Sample records for relevant biodiversity safeguards

  1. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  2. Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  3. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duc Cao; Richard Metcalf

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguards optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

  4. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been underappreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured. This paper argues that safeguards culture as an indicator of a country’s nonproliferation posture can be a useful tool.

  5. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed.

  6. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. • Life-cycle cost analysis can be a useful tool in safeguards design. • An important obstacle to straight forward application of life-cycle cost analysis is that there is no single organization responsible for the entire life-cycle cost of the facility. • The Safeguards Effectiveness Report (SGER) is proposed as a focus for the safeguards design activities, and is intended to be a living document that contains increasing safeguards relevant scope and content as the facility design emerges. Further work is required in a number of areas. The authors note that other studies supported by NGSI are addressing the development of requirements and performance criteria, as well as contributing to the design toolkit through the development of technology, methodology, and safeguards guidelines for designers. With respect to further development of the SBD design process, the authors recommend: • In the short term, conduct a workshop with interested industry representatives, to ensure that their perspectives and needs are factored into further development. • In the short term, provide NGSI SBD project documents to IAEA, and support them in the conduct of an ‘SBD Workshop II.” • In the medium term, continue to support the SBD demonstration work started with the Next Generation Nuclear Plant project. • In the longer term, conduct further studies to examine the integration of SBD into projects with concurrent consideration of physical security and safety.

  7. Safeguards Professional Development Opportunities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V [ORNL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Across the international field of safeguards there has been a rising awareness of the need for development of the next generation of safeguards professionals. The 2010 International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Symposium includes a suggested topic of 'developing safeguards professionals.' This can first be addressed by making university students and young professionals aware of safeguards and the unique career opportunities it encompasses. Then, once someone decides to go into safeguards he/she needs to be offered professional development opportunities in order to become a more effective member of the international safeguards community. This paper begins to do that by reviewing opportunities currently available. There are not many opportunities that are well advertised and this paper will serve to raise awareness of what does already exist and therefore benefit the international safeguards community. The current opportunities that will be discussed include training programs, graduate degrees, organizational outreach, professional networks, and intensive topic specific programs. The paper will also identify current needs and holes in the current offerings of professional development opportunities and suggest ways they can be filled. In the conclusion the paper addresses what types of programs are still needed.

  8. The safeguards options study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  9. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  10. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a legal document. As such, it is written in a legalese that is understood by specialists in international law and treaties, but not by most outside of this field, including designers of nuclear facilities. For this reason, many of the requirements have been simplified and restated. However, in all cases, the relevant source document and passage is noted so that readers may trace the requirement to the source. This is a helpful living guide, since some of these requirements are subject to revision over time. More importantly, the practices by which the requirements are met are continuously modernized by the IAEA and nuclear facility operators to improve not only the effectiveness of international nuclear safeguards, but also the efficiency. As these improvements are made, the following guidelines should be updated and revised accordingly.

  11. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  12. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-05-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order establishes roles and responsibilities for the Department of Energy Safeguards and Security Program. Cancels DOE O 470.4. Canceled by DOE O 470.4B

  13. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1988-01-22T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish the policy and responsibilities for the Department of Energy safeguards and security program. Does not cancel another directive. Canceled by DOE O 5630.11A dated 12-7-92.

  14. Safeguards Envelope Methodology 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Metcalf, Richard

    2012-02-14T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear safeguards are intrinsic and extrinsic features of a facility which reduce probability of the successful acquisition of special nuclear material (SNM) by hostile actors. Future bulk handling facilities in the United States will include both...

  15. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  16. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19T23:59:59.000Z

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  17. Incorporating Biodiversity Considerations Into Environmental...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Incorporating Biodiversity Considerations Into Environmental Impact Analysis Under NEPA Incorporating Biodiversity Considerations Into Environmental Impact Analysis Under NEPA This...

  18. Safeguards and Security Program References

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes definitions for terms related to the Department of Energy Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program and includes lists of references and acronyms/abbreviations applicable to S&S Program directives. Cancels the Safeguards and Security Glossary of Terms, dated 12-18-95. Current Safeguards and Security Program References can also be found at Safeguards and Security Policy Information Resource (http://pir.pnl.gov/)

  19. Safeguard Security and Awareness Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2002-10-02T23:59:59.000Z

    Provides detailed requirements and procedures to supplement DOE O 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program, Chapter IV.

  20. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation methodology can be adapted for evaluating and assessing the safeguardability of nuclear facilities – both existing, as well as those still on the drawing board. The advantages of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis is that it would not only give the facility designer an analytical method for evaluating and assessing the safeguards measures and approaches for the prospective facility, but also the ability to optimize the design of the facility process for enhancing facility safeguardability. The following report explains the need for Facility Safeguardability Analysis and explains how it could be used in the Safeguards-by-Design, in support of the design and construction of nuclear facilities.

  1. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish responsibilities for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program, and to establish program planning and management requirements for the S&S Program. Cancels DOE O 470.4A, DOE M 470.4-1, Chg. 2, and DOE O 142.1.

  2. and Pollutant Safeguarding Buildings

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    commercial buildings, these flows are driven primarily by the building's ventilation system, but natural2004 Airflow and Pollutant Transport Group Safeguarding Buildings Against Chemical and Biological research since 1998 to protect buildings and building occupants from threats posed by airborne chemical

  3. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes roles and responsibilities for the Department of Energy Safeguards and Security Program. Cancels: DOE O 470.1, DOE O 471.2A, DOE O 471.4, DOE O 472.1C, DOE O 473.1, DOE O 473.2, DOE O 474.1A. Canceled by DOE O 470.4A.

  4. NEAMS safeguards and separations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sadasivan, Pratap [Los Alamos National Laboratory; De Paoli, David W [ORNL

    2011-01-25T23:59:59.000Z

    This presentation provides a program management update on the Safeguards and Separations Integrated Performance and Safety Code (IPSC) program in the DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS). It provides an overview of FY11 work packages at multiple DOE Labs and includes material on challenge problem definitions for the IPSC effort.

  5. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-12-29T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards and Security Program ensures that the Department of Energy efficiently and effectively meets all its obligations to protect Special Nuclear Material, other nuclear materials, classified matter, sensitive information, government property, and the safety and security of employees, contractors, and the general public. Cancels DOE P 470.1.

  6. Remote monitoring for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dupree, S.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sonnier, C.S. [Jupiter Corp., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1997-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the US Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these field trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology. Fortunately, modern technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime.

  7. Statistics applied to safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Picard, R.R.

    1993-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Statistical methods are central to safeguards work. Measurements forming the basis of much materials accountancy are not perfect - ``perfect`` in the sense of being error free. Other sessions in this course address the destructive and nondestructive measurement of nuclear material, together with the inherent limitations in those measurements. The bottom line is that measurement errors are a fact of life and, since we can`t eliminate them, we have to find a rational way to deal with them. Which leads to the world of statistics. Beyond dealing with measurement errors, another area of statistical application involves the sampling of items for verification. Inspectors from the IAEA and domestic regulatory agencies periodically visit operating facilities and make measurements of selected items. By comparing their own measured values to those declared by the facilities, increased confidence is obtained. If verification measurements were not expensive, time consuming, and disruptive to operations, perhaps verification of 100% of the inventories would be desirable. In reality, many constraints lead to inspection of only a portion of those inventories. Drawing inferences about a larger ``population`` of declared items in a facility based on verification information obtained from a sample of those items is a statistical problem. There are few texts on statistics in safeguards. The lengthy exposition ``IAEA Safeguards: Statistical Concepts and Techniques`` and the US NRC book edited by Bowen and Bennet are two good sources of general information. In the next section, the subject of measurement quality is addressed. The third section covers the evaluation of MUFs, and discusses the related subjects of error propagation and sequential analysis. The final section covers verification, inspection sample size calculations, and the D statistic. The text is written at an elementary level, with references to the safeguards literature for more detailed treatment.

  8. Statistics applied to safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Picard, R.R.

    1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Statistical methods are central to safeguards work. Measurements forming the basis of much materials accountancy are not perfect - perfect'' in the sense of being error free. Other sessions in this course address the destructive and nondestructive measurement of nuclear material, together with the inherent limitations in those measurements. The bottom line is that measurement errors are a fact of life and, since we can't eliminate them, we have to find a rational way to deal with them. Which leads to the world of statistics. Beyond dealing with measurement errors, another area of statistical application involves the sampling of items for verification. Inspectors from the IAEA and domestic regulatory agencies periodically visit operating facilities and make measurements of selected items. By comparing their own measured values to those declared by the facilities, increased confidence is obtained. If verification measurements were not expensive, time consuming, and disruptive to operations, perhaps verification of 100% of the inventories would be desirable. In reality, many constraints lead to inspection of only a portion of those inventories. Drawing inferences about a larger population'' of declared items in a facility based on verification information obtained from a sample of those items is a statistical problem. There are few texts on statistics in safeguards. The lengthy exposition IAEA Safeguards: Statistical Concepts and Techniques'' and the US NRC book edited by Bowen and Bennet are two good sources of general information. In the next section, the subject of measurement quality is addressed. The third section covers the evaluation of MUFs, and discusses the related subjects of error propagation and sequential analysis. The final section covers verification, inspection sample size calculations, and the D statistic. The text is written at an elementary level, with references to the safeguards literature for more detailed treatment.

  9. Full spectrum optical safeguard

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ackerman, Mark R. (Albuquerque, NM)

    2008-12-02T23:59:59.000Z

    An optical safeguard device with two linear variable Fabry-Perot filters aligned relative to a light source with at least one of the filters having a nonlinear dielectric constant material such that, when a light source produces a sufficiently high intensity light, the light alters the characteristics of the nonlinear dielectric constant material to reduce the intensity of light impacting a connected optical sensor. The device can be incorporated into an imaging system on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or satellite.

  10. Safeguards Laboratory (SL) | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's PossibleRadiation Protection245C Unlimited ReleaseWelcome ton n uSTEM-ASafeguards &Safeguards

  11. Us-Japan cooperation on safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hori, Masato [JAEA; Kawakubo, Yoko [JAEA; Mcclelland - Kerr, J [NNSA

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    There is a long history of collaborative safeguards development between the United States and Japan. Japan has built, and continues to expand, the largest civil nuclear fuel cycle under full-scope IAEA safeguards in world. This development has posed unique challenges to the international safeguards system. Safeguards developments made through the US-Japan cooperation to address these unique challenges have significantly impacted the technologies deployed for international safeguards applications around the world.

  12. Master Safeguards and Security Agreements

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1988-02-03T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish the Department of Energy policy, requirements, responsibilities, and authorities for the development and implementation of Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSA's). Does not cancel another directive. Canceled by DOE O 5630.13A

  13. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Ensures appropriate levels of protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components; espionage; loss or theft of classified matter or Government property; and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security or on the health and safety of Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor employees, the public, or the environment. DOE O 470.1 Extended until 5-11-06 by DOE N 251.63, dated 5-11-05. Chg 1, Safeguards and Security Program, dated 9/28/95, extended by DOE N 251.57, dated 4/28/2004. Change 1, 5/21/96, revises Chapter IV. Cancels: DOE 5630.11B, DOE 5630.13A, DOE 5630.14A, DOE 5630.15, DOE 5630.16A, DOE 5630.17, DOE 5631.1C, DOE 5631.4A, DOE 5634.1B, DOE 5634.3, DOE 5639.3, DOE M 5632.1C-1 in part.

  14. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  15. Safeguards and Security Program, acronyms and abbereviations...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Program, acronyms and abbereviations - DOE M 470.4-7 Safeguards and Security Program, acronyms and abbereviations - DOE M 470.4-7 August 26, 2005 Canceled Safeguards and Security...

  16. PORTRAITS OF BIODIVERSITY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    PORTRAITS OF BIODIVERSITY FOREWORD BY E.O.WILSON #12;#12;47CLOUD FOREST NALINI M. NADKARNI MONTEVERDE CLOUD FOREST RESERVE, COSTA RICA 17SALTWATER BAY AUGUST KLEINZAHLER UNDER THE GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE with automobile traffic: sedans, hatchbacks, El Caminos, Pintos, Cabriolets, blue, red, white, gray, black

  17. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System CONTACT INFORMATION UPDATE REPORTING IDENTIFICATION SYMBOL (RIS) RIS: Address: Facility Name: CONTACTS Name Email:...

  18. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future. Consequently, the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) sponsored a team of U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory nuclear safeguards experts and technologists to conduct a workshop on methods and technologies for improving this activity, under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Approaches Project. The workshop focused on reviewing and discussing the fundamental safeguards needs, and presented technology and/or methods that could potentially address those needs more effectively and efficiently. Conclusions and Recommendations for technology to enhance the performance of DIV inspections are presented by the workshop team.

  19. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  20. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  1. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  2. Process Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ehinger, Michael H [ORNL] [ORNL; Pomeroy, George D [ORNL] [ORNL; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W [ORNL] [ORNL

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Process Monitoring has long been used to evaluate industrial processes and operating conditions in nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In nuclear applications there is a recognized need to demonstrate the safeguards benefits from using advanced process monitoring on spent fuel reprocessing technologies and associated facilities, as a complement to nuclear materials accounting. This can be accomplished by: defining credible diversion pathway scenarios as a sample problem; using advanced sensor and data analysis techniques to illustrate detection capabilities; and formulating 'event detection' methodologies as a means to quantify performance of the safeguards system. Over the past 30 years there have been rapid advances and improvement in the technology associated with monitoring and control of industrial processes. In the context of bulk handling facilities that process nuclear materials, modern technology can provide more timely information on the location and movement of nuclear material to help develop more effective safeguards. For international safeguards, inspection means verification of material balance data as reported by the operator through the State to the international inspectorate agency. This verification recognizes that the State may be in collusion with the operator to hide clandestine activities, potentially during abnormal process conditions with falsification of data to mask the removal. Records provided may show material is accounted for even though a removal occurred. Process monitoring can offer additional fidelity during a wide variety of operating conditions to help verify the declaration or identify possible diversions. The challenge is how to use modern technology for process monitoring and control in a proprietary operating environment subject to safeguards inspectorate or other regulatory oversight. Under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a range of potential safeguards applications for process monitoring are under conceptual development and evaluation. This paper reports on a study of process monitoring for a sample problem involving spent fuel reprocessing with aqueous reprocessing technologies. This includes modeling the processes in the context of a nuclear material diversion scenario and measuring the associated process chemistry. A systems-centric model is applied using actual and simulated plant data, advanced sensors, anomaly detection methods, statistical analysis and data authentication methods, to help illustrate the benefits of process monitoring applications.

  3. Nuclear material safeguards for enrichments plants: Part 4, Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant: Diversion scenarios and IAEA safeguards activities: Safeguards training course

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1988-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This publication is Part 4 of a safeguards training course in Nuclear Material Safeguards for enrichment plants. This part of the course deals with diversion scenarios and safeguards activities at gas centrifuge enrichment plants.

  4. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  5. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Challenge:

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's Possible for Renewable Energy:Nanowire3627 Federal Register /76Safeguards and Security Challenge:

  6. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  7. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Swinhoe, Martyn T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  8. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08T23:59:59.000Z

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  9. Safeguards for Uranium Extraction (UREX) +1a Process 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Feener, Jessica S.

    2011-08-08T23:59:59.000Z

    safeguards approach is needed to show that a commercially sized UREX+ facility can be safeguarded to current international standards. A detailed safeguards approach for a UREX+1a reprocessing facility has been developed. The approach includes the use...

  10. PIA - Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Electronic Safeguards...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    System (E3S) PIA - Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Electronic Safeguards Security System (E3S) More Documents & Publications PIA - 10th International Nuclear Graphite...

  11. Safeguards and Security Program - DOE Directives, Delegations...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    ARCHIVED DOE O 470.1 Chg 1, Safeguards and Security Program by Website Administrator Functional areas: Environment, Safety, and Health, Hazardous Materials, Radiation Protection,...

  12. Applications of virtual reality to nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stansfield, S.

    1996-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper presents several applications of virtual reality relevant to the areas of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. Each of these applications was developed to the prototype stage at Sandia National Laboratories` Virtual Reality and Intelligent Simulation laboratory. These applications include the use of virtual reality for facility visualization, training of inspection personnel, and security and monitoring of nuclear facilities.

  13. ORO Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System and Visitor Control System PIA, Oak Ridge Operations Office ORO Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System...

  14. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance. (DLC)

  15. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Elayat, H A; O'Connell, W J; Boyer, B D

    2006-06-05T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems used in enrichment facilities. This research focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of the safeguards in protecting against the range of safeguards concerns for enrichment plants, including diversion of attractive material and unauthorized modes of use. We developed an Extend simulation model for a generic medium-sized centrifuge enrichment plant. We modeled the material flow in normal operation, plant operational upset modes, and selected diversion scenarios, for selected safeguards systems. Simulation modeling is used to analyze both authorized and unauthorized use of a plant and the flow of safeguards information. Simulation tracks the movement of materials and isotopes, identifies the signatures of unauthorized use, tracks the flow and compilation of safeguards data, and evaluates the effectiveness of the safeguards system in detecting misuse signatures. The simulation model developed could be of use to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, enabling the IAEA to observe and draw conclusions that uranium enrichment facilities are being used only within authorized limits for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will evaluate improved approaches to nonproliferation concerns, facilitating deployment of enhanced and cost-effective safeguards systems for an important part of the nuclear power fuel cycle.

  16. Safeguards and Security Independent Oversight Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-12-23T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes the DOE Safeguards and Security Independent Oversight Program that provides DOE and contractor managers, Congress, and other stakeholders with an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of DOE safeguards and security policy and programs, and the implementation of those policies and programs. Cancels DOE 5630.12A.

  17. Safeguards and security issues during facility transition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, M.R. [USDOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Washington, DC (United States); Zack, N.R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Safeguards Systems Group

    1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The transition of Department of Energy (DOE) production facilities to those destined for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) must consider traditional safeguards and security requirements governing nuclear materials. Current DOE safeguards and security policy establishes specific requirements for the removal of facilities and waste from safeguards. However, the current physical security policy does not differentiate the protection of waste from usable materials. Other transition issues include: access of uncleared individuals, positioning security zones, nuclear material holdup, accounting for difficult-to-measure materials, inventory difference and resolution, and radiological/toxicological sabotage. Safeguards and security goals for facility transitioning must provide a workable, efficient and cost-effective system for accounting and protecting nuclear material. In depth protection strategies utilizing combinations of safeguards and security systems should be developed to meet these goals.

  18. DOE/NNSA perspective safeguard by design: GEN III/III+ light water reactors and beyond

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pan, Paul Y [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-12-10T23:59:59.000Z

    An overview of key issues relevant to safeguards by design (SBD) for GEN III/IV nuclear reactors is provided. Lessons learned from construction of typical GEN III+ water reactors with respect to SBD are highlighted. Details of SBD for safeguards guidance development for GEN III/III+ light water reactors are developed and reported. This paper also identifies technical challenges to extend SBD including proliferation resistance methodologies to other GEN III/III+ reactors (except HWRs) and GEN IV reactors because of their immaturity in designs.

  19. BIODIVERSITY Freshwater fish introductions in

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Olden, Julian D.

    BIODIVERSITY RESEARCH Freshwater fish introductions in mediterranean-climate regions and fragmenta- tion, hydrological alteration, climate change, overexploitation, pollution and the global mediterranean-climate regions: California (USA), central Chile, south-western Australia, the Iberian peninsula

  20. Enhanced safeguards via solution monitoring

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burr, T.; Wangen, L.

    1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Solution monitoring is defined as the essentially continuous monitoring of solution level, density, and temperature in all tanks in the process that contain, or could contain, safeguards-significant quantities of nuclear material. This report describes some of the enhancements that solution monitoring could make to international safeguards. The focus is on the quantifiable benefits of solution monitoring, but qualitatively, solution monitoring can be viewed as a form of surveillance. Quantitatively, solution monitoring can in some cases improve diversion detection probability. For example, the authors show that under certain assumptions, solution monitoring can be used to reduce the standard deviation of the annual material balance, {sigma}{sub MB}, from approximately 17 kg to approximately 4 kg. Such reduction in {sigma}{sub MB} will not always be possible, as they discuss. However, in all cases, solution monitoring would provide assurance that the measurement error models are adequate so that one has confidence in his estimate of {sigma}{sub MB}. Some of the results in this report were generated using data that were simulated with prototype solution monitoring software that they are developing. An accompanying document describes that software.

  1. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  2. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY09

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters which nuclear facilities may operate within to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). As a result of the U.S. having no operating nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, there has been a strong interest in obtaining process monitoring data from the ICPP. The ICPP was shut down in 1996 and a recent effort has been made to retrieve the PM data from storage in a data mining effort. In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z- testing7.

  3. safeguards

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysisDarby Dietrich57/%2A0/%2A en4/%2A2/%2A/%2A en

  4. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  5. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Santi, Peter A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hypes, Philip A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-14T23:59:59.000Z

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  6. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    R. Wigeland; T Bjornard; B. Castle

    2009-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization’s purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations’ approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  7. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  8. Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes program planning and management requirements for the Departments Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program. Cancels: DOE N 473.9 and DOE M 470.1-1

  9. Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes program planning and management requirements for the Departments Safeguards and Security. Chg 1, dated 3-7-06 Cancels DOE N 473.9, DOE M 470.1-1 Chg 2.

  10. Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Policy

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-05-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this Policy is to formalize an Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) framework. Safeguards and security management systems provide a formal, organized process for planning, performing, assessing, and improving the secure conduct of work in accordance with risk-based protection strategies. These systems are institutionalized through Department of Energy (DOE) directives and contracts. Does not cancel other directives. Canceled by DOE P 470.1A.

  11. Safeguards and Security Program and Project Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-04-18T23:59:59.000Z

    The proposed revision to this Department of Energy Guide focuses on alignment of guidance for implementing key safeguard and security components to the DOE capital asset acquisition process with the revised DOE O 413.3B, Program and Project Management for Acquisition of Capital Assets, the revised DOE O 470.4B, Safeguard and Security Program, and the new series of DOE Orders replacing the DOE M 470.4 series of manuals.

  12. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either are experts in international safeguards, or understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. The 44 participants represented eight national laboratories, four universities, three government organizations, two international organizations, two professional organizations, and three small companies. The goal of the ERIS workshop was to improve efforts to engage U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. At the workshop's conclusion, participants presented their findings to the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243). The report's major findings are summarized.

  13. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  14. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24T23:59:59.000Z

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  15. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, James W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  16. Safeguards Envelope: The First Steps

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Jean Ragusa; Robert Bean

    2008-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The possibility exists for real time accountancy and assay of nuclear materials as they move through a reprocessing facility. This project aims to establish working parameters and local figures of merit to identify possible diversion in real time with minimal operational impact. Factors such as pH, NOX gas concentration, flow speeds and radiation fields are rarely taken into account in safeguards methodologies and will be included to increase the confidence of location and assay of nuclear materials. An adaptable, real data model is being created of the contactors of the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility and will be analyzed using the appropriate modeling codes. This model will then be subjected to three, diversion scenarios and a figure of merit methodology will be utilized to create the operational parameters under which these diversion scenarios would be detected. This analysis for figure of merit methodology will include statistical fluctuations, operator error, and a rudimentary analysis of transient conditions. The long term goal of the project includes expansion universally over the plant, methods of detection without requiring access to proprietary information, and an evaluation of the requirements for future figure of merit methodologies.

  17. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  18. Integrating Food Production and Biodiversity

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    with food, and NPK fluxes at farm level. The biofuels were crude rapeseed oil, horse draft, ethanol from a combination of a workhorse and a crude rapeseed oil-fuelled tractor. Ethanol from wheat had the largest impactIntegrating Food Production and Biodiversity Energy and Scale Issues in Implementation Kristina

  19. Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory. FY 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory is published annually by the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) of the US Department of Energy (DOE), and is Intended to inform recipients of the full scope of the OSS R&D program. It is distributed for use by DOE headquarters personnel, DOE program offices, DOE field offices, DOE operating contractors, national laboratories, other federal agencies, and foreign governments. Chapters 1 through 7 of the Directory provide general information regarding the Technology Development Program, including the mission, program description, organizational roles and responsibilities, technology development lifecycle, requirements analysis, program formulation, the task selection process, technology development infrastructure, technology transfer activities, and current research and development tasks. These chapters are followed by a series of appendices which contain more specific information on aspects of the Program. Appendix A is a summary of major technology development accomplishments made during FY 1992. Appendix B lists S&S technology development reports issued during FY 1992 which reflect work accomplished through the OSS Technology Development Program and other relevant activities outside the Program. Finally, Appendix C summarizes the individual task statements which comprise the FY 1993 Technology Development Program.

  20. Training in Environmental Analyses for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, R W; Gaffney, A M; Hutcheon, N A; Kersting, A B

    2009-05-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Responding to recommendations of the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a new course, Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards, is being offered as a summer internship opportunity at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first students completed the 8 week program during the summer of 2008. Interns are given training in the analysis of bulk environmental samples for safeguards through hands-on experience working in a clean laboratory, purifying U and Pu from bulk environmental samples, and measuring U and Pu isotope ratios by multi-collector ICP mass spectrometry. A series of lectures by invited safeguards and non-proliferation experts gives the students a broad picture of the safeguards work of the IAEA. At the end of the course, the students prepare a poster of their work to showcase at LLNL's summer student poster symposium. Both undergraduate and graduate students are recruited and hired as paid interns under the aegis of the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute in the Physical and Life Sciences Directorate at LLNL. This training course seeks to introduce students to analytical and interpretive skill-sets that are not generally taught at universities, and to encourage them to pursue careers with the IAEA.

  1. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill; William Charlton; Robert Bean

    2008-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of “non-traditional” operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes.

  2. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  3. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL; Howell, John [University of Glasgow

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF{sub 6} feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load cell data; (8) hardware and software implementation for process load cell data collection; (9) costs associated with unattended monitoring of load cells (for both operator and inspector) weighed against the potential benefits of having access to such data; (10) results from field tests of load cell data collection systems in operating facilities; and (11) use of unattended load cell data to increase efficiency of on-site inspection schedules and activities.

  4. Evaluating alternative responses to safeguards alarms

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1982-04-15T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alarms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to have stolen special nuclear material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error - and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms.

  5. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

    1981-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility.

  6. In-Born Radio Frequency Identification Devices for Safeguards Use at Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ward,R.; Rosenthal,M.

    2009-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

    Global expansion of nuclear power has made the need for improved safeguards measures at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) imperative. One technology under consideration for safeguards applications is Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). RFIDs have the potential to increase IAEA inspector"s efficiency and effectiveness either by reducing the number of inspection visits necessary or by reducing inspection effort at those visits. This study assesses the use of RFIDs as an integral component of the "Option 4" safeguards approach developed by Bruce Moran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for a model GCEP [1]. A previous analysis of RFIDs was conducted by Jae Jo, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), which evaluated the effectiveness of an RFID tag applied by the facility operator [2]. This paper presents a similar evaluation carried out in the framework of Jo’s paper, but it is predicated on the assumption that the RFID tag is applied by the manufacturer at the birth of the cylinder, rather than by the operator. Relevant diversion scenarios are examined to determine if RFIDs increase the effectiveness and/ or efficiency of safeguards in these scenarios. Conclusions on the benefits offered to inspectors by using in-born RFID tagging are presented.

