of security emerges of this is that the cybersecurity of information systems has become an increasing concern. Assessing the level of risk posed

  12. Naval Postgraduate School Cyber Academic Group Graduation Checklist for MS Cyber Systems and Operations (CSO) Degree

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Environment (3-2) ________ ___CY4700 Cyber Wargame: Blue Force Operations (2-5) ________ ___CY4710 Cyber Strategy & Policy (4-2) ________ ___NW3275 Joint Maritime Operations Part 1 (4-0) ________ ___NW3276 Joint and Operations (CSO) Degree 6208P Subspecialty Code (Effective for students commencing Fall AY11 to Winter AY13

  13. Investigating the effectiveness of many-core network processors for high performance cyber protection systems. Part I, FY2011.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wheeler, Kyle Bruce; Naegle, John Hunt; Wright, Brian J.; Benner, Robert E., Jr.; Shelburg, Jeffrey Scott; Pearson, David Benjamin; Johnson, Joshua Alan; Onunkwo, Uzoma A.; Zage, David John; Patel, Jay S.

    2011-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report documents our first year efforts to address the use of many-core processors for high performance cyber protection. As the demands grow for higher bandwidth (beyond 1 Gbits/sec) on network connections, the need to provide faster and more efficient solution to cyber security grows. Fortunately, in recent years, the development of many-core network processors have seen increased interest. Prior working experiences with many-core processors have led us to investigate its effectiveness for cyber protection tools, with particular emphasis on high performance firewalls. Although advanced algorithms for smarter cyber protection of high-speed network traffic are being developed, these advanced analysis techniques require significantly more computational capabilities than static techniques. Moreover, many locations where cyber protections are deployed have limited power, space and cooling resources. This makes the use of traditionally large computing systems impractical for the front-end systems that process large network streams; hence, the drive for this study which could potentially yield a highly reconfigurable and rapidly scalable solution.

  14. SMB Information Security Seminar (2013) Exercise 4 Actions taken to maintain awareness of

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Magee, Joseph W.

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    SMB Information Security Seminar (2013) Exercise 4 Actions taken to maintain awareness of threats note of the data security issues covered in these publications. Ask yourself "Is my business vulnerable network with your peers, talk about cyber security issues. Give and get advice, hints, tips, etc. 4. Make

  15. cyber

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysisDarby Dietrich5 |0/%2A en6/%2A en2/%2A en8/%2A

  16. A Mathematical Framework for the Analysis of Cyber-Resilient Control Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Melin, Alexander M [ORNL; Ferragut, Erik M [ORNL; Laska, Jason A [ORNL; Fugate, David L [ORNL; Kisner, Roger [ORNL

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The increasingly recognized vulnerability of industrial control systems to cyber-attacks has inspired a considerable amount of research into techniques for cyber-resilient control systems. The majority of this effort involves the application of well known information security (IT) techniques to control system networks. While these efforts are important to protect the control systems that operate critical infrastructure, they are never perfectly effective. Little research has focused on the design of closed-loop dynamics that are resilient to cyber-attack. The majority of control system protection measures are concerned with how to prevent unauthorized access and protect data integrity. We believe that the ability to analyze how an attacker can effect the closed loop dynamics of a control system configuration once they have access is just as important to the overall security of a control system. To begin to analyze this problem, consistent mathematical definitions of concepts within resilient control need to be established so that a mathematical analysis of the vulnerabilities and resiliencies of a particular control system design methodology and configuration can be made. In this paper, we propose rigorous definitions for state awareness, operational normalcy, and resiliency as they relate to control systems. We will also discuss some mathematical consequences that arise from the proposed definitions. The goal is to begin to develop a mathematical framework and testable conditions for resiliency that can be used to build a sound theoretical foundation for resilient control research.

  17. Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems -- Part II: Centralized and Distributed Monitor Design

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pasqualetti, Fabio; Bullo, Francesco

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber-physical systems integrate computation, communication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber-physical systems are prone to malicious attacks so that specific analysis tools and monitoring mechanisms need to be developed to enforce system security and reliability. This paper builds upon the results presented in our companion paper [1] and proposes centralized and distributed monitors for attack detection and identification. First, we design optimal centralized attack detection and identification monitors. Optimality refers to the ability of detecting (respectively identifying) every detectable (respectively identifiable) attack. Second, we design an optimal distributed attack detection filter based upon a waveform relaxation technique. Third, we show that the attack identification problem is computationally hard, and we design a sub-optimal distributed attack identification procedure with performance guarantees. Finally, we illustr...

  18. National Security Initiatives | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated CodesTransparency VisitSilver Toyota1Resource forNational Cyber Security

  19. Sandia Energy - Cyber Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL)

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Scienceand RequirementsCoatings Initiated at PNNL's SequimReactors To ReceiveCyber HomeCyber

  20. Unclassified Distribution

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over OurThe Iron Spin TransitionProgram |FrankUltrafastHydrogenTecnica) |63 1

  1. Abstract--Network security against possible attacks involves making decisions under uncertainty. Not only may one be

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    ], security in wireless networks [12], [13] and cyber-security [14], [15], [16]. In [17] the readers can find1 Abstract--Network security against possible attacks involves making decisions under uncertainty for a further DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) botnet attack on servers). Due to limited defense

  2. Foreign National Access to DOE Cyber Systems

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1999-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    DOE N 205.16, dated 9-15-05, extends this Notice until 9-30-06, unless sooner rescinded. To ensure foreign national access to DOE cyber systems continues to advance DOE program objectives while enforcing information access restrictions.

  3. Control System Applicable Use Assessment of the Secure Computing Corporation - Secure Firewall (Sidewinder)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hadley, Mark D.; Clements, Samuel L.

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Battelle’s National Security & Defense objective is, “applying unmatched expertise and unique facilities to deliver homeland security solutions. From detection and protection against weapons of mass destruction to emergency preparedness/response and protection of critical infrastructure, we are working with industry and government to integrate policy, operational, technological, and logistical parameters that will secure a safe future”. In an ongoing effort to meet this mission, engagements with industry that are intended to improve operational and technical attributes of commercial solutions that are related to national security initiatives are necessary. This necessity will ensure that capabilities for protecting critical infrastructure assets are considered by commercial entities in their development, design, and deployment lifecycles thus addressing the alignment of identified deficiencies and improvements needed to support national cyber security initiatives. The Secure Firewall (Sidewinder) appliance by Secure Computing was assessed for applicable use in critical infrastructure control system environments, such as electric power, nuclear and other facilities containing critical systems that require augmented protection from cyber threat. The testing was performed in the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) Electric Infrastructure Operations Center (EIOC). The Secure Firewall was tested in a network configuration that emulates a typical control center network and then evaluated. A number of observations and recommendations are included in this report relating to features currently included in the Secure Firewall that support critical infrastructure security needs.

  4. Cyber-T web server: differential analysis of high-throughput data

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kayala, M. A; Baldi, P.

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    10.1093/nar/gks420 Cyber-T web server: differential analysisin the Cyber-T web server, is one of the most widelyan update to the Cyber-T web server, incorporating several

  5. SuperIdentity: Fusion of Identity across Real and Cyber Domains

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Black, Sue; Creese, Sadie; Guest, Richard; Pike, William A.; Saxby, Steven; Stanton Fraser, Danae; Stevenage, Sarah; Whitty, Monica

    2012-04-23T23:59:59.000Z

    Under both benign and malign circumstances, people now manage a spectrum of identities across both real-world and cyber domains. Our belief, however, is that all these instances ultimately track back for an individual to reflect a single 'SuperIdentity'. This paper outlines the assumptions underpinning the SuperIdentity Project, describing the innovative use of data fusion to incorporate novel real-world and cyber cues into a rich framework appropriate for modern identity. The proposed combinatorial model will support a robust identification or authentication decision, with confidence indexed both by the level of trust in data provenance, and the diagnosticity of the identity factors being used. Additionally, the exploration of correlations between factors may underpin the more intelligent use of identity information so that known information may be used to predict previously hidden information. With modern living supporting the 'distribution of identity' across real and cyber domains, and with criminal elements operating in increasingly sophisticated ways in the hinterland between the two, this approach is suggested as a way forwards, and is discussed in terms of its impact on privacy, security, and the detection of threat.

  6. National cyber defense high performance computing and analysis : concepts, planning and roadmap.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hamlet, Jason R.; Keliiaa, Curtis M.

