National Library of Energy BETA

Sample records for tampering theft vandalism

  1. Tamper-indicating seal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Fiarman, Sidney; Degen, Michael F.; Peters, Henry F.

    1985-01-01

    There is disclosed a tamper-indicating seal that permits in the field inspection and detection of tampering. Said seal comprises a shrinkable tube having a visible pattern of markings which is shrunk over the item to be sealed, and a second transparent tube, having a second visible marking pattern, which is shrunk over the item and the first tube. The relationship between the first and second set of markings produces a pattern so that the seal may not be removed without detection.

  2. Tamper-indicating seal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Fiarman, S.; Degen, M.F.; Peters, H.F.

    1982-08-13

    There is disclosed a tamper-indicating seal that permits in the field inspection and detection of tampering. Said seal comprises a shrinkable tube having a visible pattern of markings which is shrunk over th item to be sealed, and a second transparent tube, having a second visible marking pattern, which is shrunk over the item and the first tube. The relationship between the first and second set of markings produces a pattern so that the seal may not be removed without detection. The seal is particularly applicable to UF/sub 6/ cylinder valves.

  3. Tamper indicating bolt

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Blagin, Sergei V.; Barkanov, Boris P.

    2004-09-14

    A tamper-indicating fastener has a cylindrical body with threads extending from one end along a portion of the body, and a tamper indicating having a transducer for converting physical properties of the body into electronic data; electronics for recording the electronic data; and means for communicating the recorded information to a remote location from said fastener. The electronics includes a capacitor that varies as a function of force applied by the fastener, and non-volatile memory for recording instances when the capacitance varies, providing an indication of unauthorized access.

  4. Enhanced tamper indicator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Garcia, Anthony R.; Johnston, Roger G.

    2003-07-08

    The present invention provides an apparatus and method whereby the reliability and tamper-resistance of tamper indicators can be improved. A flexible connector may be routed through a latch for an enclosure such as a door or container, and the free ends of the flexible connector may be passed through a first locking member and firmly attached to an insert through the use of one or more attachment members such as set screws. A second locking member may then be assembled in interlocking relation with the first locking member to form an interlocked assembly around the insert. The insert may have one or more sharp projections extending toward the first or second locking member so that any compressive force applied in an attempt to disassemble the interlocked assembly results in permanent, visible damage to the first or second locking member.

  5. Tamper-indicating barcode and method

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Cummings, Eric B.; Even, Jr., William R.; Simmons, Blake A.; Dentinger, Paul Michael

    2005-03-22

    A novel tamper-indicating barcode methodology is disclosed that allows for detection of alteration to the barcode. The tamper-indicating methodology makes use of a tamper-indicating means that may be comprised of a particulate indicator, an optical indicator, a deformable substrate, and/or may be an integrated aspect of the barcode itself. This tamper-indicating information provides greater security for the contents of containers sealed with the tamper-indicating barcodes.

  6. Triboluminescent tamper-indicating device

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Johnston, Roger G.; Garcia, Anthony R. E.

    2002-01-01

    A tamper-indicating device is described. The device has a transparent or translucent cylindrical body that includes triboluminescent material, and an outer opaque layer that prevents ambient light from entering. A chamber in the body holds an undeveloped piece of photographic film bearing an image. The device is assembled from two body members. One of the body members includes a recess for storing film and an optical assembly that can be adjusted to prevent light from passing through the assembly and exposing the film. To use the device with a hasp, the body members are positioned on opposite sides of a hasp, inserted through the hasp, and attached. The optical assembly is then manipulated to allow any light generated from the triboluminescent materials during a tampering activity that damages the device to reach the film and destroy the image on the film.

  7. Integrated optical tamper sensor with planar waveguide

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Carson, R.F.; Casalnuovo, S.A.

    1993-01-05

    A monolithic optical tamper sensor, comprising an optical emitter and detector, connected by an optical waveguide and placed into the critical entry plane of an enclosed sensitive region, the tamper sensor having a myriad of scraps of a material optically absorbent at the wavelength of interest, such that when the absorbent material is in place on the waveguide, an unique optical signature can be recorded, but when entry is attempted into the enclosed sensitive region, the scraps of absorbent material will be displaced and the optical/electrical signature of the tamper sensor will change and that change can be recorded.

  8. Integrated optical tamper sensor with planar waveguide

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Carson, Richard F.; Casalnuovo, Stephen A.

    1993-01-01

    A monolithic optical tamper sensor, comprising an optical emitter and detector, connected by an optical waveguide and placed into the critical entry plane of an enclosed sensitive region, the tamper sensor having a myriad of scraps of a material optically absorbent at the wavelength of interest, such that when the absorbent material is in place on the waveguide, an unique optical signature can be recorded, but when entry is attempted into the enclosed sensitive region, the scraps of absorbent material will be displaced and the optical/electrical signature of the tamper sensor will change and that change can be recorded.

  9. Computer network control plane tampering monitor

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Michalski, John T.; Tarman, Thomas D.; Black, Stephen P.; Torgerson, Mark D.

    2010-06-08

    A computer network control plane tampering monitor that detects unauthorized alteration of a label-switched path setup for an information packet intended for transmission through a computer network.

  10. Reusable, tamper-indicating seal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ryan, Michael J.

    1978-01-01

    A reusable, tamper-indicating seal comprises a drum confined within a fixed body and rotatable in one direction therewithin, the top of the drum constituting a tray carrying a large number of small balls of several different colors. The fixed body contains parallel holes for looping a seal wire therethrough. The base of the drums carries cams adapted to coact with cam followers to lock the wire within the seal at one angular position of the drum. A channel in the fixed body -- visible from outside the seal -- adjacent the tray constitutes a segregated location for a small plurality of the colored balls. A spring in the tray forces colored balls into the segregated location at one angular position of the drum, further rotation securing the balls in position and the wires in the seal. A wedge-shaped plough removes the balls from the segregated location, at a different angular position of the drum, the wire being unlocked at the same position. A new pattern of colored balls will appear in the segregated location when the seal is relocked.

  11. Physical security and tamper-indicating devices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnston, R.G.; Garcia, A.R.E.

    1997-02-01

    Computer systems, electronic communications, digital data, and computer storage media are often highly vulnerable to physical tampering. Tamper-indicating devices, also called security seals, are widely used to detect physical tampering or unauthorized access. We studied 94 different security seals, both passive and electronic, developed either commercially or by the US government. Most of these seals are in wide-spread use, including for critical applications. We learned how to defeat all 94 seals using rapid, inexpensive, low-tech methods. Cost was not a good predictor of seal security. It appears to us that many of these seals can be dramatically improved with minor, low-cost modifications to either the seal or the use protocol.

  12. Utilities combat theft of service

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lady, P.

    1983-01-01

    Today theft of service has become a serious problem for the gas utilities (one utility estimated it to be 10% of its net profit) and many companies have established special departments or units to deal with it. Major factors contributing to gas theft are (1) the price escalation after the 1973-74 oil embargo, (2) high unemployment, (3) poor economic conditions, (4) a general decline in respect for utilities and the law, (5) minimal risk to offenders (customers feel that nothing will happen to them if they get caught), (6) relatively low skill required to illegally restore utility service, and (7) the attitude of getting something for nothing. Some preventive methods now being recommended include the following: (1) the use of computers to scan consumption patterns, (2) unannounced meter readings, and (3) tips from hotline tape recordings and from meter readers, departments, and neighboring utilities.

  13. A tamper-indicating quantum seal

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Williams, Brian P.; Britt, Keith A.; Humble, Travis S.

    2016-01-04

    Technical means for identifying when tampering occurs is a critical part of many containment and surveillance technologies. Conventional fiber optic seals provide methods for monitoring enclosed inventories, but they are vulnerable to spoofing attacks based on classical physics. We address these vulnerabilities with the development of a quantum seal that offers the ability to detect the intercept-resend attack using quantum integrity verification. Our approach represents an application of entanglement to provide guarantees in the authenticity of the seal state by verifying it was transmitted coherently. We implement these ideas using polarization-entangled photon pairs that are verified after passing through amore » fiber-optic channel testbed. Using binary detection theory, we find the probability of detecting inauthentic signals is greater than 0.9999 with a false alarm chance of 10–9 for a 10 second sampling interval. In addition, we show how the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect concurrently provides a tight bound on redirection attack, in which tampering modifies the shape of the seal. Our measurements limit the tolerable path length change to sub-millimeter disturbances. As a result, these tamper-indicating features of the quantum seal offer unprecedented security for unattended monitoring systems.« less

  14. An Updated Assessement of Copper Wire Thefts from Electric Utilities...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    An Updated Assessement of Copper Wire Thefts from Electric Utilities - October 2010 An Updated Assessement of Copper Wire Thefts from Electric Utilities - October 2010 The U.S. ...

  15. Tamper-indicating quantum optical seals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Humble, Travis S; Williams, Brian P

    2015-01-01

    Confidence in the means for identifying when tampering occurs is critical for containment and surveillance technologies. Fiber-optic seals have proven especially useful for actively surveying large areas or inventories due to the extended transmission range and flexible layout of fiber. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an intruder could tamper with a fiber-optic sensor by accurately replicating the light transmitted through the fiber. In this contribution, we demonstrate a novel approach to using fiber-optic seals for safeguarding large-scale inventories with increased confidence in the state of the seal. Our approach is based on the use of quantum mechanical phenomena to offer unprecedented surety in the authentication of the seal state. In particular, we show how quantum entangled photons can be used to monitor the integrity of a fiber-optic cable - the entangled photons serve as active sensing elements whose non-local correlations indicate normal seal operation. Moreover, we prove using the quantum no-cloning theorem that attacks against the quantum seal necessarily disturb its state and that these disturbances are immediately detected. Our quantum approach to seal authentication is based on physical principles alone and does not require the use of secret or proprietary information to ensure proper operation. We demonstrate an implementation of the quantum seal using a pair of entangled photons and we summarize our experimental results including the probability of detecting intrusions and the overall stability of the system design. We conclude by discussing the use of both free-space and fiber-based quantum seals for surveying large areas and inventories.

  16. Passive Tamper Indicating Enclosures Incorporating Embedded Optical Fibre

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wynn, Paul; White, Helen; Allen, Keir; Simmons, Kevin L.; Sliva, Paul; Benz, Jacob M.; Tanner, Jennifer E.

    2011-08-14

    AWE and PNNL are engaged in a technical collaboration investigating techniques to enhance continuity of knowledge over Accountable Items within a verified nuclear weapons dismantlement process. Tamper Indicating Enclosures (TIE) will likely be deployed as part of a chain of custody regime to indicate an unauthorised attempt to access an Accountable Item. This paper looks at the use of passive TIEs incorporating embedded optical fibre; concepts relating to deployment, tamper indication and unique identification will be discussed.

  17. Reusable tamper-indicating security seal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ryan, Michael J.

    1983-01-01

    The invention teaches means for detecting unauthorized tampering or substitutions of a device, and has particular utility when applied on a "seal" device used to secure a location or thing. The seal has a transparent body wall, and a first indicia, viz., a label identification is formed on the inside surface of this wall. Second and third indicia are formed on the outside surface of the transparent wall, and each of these indicia is transparent to allow the parallax angled viewing of the first indicia through these indicia. The second indicia is in the form of a broadly uniform pattern, viz, many small spaced dots; while the third indicia is in the form of easily memorized objects, such as human faces, made on a substrate by means of halftone printing. The substrate is lapped over the outside surface of the transparent wall. A thin cocoon of a transparent material, generally of the same material as the substrate such as plastic, is formed over the seal body and specifically over the transparent wall and the second and third indicia formed thereon. This cocoon is seamless and has walls of nonuniform thickness. Both the genuineness of the seal and whether anyone has attempted to compromise the seal can thus be visually determined upon inspection.

  18. Indictment for Theft of Public Funds | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Indictment for Theft of Public Funds Indictment for Theft of Public Funds PDF icon Indictment for Theft of Public Funds More Documents & Publications EVMS Training Snippet: 4.8 Control Account Manager's Roles and Responsibilities Two Men Charged With Wire Fraud CenterPoint Comments

  19. Tamper-indicating device having a glass body

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Johnston, Roger G.; Garcia, Anthony R. E.

    2003-04-29

    A tamper-indicating device is described. The device has a first glass body member and a second glass body member that are attached to each other through a hasp. The glass body members of the device can be tempered. The body members can be configured with hollow volumes into which powders, microparticles, liquids, gels, or combinations thereof are sealed. The choice, the amount, and the location of these materials can produce a visible, band pattern to provide each body member with a unique fingerprint identifier, which makes it extremely difficult to repair or replace once it is damaged in order to avoid tamper detection.

  20. Non-contact tamper sensing by electronic means

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Gritton, Dale G. (Pleasanton, CA)

    1993-01-01

    A tamper-sensing system for an electronic tag 10 which is to be fixed to a surface 11 of an article 12, the tamper-sensing system comprising a capacitor having two non-contacting, capacitively-coupled elements 16, 19. Fixing of the body to the article will establish a precise location of the capacitor elements 16 and 19 relative to each other. When interrogated, the tag will generate a tamper-sensing signal having a value which is a function of the amount of capacity of the capacitor elements. The precise relative location of the capacitor elements cannot be duplicated if the tag is removed and affixed to a surrogate article having a fiducial capacitor element 19 fixed thereto. A very small displacement, in the order of 2-10 microns, of the capacitor elements relative to each other if the tag body is removed and fixed to a surrogate article will result in the tamper-sensing signal having a different, and detectable, value when the tag is interrogated.

  1. DEVELOPMENT OF A CERAMIC TAMPER INDICATING SEAL: SRNL CONTRIBUTIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Krementz, D.; Brinkman, K.; Martinez-Rodriguez, M.; Mendez-Torres, A.; Weeks, G.

    2013-06-03

    Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) are collaborating on development of a Ceramic Seal, also sometimes designated the Intrinsically Tamper Indicating Ceramic Seal (ITICS), which is a tamper indicating seal for international safeguards applications. The Ceramic Seal is designed to be a replacement for metal loop seals that are currently used by the IAEA and other safeguards organizations. The Ceramic Seal has numerous features that enhance the security of the seal, including a frangible ceramic body, protective and tamper indicating coatings, an intrinsic unique identifier using Laser Surface Authentication, electronics incorporated into the seal that provide cryptographic seal authentication, and user-friendly seal wire capture. A second generation prototype of the seal is currently under development whose seal body is of Low Temperature Co-fired Ceramic (LTCC) construction. SRNL has developed the mechanical design of the seal in an iterative process incorporating comments from the SNL vulnerability review team. SRNL is developing fluorescent tamper indicating coatings, with recent development focusing on optimizing the durability of the coatings and working with a vendor to develop a method to apply coatings on a 3-D surface. SRNL performed a study on the effects of radiation on the electronics of the seal and possible radiation shielding techniques to minimize the effects. SRNL is also investigating implementation of Laser Surface Authentication (LSA) as a means of unique identification of each seal and the effects of the surface coatings on the LSA signature.

  2. An Updated Assessement of Copper Wire Thefts from Electric Utilities -

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    October 2010 | Department of Energy An Updated Assessement of Copper Wire Thefts from Electric Utilities - October 2010 An Updated Assessement of Copper Wire Thefts from Electric Utilities - October 2010 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability monitors changes, threats, and risks to the energy infrastructure in the United States. This report updates a previously published report on copper wire theft. The combined efforts of electric

  3. Ranking of sabotage/tampering avoidance technology alternatives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Andrews, W.B.; Tabatabai, A.S.; Powers, T.B.; Daling, P.M.; Fecht, B.A.; Gore, B.F.; Overcast, T.D.; Rankin, W.R.; Schreiber, R.E.; Tawil, J.J.

    1986-01-01

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory conducted a study to evaluate alternatives to the design and operation of nuclear power plants, emphasizing a reduction of their vulnerability to sabotage. Estimates of core melt accident frequency during normal operations and from sabotage/tampering events were used to rank the alternatives. Core melt frequency for normal operations was estimated using sensitivity analysis of results of probabilistic risk assessments. Core melt frequency for sabotage/tampering was estimated by developing a model based on probabilistic risk analyses, historic data, engineering judgment, and safeguards analyses of plant locations where core melt events could be initiated. Results indicate the most effective alternatives focus on large areas of the plant, increase safety system redundancy, and reduce reliance on single locations for mitigation of transients. Less effective options focus on specific areas of the plant, reduce reliance on some plant areas for safe shutdown, and focus on less vulnerable targets.

  4. Optical-based smart structures for tamper-indicating applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sliva, P.; Anheier, N.C.; Simmons, K.L.; Undem, H.A.

    1996-11-01

    This report is a compilation of several related projects performed from 1991 through 1996 concerning the design, construction, and application of optical-based smart structure to tamper-indicating and sensing secure containers. Due to several influences, the projects were carried through to varying degrees of completion. Cancellation of the overall project at the client level motivated the authors to gather all of the technology and ideas about smart structures developed during these several projects, whether completed or just conceptualized, into one document. Although each section individually discusses a specific project, the overall document is written chronologically with each successive section showing how increased smart structure complexity was integrated into the container.

  5. Apparatus and method for detecting tampering in flexible structures

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Maxey, Lonnie C. (Knoxville, TN); Haynes, Howard D. (Knoxville, TN)

    2011-02-01

    A system for monitoring or detecting tampering in a flexible structure includes taking electrical measurements on a sensing cable coupled to the structure, performing spectral analysis on the measured data, and comparing the spectral characteristics of the event to those of known benign and/or known suspicious events. A threshold or trigger value may used to identify an event of interest and initiate data collection. Alternatively, the system may be triggered at preset intervals, triggered manually, or triggered by a signal from another sensing device such as a motion detector. The system may be used to monitor electrical cables and conduits, hoses and flexible ducts, fences and other perimeter control devices, structural cables, flexible fabrics, and other flexible structures.

  6. Tamper-indicating devices and safeguards seals evaluation test report. Volume 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Horton, P.R.V.; Waddoups, I.G.

    1995-08-01

    Volume I was based on a survey and an evaluation of seals that are used as tamper-indicating devices at DOE facilities. For that evaluation, currently available seals were physically and environmentally evaluated under two broad categories: handling durability and tamper resistance. Our study indicated that the environmental testing had no negative effects on the results of the mechanical tests. In Volume II, we evaluate some loop, fiber optic loop, and pressure-sensitive seals that are not used at DOE facilities. However, we continue to focus on qualities required by DOE: durability and tamper resistance. The seals are comparatively rated, and recommendations are made for using currently available seals and new tamper-indicating device technology.

  7. Tamper to delay motion and decrease ionization of a sample during short pulse x-ray imaging

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    London, Richard A.; Szoke; Abraham , Hau-Riege; Stefan P. , Chapman; Henry N.

    2007-06-26

    A system for x-ray imaging of a small sample comprising positioning a tamper so that it is operatively connected to the sample, directing short intense x-ray pulses onto the tamper and the sample, and detecting an image from the sample. The tamper delays the explosive motion of the sample during irradiation by the short intense x-ray pulses, thereby extending the time to obtain an x-ray image of the original structure of the sample.

  8. Optically resonant subwavelength films for tamper-indicating tags and seals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alvine, Kyle J.; Suter, Jonathan D.; Bernacki, Bruce E.; Bennett, Wendy D.

    2015-05-23

    We present the design, modeling and performance of a proof-of-concept tamper indicating approach that exploits newly-developed subwavelength-patterned films. These films have a nanostructure-dependent resonant optical reflection that is wavelength, angle, and polarization dependent. As such, they can be tailored to fabricate overlay transparent films for tamper indication and authentication of sensitive or controlled materials not possible with currently-known technologies. An additional advantage is that the unique optical signature is dictated by the geometry and fabrication process of the nanostructures in the film, rather than on the material used. The essential structure unit in the subwavelength resonant coating is a nanoscale Open-Ring Resonator (ORR). This building block is fabricated by coating a dielectric nanoscale template with metal to form a hemispherical shell-like structure. This curved metallic shell structure has a cross-section with an intrinsic capacitance and inductance and is thus the optical equivalent to the well-known “LC” circuit where the capacitance and inductance are determined by the nanoshell dimensions. For structures with sub 100 nm scale, this resonance occurs in the visible electromagnetic spectrum, and in the IR for larger shells. Tampering of the film would be visible though misalignment of the angular dependence of the features in the film. It is additionally possible to add in intrinsic oxidation and strain sensitive matrix materials to further complicate tamper repair and counterfeiting. Cursory standoff readout would be relatively simple using a combination of a near-infrared (or visible) LED flashlight and polarizer or passively using room lighting illumination and a dispersive detector.

  9. ENHANCED SAFEGUARDS: THE ROLE OF SMART FUNCTIONAL COATINGS FOR TAMPER INDICATION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mendez-Torres, A.; Martinez-Rodriguez, M.; Brinkman, K.; Krementz, D.

    2012-02-24

    This work investigates the synthesis of smart functional coatings (SFC) using chemical solution deposition methods. Chemical solution deposition methods have recently received attention in the materials research community due to several unique advantages that include low temperature processing, high homogeneity of final products, the ability to fabricate materials with controlled surface properties and pore structures, and the ease of dopant incorporation in controlled concentrations. The optical properties of thin films were investigated using UV-Vis spectroscopy, Raman, SEM and EDS, with the aim of developing a protective transparent coating for a ceramic surface as a first line of defense for tamper indication. The signature produced by the addition of rare earth dopants will be employed as an additional tamper indicating feature. The integration of SFC's as part of a broader verification system such as an electronic seals can provide additional functionality and defense in depth. SFC's can improve the timeliness of detection by providing a robust, in-situ verifiable tamper indication framework.

  10. Method and apparatus for active tamper indicating device using optical time-domain reflectometry

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Smith, D. Barton; Muhs, Jeffrey D.; Pickett, Chris A.; Earl, D. Duncan

    1999-01-01

    An optical time-domain reflectometer (OTDR) launches pulses of light into a link or a system of multiplexed links and records the waveform of pulses reflected by the seals in the link(s). If a seal is opened, the link of cables will become a discontinuous transmitter of the light pulses and the OTDR can immediately detect that a seal has been opened. By analyzing the waveform, the OTDR can also quickly determine which seal(s) were opened. In this way the invention functions as a system of active seals. The invention is intended for applications that require long-term surveillance of a large number of closures. It provides immediate tamper detection, allows for periodic access to secured closures, and can be configured for many different distributions of closures. It can monitor closures in indoor and outdoor locations and it can monitor containers or groups of containers located many kilometers apart.

  11. Time-Domain Reflectometry for Tamper Indication in Unattended Monitoring Systems for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tedeschi, Jonathan R.; Smith, Leon E.; Moore, David E.; Sheen, David M.; Conrad, Ryan C.

    2014-12-17

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended, remotely monitored measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) leads a collaboration that is exploring various tamper-indicating (TI) measures that could help to address some of the long-standing detector and data-transmission authentication challenges with IAEA’s unattended systems. PNNL is investigating the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This report describes PNNL’s progress and preliminary findings from the first year of the study, and describes the path forward.

  12. DEVELOPMENT OF A TAMPER RESISTANT/INDICATING AEROSOL COLLECTION SYSTEM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AT BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sexton, L.

    2012-06-06

    Environmental sampling has become a key component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards approaches since its approval for use in 1996. Environmental sampling supports the IAEA's mission of drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities in a Nation State. Swipe sampling is the most commonly used method for the collection of environmental samples from bulk handling facilities. However, augmenting swipe samples with an air monitoring system, which could continuously draw samples from the environment of bulk handling facilities, could improve the possibility of the detection of undeclared activities. Continuous sampling offers the opportunity to collect airborne materials before they settle onto surfaces which can be decontaminated, taken into existing duct work, filtered by plant ventilation, or escape via alternate pathways (i.e. drains, doors). Researchers at the Savannah River National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been working to further develop an aerosol collection technology that could be installed at IAEA safeguarded bulk handling facilities. The addition of this technology may reduce the number of IAEA inspector visits required to effectively collect samples. The principal sample collection device is a patented Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) which utilizes electrostatic precipitation principles to deposit particulates onto selected substrates. Recent work has focused on comparing traditional swipe sampling to samples collected via an ACE system, and incorporating tamper resistant and tamper indicating (TRI) technologies into the ACE system. Development of a TRI-ACE system would allow collection of samples at uranium/plutonium bulk handling facilities in a manner that ensures sample integrity and could be an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. This work was supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

  13. THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF MATERIALS IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES FOR VARIOUS PROLIFERATION AND THEFT SCENARIOS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bathke, C. G.; Ebbinghaus, Bartley B.; Collins, Brian A.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Hase, Kevin R.; Robel, Martin; Wallace, R. K.; Bradley, Keith S.; Ireland, J. R.; Jarvinen, G. D.; Johnson, M. W.; Prichard, Andrew W.; Smith, Brian W.