  7. The evolution of information-driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Budlong-sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-10-14T23:59:59.000Z

    From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

  8. Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes program planning and management requirements for the Department’s Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program. Change 2 is a revision to Section M of both the Manual and the CRD to realign the process for establishing deviations from DOE directives containing safeguards and security requirements to reflect established Departmental policy as set forth in DOE O 251.1C. Original publication, 8-26-05; Chg 1, 3-7-06. Canceled by DOE O 470.4B

  9. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    N. S. Bowden

    2008-09-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore offer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several efforts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  10. Personal views on integrated safeguards and the status of safeguards R&D in the united states.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J. W. (James W.)

    2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nearly one year ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards .' This important document, which was the product of extensive efforts by the Secretariat, the Director General's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), and outside experts over a number of years, provides a basis for discussions of proposed approaches to integrated safeguards . I will refer to this framework paper to share with you my personal views of integrated safeguards .

  11. Digital Games and Biodiversity Conservation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sandbrook, Chris; Adams, William M.; Monteferri, Bruno

    2014-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

    for mobile devices such as Endomondo), or the virtual world (e.g. the ability to „like? material on Facebook, creating a competitive dynamic and encouraging further engagement). 3. Digital games and the conservation of biodiversity This article... ConservationPark, a Facebook game, claims to support conservation, but gives no details of what proportion of in-game purchases are donated, or to which organisations. 3.2.3 Games for Conservation Research, Monitoring and Planning The use of games...

  12. The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sonnier, C.S. [Jupiter Corp., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1998-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data.

  13. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  14. Evaluating safeguard effectiveness against violent insiders

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Fortney, D.S.

    1990-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The threat posed by a violent insiders presents a major challenge to safeguards managers. These insiders, in addition to their ability to exploit their special authorities, access, and knowledge of facility operations and safeguards, could use violence to defeat safeguards components and personnel. In protecting against theft of special nuclear material, facilities have emphasized the use of perimeter protection and physical barriers to protect against attacks by an outsider adversary group. Recently emphasis has begun to shift toward the implementation of hardware and procedural measures to protect against nonviolent insiders. Approaches are also needed to help assess the effectiveness of protection against those insiders who are willing to use violence. In this paper we describe an approach we're developing for dealing with violent insiders. We begin by categorizing insiders according to whether they are active or passive, rational or irrational, and whether they are willing to use force against safeguards components or coworkers. We define characteristics of each category, and describe the extent to which each category is adequately modelled by existing evaluation tools. We also discuss several modelling issues posed by active insiders, including: entry of contraband; reluctance to use violence; neutralization of insiders; and the ability to switch modes of attack between force, stealth, and deceit. 5 refs., 2 figs.

  15. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  16. IBM Software Solution Brief Safeguarding the cloud

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    IBM Software Solution Brief Safeguarding the cloud with IBM Security solutions Maintain visibility and control with proven security solutions for public, private and hybrid clouds Highlights Address cloud internal and external users, data, applications and workloads as they move to and from the cloud Regain

  17. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  18. Biodiversity Corridors in Alamo Creek, Vacaville, California

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Urrechaga, Jose; Wei, Xinghan

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Horn, Oct, 2003 4.   Alamo Creek final report, 2005 5.  Biodiversity Corridors in Alamo Creek, Vacaville, Californiabiodiversity corridors along the creek in the city and uses

  19. Measuring uncertainty in estimates of biodiversity loss: The example of biodiversity intactness variance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Jackson, Robert B.

    to accompany the recently developed biodiversity intactness index (BII) (Scholes and Biggs [Scholes, R.J., Biggs, R., 2005. A biodiversity intact- ness index. Nature 434, 45­49]). The BII is based on estimates and Cooper, 2006). To help meet this need, Scholes and Biggs (2005) developed the biodiversity intactness

  20. The US Support Program Assistance to the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis 2008

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tackentien,J.

    2008-06-12T23:59:59.000Z

    One of the United States Support Program's (USSP) priorities for 2008 is to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) development of an integrated and efficient safeguards information infrastructure, including reliable and maintainable information systems, and effective tools and resources to collect and analyze safeguards-relevant information. The USSP has provided funding in support of this priority for the ISIS Re-engineering Project (IRP), and for human resources support to the design and definition of the enhanced information analysis architecture project (nVision). Assistance for several other information technology efforts is provided. This paper will report on the various ongoing support measures undertaken by the USSP to support the IAEA's information technology enhancements and will provide some insights into activities that the USSP may support in the future.

  1. The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schanfein, Mark J; Gouveia, Fernando S

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls.

  2. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coles, Garill A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-11-09T23:59:59.000Z

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  3. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coles, Garill A.; Hockert, John; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2013-01-26T23:59:59.000Z

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  4. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10T23:59:59.000Z

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied to facility modifications or new designs • Modifications of the design that could mitigate a potential safeguards issue or facilitate a more efficient application of the safeguards approach • Possible innovative ideas for more efficient application of safeguards • The potential for changes in elements of the safeguard approach that may be required by IAEA as a result of facility design features and characteristics • Other potential concerns These issues will then be presented to the IAEA and the state regulator to be resolved in a timely manner, ensuring that the planned safeguards approach is acceptable and compatible with the facility design. The proposed approach should be validated by application to suitable facilities to assess its utility, comprehensiveness, and cost-effectiveness. The approach and example application should also be reviewed by industry to confirm the conclusions reached in the DOE review.

  5. The new geospatial tools: global transparency enhancing safeguards verification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pabian, Frank Vincent [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-09-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper focuses on the importance and potential role of the new, freely available, geospatial tools for enhancing IAEA safeguards and how, together with commercial satellite imagery, they can be used to promote 'all-source synergy'. As additional 'open sources', these new geospatial tools have heralded a new era of 'global transparency' and they can be used to substantially augment existing information-driven safeguards gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection of undeclared facilities, as well as support ongoing monitoring and verification of various treaty (e.g., NPT, FMCT) relevant activities and programs. As an illustration of how these new geospatial tools may be applied, an original exemplar case study provides how it is possible to derive value-added follow-up information on some recent public media reporting of a former clandestine underground plutonium production complex (now being converted to a 'Tourist Attraction' given the site's abandonment by China in the early 1980s). That open source media reporting, when combined with subsequent commentary found in various Internet-based Blogs and Wikis, led to independent verification of the reporting with additional ground truth via 'crowdsourcing' (tourist photos as found on 'social networking' venues like Google Earth's Panoramio layer and Twitter). Confirmation of the precise geospatial location of the site (along with a more complete facility characterization incorporating 3-D Modeling and visualization) was only made possible following the acquisition of higher resolution commercial satellite imagery that could be correlated with the reporting, ground photos, and an interior diagram, through original imagery analysis of the overhead imagery.

  6. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  7. International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zack, N.R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Safeguards Systems Group; Crawford, D.W. [USDOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Washington, DC (United States)

    1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies.

  8. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  9. Next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI) program plan for safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lockwood, Dunbar [DOE/NA-243

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is defined as the incorporation of safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign the facility at a later date, or retrofit the completed facility. Not only can SBD avoid the need for redesign or retrofit, but consideration of safeguards features early in the facility design effort can provide for a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A program has been initiated by the United States Department of Energy during the past several years to develop, demonstrate and institutionalization SBD. This plan has been developed in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA while taking into account their achievements and future plans. The United States SBD program is focused on (1) identification of best practices that satisfy existing safeguards requirements, (2) identification of advanced concepts where best practices can be improved, and (3) institutionalizing SBD by gaining its acceptance as a global norm for the design of new nuclear facilities. SBD guidance documents are being prepared as an aid to industry for their design activities, to describe the relationship between requirements, best practices, and advanced concepts. SBD 'lessons learned' studies have been conducted to help identify the existing best practices and potential areas for improvement. Finally, acceptance as a global norm is being pursued by way of international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example by way of its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States.

  10. SRS delayed neutron instruments for safeguards measurements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Studley, R.V. [Westinghouse SRC, Aiken, SC (United States)

    1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Six analytical systems measuring delayed neutrons have been used for safeguards measurements at the Savannah River Site (SRS). A predecessor, the 252Cf Activation Analysis Facility installed at the Savannah River Technology Center (formally SR Laboratory) has been used since 1974 to analyze small samples, measuring both delayed neutrons and gammas. The six shufflers, plus one currently being fabricated, were developed, designed and fabricated by the LANL N-1 group. These shufflers have provided safeguards measurements of product (2 each), in-process scrap (2 each plus a conceptual replacement) and process waste (2 each plus one being fabricated). One shuffler for scrap assay was the first shuffler to be installed (1978) in a process. Another (waste) was the first installed in a process capable of assaying barrels. A third (waste) is the first pass-through model and a fourth (product) is the most precise ({+-}.12%) and accurate NDA instrument yet produced.

  11. Science and Technology Challenges for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mark Schanfein

    2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The science and technology challenges for international safeguards range from cutting edge physics needs to practical technology solutions for high volume data handling and analysis issues. This paper will take a narrow look at some of the predominant challenges, which include those at high throughput commercial facilities and those in the detection of undeclared facilities. It is hoped that by highlighting these areas it can encourage a concerted effort by scientific institutions and industry to provide robust cost-effective solutions.

  12. Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert J. Goldston and Alexander Glaser

    2012-08-10T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

  13. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

  14. Innovative cement helps DOE safeguard nuclear facilities | Argonne...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Innovative cement helps DOE safeguard nuclear facilities By Jared Sagoff * April 25, 2008 Tweet EmailPrint ARGONNE, Ill. - When Argonne materials scientists Arun Wagh and Dileep...

  15. Safeguards and Security for Program and Project Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-08-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Guide provides a methodology for implementing the safeguards and security requirements of DOE O 413.3B. Cancels DOE G 413.3-3.

  16. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  17. FAQS Reference Guide – Safeguards and Security General Technical Base

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This reference guide addresses the competency statements in the July 2009 edition of DOE-STD-1123-2009, Safeguards and Security General Technical Base Qualification Standard.

  18. Safeguards and Security Oversight and Assessments Implementation Guide

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-12-21T23:59:59.000Z

    This Guide identifies acceptable methods for implementing the safeguards and security provisions of DOE O 226.1A. Canceled by DOE N 251.80.

  19. Plutonium finishing plant safeguards and security systems replacement study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Klear, P.F.; Humphrys, K.L.

    1994-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides the preferred alternatives for the replacement of the Safeguards and Security systems located at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant.

  20. FAQS Job Task Analyses - Safeguards and Security General Technical...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Base More Documents & Publications FAQS Qualification Card - Safeguards and Security General Technical Base FAQS Job Task Analyses - General Technical Base FAQS Qualification Card...

  1. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  2. Status of Safeguards and Separations Model Development at Plant and Molecular Levels

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    de Almeida, Valmor F [ORNL; Hay, Benjamin [ORNL; DePaoli, David W [ORNL

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A primary goal of the Safeguards and Separations IPSC effort is the development of process modeling tools that allow dynamic simulations of separations plant operations under various configurations and conditions, and integration of relevant safeguards analyses. A requirement of the effort is to develop codes on modern, expandable architectures, with flexibility to explore and evaluate a wide range of process options. During FY09, efforts at ORNL have been focused on two priority tasks toward achieving the IPSC goal: (1) a top-down exploration of architecture - Subtask 1: Explore framework for code development and integration for plant-level simulation; and (2) a bottom-up fundamental modeling effort - Subtask 2: Development of molecular-level agent design code. Subtask 1 is important because definition and development of architecture is a key issue for the overall effort, as selection of an overall approach and code/data requirements is a necessary first step in the organization, design and development of separations and safeguards codes that will be incorporated. The agent design effort of Subtask 2 is a molecular-level modeling effort that has a direct impact on a near-term issue of the Separations and Waste Forms Campaign. A current focus of experimental efforts is the development of robust agents and processes for separation of Am/Cm. Development of enhanced agent-design codes will greatly accelerate discovery and experimental testing.

  3. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.

  4. "Ecosystem Services, Biodiversity and Poverty Reduction

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    "Ecosystem Services, Biodiversity and Poverty Reduction: Is conservation the answer?" Paul van for the foreseeable future. #12;John Beddington's "Perfect Storm" Population Increase Poverty Reduction Food Security Globalisation Climate Change Health Water Security Poverty Alleviation Finance Urbanisation Population Energy

  5. Patent Law, HIPPO, and the Biodiversity Crisis

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Torrance, Andrew W.

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    the phenomena largely responsible for the current mass extinction event, and patent law offers valuable assistance in combating each one. Though it cannot offer a complete solution to the biodiversity crisis, the patent system can offer powerful tools to help...

  6. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04T23:59:59.000Z

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment was performed in September 2009 to test and demonstrate the applicability of the method to the quantitative measurement of an isotope of interest embedded in a thick target. The experiment, data analysis, and results are described in Section 4. The broad goal of our NRF studies is to assess the potential of the technique in safeguards applications. Three examples are analyzed in Section 5: the isotopic assay of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), the measurement of {sup 235}U enrichment in UF{sub 6} cylinders, and the determination of {sup 239}Pu in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The study of NRF for the assay of SNF assemblies was supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of the U.S. Department of Energy as part of a large multi-lab/university effort to quantify the plutonium (Pu) mass in spent nuclear fuel assemblies and to detect the diversion of pins with non-destructive assay (NDA) methods. NRF is one of 14 NDA techniques being researched. The methodology for performing and analyzing quantitative NRF measurements was developed for determining Pu mass in SNF and is extensively discussed in this report. The same methodology was applied to the assessment of NRF for the measurement of {sup 235}U enrichment and the determination of {sup 239}Pu in MOX fuel. The analysis centers on determining suitable NRF measurement methods, measurement capabilities that could be realized with currently available instrumentation, and photon source and detector requirements for achieving useful NDA capabilities.

  7. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D. [Sandia National Laboratories, PO Box 5800 MS 0747, Albuquerque, NM 87185 (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

  8. Secret Objective Standoff: International Safeguards Educational Exercise

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Okowita, Samantha L [ORNL

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The International Safeguards Regime, being so multi-faceted, can be overwhelming to those first introduced to its many components. The organizers and lecturers of workshops and courses on nonproliferation often provide a series of independent lectures and must somehow demonstrate the cohesive and effective nature of the system. An exercise titled The Secret Objective Standoff was developed to complement lectures with hands-on learning to assist participants in bringing all the many components (IAEA agreements, export controls, treaty obligations, international diplomacy, etc.) of the International Safeguards Regime together. This exercise divides participants into teams that are assigned the role of either a country or the IAEA and asks that they fully immerse themselves in their roles. The teams are then randomly assigned three unique and secret objectives that are intended to represent realistic and current geopolitical scenarios. Through construction, trading, or hoarding of four resources (experts, technology, money, and uranium), the teams have a finite number of turns to accomplish their objectives. Each turn has three phases random dispersal of resources, a timed discussion where teams can coordinate and strategize with others, and an action phase. During the action phase, teams inform the moderator individually and secretly what they will be doing that turn. The exercise has been tested twice with Oak Ridge National Laboratory personnel, and has been conducted with outside participants twice, in each case the experience was well received by both participants and instructors. This exercise provides instructors the ability to modify the exercise before or during game play to best fit their educational goals. By offering a range of experiences, from an in-depth look at specific components to a generalized overview, this exercise is an effective tool in helping participants achieve a full understanding the International Safeguards Regime.

  9. Safeguarding Truck-Shipped Wholesale and Retail Fuels (STSWRF)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Safeguarding Truck-Shipped Wholesale and Retail Fuels (STSWRF) Oak Ridge National Laboratory at the wholesaler/distributor level or below. This presents additional challenges in tracking untaxed fuel after approved ORNL's plan to conduct a Phase II Pilot Test titled Safeguarding Truck-Shipped Wholesale

  10. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shipley, J.P. (comp.)

    1982-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  11. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  12. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  13. Safeguards and Security Systems | ornl.gov

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's PossibleRadiation Protection245C Unlimited ReleaseWelcome ton nSafeguards and Security Systems

  14. International Nuclear Safeguards | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated Codes | National NuclearInterlibrary LoanSafeguards | National Nuclear

  15. Technology transfer significance of the International Safeguards Project Office

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Marcuse, W.; Waligura, A.J.

    1988-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are of major importance to the non-proliferation objectives of the United States of America and other nations of the world. Assurance of safeguards effectiveness is mandatory to continued peaceful use of nuclear power. To enhance the ability of the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively, and to ensure that the IAEA does not lack technical assistance in critical areas, the US Congress has made available a special authorization for a Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). This substantial program of technology transfer was initiated in 1976. The United States Departments of State and Energy, the Arms control and Disarmament Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have each accepted responsibility for parts of the Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards. Funding is provided by state through the Foreign Assistance Act. This report provides a discussion of this program.

  16. Organizational Culture, 3S, and Safeguards by Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-01-31T23:59:59.000Z

    While Safety and Security Culture are well socialized among nuclear facility designers, the concept of safeguards culture is less well defined. One area where safeguards culture may play a helpful role is in the area of Safeguards by Design. This paper will include a theoretical discussion of organizational culture, leading with safety culture and security culture that are well known, and positing that there may be room to think about safeguards culture along with the others. It will also examine the utility of the 3S concept and how this concept has been used in training for newcomer states. These will lead into a discussion of how the addition of safeguards to the mix of safety by design and security by design can be valuable, particularly as it is socialized to newcomer states.

  17. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1987-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  18. Electrochemically Modulated Separation for Plutonium Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pratt, Sandra H.; Breshears, Andrew T.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Accurate and timely analysis of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is critical in nuclear safeguards for detection of both protracted and rapid plutonium diversions. Gamma spectroscopy is a viable method for accurate and timely measurements of plutonium provided that the plutonium is well separated from the interfering fission and activation products present in spent nuclear fuel. Electrochemically modulated separation (EMS) is a method that has been used successfully to isolate picogram amounts of Pu from nitric acid matrices. With EMS, Pu adsorption may be turned "on" and "off" depending on the applied voltage, allowing for collection and stripping of Pu without the addition of chemical reagents. In this work, we have scaled up the EMS process to isolate microgram quantities of Pu from matrices encountered in spent nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Several challenges have been addressed including surface area limitations, radiolysis effects, electrochemical cell performance stability, and chemical interferences. After these challenges were resolved, 6 µg Pu was deposited in the electrochemical cell with approximately an 800-fold reduction of fission and activation product levels from a spent nuclear fuel sample. Modeling showed that these levels of Pu collection and interference reduction may not be sufficient for Pu detection by gamma spectroscopy. The main remaining challenges are to achieve a more complete Pu isolation and to deposit larger quantities of Pu for successful gamma analysis of Pu. If gamma analyses of Pu are successful, EMS will allow for accurate and timely on-site analysis for enhanced Pu safeguards.

  19. Northwest Habitat Institute Integrated Habitat and Biodiversity Information SystemIntegrated Habitat and Biodiversity Information System

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    on Geospatial Information Technologies at the National Academy of Sciences; Lead for the Spatial ApplicationNorthwest Habitat Institute Integrated Habitat and Biodiversity Information SystemIntegrated Habitat and Biodiversity Information System (IBIS) for the Columbia River Basin(IBIS) for the Columbia

  20. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Long, Jon D. [Y-12 National Security Complex] [Y-12 National Security Complex; McGinnis, Brent R [ORNL] [ORNL; Morgan, James B [ORNL] [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL] [ORNL; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA] [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA; Shipwash, Jacqueline L [ORNL] [ORNL

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working Group. The working group participants were tasked with providing recommendations for facility operators and designers, while promoting the IAEA's objectives of: (1) avoiding costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear facilities and (2) providing for more effective and efficient implementation of international safeguards.

  1. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  2. Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear meterial (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. The method is used to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards in both timely detection (in time to prevent theft) and late detection (after-the-fact). The method considers the various types of potential insider adversaries working alone or in collusion with other insiders. The approach can be used for a wide variety of facilities with various quantities and forms of SNM. An Evaluation Workbook provides documentation of the baseline assessment; this simplifies subsequent on-site appraisals. Quantitative evaluation is facilitated by an accompanying computer program. The method significantly increases an evaluation team's on-site analytical capabilities, thereby producing a more thorough and accurate safeguards evaluation.

  3. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad range of subjects, including nuclear material accountancy principles, legal definitions and the regulatory base and inspection tools and techniques. This 60% core part is given by representatives from regulatory bodies (The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, Directorate General for Nuclear Energy and Transport), industry (AREVA, British Nuclear Group), and research (Stockholm University, Hamburg University, Joint Research Centre-Institute of Transuranic Elements, and Joint Research Centre-Institute for the Protection of the Citizen). The remaining part is completed with topical lectures addressed by invited lecturers, such as from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the IAEA addressing topics of physical protection, illicit trafficking, the Iraq case study, exercises, including satellite imagery interpretation etc. With this structure of a stable core plus a variable set of invited lectures, the course will remain sustainable and up-to-date. A syllabus provides the students a homogeneous set of information material in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation matters at the European and international level. In this way, the ESARDA TKMWG aims to contribute to a two-fold scientific-technical and political-juridical education and training.

  4. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  5. Safeguards Approaches for Black Box Processes or Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Diaz-Marcano, Helly; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Miller, Erin; Wylie, Joann

    2013-09-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this study is to determine whether a safeguards approach can be developed for “black box” processes or facilities. These are facilities where a State or operator may limit IAEA access to specific processes or portions of a facility; in other cases, the IAEA may be prohibited access to the entire facility. The determination of whether a black box process or facility is safeguardable is dependent upon the details of the process type, design, and layout; the specific limitations on inspector access; and the restrictions placed upon the design information that can be provided to the IAEA. This analysis identified the necessary conditions for safeguardability of black box processes and facilities.

  6. Process monitoring in international safeguards for reprocessing plants: A demonstration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In the period 1985--1987, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory investigated the possible role of process monitoring for international safeguards applications in fuel reprocessing plants. This activity was conducted under Task C.59, ''Review of Process Monitoring Safeguards Technology for Reprocessing Facilities'' of the US program of Technical Assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards program. The final phase was a demonstration of process monitoring applied in a prototypical reprocessing plant test facility at ORNL. This report documents the demonstration and test results. 35 figs.

  7. Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials.

  8. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper S. E.

    2014-10-10T23:59:59.000Z

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  9. Apparatus for safeguarding a radiological source

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Bzorgi, Fariborz M

    2014-10-07T23:59:59.000Z

    A tamper detector is provided for safeguarding a radiological source that is moved into and out of a storage location through an access porthole for storage and use. The radiological source is presumed to have an associated shipping container approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transporting the radiological source. The tamper detector typically includes a network of sealed tubing that spans at least a portion of the access porthole. There is an opening in the network of sealed tubing that is large enough for passage therethrough of the radiological source and small enough to prevent passage therethrough of the associated shipping cask. Generally a gas source connector is provided for establishing a gas pressure in the network of sealed tubing, and a pressure drop sensor is provided for detecting a drop in the gas pressure below a preset value.

  10. Environmental monitoring for nuclear safeguards. Background paper

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    To assure that states are not violating their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must verify that states do not possess convert nuclear facilities-a mission that prior to the 1991 Gulf War, it had neither the political backing nor the resources to conduct. The IAEA recognizes the importance of this new mission and is in the process of assuming it. One of the tools it is exploring to provide some indication of the presence of secret, or undeclared, nuclear activities and facilities is environmental monitoring. Modern sampling and analysis technologies provide powerful tools to detect the presence of characteristic substances that are likely to be emitted by such illicit activities. This background paper examines the prospects for such technologies to improve nuclear safeguards. It concludes that environmental monitoring can greatly increase the ability to detect undeclared activity at declared, or known, sites, and it can significantly increase the chances of detecting and locating undeclared sites.

  11. Phoebe Barnard & Marienne de Villiers Biodiversity early warning systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    de Villiers, Marienne

    edited by Phoebe Barnard & Marienne de Villiers Biodiversity early warning systems South African-0-620-51837-6 Recommended citation: Barnard, P. & de Villiers, M. (eds). 2012. Biodiversity early warning systems: South

  12. Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning: Maintaining Natural Life Support Processes

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Minnesota, University of

    Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning: Maintaining Natural Life Support Processes Publishedbythe. ONeill, Harold A. Mooney, Osvaldo E. Sala, Amy J. Symstad, and David Tilman Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning: Maintaining Natural Life Support Processes Critical processes at the ecosystem level influence

  13. EDIT's Taxonomy and Biodiversity Information Services for Biogeographers

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mergen, Patricia; Roberts, Dave; Roca, Pere; Lancelot, Gaël

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    V.S. ( 2008) Getting Taxonomy onto the Web. The Systematist,ISSN 1948-6596 EDIT's Taxonomy and Biodiversity Informationfor the management of taxonomy and biodiversity data, we

  14. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17T23:59:59.000Z

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. Other university/organizations represented: University of California in LA, Stanford University, and the IAEA. Four of the students that completed this intensive course participated in a 2-month internship at LLNL. The conclusions of the two pilot courses and internships was a NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The Poster sessions were designed to provide a forum for sharing the results of their summer projects and providing experience in presenting their work to a varied audience of students, faculty and laboratory staff. The success of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of their two pilot efforts in the coming years.

  15. Safeguards for Uranium Extraction (UREX) +1a Process

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Feener, Jessica S.

    2011-08-08T23:59:59.000Z

    of nuclear material accountancy (MA), containment and surveillance (C/S) and solution monitoring (SM). Facility information was developed for a hypothesized UREX+1a plant with a throughput of 1000 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM) per year. Safeguard goals...

  16. Advanced integrated safeguards using front-end-triggering devices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Howell, J.A.; Whitty, W.J.

    1995-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report addresses potential uses of front-end-triggering devices for enhanced safeguards. Such systems incorporate video surveillance as well as radiation and other sensors. Also covered in the report are integration issues and analysis techniques.

  17. advanced safeguards approaches: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    to the international community as a possible means to shorten that state?s nuclear latency. If a safeguards approach could be developed for a fuel cycle featuring one of...

  18. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burr, Thomas L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hamada, Michael S. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-24T23:59:59.000Z

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  19. Influence of safeguards and fire protection on criticality safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Six, D E

    1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    There are several positive influences of safeguards and fire protection on criticality safety. Experts in each discipline must be aware of regulations and requirements of the others and work together to ensure a fault-tree design. EG and G Idaho, Inc., routinely uses an Occupancy-Use Readiness Manual to consider all aspects of criticality safety, fire protection, and safeguards. The use of the analytical tree is described.

  20. The Big Questions For Biodiversity Informatics

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Peterson, A. Townsend; Knapp, Sandra; Guralnick, Robert P.; Soberó n, Jorge; Holder, Mark T.

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    .H., FERRIER, S., HUETTMAN, F., MORITZ, C. & PETERSON, A.T. 2004. New developments in museum-based informatics and applications in biodiversity analysis. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 19, 497–503. GRAYMAN, W.M., MALES, R.M., GATES, W.E. & HADDER, A.W. 1975...