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    There is a national cyber dilemma that threatens the very fabric of government, commercial and private use operations worldwide. Much is written about 'what' the problem is, and though the basis for this paper is an assessment of the problem space, we target the 'how' solution space of the wide-area national information infrastructure through the advancement of science, technology, evaluation and analysis with actionable results intended to produce a more secure national information infrastructure and a comprehensive national cyber defense capability. This cybersecurity High Performance Computing (HPC) analysis concepts, planning and roadmap activity was conducted as an assessment of cybersecurity analysis as a fertile area of research and investment for high value cybersecurity wide-area solutions. This report and a related SAND2010-4765 Assessment of Current Cybersecurity Practices in the Public Domain: Cyber Indications and Warnings Domain report are intended to provoke discussion throughout a broad audience about developing a cohesive HPC centric solution to wide-area cybersecurity problems.

  7. OIA: Office of Contract Assurance: Assurance Systems: Cyber Security...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    (QA) It is the policy of the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) to carry out all activities in a reliable, safe and quality manner. To help fulfill...

  8. DOE CYBER SECURITY EBK: MINIMUM CORE COMPETENCY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    incident characterization (i.e., Type 1 or Type 2) and categorization (i.e., low, medium, high, or very high). * Respond to and report incidents within mandated timeframes...

  9. Implementation of a Cyber Secure Control System, Critical Elements...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    - For SPIDERS II - Collaborative Intelligence - Fail safe operation Auto-optimization - Meets user needs (cost, efficiency, emissions) Inherent Resiliency - Multiple...

  10. Cyber Security Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit: Bandolier and

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,Office of Policy, OAPM | Department of Energy Current5 by ISA -

  11. Cyber Security Evaluations Appraisal Process Guide - April 2008 |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,Office of Policy, OAPM | Department of Energy Current5 by ISA -Department of

  12. DOE CYBER SECURITY EBK: MINIMUM CORE COMPETENCY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,Office of Policy, OAPM | DepartmentIOffshoreDepartmentBegins Demoltion

  13. Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Cyber Security

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed offOCHCO2:Introduction toManagementOPAM PolicyOf Environmental Management MajorElectricity

  14. Before the House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cyber Security and

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: The FutureComments fromofBatteries fromEnvironment |Energy Henry

  15. Cyber Security Expert Jim Mellander Retires from NERSC

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625govInstrumentstdmadapInactiveVisitingContract Management Fermi Site OfficeCoursePublicCurrentCurtis C.

  16. Common Cyber Security Vulnerabilities Observed in Control System

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613PortsmouthBartlesville EnergyDepartment. CashDay-JuneOffice of

  17. Cyber Assessment Methods for SCADA Security | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613PortsmouthBartlesvilleAbout » Contact UsDepartment of Energy Cut Gas Costs

  18. Lessons Learned from Cyber Security Assessments of SCADA and Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport(FactDepartment ofLetter Report:40PMDepartment ofs o u t h e22

  19. INL Cyber Security Research (2008) | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742Energy ChinaofSchaefer To:Department ofOral TestimonyEnergyFindingINFORMATION ON THE

  20. Strategy for Improvements in Cyber Security | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed offOCHCO Overview OCHCO OverviewRepositoryManagementFacility inStatementDepartmentPrograms

  1. 2014 Headquarters Facilities Master Security Plan - Chapter 14, Cyber

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed off Energy.gov. Are you0 ARRA Newsletters 2010 ARRA Newsletters American20122Awareness

  2. Lab hosts multi-lab cyber security games

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated Codes |Is Your Home asLCLS ExperimentalFive R&D awards formuonLab hosts

  3. The Department's Cyber Security Incident Management Program, IG-0787 |

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directedAnnual Siteof Energy 2, 2015 - JanuaryTank 48HPublic Dissemination of U.S. Department

  4. Continuous Monitoring And Cyber Security For High Performance Computing |

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power Administration would likeConstitution And Bylaws |ContactFlow Diffusion ChamberSciTech

  5. Control Systems Cyber Security: Defense in Depth Strategies | Department of

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: Theof"Wave theJuly 30, 2013 Sanyo:March 2013) 1Department ofReserveEnergy

  6. Cyber Assessment Methods for SCADA Security | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: Theof"Wave theJuly 30,Crafty Gifts forHeavy-Duty| DepartmentAir

  7. Lessons Learned from Cyber Security Assessments of SCADA and Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYouTube YouTube Note: Since the.pdfBreaking ofOil & Gas »of EnergyLearningMarch 2015 Lessons LearnedManagement

  8. Common Cyber Security Vulnerabilities Observed in Control System

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: Theof"Wave the WhiteNational| Department ofCommittee Report for

  9. of Western Area Power Administration's Cyber Security Program

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently20,000 Russian Nuclearand Characterization ofC u r r e n t I s s u e s C u r r

  10. Department of Energy's July 2013 Cyber Security Breach

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed off Energy.gov. Are you0andEnergyGlobal Nuclearof aDepartment oftheAL 2010-5Department ofSpecial

  11. INL Cyber Security Research (2008) | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYouTube YouTube Note: Since the.pdfBreaking of Blythe SolarContaminationCurrentHydronic71INFOGRAPHIC: Wind EnergyINL

  12. NNSA Seeking Comments on Consolidated IT and Cyber Security Support

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742Energy China 2015of 2005 attheMohammed Khan - TechnologyJanuary 29,guidanceDepartment

  13. Management of Naval Reactors' Cyber Security Program, OIG-0884

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport(FactDepartment ofLetterEconomyDr.Energy University ofOverviewManagement of

  14. NIST Finalizes Initial Set of Smart Grid Cyber Security Guidelines |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently Asked QuestionsDepartment of Energy 3ServicesNEET FYNETLAwardNIF

  15. NNSA Seeking Comments on Consolidated IT and Cyber Security Support

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently Asked QuestionsDepartment of Energy 3ServicesNEETfor Acquisition andServices Draft

  16. Supervisory Control Strategies for Enhancing System Security and Privacy Christoforos N. Hadjicostis

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hadjicostis, Christoforos

    cyber-infrastructures (ranging from defense and banking to health care and power distribution sys- temsSupervisory Control Strategies for Enhancing System Security and Privacy Christoforos N. Hadjicostis Abstract-- Enhancing the security and reliability of auto- mated systems that control vital

  17. Towards a Secure Email Service for The Future Muhammad Shoaib Saleem and Eric Renault

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Paris-Sud XI, Université de

    content distribution, user privacy and security, naming and addressing, routing and name resolutionTowards a Secure Email Service for The Future Internet Muhammad Shoaib Saleem and ´Eric Renault.renault}@it-sudparis.eu Abstract--Email is one of the most used application over the Internet and it is vulnerable to cyber attacks

  18. Assessing Power Substation Network Security and Survivability: A Work in Progress Report1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Krings, Axel W.

    critical infrastructure systems identified was the electric power grid since this system supports all other: Cyber security, electric power security, assessment techniques 1. Introduction The on-going problem non-military infrastructures. Power grid vulnerabilities and mitigations were documented in the PCCIP

  19. SESSION: CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY IN A SMART GRID ENVIROMENT 1 Cyber-Security of SCADA Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johansson, Karl Henrik

    . I. INTRODUCTION THE electric power transmission system is probably the most vital infrastructure] proposed a framework in order to clarify the interaction between the power system and the IT infrastructure are with the Power Systems Laboratory, Department of Electrical Engineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology

  20. Microsoft Word - Cyber Effects Analysis Using VCSE 09.doc

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Unlimited Release Printed September 2008 Cyber Effects Analysis Using VCSE Promoting Control System Reliability Michael J. McDonald, Gregory N. Conrad, Travis C. Service, Regis...

  1. The NIAC Convergence of Physical and Cyber Technbologies and...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    and cyber technologies for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and process control systems and their consolidated network management. The Working Group convened a...

  2. Quantitative Cyber Risk Reduction Estimation Methodology for a Small Scada Control System

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miles A. McQueen; Wayne F. Boyer; Mark A. Flynn; George A. Beitel

    2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    We propose a new methodology for obtaining a quick quantitative measurement of the risk reduction achieved when a control system is modified with the intent to improve cyber security defense against external attackers. The proposed methodology employs a directed graph called a compromise graph, where the nodes represent stages of a potential attack and the edges represent the expected time-to-compromise for differing attacker skill levels. Time-to-compromise is modeled as a function of known vulnerabilities and attacker skill level. The methodology was used to calculate risk reduction estimates for a specific SCADA system and for a specific set of control system security remedial actions. Despite an 86% reduction in the total number of vulnerabilities, the estimated time-to-compromise was increased only by about 3 to 30% depending on target and attacker skill level.