    2012-08-29

    We must anticipate that the day is approaching when details of nuclear weapons design and fabrication will become common knowledge. On that day we must be particularly certain that all special nuclear materials (SNM) are adequately accounted for and protected and that we have a clear understanding of the utility of nuclear materials to potential adversaries. To this end, this paper examines the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing SNM and alternate nuclear materials associated with the plutonium-uranium reduction extraction (Purex), uranium extraction (UREX), coextraction (COEX), thorium extraction (THOREX), and PYROX (an electrochemical refining method) reprocessing schemes. This paper provides a set of figures of merit for evaluating material attractiveness that covers a broad range of proliferant state and subnational group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this paper is that all fissile material must be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and must be provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by subnational groups; no 'silver bullet' fuel cycle has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. The work reported herein has been performed at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for, the nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The methodology and findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security is discussed.

  14. Microsoft Word - AMI White paper final 013108 _2_.doc

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    ... * Remote turn on turn off operations * Load limiting for "bad pay" or demand response purposes * Energy prepayment * Power quality monitoring * Tamper and energy theft ...

  15. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F; Mullen, Mark

    2011-10-05

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  16. Tamper indicating seal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Romero, Juan A.; Walker, Charles A.; Blair, Dianna S.; Bodmer, Connie C.

    2012-05-29

    Seals have a flexible wire that can be looped through a hasp-like device. The seals include a body having a recess, a plug insertable into the recess and a snap ring for fastening the plug to the body. The plug and/or body can have access holes for inserting the wire into the recess. "Teeth" on the outer diameter and through-holes through the thickness of the snap ring allow for passing the ends of the flexible wire from the recess through the snap ring. The ends of the wire can be folded back over the snap ring and into engagement with the teeth. Assembly of the seal causes the ends of the wire to be securely fastened between the teeth of the snap ring and the sidewall of the recess. Seals can include a plug and/or body made of a frangible material such as glass, ceramic, glass-ceramic or brittle polymer.

  17. Tamper resistant magnetic stripes

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Naylor, Richard Brian; Sharp, Donald J.

    1999-01-01

    This invention relates to a magnetic stripe comprising a medium in which magnetized particles are suspended and in which the encoded information is recorded by actual physical rotation or alignment of the previously magnetized particles within the flux reversals of the stripe which are 180.degree. opposed in their magnetic polarity. The magnetized particles are suspended in a medium which is solid, or physically rigid, at ambient temperatures but which at moderately elevated temperatures, such as 40.degree. C., is thinable to a viscosity permissive of rotation of the particles therein under applications of moderate external magnetic field strengths within acceptable time limits.

  18. Crime Witness

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    at 1-800-437-2744. What should I report? You can report theft, vandalism, illegal dumping or suspicious activities on BPA property. As a potential Crime Witness, watch for:...

  19. Ceramic tamper-revealing seals

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Kupperman, D.S.; Raptis, A.C.; Sheen, S.H.

    1992-12-08

    A flexible metal or ceramic cable is described with composite ceramic ends, or a U-shaped ceramic connecting element attached to a binding element plate or block cast from alumina or zirconium, and connected to the connecting element by shrink fitting. 7 figs.

  20. Ceramic tamper-revealing seals

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Kupperman, David S.; Raptis, Apostolos C.; Sheen, Shuh-Haw

    1992-01-01

    A flexible metal or ceramic cable with composite ceramic ends, or a u-shaped ceramic connecting element attached to a binding element plate or block cast from alumina or zirconium, and connected to the connecting element by shrink fitting.

  1. Tampering detection system using quantum-mechanical systems

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Humble, Travis S.; Bennink, Ryan S.; Grice, Warren P.

    2011-12-13

    The use of quantum-mechanically entangled photons for monitoring the integrity of a physical border or a communication link is described. The no-cloning principle of quantum information science is used as protection against an intruder's ability to spoof a sensor receiver using a `classical` intercept-resend attack. Correlated measurement outcomes from polarization-entangled photons are used to protect against quantum intercept-resend attacks, i.e., attacks using quantum teleportation.

  2. Believing Your Eyes: Strengthening the Reliability of Tags and Seals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brim, Cornelia P.; Denlinger, Laura S.

    2013-07-01

    NNSAs Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) is working together with scientific experts at the DOE national laboratories to develop the tools needed to safeguard and secure nuclear material from diversion, theft, and sabotage--tasks critical to support future arms control treaties that may involve the new challenge of monitoring nuclear weapons dismantlement. Use of optically stimulated luminescent material is one method to enhance the security and robustness of existing tamper indicating devices such as tags and seals.

  3. Report a Suspected Crime

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    a Suspected Crime to Southwestern Power Administration To submit a crime tip, anonymous or otherwise, please complete this form with as much detail as possible . When you are finished click SUBMIT and your crime tip will be electronically sent to the Southwestern Security Officer. You can also submit a tip by mailing the Southwestern Security Officer at security@swpa.gov, or One West Third Street , Tulsa, OK 74103-3502 Type of Crime (Check all that apply) Break-In Theft Dumping Vandalism Other

  4. AP-0001-001.PDF

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AP-PO-0001-001.doc. Building Security Date: 2000/05/12 1. Introduction: Building security is a top priority for all CAMD personnel. Theft and vandalism have negative impacts by virtue of the loss of research data as well as the monetary loss. 2. Purpose: The purpose of this policy is to insure the facility is secure when it is unoccupied. 3. Definitions: a. Secure means all building alarms are armed and the gate is locked. 4. Scope of Policy: There are three (3) buildings at the CAMD facility,

  5. Museum security and the Thomas Crown Affair.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Michaud, E. C.

    2010-01-01

    Over the years, I've daydreamed about stealing a Vermeer, a Picasso, or Rembrandt. It tickles me, as much as watching the reboot of The Thomas Crown Affair. Why is it, do you suppose, so much fun to think about stealing a world renowned piece off the wall of a major metropolitan museum? Is it the romantic thoughts of getting away with it, walking past infrared detectors, and pressure sensors ala Indiana Jones with the sack of sand to remove the idol without triggering the security system? Is it the idea of snatching items with such fantastic prices, where the romance of possessing an item of such value is less intoxicating than selling it to a private collector for it to never be seen again? I suspect others share my daydreams as they watch theater or hear of a brazen daylight heist at museums around the world, or from private collections. Though when reality sets in, the mind of the security professional kicks in. How could one do it, why would one do it, what should you do once it's done? The main issue a thief confronts when acquiring unique goods is how to process or fence them. They become very difficult to sell because they are one-of-a-kind, easy to identify, and could lead to the people involved with the theft. The whole issue of museum security takes up an ironic twist when one considers the secretive British street artist 'Banksy'. Banksy has made a name for himself by brazenly putting up interesting pieces of art in broad daylight (though many critics don't consider his work to be art) on building walls, rooftops, or even museums. I bring him up for a interesting take on what may become a trend in museum security. In March of 2005, Banksy snuck a piece of his called 'Vandalized Oil Painting' into the Brooklyn Museum's Great Historical Painting Wing, plus 3 other pieces into major museums in New York. Within several days, 2 paintings had been torn down, but 2 stayed up much longer. In his home country of the UK, a unauthorized piece he created and placed in the British Museum known as 'Early Man Goes to Market' received different treatment when placed inside the walls. It was adopted into the permanent collection! I like his story because it's so counter-intuitive. Who would have thought that modern museum security might involve preventing people not just from stealing art, but from sneaking 'unauthorized' art into museums? What is next, tampering with the archive records in order to make it look like the piece in question has always been there? To learn more about museum security, I interviewed multiple experts in the field. It turns out that the glamorous lifestyle of Thomas Crown is not particularly relevant. In fact, usually nobody can point to a Mr. Big of the underworld coordinating thefts, though some organized crime families have been known to use stolen art as black market chips to trade. The common consensus among experts in the field of art theft is that, instead of most high-value pieces being stolen by outsiders with a blue print in hand and rappelling from a ceiling skylight, in reality, 80 percent of art thefts involve insiders or accomplices that execute the crime over a period of time while working or volunteering in the museum. Indeed, according to FBI statistics, between 70 and 80 percent of all solved art theft cases involve insider participation of some kind, yet according to Tom Cremers of the Musuem Security Network, 'Having been involved in risk assessments in over hundreds of museums over the past ten years, it is quite astonishing how rarely the risk of insider participation is discussed.' In regards to the insider threat, a museum is not much different from any corporation or other organization. There are directors, employees, interns, and cleaning staff (very often outsourced), security guards (again outsourced, typically with very high turnover rates). Unlike corporations, most museums also have volunteer staff, docents, and authorized visiting scholars. All these people can potentially take advantage of their position, or to be exploited by a clever attacker on the outside or insid

  6. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 4, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, rough December 31, 1995. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  7. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1996, Vol. 2, Rev. 5

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 5, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1996. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  8. Basic Research of Intrinsic Tamper Indication Markings Defined by Pulsed Laser Irradiation (Quad Chart).

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moody, Neville R.

    2015-08-01

    Objective: We will research how short (ns) and ultrashort (fs) laser pulses interact with the surfaces of various materials to create complex color layers and morphological patterns. Method: We are investigating the site-specific, formation of microcolor features. Also, research includes a fundamental study of the physics underlying periodic ripple formation during femtosecond laser irradiation. Status of effort: Laser induced color markings were demonstrated on an increased number of materials (including metal thin films) and investigated for optical properties and microstructure. Technology that allows for marking curved surfaces (and large areas) has been implemented. We have used electro-magnetic solvers to model light-solid interactions leading to periodic surface ripple patterns. This includes identifying the roles of surface plasmon polaritons. Goals/Milestones: Research corrosion resistance of oxide color markings (salt spray, fog, polarization tests); Through modeling, investigate effects of multi-source scattering and interference on ripple patterns; Investigate microspectrophotometry for mapping color; and Investigate new methods for laser color marking curved surfaces and large areas.

  9. An Updated Assessment of Copper Wire Thefts from Electric Utilities Page 1

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Should Know to Complete a Quality Application | Department of Energy - Everything You Should Know to Complete a Quality Application An Introduction to the EnergyValue Housing Awards (EVHA) - Everything You Should Know to Complete a Quality Application This webinar reviewed the history and goals of the EnergyValue Housing Awards (EVHA) Program, including comments from past winners and an overview of how to complete a quality application. File webinar_evha_20110707.wmv More Documents &

  10. October 28, 2009, Fraud and Theft in the Information Age - Companion...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    ... Elements or their senior level designees regarding which ... logistics, and personnel management applications); or (6) is ... before the stock price falls back to its usual low level. ...

  11. Identification of chemical hazards for security risk analysis activities.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, Calvin Dell

    2005-01-01

    The presentation outline of this paper is: (1) How identification of chemical hazards fits into a security risk analysis approach; (2) Techniques for target identification; and (3) Identification of chemical hazards by different organizations. The summary is: (1) There are a number of different methodologies used within the chemical industry which identify chemical hazards: (a) Some develop a manual listing of potential targets based on published lists of hazardous chemicals or chemicals of concern, 'expert opinion' or known hazards. (b) Others develop a prioritized list based on chemicals found at a facility and consequence analysis (offsite release affecting population, theft of material, product tampering). (2) Identification of chemical hazards should include not only intrinsic properties of the chemicals but also potential reactive chemical hazards and potential use for activities off-site.

  12. Cognitive Radio will revolutionize American transportation

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2013-12-06

    Cognitive Radio will revolutionize American transportation. Through smart technology, it will anticipate user needs; detect available bandwidths and frequencies then seamlessly connect vehicles, infrastructures, and consumer devices; and it will support the Department of Transportation IntelliDrive Program, helping researchers, auto manufacturers, and Federal and State officials advance the connectivity of US transportation systems for improved safety, mobility, and environmental conditions. Using cognitive radio, a commercial vehicle will know its driver, onboard freight and destination route. Drivers will save time and resources communicating with automatic toll booths and know ahead of time whether to stop at a weigh station or keep rolling. At accident scenes, cognitive radio sensors on freight and transportation modes can alert emergency personnel and measure on-site, real-time conditions such as a chemical leak. The sensors will connect freight to industry, relaying shipment conditions and new delivery schedules. For industry or military purposes, cognitive radio will enable real-time freight tracking around the globe and its sensory technology can help prevent cargo theft or tampering by alerting shipper and receiver if freight is tampered with while en route. For the average consumer, a vehicle will tailor the transportation experience to the passenger such as delivering age-appropriate movies via satellite. Cognitive radio will enhance transportation safety by continually sensing what is important to the user adapting to its environment and incoming information, and proposing solutions that improve mobility and quality of life.

  13. Investigation Letter Report: I11IG002 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    August 17, 2011 Impact of Copper Thefts on the Department of Energy A series of news articles during the last several months have reported increased thefts of copper...

  14. SAS Output

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.00 1.00 Fire -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Vandalism, Terrorism, or Malicious Acts -- -- -- -- 2.00 -- -- -- 2.00 Failed AC Substation Equipment --...

  15. Method of intrinsic marking

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Adams, David P; McDonald, Joel Patrick; Jared, Bradley Howell; Hodges, V. Carter; Hirschfeld, Deidre; Blair, Dianna S

    2014-04-01

    A method of pulsed laser intrinsic marking can provide a unique identifier to detect tampering or counterfeiting.

  16. Preliminary Notice of Violation, Bechtel Jacobs- SEA-2010-01

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Issued to Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC, related to the Theft of Classified Matter from the East Tennessee Technology Park

  17. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY * SAVANNAH RIVER SITE * AIKEN * SC

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Tamper Indicating Bolt Researchers at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) have developed a unique system to detect whether tampering has occurred in a container or compartment during storage or transport. Background In storage and/or transport of certain items, the ability to detect tampering with a container or compartment for such items can be necessary and valuable. In the transport of hazardous substances, nuclear materials, including fuels and/ or radioactive waste there are

  18. DisrupTech

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    cell materials, biofuels, tamper forensics, neutralization of toxic chemicals, biotechnology, water treatment, and industrial process improvement. Tickets to DisrupTech can be ...

  19. 1

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    cell materials, biofuels, tamper forensics, neutralization of toxic chemicals, biotechnology, water treatment, and industrial process improvement. "Our goal is to show that the ...

  20. 'DisrupTech' event to highlight bright ideas from Los Alamos

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    July 14, 2015 DisrupTech will feature eight technology presentations in the areas of sustainable fracking, solar cell materials, biofuels, tamper forensics, neutralization of toxic ...

  1. Chapter 6

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    ... transmission of classified matter. For this use, tamper-resistant closures must meet all of the following criteria: * ... or equivalent * In-line closure * Opaque * Must not ...

  2. The application of a figure of merit for nuclear explosive utility as

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    metric for material attractiveness in a nuclear material theft scenario (Journal Article) | SciTech Connect Journal Article: The application of a figure of merit for nuclear explosive utility as metric for material attractiveness in a nuclear material theft scenario Citation Details In-Document Search Title: The application of a figure of merit for nuclear explosive utility as metric for material attractiveness in a nuclear material theft scenario Authors: King, W ; Bradley, K ; Jones, E ;

  3. Safeguards and Security Program - DOE Directives, Delegations...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Ensures appropriate levels of protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components;...

  4. Inspection Report: IG-0597 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Department of Energy (DOE) and LANL property policies identify computers as "sensitive property," due in part to their susceptibility to theft and potential for conversion to cash. ...

  5. FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Nettles announced the indictment of Aaron Vennefron of Hamilton, Ohio and Phillip Thompson of Augusta, Georgia for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and theft of government funds. ...

  6. Clean Cities Guide to Alternative Fuel Commercial Lawn Equipment...

    Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicles Data Center [Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)]

    Alternative fuel mowers are one way to reduce the energy and environmental impacts of ... extend mower life, reduce fuel spillage and fuel theft, and promote a "green" image. ...

  7. The application of a figure of merit for nuclear explosive utility...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Journal Article: The application of a figure of merit for nuclear explosive utility as metric for material attractiveness in a nuclear material theft scenario Citation Details ...

  8. South Mississippi Electric Power Association (SMEPA) Smart Grid...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    Network Targeted Benefits Reduced Meter Reading Costs Improved Electric Service Reliability and Power Quality Reduced Costs from Distribution Line Losses and Theft Reduced...

  9. Rappahannock Electric Cooperative Smart Grid Project | Open Energy...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    for Customers Reduced Operating and Maintenance Costs Increased Electric Service Reliability and Power Quality Reduced Costs from Equipment Failures, Line Losses, and Theft...

  10. JC3 Incident Reporting | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Loss, Theft, or Missing: All lost, stolen, or missing laptop computers and IT resources ... Impact Classifications Functional Impact HIGH - Organization has lost the ability to ...

  11. Cover #3 Single Sheet

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    ... INDIVIDUAL SENTENCED FOR THEFT OF ALUMINUM FROM BPA SUBSTATION A joint OIG investigation with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATF&E) and local law ...

  12. DOE F 1440.3 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    40.3 DOE F 1440.3 Form letter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agent in Charge describing a theft at a Department of Energy office. PDF icon LETTER REPORTING THEFT OF PROPERTY ON NON-GSA SITE More Documents & Publications DOE F 1500.4 DOE F 1325.7A DOE F 241 5

  13. EECBG Success Story: Energy Detectives Help Pennsylvania Town...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Related Articles EECBG Success Story: Grants to Help N.H. Towns Conserve Energy Cape Coral Youth Center Manager Mark Cagel stands in front of a tamper-proof thermostat at the...

  14. Suntrica Ltd | Open Energy Information

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    Place: Tampere, Finland Zip: 33100 Product: Finland-based manufacturer of thin-film PV battery chargers. References: Suntrica Ltd1 This article is a stub. You can help OpenEI by...

  15. SAND00-XXXX

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    ... hands, or from those who wish to reduce their billing by tampering with their meters. ... has opened the door for utility companies to replace legacy systems with smart devices. ...

  16. How the Weatherization Assistance Program Changed Jasmine's Life...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Palm Beach County Sees Energy-Smart Economic Growth Cape Coral Youth Center Manager Mark Cagel stands in front of a tamper-proof thermostat at the Austen Youth Center in Cape ...

  17. Solar equipment ravaged by floods gets new life

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Mounting the electrical equipment for a solar array 12 feet off the ground on the side of an art studio building seemed like a safe height at first: it would be well above the 100-year-flood mark and out of reach of vandals.

  18. SAS Output

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    28.00 2.00 2.00 23.00 89.00 Fire 1.00 -- 1.00 1.00 3.00 -- -- 50.00 56.00 Vandalism, Terrorism, or Malicious Acts -- -- -- -- 7.00 -- -- -- 7.00 Failed AC Substation Equipment...

  19. EPA Mobile Source Enforcement Memo 1A

    Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicles Data Center [Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)]

    UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE September 4, 1997 Addendum to Mobile Source Enforcement Memorandum 1A SUBJECT: Tampering Enforcement Policy for Alternative Fuel Aftermarket Conversions A. Purpose The purpose of this document is to clarify and revise the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) "tampering" enforcement policy for motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines originally designed to

  20. A I K E N

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Monitoring the Invisible - a New Technology in Nuclear Detection AIKEN, S.C. (February 3, 2015) - A new device created by researchers at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory is able to immediately collect airborne particles to help determine if radioactive isotopes are present. This device could prove to be a valuable asset to organizations responsible for monitoring nuclear activities worldwide. The Tamper Resistant/Tamper Indicating Aerosol

  1. Ion beam inertial confinement target

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Bangerter, Roger O.; Meeker, Donald J.

    1985-01-01

    A target for implosion by ion beams composed of a spherical shell of frozen DT surrounded by a low-density, low-Z pusher shell seeded with high-Z material, and a high-density tamper shell. The target has various applications in the inertial confinement technology. For certain applications, if desired, a low-density absorber shell may be positioned intermediate the pusher and tamper shells.

  2. Calendar Year 2011 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Research Projects August 17, 2011 Investigation Letter Report: I11IG002 Impact of Copper Thefts on the Department of Energy July 28, 2011 Audit Report: OAS-RA-11-10 The...

  3. 2008 - 04 | Jefferson Lab

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    April 2008 Mon, 04282008 - 3:00pm Message from Mike Dallas: Spring Cleaning Update Fri, 04252008 - 3:00pm Reporting Theft Results in Quick Recovery of Snatched Computer Fri, ...

  4. ssspsu~3.PDF

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    ... Risk Risk is defined as Low, Moderate, or High. Risk ratings are determined by evaluating the effectiveness of the protection system against events such as the threat of the theft ...

  5. BPA-2014-01328-FOIA Response

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    0 Alarm 181 Auto Accident 0 Client Comp. 0 Emergency 0 Fire 0 Open SafeFile 0 Prop. Damage 0 Safety Hazard 0 Susp Person(s) 0 Theft 0 Water Leak 00ther Explain: Vehicle...

  6. Two Men Charged With Wire Fraud | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Men Charged With Wire Fraud More Documents & Publications Savannah River Site Contractor Agrees to Pay 3.8 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Indictment for Theft of ...

  7. Safeguards and Security Program - DOE Directives, Delegations, and

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Requirements ARCHIVED DOE O 470.1 Chg 1, Safeguards and Security Program by Website Administrator Functional areas: Environment, Safety, and Health, Hazardous Materials, Radiation Protection, Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Management, Work Processes, Ensures appropriate levels of protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components; espionage; loss or theft of classified matter or Government property; and

  8. Southwestern Power Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    SWPA Crime Witness Program 918-728-5742 Crime Witness Program Southwestern needs your help. Because much of our electrical transmission lines and equipment is located in secluded, rural areas, we need help protecting it from crimes such as: Shooting at Southwestern's insulators, power lines, transmission towers, or substation equipment Dumping waste or other materials on Southwestern property Vandalizing Southwestern's property, buildings, or vehicles Stealing Southwestern's equipment, supplies,

  9. Audit Report: IG-0750 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    50 Audit Report: IG-0750 December 18, 2006 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Program to Oversee Hydroelectric Dams Pursuant to the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates certain aspects of non-Federal hydroelectric dams. FERC is required to ensure the safety, stability. and integrity of these dams with the goal of protecting life, health, and property from, among other things, instances of sabotage and vandalism. To meet these requirements, FERC

  10. Remotely Monitored Sealing Array Software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2012-09-12

    The Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA) utilizes the Secure Sensor Platform (SSP) framework to establish the fundamental operating capabilities for communication, security, power management, and cryptography. In addition to the SSP framework the RMSA software has unique capabilities to support monitoring a fiber optic seal. Fiber monitoring includes open and closed as well as parametric monitoring to detect tampering attacks. The fiber monitoring techniques, using the SSP power management processes, allow the seals to last for years while maintaining the security requirements of the monitoring application. The seal is enclosed in a tamper resistant housing with software to support active tamper monitoring. New features include LED notification of fiber closure, the ability to retrieve the entire fiber optic history via translator command, separate memory storage for fiber optic events, and a more robust method for tracking and resending failed messages.

  11. Conductive fabric seal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Livesay, Ronald Jason; Mason, Brandon William; Kuhn, Michael Joseph; Rowe, Nathan Carl

    2015-10-13

    Disclosed are several examples of a system and method for detecting if an article is being tampered with. Included is a covering made of a substrate that is coated with a layer of an electrically conductive material that forms an electrically conductive surface having an electrical resistance. The covering is configured to at least partially encapsulate the article such that the article cannot be tampered with, without modifying the electrical resistance of the electrically conductive surface of the covering. A sensing device is affixed to the electrically conductive surface of the covering and the sensing device monitors the condition of the covering by producing a signal that is indicative of the electrical resistance of the electrically conductive surface of the covering. A measured electrical resistance that differs from a nominal electrical resistance is indicative of a covering that is being tampered with and an alert is communicated to an observer.