  1. Understanding the Effects of Marine Biodiversity

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Stachowicz, Jay

    and negative effects on herbivores. Recognizing that marine and terrestrial approaches to understandingUnderstanding the Effects of Marine Biodiversity on Communities and Ecosystems John J. Stachowicz,1 There is growing interest in the effects of changing marine biodi- versity on a variety of community properties

  2. BIODIVERSITY Accounting for tree line shift, glacier

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Zimmermann, Niklaus E.

    BIODIVERSITY RESEARCH Accounting for tree line shift, glacier retreat and primary succession land cover (tree line shift, glacier retreat and primary succession) into species distribution model. Methods We fit linear mixed effects (LME) models to historical changes in forest and glacier cover

  3. BIODIVERSITY The contribution of newly established

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bernatchez, Louis

    BIODIVERSITY RESEARCH The contribution of newly established populations to the dynamics of range River and estuary. We first determined genetic origins among several potential wild and cultured source, in Lake Memphremagog. Populations from the Maritime provinces and domestic strains do not contribute

  4. BIODIVERSITY The geography of climate change

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kraft, Nathan

    BIODIVERSITY REVIEW The geography of climate change: implications for conservation biogeography D. J. B. Kraft1 INTRODUCTION It is widely recognized that climate change poses a grave threat., 2007). The impacts of climate change are broadly detectable in many taxa, including shifts in phenology

  5. Termination of Safeguards on ULWBR Material

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ivan R. Thomas; Ernest L. Laible

    2008-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, has approved the disposition of 31 metric tons of Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (ULWBR) material in canisters stored within dry wells of the Underground Fuel Storage Facility at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). This unirradiated material consists primarily of ceramic pellets of thorium oxide in stainless steel cladding, but it also contains 300 kilograms of uranium that is 98 wt% U-233. The ULWBR material was not processed at the INTEC because it was incompatible with prior chemical separation schemes. Other economical recovery options have not been identified, and expressions of interest for consolidating the material with existing projects at other DOE sites have not been received. The U-233 could be used for producing the medical isotope Actinium-225, but the proof-of-principle demonstration and follow-on pilot program have not been developed to the point of requiring production quantities of U-233. Consequently, the selected disposition of the ULWBR material was burial as Low Level Waste at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which required terminating safeguards controls for the contained Category II quantity of Attractiveness Level D special nuclear material (SNM). The requested termination followed the twelve point evaluation criteria of the Historical Defense Program Discard Guidance and included a security analysis for evaluating the risks of theft, diversion, and radiological sabotage associated with the material. Continuity of knowledge in the book inventory was assured by documenting that the original shipper’s measurements accurately reflected the quantities of materials received and that the ULWBR materials had remained under adequate physical protection and had been subject to periodic physical inventories. The method selected for substantiating the book values as the basis for terminating safeguards was the nondestructive assay used during physical inventories. Shipping arrangements included refurbishing a licensed cask to be reused over the duration of the termination process. An accompanying batching plan and shipping schedule were developed to accommodate multiple commercial shipments of Category III quantities of SNM in the selected cask, such that all canisters would be received at NTS prior to the expiration of the nonrenewable cask license.

  6. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTEGRATION WITH SAFETY ANALYSIS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hearn, J; James Lightner, J

    2007-04-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this paper is to share the Savannah River Site lessons learned on Safeguards and Security (S&S) program integration with K-Area Complex (KAC) safety basis. The KAC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), is managed by the Washington Savannah River Company (WSRC), and the S&S program, managed by Wackenhut Services, Incorporated--Savannah River Site (WSI-SRS). WSRC and WSI-SRS developed a contractual arrangement to recognize WSI-SRS requirements in the KAC safety analysis. Design Basis Threat 2003 (DBT03) security upgrades required physical modifications and operational changes which included the availability of weapons which could potentially impact the facility safety analysis. The KAC DSA did not previously require explicit linkage to the S&S program to satisfy the safety analysis. WSI-SRS have contractual requirements with the Department of Energy (DOE) which are separate from WSRC contract requirements. The lessons learned will include a discussion on planning, analysis, approval of the controls and implementation issues.

  7. LABORATORY DEMONSTRATION OF A MULTISENSOR UNATTENDED CYLINDER VERIFICATION STATION FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Goodman, David I [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Rowland, Kelly L [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States); Smith, Sheriden [Colorado State Univ., Fort Collins, CO (United States); Miller, Karen A. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Flynn, Eric B. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-01-10T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear materials, and safeguarding uranium enrichment plants is especially important in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s proposed Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS) for UF6 cylinder verification would combine the operator’s accountancy scale with a nondestructive assay system such as the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM) and cylinder identification and surveillance systems. In this project, we built a laboratory-scale UCVS and demonstrated its capabilities using mock UF6 cylinders. We developed a signal processing algorithm to automate the data collection and processing from four continuous, unattended sensors. The laboratory demonstration of the system showed that the software could successfully identify cylinders, snip sensor data at the appropriate points in time, determine the relevant characteristics of the cylinder contents, check for consistency among sensors, and output the cylinder data to a file. This paper describes the equipment, algorithm and software development, laboratory demonstration, and recommendations for a full-scale UCVS.

  8. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ehinger, Michael H [ORNL; Johnson, Shirley [Tucker Creek Consulting

    2010-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  9. Safeguards-by-Design: An Element of 3S Integration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    R. S. Bean; T. A. Bjornard; D. J. Hebdich

    2009-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2008, the “20/20 Vision for the Future” background report by the IAEA Director General identified the possibility of integrating certain activities related to safeguards, safety, and security. Later in the year, the independent Commission report prepared at the request of the IAEA Director General noted that the Agency’s roles in nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (3S) complement and can mutually reinforce each other. Safeguards-by-design (SBD) is a practical measure that strengthens 3S integration, especially for the stage of nuclear facility design and construction, but also with ramifications for other stages of the facility life-cycle. This paper describes the SBD concept, with examples for diverse regulatory environments, being developed in the U.S under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. This is compared with related international SBD work performed in the recent IAEA workshop on “Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards”. Potential future directions for further development of SBD and its integration within 3S are identified.

  10. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Durst, Philip C.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Boyer, Brian; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

    This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line. The most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, referred to as “MOX”. However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and transmuted through irradiation in the ABR. A third and final report in this series will evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of reference. The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF.

  11. Task team approach to safeguards and security designs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zack, N.R. (Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)); Wilkey, D.D. (USDOE Idaho Operations Office, Idaho Falls, ID (United States))

    1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 1987, a US Department of Energy (DOE) supported task team was organized at the request of the DOE Idaho Field Office (DOE-ID) to provide support for safeguards and security (S S) designs of the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) facility. Prior to deferral of the project, the SIS facility was to be constructed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to produce weapons grade plutonium from DOE owned fuel grade plutonium. The task team was assembled to provide the resources necessary to assure that safeguards and security considerations were included as an integral part of the design of the facility, and that SIS designs would take advantage of available technology in the areas of physical security, measurements, accountability, and material and personnel tracking. The task team included personnel from DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE-OSS), DOE-ID, DOE contractors, and the national laboratories providing a wide range of expertise and experience. The team reviewed proposed designs and provided recommendations for safeguards and security features in each stage of the design process. The value of this approach to safeguards and security designs will be discussed with respect to benefits, lessons learned, and recommendations for future applications. 5 refs.

  12. Safeguards and security research and development progress report, October 1993--September 1994

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. [comp.

    1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R&D) program from October 1993 through September 1994. The activities presented in the first part of the report were directed primarily to domestic US safeguards applications and were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy`s Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS, NN-50). The activities described in Part 2, International Safeguards, were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/OACN, NN-40). Part 3 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have other sponsors. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R&D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published or presented in 1994.

  13. An Inspector's Assessment of the New Model Safeguards Approach for Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Curtis, Michael M.

    2007-07-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This conference paper assesses the changes that are being made to the Model Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants.

  14. Ultra-high-resolution alpha spectrometry for nuclear forensics and safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bacrania, Minesh K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croce, Mark [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bond, Evelyn [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Dry, Donald [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Moody, W. Allen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lamont, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rabin, Michael [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rim, Jung [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Audrey [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beall, James [NIST-BOULDER; Bennett, Douglas [NIST-BOULDER; Kotsubo, Vincent [NIST-BOULDER; Horansky, Robert [NIST-BOULDER; Hilton, Gene [NIST-BOULDER; Schmidt, Daniel [NIST-BOULDER; Ullom, Joel [NIST-BOULDER; Cantor, Robin [STAR CRYOELECTRONICS

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    We will present our work on the development of ultra-high-resolution detectors for alpha particle spectrometry. These detectors, based on superconducting transition-edge sensors, offer energy resolution that is five to ten times better than conventional silicon detectors. Using these microcalorimeter detectors, the isotopic composition of mixed-actinide samples can be determined rapidly without the need for actinide separation chemistry to isolate each element, or mass spectrometry to separate isotopic signatures that can not be resolved using traditional alpha spectrometry (e.g. Pu-239/Pu-240, or Pu-238/Am-241). This paper will cover the detector and measurement system, actinide source preparation, and the quantitative isotopic analysis of a number of forensics- and safeguards-relevant radioactive sources.

  15. Export Controls and International Safeguards: Strengthening Nonproliferation through Interdisciplinary Integration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peterson, Danielle J.; Goorevich, Richard; Hooper, Rich; Scheinman, Lawrence; Tape, James W.

    2008-11-03T23:59:59.000Z

    International safeguards and export controls are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of international safeguards and export controls rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.

  16. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Badalamente, R. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Anzelon, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Deland, S. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whiteson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  17. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  18. Integrated safeguards & security for material protection, accounting, and control.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Traditional safeguards and security design for fuel cycle facilities is done separately and after the facility design is near completion. This can result in higher costs due to retrofits and redundant use of data. Future facilities will incorporate safeguards and security early in the design process and integrate the systems to make better use of plant data and strengthen both systems. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integration of materials control and accounting (MC&A) measurements with physical security design for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Locations throughout the plant where data overlap occurs or where MC&A data could be a benefit were identified. This mapping is presented along with the methodology for including the additional data in existing probabilistic assessments to evaluate safeguards and security systems designs.

  19. International Safeguards Technology and Policy Education and Training Pilot Programs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G A; Essner, J T; Dougan, A D; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokava, E; Wehling, F; Martin, J; Charlton, W

    2009-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

    A major focus of the National Nuclear Security Administration-led Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. NNSA launched two pilot programs in 2008 to develop university level courses and internships in association with James, Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU). These pilot efforts involved 44 students in total and were closely linked to hands-on internships at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between TAMU, LANL, and LLNL. The LANL-based coursework was shared with the students undertaking internships at LLNL via video teleconferencing. A weeklong hands-on exercise was also conducted at LANL. A second pilot effort, the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at MIIS in cooperation with LLNL. Speakers from MIIS, LLNL, and other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. The two pilots programs concluded with an NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The value of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of the two programs in the coming years.

  20. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-10-02T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. {open_quotes}Military{close_quotes} refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. {open_quotes}Excess{close_quotes} refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. {open_quotes}Monitoring{close_quotes} is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

  1. Application of the sources code in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beddingfield, D. H. (David H.)

    2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Sources Code System provides a greatly expanded calculational capacity in the field of nuclear safeguards. It is becoming more common that we are called upon to perform assays on materials for which no standards exist. These materials tend to be mixtures of nuclear materials and low-Z compounds (spent fuels in a variety of matrices, in-process compounds such as UF6, MOX with varying water content). We will present soma applications of the Sources Code and discuss the application calculated (a,n) source terms in neutron coincidence counting for nuclear safeguards.

  2. Biodiversity Governance: A Tower of Babel of Scales and Cultures

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Soberon, Jorge; Peterson, A Townsend

    2015-03-12T23:59:59.000Z

    PERSPECTIVE Biodiversity Governance: A Tower of Babel of Scales and Cultures Jorge Soberón*, A. Townsend Peterson Biodiversity Institute and Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, United States...) explicitly mentions as stakeholders: PLOS Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002108 March 12, 2015 1 / 5 a11111 OPEN ACCESS Citation: Soberón J, Peterson AT (2015) Biodiversity Governance: A Tower of Babel of Scales and Cultures. PLoS Biol 13(3): e1002108...

  3. assessing biodiversity management: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    24 25 Next Page Last Page Topic Index 281 Density Management In Pacific Northwest Forests Renewable Energy Websites Summary: lands Emphasis on managing for biodiversity and...

  4. Emerging Biodiversity: Diversification of the Hawaiian Nesosydne planthoppers

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Goodman, Kari Roesch

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    aphid genus Hyalopterus (Hemiptera: Aphididae). Evolution,Biodiversity of Planthoppers (Hemiptera: Delphacidae) on thevs. N. geranii Order Hemiptera Hemiptera Hemiptera Hemiptera

  5. asian biodiversity resources: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    greenhouse Bohanec, Marko 2 Biodiversity impacts ecosystem productivity as much as resources, disturbance, or herbivory Environmental Sciences and Ecology Websites Summary:...

  6. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and participation in facility design options analysis in the conceptual design phase to enhance intrinsic features, among others. The SBD process is unlikely to be broadly applied in the absence of formal requirements to do so, or compelling evidence of its value. Neither exists today. A formal instrument to require the application of SBD is needed and would vary according to both the national and regulatory environment. Several possible approaches to implementation of the requirements within the DOE framework are explored in this report. Finally, there are numerous barriers to the implementation of SBD, including the lack of a strong safeguards culture, intellectual property concerns, the sensitive nature of safeguards information, and the potentially divergent or conflicting interests of participants in the process. In terms of SBD implementation in the United States, there are no commercial nuclear facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Efforts to institutionalize SBD must address these issues. Specific work in FY09 could focus on the following: finalizing the proposed SBD process for use by DOE and performing a pilot application on a DOE project in the planning phase; developing regulatory options for mandating SBD; further development of safeguards-related design guidance, principles and requirements; development of a specific SBD process tailored to the NRC environment; and development of an engagement strategy for the IAEA and other international partners.

  7. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hase, Kevin R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hawkins Erpenbeck, Heather [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

    Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.

  8. Assessing Variation in Wildlife Biodiversity in the Tien Shan Mountains of Kyrgyzstan Using Ancillary

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Schweik, Charles M.

    Assessing Variation in Wildlife Biodiversity in the Tien Shan Mountains of Kyrgyzstan Using of Kyrgyzstan and assessed their usefulness for biodiversity surveys of larger animal species. The study: Camera-trapping; biodiversity; conservation; mammals; protected areas; Tien Shan Mountains; Kyrgyzstan

  9. The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - How It Works

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nock,C.; Hoffheins,B.

    2008-07-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Support Program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to transfer US technology and expertise to assist the IAEA Department of Safeguards because its limited budget and scope would not allow for R&D activities and the procurement of specialized or customized equipment. Over the years, the USSP and the Department of Safeguards have worked together continuously to develop and improve processes for requesting, selecting, and managing projects that support the Safeguards verification mission. This paper will discuss the main USSP processes for accepting and processing Safeguards requests, and managing and reporting task progress.

  10. Relevant Videos: Stoichiometry

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Houston, Paul L.

    #12;2 of 8 Relevant Videos: Stoichiometry Stoichiometry: Limiting Reagent Suspensions, Colloids note that MANY of these Khan chemistry videos contain errors, although the basic premise and overall content is sound. If you find an error in a video, please email me the following information: video title

  11. The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper,S.

    2008-06-09T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.

  12. advanced safeguards technology: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    advanced safeguards technology First Page Previous Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Next Page Last Page Topic Index 1 February 2000 Advanced...

  13. Evaluation of three new technolgies for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stanbro, W.D.; Rodriguez, C.A.; Olinger, C.T.; Cremers, T.L.

    1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Los Alamos National Laboratory is examining a number of promising technologies that could increase the effectiveness and efficiency of international nuclear safeguards. The techniques described in this paper include video image processing, infrared imaging, and acoustic resonance spectroscopy. Each of these techniques offers unique advantages in the implementation of an inspection regime.

  14. Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards: Common technologies and challenges

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards have much in common, including the basic physical phenomena and technologies involved as well as the commitments and challenges posed by expanding nuclear programs in many countries around the world. The unique characteristics of the fission process -- such as prompt and delayed neutron and gamma ray emission -- not only provide the means of sustaining and controlling the fission chain reaction, but also provide unique ''signatures'' that are essential to quantitative measurement and effective safeguarding of key nuclear materials (notably /sup 239/Pu and /sup 235/U) against theft, loss, or diversion. In this paper, we trace briefly the historical emergence of safeguards as an essential component of the expansion of the nuclear enterprise worldwide. We then survey the major categories of passive and active nondestructive assay techniques that are currently in use or under development for rapid, accurate measurement and verification of safe-guarded nuclear materials in the many forms in which they occur throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. 23 refs., 14 figs.

  15. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  16. Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System Reporting and Data Submission

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-02-10T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual provides clear and detailed instructions and procedures for documenting and reporting data submissions for nuclear materials transactions, inventories, and material balances to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Cancels DOE 5633.3B. Canceled by DOE M 474.1-2A.

  17. Process monitoring in support of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.; Kerr, H.T.

    1987-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts touched on various concepts and a few specific applications, but none was comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report develops prototypical process monitoring concepts that can be incorporated into the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) general safeguards approach for fuel reprocessing plants. This effort considers existing approaches, recognizing limitations and needed improvements. Prototypical process monitoring applications are developed and proposed for implementation and demonstration in the Integrated Equipment Test facility, which is located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The specific information needed to accomplish the process monitoring objectives are defined, and the mechanics for obtaining that information are described. Effort is given to the identification and assessment of potential impacts and benefits associated with process monitoring concepts, with particular attention to IAEA, state, and plant operator interests. The historical development of process monitoring is described and the implications of using process monitoring in international safeguards are discussed. Specific process process monitoring applications for demonstration in the IET facility are developed in Sects. 6 through 14. 1 fig.

  18. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  19. Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

  20. A Cost Effective, Integrated and Smart Radioactive Safeguard System 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Singh, Harneet

    2012-02-14T23:59:59.000Z

    consequences. In order to protect this precious resource and ensure its use for the good of mankind, safeguard systems are more important than ever. Current Market solutions are wide ranged but have a large number of disadvantages, some of which include high...

  1. Progress Towards Deployable Antineutrino Detectors for Reactor Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowden, N; Bernstein, A; Dazeley, S; Keefer, G; Reyna, D; Cabrera-Palmer, B; Kiff, S

    2010-04-05T23:59:59.000Z

    Fission reactors emit large numbers of antineutrinos and this flux may be useful for the measurement of two quantities of interest for reactor safeguards: the reactor's power and plutonium inventory throughout its cycle. The high antineutrino flux and relatively low background rates means that simple cubic meter scale detectors at tens of meters standoff can record hundreds or thousands of antineutrino events per day. Such antineutrino detectors would add online, quasi-real-time bulk material accountancy to the set of reactor monitoring tools available to the IAEA and other safeguards agencies with minimal impact on reactor operations. Between 2003 and 2008, our LLNL/SNL collaboration successfully deployed several prototype safeguards detectors at a commercial reactor in order to test both the method and the practicality of its implementation in the field. Partially on the strength of the results obtained from these deployments, an Experts Meeting was convened by the IAEA Novel Technologies Group in 2008 to assess current antineutrino detection technology and examine how it might be incorporated into the safeguards regime. Here we present a summary of our previous deployments and discuss current work that seeks to provide expanded capabilities suggested by the Experts Panel, in particular aboveground detector operation.

  2. Nuclear reactor safeguards and monitoring with antineutrino detectors A. Bernsteina)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gratta, Giorgio

    Nuclear reactor safeguards and monitoring with antineutrino detectors A. Bernsteina) Sandia of nuclear reactor types, including power reactors, research reactors, and plutonium production reactors-understood principles that govern the core's evolution in time, can be used to determine whether the reactor is being

  3. Safeguards Agreement and Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-01-07T23:59:59.000Z

    To ensure that DOE complies with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, the Protocol to the Agreement, and the subsidiary arrangements to the Agreement. Canceled by DOE O 142.2A. Cancels DOE 1270.2B.

  4. China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Paris-Sud XI, Université de

    China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards Patrick A. Messerlin China finds of antidumping measures, but (so far) one of the smallest users of such measures. China's World Trade China's recent antidumping enforcement; how China could minimize its exposure to foreign antidumping

  5. biodiversity biodiversity

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bohanec, Marko

    of the impacts of using GM crops at the field and regional levels. Here we present the so-called "Grignon Model

  6. Remote Sensing for Biodiversity Conservation of the Albertine Rift

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Y.Q. "Yeqiao"

    183 10 Remote Sensing for Biodiversity Conservation of the Albertine Rift in Eastern Africa Samuel 2003). The rapidly developing field of remote sensing has been invaluable to biodiversity conservation distribution depend (Debinski et al. 1999). The field of remote sens- ing complements traditional field

  7. Spatial Modeling of Geographic Patterns in Biodiversity and Biofuel Production

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Spatial Modeling of Geographic Patterns in Biodiversity and Biofuel Production How can the US of biodiversity. The future of the biofuel industry will depend on public investment and trust that industry for increasing biofuel production have already come under fire because of real and perceived threats

  8. Biodiversity Toolkit Why we DON'T DIG PEAT

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Melham, Tom

    Biodiversity Toolkit Peat free Why we DON'T DIG PEAT The collegiate University is working to help the environment and wildlife by phasing out its use of products containing peat, such as compost and soil improver.admin.ox.ac.uk/estates/environment/biodiversity Cut your carbon emissions Wildlife living in peat bogs includes foxes, Irish hares, pygmy shrews, red

  9. Development of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy instrumentatin for safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barefield Il, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Clegg, Samuel M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Le, Loan A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lopez, Leon N [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In September 2006, a Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards was held at IAEA headquarters (HQ). One of the principal recommendations from this meeting was the need to 'pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials.' Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications. This meeting was held at IAEA HQ from July 7-11,2008 and hosted by the Novel Technologies Unit (NTU). The meeting was attended by 12 LIBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. After a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts were in agreement that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. The needs of the IAEA inspectors were grouped in the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activity in a Hot Cell; (3) Verifying status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. Under the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Los Alamos National Laboratory is exploring three potential applications of LIBS for international safeguards. As part of this work, we are developing: (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements like plutonium and uranium; (2) a LIBS system that can be deployed in harsh environments such as gloveboxes and hot cells providing relative compositional analysis of process streams for example ratios like Cm/Pu and Cm/U; and (3) an inspector field deployable system that can be used to analyze the elemental composition of microscopic quantities of samples containing plutonium and uranium. In this paper we will describe our current development and performance testing results both in a fixed lab and measurements in field deployable configurations using LIBS instrumentation developed for applications to international safeguards.

  10. Using Highly Interactive Virtual Environments for Safeguards Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Weil, Bradley S [ORNL] [ORNL; Alcala, Benjamin S [ORNL] [ORNL; Alcala, Scott [ORNL] [ORNL; Eipeldauer, Mary D [ORNL] [ORNL; Weil, Logan B [ORNL] [ORNL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Highly interactive virtual environment (HIVE) is a term that refers to interactive educational simulations, serious games and virtual worlds. Studies indicate that learning with the aid of interactive environments produces better retention and depth of knowledge by promoting improved trainee engagement and understanding. Virtual reality or three dimensional (3D) visualization is often used to promote the understanding of something when personal observation, photographs, drawings, and/or sketches are not possible or available. Subjects and situations, either real or hypothetical, can be developed using a 3D model. Models can be tailored to the audience allowing safeguards and security features to be demonstrated for educational purposes in addition to engineering evaluation and performance analysis. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has begun evaluating the feasibility of HIVEs for improving safeguards activities such as training, mission planning, and evaluating worker task performance. This paper will discuss the development workflow of HIVEs and present some recent examples.

  11. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog. Second edition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Auerbach, C.

    1985-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This catalog contains entries on new developments and on items listed in BNL 51450, which have either been carried over unchanged or been updated. More than 70 entries were deleted because of either obsolescence, insufficient interest in terms of safeguards, or lack of documentable development activities in recent years. Some old listings as well as new material was consolidated into more generic entries. As in the earlier document, the emphasis is on devices and instruments that are either in field use at this time or under active development. A few items such as NDA reference materials, instrument vans and certain shipping containers are included because they are important adjuncts to optimum utilization of safeguards instrumentation. This catalog does not include devices for physical protection. As was the case with its predecessor, most of the material in this catalog originated in the US and Canada; a few contributions came from member states of the European Community.

  12. Coupling GIS and LCA for biodiversity assessments of land use: Part 1: Inventory modeling

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Geyer, Roland; Stoms, David M.; Lindner, Jan P.; Davis, Frank W.; Wittstock, Bastian

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Keywords Biodiversity . Bioethanol . Geographic informationfor producing biofuels: bioethanol and biodiesel. Biomass

  13. Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1994-07-15T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish policy, responsibilities, and authorities for the protection and control of safeguards and security interests. Cancels DOE O 5632.1B, DOE O 5632.2A, DOE O 5632.5, DOE O 5632.6, DOE O 5632.9A, DOE O 5632.11, DOE O 5635.1A, DOE O 5635.2B, DOE O 5635.3. Canceled by DOE O 473.1

  14. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B. (comps.)

    1982-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  15. Safeguards and security issues for the disposition of fissile materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rutherford, D.; Fearey, B. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Moore, L. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy`s Office of Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials, preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), preparing for a record of decision (ROD) regarding this material and conducting other activities. The primary security objectives of this program are to reduce major security risks and strengthen arms reduction and nonproliferation (NP). To help achieve these objectives, a safeguards and security (S&S) team consisting of participants from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established. The S&S activity for this program is a cross-cutting task which addresses all of the FMD program options. It includes both domestic and international safeguards and includes areas such as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will discuss the activities of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) S&S team as well as some specific S&S issues associated with various FMDP options/facilities. Some of the items to be discussed include the threat, S&S requirements, S&S criteria for assessing risk, S&S issues concerning fissile material processing/facilities, and international and domestic safeguards.

  16. Feasibility of x ray fluorescence for spent fuel safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Freeman, Corey Ross [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mozin, Vladimir [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fensin, Michael L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; White, Julia M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croft, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stafford, Alissa [TAMU; Charlton, William [TAMU

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Quantifying the Pu content in spent nuclear fuel is necessary for many reasons, in particular to verify that diversion or other illicit activities have not occurred. Therefore, safeguarding the world's nuclear fuel is paramount to responsible nuclear regulation and public acceptance, but achieving this goal presents many difficulties from both a technical and economic perspective. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of NA-24 is funding a large collaborative effort between multiple laboratories and universities to improve spent nuclear fuel safeguards methods and equipment. This effort involves the current work of modeling several different nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. Several are being researched, because no single NDA technique, in isolation, has the potential to properly characterize fuel assemblies and offer a robust safeguards measure. The insights gained from this research, will be used to down-select from the original set a few of the most promising techniques that complement each other. The goal is to integrate the selected instruments to create an accurate measurement system for fuel verification that is also robust enough to detect diversions. These instruments will be fabricated and tested under realistic conditions. This work examines one of the NDA techniques; the feasibility of using x ray emission peaks from Pu and U to gather information about their relative quantities in the spent fuel. X Ray Fluorescence (XRF), is unique compared to the investigated techniques in that it is the only one able to give the elemental ratio of Pu to U, allowing the possibility of a Pu gram quantity for the assembly to be calculated. XRF also presents many challenges, mainly its low penetration, since the low energy x rays of interest are effectively shielded by the first few millimeters of a fuel pin. This paper will explore the results of Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) transport code calculations of spent fuel x ray peaks. The MCNPX simulations will be benchmarked against measurements taken at Oak Ridge. Analysis of the feasibility of XRFs role in spent nuclear fuel safeguards efforts, particularly in the context of the overall NGSI effort will be discussed.