  3. Agent-based Cyber Control Strategy Design for Resilient Control Systems: Concepts, Architecture and Methodologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Craig Rieger; Milos Manic; Miles McQueen

    2012-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The implementation of automated regulatory control has been around since the middle of the last century through analog means. It has allowed engineers to operate the plant more consistently by focusing on overall operations and settings instead of individual monitoring of local instruments (inside and outside of a control room). A similar approach is proposed for cyber security, where current border-protection designs have been inherited from information technology developments that lack consideration of the high-reliability, high consequence nature of industrial control systems. Instead of an independent development, however, an integrated approach is taken to develop a holistic understanding of performance. This performance takes shape inside a multiagent design, which provides a notional context to model highly decentralized and complex industrial process control systems, the nervous system of critical infrastructure. The resulting strategy will provide a framework for researching solutions to security and unrecognized interdependency concerns with industrial control systems.

  4. COST FUNCTIONS FOR SCHEDULING TASKS IN CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Massachusetts at Amherst, University of

    COST FUNCTIONS FOR SCHEDULING TASKS IN CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS Abhinna Jain, C.M. Krishna, Israel, cost functions, controlled plant dynamics Abstract: In Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), computational response times are different. In this paper, we consider using cost functions of task response time

  5. Cyber Threat Trees for Large System Threat Cataloging and Analysis*

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Thornton, Mitchell

    Cyber Threat Trees for Large System Threat Cataloging and Analysis* P. Ongsakorn, K. Turney, M, kturney, mitch, nair, szygenda, manikas}@lyle.smu.edu Abstract--The implementation of cyber threat. Because large systems have many possible threats that may be interdependent, it is crucial

  6. Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bullo, Francesco

    Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems Fabio Pasqualetti, Florian D of unforeseen failures and external malicious attacks. In this paper (i) we propose a mathematical framework for cyber- physical systems, attacks, and monitors; (ii) we characterize fundamental monitoring limitations

  7. Open Cyber-Architecture for Electrical Energy Markets

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gunes, Mehmet Hadi

    and robust power grid, which is less vulnerable to blackouts due to cascaded events, this paper discusses-owner infrastructure systems are many, we focus on the power grid in this paper. We propose an "Open CyberOpen Cyber-Architecture for Electrical Energy Markets M. Yuksel, K. Bekris, C. Y. Evrenosoglu, M. H

  8. Development and Demonstration of a Security Core Component

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Turke, Andy

    2014-02-28T23:59:59.000Z

    In recent years, the convergence of a number of trends has resulted in Cyber Security becoming a much greater concern for electric utilities. A short list of these trends includes: · Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have evolved from depending on proprietary hardware and operating software toward using standard off-the-shelf hardware and operating software. This has meant that these ICSs can no longer depend on “security through obscurity. · Similarly, these same systems have evolved toward using standard communications protocols, further reducing their ability to rely upon obscurity. · The rise of the Internet and the accompanying demand for more data about virtually everything has resulted in formerly isolated ICSs becoming at least partially accessible via Internet-connected networks. · “Cyber crime” has become commonplace, whether it be for industrial espionage, reconnaissance for a possible cyber attack, theft, or because some individual or group “has something to prove.” Electric utility system operators are experts at running the power grid. The reality is, especially at small and mid-sized utilities, these SCADA operators will by default be “on the front line” if and when a cyber attack occurs against their systems. These people are not computer software, networking, or cyber security experts, so they are ill-equipped to deal with a cyber security incident. Cyber Security Manager (CSM) was conceived, designed, and built so that it can be configured to know what a utility’s SCADA/EMS/DMS system looks like under normal conditions. To do this, CSM monitors log messages from any device that uses the syslog standard. It can also monitor a variety of statistics from the computers that make up the SCADA/EMS/DMS: outputs from host-based security tools, intrusion detection systems, SCADA alarms, and real-time SCADA values – even results from a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) system. When the system deviates from “normal,” CSM can alert the operator in language that they understand that an incident may be occurring, provide actionable intelligence, and informing them what actions to take. These alarms may be viewed on CSM’s built-in user interface, sent to a SCADA alarm list, or communicated via email, phone, pager, or SMS message. In recognition of the fact that “real world” training for cyber security events is impractical, CSM has a built-in Operator Training Simulator capability. This can be used stand alone to create simulated event scenarios for training purposes. It may also be used in conjunction with the recipient’s SCADA/EMS/DMS Operator Training Simulator. In addition to providing cyber security situational awareness for electric utility operators, CSM also provides tools for analysts and support personnel; in fact, the majority of user interface displays are designed for use in analyzing current and past security events. CSM keeps security-related information in long-term storage, as well as writing any decisions it makes to a (syslog) log for use forensic or other post-event analysis.

  9. Certification and Accreditation Process for Information Systems Including National Security Systems

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-02-19T23:59:59.000Z

    The Notice ensures the effectiveness of security controls on DOE Federal information systems including national security systems. The Notice will also ensure compliance with the requirements of DOE O 205.1, Department of Energy Cyber Security Management Program, dated 3-21-03, and protect DOE information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, or destruction. No cancellations. DOE N 205.15, dated 3-18-05, extends this directive until 3-18-06.

  10. Cyber Train Videos | The Ames Laboratory

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625govInstrumentstdmadapInactiveVisitingContract Management Fermi Site OfficeCoursePublicCurrentCurtis C.Cyber Train

  11. Office of Cyber Assessments | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613 122Commercial602 1,39732onMake YourDepartment ofC T O B EOff-GridCyber Assessments

  12. Sandia Energy - Cyber-Based Vulnerability Assessments

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Scienceand RequirementsCoatings Initiated at PNNL's SequimReactors To ReceiveCyber

  13. Cyber Train Complete Training | The Ames Laboratory

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power Administration would likeConstitution4Customer-Comments Sign In About |Cyber

  14. Cyber Train Overview | The Ames Laboratory

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power Administration would likeConstitution4Customer-Comments Sign In About |Cyber

  15. Terry Benzel, Bob Braden, Dongho Kim, Cliford Neuman. Anthony Joseph and Keith Sklower Ron Ostrenga and Stephen Schwab, Experience with DETER: A Testbed for Security Research. 2nd IEEE Conference on testbeds and Research Infrastructures for the

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Joseph, Anthony D.

    network attacks such as distributed denial of service, worms, and viruses. These cyber-security problems and Stephen Schwab, Experience with DETER: A Testbed for Security Research. 2nd IEEE Conference on testbeds 2006 IEEE EXPERIENCE WITH DETER: A TESTBED FOR SECURITY RESEARCH Terry Benzel, Robert Braden, Dongho

  16. SWOON: A Testbed for Secure Wireless Overlay Networks Y. L. Huang, J. D. Tygar, H. Y. Lin, L. Y. Yeh, H. Y. Tsai, K. Sklower, S. P. Shieh, C. C. Wu,

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Tygar, Doug

    SWOON: A Testbed for Secure Wireless Overlay Networks Y. L. Huang, J. D. Tygar, H. Y. Lin, L. Y There is strong demand for solutions to security problems in various wireless networks, such as WiFi, WiMAX, 3GPP heterogeneous wireless networks, such as WSN, WiMAX or 3GPP. 1 Introduction Cyber-security problems need special

  17. Modeling Cyber Conflicts Using an Extended Petri Net Formalism

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zakrzewska, Anita N [ORNL; Ferragut, Erik M [ORNL

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    When threatened by automated attacks, critical systems that require human-controlled responses have difficulty making optimal responses and adapting protections in real- time and may therefore be overwhelmed. Consequently, experts have called for the development of automatic real-time reaction capabilities. However, a technical gap exists in the modeling and analysis of cyber conflicts to automatically understand the repercussions of responses. There is a need for modeling cyber assets that accounts for concurrent behavior, incomplete information, and payoff functions. Furthermore, we address this need by extending the Petri net formalism to allow real-time cyber conflicts to be modeled in a way that is expressive and concise. This formalism includes transitions controlled by players as well as firing rates attached to transitions. This allows us to model both player actions and factors that are beyond the control of players in real-time. We show that our formalism is able to represent situational aware- ness, concurrent actions, incomplete information and objective functions. These factors make it well-suited to modeling cyber conflicts in a way that allows for useful analysis. MITRE has compiled the Common Attack Pattern Enumera- tion and Classification (CAPEC), an extensive list of cyber attacks at various levels of abstraction. CAPEC includes factors such as attack prerequisites, possible countermeasures, and attack goals. These elements are vital to understanding cyber attacks and to generating the corresponding real-time responses. We demonstrate that the formalism can be used to extract precise models of cyber attacks from CAPEC. Several case studies show that our Petri net formalism is more expressive than other models, such as attack graphs, for modeling cyber conflicts and that it is amenable to exploring cyber strategies.