  12. Remotely Monitored Sealing Array Software

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (OSTI)

    2012-09-12

    The Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA) utilizes the Secure Sensor Platform (SSP) framework to establish the fundamental operating capabilities for communication, security, power management, and cryptography. In addition to the SSP framework the RMSA software has unique capabilities to support monitoring a fiber optic seal. Fiber monitoring includes open and closed as well as parametric monitoring to detect tampering attacks. The fiber monitoring techniques, using the SSP power management processes, allow the seals to lastmore » for years while maintaining the security requirements of the monitoring application. The seal is enclosed in a tamper resistant housing with software to support active tamper monitoring. New features include LED notification of fiber closure, the ability to retrieve the entire fiber optic history via translator command, separate memory storage for fiber optic events, and a more robust method for tracking and resending failed messages.« less

  13. Modeling threat assessments of water supply systems using markov latent effects methodology.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Silva, Consuelo Juanita

    2006-12-01

    Recent amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act emphasize efforts toward safeguarding our nation's water supplies against attack and contamination. Specifically, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 established requirements for each community water system serving more than 3300 people to conduct an assessment of the vulnerability of its system to a terrorist attack or other intentional acts. Integral to evaluating system vulnerability is the threat assessment, which is the process by which the credibility of a threat is quantified. Unfortunately, full probabilistic assessment is generally not feasible, as there is insufficient experience and/or data to quantify the associated probabilities. For this reason, an alternative approach is proposed based on Markov Latent Effects (MLE) modeling, which provides a framework for quantifying imprecise subjective metrics through possibilistic or fuzzy mathematics. Here, an MLE model for water systems is developed and demonstrated to determine threat assessments for different scenarios identified by the assailant, asset, and means. Scenario assailants include terrorists, insiders, and vandals. Assets include a water treatment plant, water storage tank, node, pipeline, well, and a pump station. Means used in attacks include contamination (onsite chemicals, biological and chemical), explosives and vandalism. Results demonstrated highest threats are vandalism events and least likely events are those performed by a terrorist.

  14. Cape Coral Youth Center Helps Light the Way to Energy Savings | Department

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    of Energy Cape Coral Youth Center Helps Light the Way to Energy Savings Cape Coral Youth Center Helps Light the Way to Energy Savings May 18, 2011 - 4:32pm Addthis Cape Coral Youth Center Manager Mark Cagel stands in front of a tamper-proof thermostat at the Austen Youth Center in Cape Coral, Florida. | Photo Courtesy of the Cape Coral Youth Center Cape Coral Youth Center Manager Mark Cagel stands in front of a tamper-proof thermostat at the Austen Youth Center in Cape Coral, Florida. |

  15. Carbon Fiber SMC | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    of Energy Cape Coral Youth Center Manager Mark Cagel stands in front of a tamper-proof thermostat at the Austen Youth Center in Cape Coral, Florida. | Photo Courtesy of the Cape Coral Youth Center Cape Coral Youth Center Manager Mark Cagel stands in front of a tamper-proof thermostat at the Austen Youth Center in Cape Coral, Florida. | Photo Courtesy of the Cape Coral Youth Center April Saylor April Saylor Former Digital Outreach Strategist, Office of Public Affairs What does this project

  16. Transmission Line Security Monitor

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2013-05-28

    The Transmission Line Security Monitor is a multi-sensor monitor that mounts directly on high-voltage transmission lines to detect, characterize and communicate terrorist activity, human tampering and threatening conditions around support towers. For more information about INL's critical infrastructure protection research, visit http://www.facebook.com/idahonationallaboratory.

  17. Transmission Line Security Monitor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2011-01-01

    The Transmission Line Security Monitor is a multi-sensor monitor that mounts directly on high-voltage transmission lines to detect, characterize and communicate terrorist activity, human tampering and threatening conditions around support towers. For more information about INL's critical infrastructure protection research, visit http://www.facebook.com/idahonationallaboratory.

  18. New affordable options for infrastructure and asset protection

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2009-09-15

    Securitas is one of the leaders evolving with technology and delivering new forms of affordable security for mining facilities. It was called in to protect a large mothballed coal mine in the central USA, the victim of repeated thefts. First, Mobile Surveillance Units (MSUs) were installed but thefts continued. Later, a new wireless video security system called Videofied which used MotionViewers which use infrared detectors to detect movement and send a 10 second clip of the intrusion to an operator. This led to the thieves being caught. 2 photos.

  19. Audit Letter Report: INS-L-07-05

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Department of Energy memorandum DATE February 2, 2007 REPLY TO A T ~ N O F IG-40 SUBJECT: Letter Report on "Alleged Loss or Theft of Personally Identifiable Infonnation at Pantex," INS-L-07-05 (S06IS037) TO. Manager, Pailtex Site Office This is to advise you of the results of an Office of Inspector General (OIG) inspection of an alleged loss or theft of personally identifiable information at the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) Pantex Plant. BACKGROUND Under the

  20. the Y-12 Times, a newsletter for employees and friends of the Y-12 National Security Complex, September 2012

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Operations resume (pg. 2) Y-12 resumes nuclear operations Aug. 15. Phased Array (pg. 5) A Y-12 project brings sweet success to weld inspections. September 2012 Visit us! Whether you've been a Y-12 employee for one year or 40 years, the events of July 28 had an effect on your time here. Y-12ers have always considered themselves a family, and like family, we must work together to regain the confidence of interested groups. We know three people cut through fences and vandalized the Highly Enriched

  1. Nuclear Science Advisory Committee Issues Plan for U.S. Nuclear Physics

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safeguards and Security Challenge: The international safeguards and security system is being challenged by evolving proliferation and terrorism threats, expanding International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responsibilities, a retiring safeguards workforce, and the need for better technologies to detect and deter proliferation, theft, and sabotage. Response: Revitalize, strengthen, and sustain U.S. and international safeguards and security capabilities through the Next Generation Safeguards

  2. DOE F 1400.20 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    400.20 DOE F 1400.20 Form is used to retire DOE property. PDF icon RETIREMENT WORK ORDER More Documents & Publications Personal Property Retirement Work Order, HQ Form 1400.20 An Updated Assessement of Copper Wire Thefts from Electric Utilities - October 2010 COMMENTS�

  3. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Challenge:

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Safeguards and Security Challenge: The international safeguards and security system is being challenged by evolving proliferation and terrorism threats, expanding International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responsibilities, a retiring safeguards workforce, and the need for better technologies to detect and deter proliferation, theft, and sabotage. Response: Revitalize, strengthen, and sustain U.S. and international safeguards and security capabilities through the Next Generation Safeguards

  4. RELATIVE PROLIFERATION RISKS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL LEASING ARRANGEMENT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    CHENG,L.Y.; YUE, M.; BARI, R.A.

    2007-10-01

    The present study demonstrates a probabilistic approach to quantify the proliferation risks of fuel leasing and recycling. A Markov model approach is applied to evaluate the probability of proliferation success by diversion or theft. Proliferation risk is calculated as a product of the probability of success and the corresponding consequences.

  5. Insider Threat Case Studies at Radiological and Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pope, Noah Gale; Hobbs, Christopher

    2015-04-13

    Seven case studies are presented. The cases include thefts of various materials and sabotage. For each case there is an overview of the incident, a timeline, a profile of the perpetrator, and a discussion of the security system failures which allowed the incident to take place.

  6. Apparatus for safeguarding a radiological source

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Bzorgi, Fariborz M

    2014-10-07

    A tamper detector is provided for safeguarding a radiological source that is moved into and out of a storage location through an access porthole for storage and use. The radiological source is presumed to have an associated shipping container approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transporting the radiological source. The tamper detector typically includes a network of sealed tubing that spans at least a portion of the access porthole. There is an opening in the network of sealed tubing that is large enough for passage therethrough of the radiological source and small enough to prevent passage therethrough of the associated shipping cask. Generally a gas source connector is provided for establishing a gas pressure in the network of sealed tubing, and a pressure drop sensor is provided for detecting a drop in the gas pressure below a preset value.

  7. Pellet ad pellet-blanket neutronics and photonics for electron beam fusion

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ragheb, M.M.H.; Moses, G.A.; Maynard, C.W.

    1980-04-01

    Pellet and coupled pellet-blanket time-integrated neutronics and photonics calculations are reported for a representative low-gain (25), low-compression (deuterium-tritium core pr = 9.4 kg/m/sup 2/) pellet design for an electron beam fusion reactor. Tungsten, lead, and natural uranium are compared as pusher-tamper materials. In the three cases, neutron balances show that neutron multiplication in the pellet compensates for the energy losses and spectral softening due to neutron interactions. Fissile breeding cannot be achieved in the natural uranium case, since the fission reaction predominates. Substantive additonal energy can be obtained (approx. 5.5 MeV/source neutron) in the pellet if natural uranium is used as the tamper material. Neutron and gamma spectra from the pellet microexplosions are given.

  8. Security seal. [Patent application

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Gobeli, G.W.

    1981-11-17

    Security for a package or verifying seal in plastic material is provided by a print seal with unique thermally produced imprints in the plastic. If tampering is attempted, the material is irreparably damaged and thus detectable. The pattern of the imprints, similar to fingerprints are recorded as a positive identification for the seal, and corresponding recordings made to allow comparison. The integrity of the seal is proved by the comparison of imprint identification records made by laser beam projection.

  9. Security seal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Gobeli, Garth W.

    1985-01-01

    Security for a package or verifying seal in plastic material is provided by a print seal with unique thermally produced imprints in the plastic. If tampering is attempted, the material is irreparably damaged and thus detectable. The pattern of the imprints, similar to "fingerprints" are recorded as a positive identification for the seal, and corresponding recordings made to allow comparison. The integrity of the seal is proved by the comparison of imprint identification records made by laser beam projection.

  10. 'DisrupTech' event to highlight bright ideas from Los Alamos

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    'DisrupTech' event to highlight bright ideas from Los Alamos 'DisrupTech' event to highlight bright ideas from Los Alamos DisrupTech is hosted by the Richard P. Feynman Center for Innovation at Los Alamos and the New Mexico Angels. July 14, 2015 DisrupTech will feature eight technology presentations in the areas of sustainable fracking, solar cell materials, biofuels, tamper forensics, neutralization of toxic chemicals, biotechnology, water treatment, and industrial process improvement.

  11. Notice of Availability of the Remediation of the Moab Uranium Mill Tailings Final Environmental Impact Statement, Grand and San Juan Counties, Utah, Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0355) (08/05/05)

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    80 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 150 / Friday, August 5, 2005 / Notices that is cross referenced by the individual's name on a separate list. SAFEGUARDS: All physical access to the Department's site, and the site of the Department's contractor where this system of records is maintained, is controlled and monitored by security personnel. The computer system employed by the Department offers a high degree of resistance to tampering and circumvention. This computer system limits data access to

  12. Secure authenticated video equipment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Doren, N.E.

    1993-07-01

    In the verification technology arena, there is a pressing need for surveillance and monitoring equipment that produces authentic, verifiable records of observed activities. Such a record provides the inspecting party with confidence that observed activities occurred as recorded, without undetected tampering or spoofing having taken place. The secure authenticated video equipment (SAVE) system provides an authenticated series of video images of an observed activity. Being self-contained and portable, it can be installed as a stand-alone surveillance system or used in conjunction with existing monitoring equipment in a non-invasive manner. Security is provided by a tamper-proof camera enclosure containing a private, electronic authentication key. Video data is transferred communication link consisting of a coaxial cable, fiber-optic link or other similar media. A video review station, located remotely from the camera, receives, validates, displays and stores the incoming data. Video data is validated within the review station using a public key, a copy of which is held by authorized panics. This scheme allows the holder of the public key to verify the authenticity of the recorded video data but precludes undetectable modification of the data generated by the tamper-protected private authentication key.

  13. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-09-28

    Ensures appropriate levels of protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components; espionage; loss or theft of classified matter or Government property; and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security or on the health and safety of Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor employees, the public, or the environment. DOE N 251.40, dated 5/3/01, extends this directive until 12/31/01. Cancels DOE 5630.11B, DOE 5630.13A, DOE 5630.14A, DOE 5630.15, DOE 5630.16A, DOE 5630.17, DOE 5631.1C, DOE 5631.4A, DOE 5634.1B, DOE 5634.3, DOE 5639.3, and Chapter IX of DOE M 5632.1C-1

  14. A Qualitative Assessment of Diversion Scenarios for an Example Sodium Fast Reactor Using the GEN IV PR&PP Methodology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zentner, Michael D.; Coles, Garill A.; Therios, Ike

    2012-01-20

    FAST REACTORS;NUCLEAR ENERGY;NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT;PROLIFERATION;SAFEGUARDS;THEFT; A working group was created in 2002 by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for the purpose of developing an internationally accepted methodology for assessing the Proliferation Resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES) and its individual elements. A two year case study is being performed by the experts group using this methodology to assess the proliferation resistance of a hypothetical NES called the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). This work demonstrates how the PR and PP methodology can be used to provide important information at various levels of details to NES designers, safeguard administrators and decision makers. The study analyzes the response of the complete ESFR nuclear energy system to different proliferation and theft strategies. The challenges considered include concealed diversion, concealed misuse and 'break out' strategies. This paper describes the work done in performing a qualitative assessment of concealed diversion scenarios from the ESFR.

  15. Alternative Fuel and Advanced Technology Commercial Lawn Equipment (Spanish version); Clean Cities, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy (EERE)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nelson, Erik

    2015-06-01

    Powering commercial lawn equipment with alternative fuels or advanced engine technology is an effective way to reduce U.S. dependence on petroleum, reduce harmful emissions, and lessen the environmental impacts of commercial lawn mowing. Numerous alternative fuel and fuel-efficient advanced technology mowers are available. Owners turn to these mowers because they may save on fuel and maintenance costs, extend mower life, reduce fuel spillage and fuel theft, and demonstrate their commitment to sustainability.

  16. Office Supplies | The Ames Laboratory

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Of NONprOliferatiON aNd iNterNatiONal Security July 2011 www.nnsa.doe.gov National Nuclear Security Administration ENERGY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF Develop and implement DOE/NNSA nonproliferation and arms control policy to reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction. control the spread of WMD-related material, equipment, technology and expertise. Safeguard and Secure nuclear material to prevent its diversion, theft and sabotage. Negotiate, monitor and verify compliance with international

  17. U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY EMPLOYEE PERSONAL PROPERTY REMOVAL AUTHORIZATION

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY EMPLOYEE PERSONAL PROPERTY REMOVAL AUTHORIZATION HQ F 580.2 (10-13) Replaces HQ F 1400.25 NAME (Last, First, MI) Org Code Phone # (Item Description) Make Model Tag Number Serial Number Exp. Date RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGMENT I hereby acknowledge receipt for the item listed above and will hold myself accountable for its safety. I understand that DOE is not responsible nor financially liable for loss, theft, damage or destruction of employee's personal property brought into DOE's

  18. U.S. Attorney's Office

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Attorney's Office District of Minnesota FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Thursday, September 10, 2015 Former CEO Of Community Action Of Minneapolis William Davis Indicted For Conspiracy, Fraud And Theft Of Public Funds Jordan Davis indicted for conspiring to steal public funds through no-show job United States Attorney Andrew M. Luger today announced the indictment of WILLIAM JAMES DAVIS, 64, and JORDAN JAMES DAVIS, 34, for conspiring to steal funds from Community Action of Minneapolis (CAM) for the use

  19. Visiting Speaker Program - October 28, 2009 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    28, 2009 Visiting Speaker Program - October 28, 2009 October 28, 2009 Lecture Fraud and Theft in the Information Age by Frank W. Abagnale Jr. Author, Lecturer, Consultant Mr. Abagnale is one of the world's most respected authorities on forgery, embezzlement and secure documents. For over 35 years he has worked with, advised, and consulted with hundreds of financial institutions, corporations and government agencies around the world. Mr. Abagnale's autobiography, "Catch Me If You Can"

  20. PIV_System-PIA.pdf

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Identity theft harms millions of Americans every year. Breaches of personally identifiable information (PII) across the government have been well publicized and costly for individuals and Federal agencies. These breaches have prompted the Administration and Congress to take action to improve the protection of personal information. As Department of Energy employees and contractors, you have a responsibility t o protect all PII. DOE Order 206. I, Department of Energy Privacy Program, defines PI1

  1. Audit Report: OAS-M-08-01 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    1 Audit Report: OAS-M-08-01 October 1, 2007 Management Controls over the Bonneville Power Administration's Personal Property Accountability Bonneville Power Administration (Bonneville) did not have effective controls over its personal property tracked through the Sunflower system. Specifically, we found that (1) equipment susceptible to loss or theft was not always entered into accountability; (2) inventory location information was not always accurate; (3) the existence of personal property

  2. NETL F 580.1-19

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    19 (03/2001) OPI=BL60 (Previous Editions Obsolete) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROPERTY RETIREMENT WORK ORDER AUTHORIZATION DATE: REPORT NUMBER: TO: PROPERTY MANAGEMENT UNIT STATUS OF PROPERTY (* Explain Below) = Loss = Unserviceable = Theft = Inventory Shortage = Damage = Other RETIREMENT AUTHORIZATION FOR PROPERTY LISTED BELOW ITEM PROPERTY UNIT TOTAL NO. NUMBER COST COST DESCRIPTION UNIT QUANTITY (If additional space is needed use additional sheets) TOTAL * EXPLAIN CIRCUMSTANCES CAUSING

  3. Office Of NONprOliferatiON

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Of NONprOliferatiON aNd iNterNatiONal Security July 2011 www.nnsa.doe.gov National Nuclear Security Administration ENERGY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF Develop and implement DOE/NNSA nonproliferation and arms control policy to reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction. control the spread of WMD-related material, equipment, technology and expertise. Safeguard and Secure nuclear material to prevent its diversion, theft and sabotage. Negotiate, monitor and verify compliance with international

  4. Special Inquiry: IG-0584 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    IG-0584 Special Inquiry: IG-0584 January 28, 2003 Operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory On November 18, 2002, the Office of Inspector General began a fact finding inquiry into allegations that senior management of the Los Alamos National Laboratory engaged in a deliberate cover-up of security breaches and illegal activities, in particular, with respect to reported instances of property loss and theft. The Acting Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration requested this

  5. Inspiration from world-class scientists leads Patricia Langan to

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Nuclear Security Administration Insider Threat to Nuclear and Radiological Materials: Fact Sheet March 23, 2012 Almost all known cases of theft of nuclear material involved an insider. The threat of a nuclear facility insider, either individually or in collusion with an outsider, stealing fissile material or committing sabotage at a nuclear facility is a difficult one to accept and prevent. The skills, knowledge, access, and authority held by some insiders make the threat difficult to

  6. Instrumented SSH on NERSC Systems

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Security » Instrumented SSH Instrumented SSH on NERSC Systems NERSC uses a modified version of SSH on all of our systems that allows us to record and analyze the content of interactive SSH sessions. Why are We Doing This? Credential theft represents the single greatest threat to security here at NERSC. We are addressing this problem by analyzing user command activity and looking for behavior that is recognizably hostile. Until SSH came into widespread use, it was trivial to monitor login

  7. Alternative Fuel and Advanced Technology Commercial Lawn Equipment (Brochure), Clean Cities, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy (EERE)

    Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicles Data Center [Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)]

    Powering commercial lawn equipment with alternative fuels or advanced engine technology is an effective way to reduce U.S. dependence on petro- leum, reduce harmful emissions, and lessen the environmental impacts of commercial lawn mowing. Numer- ous alternative fuel and fuel-efficient advanced technology mowers are available. Owners turn to these mow- ers because they may save on fuel and maintenance costs, extend mower life, reduce fuel spillage and fuel theft, and demonstrate their commitment

  8. EA-2024: Gap Material Plutonium- Transport, Receipt, and Processing

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This environmental assessment evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with transporting up to 900 kilograms of plutonium from foreign nations to the United States, storing the plutonium at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and processing it for disposition. This action would be pursued only if it is determined that there is no other reasonable pathway to assure security of this plutonium from theft or diversion.

  9. Global Threat Reduction Initiative

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    comprehensive strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism; and  The key organization responsible for implementing the U.S. HEU minimization policy. GTRI MISSION Reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide. DOE STRATEGIC GOAL 2.2 Prevent the acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials for use in weapons of mass destruction and other acts of terrorism Protect high priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft and sabotage These

  10. Insider Threat to Nuclear and Radiological Materials: Fact Sheet | National

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Nuclear Security Administration Insider Threat to Nuclear and Radiological Materials: Fact Sheet March 23, 2012 Almost all known cases of theft of nuclear material involved an insider. The threat of a nuclear facility insider, either individually or in collusion with an outsider, stealing fissile material or committing sabotage at a nuclear facility is a difficult one to accept and prevent. The skills, knowledge, access, and authority held by some insiders make the threat difficult to

  11. Microsoft PowerPoint - Enhancements_Moss

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    DOE - GTRI Achieving threat reduction by protecting risk-significant WMD usable nuclear and radiological materials worldwide from theft and sabotage DHS - DNDO Implementing domestic nuclear detection efforts for a managed and coordinated response to radiological and nuclear threats DOE - ORNL ORNL serves as the primary project implementer for secure transport foreign and domestic assessments, security upgrades and technical subject matter expertise 5/16/2014 2 * Heavy emphasis on security at end

  12. PowerPoint Presentation

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    comprehensive strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism; and  The key organization responsible for implementing the U.S. HEU minimization policy. GTRI MISSION Reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide. DOE STRATEGIC GOAL 2.2 Prevent the acquisition of nuclear and radiological materials for use in weapons of mass destruction and other acts of terrorism Protect high priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft and sabotage These

  13. Alternative Fuels Data Center (Fact Sheet), Clean Cities, Vehicle Technologies Office (VTO)

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    commercial lawn equipment with alternative fuels or advanced engine technology is an effective way to reduce U.S. dependence on petro- leum, reduce harmful emissions, and lessen the environmental impacts of commercial lawn mowing. Numer- ous alternative fuel and fuel-efficient advanced technology mowers are available. Owners turn to these mow- ers because they may save on fuel and maintenance costs, extend mower life, reduce fuel spillage and fuel theft, and demonstrate their commitment to

  14. Groundwater monitoring system

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ames, Kenneth R.; Doesburg, James M.; Eschbach, Eugene A.; Kelley, Roy C.; Myers, David A.

    1987-01-01

    A groundwater monitoring system includes a bore, a well casing within and spaced from the bore, and a pump within the casing. A water impermeable seal between the bore and the well casing prevents surface contamination from entering the pump. Above the ground surface is a removable operating means which is connected to the pump piston by a flexible cord. A protective casing extends above ground and has a removable cover. After a groundwater sample has been taken, the cord is disconnected from the operating means. The operating means is removed for taking away, the cord is placed within the protective casing, and the cover closed and locked. The system is thus protected from contamination, as well as from damage by accident or vandalism.

  15. Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation (Presentation)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H

    2011-01-01

    Why is the insider a concern? There are many documented cases of nuclear material available for sale - there are more insider diversions than outsider attacks and more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Insider attributes are: have access, has authority, possesses knowledge, works with absence of timeline, can test system, and may act alone or support a team. Material control and accountability (MC&A) is an essential part of an integrated safeguards system. Objectives of MC&A are: (1) Ongoing confirmation of the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) in assigned locations; (2) Prompt investigation of anomalies that may indicate a loss of SNM; (3) Timely and localized detection of loss, diversion, or theft of a goal quantity; (4) Rapid assessment and response to detection alarms; and (5) Timely generation of information to aid in the recovery of SNM in the event of an actual loss, diversion, or theft from the purview of the MC&A system. Control and accountability of material, equipment, and data are essential to minimizing insider threats.

  16. A GAMMA RAY SCANNING APPROACH TO QUANTIFY SPENT FUEL CASK RADIONUCLIDE CONTENTS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Branney, S.