  17. Evolution, biodiversity, taxonomy FTIR spectroscopy and taxonomic purpose

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Paris-Sud XI, Université de

    Evolution, biodiversity, taxonomy FTIR spectroscopy and taxonomic purpose: Contribution. taxonomy / FTIR spectroscopy / Streptococcus / Lactobacillus Résumé -- Apport de la spectroscopie infrarouge à transformée de Fourier en taxonomie : contribution à la classification de bactéries lactiques

  18. Disentangling Biodiversity and Climatic Determinants of Wood Production

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Paris-Sud XI, Université de

    an important role in carbon sequestration. Methodology/Principal Findings: We tested whether tree wood incorporating the role of biodiversity in management and policy plans for forest carbon sequestration. Citation

  19. REVIEW PAPER Factors and processes affecting plant biodiversity

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Boyer, Edmond

    ecosystem services of grasslands and rangelands is about US$ 232 ha-1 year-1 . Nevertheless, the precise evaluation of biodiversity benefits remains challenging. This issue is due to valuation methods, subjective

  20. The Biodiversity of the Mediterranean Sea: Estimates, Patterns, and Threats

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Myers, Ransom A.

    Ignacio Saiz-Salinas21 , Carles San Vicente22 , Samuel Somot23 , Jose´ Templado24 , Xavier Turon7 that will continue to change the biodiversity of the Mediterranean, mainly in its eastern basin that can spread

  1. West Lothian Biodiversity Action Plan: Oil Shale Bings 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Harvie, Barbra

    2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report establishes the importance of the West Lothian oil-shale bings at both a national (UK) and local (West Lothian) scale, for their contribution to local biodiversity, their historical importance, their education ...

  2. A parameter study to optimizing scintillator characteristics for increased sensitivity in nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security based applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Daniel Shy

    2014-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A parameter study to optimizing scintillator characteristics for increased sensitivity in nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security based applications

  3. Advanced Process Monitoring Techniques for Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Orton, Christopher R.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Peper, Shane M.

    2010-11-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies, including both the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor and a spectroscopy-based monitoring system, to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The MIP Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. This paper will provide an overview of our methods and report our on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies.

  4. Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-04-05T23:59:59.000Z

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

  5. Nuclear Safeguards Considerations For The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Phillip Casey Durst; David Beddingfield; Brian Boyer; Robert Bean; Michael Collins; Michael Ehinger; David Hanks; David L. Moses; Lee Refalo

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    High temperature reactors (HTRs) have been considered since the 1940s, and have been constructed and demonstrated in the United Kingdom (Dragon), United States (Peach Bottom and Fort Saint Vrain), Japan (HTTR), Germany (AVR and THTR-300), and have been the subject of conceptual studies in Russia (VGM). The attraction to these reactors is that they can use a variety of reactor fuels, including abundant thorium, which upon reprocessing of the spent fuel can produce fissile U-233. Hence, they could extend the stocks of available uranium, provided the fuel is reprocessed. Another attractive attribute is that HTRs typically operate at a much higher temperature than conventional light water reactors (LWRs), because of the use of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide coated (TRISO) fuel particles embedded in ceramic graphite. Rather than simply discharge most of the unused heat from the working fluid in the power plant to the environment, engineers have been designing reactors for 40 years to recover this heat and make it available for district heating or chemical conversion plants. Demonstrating high-temperature nuclear energy conversion was the purpose behind Fort Saint Vrain in the United States, THTR-300 in Germany, HTTR in Japan, and HTR-10 and HTR-PM, being built in China. This resulted in nuclear reactors at least 30% or more thermodynamically efficient than conventional LWRs, especially if the waste heat can be effectively utilized in chemical processing plants. A modern variant of high temperature reactors is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). Originally developed in the United States and Germany, it is now being redesigned and marketed by the Republic of South Africa and China. The team examined historical high temperature and high temperature gas reactors (HTR and HTGR) and reviewed safeguards considerations for this reactor. The following is a preliminary report on this topic prepared under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Project in support of the NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).

  6. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W. [comp.

    1997-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  7. Extended Evaluations of the Commercial Spectrometer Systems for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duc T. Vo

    1999-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards applications require the best of the spectrometer system with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be easy to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with five different germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscope y may become the way of future gamma-ray spectroscopy.

  8. NGSI Safeguards by Design | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTubahq.na.govSecurityMaintaining theSan Jose-San|NGSI Safeguards by Design |

  9. Safeguards and Security for Program and Project Management - DOE

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's PossibleRadiation Protection245C Unlimited ReleaseWelcome ton nSafeguards and Security

  10. FAQS Qualification Card - Safeguards and Security | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport in Representative Geologic MediaTreatment | Department ofMechanicalSafeguards and

  11. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gilligan, Kimberly [ORNL

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined • trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; • the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and • the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007).1 The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

  12. Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

    2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states’ (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

  13. Spectroscopic Online Monitoring for Process Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Fuel Reprocessing Streams - 13553

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bryan, S.A.; Levitskaia, T.G.; Casella, Amanda; Peterson, James [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 902 Battelle Boulevard, PO Box 999,MSIN: P7-25, Richland, WA, 99352 (United States)] [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 902 Battelle Boulevard, PO Box 999,MSIN: P7-25, Richland, WA, 99352 (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    There is a renewed interest worldwide to promote the use of nuclear power and close the nuclear fuel cycle. The long term successful use of nuclear power is critically dependent upon adequate and safe processing and disposition of the used nuclear fuel. Liquid-liquid extraction is a separation technique commonly employed for the processing of the dissolved spent nuclear fuel. The instrumentation used to monitor these processes must be robust, require little or no maintenance, and be able to withstand harsh environments such as high radiation fields and aggressive chemical matrices. This paper discusses application of absorption and vibrational spectroscopic techniques supplemented by physicochemical measurements for radiochemical process monitoring. In this context, our team experimentally assessed the potential of Raman and spectrophotometric techniques for on-line real-time monitoring of the U(VI)/nitrate ion/nitric acid and Pu(IV)/Np(V)/Nd(III), respectively, in solutions relevant to spent fuel reprocessing. Both techniques demonstrated robust performance in the repetitive batch measurements of each analyte in a wide concentration range using simulant and commercial dissolved spent fuel solutions. Static spectroscopic measurements served as training sets for the multivariate data analysis to obtain partial least squares predictive models, which were validated using on-line centrifugal contactor extraction tests. Satisfactory prediction of the analytes concentrations in these preliminary experiments warrants further development of the spectroscopy-based methods for radiochemical safeguards and process control. (authors)

  14. Spectroscopic online monitoring for process control and safeguarding of radiochemical streams

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bryan, S.A.; Levitskaia, T.G. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 902 Battelle Boulevard, PO Box 999, MSIN: P7-25, Richland, WA 99352 (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper summarizes application of the absorption and vibrational spectroscopic techniques supplemented by physicochemical measurements for radiochemical process monitoring. In this context, our team experimentally assessed the potential of Raman and spectrophotometric techniques for online real-time monitoring of the U(VI)/nitrate ion/nitric acid and Pu(IV)/Np(V)/Nd(III), respectively, in solutions relevant to spent fuel reprocessing. These techniques demonstrate robust performance in the repetitive batch measurements of each analyte in a wide concentration range using simulant and commercial dissolved spent fuel solutions. Spectroscopic measurements served as training sets for the multivariate data analysis to obtain partial least squares predictive models, which were validated using on-line centrifugal contactor extraction tests. Satisfactory prediction of the analytes concentrations in these preliminary experiments warrants further development of the spectroscopy-based methods for radiochemical process control and safeguarding. Additionally, the ability to identify material intentionally diverted from a liquid-liquid extraction contactor system was successfully tested using on-line process monitoring as a means to detect the amount of material diverted. (authors)

  15. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mullen, Mark [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-10-05T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  16. International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolai I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Sokova, Elena K.; Ford, David G.

    2010-04-20T23:59:59.000Z

    All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

  17. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Whitaker, Jr., James [ORNL; Garner, James R [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL; Lockwood, Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA; Gilligan, Kimberly V [ORNL; Younkin, James R [ORNL; Hooper, David A [ORNL; Henkel, James J [ORNL; Krichinsky, Alan M [ORNL

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    As Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) increase in separative work unit (SWU) capacity, the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model safeguards approach needs to be strengthened. New measures to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approach are being investigated that will be mutually beneficial to the facility operators and the IAEA. One of the key concepts being studied for application at future GCEPs is embracing joint use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. A mock F/W system was built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to generate and collect F/W data from an analogous system. The ORNL system has been used to collect data representing several realistic normal process and off-normal (including diversion) scenarios. Emphasis is placed on the novelty of the analysis of data from the sensors as well as the ability to build information out of raw data, which facilitates a more effective and efficient verification process. This paper will provide a progress report on recent accomplishments and next steps.

  18. Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Ward, Rebecca; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Middleton, Bobby D.

    2011-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

  19. Application of safeguards technology in DOE's environmental restoration program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eccleston, G.W.; Baker, M.P.; Hansen, W.R.; Lucas, M.C.; Markin, J.T.; Phillips, J.R.

    1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    During the last two decades, the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has supported the research and development of safeguards systems analysis methodologies and nondestructive assay (NDS) technology for characterizing, monitoring, and accounting nuclear materials. This paper discusses methodologies and NDA instrumentation developed by the DOE/OSS program that could be applied in the Environmental Restoration Program. NDA instrumentation could be used for field measurements during site characterization and to monitor nuclear materials, heavy metals, and other hazardous materials during site remediation. Systems methodologies can minimize the expenditure of resources and help specify appropriate combinations of NDA instrumentation and chemical analyses to characterize a variety of materials quickly and reduce personnel exposure in hazardous environments. A training program is available to teach fundamental and advanced principles and approaches to characterize and quantify nuclear materials properly and to organize and analyze measurement information for decision making. The ability to characterize the overall volume and distribution of materials at a waste site is difficult because of the inhomogeneous distribution of materials, the requirement for extreme sensitivity, and the lack of resources to collect and chemically analyze a sufficient number of samples. Using a systems study approach based on statistical sampling, the resources necessary to characterize a site can be enhanced by appropriately combining in situ and field NDA measurements with laboratory analyses. 35 refs., 1 figs., 2 tabs.

  20. Biodiversity Analysis of Vegetation on the Nevada Test Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    W. K. Ostler; D. J. Hansen

    2001-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) located in south central Nevada encompasses approximately 3,561 square kilometers and straddles two major North American deserts, Mojave and Great Basin. Transitional areas between the two desert types have been created by gradients in elevation, precipitation, temperature, and soils. From 1996-1998, more than 1,500 ecological landform units were sampled at the NTS for numerous biotic and abiotic parameters. These data provide a basis for spatial evaluations of biodiversity over landscape scales at the NTS. Species diversity maps (species richness vs. species abundance) have been produced. Differences in ecosystem diversity at the ecoregion, alliance, association, and ecological landform unit levels are presented. Spatial distribution maps of species presence and abundance provide evidence of where transition zones occur and the resulting impact on biodiversity. The influences of abiotic factors (elevation, soil, precipitation) and anthropogenic disturbance on biodiversity are assessed.

  1. An endangered oasis of aquatic microbial biodiversity in the Chihuahuan desert

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Forney, Larry J.

    An endangered oasis of aquatic microbial biodiversity in the Chihuahuan desert Valeria Souza, representing a desert oasis of high biodiversity. Here, we combine data from molecular microbiology and geology

  2. South African National Biodiversity Institute and University of Cape Town (South Africa) Postdoctoral Fellow (1position)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Jarrett, Thomas H.

    South African National Biodiversity Institute and University of Cape Town (South Africa from designated groups in terms of South Africa's employment equity targets will have preference) Postdoctoral Fellow (1position) (Two year Contract) The South African National Biodiversity Institute

  3. Preliminary global assessment of terrestrial biodiversity consequences of sea level rise mediated by climate change

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Menon, Shaily; Soberó n, Jorge; Li, Xingong; Peterson, A. Townsend

    2010-02-25T23:59:59.000Z

    Considerable attention has focused on the climatic effects of global climate change on biodiversity, but few analyses and no broad assessments have evaluated the effects of sea level rise on biodiversity. Taking advantage of new maps of marine...

  4. Developing the Next Generation of International Safeguards and Nonproliferation Experts: Highlights of Select Activities at the National Laboratories

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reed, J; Mathews, C; Kirk, B; Lynch, P; Doyle, J; Meek, E; Pepper, S; Metcalf, R

    2010-03-31T23:59:59.000Z

    With many safeguards experts in the United States at or near retirement age, and with the growing and evolving mission of international safeguards, attracting and educating a new generation of safeguards experts is an important element of maintaining a credible and capable international safeguards system. The United States National Laboratories, with their rich experience in addressing the technical and policy challenges of international safeguards, are an important resource for attracting, educating, and training future safeguards experts. This presentation highlights some of the safeguards education and professional development activities underway at the National Laboratories. These include university outreach, summer courses, internships, mid-career transition, knowledge retention, and other projects. The presentation concludes with thoughts on the challenge of interdisciplinary education and the recruitment of individuals with the right balance of skills and backgrounds are recruited to meet tomorrow's needs.

  5. Safeguards and Security Research and Development progress report, October 1992--September 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. [comps.

    1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development program. Part 1 covers the three project phases that are part of the development of the technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. Examples include advanced portal monitor technology, digital image analysis for materials control, neutron multiplicity counting techniques, and development of a tomographic gamma-ray scanner. It treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 2 covers international safeguards activities, including technology developed for direct application in the international community, support to the IAEA, and bilateral technical exchanges with many other States, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Japan, Russia, and the Ukraine. Part 3 highlights a variety of projects, including several in computer security R and D, direct support of the IAEA through the Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, and safeguards projects funded by the US Department of State, the DOE`s Office of Technology Development, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Japan, and Germany. A few examples of these projects are the support to the Westinghouse Hanford Company efforts in data acquisition and control for the hydrogen mitigation tests on high-level-waste Tank 101-SY, nondestructive assay development for Warhead Dismantlement, and instrumentation system development for the Siemans mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant in Germany. 75 refs.

  6. Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Michael Holzemer; Alan Carvo

    2012-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

  7. The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Training and Human Resources

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Queirolo,A.

    2008-06-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) priority of training and human resources is aimed at providing the Department of Safeguards with an appropriate mixture of regular staff and extrabudgetary experts who are qualified to meet the IAEA's technical needs and to provide personnel with appropriate instruction to improve the technical basis and specific skills needed to perform their job functions. The equipment and methods used in inspection activities are unique, complex, and evolving. New and experienced safeguards inspectors need timely and effective training to perform required tasks and to learn new skills prescribed by new safeguards policies or agreements. The role of the inspector has changed from that of strictly an accountant to include that of a detective. New safeguards procedures are being instituted, and therefore, experienced inspectors must be educated on these new procedures. The USSP also recognizes the need for training safeguards support staff, particularly those who maintain and service safeguards equipment (SGTS), and those who perform information collection and analysis (SGIM). The USSP is committed to supporting the IAEA with training to ensure the effectiveness of all staff members and will continue to offer its assistance in the development and delivery of basic, refresher, and advanced training courses. This paper will discuss the USSP ongoing support in the area of training and IAEA staffing.

  8. The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), up and walking

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Opgenoorth, Lars; Faith, Daniel P

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    valuation, and accounting (3d)  Platform goal  Strengthen the science?policy interface for biodiversity and ecosystem services   

  9. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stevens, Rebecca S [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mc Clelland - Kerr, John [NNSA-NA-242; Senzaki, Masao [JAEA; Hori, Masato [JAEA

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  10. A Monte Carlo based spent fuel analysis safeguards strategy assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fensin, Michael L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Nathan P [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for quantifying plutonium mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, creating diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here the generalized assessment process, the techniques employed to automate the coupled facets of the assessment process, and the standard burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library. We also clearly define the diversion scenarios that will be analyzed during the standardized assessments. Though this study is currently limited to generic PWR assemblies, it is expected that the results of the assessment will yield an adequate spent fuel analysis strategy knowledge that will help the down-select process for other reactor types.

  11. Biodiversity Regulation of Ecosystem Services Coordinating Lead Authors: Sandra Diaz, David Tilman, Joseph Fargione

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Minnesota, University of

    Chapter 11 Biodiversity Regulation of Ecosystem Services Coordinating Lead Authors: Sandra Di.2.1 Ecosystem Resource Dynamics, with Emphasis on Primary Production 11.2.2 Ecosystem Stability, with Emphasis.3.5 Biodiversity Effects on Human Disease Regulation 11.4 Biodiversity Effects on the Provision of Marine Ecosystem

  12. Factoring species, non-species values and threats into biodiversity prioritisation across the ecoregions

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Vermont, University of

    population density, and the extinction risk of species. This threat index is positively correlated with allFactoring species, non-species values and threats into biodiversity prioritisation across Biodiversity Species Non-species biological values Threat A B S T R A C T Biodiversity in Africa, Madagascar

  13. Trinity Centre for Biodiversity Research Strategic Plan 2012-2014 Strategic Plan 2012-2014

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    O'Mahony, Donal E.

    Trinity Centre for Biodiversity Research Strategic Plan 2012-2014 1 Strategic Plan 2012-2014 www.tcd.ie/tcbr #12;Trinity Centre for Biodiversity Research Strategic Plan 2012-2014 2 TCBR Strategic Plan 2012-2014 Mission statement The mission of Trinity Centre for Biodiversity Research (TCBR) is to bring together

  14. Next Generations Safeguards Initiative: The Life of a Cylinder

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Morgan, James B [ORNL; White-Horton, Jessica L [ORNL

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has begun a program based on a five-year plan to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders and their locations throughout the life cycle. A key initial activity in the NGSI program is to understand and document the 'life of a UF6 cylinder' from cradle to grave. This document describes the life of a UF6 cylinder and includes cylinder manufacture and procurement processes as well as cylinder-handling and operational practices at conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and depleted UF6 conversion facilities. The NGSI multiple-laboratory team is using this document as a building block for subsequent tasks in the five-year plan, including development of the functional requirements for cylinder-tagging and tracking devices.

  15. The uranium cylinder assay system for enrichment plant safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rael, Carlos D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Iwamoto, Tomonori [JNFL; Tamura, Takayuki [JNFL; Aiuchi, Syun [JNFL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguarding sensitive fuel cycle technology such as uranium enrichment is a critical component in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. A useful tool for the nuclear materials accountancy of such a plant would be an instrument that measured the uranium content of UF{sub 6} cylinders. The Uranium Cylinder Assay System (UCAS) was designed for Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) for use in the Rokkasho Enrichment Plant in Japan for this purpose. It uses total neutron counting to determine uranium mass in UF{sub 6} cylinders given a known enrichment. This paper describes the design of UCAS, which includes features to allow for unattended operation. It can be used on 30B and 48Y cylinders to measure depleted, natural, and enriched uranium. It can also be used to assess the amount of uranium in decommissioned equipment and waste containers. Experimental measurements have been carried out in the laboratory and these are in good agreement with the Monte Carlo modeling results.

  16. Nuclear Reactor Safeguards and Monitoring with Antineutrino Detectors

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Adam Bernstein; Yifang Wang; Giorgio Gratta; Todd West

    2001-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cubic-meter-sized antineutrino detectors can be used to non-intrusively, robustly and automatically monitor and safeguard a wide variety of nuclear reactor types, including power reactors, research reactors, and plutonium production reactors. Since the antineutrino spectra and relative yields of fissioning isotopes depend on the isotopic composition of the core, changes in composition can be observed without ever directly accessing the core itself. Information from a modest-sized antineutrino detector, coupled with the well-understood principles that govern the core's evolution in time, can be used to determine whether the reactor is being operated in an illegitimate way. A group at Sandia is currently constructing a one cubic meter antineutrino detector at the San Onofre reactor site in California to demonstrate these principles.

  17. Cross-Scale Responses of Biodiversity to Hurricane and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Willig, Michael

    Cross-Scale Responses of Biodiversity to Hurricane and Anthropogenic Disturbance in a Tropical and Georges, as well as by patterns of historic land use. Hurricane-induced changes in spatial organization changed after the hurricanes and were significantly different between Hurricanes Hugo and Georges. Alpha

  18. Bioenergy to Biodiversity: Downscaling scenarios of land use change 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    MacKenzie, Ian

    2009-11-26T23:59:59.000Z

    Bioenergy crops are a key component of Scotland’s strategy to meet 2050 carbon emissions targets. The introduction of these crops could have large scale impacts on the biodiversity of lowland farmland. These impacts depend on the change in land use...

  19. Measuring Public Preferences for Biodiversity Conservation Policies in

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    households ·Sample stratified by region; 1000 each ·54% response rate #12;Biodiversity Conservation Programs misspecification ­ Demand curves probably bend at baseline ­ Upward bias on WTP for increases, downward bias on portion of curve below baseline ­ Estimation not grossly biased · Uncertainty over aggregation of WTP

  20. Sustaining multiple ecosystem functions in grassland communities requires higher biodiversity

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Zavaleta, Erika

    Sustaining multiple ecosystem functions in grassland communities requires higher biodiversity Erika (sent for review July 27, 2009) Society places value on the multiple functions of ecosystems from ecosystems to provide threshold levels of up to eight ecosystem functions simultaneously. Across years

  1. Functional consequences of realistic biodiversity changes in a marine ecosystem

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brody, James P.

    Functional consequences of realistic biodiversity changes in a marine ecosystem Matthew E. S for the goods and services provided by natural ecosystems. However, relatively few studies have evalu- ated- ity to loss and their contributions to ecosystem functioning. ammonium diversity ecosystem function

  2. Biotype 23 Page 1 The Biodiversity & Conservation Newsletter of Woodland

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    plans. Woodland Ecology Branch have started work on a project to develop a computer-based decision support system which will be used to identify threats and opportunities from forest management biodiversity officer is actively preparing data sets of SAP (Species Action Plan) species by conservancy

  3. Restoration of ecosystem services and biodiversity: conflicts and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rey Benayas, José María

    . Despite this uncertainty, new methods of ecosystem service valuation are suggesting that the economicRestoration of ecosystem services and biodiversity: conflicts and opportunities James M. Bullock1 benefits of restoration can outweigh costs. Payment for Ecosystem Service schemes could therefore provide

  4. Balancing biodiversity in a changing environment: extinction debt,

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sax, Dov

    Balancing biodiversity in a changing environment: extinction debt, immigration credit and species Dynamics Species immigration and extinction are the dominant forces underlying changes in species diversity environmental change. The model incorporates lags in extinction and immigration, which lead to extinction debt

  5. Green Roof Effect on Arthropod Biodiversity By Caitlin Race

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ginzel, Matthew

    Green Roof Effect on Arthropod Biodiversity By Caitlin Race A green roof is a roof. Green roof technology has become increasingly popular due to several benefits including, insulation, runoff protection, and aesthetic value. This project was designed to see if a green roof would benefit

  6. Biodiversity Database Developer/Programmer Academy of Natural Sciences, Philadelphia

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Plotkin, Joshua B.

    Biodiversity Database Developer/Programmer Academy of Natural Sciences, Philadelphia (Position of Philadelphia seeks a database programmer who can develop desktop and web-based solutions for managing specimen), paleontology (fossils) and general invertebrates. Current databases hold more than 1 million records in various

  7. An Overview of Marine Biodiversity in United States Waters

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Fautin, Daphne G.; Dalton, Penelope; Incze, Lewis S.; Leong, Jo-Ann C.; Pautzke, Clarence; Rosenberg, Andrew; Sandifer, Paul A.; Sedberry, George R.; Tunnell, John W. Jr.; Abbott, Isabella; Brainard, Russell E.; Broduer, Melissa; Eldredge, Lucius G.; Feldman, Michael; Moretzsohn, Fabio; Vroom, Peter S.; Wainstein, Michelle; Wolf, Nicholas

    2010-08-02T23:59:59.000Z

    in this region is extremely steep, and thus is of particular interest for monitoring biodiversity changes in a warming climate. The Gulf of Maine is topographically and geologically complex, containing three major basins up to 300 m deep, and numerous smaller...

  8. Biofuels, biodiversity, and people: Understanding the conflicts and finding opportunities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Review Biofuels, biodiversity, and people: Understanding the conflicts and finding opportunities interests in biofuels. Biofuels are viewed by many policy makers as a key to reducing reliance on foreign concerns, and by reports questioning the rationale that biofuels substantially reduce carbon emissions. We

  9. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper S. E.; .; Worrall, L.; Pickett, C.; Bachner, K.; Queirolo, A.

    2014-08-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, the U.S. Department of State, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a a workshop on the subject of ”Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation.” The workshop was held at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. The workshop participants included software and hardware experts from national laboratories, industry, government, and IAEA member states who were specially selected by the workshop organizers based on their experience with software that is developed for the control and operation of safeguards instrumentation. The workshop included presentations, to orient the participants to the IAEA Department of Safeguards software activities related to instrumentation data collection and processing, and case studies that were designed to inspire discussion of software development, use, maintenance, and upgrades in breakout sessions and to result in recommendations for effective software practices and management. This report summarizes the results of the workshop.

  10. Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Doehle, Joel R.; Toomey, Christopher M.

    2014-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

  11. Design of a Safeguards Instrument for Plutonium Quantification in an Electrochemical Refining System 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Le Coq, Annabelle G

    2013-06-25T23:59:59.000Z

    There has been a strong international interest in using pyroprocessing to close the fast nuclear reactor fuel cycle and reprocess spent fuel efficiently. To commercialize pyroprocessing, safeguards technologies are required to be developed...

  12. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  13. A framework for nuclear facility safeguard evaluation using probabilistic methods and expert elicitation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Iamsumang, Chonlagarn

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the advancement of the next generation of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, concerns of the effectiveness of nuclear facility safeguards have been increasing due to the inclusion of highly enriched material and reprocessing ...

  14. Evaluation of a Business Case for Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Power Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wood, Thomas W.; Seward, Amy M.; Lewis, Valerie A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards by Design (SbD) is a well-known paradigm for consideration and incorporation of safeguards approaches and associated design features early in the nuclear facility development process. This paradigm has been developed as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and has been accepted as beneficial in many discussions and papers on NGSI or specific technologies under development within NGSI. The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine the business case justification of SbD for nuclear power reactors. Ultimately, the implementation of SbD will rely on the designers of nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is important to assess the incentives which will lead designers to adopt SbD as a standard practice for nuclear facility design. This report details the extent to which designers will have compelling economic incentives to adopt SbD.