  18. Security Policy

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Security Policy analyzes, develops and interprets safeguards and security policy governing national security functions and the protection of related critical assets entrusted to the...

  19. Real-Time SCADA Cyber Protection Using Compression Techniques

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lyle G. Roybal; Gordon H Rueff

    2013-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) has a critical mission to secure the energy infrastructure from cyber attack. Through DOE-OE’s Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed a method to detect malicious traffic on Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network using a data compression technique. SCADA network traffic is often repetitive with only minor differences between packets. Research performed at the INL showed that SCADA network traffic has traits desirable for using compression analysis to identify abnormal network traffic. An open source implementation of a Lempel-Ziv-Welch (LZW) lossless data compression algorithm was used to compress and analyze surrogate SCADA traffic. Infected SCADA traffic was found to have statistically significant differences in compression when compared against normal SCADA traffic at the packet level. The initial analyses and results are clearly able to identify malicious network traffic from normal traffic at the packet level with a very high confidence level across multiple ports and traffic streams. Statistical differentiation between infected and normal traffic level was possible using a modified data compression technique at the 99% probability level for all data analyzed. However, the conditions tested were rather limited in scope and need to be expanded into more realistic simulations of hacking events using techniques and approaches that are better representative of a real-world attack on a SCADA system. Nonetheless, the use of compression techniques to identify malicious traffic on SCADA networks in real time appears to have significant merit for infrastructure protection.

  20. Ruminati : modeling the detection of textual cyber-bullying

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dinakar, Karthik

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The scourge of cyber-bullying has received widespread attention at all levels of society including parents, educators, adolescents, social scientists, psychiatrists and policy makers at the highest echelons of power. ...

  1. Cyber Vulnerability Disclosure Policies for the Department of Electrical and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Manimaran, Govindarasu

    Cyber Vulnerability Disclosure Policies for the Smart Grid Adam Hahn Department of Electrical ATTRIBUTES The "Vulnerability Disclosure Framework" developed by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Iowa State University Ames, IA 50011 Email: gmani

  2. Integration of wireless sensor networks in environmental monitoring cyber infrastructure

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Huang, Yan

    Integration of wireless sensor networks in environmental monitoring cyber infrastructure Jue Yang Ă? to revolutionize many science and engineering domains. We present a novel environmental monitoring system collection, management, visualization, dissemination, and exchange, conforming to the new Sensor Web

  3. A Statistical Model for Generating a Population of Unclassified Objects and Radiation Signatures Spanning Nuclear Threats

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nelson, K; Sokkappa, P

    2008-10-29T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes an approach for generating a simulated population of plausible nuclear threat radiation signatures spanning a range of variability that could be encountered by radiation detection systems. In this approach, we develop a statistical model for generating random instances of smuggled nuclear material. The model is based on physics principles and bounding cases rather than on intelligence information or actual threat device designs. For this initial stage of work, we focus on random models using fissile material and do not address scenarios using non-fissile materials. The model has several uses. It may be used as a component in a radiation detection system performance simulation to generate threat samples for injection studies. It may also be used to generate a threat population to be used for training classification algorithms. In addition, we intend to use this model to generate an unclassified 'benchmark' threat population that can be openly shared with other organizations, including vendors, for use in radiation detection systems performance studies and algorithm development and evaluation activities. We assume that a quantity of fissile material is being smuggled into the country for final assembly and that shielding may have been placed around the fissile material. In terms of radiation signature, a nuclear weapon is basically a quantity of fissile material surrounded by various layers of shielding. Thus, our model of smuggled material is expected to span the space of potential nuclear weapon signatures as well. For computational efficiency, we use a generic 1-dimensional spherical model consisting of a fissile material core surrounded by various layers of shielding. The shielding layers and their configuration are defined such that the model can represent the potential range of attenuation and scattering that might occur. The materials in each layer and the associated parameters are selected from probability distributions that span the range of possibilities. Once an object is generated, its radiation signature is calculated using a 1-dimensional deterministic transport code. Objects that do not make sense based on physics principles or other constraints are rejected. Thus, the model can be used to generate a population of spectral signatures that spans a large space, including smuggled nuclear material and nuclear weapons.

  4. Protecting Accelerator Control Systems in the Face of Sophisticated Cyber Attacks

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hartman, Steven M [ORNL] [ORNL

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cyber security for industrial control systems has received significant attention in the past two years. The news coverage of the Stuxnet attack, believed to be targeted at the control system for a uranium enrichment plant, brought the issue to the attention of news media and policy makers. This has led to increased scrutiny of control systems for critical infrastructure such as power generation and distribution, and industrial systems such as chemical plants and petroleum refineries. The past two years have also seen targeted network attacks aimed at corporate and government entities including US Department of Energy National Laboratories. Both of these developments have potential repercussions for the control systems of particle accelerators. The need to balance risks from potential attacks with the operational needs of an accelerator present a unique challenge for the system architecture and access model.

  5. Anthem Cyber Attack: Information and Call-in Phone Number | Jefferson...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Anthem Cyber Attack: Information and Call-in Phone Number Colleagues, As you may have heard by now, Anthem was the latest victim of a cyber attack. Anthem reports that they were...

  6. Process Control Systems in the Chemical Industry: Safety vs. Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jeffrey Hahn; Thomas Anderson

    2005-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Traditionally, the primary focus of the chemical industry has been safety and productivity. However, recent threats to our nation’s critical infrastructure have prompted a tightening of security measures across many different industry sectors. Reducing vulnerabilities of control systems against physical and cyber attack is necessary to ensure the safety, security and effective functioning of these systems. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has developed a strategy to secure these vulnerabilities. Crucial to this strategy is the Control Systems Security and Test Center (CSSTC) established to test and analyze control systems equipment. In addition, the CSSTC promotes a proactive, collaborative approach to increase industry's awareness of standards, products and processes that can enhance the security of control systems. This paper outlines measures that can be taken to enhance the cybersecurity of process control systems in the chemical sector.

  7. GAO-06-811 Information Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security Research and Development

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport inEnergy0.pdfTechnologies ProgramOutfittedof6ExecutiveOfficethe Chairman,

  8. Using Operational Security (OPSEC) to Support a Cyber Security Culture in

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic2Uranium TransferonUS-India EnergyUnlockingDepartment ofOwners |UsingControl

  9. Using Operational Security (OPSEC) to Support a Cyber Security Culture in

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your DensityEnergy U.S.-China Electric Vehicle and03/02 TUE 08:59 FAXFact SheetConditionsOwners

  10. Secure Systems Editor: S.W. Smith, sws@cs.dartmouth.edu

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Smith, Sean W.

    Secure Systems Editor: S.W. Smith, sws@cs.dartmouth.edu side of the picture--the computers which we train students, young and old, to be effective cyber-citizens; and the media coverage or produce more effective tailors. S.W. SMITH Dartmouth College T oalargeextent,computingsystemsareu

  11. Scalable, Secure Energy Information Management for Demand-Response Analysis Yogesh Simmhan1,2

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Prasanna, Viktor K.

    is expanding at a rapid rate to enable communication using emerging standards, the software architecture. A medical emergency or disaster preparedness agency imposes relaxed privacy requirements during emergency by the smart grid in the context of cyber-security ­ the real time nature of data and the large scale at which

  12. Distributed Detection of Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: A Waveform Relaxation Approach

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bullo, Francesco

    Distributed Detection of Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks: A Waveform Relaxation Approach to operate safely and reliably against cyber-physical attacks. The large dimensionality and the difficulty system and cyber- physical attacks as unknown inputs. This modeling framework captures, for instance

  13. Switched System Models for Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attack Construction and Simulation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kundur, Deepa

    Switched System Models for Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attack Construction and Simulation Shan Liu the need to develop intelligent models of cyber-physical attacks that produce salient disruptions. In this paper, we present a foundation for the development of a class of intelligent cyber-physical attacks

  14. Critical issues in process control system security : DHS spares project.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hernandez, Jacquelynne; McIntyre, Annie; Henrie, Morgan

    2010-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The goals of this event are: (1) Discuss the next-generation issues and emerging risks in cyber security for control systems; (2) Review and discuss common control system architectures; (3) Discuss the role of policy, standards, and supply chain issues; (4) Interact to determine the most pertinent risks and most critical areas of the architecture; and (5) Merge feedback from Control System Managers, Engineers, IT, and Auditors.