    2011-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has outlined a need to develop methods of allowing re-verification of LWR spent fuel stored in dry storage casks without the need of a reference baseline measurement. Some scanning methods have been developed, but improvements can be made to readily provide required data for spent fuel cask verification. The scanning process should be conditioned to both confirm the contents and detect any changes due to container/contents degradation or unauthorized removal or tampering. Savannah River National Laboratory and The University of Tennessee are exploring a new method of engineering a high efficiency, cost effective detection system, capable of meeting the above defined requirements in a variety of environmental situations. An array of NaI(Tl) detectors, arranged to form a 'line scan' along with a matching array of 'honeycomb' collimators provide a precisely defined field of view with minimal degradation of intrinsic detection efficiency and with significant scatter rejection. Scanning methods are adapted to net optimum detection efficiency of the combined system. In this work, and with differing detectors, a series of experimental demonstrations are performed that map system spatial performance and counting capability before actual spent fuel cask scans are performed. The data are evaluated to demonstrate the prompt ability to identify missing fuel rods or other content abnormalities. To also record and assess cask tampering, the cask is externally examined utilizing FTIR hyper spectral and other imaging/sensing approaches. This provides dated records and indications of external abnormalities (surface deposits, smears, contaminants, corrosion) attributable to normal degradation or to tampering. This paper will describe the actual gathering of data in both an experimental climate and from an actual spent fuel dry storage cask, and how an evaluation may be performed by an IAEA facility inspector attempting to draw an independent safeguards conclusion concerning the status of the special nuclear material.

  17. Seal system with integral detector

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Fiarman, Sidney

    1985-01-01

    There is disclosed a seal system for materials where security is of the essence, such as nuclear materials, which is tamper-indicating, which indicates changes in environmental conditions that evidence attempts to by-pass the seal, which is unique and cost effective, said seal system comprised of a seal where an optical signal is transmitted through a loop, with a detector to read said signal, and one or more additional detectors designed to detect environmental changes, these detectors being operatively associated with the seal so that detection of a break in the optical signal or detection of environmental changes will cause an observable change in the seal.

  18. Without a Trace

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Without a Trace 1663 Los Alamos science and technology magazine Latest Issue:March 2016 past issues All Issues » submit Without a Trace Some packages are so valuable that they require a way to unequivocally reveal if anyone has tried to get in. March 8, 2016 Rows of cans marked radioactive on a storage shelf The International Atomic Energy Agency uses tens of thousands of tamper-evident seals annually to help monitor nuclear material around the world. CREDIT: IAEA "The seal is designed to

  19. Seal system with integral detector

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Fiarman, S.

    1982-08-12

    A seal system is disclosed for materials where security is of the essence, such as nuclear materials. The seal is tamper-indicating, indicates changes in environmental conditions that evidence attempts to bypass the seal, is unique and cost effective. The seal system is comprised of a seal where an optical signal is transmitted through a loop, with a detector to read said signal, and one or more additional detectors designed to detect environmental changes, these detectors being operatively associated with the seal so that detection of a break in the optical signal or detection of environmental changes will cause an observable change in the seal.

  20. Radiation detectors as surveillance monitors for IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Dowdy, E.J.

    1980-10-01

    Radiation detectors used for personnel dosimetry are examined for use under IAEA Safeguards as monitors to confirm the passage or nonpassage (YES/NO) of plutonium-bearing nuclear material at barrier penetrations declared closed. In this application where backgrounds are ill defined, no advantage is found for a particular detector type because of intrinsic efficiency. Secondary considerations such as complexity, ease of tamper-proofing, and ease of readout are used to recommend specific detector types for routine monitoring and for data-base measurements. Recommendations are made for applications, data acquisition, and instrument development.

  1. Rotary mechanical latch

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Spletzer, Barry L.; Martinez, Michael A.; Marron, Lisa C.

    2012-11-13

    A rotary mechanical latch for positive latching and unlatching of a rotary device with a latchable rotating assembly having a latching gear that can be driven to latched and unlatched states by a drive mechanism such as an electric motor. A cam arm affixed to the latching gear interfaces with leading and trailing latch cams affixed to a flange within the drive mechanism. The interaction of the cam arm with leading and trailing latch cams prevents rotation of the rotating assembly by external forces such as those due to vibration or tampering.

  2. HASQARD Section 4

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    HASQARD Section 4.2.4, Volume 2, Revision 3 requires: "The field custodian shall seal the cap of the individual sample container so that any tampering is easy to detect. Custody seals shall be used to verify that sample integrity has been maintained during transport." The HASQARD Focus Group provides the following clarification to the requirement: Note: The presence of, or fixative residue from, custody seals can interfere with the functionality of equipment used during analysis (e.g.,

  3. HASQARD Section 4

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    text of the sixth paragraph in HASQARD Volume 2, Revision 3, Section 4.2.4 is revised to say: "Custody seals shall be used to verify that sample integrity has been maintained during transport. The field custodian shall seal the cap of the individual sample container so that any tampering is easy to detect. In lieu of using a custody seal directly applied to sample containers, the sample container may be placed inside a secondary container that is sealed with a custody seal. Custody tape

  4. RadSTraM: Radiological Source Tracking and Monitoring, Phase II Final Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Warren, Tracy A; Walker, Randy M; Hill, David E; Gross, Ian G; Smith, Cyrus M; Abercrombie, Robert K

    2008-12-01

    This report focuses on the technical information gained from the Radiological Source Tracking and Monitoring (RadSTraM) Phase II investigation and its implications. The intent of the RadSTraM project was to determine the feasibility of tracking radioactive materials in commerce, particularly International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category 3 and 4 materials. Specifically, Phase II of the project addressed tracking radiological medical isotopes in commerce. These categories of materials are susceptible to loss or theft but the problem is not being addressed by other agencies.

  5. Summary report on transportation of nuclear fuel materials in Japan : transportation infrastructure, threats identified in open literature, and physical protection regulations.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cochran, John Russell; Ouchi, Yuichiro; Furaus, James Phillip; Marincel, Michelle K.

    2008-03-01

    This report summarizes the results of three detailed studies of the physical protection systems for the protection of nuclear materials transport in Japan, with an emphasis on the transportation of mixed oxide fuel materials1. The Japanese infrastructure for transporting nuclear fuel materials is addressed in the first section. The second section of this report presents a summary of baseline data from the open literature on the threats of sabotage and theft during the transport of nuclear fuel materials in Japan. The third section summarizes a review of current International Atomic Energy Agency, Japanese and United States guidelines and regulations concerning the physical protection for the transportation of nuclear fuel materials.

  6. Audit Letter Report: INS-L-07-05 | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    5 Audit Letter Report: INS-L-07-05 February 2, 2007 Alleged Loss or Theft of Personally Identifiable Information at Pantex Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, as amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act, all United States (U.S.) employers are required to obtain and retain information concerning each employee's eligibility to work in the U.S. The information to be collected generally consists of the employee's social security number, address, date of birth, and other

  7. Concealed identification symbols and nondestructive determination of the identification symbols

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Nance, Thomas A.; Gibbs, Kenneth M.

    2014-09-16

    The concealing of one or more identification symbols into a target object and the subsequent determination or reading of such symbols through non-destructive testing is described. The symbols can be concealed in a manner so that they are not visible to the human eye and/or cannot be readily revealed to the human eye without damage or destruction of the target object. The identification symbols can be determined after concealment by e.g., the compilation of multiple X-ray images. As such, the present invention can also provide e.g., a deterrent to theft and the recovery of lost or stolen objects.

  8. US-Russian Cooperation in Upgrading MC&A System at Rosatom Facilities: Measurement of Nuclear Materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Jensen, Bruce A

    2011-01-01

    Improve protection of weapons-usable nuclear material from theft or diversion through the development and support of a nationwide sustainable and effective Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) program based on material measurement. The material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) cooperation has yielded significant results in implementing MC&A measurements at Russian nuclear facilities: (1) Establishment of MEM WG and MEMS SP; (2) Infrastructure for development, certification, and distribution of RMs; and (3) Coordination on development and implementation of MMs.

  9. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-09-28

    Ensures appropriate levels of protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components; espionage; loss or theft of classified matter or Government property; and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security or on the health and safety of Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor employees, the public, or the environment. DOE O 470.1 Extended until 5-11-06 by DOE N 251.63, dated 5-11-05. Chg 1, Safeguards and Security Program, dated 9/28/95, extended by DOE N 251.57, dated 4/28/2004. Change 1, 5/21/96, revises Chapter IV. Cancels: DOE 5630.11B, DOE 5630.13A, DOE 5630.14A, DOE 5630.15, DOE 5630.16A, DOE 5630.17, DOE 5631.1C, DOE 5631.4A, DOE 5634.1B, DOE 5634.3, DOE 5639.3, DOE M 5632.1C-1 in part.

  10. Development of Green Box sensor module technologies for rail applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rey, D.; Breeding, R.; Hogan, J.; Mitchell, J.; McKeen, R.G.; Brogan, J.

    1996-04-01

    Results of a joint Sandia National Laboratories, University of New Mexico, and New Mexico Engineering Research Institute project to investigate an architecture implementing real-time monitoring and tracking technologies in the railroad industry is presented. The work, supported by the New Mexico State Transportation Authority, examines a family of smart sensor products that can be tailored to the specific needs of the user. The concept uses a strap-on sensor package, designed as a value-added component, integrated into existing industry systems and standards. Advances in sensor microelectronics and digital signal processing permit us to produce a class of smart sensors that interpret raw data and transmit inferred information. As applied to freight trains, the sensors` primary purpose is to minimize operating costs by decreasing losses due to theft, and by reducing the number, severity, and consequence of hazardous materials incidents. The system would be capable of numerous activities including: monitoring cargo integrity, controlling system braking and vehicle acceleration, recognizing component failure conditions, and logging sensor data. A cost-benefit analysis examines the loss of revenue resulting from theft, hazardous materials incidents, and accidents. Customer survey data are combined with the cost benefit analysis and used to guide the product requirements definition for a series of specific applications. A common electrical architecture is developed to support the product line and permit rapid product realization. Results of a concept validation, which used commercial hardware and was conducted on a revenue-generating train, are also reported.

  11. A Zero Knowledge Protocol For Nuclear Warhead Verification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Glaser, Alexander; Goldston, Robert J.

    2014-03-14

    The verification of nuclear warheads for arms control faces a paradox: International inspectors must gain high confidence in the authenticity of submitted items while learning nothing about them. Conventional inspection systems featuring ''information barriers'', designed to hide measurments stored in electronic systems, are at risk of tampering and snooping. Here we show the viability of fundamentally new approach to nuclear warhead verification that incorporates a zero-knowledge protocol, designed such that sensitive information is never measured so does not need to be hidden. We interrogate submitted items with energetic neutrons, making in effect, differential measurements of neutron transmission and emission. Calculations of diversion scenarios show that a high degree of discrimination can be achieved while revealing zero information. Timely demonstration of the viability of such an approach could be critical for the nexxt round of arms-control negotiations, which will likely require verification of individual warheads, rather than whole delivery systems.

  12. Magnetic vector field tag and seal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Johnston, Roger G.; Garcia, Anthony R.

    2004-08-31

    One or more magnets are placed in a container (preferably on objects inside the container) and the magnetic field strength and vector direction are measured with a magnetometer from at least one location near the container to provide the container with a magnetic vector field tag and seal. The location(s) of the magnetometer relative to the container are also noted. If the position of any magnet inside the container changes, then the measured vector fields at the these locations also change, indicating that the tag has been removed, the seal has broken, and therefore that the container and objects inside may have been tampered with. A hollow wheel with magnets inside may also provide a similar magnetic vector field tag and seal. As the wheel turns, the magnets tumble randomly inside, removing the tag and breaking the seal.

  13. Hardware device to physical structure binding and authentication

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Hamlet, Jason R.; Stein, David J.; Bauer, Todd M.

    2013-08-20

    Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a hardware device for authenticating a binding of the hardware device and a physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes an internal physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generate an internal PUF value. Binding logic is coupled to receive the internal PUF value, as well as an external PUF value associated with the physical structure, and generates a binding PUF value, which represents the binding of the hardware device and the physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit also includes a cryptographic unit that uses the binding PUF value to allow a challenger to authenticate the binding.

  14. Supplemental Systems for Unattended UF6 Cylinder Monitoring

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Curtis, Michael M.

    2010-08-11

    Cylinder assay and mass measurements, the mainstay of enrichment plant verification efforts have historically been performed by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors using portable equipment. For the sake of efficiency, accuracy, and timeliness, such equipment is being supplanted by unattended measurement stations. Ancillary systems must be employed with such stations to ensure that measured parameters are properly recorded, cylinders are positively identified, operations occur according to procedure, and no tampering takes place in the inspectors’ absence. Depending on the facility, it may prove feasible to track cylinders from the measurement vicinity to their storage locations using surveillance. This paper will provide a cursory description of the various subsystems associated with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Integrated Cylinder Verification Station and how inattention to the requirements of such systems could seriously diminish the capability of the integrated whole.

  15. The Mailbox Computer System for the IAEA verification experiment on HEU downlending at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Aronson, A.L.; Gordon, D.M.

    2000-07-31

    IN APRIL 1996, THE UNITED STATES (US) ADDED THE PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT TO THE LIST OF FACILITIES ELIGIBLE FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS. AT THAT TIME, THE US PROPOSED THAT THE IAEA CARRY OUT A ''VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT'' AT THE PLANT WITH RESPECT TO DOOWNBLENDING OF ABOUT 13 METRIC TONS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) IN THE FORM OF URANIUM HEXAFLUROIDE (UF6). DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1997 THROUGH JULY 1998, THE IAEA CARRIED OUT THE REQUESTED VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT. THE VERIFICATION APPROACH USED FOR THIS EXPERIMENT INCLUDED, AMONG OTHER MEASURES, THE ENTRY OF PROCESS-OPERATIONAL DATA BY THE FACILITY OPERATOR ON A NEAR-REAL-TIME BASIS INTO A ''MAILBOX'' COMPUTER LOCATED WITHIN A TAMPER-INDICATING ENCLOSURE SEALED BY THE IAEA.

  16. Method of monitoring stored nuclear fuel elements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Borloo, E.; Buergers, W.; Crutzen, S.; Vinche, C.

    1983-05-24

    To monitor a nuclear fuel element or fuel elements located in a store, e.g. a pond in a swimming pool reactor, the store is illuminated ultrasonically using one or more transducers transmitting ultrasonic signals in one or more predetermined directions to obtain an output which, because it depends on the number and relative location of the fuel elements in the store, and the structure of the store itself is distinctive to the fuel elements or elements stored therein. From this distinctive output is derived an identity unique to the stored fuel element or elements and a reference signal indicative of the whole structure when intact, the reference signal and identity being recorded. Subsequent ultrasonic testing of the store and its contents under identical operating conditions produces a signal which is compared to the recorded reference signal and if different therefrom reveals the occurrence of tampering with the store and/or the fuel element or elements.

  17. Hardware device binding and mutual authentication

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Hamlet, Jason R; Pierson, Lyndon G

    2014-03-04

    Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic unit within a computing device for binding multiple hardware devices and mutually authenticating the devices. The cryptographic unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generates a binding PUF value. The cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF value during an enrollment phase and subsequent authentication phases. During a subsequent authentication phase, the cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF values of the multiple hardware devices to generate a challenge to send to the other device, and to verify a challenge received from the other device to mutually authenticate the hardware devices.

  18. Radioactive material package closures with the use of shape memory alloys

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Koski, J.A.; Bronowski, D.R.

    1997-11-01

    When heated from room temperature to 165 C, some shape memory metal alloys such as titanium-nickel alloys have the ability to return to a previously defined shape or size with dimensional changes up to 7%. In contrast, the thermal expansion of most metals over this temperature range is about 0.1 to 0.2%. The dimension change of shape memory alloys, which occurs during a martensite to austenite phase transition, can generate stresses as high as 700 MPa (100 kspi). These properties can be used to create a closure for radioactive materials packages that provides for easy robotic or manual operations and results in reproducible, tamper-proof seals. This paper describes some proposed closure methods with shape memory alloys for radioactive material packages. Properties of the shape memory alloys are first summarized, then some possible alternative sealing methods discussed, and, finally, results from an initial proof-of-concept experiment described.

  19. Development of a Whole Container Seal

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kuhn, Michael J; Pickett, Chris A; Stinson, Brad J; Rowe, Nathan C

    2014-01-01

    This paper outlines a technique for utilizing electrically conductive textiles as a whole container seal. This method has the potential to provide more robustness for ensuring that the container has not been breached versus conventional sealing methods that only provide tamper indication at the area used for normal access. The conductive textile is used as a distributed sensor for detecting and localizing container tamper or breach. For sealing purposes, the conductive fabric represents a bounded, near-infinite grid of resistors. The well-known infinite resistance grid problem was used to model and confirm the expected accuracy and validity of this approach. An experimental setup was built that uses a multiplexed Wheatstone bridge measurement to determine the resistances of a coarse electrode grid across the conductive fabric. Non-uniform resistance values of the grid infer the presence of damage or tears in the fabric. Results suggest accuracy proportional to the electrode spacing in determining the presence and location of disturbances in conductive fabric samples. Current work is focused on constructing experimental prototypes for field and environmental testing to gauge the performance of these whole container seals in real world conditions. We are also developing software and hardware to interface with the whole container seals. The latest prototypes are expected to provide more accuracy in detecting and localizing events, although detection of a penetration should be adequate for most sealing applications. We are also developing smart sensing nodes that integrate digital hardware and additional sensors (e.g., motion, humidity) into the electrode nodes within the whole container seal.

  20. A "Proof-of-Concept" Demonstration of RF-Based Technologies for UF6 Cylinder Tracking at Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pickett, Chris A; Younkin, James R; Kovacic, Donald N; Dixon, E. T.; Martinez, B.

    2007-01-01

    This effort describes how radio-frequency (RF) technology can be integrated into a uranium enrichment facility's nuclear materials accounting and control program to enhance uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinder tracking and thus provide benefits to both domestic and international safeguards. Approved industry-standard cylinders are used to handle and store UF6 feed, product, tails, and samples at uranium enrichment plants. In the international arena, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on time-consuming manual cylinder inventory and tracking techniques to verify operator declarations and to detect potential diversion of UF6. Development of a reliable, automated, and tamper-resistant process for tracking and monitoring UF6 cylinders would greatly reduce the risk of false or misreported cylinder tare weights, diversion of nuclear material, concealment of excess production, utilization of undeclared cylinders, and misrepresentation of the cylinders contents. This paper will describe a "proof-of concept" system that was designed show the feasibility of using RF based technologies to track individual UF6 cylinders throughout their entire life cycle, and thus ensure both increased domestic accountability of materials and a more effective and efficient method for application of IAEA international safeguards at the site level. The proposed system incorporates RF-based identification devices, which provide a mechanism for a reliable, automated, and tamper-resistant tracking network. We explore how securely attached RF tags can be integrated with other safeguards technologies to better detect diversion of cylinders. The tracking system could also provide a foundation for integration of other types of safeguards that would further enhance detection of undeclared activities.

  1. Remote Sensing Laboratory - RSL

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2014-11-06

    One of the primary resources supporting homeland security is the Remote Sensing Laboratory, or RSL. The Laboratory creates advanced technologies for emergency response operations, radiological incident response, and other remote sensing activities. RSL emergency response teams are on call 24-hours a day, and maintain the capability to deploy domestically and internationally in response to threats involving the loss, theft, or release of nuclear or radioactive material. Such incidents might include Nuclear Power Plant accidents, terrorist incidents involving nuclear or radiological materials, NASA launches, and transportation accidents involving nuclear materials. Working with the US Department of Homeland Security, RSL personnel equip, maintain, and conduct training on the mobile detection deployment unit, to provide nuclear radiological security at major national events such as the super bowl, the Indianapolis 500, New Year's Eve celebrations, presidential inaugurations, international meetings and conferences, just about any event where large numbers of people will gather.

  2. Examining the Risk of Nuclear Trafficking

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Balatsky, Galya; Severe, William R; Schoeneck, Jeffery

    2009-01-01

    The need to stop illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials around the world is undeniable and urgent. This issue is particularly evident due to the highly dangerous consequences of the risks involved, the known interest of terrorist groups in acquiring such materials and the vulnerability of theft and diversion of such materials. Yet the phenomenon of nuclear trafficking remains a subject where the unknown dominates what is known on the subject. The trafficking panel at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Workshop on Reducing the Risk of Radioactive and Nuclear Materials that took place in Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 10-11, 2009, dealt with some of the issues associated with nuclear trafficking. Different points of view on how to better address trafficking and thwart perpetrator efforts were discussed. This paper presents some of these views and addresses practical measures that should be considered to improve the situation.

  3. Enduring Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Proceedings of a panel discussion

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Walter, C. E., LLNL

    1997-11-18

    The panel reviewed the complete nuclear fuel cycle in the context of alternate energy resources, energy need projections, effects on the environment, susceptibility of nuclear materials to theft, diversion, and weapon proliferation. We also looked at ethical considerations of energy use, as well as waste, and its effects. The scope of the review extended to the end of the next century with due regard for world populations beyond that period. The intent was to take a long- range view and to project, not forecast, the future based on ethical rationales, and to avoid, as often happens, long-range discussions that quickly zoom in on only the next few decades. A specific nuclear fuel cycle technology that could satisfy these considerations was described and can be applied globally.

  4. Remote Sensing Laboratory - RSL

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2015-01-09

    One of the primary resources supporting homeland security is the Remote Sensing Laboratory, or RSL. The Laboratory creates advanced technologies for emergency response operations, radiological incident response, and other remote sensing activities. RSL emergency response teams are on call 24-hours a day, and maintain the capability to deploy domestically and internationally in response to threats involving the loss, theft, or release of nuclear or radioactive material. Such incidents might include Nuclear Power Plant accidents, terrorist incidents involving nuclear or radiological materials, NASA launches, and transportation accidents involving nuclear materials. Working with the US Department of Homeland Security, RSL personnel equip, maintain, and conduct training on the mobile detection deployment unit, to provide nuclear radiological security at major national events such as the super bowl, the Indianapolis 500, New Year's Eve celebrations, presidential inaugurations, international meetings and conferences, just about any event where large numbers of people will gather.

  5. Report to Congress on abnormal occurrences, October--December 1993. Volume 16, No. 4

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-04-01

    Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 identifies an abnormal occurrence as an unscheduled incident or event that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be significant from the standpoint of public health or safety and requires a quarterly report of such events to be made to Congress. This report covers the period from October 1 through December 31, 1993. This report discusses six abnormal occurrences at NRC-licensed facilities. Five involved medical brachytherapy misadministrations, and one involved an overexposure to a nursing infant. Seven abnormal occurrences that were reported by the Agreement States are also discussed, based on information provided by the Agreement States as of February 28, 1994. Of these events, three involved brachytherapy misadministrations, one involved a teletherapy misadministration, one involved a theft of radioactive material during transport and improper disposal, and two involved lost sources.

  6. DEVELOPMENT OF A METHODOLOGY TO ASSESS PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR GENERATION IV SYSTEMS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nishimura, R.; Bari, R.; Peterson, P.; Roglans-Ribas, J.; Kalenchuk, D.

    2004-10-06

    Enhanced proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR&PP) is one of the technology goals for advanced nuclear concepts, such as Generation IV systems. Under the auspices of the Generation IV International Forum, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology of the U.S. DOE, the Office of Nonproliferation Policy of the National Nuclear Security Administration, and participating organizations from six other countries are sponsoring an international working group to develop an evaluation methodology for PR&PP. This methodology will permit an objective PR&PP comparison between alternative nuclear systems (e.g., different reactor types or fuel cycles) and support design optimization to enhance robustness against proliferation, theft and sabotage. The paper summarizes the proposed assessment methodology including the assessment framework, measures used to express the PR&PP characteristics of the system, threat definition, system element and target identification, pathway identification and analysis, and estimation of the measures.

  7. A strap-on monitoring system for rail car applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hogan, J.; Rey, D.; Mitchell, J.; Breeding, R.; McKeen, R.G.; Brogan, J.