  15. JOINT UNITED STATES/IAEA PROPOSED APPROACH FOR SAFEGUARDS DURING PLUTONIUM STABILIZATION, PACKAGING, AND SHIPMENT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    L. KWEI; B. SMITH; ET AL

    2001-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    For safety reasons, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing to stabilize and package plutonium oxide currently subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) beginning in the year 2001. The Hanford Site will also stabilize and package plutonium materials under IAEA safeguards. The U.S. and the IAEA began consultations in late 1996 to develop an approach to the application of safeguards during stabilization and packaging. With the plans to ship RFETS plutonium to Savannah River for interim storage prior to final disposition, this work has been extended to include safeguards during shipment. This paper will discuss the elements of a joint U.S./IAEA proposal for this task.

  16. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC.

  17. Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barefield Ii, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Clegg, Samuel M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Veirs, Douglas K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Browne, Mike [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lopez, Leon [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Martinez, Ron [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Le, Loan [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lamontagne, Stephen A [DOE/NNSA/NA241; Veal, Kevin [NN/ADTR

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as outlined in the NGSI will be discussed.

  18. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States). Fission Energy and Systems Safety Program

    1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient.

  19. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Reimold, Benjamin A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ward, Steven L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Howell, John [GLASGOW UNIV.

    2010-09-13T23:59:59.000Z

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  20. Authentication of reprocessing plant safeguards data through correlation analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burr, T.L.; Wangen, L.E.; Mullen, M.F.

    1995-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report investigates the feasibility and benefits of two new approaches to the analysis of safeguards data from reprocessing plants. Both approaches involve some level of plant modeling. All models involve some form of mass balance, either applied in the usual way that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at discrete times or applied by accounting for pipe flow rates that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at continuous times. In the first case, material balances are computed after each tank-to-tank transfer. In the second case, material balances can be computed at any desired time. The two approaches can be described as follows. The first approach considers the application of a new multivariate sequential test. The test statistic is a scalar, but the monitored residual is a vector. The second approach considers the application of recent nonlinear time series methods for the purpose of empirically building a model for the expected magnitude of a material balance or other scalar variable. Although the report restricts attention to monitoring scalar time series, the methodology can be extended to vector time series.

  1. Review of selected dynamic material control functions for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lowry, L.L.

    1980-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the development of Dynamic Special Nuclear Material Accounting and Control systems used in nuclear manufacturing and reprocessing plants, there arises the question as to how these systems affect the IAEA inspection capabilities. The systems in being and under development provide information and control for a variety of purposes important to the plant operator, the safeguards purpose being one of them. This report attempts to judge the usefulness of these dynamic systems to the IAEA and have defined 12 functions that provide essential information to it. If the information acquired by these dynamic systems is to be useful to the IAEA, the inspectors must be able to independently verify it. Some suggestions are made as to how this might be done. But, even if it should not be possible to verify all the data, the availability to the IAEA of detailed, simultaneous, and plant-wide information would tend to inhibit a plant operator from attempting to generate a floating or fictitious inventory. Suggestions are made that might be helpful in the design of future software systems, an area which has proved to be fatally deficient in some systems and difficult in all.

  2. EMCAS, an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.; Bichl, F.J.

    1987-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MCandA) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities.

  3. EMCAS: An evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.; Bichl, F.J.

    1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities. 3 figs., 5 tabs.

  4. Applications of a portable MCA in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Halbig, J.K.; Klosterbuer, F.; Cameron, R.A.

    1986-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 1981 a small, battery-operated multichannel analyzer (MCA) prototype developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory was delivered to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The intent was to produce an instrument for inspector (nonscientist) use. Automated measurement programs were built into the MCA. An enhanced, commercially produced MCA is now available, which was patterned after and is software compatible with the prototype. After an extensive review of the hardware and software of the available portable MCAs, the IAEA has chosen this MCA to be used by IAEA inspectors throughout the world. Inspectors from the EURATOM Directorate of Safeguards are also using these MCAs in inspections throughout Europe. While this MCA's portability and programmability make it ideally suited for infield applications, its powerful built-in intelligence and communications protocol make it a strong candidate for distributed data acquisition and control systems. The user-instrument interface philosophy is so easy to use that in domestic and international training schools, the operators manual is not used.

  5. Materials accounting and international safeguards for MOX facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.; Hafer, J.F.

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Our experience with mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facilities leads us to conclude that there is inadequate guidance available to plant and process designers to make materials accounting systems timely, efficient, and minimally intrusive. A well designed state system for accounting and control of nuclear materials would be beneficial to plant operations and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or state regulatory agencies. Among the difficult accounting problems that arise in a large-scale MOX facility are the following: (1) process steps (such as the blending and splitting of powders) that require the accounting system to track material flow, calculate quantities based on previous measurements, and propagate uncertainties as part of data analysis; (2) extensive buffer storage areas involving long residence times that necessitate frequent corrections for material loss from radioactive decay; and (3) facility accounting at one level (for example, fuel pins) that must be reconciled with verification measurements at another level (for example, pin trays or assemblies). Approaches to addressing these problems include designing a special facility, simulating material flow, developing software for near-real-time materials accounting, and establishing achievable verification goals. This paper elaborates on these problems and proposes approaches to a materials accounting system design that considers facility, state, and IAEA safeguards and verification objectives. 11 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab.

  6. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the U.S. Department of Energy. Quarter ending September 30, 1996

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Davis, G.; Johnson, D.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

    1996-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The paper describes tasks undertaken in each of the following areas: Safeguards technology program (STP); Safeguards and material accountability (SMA); Computer security, distributed systems; Complex-wide access control system (CWAC); and Standardization of security systems (SSS). The STP develops advanced, nondestructive analysis technology for measurement of special nuclear materials. Work focuses on R and D relating to X- and gamma-ray spectrometry and to development of computer codes for interpreting the spectral data obtained by these techniques. The SMA is concerned with four areas: insider protection; material accountability; planning and evaluation; and information security. The Computer Security Technology Center provides expertise and solutions to the many information security problems present in today`s computer systems and networks. Incidents of intrusions, computer viruses, the purposeful replacement of legitimate software for illegal purposes, and similar acts are being addressed by the creation of security software, the delivery of incident response expertise, and research and development into secure systems. The purpose of the CWAC is to develop an approach that will allow visitors to use their DOE standard badge in access control systems throughout the DOE complex. The purpose of the SSS project is to support the standardization of security systems to meet DOE orders and requirements, and to support the DOE in offering relevant security technology and capabilities to Federal standardization efforts.

  7. Fragmentation Energetics of Clusters Relevant to Atmospheric...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    of Clusters Relevant to Atmospheric New Particle Formation. Fragmentation Energetics of Clusters Relevant to Atmospheric New Particle Formation. Abstract: The exact mechanisms by...

  8. Behavior of 241Am in fast reactor systems - a safeguards perspective

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lafleur, Adrienne M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Advanced fuel-cycle developments around the world currently under development are exploring the possibility of disposing of {sup 241}Am from spent fuel recycle processes by burning this material in fast reactors. For safeguards practitioners, this approach could potentially complicate both fresh- and spent-fuel safeguards measurements. The increased ({alpha},n) production in oxide fuels from the {sup 241}Am increases the uncertainty in coincidence assay of Pu in MOX assemblies and will require additional information to make use of totals-based neutron assay of these assemblies. We have studied the behavior of {sup 241}Am-bearing MOX fuel in the fast reactor system and the effect on neutron and gamma-ray source-terms for safeguards measurements. In this paper, we will present the results of simulations of the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a fast breeder reactor system. Because of the increased use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors and advances in fuel-cycle designs aimed at americium disposal in fast reactors, we have undertaken a brief study of the behavior of americium in these systems to better understand the safeguards impacts of these new approaches. In this paper we will examine the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a variety of nuclear systems to provide insight into the safeguards implications of proposed Am disposition schemes.

  9. IMPACT OF THE U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM SAFEGUARDS INTERNSHIP PROGRAM.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    PEPPER, S.; OSIECKI, C.

    2006-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Support Program began funding an internship program in the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 2002. Since that time, 39 U.S. citizens and permanent residents have been placed in one-year, paid internships with the IAEA. The management of the internship program was originally the responsibility of the International Safeguards Project Office but was transferred to the Office of Educational Programs at Brookhaven National Laboratory in 2004. Feedback on the internship program from the U.S. government and the IAEA has been positive. The interns have completed basic yet essential work for the Department of Safeguards and freed IAEA staff members to perform more complex tasks. The cost of an intern is low relative to other forms of human resources support. After the conclusion of their assignments, many of the interns go on to work for the U.S. government, the national laboratories, or companies in international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will discuss the work done by the interns for the IAEA, factors influencing the success of the internship program, and the effects the program has had on the careers of interns, in preparing the next generation to work in the nuclear industry, participation in INMM activities, and recruitment for U.S. citizens for safeguards positions.

  10. Safeguards by design - industry engagement for new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Grice, Thomas [NRC; Lockwood, Dunbar [DOE/NA-243

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) has initiated a Safeguards by Design (SBD) effort to encourage the incorporation of international (IAEA) safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign or retrofit the facility at a later date. The main goals of Safeguards by Design are to (1) make the implementation of international safeguards at new civil nuclear facilities more effective and efficient, (2) avoid costly and time-consuming re-design work or retrofits at such facilities and (3) design such facilities in a way that makes proliferation as technically difficult, as time-consuming, and as detectable as possible. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently hosted efforts to facilitate the use of Safeguards by Design for new uranium enrichment facilities currently being planned for construction in the U.S. While SBD is not a NRC requirement, the NRC is aiding the implementation of SBD by coordinating discussions between DOE's NA-24 and industry's facility design teams. More specifically, during their normal course of licensing discussions the NRC has offered industry the opportunity to engage with NA-24 regarding SBD.

  11. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  12. Coupling a transient solvent extraction module with the separations and safeguards performance model.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DePaoli, David W. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Birdwell, Joseph F. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Gauld, Ian C. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Cipiti, Benjamin B.; de Almeida, Valmor F. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN)

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A number of codes have been developed in the past for safeguards analysis, but many are dated, and no single code is able to cover all aspects of materials accountancy, process monitoring, and diversion scenario analysis. The purpose of this work was to integrate a transient solvent extraction simulation module developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The SSPM was designed for materials accountancy and process monitoring analyses, but previous versions of the code have included limited detail on the chemical processes, including chemical separations. The transient solvent extraction model is based on the ORNL SEPHIS code approach to consider solute build up in a bank of contactors in the PUREX process. Combined, these capabilities yield a more robust transient separations and safeguards model for evaluating safeguards system design. This coupling and initial results are presented. In addition, some observations toward further enhancement of separations and safeguards modeling based on this effort are provided, including: items to be addressed in integrating legacy codes, additional improvements needed for a fully functional solvent extraction module, and recommendations for future integration of other chemical process modules.

  13. Coupling GIS and LCA for biodiversity assessments of land use: Part 2: Impact assessment

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Geyer, Roland; Lindner, Jan P.; Stoms, David M.; Davis, Frank W.; Wittstock, Bastian

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Biodiversity impacts . Bioethanol . Evenness . Geographicto produce a liter of bioethanol depends on where thethen assessed for three bioethanol feedstocks at different

  14. The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), up and walking

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Opgenoorth, Lars; Faith, Daniel P

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    methodologies on value, valuation, and accounting (3d)  Platform goal  Strengthen the science?policy interface for biodiversity and ecosystem services   

  15. Development and Evaluation of a Safeguards System Concept for a Pebble-Fueled High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gitau, Ernest Travis Ngure

    2012-10-19T23:59:59.000Z

    the world, adequate methods for safeguarding the reactor must be developed. Current safeguards methods for the pebble-fueled HTGR focus on extensive, redundant containment and surveillance (C/S) measures or a combination of item-type and bulk-type material...

  16. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 4, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, rough December 31, 1995. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  17. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1996, Vol. 2, Rev. 5

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1997-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 5, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1996. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  18. Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR&PP case study results

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design should have such features in it if it is seen to have intrinsic proliferation resistance. The technical difficulty in diverting material from the ESFR is at least as strongly impacted by the adversaries overall technical capabilities as it is by the effort required to overcome those barriers intrinsic to the nuclear fuel cycle. The intrinsic proliferation resistance of the ESFR will affect how extrinsic measures in the safeguards approach for the ESFR will provide overall proliferation resistance.

  19. Report on the NGS3 Working Group on Safeguards by Design For Aqueous Reprocessing Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael; Schanfein, Mark

    2011-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of the Working Group on SBD for Aqueous Reprocessing Facilities was to provide recommendations, for facility operators and designers, which would aid in the coordination and integration of nuclear material accountancy and the safeguards requirements of all concerned parties - operators, state/regional authorities, and the IAEA. The recommendations, which are to be provided to the IAEA, are intended to assist in optimizing facility design and operating parameters to ensure the safeguardability of the facility while minimizing impact on the operations. The one day Working Group session addressed a wide range of design and operating topics.

  20. Integrated Safeguards and Security Management Self-Assessment 2004

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lunford, Dan; Ramsey, Dwayne

    2005-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2002 Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory deployed the first Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Self-Assessment process, designed to measure the effect of the Laboratory's ISSM efforts. This process was recognized by DOE as a best practice and model program for self-assessment and training. In 2004, the second Self-Assessment was launched. The cornerstone of this process was an employee survey that was designed to meet several objectives: (1) Ensure that Laboratory assets are protected. (2) Provide a measurement of the Laboratory's current security status that can be compared against the 2002 Self-Assessment baseline. (3) Educate all Laboratory staff about security responsibilities, tools, and practices. (4) Provide security staff with feedback on the effectiveness of security programs. (5) Provide line management with the information they need to make informed decisions about security. This 2004 Self Assessment process began in July 2004 with every employee receiving an information packet and instructions for completing the ISSM survey. The Laboratory-wide survey contained questions designed to measure awareness and conformance to policy and best practices. The survey response was excellent--90% of Berkeley Lab employees completed the questionnaire. ISSM liaisons from each division followed up on the initial survey results with individual employees to improve awareness and resolve ambiguities uncovered by the questionnaire. As with the 2002 survey, the Self-Assessment produced immediate positive results for the ISSM program and revealed opportunities for longer-term corrective actions. Results of the questionnaire provided information for organizational profiles and an institutional summary. The overall level of security protection and awareness was very high--often above 90%. Post-survey work by the ISSM liaisons and line management consistently led to improved awareness and metrics, as shown by a comparison of profiles at the end of phase one (August 6, 2004) and phase two (November 1, 2004). The Self-Assessment confirmed that classified information is not held or processed at Berkeley Lab. The survey results also identified areas where increased employee knowledge and awareness of Laboratory policy would be beneficial, the two most prominent being password usage and wireless network service. Line management will be able to determine additional corrective actions based on the results of the Self-Assessment. Future assessments will raise the ratings bar for some existing program elements and add new elements to stimulate further improvements in Laboratory security.

  1. Initial Evaluation of a New Electromechanical Cooler for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coleman, RL

    2002-10-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The use of liquid nitrogen (LN{sub 2}) constitutes the current state of the art in cryogenic cooling for high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, which are widely used for {gamma}-ray and characteristic X-ray spectroscopy because of their excellent energy discrimination. Use of LN{sub 2} requires a liquid nitrogen supply, cumbersome storage tanks and plumbing, and the frequent attention of personnel to be sure that nitrogen levels are sufficient to maintain the detectors at a sufficiently low operating temperature. Safety hazards also are associated with the use of LN{sub 2}, both because of the potential for severe frostbite on exposure to skin and because it displaces ambient oxygen when it evaporates in closed spaces. Existing electromechanical coolers have, until now, been more expensive to procure and maintain than LN{sub 2} systems. Performance and reliability have also been serious issues because of microphonic degradation of photon energy peak resolution and cooler failures due to compressor oil becoming entrained in the refrigerant. This report describes the results of tests of a new HPGe detector cooling technology, the PerkinElmer ORTEC{reg_sign} Products X-Cooler{trademark} that, according to the manufacturer, significantly reduces the lifetime cost of the cooling system without degradation of the output signal. The manufacturer claims to have overcome cost, performance and reliability problems of older-generation electromechanical coolers, but the product has no significant history of use, and this project is the first independent evaluation of its performance for Total cost savings for the DOE and other agencies that use HPGe systems extensively for safeguards monitoring is expected to be quite significant if the new electromechanical cooler technology is shown to be reliable and if performance characteristics indicate its usefulness for this application. The technology also promises to make HPGe monitoring, characterization and detection available for unattended or covert operation and in remote or inaccessible locations where the unavailability of LN{sub 2} and signal degradation from existing mechanical coolers prevent its use at the present time.

  2. Hydrology as a driver of biodiversity: Controls on carrying capacity, niche formation, and dispersal

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Konar, Megan

    Hydrology as a driver of biodiversity: Controls on carrying capacity, niche formation Centre for Hydrology, ``Dino Tonini'', Padua, Italy a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Available online 3 March 2012 Keywords: Hydrology Biodiversity Dispersal Carrying capacity Niches Climate change

  3. Patterns of extinction and biodiversity in the fossil record Ricard V. Sole and Mark Newman

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Newman, Mark

    extinction of all time took place, killing at least 90% of all species on the Earth, and ending the eraPatterns of extinction and biodiversity in the fossil record Ricard V. Sol´e and Mark Newman Santa in biodiversity towards the present, punctuated by a number of large extinction events which wiped out a signi#2

  4. Predicting the responsiveness of soil biodiversity to deforestation: a cross-biome study

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Colorado at Boulder, University of

    Predicting the responsiveness of soil biodiversity to deforestation: a cross-biome study T H O M Abstract The consequences of deforestation for aboveground biodiversity have been a scientific throughput sequencing, we characterize the effects of deforestation on micro- bial communities across

  5. Biodiversity at Risk Genomes are key to basic research, and may contain solu-

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mathis, Wayne N.

    Biodiversity at Risk Genomes are key to basic research, and may contain solu- tions to many a respon- sibility to sample and preserve this diversity for the future. The Global Genome Initiative Preserving the Genomic Diversity of Life on Earth Genomics is shaping the future of biodiversity research

  6. NNSA Signs Memorandum with Kuwait to Increase Cooperation on Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    On June 23, 2010, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation topics with the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC). NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino and KNNEC's Secretary General, Dr. Ahmad Bishara, signed the memorandum at a ceremony at U.S. Department of Energy headquarters in Washington.

  7. Education in Safeguards and Security Technology Meeting Challenges with Technology and Experience

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Paschal, Linda J [ORNL; Chapman, Jeffrey Allen [ORNL; Rowe, Nathan C [ORNL; Stinson, Brad J [ORNL

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Education and hands-on experience are crucial to ensuring a workforce of safeguards and security professionals who can meet the challenges currently faced in global nuclear safeguards and security. Global demand for nuclear energy and technology, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the cleanup of Cold War facilities have resulted in an increased need for trained safeguards and security personnel. At the same time, the global community is facing a growing shortage of experienced workers with hands-on knowledge of nuclear material processing. Limited access to operating facilities has dramatically reduced the opportunities for next-generation practitioners to obtain hands-on training experience. To address these needs, the Safeguards Technology Integration Center (STIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was created as a Department of Energy User Facility to provide access both to the latest technology and to field-experienced professionals. The STIC provides real-world conditions, process equipment mock-ups, and controlled access to encapsulated radioactive materials (including highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for training and technology evaluation encompassing various techniques and skills, such as Radiation Inspection Systems, Containment and Surveillance Systems, Nondestructive Assay, Security System Performance Testing, and System Design and Analysis. The STIC facilities, laboratories, test beds, and training facilities are described along with the more notable aspects of the training program, which has included more than 1000 participants in the last four years.

  8. Manual for Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System Reporting and Data Submission

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-08-19T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual provides detailed instructions for documenting and reporting data submissions for nuclear materials transactions, inventories, and material balances to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Cancels DOE M 474.1-2. Canceled by DOE M 470.4-6.

  9. Reactor antineutrino monitoring with a plastic scintillator array as a new safeguards method

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    S. Oguri; Y. Kuroda; Y. Kato; R. Nakata; Y. Inoue; C. Ito; M. Minowa

    2014-05-23T23:59:59.000Z

    We developed a segmented reactor-antineutrino detector made of plastic scintillators for application as a tool in nuclear safeguards inspection and performed mostly unmanned field operations at a commercial power plant reactor. At a position outside the reactor building, we measured the difference in reactor antineutrino flux above the ground when the reactor was active and inactive.

  10. MINOR for Natural Resources Conservation Conserving Earth's biological diversity and safeguarding the benefits or "ecosystem services"

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Schweik, Charles M.

    . Environmental Resources NRC 390E Evolution and Conservation (3cr-sprg) NRC 575 Case Studies in Conservation NRC for Natural Resources Conservation Conserving Earth's biological diversity and safeguarding the benefits resources conservation. In this minor, students learn about the ecology of terrestrial and aquatic

  11. Analysis of the effectiveness of gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinjoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235U enrichment of declared UF6 containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive assay (DA) of samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements. These improvements could reduce the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also explore how a few advanced safeguards systems could be assembled for unattended operation. The analysis will focus on how unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections (IDS) can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear materials when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems.

  12. Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Small Graphite Moderated Reactor and Associated Fuel Cycle Facilities 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rauch, Eric B.

    2010-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

    this type of reactor desirable also make it suspicious to the international community as a possible means to shorten that state?s nuclear latency. If a safeguards approach could be developed for a fuel cycle featuring one of these reactors, it would ease...

  13. Role of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards in confidence building

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Augustson, R.H.

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In this paper, I will examine some attributes of confidence building and connect them with how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) interacts with its member states in carrying out its safeguards function. These interactions and the structure set up to define them help maintain and strengthen confidence between the IAEA and the member states and among these states. 3 refs.

  14. INL Human Resource Development and the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gouveia, Fernando; Metcalf, Richard Royce Madison

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    It is the stated goal of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to promote the development of a strengthened nuclear safeguards base, one with the potential to advance the secure and peaceful implementation of nuclear energy world-wide. To meet this goal, the initiative, among other things, has sought to develop a revitalized effort to ensure the continued availability of next generation safeguards professionals. Accordingly, this paper serves to outline the human capital building strategies taken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in line with the NGSI. Various components are presented in detail, including INL’s efforts directed at university outreach, in particular the laboratory’s summer internship program, along with the development of various innovative training programs and long-term oriented strategies for student professional development. Special highlights include a video training series, developed by INL in cooperation with LLNL and other laboratories, which sought to expose students and entry-level professionals to the concept and practice of international nuclear safeguards.

  15. Directory of guidance documents relating to biodiversity and cultural knowledge research and prospecting

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Churcher, T. [comp.] [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States). Dept. of Geography]|[Lawrence Berkeley National Lab., CA (United States)

    1997-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Biodiversity in both developing and developed countries has been accessed for a long time by local communities as well as by outside researchers and corporate prospectors. Such activities are carried out for various purposes. Sometimes plants, animals and habitats are merely described, other times the goal is to extract for profit. These activities have helped to advance knowledge and create awareness of how precious biodiversity is. These activities have also generated many products that contribute to the health and well-being of global consumers, but may not necessarily provide benefits to their original stewards. Research has also focused attention on particular features of biodiversity. Biodiversity has been conserved, both by local community traditions, and by more formal means, with varying degree of effectiveness. One recently proposed means is the Convention on Biological Diversity. That convention has been ratified by large number of countries and has stimulated global concern over this issue. It has provided a framework for conserving biodiversity. At the same time many local communities, NGOs and people`s organizations are advancing alternative ways to conserve biodiversity and cultural diversity. In many places, the conservation of biodiversity and the protection of cultural diversity are inescapably intertwined. Despite strong links between biodiversity and the land and the water management traditions of the 6000 linguistically distinct cultures, the Convention on Biological Diversity focuses on nation-state sovereignty over biodiversity. We believe that local communities should have greater say in whether and how biodiversity is studied, extracted and commercialized. We consider prior informed consent to be a necessary requirement of such explorations, as is equitable sharing of any benefits arising from them.

  16. Abstract: The challenges in nuclear safeguards and in nuclear security have significantly changed over the last decades. On the one side nuclear safeguards evolved from the simple verifica9on of declared amounts of material to a more informa9on driven app

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Abstract: The challenges in nuclear safeguards and in nuclear security have significantly changed over the last decades. On the one side nuclear safeguards evolved-doctoral researcher where he analysed dissolu9on residues from reprocessing of nuclear fuels

  17. The Sun Asphericities: Astrophysical Relevance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    J-P. Rozelot; S. Pireaux; S. Lefebvre; T. Corbard

    2004-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Of all the fundamental parameters of the Sun (diameter, mass, temperature...), the gravitational multipole moments (of degree l and order m) that determine the solar moments of inertia, are still poorly known. However, at the first order (l=2), the quadrupole moment is relevant to many astrophysical applications. It indeed contributes to the relativistic perihelion advance of planets, together with the post-Newtonian (PN) parameters; or to the precession of the orbital plane about the Sun polar axis, the latter being unaffected by the purely relativistic PN contribution. Hence, a precise knowledge of the quadrupole moment is necessary for accurate orbit determination, and alternatively, to obtain constraints on the PN parameters. Moreover, the successive gravitational multipole moments have a physical meaning: they describe deviations from a purely spherical mass distribution. Thus, their precise determination gives indications on the solar internal structure. Here, we explain why it is difficult to compute these parameters, how to derive the best values, and how they will be determined in a near future by means of space experiments.

  18. IAEA SAFEGUARDS DURING PLUTONIUM STABILIZATION AT HANFORDS PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MCRAE, L.P.

    2004-02-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The Vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) became subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards beginning in 1994 as part of the US excess fissile material program. The inventory needed to be stabilized and repackaged for long-term storage to comply with Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. In 1998, the United States began negotiations with IAEA to develop methods to maintain safeguards as this material was stabilized and repackaged. The Design Information Questionnaire was revised and submitted to the IAEA in 2002 describing how PFP would be modified to accommodate the stabilization process line. The operation plan for 2003 was submitted describing the proposed schedules for removing materials for stabilization. Stabilization and repackaging activities for the safeguarded plutonium began in January 2003 and were completed in December 2003. The safeguards approach implemented at the Hanford Site was a combination of the original baseline approach augmented by a series of five vault additions of stabilized materials followed by five removals of unstabilized materials. IAEA containment and surveillance measures were maintained until the unstabilized material was removed. Following placement of repackaged material (most from the original safeguarded stock) into the storage vault, the IAEA conducted inventory change verification measurements and then established containment and surveillance. As part of the stabilization campaign, the IAEA developed new measurement methods and calibration standards representative of the materials and packaging. The annual physical inventory verification was conducted on the normal IAEA schedule following the fourth additional/removal phase. Plant activities and the impacts on operations are described.

  19. A comparison of some relevance feedback techniques

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cashman, Leslie Edward

    1972-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    the relevant documents. Needless to say, perfect indexing does not exist in document retr1eval systems. Yet to use relevance feedback a basic assumption has to be made. Specifically 1t must be assumed that documents relevant to a given query will res1de... results. Out ut de ictin the functionin of each strate . The vector mentioned above is printed for each iteration of each strategy. At a glance it shows how the ranks of the relevant documents vacillate from one iteration to the next. In addition...