  15. information security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Faculty listing for "information security" ... 1167; Phone: +1 765 49-46022; Email: wagstaff@purdue.edu; Research Interests: number theory, information security.

  16. Building Smart Communities with Cyber-Physical Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Xia, Feng

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    There is a growing trend towards the convergence of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and social computing, which will lead to the emergence of smart communities composed of various objects (including both human individuals and physical things) that interact and cooperate with each other. These smart communities promise to enable a number of innovative applications and services that will improve the quality of life. This position paper addresses some opportunities and challenges of building smart communities characterized by cyber-physical and social intelligence.

  17. Modern Quantum Technologies of Information Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Korchenko, Oleksandr; Gnatyuk, Sergiy

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In the paper systematization and classification of modern quantum technologies of the information security against cyber-terrorist attack are carried out. The characteristic of the basic directions of quantum cryptography from the viewpoint of used quantum technologies is given. The qualitative analysis of advantages and disadvantages of concrete quantum protocols is made. The current status of a problem of practical quantum cryptography using in telecommunication networks is considered. In particular, the short review of existing commercial systems of quantum key distribution is given.

  18. Computationally Efficient Neural Network Intrusion Security Awareness

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Todd Vollmer; Milos Manic

    2009-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An enhanced version of an algorithm to provide anomaly based intrusion detection alerts for cyber security state awareness is detailed. A unique aspect is the training of an error back-propagation neural network with intrusion detection rule features to provide a recognition basis. Network packet details are subsequently provided to the trained network to produce a classification. This leverages rule knowledge sets to produce classifications for anomaly based systems. Several test cases executed on ICMP protocol revealed a 60% identification rate of true positives. This rate matched the previous work, but 70% less memory was used and the run time was reduced to less than 1 second from 37 seconds.

  19. The changing face of Hanford security 1990--1994

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thielman, J.

    1995-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The meltdown of the Cold War was a shock to the systems built to cope with it. At the DOE`s Hanford Site in Washington State, a world-class safeguards and security system was suddenly out of step with the times. The level of protection for nuclear and classified materials was exceptional. But the cost was high and the defense facilities that funded security were closing down. The defense mission had created an umbrella of security over the sprawling Hanford Site. Helicopters designed to ferry special response teams to any trouble spot on the 1,456 square-kilometer site made the umbrella analogy almost literally true. Facilities were grouped into areas, fenced off like a military base, and entrance required a badge check for everyone. Within the fence, additional rings of protection were set up around security interests or targets. The security was effective, but costly to operate and inconvenient for employees and visitors alike. Moreover, the umbrella meant that virtually all employees needed a security clearance just to get to work, whether they worked on classified or unclassified projects. Clearly, some fundamental rethinking of safeguards and security was needed. The effort to meet that challenge is the story of transition at Hanford and documented here.

  20. Cyber-Physical Energy Systems: Focus on Smart Buildings

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gupta, Rajesh

    of a deeply coupled system of energy usage, comfort and work derived. At a macroscale, buildings use approxi computers and laptops in offices and homes will exceed over 3x the energy use by all data centers combinedCyber-Physical Energy Systems: Focus on Smart Buildings Jan Kleissl Dept. of Mechanical

  1. A Deception Framework for Survivability Against Next Generation Cyber Attacks

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Upadhyaya, Shambhu

    to the electronic business domain. According to the asymmetric warfare theory, attack- ers have the advantage- rity, survivability 1. Introduction This is the era of cyber-warfare and it is no longer limited to military domain. Knapp and Boulton [12] have reviewed information warfare literature from 1990 to mid-2005

  2. Embedded Cyber-Physical Anomaly Detection in Smart Meters

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    vulnerabilities that arise from deployment of local cyber-physical attacks at a smart metering location and physical domains. 1 Introduction Limitations of today's power networks, combined with the need we address the risk of manipula- tions at the end-user level, even when a trusted infrastructure

  3. Cyber-Vulnerability of Power Grid Monitoring and Control Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Manimaran, Govindarasu

    Cyber-Vulnerability of Power Grid Monitoring and Control Systems Chee-Wooi Ten Iowa State, and power infrastructures due to the complexity of required compliances [5]. Although the complex outages. Three modes of malicious attacks on the power infrastructure are (i) attack upon the system, (ii

  4. Unclassified Source Term and Radionuclide Data for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McCord, John

    2004-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report documents the evaluation of the information and data available on the unclassified source term and radionuclide contamination for Central and Western Pahute Mesa: Corrective Action Units (CAUs) 101 and 102.

  5. Breaking into a computer : attack techniques and tools used by cyber-criminals

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2011-10-06T23:59:59.000Z

    Oral presentation in English, slides in English. We will show you how and why cyber-criminals attack your computers: their motives, methods and tools.

  6. Breaking into a computer : attack techniques and tools used by cyber-criminals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2010-06-24T23:59:59.000Z

    Oral presentation in English, slides in English. We will show you how and why cyber-criminals attack your computers: their motives, methods and tools.

  7. Microsoft Word - OE Cyber Release 10 18 07.doc

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    for security interoperability through the Lemnos Interoperable Security Program. * Siemens Corporate Research, Inc. of Princeton, NJ - selected for an award of up to 1.3...

  8. Towards a Standard for Highly Secure SCADA Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carlson, R.

    1998-09-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The critical energy inkstructures include gas, OL and electric power. These Mrastructures are complex and interdependent nmvorks that are vital to the national secwiy and social well being of our nation. Many electric power systems depend upon gas and oil, while fossil energy delive~ systems depend upon elecnic power. The control mechanisms for these Mrastructures are often referred to as SCADA (Supmivry CkmdandDaU Ac@itz&z) systems. SCADA systems provide remote monitoring and centralized control for a distributed tmnsportation infmsmucture in order to facilitate delivery of a commodi~. AIthough many of the SCADA concepts developed in this paper can be applied to automotive mmsponation systems, we will use transportation to refer to the movement of electrici~, gas, and oil. \\ Recently, there have been seveml reports suggesting that the widespread and increasing use of SCADA for control of energy systems provides an increasing opportuni~ for an advers~ to cause serious darnage to the energy inbstmcturei~. This damage could arise through cyber infiltration of the SCADA networks, by physically tampering with the control networks, or through a combination of both means. SCADA system threats decompose into cyber and physical threats. One solution to the SCADA security problem is to design a standard for a highly secure KA.DA system that is both cyber, and physdly secure. Not all-physical threats are possible to guard again% but of those threats that are, high security SCADA provides confidence that the system will continue to operate in their presence. One of the most important problems in SCADA securi~ is the relationship between the cyber and physical vulnerabilities. Cyber intrusion increases physical Vulnerabilities, while in the dual problem physical tampering increases cyber vulnerabilit.ies. There is potential for feedback and the precise dynamics need to be understood. As a first step towards a stan~ the goal of this paper is to facilitate a discussion of the requirements analysis for a highly secure SCADA system. The fi-arnework for the discussion consists of the identification of SCADA security investment areas coupled with the tradeoffs that will force compromises in the solution. For example, computational and bandwidth requirements of a security standard could force the replacement of entire SCADA systems. The requirements for a real-time response in a cascading electric power failure could pose limitations on authentication and encryption mechanisms. The shortest path to the development of a high securi~ SC.ADA standard will be achieved by leveraging existing standards efforts and ensuring that security is being properly addressed in those standards. The Utility Communications Architecture 2.o (UC@, for real-time utili~ decision control, represents one such standard. The development of a SCADA secwiy specification is a complex task that will benefit from a systems engineering approach.