    1996-12-01

    A joint Sandia National Laboratories, University of New Mexico, and New Mexico Engineering Research Institute project to investigate an architecture implementing real-time monitoring and tracking technologies in the railroad industry is presented. The work examines a strap-on sensor package, designed as a value-added component, integrated into existing industry systems and standards. As applied to freight trains, the sensors` primary purpose is to minimize operating costs by decreasing losses due to theft, and by reducing the number, severity, and a consequence of hazardous materials incidents. Product requirements are based on a cost-benefit analysis of operating losses. Results of a concept validation experiment conducted on a revenue generating train are reported.

  8. Approach to proliferation risk assessment based on multiple objective analysis framework

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Andrianov, A.; Kuptsov, I.

    2013-07-01

    The approach to the assessment of proliferation risk using the methods of multi-criteria decision making and multi-objective optimization is presented. The approach allows the taking into account of the specifics features of the national nuclear infrastructure, and possible proliferation strategies (motivations, intentions, and capabilities). 3 examples of applying the approach are shown. First, the approach has been used to evaluate the attractiveness of HEU (high enriched uranium)production scenarios at a clandestine enrichment facility using centrifuge enrichment technology. Secondly, the approach has been applied to assess the attractiveness of scenarios for undeclared production of plutonium or HEU by theft of materials circulating in nuclear fuel cycle facilities and thermal reactors. Thirdly, the approach has been used to perform a comparative analysis of the structures of developing nuclear power systems based on different types of nuclear fuel cycles, the analysis being based on indicators of proliferation risk.

  9. The Cyber Security Crisis

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Spafford, Eugene [Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, United States

    2009-09-01

    Despite considerable activity and attention, the overall state of information security continues to get worse. Attacks are increasing, fraud and theft are rising, and losses may exceed $100 billion per year worldwide. Many factors contribute to this, including misplaced incentives for industry, a lack of attention by government, ineffective law enforcement, and an uninformed image of who the perpetrators really are. As a result, many of the intended attempts at solutions are of limited (if any) overall effectiveness. This presentation will illustrate some key aspects of the cyber security problem and its magnitude, as well as provide some insight into causes and enabling factors. The talk will conclude with some observations on how the computing community can help improve the situation, as well as some suggestions for 'cyber self-defense.'

  10. Secure Data Transfer Guidance for Industrial Control and SCADA Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mahan, Robert E.; Fluckiger, Jerry D.; Clements, Samuel L.; Tews, Cody W.; Burnette, John R.; Goranson, Craig A.; Kirkham, Harold

    2011-09-01

    This document was developed to provide guidance for the implementation of secure data transfer in a complex computational infrastructure representative of the electric power and oil and natural gas enterprises and the control systems they implement. For the past 20 years the cyber security community has focused on preventative measures intended to keep systems secure by providing a hard outer shell that is difficult to penetrate. Over time, the hard exterior, soft interior focus changed to focus on defense-in-depth adding multiple layers of protection, introducing intrusion detection systems, more effective incident response and cleanup, and many other security measures. Despite much larger expenditures and more layers of defense, successful attacks have only increased in number and severity. Consequently, it is time to re-focus the conventional approach to cyber security. While it is still important to implement measures to keep intruders out, a new protection paradigm is warranted that is aimed at discovering attempted or real compromises as early as possible. Put simply, organizations should take as fact that they have been, are now, or will be compromised. These compromises may be intended to steal information for financial gain as in the theft of intellectual property or credentials that lead to the theft of financial resources, or to lie silent until instructed to cause physical or electronic damage and/or denial of services. This change in outlook has been recently confirmed by the National Security Agency [19]. The discovery of attempted and actual compromises requires an increased focus on monitoring events by manual and/or automated log monitoring, detecting unauthorized changes to a system's hardware and/or software, detecting intrusions, and/or discovering the exfiltration of sensitive information and/or attempts to send inappropriate commands to ICS/SCADA (Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems.

  11. Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H; Roche, Charles T

    2011-01-01

    The technical objectives of nuclear safeguards are (1) the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown and (2) the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards and security program must address both outsider threats and insider threats. Outsider threats are primarily addressed by the physical protection system. Insider threats can be any level of personnel at the site including passive or active insiders that could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion. This could occur by an individual acting alone or by collusion between an individual with material control and accountability (MC&A) responsibilities and another individual who has responsibility or control within both the physical protection and the MC&A systems. The insider threat is one that must be understood and incorporated into the safeguards posture. There have been more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The insider has access, authority, and knowledge, as well as a set of attributes, that make him/her difficult to detect. An integrated safeguards program is designed as a defense-in-depth system that seeks to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, to provide early detection of any unauthorized attempt to remove nuclear material, and to rapidly respond to any attempted removal of nuclear material. The program is also designed to support protection against sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, program continuity, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. Nuclear MC&A play an essential role in the capabilities of an integrated safeguards system to deter and detect theft or diversion of nuclear material. An integrated safeguards system with compensating mitigation can decrease the risk of an insider performing a malicious act without detection.

  12. Archaeological investigations on the Buckboard Mesa Road Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Amick, D.S.; Henton, G.H.; Pippin, L.C.

    1991-10-01

    In 1986, the Desert Research Institute (DRI) conducted an archaeological reconnaissance of a new alignment for the Buckboard Mesa Road on the Nevada Test Site for the Department of Energy (DOE). During this reconnaissance, several archaeological sites of National Register quality were discovered and recorded including a large quarry, site 26Ny4892, and a smaller lithic scatter, site 26Ny4894. Analysis of the debitage at 26Ny4892 indicates that this area was used primarily as a quarry for relatively small cobbles of obsidian found in the alluvium. Lithic reduction techniques used here are designed for efficiently reducing small pieces of toolstone and are oriented towards producing flake blanks from small cores and bifacially reducing exhausted cores. Projectile point cross references indicate that the area has seen at least casual use for about 10,000 years and more sustained use for the last 3,000 years. Initial obsidian hydration measurements indicate sustained use of the quarry for about the last 3,000 years although the loci of activities appear to change over time. Based on this study, the DRI recommends that quarrying activities in the area of 26Ny4892 are sufficiently sampled and that additional investigations into that aspect of prehistoric activity in the area are not necessary. This does not apply to other aspects of prehistoric use. DRI recommends that preconstruction surveys continue to identify nonquarrying, prehistoric utilization of the area. With the increased traffic on the Buckboard Mesa Road, there is a greater potential for vandalism to sites of National Register-quality located near the road. The DRI recommends that during the orientation briefing the workers at the Test Site be educated about the importance of cultural resources and the need for their protection. 202 refs., 41 figs., 52 tabs.

  13. NDCX-II target experiments and simulations

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Barnard, J. J.; More, R. M.; Terry, M.; Friedman, A.; Henestroza, E.; Koniges, A.; Kwan, J. W.; Ng, A.; Ni, P. A.; Liu, W.; et al

    2013-06-13

    The ion accelerator NDCX-II is undergoing commissioning at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Its principal mission is to explore ion-driven High Energy Density Physics (HEDP) relevant to Inertial Fusion Energy (IFE) especially in the Warm Dense Matter (WDM) regime. We have carried out hydrodynamic simulations of beam-heated targets for parameters expected for the initial configuration of NDCX-II. For metal foils of order one micron thick (thin targets), the beam is predicted to heat the target in a timescale comparable to the hydrodynamic expansion time for experiments that infer material properties from measurements of the resulting rarefaction wave. We have alsomore » carried out hydrodynamic simulations of beam heating of metallic foam targets several tens of microns thick (thick targets) in which the ion range is shorter than the areal density of the material. In this case shock waves will form and we derive simple scaling laws for the efficiency of conversion of ion energy into kinetic energy of fluid flow. Geometries with a tamping layer may also be used to study the merging of a tamper shock with the end-of-range shock. As a result, this process can occur in tamped, direct drive IFE targets.« less

  14. Remote Monitoring and Tracking of UF6 Cylinders Using Long-Range Passive Ultra-wideband (UWB) RFID Tags

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nekoogar, F; Dowla, F

    2007-06-06

    An IAEA Technical Meeting on Techniques for IAEA Verification of Enrichment Activities identified 'smart tags' as a technology that should be assessed for tracking and locating UF6 cylinders. Although there is vast commercial industry working on RFID systems, the vulnerabilities of commercial products are only beginning to emerge. Most of the commercially off-the-shelf (COTS) RFID systems operate in very narrow frequency bands, making them vulnerable to detection, jamming and tampering and also presenting difficulties when used around metals (i.e. UF6 cylinders). Commercial passive RFID tags have short range, while active RFID tags that provide long ranges have limited lifetimes. There are also some concerns with the introduction of strong (narrowband) radio frequency signals around radioactive and nuclear materials. Considering the shortcomings of commercial RFID systems, in their current form, they do not offer a promising solution for continuous monitoring and tracking of UF6 cylinders. In this paper, we identify the key challenges faced by commercial RFID systems for monitoring UF6 cylinders, and introduce an ultra-wideband approach for tag/reader communications that addresses most of the identified challenges for IAEA safeguards applications.

  15. The Development of a Smart Distribution Grid Testbed for Integrated Information Management Systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lu, Ning; Du, Pengwei; Paulson, Patrick R.; Greitzer, Frank L.; Guo, Xinxin; Hadley, Mark D.

    2011-07-28

    This paper presents a smart distribution grid testbed to test or compare designs of integrated information management systems (I2MSs). An I2MS extracts and synthesizes information from a wide range of data sources to detect abnormal system behaviors, identify possible causes, assess the system status, and provide grid operators with response suggestions. The objective of the testbed is to provide a modeling environment with sufficient data sources for the I2MS design. The testbed includes five information layers and a physical layer; it generates multi-layer chronological data based on actual measurement playbacks or simulated data sets produced by the physical layer. The testbed models random hardware failures, human errors, extreme weather events, and deliberate tampering attempts to allow users to evaluate the performance of different I2MS designs. Initial results of I2MS performance tests showed that the testbed created a close-to-real-world environment that allowed key performance metrics of the I2MS to be evaluated.

  16. Battery venting system and method

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Casale, Thomas J.; Ching, Larry K. W.; Baer, Jose T.; Swan, David H.

    1999-01-05

    Disclosed herein is a venting mechanism for a battery. The venting mechanism includes a battery vent structure which is located on the battery cover and may be integrally formed therewith. The venting mechanism includes an opening extending through the battery cover such that the opening communicates with a plurality of battery cells located within the battery case. The venting mechanism also includes a vent manifold which attaches to the battery vent structure. The vent manifold includes a first opening which communicates with the battery vent structure opening and second and third openings which allow the vent manifold to be connected to two separate conduits. In this manner, a plurality of batteries may be interconnected for venting purposes, thus eliminating the need to provide separate vent lines for each battery. The vent manifold may be attached to the battery vent structure by a spin-welding technique. To facilitate this technique, the vent manifold may be provided with a flange portion which fits into a corresponding groove portion on the battery vent structure. The vent manifold includes an internal chamber which is large enough to completely house a conventional battery flame arrester and overpressure safety valve. In this manner, the vent manifold, when installed, lessens the likelihood of tampering with the flame arrester and safety valve.

  17. Battery venting system and method

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Casale, T.J.; Ching, L.K.W.; Baer, J.T.; Swan, D.H.

    1999-01-05

    Disclosed herein is a venting mechanism for a battery. The venting mechanism includes a battery vent structure which is located on the battery cover and may be integrally formed therewith. The venting mechanism includes an opening extending through the battery cover such that the opening communicates with a plurality of battery cells located within the battery case. The venting mechanism also includes a vent manifold which attaches to the battery vent structure. The vent manifold includes a first opening which communicates with the battery vent structure opening and second and third openings which allow the vent manifold to be connected to two separate conduits. In this manner, a plurality of batteries may be interconnected for venting purposes, thus eliminating the need to provide separate vent lines for each battery. The vent manifold may be attached to the battery vent structure by a spin-welding technique. To facilitate this technique, the vent manifold may be provided with a flange portion which fits into a corresponding groove portion on the battery vent structure. The vent manifold includes an internal chamber which is large enough to completely house a conventional battery flame arrester and overpressure safety valve. In this manner, the vent manifold, when installed, lessens the likelihood of tampering with the flame arrester and safety valve. 8 figs.

  18. Battery Vent Mechanism And Method

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ching, Larry K. W.

    2000-02-15

    Disclosed herein is a venting mechanism for a battery. The venting mechanism includes a battery vent structure which is located on the battery cover and may be integrally formed therewith. The venting mechanism includes an opening extending through the battery cover such that the opening communicates with a plurality of battery cells located within the battery case. The venting mechanism also includes a vent manifold which attaches to the battery vent structure. The vent manifold includes a first opening which communicates with the battery vent structure opening and second and third openings which allow the vent manifold to be connected to two separate conduits. In this manner, a plurality of batteries may be interconnected for venting purposes, thus eliminating the need to provide separate vent lines for each battery. The vent manifold may be attached to the battery vent structure by a spin-welding technique. To facilitate this technique, the vent manifold may be provided with a flange portion which fits into a corresponding groove portion on the battery vent structure. The vent manifold includes an internal chamber which is large enough to completely house a conventional battery flame arrester and overpressure safety valve. In this manner, the vent manifold, when installed, lessens the likelihood of tampering with the flame arrester and safety valve.

  19. Low-bandwidth authentication.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Donnelly, Patrick Joseph; McIver, Lauren; Gaines, Brian R.; Anderson, Erik; Collins, Michael Joseph; Thomas,Kurt Adam; McDaniel, Austin

    2007-09-01

    Remotely-fielded unattended sensor networks generally must operate at very low power--in the milliwatt or microwatt range--and thus have extremely limited communications bandwidth. Such sensors might be asleep most of the time to conserve power, waking only occasionally to transmit a few bits. RFID tags for tracking or material control have similarly tight bandwidth constraints, and emerging nanotechnology devices will be even more limited. Since transmitted data is subject to spoofing, and since sensors might be located in uncontrolled environments vulnerable to physical tampering, the high-consequence data generated by such systems must be protected by cryptographically sound authentication mechanisms; but such mechanisms are often lacking in current sensor networks. One reason for this undesirable situation is that standard authentication methods become impractical or impossible when bandwidth is severely constrained; if messages are small, a standard digital signature or HMAC will be many times larger than the message itself, yet it might be possible to spare only a few extra bits per message for security. Furthermore, the authentication tags themselves are only one part of cryptographic overhead, as key management functions (distributing, changing, and revoking keys) consume still more bandwidth. To address this problem, we have developed algorithms that provide secure authentication while adding very little communication overhead. Such techniques will make it possible to add strong cryptographic guarantees of data integrity to a much wider range of systems.

  20. Quantum Security for the Physical Layer

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Humble, Travis S

    2013-01-01

    The physical layer describes how communication signals are encoded and transmitted across a channel. Physical security often requires either restricting access to the channel or performing periodic manual inspections. In this tutorial, we describe how the field of quantum communication offers new techniques for securing the physical layer. We describe the use of quantum seals as a unique way to test the integrity and authenticity of a communication channel and to provide security for the physical layer. We present the theoretical and physical underpinnings of quantum seals including the quantum optical encoding used at the transmitter and the test for non-locality used at the receiver. We describe how the envisioned quantum physical sublayer senses tampering and how coordination with higher protocol layers allow quantum seals to influence secure routing or tailor data management methods. We conclude by discussing challenges in the development of quantum seals, the overlap with existing quantum key distribution cryptographic services, and the relevance of a quantum physical sublayer to the future of communication security.

  1. Proceedings Second Annual Cyber Security and Information Infrastructure Research Workshop

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sheldon, Frederick T; Krings, Axel; Yoo, Seong-Moo; Mili, Ali; Trien, Joseph P

    2006-01-01

    The workshop theme is Cyber Security: Beyond the Maginot Line Recently the FBI reported that computer crime has skyrocketed costing over $67 billion in 2005 alone and affecting 2.8M+ businesses and organizations. Attack sophistication is unprecedented along with availability of open source concomitant tools. Private, academic, and public sectors invest significant resources in cyber security. Industry primarily performs cyber security research as an investment in future products and services. While the public sector also funds cyber security R&D, the majority of this activity focuses on the specific mission(s) of the funding agency. Thus, broad areas of cyber security remain neglected or underdeveloped. Consequently, this workshop endeavors to explore issues involving cyber security and related technologies toward strengthening such areas and enabling the development of new tools and methods for securing our information infrastructure critical assets. We aim to assemble new ideas and proposals about robust models on which we can build the architecture of a secure cyberspace including but not limited to: * Knowledge discovery and management * Critical infrastructure protection * De-obfuscating tools for the validation and verification of tamper-proofed software * Computer network defense technologies * Scalable information assurance strategies * Assessment-driven design for trust * Security metrics and testing methodologies * Validation of security and survivability properties * Threat assessment and risk analysis * Early accurate detection of the insider threat * Security hardened sensor networks and ubiquitous computing environments * Mobile software authentication protocols * A new "model" of the threat to replace the "Maginot Line" model and more . . .

  2. Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1981-05-01

    This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table. (AT)

  3. Power Line Integrity Monitor and Repeater

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (OSTI)

    2005-09-30

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed a power system integrity monitor and repeater that provide real time status of the integrity of the physical structure of power poles and transmission towers. It may be applied to other structures, such as pipelines or cell towers, which have multiple segments that can cover hundreds of miles. Sensors and on-board processing provide indication of tampering or impending damage to the structure with information provided to the centralmore » operations center or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) for mitigative actions. This software runs on a series of small, inexpensive, low power electronic sensor platforms that are mounted on each tower of an electric power transmission or distribution system for the purpose of communicating system integrity to a central location. The software allows each platform to: 1) interface with sensors that monitor tower integrity, 2) record and analyze events, 3) communicate sensor information to other sensor platforms located on adjacent towers or to a central monitoring location, and 4) derive, conserve, and store platform power from the transmission of electric power.« less

  4. LANSCE personnel access control system

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sturrock, J.C.; Gallegos, F.R.; Hall, M.J.

    1997-01-01

    The Radiation Security System (RSS) at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) provides personnel protection from prompt radiation due to accelerated beam. The Personnel Access Control System (PACS) is a component of the RSS that is designed to prevent personnel access to areas where prompt radiation is a hazard. PACS was designed to replace several older personnel safety systems (PSS) with a single modem unified design. Lessons learned from the operation over the last 20 years were incorporated into a redundant sensor, single-point failure safe, fault tolerant, and tamper-resistant system that prevents access to the beam areas by controlling the access keys and beam stoppers. PACS uses a layered philosophy to the physical and electronic design. The most critical assemblies are battery backed up, relay logic circuits; less critical devices use Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) for timing functions and communications. Outside reviewers have reviewed the operational safety of the design. The design philosophy, lessons learned, hardware design, software design, operation, and limitations of the device are described.

  5. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Ianakiev, Kiril D; Reimold, Benjamin A; Ward, Steven L; Howell, John

    2010-09-13

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  6. The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Containment and Surveillance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Diaz,R.A.

    2008-06-13

    The United States Support Program (USSP) priority for containment and surveillance (US) focuses on maintaining or improving the reliability and cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for IAEA safeguards, expanding the number of systems that are unattended and remotely monitored, and developing verification methods that help streamline the on-site inspection process. Existing IAEA C/S systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems, which may include active seals, nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. These systems operate autonomously. They send analytical data to IAEA headquarters where it can be reviewed. These systems present challenges to the goals of improved system performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness. One critical lesson from past experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer, and the facility operator, to create a successful, cost effective system. Recent USSP C/S activities include Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant safeguard systems, production of a new shift register, numerous vulnerability assessments of C/S systems, a conduit monitoring system which identifies tampering of IAEA conduit deployed in the field, fiber optic seal upgrades, unattended monitoring system software upgrades, next generation surveillance system which will upgrade existing camera systems, and support of the IAEA's development of the universal nondestructive assay data acquisition platform.

  7. Electronic security device

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Eschbach, E.A.; LeBlanc, E.J.; Griffin, J.W.

    1992-03-17

    The present invention relates to a security device having a control box containing an electronic system and a communications loop over which the system transmits a signal. The device is constructed so that the communications loop can extend from the control box across the boundary of a portal such as a door into a sealed enclosure into which access is restricted whereby the loop must be damaged or moved in order for an entry to be made into the enclosure. The device is adapted for detecting unauthorized entries into such enclosures such as rooms or containers and for recording the time at which such entries occur for later reference. Additionally, the device detects attempts to tamper or interfere with the operation of the device itself and records the time at which such events take place. In the preferred embodiment, the security device includes a microprocessor-based electronic system and a detection module capable of registering changes in the voltage and phase of the signal transmitted over the loop. 11 figs.

  8. Monitoring system including an electronic sensor platform and an interrogation transceiver

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Kinzel, Robert L.; Sheets, Larry R.

    2003-09-23

    A wireless monitoring system suitable for a wide range of remote data collection applications. The system includes at least one Electronic Sensor Platform (ESP), an Interrogator Transceiver (IT) and a general purpose host computer. The ESP functions as a remote data collector from a number of digital and analog sensors located therein. The host computer provides for data logging, testing, demonstration, installation checkout, and troubleshooting of the system. The IT transmits signals from one or more ESP's to the host computer to the ESP's. The IT host computer may be powered by a common power supply, and each ESP is individually powered by a battery. This monitoring system has an extremely low power consumption which allows remote operation of the ESP for long periods; provides authenticated message traffic over a wireless network; utilizes state-of-health and tamper sensors to ensure that the ESP is secure and undamaged; has robust housing of the ESP suitable for use in radiation environments; and is low in cost. With one base station (host computer and interrogator transceiver), multiple ESP's may be controlled at a single monitoring site.

  9. AUTHENTICATED SENSOR INTERFACE DEVICE FOR JOINT USE SAFEGUARDS APPLICATIONS - CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Poland, R.; Drayer, R.; Wilson, J.

    2013-08-12

    This paper will discuss the key features of the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device that collectively provide the ability to share data among a number of parties while ensuring the authentication of data and protecting both the operators and the IAEAs interests. The paper will also discuss the development of the prototype, the initial testing with an accountancy scale, and future plans and challenges to implementation into the joint use and remote monitoring applications. As nuclear fuel cycle technology becomes more prevalent throughout the world and the capacity of plants increases, limited resources of the IAEA are being stretched near a breaking point. A strategy is to increase efficiency in safeguards monitoring using joint use equipment that will provide the facility operator process data while also providing the IAEA key safeguards data. The data, however, must be authenticated and validated to ensure the data have not been tampered with. The Authenticated Sensor Interface Device provides the capability to share data and can be a valuable component in the IAEAs ability to collect accountancy data from scales in Uranium conversion and enrichment plants, as well as nuclear fuel fabrication plants. Likewise, the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device can be configured to accept a diverse array of input signals, ranging from analog voltage, to current, to digital interfaces and more. These modular capabilities provide the ability to collect authenticated, joint-use, data streams from various process monitoring sensors.

  10. Code Seal v 1.0

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (OSTI)

    2009-12-11

    CodeSeal is a Sandia National Laboratories developed technology that provides a means of securely obfuscating finite state machines in a mathematically provable way. The technology was developed in order to provide a solution for anti-reverse engineering, assured execution, and integrity of execution. CodeSeal accomplishes these goals with the addition of the concept of a trust anchor, a small piece of trust integrated into the system, to the model of code obfuscation. Code obfuscation is anmore » active area of academic research, but most findings have merely demonstrated that general obfuscation is impossible. By modifying the security model such that we may rely on the presence of a small, tamper-protected device, however, Sandia has developed an effective method for obfuscating code. An open publication describing the technology in more detail can be found at http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/184.pdf.Independent Software/Hardware monitors, Use control, Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), Algorithm obfuscation« less

  11. Electronic security device

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Eschbach, Eugene A.; LeBlanc, Edward J.; Griffin, Jeffrey W.

    1992-01-01

    The present invention relates to a security device having a control box (12) containing an electronic system (50) and a communications loop (14) over which the system transmits a signal. The device is constructed so that the communications loop can extend from the control box across the boundary of a portal such as a door into a sealed enclosure into which access is restricted whereby the loop must be damaged or moved in order for an entry to be made into the enclosure. The device is adapted for detecting unauthorized entries into such enclosures such as rooms or containers and for recording the time at which such entries occur for later reference. Additionally, the device detects attempts to tamper or interfere with the operation of the device itself and records the time at which such events take place. In the preferred embodiment, the security device includes a microprocessor-based electronic system (50) and a detection module (72) capable of registering changes in the voltage and phase of the signal transmitted over the loop.