  20. Performance, Market and Manufacturing Constraints relevant to...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Constraints relevant to the Industrialization of Thermoelectric Devices Market pricing of thermoelectric raw materials and processing, cost of manufacture of devices and...

  1. A comparison of some relevance feedback techniques 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cashman, Leslie Edward

    1972-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    the relevant documents. Needless to say, perfect indexing does not exist in document retr1eval systems. Yet to use relevance feedback a basic assumption has to be made. Specifically 1t must be assumed that documents relevant to a given query will res1de... results. Out ut de ictin the functionin of each strate . The vector mentioned above is printed for each iteration of each strategy. At a glance it shows how the ranks of the relevant documents vacillate from one iteration to the next. In addition...

  2. Master safeguards and security agreements and protection program planning orders and guide

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hensley, B.

    1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper discusses the Master Safeguards and Security Agreement (MSSA) and Protection Program Planning (PPP) orders of the Department of Energy (DOE). Both orders establish DOE policy, requirements, responsibilities, and authorities for the development and implementation of MSSA's and associated planning documents. The MSSA subcommittee to the Policy Development Task Force was responsible for the development of the MSSA order. Unlike other subcommittees that were involved in updating existing orders, the AMSSA subcommittee produced the initial version of the MSSA order. The subcommittee included representation from DOE outlay program offices with Headquarters and field office safeguards and security expertise. The PPP order was developed by a separate subcommittee and included representation mainly from the Task Force itself. It was completed much later than the other orders and remains under review within the Department.

  3. Safeguard By Design Lessons Learned from DOE Experience Integrating Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hockert, John; Burbank, Roberta L.

    2010-04-13T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper identifies the lessons to be learned for the institutionalization of Safeguards by Design (SBD) from the Department of Energy (DOE) experience developing and implementing DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process. The experience is valuable because of the similarity of the challenges of integrating safety and safeguards into the design process. The paper reviews the content and development of DOE-STD-1189-2008 from its initial concept in January 2006 to its issuance in March 2008. Lessons learned are identified in the areas of the development and structure of requirements for the SBD process; the target audience for SBD requirements and guidance, the need for a graded approach to SBD, and a possible strategy for development and implementation of SBD within DOE.

  4. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-03-04T23:59:59.000Z

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  5. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  6. LETTER Community ecology theory predicts the effects of agrochemical mixtures on aquatic biodiversity and ecosystem

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lajeunesse, Marc J.

    LETTER Community ecology theory predicts the effects of agrochemical mixtures on aquatic experiment to examine the effects of pairwise agrochemical mixtures [fertiliser, herbicide (atrazine. As postulated, the responses of biodiversity and ecosystem properties to agrochemicals alone and in mixtures

  7. Perennial grasslands enhance biodiversity and multiple ecosystem services in bioenergy landscapes

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Landis, Doug

    of ecosystem functions, promoting the creation of multifunctional agricultural landscapes. We foundPerennial grasslands enhance biodiversity and multiple ecosystem services in bioenergy landscapes, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824; b Great Lakes Bioenergy Research Center, US Department

  8. XIII World Forestry Congress Buenos Aires, Argentina, 18 23 October 2009 Landscape biodiversity monitoring

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    XIII World Forestry Congress Buenos Aires, Argentina, 18 ­ 23 October 2009 1 Landscape biodiversity #12;XIII World Forestry Congress Buenos Aires, Argentina, 18 ­ 23 October 2009 2 management. Moreover

  9. Marine renewable energy: potential benefits to biodiversity? An urgent call for research

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Exeter, University of

    Marine renewable energy: potential benefits to biodiversity? An urgent call for research Richard 1 Centre for Ecology and Conservation and Peninsula Research Institute for Marine Renewable Energy driver. In response, many governments have initiated programmes of energy production from renewable

  10. Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order defines requirements for Department of Energy (DOE) compliance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, the Protocol to the Agreement, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement, and the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement and Additional Protocol. Cancels DOE O 142.2. Admin Chg 1, 6-27-13.

  11. Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order defines requirements for Department of Energy (DOE) compliance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, the Protocol to the Agreement, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement, and the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement and Additional Protocol. Cancels DOE O 142.2. Admin Chg 1, dated 6-27-13, cancels DOE O 142.1A. Certified 12-3-14.

  12. Plutonium Measurements with a Fast-Neutron Multiplicity Counter for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jennifer L. Dolan; Marek Flaska; Alexis Poitrasson-Riviere; Andreas Enqvist; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2014-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Measurements were performed at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy to field test a fast-neutron multiplicity counter developed at the University of Michigan. The measurements allowed the illustration of the system’s photon discrimination abilities, efficiency when measuring neutron multiplicity, ability to characterize 240Pueff mass, and performance relative to a currently deployed neutron coincidence counter. This work is motivated by the need to replace and improve upon 3He neutron detection systems for nuclear safeguards applications.

  13. 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) based pyroprocessing facility safety evaluation plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ku, J.H.; Choung, W.M.; You, G.S.; Moon, S.I.; Park, S.H.; Kim, H.D. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute - KAERI, 989-111 Daeduk-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, 305-353 (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The big advantage of pyroprocessing for the management of spent fuels against the conventional reprocessing technologies lies in its proliferation resistance since the pure plutonium cannot be separated from the spent fuel. The extracted materials can be directly used as metal fuel in a fast reactor, and pyroprocessing reduces drastically the volume and heat load of the spent fuel. KAERI has implemented the SBD (Safeguards-By-Design) concept in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The goal of SBD is to integrate international safeguards into the entire facility design process since the very beginning of the design phase. This paper presents a safety evaluation plan using a conceptual design of a reference pyroprocessing facility, in which 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety)-By-Design (3SBD) concept is integrated from early conceptual design phase. The purpose of this paper is to establish an advanced pyroprocessing hot cell facility design concept based on 3SBD for the successful realization of pyroprocessing technology with enhanced safety and proliferation resistance.

  14. Under-sodium viewing technology for improvement of fast-reactor safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Gerhart, Jeremy J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Kawakubo, Yoko [JAEA

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The current safeguards approach for fast reactors relies exclusively on maintenance of continuity of knowledge to track the movement of fuel assemblies through these facilities. The remote handling of fuel assemblies, the visual opacity of the liquid metal coolant. and the chemical reactivity of sodium all combine and result in significant limitations on the available options to verify fuel assembly identification numbers or the integrity of these assemblies. These limitations also serve to frustrate attempts to restore the continuity-of-knowledge in instances where the information is under a variety of scenarios. The technology of ultrasonic under-sodium viewing offers new options to the safeguards community for recovering continuity-of-knowledge and applying more traditional item accountancy to fast reactor facilities. We have performed a literature review to investigate the development of under-sodium viewing technologies. In this paper we will summarize our findings and report the state of development of this technology and we will present possible applications to the fast reactor system to improve the existing safeguards approach at these reactors and in future fast reactors.

  15. ASSESS (Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security) update: Current status and future developments

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Al-Ayat, R.A. (Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)); Cousins, T.D. (USDOE, Washington, DC (USA)); Hoover, E.R. (Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA))

    1990-07-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) has been released for use by DOE field offices and their contractors. In October, 1989, we offered a prototype workshop to selected representatives of the DOE community. Based on the prototype results, we held the first training workshop at the Central Training Academy in January, 1990. Four additional workshops are scheduled for FY 1990. ASSESS is a state-of-the-art analytical tool for management to conduct integrated evaluation of safeguards systems at facilities handling facilities. Currently, ASSESS focuses on the threat of theft/diversion of special nuclear material by insiders, outsiders, and a special form of insider/outsider collusion. ASSESS also includes a neutralization module. Development of the tool is continuing. Plans are underway to expand the capabilities of ASSESS to evaluate against violent insiders, to validate the databases, to expand the neutralization module, and to assist in demonstrating compliance with DOE Material Control and Accountability (MC A) Order 5633.3. These new capabilities include the ability to: compute a weighted average for performance capability against a spectrum of insider adversaries; conduct defense-in-depth analyses; and analyze against protracted theft scenarios. As they become available, these capabilities will be incorporated in our training program. ASSESS is being developed jointly by Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories under the sponsorship of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security.

  16. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS DURING STABILIZATION AT HANFORD PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MCRAE, L.P.

    2004-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The Vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) became subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards beginning in 1994 as part of the US excess fissile material program. The inventory needed to be stabilized and repackaged for long-term storage to comply with Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. In 1998, the United States began negotiations with IAEA to develop methods to maintain safeguards during stabilization and repackaging of this material. The Design Information Questionnaire was revised and submitted to the IAEA in 2002 describing modification to the facility to accommodate the stabilization process line. The operation plan for 2003 was submitted describing the proposed schedules for removing materials for stabilization. Stabilization and repackaging activities for the safeguarded plutonium began in January 2003 and were completed in December 2003. The stabilization was completed in five phases. IAEA containment and surveillance measures were maintained until the material was removed by phase for stabilization and repackaging. Following placement of the repackaged material into the storage vault, the IAEA conducted inventory change verification measurements, and re-established containment and surveillance. Plant activities and the impacts on operations are described.

  17. Center for Gas Separations Relevant to

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cohen, Ronald C.

    Center for Gas Separations Relevant to Clean Energy Technologies #12;Director Berend Smit Jeffrey, metal-organic framework. © 2013 EFRC Center for Gas Separation Relevant to Clean Energy Technology. All the current separation technology, developed over sixty years ago, requires 25-35% more coal to produce

  18. Safeguards and security concept for the Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) and Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) fuel cycle, SAF line technical support

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schaubert, V.J.; Remley, M.E.; Grantham, L.F.

    1986-02-21T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is a safeguards and security concept system review for the secure automated fabrication (SAF) and national liquid metal reactor (LMR) fuel programs.

  19. The Value of Small-Scale Projects in Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Rural Development in the Ecuadorian Chocó

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Fernández, Sarah Haidée

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Ecotourism and Sustainable Development: Who Owns Paradise?Biodiversity for Sustainable Development. Oslo: ScandinavianConservation and Sustainable Development. Washington D.C. :

  20. Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1981-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table. (AT)

  1. Integrated safeguards testing laboratories in support of the advanced fuel cycle initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Santi, Peter A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Klasky, Kristen L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lee, Haeok [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sprinkle, James K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Williams, Bradley [DOE, NE

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A key enabler for advanced fuel cycle safeguards research and technology development for programs such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is access to facilities and nuclear materials. This access is necessary in many cases in order to ensure that advanced safeguards techniques and technologies meet the measurement needs for which they were designed. One such crucial facility is a hot cell based laboratory which would allow developers from universities, national laboratories, and commercial companies to perform iterative research and development of advanced safeguards instrumentation under realistic operating conditions but not be subject to production schedule limitations. The need for such a facility arises from the requirement to accurately measure minor actinide and/or fission product bearing nuclear materials that cannot be adequately shielded in glove boxes. With the contraction of the DOE nuclear complex following the end of the cold war, many suitable facilities at DOE sites are increasingly costly to operate and are being evaluated for closure. A hot cell based laboratory that allowed developers to install and remove instrumentation from the hot cell would allow for both risk mitigation and performance optimization of the instrumentation prior to fielding equipment in facilities where maintenance and repair of the instrumentation is difficult or impossible. These benefits are accomplished by providing developers the opportunity to iterate between testing the performance of the instrumentation by measuring realistic types and amounts of nuclear material, and adjusting and refining the instrumentation based on the results of these measurements. In this paper, we review the requirements for such a facility using the Wing 9 hot cells in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility as a model for such a facility and describe recent use of these hot cells in support of AFCI.

  2. Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Humberto Garcia; Wen-Chiao Lin; Reed Carlson

    2014-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

  3. High-resolution microcalorimeter detectors as a tool in the future of nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hoteling, Nathan J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hoover, Andrew S [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    New measurements are presented from the LANL-NIST microcalorimeter array for two standard plutonium sources. The results demonstrate substantially smaller error bars obtained from the spectral analysis program FRAM. Some areas of improvement to the analysis technique have been identified, indicating that the micro calorimeter results can be improved upon. These results support the viability of a device for performing real nuclear safeguards measurements in the near future. The challenge of providing reliably accurate and precise data is a critical component of any safeguards initiative. In the realm of nuclear safeguards, this is an especially daunting task since inaccurate and/or imprecise data could have very serious international consequences. As such, there is a constant drive within the community to establish better measurement and analysis techniques in order to further reduce the associated errors and uncertainties. Even with todays state of the art equipment, measurement uncertainties can extend to several significant quantities worth of material over a relatively modest period of time. Furthermore, there is a strong desire for improved nondestructive analysis techniques in order to reduce both the cost, turnover rate, and inconvenience of destructive analyses. One promising new technology that may help to realize these goals is that of gamma-ray microcalorimeter detectors. The hallmark quality of this new technique is the ability to achieve energy resolution nearly an order of magnitude better than typical planar high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors. Such an improvement may help reduce uncertainties associated with, for instance, plutonium isotopics or uranium enrichment measurements. This may, in turn, help to reduce uncertainties in total plutonium and/or uranium content in a given sample without the need for destructive analysis. In this paper, we will describe this new detector technology as well as some recent measurements carried out with the LANL-NIST gamma-ray microcalorimeter ({micro}cal) array. Discussion will focus on the capabilities of this technology as well as the progress toward a practical measurement device.

  4. Passive Measurement of Organic-Scintillator Neutron Signatures for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jennfier L. Dolan; Eric C. Miller; Alexis C. Kaplan; Andreas Enqvist; Marek Flaska; Alice Tomanin; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2012-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    At nuclear facilities, domestically and internationally, most measurement systems used for nuclear materials’ control and accountability rely on He-3 detectors. Due to resource shortages, alternatives to He-3 systems are needed. This paper presents preliminary simulation and experimental efforts to develop a fast-neutron-multiplicity counter based on liquid organic scintillators. This mission also provides the opportunity to broaden the capabilities of such safeguards measurement systems to improve current neutron-multiplicity techniques and expand the scope to encompass advanced nuclear fuels.

  5. Decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, a Shift in Paradigm for Terminating Safeguards on Process Holdup

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ivan R. Thomas

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    INMM Abstract 51st Annual Meeting Decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, a Shift in Paradigm for Terminating Safeguards on Process Holdup The Fuel Process Building at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) is being decommissioned after nearly four decades of recovering high enriched uranium from various government owned spent nuclear fuels. The separations process began with fuel dissolution in one of multiple head-ends, followed by three cycles of uranium solvent extraction, and ending with denitration of uranyl nitrate product. The entire process was very complex, and the associated equipment formed an extensive maze of vessels, pumps, piping, and instrumentation within several layers of operating corridors and process cells. Despite formal flushing and cleanout procedures, an accurate accounting for the residual uranium held up in process equipment over extended years of operation, presented a daunting safeguards challenge. Upon cessation of domestic reprocessing, the holdup remained inaccessible and was exempt from measurement during ensuing physical inventories. In decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, the Idaho Cleanup Project, which operates the INTEC, deviated from the established requirements that all nuclear material holdup be measured and credited to the accountability books and that all nuclear materials, except attractiveness level E residual holdup, be transferred to another facility. Instead, the decommissioning involved grouting the process equipment in place, rather than measuring and removing the contained holdup for subsequent transfer. The grouting made the potentially attractiveness level C and D holdup even more inaccessible, thereby effectually converting the holdup to attractiveness level E and allowing for termination of safeguards controls. Prior to grouting the facility, the residual holdup was estimated by limited sampling and destructive analysis of solutions in process lines and by acceptable knowledge based upon the separations process, plant layout, and operating history. The use of engineering estimates, in lieu of approved measurement methods, was justified by the estimated small quantity of holdup remaining, the infeasibility of measuring the holdup in a highly radioactive background, and the perceived hazards to personnel. The alternate approach to quantifying and terminating safeguards on process holdup was approved by deviation.

  6. Safeguards & Security (S&S) Program | U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)

    Office of Science (SC) Website

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over OurThe Iron4(SC) Mapping the ImpactSC Correspondence Control CenterSafeguards

  7. Microsoft PowerPoint - IAEA Safeguards Reporting Requirements for U.S. Facilities_Peter Habighorst

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysis and Feedback onWorkingIAEA Safeguards

  8. Manual for Implementation of the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-06-12T23:59:59.000Z

    This Manual provides detailed information for implementing the requirements of DOE O 142.2A, dated 12-15-06; the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in the United States; the Original Protocol to the Agreement; the Additional Protocol to the Agreement signed by the United States and the IAEA on June 12, 1998; and the Interagency Procedures for the Implementation of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. No cancellation. Admin Chg 1, dated 6-27-13, cancels DOE M 142.2-1. Certified 12-3-14.

  9. Manual for Implementation of the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-06-12T23:59:59.000Z

    This Manual provides detailed information for implementing the requirements of DOE O 142.2A, dated 12-15-06; the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in the United States; the Original Protocol to the Agreement; the Additional Protocol to the Agreement signed by the United States and the IAEA on June 12, 1998; and the Interagency Procedures for the Implementation of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. No cancellation. Admin Chg 1, 6-27-13

  10. Role of Soil Disturbances in Determining Post-Harvest Plant1 Biodiversity and Invasive Weed Distributions2

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    ) disturbance frequency, and (4) the severity9 of the disturbance. Both frequency and severity are important1 Role of Soil Disturbances in Determining Post-Harvest Plant1 Biodiversity and Invasive Weed Telephone: +01-928-556-2176, FAX +01-928-556-21308 9 SHORT TITLE: Soil Disturbances, Biodiversity

  11. Demonstration of safeguards technology at the Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), Arzamas-16

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Yuferev, V.; Skripka, G.; Augustson, R.H. [and others

    1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    As part of the US-Russian Lab-to-Lab program for strengthening nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A), a testbed facility has been established in a laboratory of the VNIIEF to demonstrate safeguards technology to nuclear facility operators. The design of the testbed MPC&A system provides the functions of nondestructive measurements for plutonium and highly enriched uranium, item control, personnel access control, radiation portal monitoring, search equipment, and computerized on-line accounting. The system controls, monitors, and accounts for nuclear material and people as the material moves through three MBAs. It also assists with physical inventory taking. A total of 39 instruments and control systems are being demonstrated in the present version of the testbed. Of these, about half are of Russian design and fabrication, including the software for the item monitoring and the accounting systems. These two computer systems are on an ethernet network and connected in a client-server local area architecture. The item monitoring system is integrated with the accounting system, providing alarm and status information to a central dispatcher terminal. The operation of the MPC&A testbed has been demonstrated under routine and alarm conditions in collaboration with safeguards staff from the six participating US national labs. Workshops and training for Russian nuclear facility operators are in progress. As needs for additional MPC&A technology at specific plants are identified, these are incorporated into the testbed and used to certify the hardware and software for implementation at the plant.

  12. The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Containment and Surveillance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Diaz,R.A.

    2008-06-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States Support Program (USSP) priority for containment and surveillance (US) focuses on maintaining or improving the reliability and cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for IAEA safeguards, expanding the number of systems that are unattended and remotely monitored, and developing verification methods that help streamline the on-site inspection process. Existing IAEA C/S systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems, which may include active seals, nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. These systems operate autonomously. They send analytical data to IAEA headquarters where it can be reviewed. These systems present challenges to the goals of improved system performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness. One critical lesson from past experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer, and the facility operator, to create a successful, cost effective system. Recent USSP C/S activities include Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant safeguard systems, production of a new shift register, numerous vulnerability assessments of C/S systems, a conduit monitoring system which identifies tampering of IAEA conduit deployed in the field, fiber optic seal upgrades, unattended monitoring system software upgrades, next generation surveillance system which will upgrade existing camera systems, and support of the IAEA's development of the universal nondestructive assay data acquisition platform.

  13. AUTHENTICATED SENSOR INTERFACE DEVICE FOR JOINT USE SAFEGUARDS APPLICATIONS - CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Poland, R.; Drayer, R.; Wilson, J.

    2013-08-12T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper will discuss the key features of the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device that collectively provide the ability to share data among a number of parties while ensuring the authentication of data and protecting both the operator’s and the IAEA’s interests. The paper will also discuss the development of the prototype, the initial testing with an accountancy scale, and future plans and challenges to implementation into the joint use and remote monitoring applications. As nuclear fuel cycle technology becomes more prevalent throughout the world and the capacity of plants increases, limited resources of the IAEA are being stretched near a breaking point. A strategy is to increase efficiency in safeguards monitoring using “joint use” equipment that will provide the facility operator process data while also providing the IAEA key safeguards data. The data, however, must be authenticated and validated to ensure the data have not been tampered with. The Authenticated Sensor Interface Device provides the capability to share data and can be a valuable component in the IAEA’s ability to collect accountancy data from scales in Uranium conversion and enrichment plants, as well as nuclear fuel fabrication plants. Likewise, the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device can be configured to accept a diverse array of input signals, ranging from analog voltage, to current, to digital interfaces and more. These modular capabilities provide the ability to collect authenticated, joint-use, data streams from various process monitoring sensors.

  14. Implementation of safeguards and security for fissile materials disposition reactor alternative facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1995-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered and include facilities which provide for long-ten-n and interim storage, convert and stabilize fissile materials for other disposition alternatives, immobilize fissile material in glass and/or ceramic material, fabricate fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and dispose of fissile material using a number of geologic alternatives. Particular attention will be given to the reactor alternatives which include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary LWRs and CANDU reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include processing which converts Pu to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility located in either the US or in Europe, US LWRs or the CANDU reactors and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository. This paper focuses on how the objectives of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction and nonproliferation will be accomplished and the possible impacts of meeting these objectives on facility operations and design. Some of the areas in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threat, and (4) potential proliferation risks, the impacts on the facilities, and safeguards and security issues unique to the presence of Category 1 or strategic special nuclear material.

  15. BN-350 unattended safeguards system current status and initial fuel movement data

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, Richard Brady [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Browne, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Parker, Robert F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ingegneri, Maurizio [IAEA

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor facility in Aktau, Kazakhstan continues to provide safeguards monitoring data as the spent fuel disposition project transitions from wet fuel storage to dry storage casks. Qualitative data from the initial cask loading procedures has been released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is presented here for the first time. The BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, operated as a plutonium-producing facility from 1973 W1til 1999. Kazakhstan signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1994, and shortly afterwards the IAEA began safeguarding the reactor facility and its nuclear material. Slnce the cessation of reactor operations ten years ago, the chief proliferation concern has been the spent fuel assemblies stored in the pond on-site. By 2002, all fuel assemblies in wet storage had been repackaged into proliferation-resistant canisters. From the beginning, the IAEA's safeguards campaign at the BN-350 included a constant unattended sensor presence in the form of UNARM which monitors nuclear material activities at the facility in the absence of inspector presence. The UNARM equipment at the BN-350 was designed to be modular and extensible, allowing the system to adapt as the safeguards requirements change. This has been particularly important at the BN-350 due to the prolonged wet storage phase of the project. The primary function of the BN-350 UNARM system is to provide the IAEA with an independent, radiation-centric Containment and Surveillance (C&S) layer in addition to the standard seals and video systems. The UNARM system has provided continuous Continuity of Knowledge (COK) data for the BN-350's nuclear material storage areas in order to ensure the validity of the attended measurements during the lifetime of the project. The first of these attended measurements was characterization of the spent fuel assemblies. This characterization utilized the Spent Fuel Coincidence Counter (SFCC) instrument [ref] to measure neutron multiplicity and calculate Pu mass. These calculated masses were then compared to modeling simulation of the assemblies as well as declarations from the facility in order to baseline the amount of material under IAEA safeguards [ref]. Once the baseline was established, bundles of four or six assemblies were repackaged into proliferati n-resistant canisters. This provided an additional physical barrier to material diversion and provided further protection by choosing assemblies for each canister so that the overall dose rate met self-protection requirements. Each of the canisters were then characterized using a similar technique to the SFCC, but with the Spent Fuel Attribute Monitor (SPAM) instnunent (ref). The data from these measurements were then used to calculate an attribute proportional to the total Pu mass in each canister. This attribute was then compared to the know Pu mass of each assembly in order to verify the accuracy of SPAM. In the event that COK is lost, the SPAM detector remains positioned to reverify Pu content of individual canisters without requiring the canister to be opened.

  16. Identifying Relevant Databases for Multidatabase Mining

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Liu, Huan

    Identifying Relevant Databases for Multidatabase Mining Huan Liu, Hongjun Lu, Jun Yao Department,luhj,yaojung@iscs.nus.edu.sg Abstract. Various tools and systems for knowledge discovery and data mining are developed and available is where we should start mining. In this paper, breaking away from the conventional data mining assumption

  17. Brain Evolution Relevant to P. Thomas Schoenemann

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Schoenemann, P. Thomas

    Brain Evolution Relevant to Language P. Thomas Schoenemann James Madison University 1. Introduction The evolution of language obviously presupposes a brain that made language possible. At the same time, given of the human brain must have been language. Given that language is at least as much a cultural

  18. A Tale of Two Rivers: Implications of Water Management Practices for Mussel Biodiversity Outcomes During Droughts

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Allen, Daniel C.