  9. Network QoS Management in Cyber-Physical Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Xia, Feng; Dong, Jinxiang; Sun, Youxian

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Technical advances in ubiquitous sensing, embedded computing, and wireless communication are leading to a new generation of engineered systems called cyber-physical systems (CPS). CPS promises to transform the way we interact with the physical world just as the Internet transformed how we interact with one another. Before this vision becomes a reality, however, a large number of challenges have to be addressed. Network quality of service (QoS) management in this new realm is among those issues that deserve extensive research efforts. It is envisioned that wireless sensor/actuator networks (WSANs) will play an essential role in CPS. This paper examines the main characteristics of WSANs and the requirements of QoS provisioning in the context of cyber-physical computing. Several research topics and challenges are identified. As a sample solution, a feedback scheduling framework is proposed to tackle some of the identified challenges. A simple example is also presented that illustrates the effectiveness of the pr...

  10. Defense on the Move: Ant-Based Cyber Defense

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fink, Glenn A.; Haack, Jereme N.; McKinnon, Archibald D.; Fulp, Errin W.

    2014-04-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Many common cyber defenses (like firewalls and IDS) are as static as trench warfare allowing the attacker freedom to probe them at will. The concept of Moving Target Defense (MTD) adds dynamism to the defender side, but puts the systems to be defended themselves in motion, potentially at great cost to the defender. An alternative approach is a mobile resilient defense that removes attackers’ ability to rely on prior experience without requiring motion in the protected infrastructure itself. The defensive technology absorbs most of the cost of motion, is resilient to attack, and is unpredictable to attackers. The Ant-Based Cyber Defense (ABCD) is a mobile resilient defense providing a set of roaming, bio-inspired, digital-ant agents working with stationary agents in a hierarchy headed by a human supervisor. The ABCD approach provides a resilient, extensible, and flexible defense that can scale to large, multi-enterprise infrastructures like the smart electric grid.

  11. Sandia Energy » Cyber Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL)

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's PossibleRadiationImplementingnpitche Home About npitche This author has notExpansionSandiaCyber

  12. Measurable Control System Security through Ideal Driven Technical Metrics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miles McQueen; Wayne Boyer; Sean McBride; Marie Farrar; Zachary Tudor

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Security Division supported development of a small set of security ideals as a framework to establish measurable control systems security. Based on these ideals, a draft set of proposed technical metrics was developed to allow control systems owner-operators to track improvements or degradations in their individual control systems security posture. The technical metrics development effort included review and evaluation of over thirty metrics-related documents. On the bases of complexity, ambiguity, or misleading and distorting effects the metrics identified during the reviews were determined to be weaker than necessary to aid defense against the myriad threats posed by cyber-terrorism to human safety, as well as to economic prosperity. Using the results of our metrics review and the set of security ideals as a starting point for metrics development, we identified thirteen potential technical metrics - with at least one metric supporting each ideal. Two case study applications of the ideals and thirteen metrics to control systems were then performed to establish potential difficulties in applying both the ideals and the metrics. The case studies resulted in no changes to the ideals, and only a few deletions and refinements to the thirteen potential metrics. This led to a final proposed set of ten core technical metrics. To further validate the security ideals, the modifications made to the original thirteen potential metrics, and the final proposed set of ten core metrics, seven separate control systems security assessments performed over the past three years were reviewed for findings and recommended mitigations. These findings and mitigations were then mapped to the security ideals and metrics to assess gaps in their coverage. The mappings indicated that there are no gaps in the security ideals and that the ten core technical metrics provide significant coverage of standard security issues with 87% coverage. Based on the two case studies and evaluation of the seven assessments, the security ideals demonstrated their value in guiding security thinking. Further, the final set of core technical metrics has been demonstrated to be both usable in the control system environment and provide significant coverage of standard security issues.

  13. A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on 3G Networks Kameswari Kotapati, Peng Liu, Yan Sun, Thomas F. LaPorta

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yener, Aylin

    1 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on 3G Networks Kameswari Kotapati, Peng Liu, Yan Sun, Thomas F. La Infrastructure Cyber Attack. This paper is the first to propose attack taxonomy for 3G networks. The uniqueness of this taxonomy is the inclusion of Cross Infrastructure Cyber Attacks in addition to the standard Single

  14. EL Program: Smart Grid Program Manager: David Wollman, Smart Grid and Cyber-Physical Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    EL Program: Smart Grid Program Manager: David Wollman, Smart Grid and Cyber-Physical Systems Program Office, Associate Program Manager: Dean Prochaska, Smart Grid and Cyber- Physical Systems Program [updated August 23, 2013] Summary: This program develops and demonstrates smart grid measurement science

  15. NSF Workshop On Cyber-Physical Systems Research Motivation, Techniques and Roadmap

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rajkumar, Ragunathan "Raj"

    NSF Workshop On Cyber-Physical Systems Research Motivation, Techniques and Roadmap October 16 - 17 from industry, research laboratories, academia, and government to develop an attractive roadmap challenges, and a roadmap for Cyber-Physical Systems. The organizers will deliver a report to the National

  16. Co-Regulation of Cyber Physical Systems Justin M. Bradley and Ella M. Atkins

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rajkumar, Ragunathan "Raj"

    Co-Regulation of Cyber Physical Systems Justin M. Bradley and Ella M. Atkins 1 Introduction Cyber, and safety levels through regulation of its physical effectors (e.g. propulsive, steering, switches) and through regulation of its computational resources (e.g. processing and communication). To-date, primarily

  17. National Center for Digital Government Reflections on The Fog of (Cyber)War

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Schweik, Charles M.

    National Center for Digital Government Reflections on The Fog of (Cyber)War Diego. These assertions are: (a) Cyberspace is a new operational domain for waging war; (b) Cyber warfare can be as severe, it aims at reconnecting the idea of "fog of war" to its Clausewitzian roots, highlighting the importance

  18. Networked Control Systems under Cyber Attacks with Applications to Power Networks

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johansson, Karl Henrik

    Terms-- Networked Control Systems, Fault Detection, Power Systems I. INTRODUCTION Several infrastructure infrastructure systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks [1], [2], which are performed on the information residingNetworked Control Systems under Cyber Attacks with Applications to Power Networks Andr´e Teixeira

  19. A co-simulation framework for design of time-triggered automotive cyber physical systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Koutsoukos, Xenofon D.

    A co-simulation framework for design of time-triggered automotive cyber physical systems Zhenkai Automotive control system SystemC a b s t r a c t Designing cyber-physical systems (CPS) is challenging due to the tight interactions between software, network/platform, and physical components. Automotive control sys

  20. Taming Uncertainties in Wireless Messaging for Automotive Cyber-Physical-Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rajkumar, Ragunathan "Raj"

    Taming Uncertainties in Wireless Messaging for Automotive Cyber-Physical-Systems Hongwei Zhang Wireless networking for automotive CPS Today's vehicles are much more than a mechanical device, and complex to the scalability of vehicular communication system, which is a basic element of automotive cyber-physical systems

  1. The CyberWalk Platform: Human-Machine Interaction Enabling Unconstrained Walking through VR

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    The CyberWalk Platform: Human-Machine Interaction Enabling Unconstrained Walking through VR P, locomotion is either restricted to a 1D motion on a linear treadmill, like in the Treadport platform [3: the "omni-directional" CyberWalk platform (Figs. 1­2). The platform consists of an array of synchronous

  2. Global security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lynch, Patrick

    2014-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

    Patrick Lynch helps technical staff, academic leaders and governments around the world improve the safety and security of their nuclear power programs.

  3. Global security

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Lynch, Patrick

    2014-07-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Patrick Lynch helps technical staff, academic leaders and governments around the world improve the safety and security of their nuclear power programs.

  4. Secure Control Systems for the Energy Sector

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, Rhett; Campbell, Jack; Hadley, Mark

    2012-03-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL) will conduct the Hallmark Project to address the need to reduce the risk of energy disruptions because of cyber incidents on control systems. The goals is to develop solutions that can be both applied to existing control systems and designed into new control systems to add the security measures needed to mitigate energy network vulnerabilities. The scope of the Hallmark Project contains four primary elements: 1. Technology transfer of the Secure Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Communications Protocol (SSCP) from Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL) to Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL). The project shall use this technology to develop a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 compliant original equipment manufacturer (OEM) module to be called a Cryptographic Daughter Card (CDC) with the ability to directly connect to any PC enabling that computer to securely communicate across serial to field devices. Validate the OEM capabilities with another vendor. 2. Development of a Link Authenticator Module (LAM) using the FIPS 140-2 validated Secure SCADA Communications Protocol (SSCP) CDC module with a central management software kit. 3. Validation of the CDC and Link Authenticator modules via laboratory and field tests. 4. Creation of documents that record the impact of the Link Authenticator to the operators of control systems and on the control system itself. The information in the documents can assist others with technology deployment and maintenance.