  12. Best Practices for the Security of Radioactive Materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coulter, D.T.; Musolino, S.

    2009-05-01

    This work is funded under a grant provided by the US Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control. The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) awarded a contract to Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to develop best practices guidance for Office of Radiological Health (ORH) licensees to increase on-site security to deter and prevent theft of radioactive materials (RAM). The purpose of this document is to describe best practices available to manage the security of radioactive materials in medical centers, hospitals, and research facilities. There are thousands of such facilities in the United States, and recent studies suggest that these materials may be vulnerable to theft or sabotage. Their malevolent use in a radiological-dispersion device (RDD), viz., a dirty bomb, can have severe environmental- and economic- impacts, the associated area denial, and potentially large cleanup costs, as well as other effects on the licensees and the public. These issues are important to all Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Agreement State licensees, and to the general public. This document outlines approaches for the licensees possessing these materials to undertake security audits to identify vulnerabilities in how these materials are stored or used, and to describe best practices to upgrade or enhance their security. Best practices can be described as the most efficient (least amount of effort/cost) and effective (best results) way of accomplishing a task and meeting an objective, based on repeatable procedures that have proven themselves over time for many people and circumstances. Best practices within the security industry include information security, personnel security, administrative security, and physical security. Each discipline within the security industry has its own 'best practices' that have evolved over time into common ones. With respect to radiological devices and radioactive-materials security, industry best practices encompass both physical security (hardware and engineering) and administrative procedures. Security regimes for these devices and materials typically use a defense-in-depth- or layered-security approach to eliminate single points of failure. The Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS), the Security Industry Association (SIA) and Underwriters Laboratory (UL) all rovide design guidance and hardware specifications. With a graded approach, a physical-security specialist can tailor an integrated security-management system in the most appropriate cost-effective manner to meet the regulatory and non-regulatory requirements of the licensee or client.

  13. System Effectiveness

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H

    2011-01-01

    An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. It is critical that a nuclear facility conduct a thorough self-assessment of the material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system to evaluate system effectiveness. Self-assessment involves vulnerability analysis and performance testing of the MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. Analysis of the MPC&A system is necessary to understand the limits and vulnerabilities of the system to internal threats. Self-assessment helps the facility be prepared to respond to internal threats and reduce the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear material. MSET is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's MPC&A system. MSET analyzes the effectiveness of an MPC&A system based on defined performance metrics for MPC&A functions based on U.S. and international best practices and regulations. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time and reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential performance improvement or system upgrade can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance. The analyses reveal where performance degradation has the greatest detrimental impact on total system risk and where performance improvements have the greatest reduction in system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction actually achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk.

  14. EXAMINATION OF SECURITY EVENTS AS DBES FOR MGDS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY SSCS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J.M. Hartsell

    1998-04-13

    A portion of the safeguards and security system for the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) has been identified as QA-1 based on the classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) performed in accordance with QAP-2-3, ''Classification of Permanent Items'' (Reference 5.2). The classification analysis, ''Classification of the Preliminary MGDS Repository Design'' (Reference 5.9), identifies the ''Safeguards Material Control and Accountability'' system as a QA-1 SSC based on the identification of unauthorized intrusion, sabotage, theft, and diversion as potential Design Basis Events (DBEs). The purpose of this analysis is to provide justification to eliminate these events as DBEs for the MGDS based on a review of the Codes of Federal Regulation (CFRs) for geologic repositories (10 CFR 60), commercial reactor facilities (10 CFR 50), independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) and monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installations (10 CFR 72), and other relevant guidance documents in an effort to clarify that security events should not be considered in the QA design process of important to safety SSCs for the MGDS. The MGDS is a first of a kind geologic repository and no licensing precedent has been established for this type of facility.

  15. Gamma watermarking

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ishikawa, Muriel Y.; Wood, Lowell L.; Lougheed, Ronald W.; Moody, Kenton J.; Wang, Tzu-Fang

    2004-05-25

    A covert, gamma-ray "signature" is used as a "watermark" for property identification. This new watermarking technology is based on a unique steganographic or "hidden writing" digital signature, implemented in tiny quantities of gamma-ray-emitting radioisotopic material combinations, generally covertly emplaced on or within an object. This digital signature may be readily recovered at distant future times, by placing a sensitive, high energy-resolution gamma-ray detecting instrument reasonably precisely over the location of the watermark, which location may be known only to the object's owner; however, the signature is concealed from all ordinary detection means because its exceedingly low level of activity is obscured by the natural radiation background (including the gamma radiation naturally emanating from the object itself, from cosmic radiation and material surroundings, from human bodies, etc.). The "watermark" is used in object-tagging for establishing object identity, history or ownership. It thus may serve as an aid to law enforcement officials in identifying stolen property and prosecuting theft thereof. Highly effective, potentially very low cost identification-on demand of items of most all types is thus made possible.

  16. Programmatic and technical requirements for the FMDP fresh MOX fuel transport package

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ludwig, S. B.; Michelhaugh, R. D.; Pope, R. B.; Shappert, L. B.; Singletary, B. H.; Chae, S. M.; Parks, C. V.; Broadhead, B. L.; Schmid, S. P.; Cowart, C. G.

    1997-12-01

    This document is intended to guide the designers of the package to all pertinent regulatory and other design requirements to help ensure the safe and efficient transport of the weapons-grade (WG) fresh MOX fuel under the Fissile Materials Disposition Program. To accomplish the disposition mission using MOX fuel, the unirradiated MOX fuel must be transported from the MOX fabrication facility to one or more commercial reactors. Because the unirradiated fuel contains large quantities of plutonium and is not sufficient radioactive to create a self-protecting barrier to deter the material from theft, DOE intends to use its fleet of safe secure trailers (SSTs) to provide the necessary safeguards and security for the material in transit. In addition to these requirements, transport of radioactive materials must comply with regulations of the Department of Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In particular, NRC requires that the packages must meet strict performance requirements. The requirements for shipment of MOX fuel (i.e., radioactive fissile materials) specify that the package design is certified by NRC to ensure the materials contained in the packages are not released and remain subcritical after undergoing a series of hypothetical accident condition tests. Packages that pass these tests are certified by NRC as a Type B fissile (BF) package. This document specifies the programmatic and technical design requirements a package must satisfy to transport the fresh MOX fuel assemblies.

  17. 1996 NRC annual report. Volume 13

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-10-01

    This 22nd annual report of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) describes accomplishments, activities, and plans made during Fiscal Year 1996 (FH 1996)--October 1, 1995, through September 30, 1996. Significant activities that occurred early in FY 1997 are also described, particularly changes in the Commission and organization of the NRC. The mission of the NRC is to ensure that civilian uses of nuclear materials in the US are carried out with adequate protection of public health and safety, the environment, and national security. These uses include the operation of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle plants and medical, industrial, and research applications. Additionally, the NRC contributes to combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons material worldwide. The NRC licenses and regulates commercial nuclear reactor operations and research reactors and other activities involving the possession and use of nuclear materials and wastes. It also protects nuclear materials used in operation and facilities from theft or sabotage. To accomplish its statutorily mandated regulatory mission, the NRC issues rules and standards, inspects facilities and operations, and issues any required enforcement actions.

  18. The adequacy of current import and export controls on sealed radioactive sources.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Longley, Susan W.; Cochran, John Russell; Price, Laura L.; Lipinski, Kendra J.

    2003-10-01

    Millions of sealed radioactive sources (SRSs) are being used for a wide variety of beneficial purposes throughout the world. Security experts are now concerned that these beneficial SRSs could be used in a radiological dispersion device to terrorize and disrupt society. The greatest safety and security threat is from those highly radioactive Category 1 and 2 SRSs. Without adequate controls, it may be relatively easy to legally purchase a Category 1 or 2 SRS on the international market under false pretenses. Additionally, during transfer, SRSs are particularly susceptible to theft since the sources are in a shielded and mobile configuration, transportation routes are predictable, and shipments may not be adequately guarded. To determine if government controls on SRS are adequate, this study was commissioned to review the current SRS import and export controls of six countries. Canada, the Russian Federation, and South Africa were selected as the exporting countries, and Egypt, the Philippines, and the United States were selected as importing countries. A detailed review of the controls in each country is presented. The authors found that Canada and Russia are major exporters, and are exporting highly radioactive SRSs without first determining if the recipient is authorized by the receiving country to own and use the SRSs. Available evidence was used to estimate that on average there are tens to possibly hundreds of intercountry transfers of highly radioactive SRSs each day. Based on these and other findings, this reports recommends stronger controls on the export and import of highly radioactive SRSs.

  19. An Assessment of the Attractiveness of Material Associated with a MOX Fuel Cycle from a Safeguards Perspective

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bathke, Charles G; Wallace, Richard K; Ireland, John R; Johnson, M W; Hase, Kevin R; Jarvinen, Gordon D; Ebbinghaus, Bartley B; Sleaford, Brad W; Collins, Brian A; Robel, Martin; Bradley, Keith S; Prichard, Andrew W; Smith, Brian W

    2009-01-01

    This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, coextraction, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant State and sub-national group capabilities. This study also considers those materials that will be recycled and burned, possibly multiple times, in LWRs [e.g., plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel]. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a State and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

  20. Unique Construction and Social Experiences in Residential Remediation Sites - 13423

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jung, Paul; Scarborough, Rebecca

    2013-07-01

    Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc., (Sevenson) has performed several radiological remediation projects located in residential urban areas. Over the course of these projects, there has been a wide variety of experiences encountered from construction related issues to unique social situations. Some of the construction related issues included the remediation of interior basements where contaminated material was located under the footers of the structure or was used in the mortar between cinder block or field stone foundations. Other issues included site security, maintaining furnaces or other utilities, underpinning, backfilling and restoration. In addition to the radiological hazards associated with this work there were occupational safety and industrial hygiene issues that had to be addressed to ensure the safety and health of neighboring properties and residents. The unique social situations at these job sites have included arson, theft/stolen property, assault/battery, prostitution, execution of arrest warrants for residents, discovery of drugs and paraphernalia, blood borne pathogens, and unexploded ordnance. Some of these situations have become a sort of comical urban legend throughout the organization. One situation had historical significance, involving the demolition of a house to save a tree older than the Declaration of Independence. All of these projects typically involve the excavation of early 20. century items such as advertisement signs, various old bottles (milk, Listerine, perfume, whisky) and other miscellaneous common trash items. (authors)

  1. A Selectivity based approach to Continuous Pattern Detection in Streaming Graphs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Choudhury, Sutanay; Holder, Larry; Chin, George; Agarwal, Khushbu; Feo, John T.

    2015-02-02

    Cyber security is one of the most significant technical challenges in current times. Detecting adversarial activities, prevention of theft of intellectual properties and customer data is a high priority for corporations and government agencies around the world. Cyber defenders need to analyze massive-scale, high-resolution network flows to identify, categorize, and mitigate attacks involving net- works spanning institutional and national boundaries. Many of the cyber attacks can be described as subgraph patterns, with promi- nent examples being insider infiltrations (path queries), denial of service (parallel paths) and malicious spreads (tree queries). This motivates us to explore subgraph matching on streaming graphs in a continuous setting. The novelty of our work lies in using the subgraph distributional statistics collected from the streaming graph to determine the query processing strategy. We introduce a Lazy Search" algorithm where the search strategy is decided on a vertex-to-vertex basis depending on the likelihood of a match in the vertex neighborhood. We also propose a metric named Relative Selectivity" that is used to se- lect between different query processing strategies. Our experiments performed on real online news, network traffic stream and a syn- thetic social network benchmark demonstrate 10-100x speedups over selectivity agnostic approaches.

  2. Design of a smart, survivable sensor system for enhancing the safe and secure transportation of hazardous or high-value cargo on railroads

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hogan, J.R.; Rey, D.; Faas, S.E.

    1994-01-01

    An application of smart sensor technology developed by Sandia National Laboratories for use in the safe and secure transportation of high value of hazardous materials is proposed for a railroad application. The Green Box would be capable of surviving most typical railroad accidents. In an accident, the system would send a distress signal notifying authorities of the location and condition of the cargo; permitting them to respond in the most effective manner. The concept proposes a strap-on sensor package, the Green Box, that could be attached to any railroad car or cargo container. Its primary purpose is to minimize the number, severity and consequences of accidents and to reduce losses due to theft. The system would also be capable of recognizing component failure conditions, notifying the operators and logging sensor data for use in directing preventative maintenance. The modular implementation, which facilitates system integration in a number of applications including the Advanced Train Control System (ACTS), is discussed. The methodology for determining the environmental specification for accident survivability is presented. A test plan for evaluating hardware performance in both normal operating and accident conditions is described.

  3. Risk Due to Radiological Terror Attacks With Natural Radionuclides

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Friedrich, Steinhaeusler; Lyudmila, Zaitseva; Stan, Rydell

    2008-08-07

    The naturally occurring radionuclides radium (Ra-226) and polonium (Po-210) have the potential to be used for criminal acts. Analysis of international incident data contained in the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (CSTO), operated at the University of Salzburg, shows that several acts of murder and terrorism with natural radionuclides have already been carried out in Europe and Russia. Five different modes of attack (T) are possible: (1) Covert irradiation of an individual in order to deliver a high individual dose; (2) Covert irradiation of a group of persons delivering a large collective dose; (3) Contamination of food or drink; (4) Generation of radioactive aerosols or solutions; (5) Combination of Ra-226 with conventional explosives (Dirty Bomb).This paper assesses the risk (R) of such criminal acts in terms of: (a) Probability of terrorist motivation deploying a certain attack mode T; (b) Probability of success by the terrorists for the selected attack mode T; (c) Primary damage consequence (C) to the attacked target (activity, dose); (d) Secondary damage consequence (C') to the attacked target (psychological and socio-economic effects); (e) Probability that the consequences (C, C') cannot be brought under control, resulting in a failure to manage successfully the emergency situation due to logistical and/or technical deficits in implementing adequate countermeasures. Extensive computer modelling is used to determine the potential impact of such a criminal attack on directly affected victims and on the environment.

  4. Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Michael Holzemer; Alan Carvo

    2012-04-01

    Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

  5. Developing standard performance testing procedures for material control and accounting components at a site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Scherer, Carolynn P; Bushlya, Anatoly V; Efimenko, Vladimir F; Ilyanstev, Anatoly; Regoushevsky, Victor I

    2010-01-01

    The condition of a nuclear material control and accountability system (MC&A) and its individual components, as with any system combining technical elements and documentation, may be characterized through an aggregate of values for the various parameters that determine the system's ability to perform. The MC&A system's status may be functioning effectively, marginally or not functioning based on a summary of the values of the individual parameters. This work included a review of the following subsystems, MC&A and Detecting Material Losses, and their respective elements for the material control and accountability system: (a) Elements of the MC&A Subsystem - Information subsystem (Accountancy/Inventory), Measurement subsystem, Nuclear Material Access subsystem, including tamper-indicating device (TID) program, and Automated Information-gathering subsystem; (b) Elements for Detecting Nuclear Material Loses Subsystem - Inventory Differences, Shipper/receiver Differences, Confirmatory Measurements and differences with accounting data, and TID or Seal Violations. In order to detect the absence or loss of nuclear material there must be appropriate interactions among the elements and their respective subsystems from the list above. Additionally this work includes a review of regulatory requirements for the MC&A system component characteristics and criteria that support the evaluation of the performance of the listed components. The listed components had performance testing algorithms and procedures developed that took into consideration the regulatory criteria. The developed MC&A performance-testing procedures were the basis for a Guide for MC&A Performance Testing at the material balance areas (MBAs) of State Scientific Center of the Russian Federation - Institute for Physics and Power Engineering (SSC RF-IPPE).

  6. Initial CTBT international monitoring system security findings and recommendations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Craft, R.L.; Draelos, T.J.

    1996-08-01

    An initial security evaluation of the proposed International Monitoring System (IMS) suggests safeguards at various points in the IMS to provide reliable information to the user community. Modeling the IMS as a network of information processing nodes provides a suitable architecture for assessing data surety needs of the system. The recommendations in this paper include the use of public-key authentication for data from monitoring stations and for commands issued to monitoring stations. Other monitoring station safeguards include tamper protection of sensor subsystems, preservation of data (i.e. short-term archival), and limiting the station`s network services. The recommendations for NDCs focus on the need to provide a backup to the IDC for data archival and data routing. Safeguards suggested for the IDC center on issues of reliability. The production of event bulletins should employ {open_quotes}two-man{close_quotes} procedures. As long as the data maintains its integrity, event bulletins can be produced by NDCs as well. The effective use of data authentication requires a sound key management system. Key management systems must be developed for the authentication of data, commands, and event bulletins if necessary. It is recommended that the trust placed in key management be distributed among multiple parties. The recommendations found in this paper offer safeguards for identified vulnerabilities in the IMS with regard to data surety. However, several outstanding security issues still exist. These issues include the need to formalize and obtain a consensus on a threat model and a trust model for the IMS. The final outstanding security issue that requires in-depth analysis concerns the IDC as a potential single point of failure in the current IMS design.

  7. The 'Room within a Room' Concept for Monitored Warhead Dismantlement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tanner, Jennifer E.; Benz, Jacob M.; White, Helen; McOmish, Sarah; Allen, Keir; Tolk, Keith; Weeks, George E.

    2014-12-01

    Over the past 10 years, US and UK experts have engaged in a technical collaboration with the aim of improving scientific and technological abilities in support of potential future nuclear arms control and non-proliferation agreements. In 2011 a monitored dismantlement exercise provided an opportunity to develop and test potential monitoring technologies and approaches. The exercise followed a simulated nuclear object through a dismantlement process and looked to explore, with a level of realism, issues surrounding device and material monitoring, chain of custody, authentication and certification of equipment, data management and managed access. This paper focuses on the development and deployment of the room-within-a-room system, which was designed to maintain chain of custody during disassembly operations. A key challenge for any verification regime operating within a nuclear weapon complex is to provide the monitoring party with the opportunity to gather sufficient evidence, whilst protecting sensitive or proliferative information held by the host. The requirement to address both monitoring and host party concerns led to a dual function design which: Created a controlled boundary around the disassembly process area which could provide evidence of unauthorised diversion activities. Shielded sensitive disassembly operations from monitoring party observation. The deployed room-within-a-room was an integrated system which combined a number of chain of custody technologies (i.e. cameras, tamper indicating panels and enclosures, seals, unique identifiers and radiation portals) and supporting deployment procedures. This paper discusses the bounding aims and constraints identified by the monitoring and host parties with respect to the disassembly phase, the design of the room-within-a-room system, lessons learned during deployment, conclusions and potential areas of future work. Overall it was agreed that the room-within-a-room approach was effective but the individual technologies used to create the system deployed during this exercise required further development.

  8. The Changing Adventures of Mixed Low-Level Waste Disposal at the Nevada Test Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DOE /Navarro/NSTec

    2007-02-01

    After a 15-year hiatus, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) began accepting DOE off-site generated mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) for disposal at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in December 2005. This action was predicated on the acceptance by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) of a waste analysis plan (WAP). The NNSA/NSO agreed to limit mixed waste disposal to 20,000 cubic meters (approximately 706,000 cubic feet) and close the facility by December 2010 or sooner, if the volume limit is reached. The WAP and implementing procedures were developed based on Hanford’s system of verification to the extent possible so the two regional disposal sites could have similar processes. Since the NNSA/NSO does not have a breaching facility to allow the opening of boxes at the site, verification of the waste occurs by visual inspection at the generator/treatment facility or by Real-Time-Radiography (RTR) at the NTS. This system allows the NTS to effectively, efficiently, and compliantly accept MLLW for disposal. The WAP, NTS Waste Acceptance Criteria, and procedures have been revised based on learning experiences. These changes include: RTR expectations; visual inspection techniques; tamper-indicating device selection; void space requirements; and chemical screening concerns. The NNSA/NSO, NDEP, and the generators have been working together throughout the debugging of the verification processes. Additionally, the NNSA/NSO will continue to refine the MLLW acceptance processes and strive for continual improvement of the program.

  9. Evaluation of a RF-Based Approach for Tracking UF6 Cylinders at a Uranium Enrichment Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pickett, Chris A; Younkin, James R; Kovacic, Donald N; Laughter, Mark D; Hines, Jairus B; Boyer, Brian; Martinez, B.

    2008-01-01

    Approved industry-standard cylinders are used globally to handle and store uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) feed, product, tails, and samples at uranium enrichment plants. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on time-consuming physical inspections to verify operator declarations and detect possible diversion of UF{sub 6}. Development of a reliable, automated, and tamper-resistant system for near real-time tracking and monitoring UF{sub 6} cylinders (as they move within an enrichment facility) would greatly improve the inspector function. This type of system can reduce the risk of false or misreported cylinder tare weights, diversion of nuclear material, concealment of excess production, utilization of undeclared cylinders, and misrepresentation of the cylinders contents. This paper will describe a proof-of-concept approach that was designed to evaluate the feasibility of using radio frequency (RF)-based technologies to track individual UF{sub 6} cylinders throughout a portion of their life cycle, and thus demonstrate the potential for improved domestic accountability of materials, and a more effective and efficient method for application of site-level IAEA safeguards. The evaluation system incorporates RF-based identification devices (RFID) which provide a foundation for establishing a reliable, automated, and near real-time tracking system that can be set up to utilize site-specific, rules-based detection algorithms. This paper will report results from a proof-of-concept demonstration at a real enrichment facility that is specifically designed to evaluate both the feasibility of using RF to track cylinders and the durability of the RF equipment to survive the rigors of operational processing and handling. The paper also discusses methods for securely attaching RF devices and describes how the technology can effectively be layered with other safeguard systems and approaches to build a robust system for detecting cylinder diversion. Additionally, concepts for off-site tracking of cylinders are described.

  10. USE OF MAILBOX APPROACH, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE, AND SHORT-NOTICE RANDOM INSPECTIONS TO ENHANCE DETECTION OF UNDECLARED LEU PRODUCTION AT GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BOYER, B.D.; GORDON, D.M.; JO, J.

    2006-07-16

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to detect undeclared LEU production with adequate detection probability. ''Mailbox'' declarations have been used in the last two decades to verify receipts, production, and shipments at some bulk-handling facilities (e.g., fuel-fabrication plants). The operator declares the status of his plant to the IAEA on a daily basis using a secure ''Mailbox'' system such as a secure tamper-resistant computer. The operator agrees to hold receipts and shipments for a specified period of time, along with a specified number of annual inspections, to enable inspector access to a statistically large enough population of UF{sub 6} cylinders and fuel assemblies to achieve the desired detection probability. The inspectors can access the ''Mailbox'' during randomly timed inspections and then verify the operator's declarations for that day. Previously, this type of inspection regime was considered mainly for verifying the material balance at fuel-fabrication, enrichment, and conversion plants. Brookhaven National Laboratory has expanded the ''Mailbox'' concept with short-notice random inspections (SNRIs), coupled with enhanced video surveillance, to include declaration and verification of UF{sub 6} cylinder operational data to detect activities associated with undeclared LEU production at GCEPs. Since the ''Mailbox'' declarations would also include data relevant to material-balance verification, these randomized inspections would replace the scheduled monthly interim inspections for material-balance purposes; in addition, the inspectors could simultaneously perform the required number of Limited-Frequency Unannounced Access (LFUA) inspections used for HEU detection. This approach would provide improved detection capabilities for a wider range of diversion activities with not much more inspection effort than at present.

  11. Motion Tracking Of A Handheld Scanner With An Infrared Vision System

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Seppi, Jeremy H.; Hatchell, Brian K.; McMakin, Douglas L.