    REPORT A Tale of Two Rivers: Implications of Water Management Practices for Mussel Biodiversity Outcomes During Droughts Daniel C. Allen, Heather S. Galbraith, Caryn C. Vaughn, Daniel E. Spooner Received Abstract Droughts often pose situations where stream water levels are lowest while human demand for water

  19. National Inventory of Woodland and Trees Analysis of Management and Biodiversity Data

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    National Inventory of Woodland and Trees 1995-1999 Analysis of Management and Biodiversity Data collected during the first National Inventory of Woodland and Trees (NIWT1) that were not published this National Inventory project. The new types of data reflect the rapid expansion in the information needs

  20. V Biodiversity and Conservation6, The non-volant mammal fauna of Mexico

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nacional Autónoma de México, Universidad

    ,- - V Biodiversity and Conservation6, The non-volant mammal fauna of Mexico: speciesrichnessin Nacional Autónoma de México, Apartado Po.l'tal 70-275, 04510 México. D, F., Mexico Received10January 1995;revisedand accepted8 February 1996 ,:j J ~, The mammalian fauna of Mexico is one of the world's richest

  1. The marine biodiversity curve is an icon of paleobiology. The familiar curve shows

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Waxman, David

    the temperate phage infects Escherichia coli, it enters one of two pathways: lytic (replicates and killsThe marine biodiversity curve is an icon of paleobiology. The familiar curve shows increasing (distinct rock units) as a proxy for the amount of marine rock available for paleontological sampling

  2. Species invasions and extinction: The future of native biodiversity on islands

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sax, Dov

    Species invasions and extinction: The future of native biodiversity on islands Dov F. Sax, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 Predation by exotic species has caused the extinction these scenarios have for the future retention or extinction of native plant species. Finally, we identify invasion

  3. River restoration, habitat heterogeneity and biodiversity: a failure of theory or practice?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Palmer, Margaret A.

    heterogeneity (HH) promotes restoration of biodiversity. This paradigm is reflected in stream restoration in streams that were not in need of restoration. 3. We found habitat and macroinvertebrate data for 78 independent stream or river restoration projects described by 18 different author groups in which invertebrate

  4. BirdWatch--Supporting Citizen Scientists for Better Linked Data Quality for Biodiversity

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hyvönen, Eero

    quality in a citizen science setting, and presents a mobile tool BirdWatch for citizen observers, miti be initiated. In many areas of biology, much of the observational data is based on citizen science: the dataBirdWatch--Supporting Citizen Scientists for Better Linked Data Quality for Biodiversity Management

  5. Characterisation of biodiversity in improved rubber agroforests in West-Kalimantan,

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Paris-Sud XI, Université de

    Characterisation of biodiversity in improved rubber agroforests in West-Kalimantan, Indonesia. Real of jungle rubber. Since the introduction of rubber at the turn of the 20th century smallholders have developed an original complex agroforestry system called jungle rubber in which non selected young rubber

  6. Plant biodiversity and ethnobotany inside the projected impact area of the Upper Seti Hydropower Project,

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Asselin, Hugo

    Plant biodiversity and ethnobotany inside the projected impact area of the Upper Seti Hydropower hydropower project, currently under feasibility study. The objective of the study was to document plant the construction of major hydropower infrastructure (Pokharel 2001; Bartle 2002). However, potential impacts

  7. biodiversity over the past two decades, but, except for a few flagship species, detailed

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Li, Zhanqing

    as a carbon-free source of energy (10). The construction of dams is increas- ingly regarded as the biggest biodiversity. One thing is for sure, though: The rising water brings a tremendous amount of energy, but what Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, People's Republic of China. References and Notes 1. D. Dudgeon, Bio

  8. Homogenization of regional river dynamics by dams and global biodiversity implications

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Poff, N. LeRoy

    Homogenization of regional river dynamics by dams and global biodiversity implications N. Le differ- ences in climate and geology. Extensive construction of dams by humans has greatly dampened to regional-scale environmental templates caused by dams is largely unexplored but of critical conservation

  9. Deforestation and biodiversity conservation in Mexico1 Vctor Snchez-Cordero1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sarkar, Sahotra

    Deforestation and biodiversity conservation in Mexico1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712-1180, USA. Abstract Deforestation is one of the main factors negatively affecting the conservation of biological diversity. We assess the impact of deforestation

  10. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences Biodiversity and Ecosystem Processes in Freshwater Sediments

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Palmer, Margaret A.

    Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences Biodiversity and Ecosystem Processes in Freshwater Sediments: Springer on behalf of Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4314671@jstor.org. . Springer and Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve

  11. Treatment of biodiversity issues in impact assessment of electricity power transmission lines: A Finnish case review

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Soederman, Tarja [Senior Researcher, Lic. Phil., Finnish Environment Institute, Nature Division, P.O. Box 140, FIN-00251 Helsinki (Finland)]. E-mail: tarja.soderman@ymparisto.fi

    2006-05-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process concerning the route of a 400 kV power transmission line between Loviisa and Hikiae in southern Finland was reviewed in order to assess how biodiversity issues are treated and to provide suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of treatment of biodiversity issues in impact assessment of linear development projects. The review covered the whole assessment process, including interviews of stakeholders, participation in the interest group meetings and review of all documents from the project. The baseline studies and assessment of direct impacts in the case study were detailed but the documentation, both the assessment programme and the assessment report, only gave a partial picture of the assessment process. All existing information, baseline survey and assessment methods should be addressed in the scoping phase in order to promote interaction between all stakeholders. In contrast to the assessment of the direct effects, which first emphasized impacts on the nationally important and protected flying squirrel but later expanded to deal with the assessment of impacts on ecologically important sites, the indirect and cumulative impacts of the power line were poorly addressed. The public was given the opportunity to become involved in the EIA process. However, they were more concerned with impacts on their properties and less so on biodiversity and species protection issues. This suggests that the public needs to become more informed about locally important features of biodiversity.

  12. Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) into the design of small modular reactors : a handbook.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Middleton, Bobby D.; Mendez, Carmen Margarita [Sociotecnia Solutions] [Sociotecnia Solutions

    2013-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The existing regulatory environment for nuclear reactors impacts both the facility design and the cost of operations once the facility is built. Delaying the consideration of regulatory requirements until late in the facility design - or worse, until after construction has begun - can result in costly retrofitting as well as increased operational costs to fulfill safety, security, safeguards, and emergency readiness requirements. Considering the scale and scope, as well as the latest design trends in the next generation of nuclear facilities, there is an opportunity to evaluate the regulatory requirements and optimize the design process for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), as compared to current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). To this end, Sandia has embarked on an initiative to evaluate the interactions of regulations and operations as an approach to optimizing the design of SMR facilities, supporting operational efficiencies, as well as regulatory requirements. The early stages of this initiative consider two focus areas. The first focus area, reported by LaChance, et al. (2007), identifies the regulatory requirements established for the current fleet of LWR facilities regarding Safety, Security, Operations, Safeguards, and Emergency Planning, and evaluates the technical bases for these requirements. The second focus area, developed in this report, documents the foundations for an innovative approach that supports a design framework for SMR facilities that incorporates the regulatory environment, as well as the continued operation of the facility, into the early design stages, eliminating the need for costly retrofitting and additional operating personnel to fulfill regulatory requirements. The work considers a technique known as Integrated Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (ISOSS) (Darby, et al., 2007). In coordination with the best practices of industrial operations, the goal of this effort is to develop a design framework that outlines how ISOSS requirements can be incorporated into the pre-conceptual through early facility design stages, seeking a cost-effective design that meets both operational efficiencies and the regulatory environment. The larger scope of the project, i.e., in future stages, includes the identification of potentially conflicting requirements identified by the ISOSS framework, including an analysis of how regulatory requirements may be changed to account for the intrinsic features of SMRs.

  13. Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Humberto E. Garcia

    2014-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system-centric strategy that utilizes data collected from a system of sensors and that effectively exploits known characterizations of sensors and facility operations in order to significantly improve anomaly detection, reduce false alarm, and enhance assessment robustness under unreliable partial sensor information.

  14. American Indian Policy and Relevant DOE and Executive Orders...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Services Communication & Engagement Tribal Programs American Indian Policy and Relevant DOE and Executive Orders American Indian Policy and Relevant DOE and Executive...

  15. Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 2. Appendix

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Goldman, A J

    1984-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This appendix provides detailed information regarding game theory (strategic analysis) and its potential role in safeguards to supplement the main body of this report. In particualr, it includes an extensive, though not comprehensive review of literature on game theory and on other topics that relate to the formulation of a game-theoretic model (e.g. the payoff functions). The appendix describes the basic form and components of game theory models, and the solvability of various models. It then discusses three basic issues related to the use of strategic analysis in material accounting: (1) its understandability; (2) its viability in regulatory settings; and (3) difficulties in the use of mixed strategies. Each of the components of a game theoretic model are then discussed and related to the present context.

  16. Probabilistic risk analysis toward cost-effective 3S (safety, safeguards, security) implementation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Mochiji, Toshiro [Department of Science and Technology for Nuclear Material Management, Japan Atomic Energy Agency, 2-4 Shirane, Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Naka-gun, Ibaraki 319-1193 (Japan)

    2014-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) has been introduced for several decades in safety and nuclear advanced countries have already used this methodology in their own regulatory systems. However, PRA has not been developed in safeguards and security so far because of inherent difficulties in intentional and malicious acts. In this paper, probabilistic proliferation and risk analysis based on random process is applied to hypothetical reprocessing process and physical protection system in nuclear reactor with the Markov model that was originally developed by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) in Generation IV International Framework (GIF). Through the challenge to quantify the security risk with a frequency in this model, integrated risk notion among 3S to pursue the cost-effective installation of those countermeasures is discussed in a heroic manner.

  17. The ASSESS (Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security) Outsider module with multiple analyses

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Snell, M.K.; Winblad, A.E. (Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA)); Bingham, B.; Key, B.; Walker, S. (Science and Engineering Associates, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (USA))

    1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) includes modules for analyzing vulnerabilities against outsider and insider adversaries. The ASSESS Outsider Analysis Module has been upgraded to allow for defining, analyzing, and displaying the results of multiple analyses. Once a set of threat definitions have been defined in one Outsider file, they can be readily copied to other Outsider files. This multiple analysis, or batch, mode of operation provides an efficient way of covering the standard DOE outsider threat spectrum. A new approach for coupling the probability of interruption, P(I), values and values calculated by the ASSESS Neutralization module has been implemented in Outsider and is described. An enhanced capability for printing results of these multiple analyses is also included in the upgraded Outside module. 7 refs., 7 figs., 1 tab.

  18. Safeguards and Security FY 1996 Program Plan: WBS 6.6

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lee, F.D.

    1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards and Security (SAS) Program is based upon integrity, competence and innovation in the protection of the public and Hanford resources through: (1) outstanding assistance, oversight, education, and counsel to their customers to ensure the protection of the public, site personnel, assets, and information; (2) value-added and cost-effective solutions to Hanford issues; and (3) risk management techniques to ensure effective asset protection, site accessibility, and the flexibility to adapt to changing customer needs. This plan is divided into two parts: overview and SAS WBS (work breakdown structure) dictionary sheets. The overview is divided into vision and mission, goals and objectives, assumptions and priorities, milestones, and a summary. The SAS WBS dictionary sheets are divided into department overhead, general and administrative, sitewide support, Hanford patrol, traffic safety, and locksmith services.

  19. Precision Information Environment (PIE) for International Safeguards: Pre-Demonstration Development Use Cases

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.

    2013-11-13T23:59:59.000Z

    In FY2013, the PIE International Safeguards team demonstrated our development progress to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) staff from the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24, our client) and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22). Following the demonstration, the team was asked by our client to complete additional development prior to a planned demonstration at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), scheduled tentatively for January or spring of 2014. The team discussed four potential areas for development (in priority order), and will develop them as time and funding permit prior to an IAEA demonstration. The four capability areas are: 1. Addition of equipment manuals to PIE-accessible files 2. Optical character recognition (OCR) of photographed text 3. Barcode reader with information look-up from a database 4. Add Facilities to Data Model 5. Geospatial capabilities with information integration Each area will be described below in a use case.

  20. Considerations for Possible Light Impact of Spent Nuclear Fuel for Safeguards Measurements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brian K. Castle; Kelly D. Ellis

    2012-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This effort is designed to be a preliminary study to determine the appropriateness of lightly contacting SNF with zirconium-based cladding, in wet storage, for the purpose of taking safeguards measurements. Contact will likely consist of an initial impact followed by a light tensile load on the exterior surface of the SNF cladding. In the past, concerns have been raised that contacting SNF cladding could result in a loss of long-term mechanical integrity due to crack initiation, uncontrolled crack propagation, and a mechanical exfoliation of the protective oxide layer. The mechanical integrity concerns are addressed with an analytic model that evaluates the threshold impact limits for degraded, but undamaged SNF cladding. Aqueous corrosion concerns, associated with exfoliation of the protective oxide layer, are addressed with a qualitative argument, focusing on the possible corrosion mechanisms of zirconium-based cladding.

  1. Safeguards design strategies: designing and constructing new uranium and plutonium processing facilities in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Scherer, Carolynn P [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Long, Jon D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

    In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) is transforming its outdated and oversized complex of aging nuclear material facilities into a smaller, safer, and more secure National Security Enterprise (NSE). Environmental concerns, worker health and safety risks, material security, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while maintaining the capability for an effective nuclear deterrence by the United States, are influencing this transformation. As part of the nation's Uranium Center of Excellence (UCE), the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will advance the U.S.'s capability to meet all concerns when processing uranium and is located adjacent to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF), designed for consolidated storage of enriched uranium. The HEUMF became operational in March 2010, and the UPF is currently entering its final design phase. The designs of both facilities are for meeting anticipated security challenges for the 21st century. For plutonium research, development, and manufacturing, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico is now under construction. The first phase of the CMRR Project is the design and construction of a Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building. The second phase consists of the design and construction of the Nuclear Facility (NF). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) selected these two sites as part of the national plan to consolidate nuclear materials, provide for nuclear deterrence, and nonproliferation mission requirements. This work examines these two projects independent approaches to design requirements, and objectives for safeguards, security, and safety (3S) systems as well as the subsequent construction of these modern processing facilities. Emphasis is on the use of Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), incorporating Systems Engineering (SE) principles for these two projects.

  2. INL Active Interrogation Testing In Support of the GNEP Safeguards Campaign

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    David L. Chichester

    2008-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. Work at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in the area of active interrogation, using neutron and photon sources, has been under way for many years to develop methods for detecting and quantifying nuclear material for national and homeland security research areas. This research knowledge base is now being extended to address nuclear safeguards and process monitoring issues related to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). As a first step in this area preliminary scoping studies have been performed to investigate the usefulness of using active neutron interrogation, with a low-power electronic neutron generator, to assay Department of Transportation 6M shipping drums containing uranium oxide fuel rodlets from INL’s zero power physics reactor. Using the paired-counting technique during the die-away time period of interrogation, a lower detection limit of approximately 4.2 grams of enriched uranium (40% 235U) was calculated for a 40 minute measurement using a field portable 2.5 MeV neutron source and an array of 16 moderated helium-3 neutron tubes. Future work in this area, including the use of a more powerful neutron source and a better tailored detector array, would likely improve this limit to a much lower level. Further development work at INL will explore the applicability of active interrogation in association with the nuclear safeguards and process monitoring needs of the advanced GNEP facilities under consideration. This work, which will include both analyses and field demonstrations, will be performed in collaboration with colleagues at INL and elsewhere that have expertise in nuclear fuel reprocessing as well as active interrogation and its use for nuclear material analyses.

  3. LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROGRAM The purpose of the Lockout/Tagout program is to safeguard employees from unexpected start-up of

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROGRAM The purpose of the Lockout/Tagout program is to safeguard employees from the Lockout/Tagout Program, please contact the EH&S Occupational Health and Safety Program at 725-3209. #12;

  4. Safeguarding Health Information: Building Assurance through HIPAA Security Hosted by the HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    1 Safeguarding Health Information: Building Assurance through HIPAA Security Hosted by the HHS, Acting Chief, Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), NIST 9 Data Using Encryption Matthew Scholl, Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory

  5. EERE QC Workshop: Overview of Relevant Processes

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny:Revised Finding of98-F, Western22, 2014FluidLaboratoryDesertEERE PowerPointRelevant

  6. Biodiversity Conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study of the African Dwarf Crocodiles (Osteolaemus Spp.)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Smolensky, Nicole Limunga

    2014-11-20T23:59:59.000Z

    Overexploitation of wildlife is a leading threat to biodiversity in tropical Africa. Effective management requires integrating information on the extent of exploitation, distribution, and status of exploited species. I explore how trade filters...

  7. Enabling Biodiversity Research with Open Source Workflow, GIS and Metadata Tools

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Grady, C.J.

    2011-11-16T23:59:59.000Z

    for conservation and management decisions • Challenges – Large extents (> 10,000 km2) – Fine resolution (< 1000 m2 ? 30m x 30m) –Many species (10,000 +) QGIS with Lifemapper MacroEcology plug?in Hexagonal Grid Mouse ‘Presence’ Sites / Species Plot VisTrails Reproducibility • Simple... process metadata • Process metadata extensions • Lifemapper client metadata reader Collaborations • KU Biodiversity Institute • NSF Cyber?Commons • Change Thinking • CI Team http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VCFixtqlimg Future Directions • Publish...

  8. Design and development of a 3He replacement safeguards neutron counter based on 10B-lined proportional detector technology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Henzlova, Daniela [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Evans, Louise [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rael, Carlos D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Martinez, Isaac P. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This presentation represents an overview of the experimental evaluation of a boron-lined proportional technology performed within an NA-241 sponsored project on testing of boron-lined proportional counters for the purpose of replacement of {sup 3}He technologies. The presented boron-lined technology will be utilized in a design of a full scale safeguards neutron coincidence counter. The design considerations and the Monte Carlo performance predictions for the counter are also presented.

  9. Towards increased policy relevance in energy modeling

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Worrell, Ernst; Ramesohl, Stephan; Boyd, Gale

    2003-07-29T23:59:59.000Z

    Historically, most energy models were reasonably equipped to assess the impact of a subsidy or change in taxation, but are often insufficient to assess the impact of more innovative policy instruments. We evaluate the models used to assess future energy use, focusing on industrial energy use. We explore approaches to engineering-economic analysis that could help improve the realism and policy relevance of engineering-economic modeling frameworks. We also explore solutions to strengthen the policy usefulness of engineering-economic analysis that can be built from a framework of multi-disciplinary cooperation. We focus on the so-called ''engineering-economic'' (or ''bottom-up'') models, as they include the amount of detail that is commonly needed to model policy scenarios. We identify research priorities for the modeling framework, technology representation in models, policy evaluation and modeling of decision-making behavior.

  10. FEMO, A FLOW AND ENRICHMENT MONITOR FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS AT A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gunning, John E [ORNL; Laughter, Mark D [ORNL; March-Leuba, Jose A [ORNL

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A number of countries have received construction licenses or are contemplating the construction of large-capacity gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The capability to independently verify nuclear material flows is a key component of international safeguards approaches, and the IAEA does not currently have an approved method to continuously monitor the mass flow of 235U in uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas streams. Oak Ridge National Laboratory is investigating the development of a flow and enrichment monitor, or FEMO, based on an existing blend-down monitoring system (BDMS). The BDMS was designed to continuously monitor both 235U mass flow and enrichment of UF6 streams at the low pressures similar to those which exists at GCEPs. BDMSs have been installed at three sites-the first unit has operated successfully in an unattended environment for approximately 10 years. To be acceptable to GCEP operators, it is essential that the instrument be installed and maintained without interrupting operations. A means to continuously verify flow as is proposed by FEMO will likely be needed to monitor safeguards at large-capacity plants. This will enable the safeguards effectiveness that currently exists at smaller plants to be maintained at the larger facilities and also has the potential to reduce labor costs associated with inspections at current and future plants. This paper describes the FEMO design requirements, operating capabilities, and development work required before field demonstration.

  11. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA): A Nondestructive Assay Technique for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Plutonium Assay Challenge

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. W. Sterbentz; D. L. Chichester

    2010-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This is an end-of-year report for a project funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241). The goal of this project is to investigate the feasibility of using Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) to assay plutonium in commercial light-water-reactor spent fuel. This project is part of a larger research effort within the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to evaluate methods for assaying plutonium in spent fuel, the Plutonium Assay Challenge. The first-year goals for this project were modest and included: 1) developing a zero-order MCNP model for the NRTA technique, simulating data results presented in the literature, 2) completing a preliminary set of studies investigating important design and performance characteristics for the NRTA measurement technique, and 3) documentation of this work in an end of the year report (this report). Research teams at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and at several universities are also working to investigate plutonium assay methods for spent-fuel safeguards. While the NRTA technique is well proven in the scientific literature for assaying individual spent fuel pins, it is a newcomer to the current NGSI efforts studying Pu assay method techniques having just started in March 2010; several analytical techniques have been under investigation within this program for two to three years or more. This report summarizes a nine month period of work.

  12. Technology diffusion of a different nature: Applications of nuclear safeguards technology to the chemical weapons verification regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kadner, S.P. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Reisman, A. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Turpen, E. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Cambridge, MA (United States)

    1996-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

  13. Interim Update: Global Automotive Power Electronics R&D Relevant...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Interim Update: Global Automotive Power Electronics R&D Relevant To DOE 2015 and 2020 Cost Targets Interim Update: Global Automotive Power Electronics R&D Relevant To DOE 2015 and...

  14. Safeguards Verification Measurements using Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anheier, Norman C.; Cannon, Bret D.; Kulkarni, Gourihar R.; Munley, John T.; Nelson, Danny A.; Qiao, Hong (Amy) [Amy; Phillips, Jon R.

    2012-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

    Laser Ablation Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) is a new verification measurement technology under development at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). LAARS uses three lasers to ablate and then measure the relative isotopic abundance of uranium compounds. An ablation laser is tightly focused on uranium-bearing solids, producing a small atomic uranium vapor plume. Two collinear wavelength-tuned spectrometry lasers transit through the plume and the absorbance of U-235 and U-238 isotopes are measured to determine U-235 enrichment. The measurement is independent of chemical form and degree of dilution with nuisance dust and other materials. LAARS has high relative precision and detection limits approaching the femtogram range for U-235. The sample is scanned and assayed point-by-point at rates reaching 1 million measurements/hour, enabling LAARS to detect and analyze uranium in trace samples. The spectrometer is assembled using primarily commercially available components and features a compact design and automated analysis.Two specific gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) applications of the spectrometer are currently under development: 1) LAARS-Environmental Sampling (ES), which collects and analyzes aerosol particles for GCEP misuse detection and 2) LAARS-Destructive Assay (DA), which enables onsite enrichment DA sample collection and analysis for protracted diversion detection. The two applications propose game-changing technological advances in GCEP safeguards verification.

  15. Application of EMCAS timeliness model to the safeguards/facility interface

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.

    1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Hanford operating contractor has developed a timeliness model for periodic mass balance tests (MBTs) for loss of special nuclear material (SNM). The purpose of the model is to compute the probability that an adversary will be detected by a periodic MBT before he could escape from a facility with stolen SNM using stealth and deceit to avoid detection. The model considers (a) the loss detection sensitivity of the MBT, (b) the time between MBTs, and (c) the statistical distribution of the total time required to complete stealth and deceit strategies. The model shows whether or not it is cost-effective to conduct frequent MBTs for loss and where improvements should be made. The Evaluation Methods for Material Control and Accountability Safeguards Systems (EMCAS) timeliness model computes the loss detection capability of periodic materials control and accounting (MC A) tests in terms of (a) the ability of the test to detect the specified target quantity and (b) the probability that the MC A test will occur before the adversary can complete the sequence of stealth and deceit strategies required to avoid detection.

  16. Savannah River Site delayed neutron instruments for safeguards measurements. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Studley, R.V.

    1992-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) includes a variety of nuclear production facilities that, since 1953, have processed special nuclear materials (SNM) including highly-enriched uranium (>90% {sup 235}U), recycled enriched uranium ({approximately}50% {sup 235}U + 40% {sup 236}U), low burnup plutonium (> 90% {sup 239}Pu + < 6% {sup 240}Pu ) and several other nuclear materials such as heat source plutonium ({sup 238}Pu). DOE Orders, primarily 5633.3, require all nuclear materials to be safeguarded through accountability and material control. Accountability measurements determine the total amount of material in a facility, balancing inventory changes against receipts and shipments, to provide assurance (delayed) that all material was present. Material control immediately detects or deters theft or diversion by assuring materials remain in assigned locations or by impeding unplanned movement of materials within or from a material access area. Goals for accountability or material control, and, therefore, the design of measurement systems, are distinctly different. Accountability measurements are optimized for maximum precision and accuracy, usually for large amounts of special nuclear material. Material control measurements are oriented more toward security features and often must be optimized for sensitivity, to detect small amounts of materials where none should be.

  17. AUTOMATED PROCESS MONITORING: APPLYING PROVEN AUTOMATION TECHNIQUES TO INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS NEEDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O'Hara, Matthew J.; Durst, Philip C.; Grate, Jay W.; Devol, Timothy A.; Egorov, Oleg; Clements, John P.

    2008-07-13T23:59:59.000Z

    Identification and quantification of specific alpha- and beta-emitting radionuclides in complex liquid matrices is highly challenging, and is typically accomplished through laborious wet chemical sample preparation and separations followed by analysis using a variety of detection methodologies (e.g., liquid scintillation, gas proportional counting, alpha energy analysis, mass spectrometry). Analytical results may take days or weeks to report. Chains of custody and sample security measures may also complicate or slow the analytical process. When an industrial process-scale plant requires the monitoring of specific radionuclides as an indication of the composition of its feed stream or of plant performance, radiochemical measurements must be fast, accurate, and reliable. Scientists at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have assembled a fully automated prototype Process Monitor instrument capable of a variety of tasks: automated sampling directly from a feed stream, sample digestion / analyte redox adjustment, chemical separations, radiochemical detection and data analysis / reporting. The system is compact, its components are fluidically inter-linked, and analytical results could be immediately transmitted to on- or off-site locations. The development of a rapid radiochemical Process Monitor for 99Tc in Hanford tank waste processing streams, capable of performing several measurements per hour, will be discussed in detail. More recently, the automated platform was modified to perform measurements of 90Sr in Hanford tank waste stimulant. The system exemplifies how automation could be integrated into reprocessing facilities to support international nuclear safeguards needs.

  18. The Feasibility of Cask "Fingerprinting" as a Spent-Fuel, Dry-Storage Cask Safeguards Technique

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ziock, K P; Vanier, P; Forman, L; Caffrey, G; Wharton, J; Lebrun, A

    2005-07-27T23:59:59.000Z

    This report documents a week-long measurement campaign conducted on six, dry-storage, spent-nuclear-fuel storage casks at the Idaho National Laboratory. A gamma-ray imager, a thermal-neutron imager and a germanium spectrometer were used to collect data on the casks. The campaign was conducted to examine the feasibility of using the cask radiation signatures as unique identifiers for individual casks as part of a safeguards regime. The results clearly show different morphologies for the various cask types although the signatures are deemed insufficient to uniquely identify individual casks of the same type. Based on results with the germanium spectrometer and differences between thermal neutron images and neutron-dose meters, this result is thought to be due to the limitations of the extant imagers used, rather than of the basic concept. Results indicate that measurements with improved imagers could contain significantly more information. Follow-on measurements with new imagers either currently available as laboratory prototypes or under development are recommended.

  19. Advances Towards Readily Deployable Antineutrino Detectors for Reactor Monitoring and Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowden, N S; Bernstein, A; Dazeley, S; Lund, J; Reyna, D; Sadler, L; Svoboda, R

    2008-06-05T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear reactors have served as the neutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Our LLNL/SNL collaboration has demonstrated that such antineutrino based monitoring is feasible using a relatively small cubic meter scale detector at tens of meters standoff from a commercial PWR. With little or no burden on the plant operator we have been able to remotely and automatically monitor the reactor operational status (on/off), power level, and fuel burnup. Recently, we have investigated several technology paths that could allow such devices to be more readily deployed in the field. In particular, we have developed and fielded two new detectors; a low cost, non- flammable water based design; and a robust solid-state design based upon plastic scintillator. Here we will describe the tradeoffs inherent in these designs, and present results from their field deployments.

  20. Contextual Risk and Its Relevance in Economics

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Diederik Aerts; Sandro Sozzo

    2011-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

    Uncertainty in economics still poses some fundamental problems illustrated, e.g., by the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. To overcome these difficulties, economists have introduced an interesting distinction between 'risk' and 'ambiguity' depending on the existence of a (classical Kolmogorovian) probabilistic structure modeling these uncertainty situations. On the other hand, evidence of everyday life suggests that 'context' plays a fundamental role in human decisions under uncertainty. Moreover, it is well known from physics that any probabilistic structure modeling contextual interactions between entities structurally needs a non-Kolmogorovian quantum-like framework. In this paper we introduce the notion of 'contextual risk' with the aim of modeling a substantial part of the situations in which usually only 'ambiguity' is present. More precisely, we firstly introduce the essentials of an operational formalism called 'the hidden measurement approach' in which probability is introduced as a consequence of fluctuations in the interaction between entities and contexts. Within the hidden measurement approach we propose a 'sphere model' as a mathematical tool for situations in which contextual risk occurs. We show that a probabilistic model of this kind is necessarily non-Kolmogorovian, hence it requires either the formalism of quantum mechanics or a generalization of it. This insight is relevant, for it explains the presence of quantum or, better, quantum-like, structures in economics, as suggested by some authors, and can serve to solve the aforementioned paradoxes.