  5. Unclassified Source Term and Radionuclide Data for the Groundwater Flow and Contaminant Transport Model of CAUs 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nye County, Nevada

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilAElectronic Input Options Gary L. Hirsch SNLMay 20102UNCLASSIFIED

  6. Secure Information Exchange Gateway for Electric Grid Operations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robertson, F.; Carroll, J.; Sanders, William; Yardley, Timothy; Heine, Erich; Hadley, Mark; McKinnon, David; Motteler, Barbara; Giri, Jay; Walker, William; McCartha, Esrick

    2014-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The major objectives of the SIEGate project were to improve the security posture and minimize the cyber-attack surface of electric utility control centers and to reduce the cost of maintaining control-room-to-control-room information exchange. Major project goals included the design, development, testing, and commercialization of a single security-hardened appliance that could meet industry needs for resisting cyber-attacks while protecting the confidentiality and integrity of a growing volume of real-time information needed to ensure the reliability of the bulk electric system and interoperating with existing data formats and networking technologies. The SIEGate project has achieved its goals and objectives. The SIEGate Design Document, issued in March 2012, presented SIEGate use cases, provided SIEGate requirements, established SIEGate design principles, and prescribed design functionality of SIEGate as well as the components that make up SIEGate. SIEGate Release Version 1.0 was posted in January 2014. Release Version 1.0.83, which was posted on March 28, 2014, fixed many issues discovered by early adopters and added several new features. Release Candidate 1.1, which added additional improvements and bug fixes, was posted in June 2014. SIEGate executables have been downloaded more than 300 times. SIEGate has been tested at PJM, Entergy, TVA, and Southern. Security testing and analysis of SIEGate has been conducted at PNNL and PJM. Alstom has provided a summary of recommended steps for commercialization of the SIEGate Appliance and identified two deployment models with immediate commercial application.

  7. Secure Data Transfer Guidance for Industrial Control and SCADA Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mahan, Robert E.; Fluckiger, Jerry D.; Clements, Samuel L.; Tews, Cody W.; Burnette, John R.; Goranson, Craig A.; Kirkham, Harold

    2011-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document was developed to provide guidance for the implementation of secure data transfer in a complex computational infrastructure representative of the electric power and oil and natural gas enterprises and the control systems they implement. For the past 20 years the cyber security community has focused on preventative measures intended to keep systems secure by providing a hard outer shell that is difficult to penetrate. Over time, the hard exterior, soft interior focus changed to focus on defense-in-depth adding multiple layers of protection, introducing intrusion detection systems, more effective incident response and cleanup, and many other security measures. Despite much larger expenditures and more layers of defense, successful attacks have only increased in number and severity. Consequently, it is time to re-focus the conventional approach to cyber security. While it is still important to implement measures to keep intruders out, a new protection paradigm is warranted that is aimed at discovering attempted or real compromises as early as possible. Put simply, organizations should take as fact that they have been, are now, or will be compromised. These compromises may be intended to steal information for financial gain as in the theft of intellectual property or credentials that lead to the theft of financial resources, or to lie silent until instructed to cause physical or electronic damage and/or denial of services. This change in outlook has been recently confirmed by the National Security Agency [19]. The discovery of attempted and actual compromises requires an increased focus on monitoring events by manual and/or automated log monitoring, detecting unauthorized changes to a system's hardware and/or software, detecting intrusions, and/or discovering the exfiltration of sensitive information and/or attempts to send inappropriate commands to ICS/SCADA (Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems.

  8. Sandia Energy - Cyber Research Facility Opens at Sandia's California

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's PossibleRadiation Protection245C Unlimited ReleaseWelcomeLong LifetimeConcentratingSite Cyber

  9. OCIO Technology Summit: Cyber Innovation | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYouTube YouTube Note: Since the.pdfBreaking ofOilNEWResponse to Time-Based Rates fromNuclear5.html[2/3/2012Cyber

  10. National Nuclear Security Administration | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    National Nuclear Security Administration | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing...

  11. Information Security Group IY5512 Computer Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mitchell, Chris

    Information Security Group IY5512 Computer Security Part 7b: Windows securityPart 7b: Windows security Chris Mitchell me@chrismitchell.net http://www.chrismitchell.net 1 Information Security Group) of Windows machines. 2 Information Security Group Objectives II · Focus on Active Directory, authentication

  12. Audit of Selected Aspects of the Unclassified Computer Security Program at a DOE Headquarters Computing Facility, AP-B-95-02

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: The FutureComments from TarasaName4Services Requirements Discussed In, 1995FOR THE

  13. Transportation Security | ornl.gov

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Transportation Security SHARE Global Threat Reduction Initiative Transportation Security Cooperation Secure Transport Operations (STOP) Box Security of radioactive material while...

  14. UNCLASSIFIED Institute for Materials ...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Institute for Materials Science Lecture Series Dr Roger D Doherty M.A. D. Phil., Fellow TMS Emeritus Professor of Materials Science and Engineering, Drexel University,...

  15. UNCLASSIFIED Executive summary

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Vuik, Kees

    used in the Time Domain Integral Equation method Problem area Improving stealth technology radar absorbing materials. In particular ferromagnetic materials can be utilised as a coating materials. Since nonlinear responses are expected, the method is fully formulated in the time domain

  16. Controlled Unclassified Information

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T, Inc.'sEnergyTexas1.SpaceFluor FederalEnergyContractor:Department3-1

  17. Security Conditions

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-07-08T23:59:59.000Z

    This Notice ensures that DOE uniformly meets the requirements of the Homeland Security Advisory System outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3, Threat Conditions and Associated Protective Measures, dated 3-11-02, and provides responses specified in Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (U), dated 6-21-95. It cancels DOE N 473.8, Security Conditions, dated 8-7-02. Extended until 7-7-06 by DOE N 251.64, dated 7-7-05 Cancels DOE N 473.8

  18. Security Specialist

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The position is located in the Office of Environmental Management (EM),Office of Safeguards, Security and Emergency Preparedness (EM-44). The mission of EM-44 is to develop and oversee the...

  19. Personnel Security

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes the overall objectives and requirements for the Department of Energy Personnel Security Program. Cancels DOE M 472.1-1B. Canceled by DOE O 472.2.

  20. Personnel Security

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-27T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order establishes requirements for a successful, efficient and cost-effective personnel security program to ensure accurate, timely and equitable determinations of individuals’ eligibility for access to classified information and fitness for placement or retention in national security positions. Cancels DOE M 470.4-5, DOE N 470.4 and DOE N 470.5. Admin Chg 1, 10-8-13.

  1. Information Security

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-06-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The protection and control of classified information is critical to our nation’s security. This Order establishes requirements and responsibilities for Department of Energy (DOE) Departmental Elements, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), to protect and control classified information as required by statutes, regulation, Executive Orders, government-wide policy directives and guidelines, and DOE policy and directives. Cancels DOE M 470.4-4A Chg except for Section D.

  2. ModelPlex: Verified Runtime Validation of Verified Cyber-Physical System Models

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Platzer, André

    dynamics. In CPS, models are essential; but any model we could possibly build necessarily deviates from. In CPS, models are essential; but a cyber- physical systems (CPS) safe. Formal methods make strong guarantees about the system behavior

  3. Integrating Neuromuscular and Cyber Systems for Neural Control of Artificial Legs

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yang, Qing "Ken"

    and computer system is essential. This integration leads to a cyber- physical system (CPS), in which a complex (CPS) for neurally controlled artificial legs. The key to the new CPS system is the neural

  4. Synthesis of Distributed Execution Platforms for Cyber-Physical Systems with Applications to

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Carloni, Luca

    of the behavior, such as time, that are essential to CPSs. For this reason, CPS designers are forced to extensive are just a few examples of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. The characterizing

  5. Researchers develop new search tool to help fight child porn, catch cyber

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Fung, Benjamin C. M.

    Researchers develop new search tool to help fight child porn, catch cyber thieves Canada Standard a comment... Post to Facebook 0 0 New #12;Researchers develop new search tool to help fight child porn

  6. US public perspectives on security :

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.; Silva, Carol L.