    2011-08-07

    Handheld scanners are used in a large number of applications to inspect walls, floors, tanks, and other large structures. Measurements are made to characterize physical properties, uncover defects, detect evidence of tampering, quantify surface contamination, and so forth. Handheld scanning suffers from a number of drawbacks. The relationship between the data collected and scanned location is difficult or impossible to track. Humans using handheld scanners can unintentionally scan the same area multiple times or entirely overlook an area of interest. An automated scanner tracking system could improve upon current inspection practices with a handheld scanner in terms of efficiency, accuracy, and quality. The authors have developed a handheld scanner tracking system that will allow users to visualize previously scanned areas, highlight areas where important or unusual data are acquired, and store scanning location with acquired data. The scanned regions are saved in real time and projected back on the scanned area using a projector. The system currently utilizes the Smoothboard software, which has already been designed to interpret the location of a captured infrared source from a Wii Remote controller to create an interactive whiteboard. This software takes advantage of the Wii Remotes ability to track the location of an infrared source, and when proper calibration of the Wii Remote orientation is complete, any surface can become a virtual whiteboard. In addition to recording and projecting scan pathways, the system developed by the authors can be used to make notes on the scanning process and project acquired data on top of the scanned area. This latter capability can be used to guide sample acquisition or demolition activities. This paper discusses development of the system and potential benefits to wall scanning with handheld scanners.

  12. Audit of the management and cost of the Department of Energy`s protective forces

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-07-01

    The Department of Energy`s safeguards and security program is designed to provide appropriate, efficient, and effective protection of the Department`s nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, facilities, and classified information. These items must be protected against theft, sabotage, espionage, and terrorist activity, with continuing emphasis on protection against the insider threat. The purpose of the audit was to determine if protective forces were efficiently managed and appropriately sized in light of the changing missions and current budget constraints. The authors found that the cost of physical security at some sites had grown beyond those costs incurred when the site was in full production. This increase was due to a combination of factors, including concerns about the adequacy of physical security, reactions to the increase in terrorism in the early 1980s with the possibility of hostile attacks, and the selection of security system upgrades without adequate consideration of cost effectiveness. Ongoing projects to upgrade security systems were not promptly reassessed when missions changed and levels of protection were not determined in a way which considered the attractiveness of the material being protected. The authors also noted several opportunities for the Department to improve the operational efficiency of its protective force operations, including, eluminating overtime paid to officers prior to completion of the basic 40-hour workweek, paying hourly wages of unarmed guards which are commensurate with their duties, consolidating protective force units, transferring law enforcement duties to local law agencies, eliminating or reducing paid time to exercise, and standardizing supplies and equipment used by protective force members.

  13. FOSTERING MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEXICO, COLOMBIA, AND THE UNITED STATES TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF HIGH-ACTIVITY RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Butler, Nicholas; Watson, Erica E.; Wright, Kyle A.

    2009-10-07

    The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) reduces and protects vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide from sabotage, theft or diversion. The GTRI program has worked successfully with foreign countries to remove and protect nuclear and radioactive materials including high-activity sources used in medical, commercial, and research applications. There are many barriers to successful bilateral cooperation that must be overcome including language, preconceived perceptions, long distances, and different views on the threat and protection requirements. Successful cooperation is often based on relationships and building trusting relationships takes time. In the case of Mexico, GTRI first made contact in 2005. The project then lost momentum and stalled. At the same time, GTRIs cooperation with the Republic of Colombia was a resounding success resulting in the securing of forty sites; the consolidation of numerous disused/orphan sources at a secure national storage facility; and, the development of a comprehensive approach to security including, inter alia, training and sustainability. The government of Colombia also showcased this comprehensive approach to thirteen Central American and Caribbean countries at a GTRI regional security conference held in Panama in October 2004. Representatives from the Colombian government were aware of GTRIs interest in initiating cooperation with the Government of Mexico and to facilitate this cooperation, they offered to invite their Mexican counterparts to Colombia to observe its successful cooperation with GTRI. Shortly after that visit, the Government of Mexico agreed to move forward and requested that the cooperative efforts in Mexico be performed in a tripartite manner, leveraging the skills, experience, and resources of the Colombians. As a result, 22 of Mexicos largest radioactive sites have had security upgrades in place within 18 months of cooperation.

  14. Illicit Trafficking of Natural Radionuclides

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Friedrich, Steinhaeusler; Lyudmila, Zaitseva

    2008-08-07

    Natural radionuclides have been subject to trafficking worldwide, involving natural uranium ore (U 238), processed uranium (yellow cake), low enriched uranium (<20% U 235) or highly enriched uranium (>20% U 235), radium (Ra 226), polonium (Po 210), and natural thorium ore (Th 232). An important prerequisite to successful illicit trafficking activities is access to a suitable logistical infrastructure enabling an undercover shipment of radioactive materials and, in case of trafficking natural uranium or thorium ore, capable of transporting large volumes of material. Covert en route diversion of an authorised uranium transport, together with covert diversion of uranium concentrate from an operating or closed uranium mines or mills, are subject of case studies. Such cases, involving Israel, Iran, Pakistan and Libya, have been analyzed in terms of international actors involved and methods deployed. Using international incident data contained in the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) and international experience gained from the fight against drug trafficking, a generic Trafficking Pathway Model (TPM) is developed for trafficking of natural radionuclides. The TPM covers the complete trafficking cycle, ranging from material diversion, covert material transport, material concealment, and all associated operational procedures. The model subdivides the trafficking cycle into five phases: (1) Material diversion by insider(s) or initiation by outsider(s); (2) Covert transport; (3) Material brokerage; (4) Material sale; (5) Material delivery. An Action Plan is recommended, addressing the strengthening of the national infrastructure for material protection and accounting, development of higher standards of good governance, and needs for improving the control system deployed by customs, border guards and security forces.

  15. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Orphan Source Recovery Project in the Russian Federation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Russell, J. W.; Ahumada, A. D.; Blanchard, T. A.

    2012-06-04

    After 9/11, officials at the United States Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grew more concerned about radiological materials that were vulnerable to theft and illicit use around the world. The concern was that terrorists could combine stolen radiological materials with explosives to build and detonate a radiological dispersal device (RDD), more commonly known as a dirty bomb. In response to this and other terrorist threats, the DOE/NNSA formed what is now known as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to consolidate and accelerate efforts to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. Although a cooperative program was already underway in the Russian Federation to secure nuclear materials at a range of different facilities, thousands of sealed radioactive sources remained vulnerable at medical, research, and industrial sites. In response, GTRI began to focus efforts on addressing these materials. GTRIs Russia Orphan Source Recovery Project, managed at the Nevada National Security Sites North Las Vegas facility, was initiated in 2002. Throughout the life of the project, Joint Stock Company Isotope has served as the primary Russian subcontractor, and the organization has proven to be a successful partner. Since the first orphan source recovery of an industrial cobalt-60 irradiator with 647 curies (Ci) at an abandoned facility in Moscow in 2003, the GTRI Orphan Source Recovery Project in the Russian Federation has accomplished substantial levels of threat reduction. To date, GTRI has recovered and securely disposed of more than 5,100 sources totaling more that 628,000 Ci. This project serves as an extraordinary example of how international cooperation can be implemented by partners with mutual interests to achieve significant goals.

  16. Computers as tools

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eriksson, I.V.

    1994-12-31

    The following message was recently posted on a bulletin board and clearly shows the relevance of the conference theme: {open_quotes}The computer and digital networks seem poised to change whole regions of human activity -- how we record knowledge, communicate, learn, work, understand ourselves and the world. What`s the best framework for understanding this digitalization, or virtualization, of seemingly everything? ... Clearly, symbolic tools like the alphabet, book, and mechanical clock have changed some of our most fundamental notions -- self, identity, mind, nature, time, space. Can we say what the computer, a purely symbolic {open_quotes}machine,{close_quotes} is doing to our thinking in these areas? Or is it too early to say, given how much more powerful and less expensive the technology seems destinated to become in the next few decades?{close_quotes} (Verity, 1994) Computers certainly affect our lives and way of thinking but what have computers to do with ethics? A narrow approach would be that on the one hand people can and do abuse computer systems and on the other hand people can be abused by them. Weli known examples of the former are computer comes such as the theft of money, services and information. The latter can be exemplified by violation of privacy, health hazards and computer monitoring. Broadening the concept from computers to information systems (ISs) and information technology (IT) gives a wider perspective. Computers are just the hardware part of information systems which also include software, people and data. Information technology is the concept preferred today. It extends to communication, which is an essential part of information processing. Now let us repeat the question: What has IT to do with ethics? Verity mentioned changes in {open_quotes}how we record knowledge, communicate, learn, work, understand ourselves and the world{close_quotes}.

  17. The acquisition of dangerous biological materials :

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Aceto, Donato Gonzalo; Astuto-Gribble, Lisa M.; Gaudioso, Jennifer M.

    2007-11-01

    Numerous terrorist organizations have openly expressed interest in producing and deploying biological weapons. However, a limiting factor for many terrorists has been the acquisition of dangerous biological agents, as evidenced by the very few successful instances of biological weapons use compared to the number of documented hoaxes. Biological agents vary greatly in their ability to cause loss of life and economic damage. Some agents, if released properly, can kill many people and cause an extensive number of secondary infections; other agents will sicken only a small number of people for a short period of time. Consequently, several biological agents can potentially be used to perpetrate a bioterrorism attack but few are likely capable of causing a high consequence event. It is crucial, from a US national security perspective, to more deeply understand the likelihood that terrorist organizations can acquire the range of these agents. Few studies have attempted to comprehensively compile the technical information directly relevant to the acquisition of dangerous bacteria, viruses and toxins. In this report, technical fact sheets were assembled for 46 potentially dangerous biological agents. Much of the information was taken from various research sources which could ultimately and significantly expedite and improve bioterrorism threat assessments. By systematically examining a number of specific agent characteristics included in these fact sheets, it may be possible to detect, target, and implement measures to thwart future terrorist acquisition attempts. In addition, the information in these fact sheets may be used as a tool to help laboratories gain a rudimentary understanding of how attractive a method laboratory theft is relative to other potential acquisition modes.

  18. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Satkowiak, Lawrence

    2014-05-09

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

  19. Security-by-design handbook.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Snell, Mark Kamerer; Jaeger, Calvin Dell; Scharmer, Carol; Jordan, Sabina Erteza; Tanuma, Koji; Ochiai, Kazuya; Iida, Toru

    2013-01-01

    This document is a draft SecuritybyDesign (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to %E2%80%9Cencourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.%E2%80%9D The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PASPP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessonslearned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the systemlevel incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A fourelement strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.

  20. GTRI Remote Monitoring System: Training and Operational Needs Assessment Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Day, Debra E.; Fox, Sorcha

    2012-04-20

    The mission of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA's) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is to identify, secure, recover and facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and high-risk radioactive materials around the world that pose a threat to the United States and the international community. The GTRI's unique mission to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide directly addresses recommendations of the 9/11 Commission1, and is a vital part of the President's National Security Strategy and the Global Initiative. The GTRI Remote Monitoring System (RMS) is a standalone security system that includes radiation and tamper alarms, and CCTV; which can be transmitted securely over the Internet to multiple on-site and off-site locations. Through our experiences during installation of the system at 162 sites, plus feedback received from Alarm Response Training course participants, site input to project teams and analysis of trouble calls; indications were that current system training was lacking and inconsistent. A survey was undertaken to gather information from RMS users across the nation, to evaluate the current level of training and determine what if any improvements needed to be made. Additional questions were focused on the operation of the RMS software. The training survey was initially sent electronically to 245 users at the RMS sites and achieved a 37.6% return rate. Analysis of the resulting data revealed that 34.6% of the respondents had not received training or were unsure if they had, despite the fact that vendor engineers provide training at installation of the system. Any training received was referred to as minimal, and brief, not documented, and nothing in writing. 63.7% of respondents said they were either not at all prepared or only somewhat prepared to use the RMS software required to effectively operate the system. As a result of this analysis, a formal training curriculum will be designed and implemented to include several blended learning delivery options. This training will be piloted at RMS sites; initial training will become a required element of RMS installation and refresher training will be considered for sustainability of operations.

  1. Ultra-secure RF Tags for Safeguards and Security - SBIR Phase II Final Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Twogood, Richard E

    2015-01-27

    This is the Final Report for the DOE Phase II SBIR project “Ultra-secure RF Tags for Safeguards and Security.” The topics covered herein include technical progress made, progress against the planned milestones and deliverables, project outcomes (results, collaborations, intellectual property, etc.), and a discussion on future expectations of deployment and impacts of the results of this work. In brief, all planned work for the project was successfully completed, on or ahead of schedule and on budget. The major accomplishment was the successful development of a very advanced passive ultra-secure RFID tag system with combined security features unmatched by any commercially available ones. These tags have high-level dynamic encrypted authentication, a novel tamper-proofing mechanism, system software including graphical user interfaces and networking, and integration with a fiber-optic seal mechanism. This is all accomplished passively (with no battery) by incorporating sophisticated hardware in the tag which harvests the energy from the RFID readers that are interrogating the tag. Based on initial feedback (and deployments) at DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), it is anticipated these tags and their offspring will meet DOE and international community needs for highly secure RFID systems. Beyond the accomplishment of those original objectives for the ultra-secure RF tags, major new spin-off thrusts from the original work were identified and successfully pursued with the cognizance of the DOE sponsor office. In particular, new classes of less sophisticated RFID tags were developed whose lineage derives from the core R&D thrusts of this SBIR. These RF “tag variants” have some, but not necessarily all, of the advanced characteristics described above and can therefore be less expensive and meet far wider markets. With customer pull from the DOE and its national laboratories, new RFID tags and systems (including custom readers and software) for government needs in asset management and tracking were developed. These were tested at a national laboratory and other government facilities, and resulted in immediate procurement actions by the government and deployment of these new systems. Thus, commercialization of the results of this Phase II DOE SBIR was already underway before the end of the SBIR itself. More importantly, operations involving asset management at selected DoE and government sites are already being impacted favorably and could have much broader impacts in the near future.

  2. ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING USING LOCATION SPECIFIC AIR MONITORING IN BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sexton, L.; Hanks, D.; Degange, J.; Brant, H.; Hall, G.; Cable-Dunlap, P.; Anderson, B.

    2011-06-07

    Since the introduction of safeguards strengthening measures approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (1992-1997), international nuclear safeguards inspectors have been able to utilize environmental sampling (ES) (e.g. deposited particulates, air, water, vegetation, sediments, soil and biota) in their safeguarding approaches at bulk uranium/plutonium handling facilities. Enhancements of environmental sampling techniques used by the IAEA in drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities will soon be able to take advantage of a recent step change improvement in the gathering and analysis of air samples at these facilities. Location specific air monitoring feasibility tests have been performed with excellent results in determining attribute and isotopic composition of chemical elements present in an actual test-bed sample. Isotopic analysis of collected particles from an Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) collection, was performed with the standard bulk sampling protocol used throughout the IAEA network of analytical laboratories (NWAL). The results yielded bulk isotopic values expected for the operations. Advanced designs of air monitoring instruments such as the ACE may be used in gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) to detect the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or enrichments not declared by a State. Researchers at Savannah River National Laboratory in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory are developing the next generation of ES equipment for air grab and constant samples that could become an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. Location specific air monitoring to be used to establish a baseline environmental signature of a particular facility employed for comparison of consistencies in declared operations will be described in this paper. Implementation of air monitoring will be contrasted against the use of smear ES when used during unannounced inspections, design information verification, limited frequency unannounced access, and complementary access visits at bulk handling facilities. Analysis of technical features required for tamper indication and resistance will demonstrate the viability of successful application of the system in taking ES within a bulk handling location. Further exploration of putting this technology into practice is planned to include mapping uranium enrichment facilities for the identification of optimal for installation of air monitoring devices.

  3. Clean Cities Guide to Alternative Fuel Commercial Lawn Equipment (Brochure)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    2011-10-01

    Guide explains the different types of alternative fuel commercial mowers and lists the makes and models of the ones available on the market. Turf grass is a fixture of the American landscape and the American economy. It is the nation's largest irrigated crop, covering more than 40 million acres. Legions of lawnmowers care for this expanse during the growing season-up to year-round in the warmest climates. The annual economic impact of the U.S. turf grass industry has been estimated at more than $62 billion. Lawn mowing also contributes to the nation's petroleum consumption and pollutant emissions. Mowers consume 1.2 billion gallons of gasoline annually, about 1% of U.S. motor gasoline consumption. Commercial mowing accounts for about 35% of this total and is the highest-intensity use. Large property owners and mowing companies cut lawns, sports fields, golf courses, parks, roadsides, and other grassy areas for 7 hours per day and consume 900 to 2,000 gallons of fuel annually depending on climate and length of the growing season. In addition to gasoline, commercial mowing consumes more than 100 million gallons of diesel annually. Alternative fuel mowers are one way to reduce the energy and environmental impacts of commercial lawn mowing. They can reduce petroleum use and emissions compared with gasoline- and diesel-fueled mowers. They may also save on fuel and maintenance costs, extend mower life, reduce fuel spillage and fuel theft, and promote a 'green' image. And on ozone alert days, alternative fuel mowers may not be subject to the operational restrictions that gasoline mowers must abide by. To help inform the commercial mowing industry about product options and potential benefits, Clean Cities produced this guide to alternative fuel commercial lawn equipment. Although the guide's focus is on original equipment manufacturer (OEM) mowers, some mowers can be converted to run on alternative fuels. For more information about propane conversions. This guide may be particularly helpful for organizations that are already using alternative fuels in their vehicles and have an alternative fuel supply or electric charging in place (e.g., golf cart charging stations at most golf courses). On the flip side, experiencing the benefits of using alternative fuels in mowing equipment may encourage organizations to try them in on-road vehicles as well. Whatever the case, alternative fuel commercial lawnmowers are a powerful and cost-effective way to reduce U.S. petroleum dependence and help protect the environment.

  4. FOSTERING MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, COLOMBIA, AND THE UNITED STATES TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF HIGH-ACTIVITY RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Butler, Nicholas; McCaw, Erica E.; Wright, Kyle A.; Medina, Maximo

    2009-10-06

    The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) reduces and protects vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide from sabotage, theft or diversion. The GTRI has worked successfully with foreign countries to remove and protect nuclear and radioactive materials including high-activity sources used in medical, commercial, and research applications. There are many barriers to successful bilateral cooperation that must be overcome including language, preconceived perceptions, long distances, and different views on the threat and protection requirements. Successful cooperation is often based on relationships and building trusting relationships takes time. In the case of Dominican Republic, the GTRI first received contact in 2008 from the Government of Dominican Republic. They requested cooperation that was similar to the tri-partite cooperation between Colombia, Mexico and the United States. Throughout the region it was widely known that the GTRIs cooperation with the Government of Colombia was a resounding success resulting in the securing of forty sites; the consolidation of numerous disused/orphan sources at a secure national storage facility; and, the development of a comprehensive approach to security including, inter alia, training and sustainability. The Government of Colombia also showcased this comprehensive approach to thirteen Central American and Caribbean countries at a GTRI regional security conference held in Panama in October 2004. In 2007, Colombia was an integral component of GTRI multi-lateral cooperation initiation in Mexico. As a result, twenty two of Mexicos largest radioactive sites have been upgraded in the past eighteen months. These two endeavors served as catalysts for cooperation opportunities in the Dominican Republic. Representatives from the Colombian government were aware of GTRIs interest in initiating cooperation with the Government of Dominican Republic and to facilitate this cooperation, they traveled to the Dominican Republic and provided briefings and presentations which demonstrated its successful cooperation with the GTRI. Shortly after that visit, the Government of Dominican Republic agreed to move forward and requested that the cooperative efforts in Dominican Republic be performed in a tripartite manner, leveraging the skills, experience, and resources of the Colombians, and the financial and technical support of the United States. As a result, two of Dominican Republics largest radioactive sites had security upgrades in place within 90 days of the cooperation visit in December 2008.

  5. Material Control and Accounting Design Considerations for High-Temperature Gas Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Trond Bjornard; John Hockert

    2011-08-01

    The subject of this report is domestic safeguards and security by design (2SBD) for high-temperature gas reactors, focusing on material control and accountability (MC&A). The motivation for the report is to provide 2SBD support to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project, which was launched by Congress in 2005. This introductory section will provide some background on the NGNP project and an overview of the 2SBD concept. The remaining chapters focus specifically on design aspects of the candidate high-temperature gas reactors (HTGRs) relevant to MC&A, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements, and proposed MC&A approaches for the two major HTGR reactor types: pebble bed and prismatic. Of the prismatic type, two candidates are under consideration: (1) GA's GT-MHR (Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor), and (2) the Modular High-Temperature Reactor (M-HTR), a derivative of Areva's Antares reactor. The future of the pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR) for NGNP is uncertain, as the PBMR consortium partners (Westinghouse, PBMR [Pty] and The Shaw Group) were unable to agree on the path forward for NGNP during 2010. However, during the technology assessment of the conceptual design phase (Phase 1) of the NGNP project, AREVA provided design information and technology assessment of their pebble bed fueled plant design called the HTR-Module concept. AREVA does not intend to pursue this design for NGNP, preferring instead a modular reactor based on the prismatic Antares concept. Since MC&A relevant design information is available for both pebble concepts, the pebble-bed HTGRs considered in this report are: (1) Westinghouse PBMR; and (2) AREVA HTR-Module. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) sponsors the Fuel Cycle Research and Development program (FCR&D), which contains an element specifically focused on the domestic (or state) aspects of SBD. This Material Protection, Control and Accountancy Technology (MPACT) program supports the present work summarized in this report, namely the development of guidance to support the consideration of MC&A in the design of both pebble-bed and prismatic-fueled HTGRs. The objective is to identify and incorporate design features into the facility design that will cost effectively aid in making MC&A more effective and efficient, with minimum impact on operations. The theft of nuclear material is addressed through both MC&A and physical protection, while the threat of sabotage is addressed principally through physical protection.

  6. The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schanfein, Mark; Gouveia, Fernando; Crawford, Cary E.; Pickett, Chris J.; Jay, Jeffrey

    2010-07-15

    The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls. Introduction The U.S. safeguards technology base got its start almost half a century ago in the nuclear weapons program of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and their predecessors: AEC & ERDA. Due to nuclear materials’ strategic importance and value, and the risk associated with the public’s and worker’s health and the potential for theft, significant investments were made to develop techniques to measure nuclear materials using both destructive assay (DA) and non-destructive assay (NDA). Major investment within the U.S. DOE Domestic Safeguards Program continued over the next three decades, resulting in continuous improvements in the state-of-the-art of these techniques. This was particularly true in the area of NDA with its ability to use gamma rays, neutrons, and heat to identify and quantify nuclear materials without the need to take direct samples of the material. Most of these techniques were commercialized and transferred to industry, opening their applications to the nuclear industry worldwide and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

  7. Evaluation of MC&A Effectiveness and Its Contribution to the Safeguarding Of Nuclear Material with Assurance Assessments

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schlegel, Steven C.

    2007-07-10

    Safeguards and Security within the DOE complex has struggled with integrating MC&A and Physical Security together in a single model. Attempts were made to incorporate MC&A elements that provide detection into vulnerability assessments. While this approach has met with some success, it does not fully address the different contributions that each make to nuclear material protection. Protection measures that rely on the lack of alarms to imply all nuclear material is still present, in the correct location, and intended use are limited due to their passive nature. A highly effective system may provide confidence that all nuclear material is still present, but it does not provide assurance that it is there. MC&A, through active measures that confirm or verify the actual presence of nuclear material, provides assurance that all of the nuclear material is controlled and accounted for. This paper presents a model that combines the detection and assessment functions from vulnerability assessments with assurance activities provided by MC&A to provide an integrated model that can be used for evaluation of current systems, evaluation of system changes, and monitoring assurance in real time based upon operational activities. 1.0 OVERVIEW Material control and accounting (MC&A) and physical security provide complementary measures that can effectively protect nuclear material against the threats of theft, diversion, and sabotage. Tools have been introduced to evaluate and quantify the effectiveness of different protective measures and schemes, but the ability to fully model the contribution of MC&A to protection effectiveness has been limited. This is due, in part, by not fully recognizing that the two areas contribute differently, but not independently, to protection effectiveness. Physical protection provides detection, assessment, interruption, neutralization, and deterrence against a threat. Except for deterrence, mathematical models have been developed to quantify the contributions of the other elements to obtain an effectiveness value. MC&A helps contribute to this model by providing some detection capabilities and providing assessment under some circumstances to ensure all of the nuclear material is still present as documented. A strong program provides great confidence that nuclear material remains in the location and amounts documented in the nuclear material accounting system. Physical protection is not perfect, however, necessitating MC&A contribution.