    2012-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    We report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2011 on public assessments of contemporary and emerging interstate nuclear threats, support for strategic arms control, and preferences for responding to limited nuclear attacks on the United States. Additionally, we analyze public views of the threat of terrorism, including cyber attacks, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and preferences for responding to an act of radiological terrorism against the United States. Also, we report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2011 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public views on energy requirements, preferences for energy sources, energy conservation versus development, energy independence, implications of events at Fukushima, Japan, for US public support of nuclear generation, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and trust in nuclear risk assessments from government and other public sources. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

  7. Interoperable and Secure Communication for Cyber Physical Systems in the Energy Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Eun Kyu

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    energy curtailment of a service contract. The strategy mustenergy loads) of a service contract. The customer expectsCSP). That is, a service contract is made amongst three

  8. Interoperable and Secure Communication for Cyber Physical Systems in the Energy Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Eun Kyu

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    C. Qiu, C. -C. Chu, and R. Gadh. Design of Fair ChargingQiu, C. -C. Chu, and R. Gadh. Design of Fast Response SmartK. Lee, R. Huang, P. Chu, R. Gadh, and M. Gerla. Enhancing

  9. Interoperable and Secure Communication for Cyber Physical Systems in the Energy Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Eun Kyu

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Energy Research Center (SMERC), who are always willing toand deployed by the UCLA SMERC research team. I thank Rui

  10. Interoperable and Secure Communication for Cyber Physical Systems in the Energy Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Eun Kyu

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/ SGIPSemanticModelSGAC. [4]periods [42]. http://www.iec.ch/smartgrid/standards/ http://

  11. Assuring the Safety, Security, and Reliability of Medical-Device Cyber-

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hu, Fei

    · Difibtech external defibrillators (2007) ­ Self-test resets low-battery status · Baxter's Colleague Infusion of adverse events associated with the use of infusion pumps - 1% deaths, 34% serious injuries - 87 infusion and Radiological Health. White Paper: Infusion Pump Improvement Initiative, April 2010 Infusion Pump Safety #12

  12. The strategic implications of the current Internet design for cyber security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Iheagwara, Charles M

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In the last two decades, the Internet system has evolved from a collection point of a few networks to a worldwide interconnection of millions of networks and users who connect to transact virtually all kinds of business. ...

  13. Interoperable and Secure Communication for Cyber Physical Systems in the Energy Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Eun Kyu

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    in more flexible ways as a “prosumer”. In the trading, realESI supports as a service prosumer. The other two examine

  14. Conformance Tool High Level Design Document: IEC 61850 Cyber Security Acceleration Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Edgar, Thomas W.

    2013-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document is the high level design document for the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) IEC 62351-3, 4 and 6 standards conformance test software toolkit.

  15. Cyber Security in the Smart Grid: Survey and Challenges$ Wenye Wanga,

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Wenye

    national efforts to develop the next-generation electric power system, commonly referred to as the SmartDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, North Carolina State University, Raleigh NC 27606, US. Abstract The Smart Grid, generally referred to as the next-generation power system, is considered as a revolutionary

  16. A Cyber Security Study of a SCADA Energy Management System: Stealthy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johansson, Karl Henrik

    of critical infrastructures in our society are the power, the gas and the water supply networks transmitted through unencrypted communication chan- nels, making these critical infrastructures vulnerable Estimator Andr´e Teixeira Gy¨orgy D´an Henrik Sandberg Karl H. Johansson School of Electrical

  17. Interoperable and Secure Communication for Cyber Physical Systems in the Energy Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Eun Kyu

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Microgrid operation with power generation, load, and energy storage. . . . .Microgrid operation with power generation, load, and energy storage.

  18. Interoperable and Secure Communication for Cyber Physical Systems in the Energy Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Eun Kyu

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Power generation [KW] on a solar panel in summer andpole, a desk lamp, or a solar panel at home. Challenge:Electric Vehicle (EV) and solar panel to smart light and

  19. Interoperable and Secure Communication for Cyber Physical Systems in the Energy Grid

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Eun Kyu

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Loads for Demand Response within Buildings. In ACM BuildSys,Demand Response (ADR) service contract with the buildingbuilding owner participate in an automated demand response

  20. Follow-up Audit of the Department's Cyber Security Incident Management Program, IG-0878

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed offOCHCO2: FinalOffers3.pdf0-45.pdf Flash2010-45.pdfFlash2011-43and StatementNovemberFollow-up Audit

  1. Cyber Security Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit: National SCADA Test Bed

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613PortsmouthBartlesvilleAbout » Contact UsDepartment of Energy Cut Gas

  2. Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems Version 1.8 |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613PortsmouthBartlesvilleAbout » Contact UsDepartment of Energy Cut GasDepartment of

  3. Lessons Learned from Cyber Security Assessments of SCADA and Energy Management Systems

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport(FactDepartment ofLetter Report:40PMDepartment ofs o u t h e22U.S. Department of

  4. Obama's Call for Public-Private Cyber Security Collaboration Reflected in

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn'tOrigin of Contamination in ManyDepartment of Order No.ofUseIowa |ProgramsAnnounces Steps toDOE's

  5. Report of the Cyber Security Research Needs for Open Science Workshop |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic2 OPAM615_CostNSAR -Department of Energyasto| Department ofDepartment of

  6. Cyber Security Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit: National SCADA Test Bed

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: Theof"Wave theJuly 30,Crafty Gifts forHeavy-Duty| DepartmentAirPortaledge,May

  7. Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems Version 1.8 |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: Theof"Wave theJuly 30,Crafty Gifts forHeavy-Duty|Department of Energy

  8. Cyber Security Summer School: Lessons for the Modern Grid | Department of

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: Theof"Wave theJuly 30,Crafty Gifts forHeavy-Duty|Department of Energy1

  9. 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently20,000 RussianBy:Whether you're a16-17, 2015 | Department ofSupervisory control and data

  10. ABB and Energy Utilities Form Consortium to Fund SCADA/EMS Cyber Security

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently20,000 RussianBy:Whether you're a16-17, 2015 |7 Energy of6 FREEDOM OFAssessment at

  11. Ninth Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference | ornl.gov

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated CodesTransparencyDOE Project Taps HPCNew4 News CleanMaterialsNinth Annual

  12. Delegation Order No. 003.03-02 Delegation of Authority - Cyber Security -

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power Administration wouldDECOMPOSITIONPortal Decision SupportIntelligenceAuthority - DOEDOE

  13. Management of Los Alamos National Laboratory's Cyber Security Program, IG-0880

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport(FactDepartment ofLetterEconomyDr.Energy University ofOverviewManagement of Los

  14. 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: The Future of BadTHEEnergyReliability2015 Peer Review |5Dryers;Prairie21 Steps

  15. ABB and Energy Utilities Form Consortium to Fund SCADA/EMS Cyber Security

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: The Future of1 A Strategic Framework for SMRA View from the-1Assessment at

  16. Report of the Cyber Security Research Needs for Open Science Workshop |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn'tOrigin ofEnergy at Waste-to-Energy using Fues Cells Webinar,Verizon andNo.the

  17. Taxation and Social Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kaplow, Louis

    2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Re: Taxation and Social Security Attached is draft chapter11 TAXATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY A substantial fraction ofaspects of social security schemes in a setting in which

  18. Security and Elections

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bishop, Matt; Peisert, Sean

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    World Conf. Information Security Education, 2007, pp. 17–24;Security andElections IEEE Security & Privacy, 10(5):64–67, Sept. -

  19. CAMPUS SECURITY REPORT 2009

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    CAMPUS SECURITY REPORT 2009 San Francisco State University University Police Department 1600 & Procedure Concerning Security, Access & Maintenance of Campus Facilities & Weapons Policies........................................................... 6 g. Safety & Security

  20. Final report : impacts analysis for cyber attack on electric power systems (National SCADA Test Bed FY08).

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Phillips, Laurence R.; Richardson, Bryan T.; Stamp, Jason Edwin; LaViolette, Randall A.

    2009-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    To analyze the risks due to cyber attack against control systems used in the United States electrical infrastructure, new algorithms are needed to determine the possible impacts. This research is studying the Reliability Impact of Cyber ttack (RICA) in a two-pronged approach. First, malevolent cyber actions are analyzed in terms of reduced grid reliability. Second, power system impacts are investigated using an abstraction of the grid's dynamic model. This second year of esearch extends the work done during the first year.