  8. Nuclear Material Control and Accountability System Effectiveness Tool (MSET)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H; Roche, Charles T; Campbell, Billy J; Hammond, Glenn A; Meppen, Bruce W; Brown, Richard F

    2011-01-01

    A nuclear material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) has been developed in the United States for use in evaluating material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) systems in nuclear facilities. The project was commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation. MSET was developed by personnel with experience spanning more than six decades in both the U.S. and international nuclear programs and with experience in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in the nuclear power industry. MSET offers significant potential benefits for improving nuclear safeguards and security in any nation with a nuclear program. MSET provides a design basis for developing an MC&A system at a nuclear facility that functions to protect against insider theft or diversion of nuclear materials. MSET analyzes the system and identifies several risk importance factors that show where sustainability is essential for optimal performance and where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. MSET contains five major components: (1) A functional model that shows how to design, build, implement, and operate a robust nuclear MC&A system (2) A fault tree of the operating MC&A system that adapts PRA methodology to analyze system effectiveness and give a relative risk of failure assessment of the system (3) A questionnaire used to document the facility's current MPC&A system (provides data to evaluate the quality of the system and the level of performance of each basic task performed throughout the material balance area [MBA]) (4) A formal process of applying expert judgment to convert the facility questionnaire data into numeric values representing the performance level of each basic event for use in the fault tree risk assessment calculations (5) PRA software that performs the fault tree risk assessment calculations and produces risk importance factor reports on the facility's MC&A (software widely used in the aerospace, chemical, and nuclear power industries) MSET was peer reviewed in 2007 and validated in 2008 by benchmark testing at the Idaho National Laboratory in the United States. The MSET documents were translated into Russian and provided to Rosatom in July of 2008, and MSET is currently being evaluated for potential application in Russian Nuclear Facilities.

  9. The effect of terrorism on public confidence : an exploratory study.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Berry, M. S.; Baldwin, T. E.; Samsa, M. E.; Ramaprasad, A.; Decision and Information Sciences

    2008-10-31

    A primary goal of terrorism is to instill a sense of fear and vulnerability in a population and to erode confidence in government and law enforcement agencies to protect citizens against future attacks. In recognition of its importance, the Department of Homeland Security includes public confidence as one of the metrics it uses to assess the consequences of terrorist attacks. Hence, several factors--including a detailed understanding of the variations in public confidence among individuals, by type of terrorist event, and as a function of time--are critical to developing this metric. In this exploratory study, a questionnaire was designed, tested, and administered to small groups of individuals to measure public confidence in the ability of federal, state, and local governments and their public safety agencies to prevent acts of terrorism. Data were collected from the groups before and after they watched mock television news broadcasts portraying a smallpox attack, a series of suicide bomber attacks, a refinery bombing, and cyber intrusions on financial institutions that resulted in identity theft and financial losses. Our findings include the following: (a) the subjects can be classified into at least three distinct groups on the basis of their baseline outlook--optimistic, pessimistic, and unaffected; (b) the subjects make discriminations in their interpretations of an event on the basis of the nature of a terrorist attack, the time horizon, and its impact; (c) the recovery of confidence after a terrorist event has an incubation period and typically does not return to its initial level in the long-term; (d) the patterns of recovery of confidence differ between the optimists and the pessimists; and (e) individuals are able to associate a monetary value with a loss or gain in confidence, and the value associated with a loss is greater than the value associated with a gain. These findings illustrate the importance the public places in their confidence in government and law enforcement and also indicate that the level of importance is clearly of a magnitude on the order of other major terrorist event consequences, such as loss of human life and impacts to the economy.

  10. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laughter, Mark D

    2007-11-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future, but has yet to be demonstrated commercially. In the early 1980s, six countries developing gas centrifuge technology (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia) along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) began developing effective safeguards techniques for GCEPs. This effort was known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). The HSP had the goal of maximizing safeguards effectiveness while minimizing the cost to the operator and inspectorate, and adopted several recommendations, such as the acceptance of limited-frequency unannounced access (LFUA) inspections in cascade halls, and the use of nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements and tamper-indicating seals. While only the HSP participants initially committed to implementing all the measures of the approach, it has been used as a model for the safeguards applied to GCEPs in additional states. This report provides a snapshot overview of world enrichment capacity in 2007, including profiles of the uranium enrichment programs of individual states. It is based on open-source information, which is dependent on unclassified sources and may therefore not reflect the most recent developments. In addition, it briefly describes some of the safeguards techniques being used at various enrichment plants, including implementation of HSP recommendations.

  11. Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay of Boxed Wastes for the TRU Waste Characterization Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carlsbad Field Office

    2001-01-31

    The Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) for nondestructive assay (NDA) consists of a series of tests to evaluate the capability for NDA of transuranic (TRU) waste throughout the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. Each test is termed a PDP cycle. These evaluation cycles provide an objective measure of the reliability of measurements obtained from NDA systems used to characterize the radiological constituents of TRU waste. The primary documents governing the conduct of the PDP are the Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WAC; DOE 1999a) and the Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD; DOE 1999b). The WAC requires participation in the PDP; the PDP must comply with the QAPD and the WAC. The WAC contains technical and quality requirements for acceptable NDA. This plan implements the general requirements of the QAPD and applicable requirements of the WAC for the NDA PDP for boxed waste assay systems. Measurement facilities demonstrate acceptable performance by the successful testing of simulated waste containers according to the criteria set by this PDP Plan. Comparison among DOE measurement groups and commercial assay services is achieved by comparing the results of measurements on similar simulated waste containers reported by the different measurement facilities. These tests are used as an independent means to assess the performance of measurement groups regarding compliance with established quality assurance objectives (QAOs). Measurement facilities must analyze the simulated waste containers using the same procedures used for normal waste characterization activities. For the boxed waste PDP, a simulated waste container consists of a modified standard waste box (SWB) emplaced with radioactive standards and fabricated matrix inserts. An SWB is a waste box with ends designed specifically to fit the TRUPACT-II shipping container. SWBs will be used to package a substantial volume of the TRU waste for disposal. These PDP sample components are distributed to the participating measurement facilities that have been designated and authorized by the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO). The NDA Box PDP materials are stored at these sites under secure conditions to protect them from loss, tampering, or accidental damage. Using removable PDP radioactive standards, isotopic activities in the simulated waste containers are varied to the extent possible over the range of concentrations anticipated in actual waste characterization situations. Manufactured matrices simulate expected waste matrix configurations and provide acceptable consistency in the sample preparation process at each measurement facility. Analyses that are required by the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to demonstrate compliance with various regulatory requirements and that are included in the PDP may only be performed by measurement facilities that demonstrate acceptable performance in the PDP. These analyses are referred to as WIPP analyses, and the wastes on which they are performed are referred to as WIPP wastes in this document.

  12. 1972-1997, Twenty-five years of energy and environmental history : lessons learned.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Drucker, H.

    1997-12-17

    Given the events of the past 25 years concerning energy and environmental issues and our reaction to them, what lessons can we learn? First, the individual American consumer wants and expects energy to be a stable commodity with low prices and easy availability. As evidenced by the heated debate over increasing the federal gasoline tax by $.05 per gallon (which would still leave Americans paying only one-third of what Europeans pay for gasoline), increases in energy prices elicit very strong public and political opposition. As further evidence, it has been argued that the general public support of the Gulf War was due, in part, to a recognition of the need to maintain a stable source of cheap oil from the region. The American public wants to maintain the benefits of cheap and abundant energy and expects its political leaders to make it happen. A second lesson is that if constraints on the energy supply do occur (e.g., the OPEC-imposed oil embargo) ardor environmental impacts from energy use do appear to be significant (e.g., SO{sub 2} and CO{sub 2} emissions), the preference is for a technology fix rather than a behavioral change. This is evidenced by our reliance on moving low-sulfur coal more than 1,000 miles from Wyoming to burn in Illinois power plants rather than reducing the demand for electricity with energy-efficient measures in residential, commercial, and industrial activities. National research programs to produce an automobile that gets 80+ miles per gallon take higher priority over working to get people to use mass transit to reduce their driving mileage. Americans expect that advanced technology can be relied upon to come up with solutions to energy and environmental problems without having to change their lifestyles. The experience with natural gas, in which a regulatory change (deregulation) was combined with technology developments (horizontal drilling and improved gas turbines for electricity generation) to increase available supply and hold prices down, has added to the confidence in the efficacy of technology fixes to solve energy and environmental problems. Third, it is difficult for government to tamper with energy markets and achieve the desired results.The energy system has shown itself to be a complex adaptive system that adjusts to even the most strenuous burdens in ways that are not easy to predict. Governmental attempts to predict and then prescribe the development of the future energy system are bound to meet with limited, if any, success. Rather, the more appropriate goal seems to be development of a robust and flexible energy system that can evolve and adjust to changing conditions. Given the experiences of the past and the lessons learned from these experiences, what might the future bring? Some predictions can be made with considerable confidence. It is highly likely that the trend of deregulating the energy sector will continue, with electricity deregulation a virtual certainty. It is also highly probable that the demand and consumption of energy from developing countries will soon surpass those of the US, Europe, and Japan, thus making them serious competitors for limited fossil fuel resources. In the environmental arena, some form of emission control of greenhouse gases from the energy sector will be agreed upon soon by the international community. More stringent regulations in the US for the emissions of some air and water pollutants are also likely. Preservation of biological diversity will also likely continue to be an issue of increasing importance.

  13. RESULTS FROM A DEMONSTRATION OF RF-BASED UF6 CYLINDER ACCOUNTING AND TRACKING SYSTEM INSTALLED AT A USEC FACILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pickett, Chris A; Kovacic, Donald N; Morgan, Jim; Younkin, James R; Carrick, Bernie; Ken, Whittle; Johns, R E

    2008-09-01

    Approved industry-standard cylinders are used globally for storing and transporting uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) at uranium enrichment plants and processing facilities. To verify that no diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material involving UF{sub 6} cylinders at the facility has occurred, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts periodic, labor-intensive physical inspections to validate facility records, cylinder identities, and cylinder weights. A reliable cylinder monitoring system that would improve overall inspector effectiveness would be a significant improvement to the current international safeguards inspection regime. Such a system could include real-time unattended monitoring of cylinder movements, situation-specific rules-based event detection algorithms, and the capability to integrate with other types of safeguards technologies. This type of system could provide timely detection of abnormal operational activities that may be used to ensure more appropriate and efficient responses by the IAEA. A system of this type can reduce the reliance on paper records and have the additional benefit of facilitating domestic safeguards at the facilities at which it is installed. A radio-frequency (RF)-based system designed to track uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) cylinders during processing operations was designed, assembled, and tested at the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) facility in Portsmouth, Ohio, to determine the operational feasibility and durability of RF technology. The overall objective of the effort was to validate the robustness of RF technology for potential use as a future international safeguards tool for tracking UF6 cylinders at uranium-processing facilities. The results to date indicate that RF tags represent a feasible technique for tracking UF{sub 6} cylinders in operating facilities. Additional work will be needed to improve the operational robustness of the tags for repeated autoclave processing and to add tamper-indicating and data authentication features to some of the pertinent system components. Future efforts will focus on these needs along with implementing protocols relevant to IAEA safeguards. The work detailed in this report demonstrates the feasibility of constructing RF devices that can survive the operational rigors associated with the transportation, storage, and processing of UF6 cylinders. The system software specially designed for this project is called Cylinder Accounting and Tracking System (CATS). This report details the elements of the CATS rules-based architecture and its use in safeguards-monitoring and asset-tracking applications. Information is also provided on improvements needed to make the technology ready, as well as options for improving the safeguards aspects of the technology. The report also includes feedback from personnel involved in the testing, as well as individuals who could utilize an RF-based system in supporting the performance of their work. The system software was set up to support a Mailbox declaration, where a declaration can be made either before or after cylinder movements take place. When the declaration is made before cylinders move, the operators must enter this information into CATS. If the IAEA then shows up unexpectedly at the facility, they can see how closely the operational condition matches the declaration. If the declaration is made after the cylinders move, this provides greater operational flexibility when schedules are interrupted or are changed, by allowing operators to declare what moves have been completed. The IAEA can then compare where cylinders are with where CATS or the system says they are located. The ability of CATS to automatically generate Mailbox declarations is seen by the authors as a desirable feature. The Mailbox approach is accepted by the IAEA but has not been widely implemented (and never in enrichment facilities). During the course of this project, we have incorporated alternative methods for implementation.

  14. Development and Demonstration of a Security Core Component

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Turke, Andy

    2014-02-28

    In recent years, the convergence of a number of trends has resulted in Cyber Security becoming a much greater concern for electric utilities. A short list of these trends includes: · Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have evolved from depending on proprietary hardware and operating software toward using standard off-the-shelf hardware and operating software. This has meant that these ICSs can no longer depend on “security through obscurity. · Similarly, these same systems have evolved toward using standard communications protocols, further reducing their ability to rely upon obscurity. · The rise of the Internet and the accompanying demand for more data about virtually everything has resulted in formerly isolated ICSs becoming at least partially accessible via Internet-connected networks. · “Cyber crime” has become commonplace, whether it be for industrial espionage, reconnaissance for a possible cyber attack, theft, or because some individual or group “has something to prove.” Electric utility system operators are experts at running the power grid. The reality is, especially at small and mid-sized utilities, these SCADA operators will by default be “on the front line” if and when a cyber attack occurs against their systems. These people are not computer software, networking, or cyber security experts, so they are ill-equipped to deal with a cyber security incident. Cyber Security Manager (CSM) was conceived, designed, and built so that it can be configured to know what a utility’s SCADA/EMS/DMS system looks like under normal conditions. To do this, CSM monitors log messages from any device that uses the syslog standard. It can also monitor a variety of statistics from the computers that make up the SCADA/EMS/DMS: outputs from host-based security tools, intrusion detection systems, SCADA alarms, and real-time SCADA values – even results from a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) system. When the system deviates from “normal,” CSM can alert the operator in language that they understand that an incident may be occurring, provide actionable intelligence, and informing them what actions to take. These alarms may be viewed on CSM’s built-in user interface, sent to a SCADA alarm list, or communicated via email, phone, pager, or SMS message. In recognition of the fact that “real world” training for cyber security events is impractical, CSM has a built-in Operator Training Simulator capability. This can be used stand alone to create simulated event scenarios for training purposes. It may also be used in conjunction with the recipient’s SCADA/EMS/DMS Operator Training Simulator. In addition to providing cyber security situational awareness for electric utility operators, CSM also provides tools for analysts and support personnel; in fact, the majority of user interface displays are designed for use in analyzing current and past security events. CSM keeps security-related information in long-term storage, as well as writing any decisions it makes to a (syslog) log for use forensic or other post-event analysis.

  15. U.S. and Russian Collaboration in the Area of Nuclear Forensics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kristo, M J

    2007-10-22

    Nuclear forensics has become increasingly important in the fight against illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. The illicit trafficking of nuclear materials is, of course, an international problem; nuclear materials may be mined and milled in one country, manufactured in a second country, diverted at a third location, and detected at a fourth. There have been a number of articles in public policy journals in the past year that call for greater interaction between the U. S. and the rest of the world on the topic of nuclear forensics. Some believe that such international cooperation would help provide a more certain capability to identify the source of the nuclear material used in a terrorist event. An improved international nuclear forensics capability would also be important as part of the IAEA verification toolkit, particularly linked to increased access provided by the additional protocol. A recent study has found that, although international progress has been made in securing weapons-usable HEU and Pu, the effort is still insufficient. They found that nuclear material, located in 40 countries, could be obtained by terrorists and criminals and used for a crude nuclear weapon. Through 2006, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database had recorded a total of 607 confirmed events involving illegal possession, theft, or loss of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Although it is difficult to predict the future course of such illicit trafficking, increasingly such activities are viewed as significant threats that merit the development of special capabilities. As early as April, 1996, nuclear forensics was recognized at the G-8 Summit in Moscow as an important element of an illicit nuclear trafficking program. Given international events over the past several years, the value and need for nuclear forensics seems greater than ever. Determining how and where legitimate control of nuclear material was lost and tracing the route of the material from diversion through interdiction are important goals for nuclear forensics and attribution. It is equally important to determine whether additional devices or materials that pose a threat to public safety are also available. Finding the answer to these questions depends on determining the source of the material and its method of production. Nuclear forensics analysis and interpretation provide essential insights into methods of production and sources of illicit radioactive materials. However, they are most powerful when combined with other sources of information, including intelligence and traditional detective work. The certainty of detection and punishment for those who remove nuclear materials from legitimate control provides the ultimate deterrent for such diversion and, ultimately, for the intended goal of such diversion, including nuclear terrorism or proliferation. Consequently, nuclear forensics is an integral part of 'nuclear deterrence' in the 21st century. Nuclear forensics will always be limited by the diagnostic information inherent in the interdicted material. Important markers for traditional forensics (fingerprints, stray material, etc.) can be eliminated or obscured, but many nuclear materials have inherent isotopic or chemical characteristics that serve as unequivocal markers of specific sources, production processes, or transit routes. The information needed for nuclear forensics goes beyond that collected for most commercial and international verification activities. Fortunately, the international nuclear engineering enterprise has a restricted number of conspicuous process steps that makes the interpretation process easier. Ultimately, though, it will always be difficult to distinguish between materials that reflect similar source or production histories, but are derived from disparate sites. Due to the significant capital costs of the equipment and the specialized expertise of the personnel, work in the field of nuclear forensics has been restricted so far to a handful of national and international laboratories. There are a limited number of

  16. Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Powell, Danny H; Elwood Jr, Robert H

    2011-01-01

    An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. The material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system. The MSET process is divided into four distinct and separate parts: (1) Completion of the questionnaire that assembles information about the operations of every aspect of the MPC&A system; (2) Conversion of questionnaire data into numeric values associated with risk; (3) Analysis of the numeric data utilizing the MPC&A fault tree and the SAPHIRE computer software; and (4) Self-assessment using the MSET reports to perform the effectiveness evaluation of the facility's MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. If the need for system improvements or upgrades is indicated when the system is analyzed, MSET provides the capability to evaluate potential or actual system improvements or upgrades. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time. The system can be reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential system improvement can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance and reveals where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk. The functional model, the system risk assessment tool, and the facility evaluation questionnaire are valuable educational tools for MPC&A personnel. These educational tools provide a framework for ongoing dialogue between organizations regarding the design, development, implementation, operation, assessment, and sustainability of MPC&A systems. An organization considering the use of MSET as an analytical tool for evaluating the effectiveness of its MPC&A system will benefit from conducting a complete MSET exercise at an existing nuclear facility.

  17. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs-2009

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laughter, Mark D

    2009-04-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, whereas HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is not diverted or enriched to HEU. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 56 million kilogram separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22.5 million in gaseous diffusion and more than 33 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 34 million SWU/year of capacity is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future but has yet to be demonstrated commercially. In the early 1980s, six countries developing gas centrifuge technology (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia) along with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community began developing effective safeguards techniques for GCEPs. This effort was known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). The HSP had the goal of maximizing safeguards effectiveness while minimizing the cost to the operator and inspectorate, and adopted several recommendations, such as the acceptance of limited-frequency unannounced access inspections in cascade halls, and the use of nondestructive assay measurements and tamper-indicating seals. While only the HSP participants initially committed to implementing all the measures of the approach, it has been used as a model for the safeguards applied to GCEPs in additional states. Uranium enrichment capacity has continued to expand on all fronts in the last few years. GCEP capacity is expanding in anticipation of the eventual shutdown of the less-efficient GDPs, the termination of the U.S.-Russia HEU blend-down program slated for 2013, and the possible resurgence of nuclear reactor construction as part of an expected 'Nuclear Renaissance'. Overall, a clear trend in the world profile of uranium enrichment plant operation is the continued movement towards multinational projects driven by commercial and economic interests. Along this vein, the safeguards community is continuing to develop new safeguards techniques and technologies that are not overly burdensome to enrichment plant operators while delivering more effective and efficient results. This report provides a snapshot overview of world enrichment capacity in 2009, including profiles of the uranium enrichment programs of individual states. It is a revision of a 2007 report on the same topic; significant changes in world enrichment programs between the previous and current reports are emphasized. It is based entirely on open-source information, which is dependent on published sources and may therefore not be completely accurate or reflect the most recent developments. Consequently, readers should not assume that information cited here has the endorsement of either ORNL or the U.S. Department of Energy. We are merely reporting what's been reported. In addition, this report briefly describes some of the safeguards techniques being used at various enrichment plants, including implementation of HSP recommendations.

  18. Session 70 - Panel: Consequence Management of a Radiological Dispersion Device

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demmer, Rick; Lenox, Dave; Wilson, Pete; Schumann, Jean; Honerlah, Hans; Chen, S.Y.; Gwiazdowski, Gene

    2006-07-01

    This was an unusual panel session in that the panelists did not give presentations but responded to a tabletop exercise where they postulated decisions necessary after radiological dispersal device detonation event (dirty bomb). Articles in the daily WM'06 newsletter sought to prepare the participants for a simulated exercise involving the sighting of a known terrorist and the theft of radiological materials. During the slide presentation (in the form of a developing television news broadcast) the audience played decision makers and their 'votes' were tallied for multiple choice decisions and questions. After that was completed, the expert panel was asked to give their best responses for those decisions. The audience was allowed to ask questions and to give opinions as the panel responded. During the exercise the session co-chairs alternated announcing the events as they unfolded in the exercise and polled the audience using multiple-choice options for decisions to be made during the event. The answers to those questions were recorded and compared to the panelists' answers. The event chronology and decisions (audience questions) are shown in this report. - An explosion was reported at the Tucson International Airport (9:35 am). 1. Who is in charge? - Witnesses report 10-20 fatalities, 50 injured and massive damage to the airport, no cause determined yet (9:55 am). 2. IC's Next Action Should Be? - KRAD (local television station) Investigative News Reporters interviewed witnesses that observed a 25 foot U-Haul truck pull up onto the departure ramp just moments before the explosion (10:02 am). Terrorism has not been ruled out. 3. When is the incident declared a potential crime scene? - City of Tucson IC has ordered an evacuation of the airport to a holding area at a nearby long term parking area (10:10 am). No information has been given as to why the evacuation took place. The explosion is suspected to contain chemical, biological or radiological agents. County and State emergency operations centers have been activated. 4. Terrorism is suspected; next action is? - KRAD News has just learned that elevated levels of radiation have been detected at the airport and by the University of Arizona remote detectors (10:17 am). A 'dirty bomb' is now suspected. 5. What should the IC do next? - KRAD reporters have learned that dose rates are approximately 7.5 mR/hr gamma radiation in the short-term parking area (10:28 am). Experts attending a conference at the Tucson Convention Center state that these levels are not life threatening, but well above acceptable levels. 6. What does the IC do next? 7. Who is the coordinating agency? - Forensics indicate that the radioactive material used in the explosion at the Tucson Airport is apparently a mixture of high jacked low level waste from a nuclear facility and stolen radiation sources for medical or industrial purposes (11:21 am). The origin of the waste material is from an audience member's plant (assume it is your own material). 8. Who is responsible for surveys and characterization? 9. Who is responsible for the decontamination? 10. Where are the injured and contaminated victims treated? KRAD learned from the University of Arizona that the plume from the 'dirty bomb' elevated radiation levels above approved levels over a 3 square mile area downwind of the Tucson Airport (1:13 pm). People in the affected area are checking in at emergency rooms at the hospital to learn if they're in danger of radiation health affects. Gridlock has set in as panicked people are either leaving the area or headed for emergency rooms. 11. What should be done to help mitigate fears? DHS raises the National Terrorism Alert to Code Red (late afternoon). 12. What should your nuclear facility do next? 13. KRAD reporter contacts you at your nuclear facility and asks, 'Since title to the waste remains with your company, will your company cover the cost of the terrorist event including all decontamination and medical expenses? The results of the question were very interesting and stimulated quite a bit of discussion am