  1. Money for something? Investigating the effectiveness of biodiversity conservation interventions in the Northern Plains of Cambodia

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Clements, Thomas

    2013-04-16T23:59:59.000Z

    ),!leading!to!calls!for!increases!in!future!funding!by!an!order!of!magnitude!or!more!(Eliasch,!2008).!!Designing!policies!to!conserve!and!sustainably!mange!environmental!resources!and!biodiversity!is!however!extremely!challenging,!given!the!complex!and... !intervention!based!on!a!simplification!of!this!complexity!(Hirschmann,!1968;!Roe,!1991;!Mosse,!2004).!Strong!narratives!can!become!convincing!arguments!for!change,!particularly!when!supported!by!powerful!actors,!such!as!national!Governments,!donor!aid!agencies!and!international!organisations,!and!can!lead!to!the...

  2. Advances toward a transportable antineutrino detector system for reactor monitoring and safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reyna, D. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bernstein, A. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Lund, J.; Kiff, S.; Cabrera-Palmer, B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bowden, N. S.; Dazeley, S.; Keefer, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States)

    2011-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear reactors have served as the neutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Our SNL/LLNL collaboration has demonstrated that such antineutrino based monitoring is feasible using a relatively small cubic meter scale liquid scintillator detector at tens of meters standoff from a commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). With little or no burden on the plant operator we have been able to remotely and automatically monitor the reactor operational status (on/off), power level, and fuel burnup. The initial detector was deployed in an underground gallery that lies directly under the containment dome of an operating PWR. The gallery is 25 meters from the reactor core center, is rarely accessed by plant personnel, and provides a muon-screening effect of some 20-30 meters of water equivalent earth and concrete overburden. Unfortunately, many reactor facilities do not contain an equivalent underground location. We have therefore attempted to construct a complete detector system which would be capable of operating in an aboveground location and could be transported to a reactor facility with relative ease. A standard 6-meter shipping container was used as our transportable laboratory - containing active and passive shielding components, the antineutrino detector and all electronics, as well as climate control systems. This aboveground system was deployed and tested at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in southern California in 2010 and early 2011. We will first present an overview of the initial demonstrations of our below ground detector. Then we will describe the aboveground system and the technological developments of the two antineutrino detectors that were deployed. Finally, some preliminary results of our aboveground test will be shown. (authors)

  3. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Overview and Policy Context of UF6 Cylinder Tracking Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Whitaker, J. Michael [ORNL; White-Horton, Jessica L. [ORNL; Durbin, Karyn R. [NNSA

    2012-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

    Thousands of cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) move around the world from conversion plants to enrichment plants to fuel fabrication plants, and their contents could be very useful to a country intent on diverting uranium for clandestine use. Each of these large cylinders can contain close to a significant quantity of natural uranium (48Y cylinder) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) (30B cylinder) defined as 75 kg {sup 235}U which can be further clandestinely enriched to produce 1.5 to 2 significant quantities of high enriched uranium (HEU) within weeks or months depending on the scale of the clandestine facility. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) kicked off a 5-year plan in April 2011 to investigate the concept of a unique identification system for UF{sub 6} cylinders and potentially to develop a cylinder tracking system that could be used by facility operators and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The goal is to design an integrated solution beneficial to both industry and inspectorates that would improve cylinder operations at the facilities and provide enhanced capabilities to deter and detect both diversion of low-enriched uranium and undeclared enriched uranium production. The 5-year plan consists of six separate incremental tasks: (1) define the problem and establish the requirements for a unique identification (UID) and monitoring system; (2) develop a concept of operations for the identification and monitoring system; (3) determine cylinder monitoring devices and technology; (4) develop a registry database to support proof-of-concept demonstration; (5) integrate that system for the demonstration; and (6) demonstrate proof-of-concept. Throughout NNSA's performance of the tasks outlined in this program, the multi-laboratory team emphasizes that extensive engagement with industry stakeholders, regulatory authorities and inspectorates is essential to its success.

  4. Uranium-233 waste definition: Disposal options, safeguards, criticality control, and arms control

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Storch, S.N. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Lewis, L.C. [Lockheed Martin Idaho Technology Co., Idaho Falls, ID (United States). Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Lab.

    1998-07-07T23:59:59.000Z

    The US investigated the use of {sup 233}U for weapons, reactors, and other purposes from the 1950s into the 1970s. Based on the results of these investigations, it was decided not to use {sup 233}U on a large scale. Most of the {sup 233}U-containing materials were placed in long-term storage. At the end of the cold war, the US initiated, as part of its arms control policies, a disposition program for excess fissile materials. Other programs were accelerated for disposal of radioactive wastes placed in storage during the cold war. Last, potential safety issues were identified related to the storage of some {sup 233}U-containing materials. Because of these changes, significant activities associated with {sup 233}U-containing materials are expected. This report is one of a series of reports to provide the technical bases for future decisions on how to manage this material. A basis for defining when {sup 233}U-containing materials can be managed as waste and when they must be managed as concentrated fissile materials has been developed. The requirements for storage, transport, and disposal of radioactive wastes are significantly different than those for fissile materials. Because of these differences, it is important to classify material in its appropriate category. The establishment of a definition of what is waste and what is fissile material will provide the guidance for appropriate management of these materials. Wastes are defined in this report as materials containing sufficiently small masses or low concentrations of fissile materials such that they can be managed as typical radioactive waste. Concentrated fissile materials are defined herein as materials containing sufficient fissile content such as to warrant special handling to address nuclear criticality, safeguards, and arms control concerns.

  5. ON-LINE MONITORING FOR CONTROL AND SAFEGUARDING OF RADIOCHEMICAL STREAMS AT SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Lines, Amanda M.; Billing, Justin M.; Casella, Amanda J.; Johnsen, Amanda M.; Peterson, James M.; Thomas, Elizabeth M.

    2009-11-10T23:59:59.000Z

    Advanced techniques that enhance safeguarding of spent fuel reprocessing plants are urgently needed. Our approach is based on the prerequisite that real-time monitoring of solvent extraction flowsheets at a spent fuel reprocessing plant provides the unique capability to quickly detect unwanted manipulations with fissile isotopes present in the radiochemical streams during reprocessing activities. The methods used to monitor these processes must be robust and capable of withstanding harsh radiation and chemical environments. A new on-line monitoring system satisfying these requirements and featuring Raman spectroscopy combined with a Coriolis and conductivity probes recently has been developed by our research team for tank waste retrieval. It provides immediate chemical data and flow parameters of high-level radioactive waste streams with high brine content generated during retrieval activities from nuclear waste storage tanks at the Hanford Site. The nature of the radiochemical streams at the spent fuel reprocessing plant calls for additional spectroscopic information that can be gained by using Vis-NIR capabilities augmenting Raman spectroscopy. A fiber optic Raman probe allows monitoring of high concentration species encountered in both aqueous and organic phases within the UREX suite of flowsheets, including metal oxide ions, such as uranyl, components of the organic solvent, inorganic oxo-anions, and water. Actinides and lanthanides are monitored remotely by Vis-NIR spectroscopy in aqueous and organic phases. In this report, we present our results on spectroscopic measurements of simulant flowsheet solutions and commercial fuels designed to demonstrate the applicability of Raman and Vis-NIR spectroscopic analysis for actual dissolver feed solutions.

  6. Remote-Reading Safety and Safeguards Surveillance System for 3013 Containers

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lechelt, W. M.; Skorpik, J. R.; Silvers, K. L.; Szempruch, R. W.; Douglas, D. G.; Fein, K. O.

    2002-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

    At Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), plutonium oxide is being loaded into stainless steel containers for long-term storage on the Hanford Site. These containers consist of two weld-sealed stainless steel cylinders nested one within the other. A third container holds the plutonium within the inner cylinder. This design meets the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) storage standard, DOE-STD- 3013-2000, which anticipates a 50-year storage lifetime. The 3013 standard also requires a container surveillance program to continuously monitor pressure and to assure safeguards are adequate. However, the configuration of the container system makes using conventional measurement and monitoring methods difficult. To better meet the 3013 monitoring requirements, a team from Fluor Hanford (who manages the PFP), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and Vista Engineering Technologies, LLC, developed a safer, cost-efficient, remote PFP 3013 container surveillance system. This new surveillance system is a combination of two successfully deployed technologies: (1) a magnetically coupled pressure gauge developed by Vista Engineering and (2) a radio frequency (RF) tagging device developed by PNNL. This system provides continuous, 100% monitoring of critical parameters with the containers in place, as well as inventory controls. The 3013 container surveillance system consists of three main elements: (1) an internal magnetic pressure sensor package, (2) an instrument pod (external electronics package), and (3) a data acquisition storage and display computer. The surveillance system described in this paper has many benefits for PFP and DOE in terms of cost savings and reduced personnel exposure. In addition, continuous safety monitoring (i.e., internal container pressure and temperature) of every container is responsible nuclear material stewardship and fully meets and exceeds DOE's Integrated Surveillance Program requirements.

  7. Modeling of UF{sub 6} enrichment with gas centrifuges for nuclear safeguards activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mercurio, G.; Peerani, P.; Richir, P.; Janssens, W.; Eklund, G. [European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements Via Fermi, 2749-TP181,20127 Ispra (Italy)

    2012-09-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The physical modeling of uranium isotopes ({sup 235}U, {sup 238}U) separation process by centrifugation of is a key aspect for predicting the nuclear fuel enrichment plant performances under surveillance by the Nuclear Safeguards Authorities. In this paper are illustrated some aspects of the modeling of fast centrifuges for UF{sub 6} gas enrichment and of a typical cascade enrichment plant with the Theoretical Centrifuge and Cascade Simulator (TCCS). The background theory for reproducing the flow field characteristics of a centrifuge is derived from the work of Cohen where the separation parameters are calculated using the solution of a differential enrichment equation. In our case we chose to solve the hydrodynamic equations for the motion of a compressible fluid in a centrifugal field using the Berman - Olander vertical velocity radial distribution and the solution was obtained using the Matlab software tool. The importance of a correct estimation of the centrifuge separation parameters at different flow regimes, lies in the possibility to estimate in a reliable way the U enrichment plant performances, once the separation external parameters are set (feed flow rate and feed, product and tails assays). Using the separation parameters of a single centrifuge allow to determine the performances of an entire cascade and, for this purpose; the software Simulink was used. The outputs of the calculation are the concentrations (assays) and the flow rates of the enriched (product) and depleted (tails) gas mixture. These models represent a valid additional tool, in order to verify the compliance of the U enrichment plant operator declarations with the 'on site' inspectors' measurements.

  8. Implications of Export/Import Reporting Requirements in the United States - International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Additional Protocol

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Killinger, Mark H; Benjamin, Eugene L; McNair, Gary W

    2001-02-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The US has signed but not ratified the US/IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol. If ratified, the Additional Protocol will require the US to report to the IAEA certain nuclear-related exports and imports to the IAEA. This document identifies and assesses the issues associated with the US making those reports. For example, some regulatory changes appear to be necessary. The document also attempts to predict the impact on the DOE Complex by assessing the historical flow of exports and imports that would be reportable if the Additional Protocol were in force.

  9. Implications of Export/Import Reporting Requirements in the United States - International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Additional Protocol

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Killinger, Mark H.; Benjamin, Eugene L.; McNair, Gary W.

    2001-02-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States has signed but not ratified the US/IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol. If ratified, the Additional Protocol will require the US to report to the IAEA certain nuclear-related exports and imports to the IAEA. This document identifies and assesses the issues associated with the US making those reports. For example, some regulatory changes appear to be necessary. The document also attempts to predict the impact on the DOE Complex by assessing the historical flow of exports and imports that would be reportable if the Additional Protocol were in force.

  10. BIODIVERSITY INVENTORIES: Boletineae (Fungi) in Queensland, Australia The Boletineae (Fungi: Basidiomycetes) is a large suborder (~32 genera) of putrescent mushrooms with

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hibbett, David S.

    BIODIVERSITY INVENTORIES: Boletineae (Fungi) in Queensland, Australia The Boletineae (Fungi in the world. The work outlined in this proposal will provide a first biodiversity inventory of this group this partnership, it will be possible to thoroughly inventory the Boletineae of the rich and varied forests

  11. Risks to global biodiversity from fossil-fuel production exceed those from biofuel production

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dale, Virginia H [ORNL; Parish, Esther S [ORNL; Kline, Keith L [ORNL

    2015-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Potential global biodiversity impacts from near-term gasoline production are compared to biofuel, a renewable liquid transportation fuel expected to substitute for gasoline in the near term (i.e., from now until c. 2030). Petroleum exploration activities are projected to extend across more than 5.8 billion ha of land and ocean worldwide (of which 3.1 billion is on land), much of which is in remote, fragile terrestrial ecosystems or off-shore oil fields that would remain relatively undisturbed if not for interest in fossil fuel production. Future biomass production for biofuels is projected to fall within 2.0 billion ha of land, most of which is located in areas already impacted by human activities. A comparison of likely fuel-source areas to the geospatial distribution of species reveals that both energy sources overlap with areas with high species richness and large numbers of threatened species. At the global scale, future petroleum production areas intersect more than double the area and higher total number of threatened species than future biofuel production. Energy options should be developed to optimize provisioning of ecosystem services while minimizing negative effects, which requires information about potential impacts on critical resources. Energy conservation and identifying and effectively protecting habitats with high-conservation value are critical first steps toward protecting biodiversity under any fuel production scenario.

  12. adenocarcinoma potential relevance: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    of ionizing pairs, diffusion and basic readout geometries relevant to potential real detector scenarios, such as under development for the DRIFT experiment. The results clearly...

  13. Aksaray And Ecemis Faults - Diapiric Salt Relationships- Relevance...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    Aksaray And Ecemis Faults - Diapiric Salt Relationships- Relevance To The Hydrocarbon Exploration In The Tuz Golu (Salt Lake) Basin, Central Anatolia, Turkey Jump to: navigation,...

  14. Toward a Fieldable Atomic Mass Spectrometer for Safeguards Applications: Sample Preparation and Ionization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barinaga, Charles J.; Hager, George J.; Hart, Garret L.; Koppenaal, David W.; Marcus, R. Kenneth; Jones, Sarah MH; Manard, Benjamin T.

    2014-10-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) long-term research and development plan calls for the development of new methods to detect misuse at nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as reprocessing and enrichment plants. At enrichment plants, for example, the IAEA’s contemporary safeguards approaches are based on a combination of routine and random inspections that include collection of UF6 samples from in-process material and selected cylinders for subsequent analyses. These analyses include destructive analysis (DA) in a laboratory (typically by mass spectrometry [MS]) for isotopic characterization, and environmental sampling (ES) for subsequent laboratory elemental and isotopic analysis (also both typically by MS). One area of new method development includes moving this kind of isotope ratio analytical capability for DA and ES activities into the field. Some of the reasons for these developments include timeliness of results, avoidance of hazardous material shipments, and guidance for additional sample collecting. However, this capability does not already exist for several reasons, such as that most lab-based chemical and instrumental methods rely on laboratory infrastructure (highly trained staff, power, space, hazardous material handling, etc.) and require significant amounts of consumables (power, compressed gases, etc.). In addition, there are no currently available, fieldable instruments for atomic or isotope ratio analysis. To address these issues, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and collaborator, Clemson University, are studying key areas that limit the fieldability of isotope ratio mass spectrometry for atomic ions: sample preparation and ionization, and reducing the physical size of a fieldable mass spectrometer. PNNL is seeking simple and robust techniques that could be effectively used by inspectors who may have no expertise in analytical MS. In this report, we present and describe the preliminary findings for three candidate techniques: matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization (MALDI) MS, liquid sampling-atmospheric pressure glow discharge (LS-APGD), and laser ablation/ionization (LAI) MS at atmospheric pressure. Potential performance metrics for these techniques will be presented, including detectability, response, isotope ratio accuracy and precision, and ease of use.

  15. Safeguards Verification Measurements using Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anheier, Norman C.; Cannon, Bret D.; Qiao, Hong (Amy) [Amy; Phillips, Jon R.

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Laser Ablation Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) is a new verification measurement technology under development at the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). LAARS uses three lasers to ablate and then measure the relative isotopic abundance of uranium compounds. An ablation laser is tightly focused on uranium-bearing solids producing a small plume containing uranium atoms. Two collinear wavelength-tuned spectrometry lasers transit through the plume and the absorbance of U-235 and U-238 isotopes are measured to determine U-235 enrichment. The measurement has high relative precision and detection limits approaching the femtogram range for uranium. It is independent of chemical form and degree of dilution with nuisance dust and other materials. High speed sample scanning and pinpoint characterization allow measurements on millions of particles/hour to detect and analyze the enrichment of trace uranium in samples. The spectrometer is assembled using commercially available components at comparatively low cost, and features a compact and low power design. Future designs can be engineered for reliable, autonomous deployment within an industrial plant environment. Two specific applications of the spectrometer are under development: 1) automated unattended aerosol sampling and analysis and 2) on-site small sample destructive assay measurement. The two applications propose game-changing technological advances in gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) safeguards verification. The aerosol measurement instrument, LAARS-environmental sampling (ES), collects aerosol particles from the plant environment in a purpose-built rotating drum impactor and then uses LAARS-ES to quickly scan the surface of the impactor to measure the enrichments of the captured particles. The current approach to plant misuse detection involves swipe sampling and offsite analysis. Though this approach is very robust it generally requires several months to obtain results from a given sample collection. The destructive assay instrument, LAARS-destructive assay (DA), uses a simple purpose-built fixture with a sampling planchet to collect adsorbed UF6 gas from a cylinder valve or from a process line tap or pigtail. A portable LAARS-DA instrument scans the microgram quantity of uranium collected on the planchet and the assay of the uranium is measured to ~0.15% relative precision. Currently, destructive assay samples for bias defect measurements are collected in small sample cylinders for offsite mass spectrometry measurement.

  16. aging brain relevance: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    aging brain relevance First Page Previous Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Next Page Last Page Topic Index 1 Brain Evolution Relevant to P....

  17. Energy, Water and Fish: Biodiversity Impacts of Energy-Sector Water Demand in the United States Depend on

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Olden, Julian D.

    for electricity generation from coal. Historical water use by the energy sector is related to patterns of fishEnergy, Water and Fish: Biodiversity Impacts of Energy- Sector Water Demand in the United States Rising energy consumption in coming decades, combined with a changing energy mix, have the potential

  18. Hell and High Water: Practice-Relevant Adaptation Science

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moss, Richard H.; Meehl, G.; Lemos, Maria Carmen; Smith, J. B.; Arnold, J. R.; Arnott, J. C.; Behar, D.; Brasseur, Guy P.; Broomell, S. B.; Busalacchi, Antonio; Dessai, S.; Ebi, Kristie L.; Edmonds, James A.; Furlow, J.; Goddard, L.; Hartmann, Holly; Hurrell, Jim; Katzenberger, J. W.; Liverman, D. M.; Mote, Phil; Moser, S. C.; Kumar, A.; Pulwarty, Roger; Seyller, E. A.; Turner, B.L.; Washington, Warren M.; Wilbanks, Thomas

    2013-11-08T23:59:59.000Z

    Recent extreme weather such as Hurricane Sandy and the 2012 drought demonstrate the vulnerability of the United States to climate extremes in the present and point to the potential for increased future damages under a changing climate. They also provide lessons for reducing harm and realizing any potential benefits. Preparedness measures – also referred to as adaptation – can cost-effectively increase resilience today and in the future. The upfront costs will be more than offset by reductions in property damage, lives and livelihoods lost, and expensive post-disaster recovery processes. While others have addressed use of science for adaptation in specific sectors including biodiversity (Heller and Zavaleta, 2009) and freshwater ecosystem management (Wilby et al., 2010), or by simply taking a more pragmatic approach to adaptation under uncertainty (Hallegatte, 2009), here the authors make the case that a new, comprehensive approach is needed to create and use science to inform adaptations with applicable and sound knowledge (Kerr et al., 2011).

  19. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the U.S. Department of Energy. Quarter ending December 31, 1996

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strauch, M.S.

    1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) carries out safeguards and security activities for the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), as well as other organizations, both within and outside the DOE. This document summarizes the activities conducted for the OSS during the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 1997 (October through December, 1996). The nature and scope of the activities carried out for OSS at LLNL require a broad base of technical expertise. To assure projects are staffed and executed effectively, projects are conducted by the organization at LLNL best able to supply the needed technical expertise. These projects are developed and managed by senior program managers. Institutional oversight and coordination is provided through the LLNL Deputy Director`s office. At present, the Laboratory is supporting OSS in four areas: (1) safeguards technology; (2) safeguards and material accountability; (3) computer security--distributed systems; and (4) physical and personnel security support. The remainder of this report describes the activities in each of these four areas. The information provided includes an introduction which briefly describes the activity, summary of major accomplishments, task descriptions with quarterly progress, summaries of milestones and deliverables and publications published this quarter.

  20. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy: Quarter ending December 31, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Steele, E.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) carries out safeguards and security activities for the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), as well as other organizations, both within and outside the DOE. This document summarizes the activities conducted for the OSS during the first quarter of fiscal year 1994 (October through December, 1993). The nature and scope of the activities carried out for OSS at LLNL require a broad base of technical expertise. To assure projects are staffed and executed effectively, projects are conducted by the organization at LLNL best able to supply the needed technical expertise. These projects are developed and managed by senior program managers. Institutional oversight and coordination is provided through the LLNL Deputy Director`s office. At present, the Laboratory is supporting OSS in five areas: (1) Safeguards Technology, (2) Safeguards and Decision Support, (3) Computer Security, (4) DOE Automated Physical Security, and (5) DOE Automated Visitor Access Control System. This report describes the activities in each of these five areas. The information provided includes an introduction which briefly describes the activity, summary of major accomplishments, task descriptions with quarterly progress, summaries of milestones and deliverables and publications published this quarter.

  1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy: Quarter ending September 30, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.; Mansur, D.L.; Davis, G.

    1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) carries out safeguards and security activities for the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), as well as other organizations, both within and outside the DOE. This document summarizes the activities conducted for the OSS during the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1993 (July through September, 1993). The nature and scope of the activities carried out for OSS at LLNL require a broad base of technical expertise. To assure projects are staffed and executed effectively, projects are conducted by the organization at LLNL best able to supply the needed technical expertise. These projects are developed and managed by senior program managers. Institutional oversight and coordination is provided through the LLNL Deputy Director`s office. At present, the Laboratory is supporting OSS in five areas: Safeguards Technology, Safeguard System Studies, Computer Security, DOE Automated Physical Security and DOE Automated Visitor Access Control System. The remainder of this report describes the activities in each of these five areas. The information provided includes an introduction which briefly describes the activity, summary of major accomplishments, task descriptions with quarterly progress, summaries of milestones and deliverables and publications published this quarter.

  2. Detection of Physiologically Relevant Alcohol Concentrations Using Raman Spectroscopy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McKay, Joshua L.

    2006-08-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This is the first step in a series of studies to test the feasibility of using Raman Spectroscopy (RS) to non-invasively detect physiologically relevant blood alcohol concentrations. Blood tests, urine tests, and the breathalyzer are currently...

  3. Proactively searching the Web: Can we agree on what's relevant?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chen, Yiling

    Proactively searching the Web: Can we agree on what's relevant? Jay Budzik, Michael Ruberry Ave. Evanston, IL 60201 USA +1 847 491 3500 budzik@cs.northwestern.edu ABSTRACT We administered

  4. Biodiversity Monitoring Using NGS Approaches on Unusual Substrates (2013 DOE JGI Genomics of Energy and Environment 8th Annual User Meeting)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gilbert, Tom [National History Museum of Denmark

    2013-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Tom Gilbert of the Natural History Museum of Denmark on "Biodiversity monitoring using NGS approaches on unusual substrates" at the 8th Annual Genomics of Energy & Environment Meeting in Walnut Creek, Calif.

  5. Ghost Forests in the Sea: The Use of Marine Protected Areas to Restore Biodiversity to Kelp Forest Ecosystems in Southern California

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dayton, Paul K.

    2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    P.E. 2004. The La Jolla Kelp Bed and Reserve: “In theabundance in the La Jolla Kelp Forest. Southern Calif. Acad.Restore Biodiversity to Kelp Forest Ecosystems in Southern

  6. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy, quarter ending March 31, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.; Mansur, D.L.; Davis, G.

    1993-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This quarterly report discusses activities in the Safeguards Technology Program (STP) which is a program in LLNL`s Nuclear Chemistry Division that develop advanced, nondestructive-analysis (NDA) technology for measurement of special nuclear materials. The work focuses on R&D relating to x{minus} and gamma-ray spectrometry techniques and to the development of computer codes for interpreting the spectral data obtained by these techniques.

  7. Membrane processes relevant for the polymer electrolyte fuel cell

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kjelstrup, Signe

    Membrane processes relevant for the polymer electrolyte fuel cell Aleksander Kolstad Chemical. The important aspects concerning the Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell, more commonly known as Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC), have been studied in two separate parts. Part 1 of the thesis

  8. Applied zooarchaeology: the relevance of faunal analysis to

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wolverton, Steve

    rcalrn of modern wildlife management by applying the knowledge it gains from its unique perspcctivcApplied zooarchaeology: the relevance of faunal analysis to wildlife management R. bee Lagman to define the boundaries of biological preserves meant to prescr~~cbiota in perpetuity are all subjects

  9. Spectroscopic Studies of Atmospheric Relevant Air-Aqueous Interfaces DISSERTATION

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Spectroscopic Studies of Atmospheric Relevant Air-Aqueous Interfaces DISSERTATION Presented The Ohio State University 2010 Dissertation Committee: Heather C. Allen, Advisor Anne Carey Harold Walker in this dissertation as proxies of organic coated aerosols. Since a number of organic compounds are emitted

  10. Towards activity-relevant attribution of IT energy usage

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chaudhuri, Surajit

    Towards activity-relevant attribution of IT energy usage From a previous study we were able to disaggregate per socket energy consumption from whole domicile energy consumption. We discovered that Home preparation/storage, it is the largest contributor to personal energy consumption. Understanding how and when

  11. accelerator-relevant materials untersuchung: Topics by E-print...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    accelerator-relevant materials untersuchung First Page Previous Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Next Page Last Page Topic Index 1...

  12. Radio Emission from Ultracool Dwarfs and the Relevant Radiation Mechanisms

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Radio Emission from Ultracool Dwarfs and the Relevant Radiation Mechanisms A thesis submitted have learnt a lot of knowledge which includes not only the radio instruments for observations, but also the science such as particle simulations for understanding the detected radio signal. Also, from this research

  13. Editor's Choice Editor's Choice: Crop Genome Plasticity and Its Relevance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Parrott, Wayne

    . The term GE is preferred over the term "genetically modified" (commonly referred to as GMEditor's Choice Editor's Choice: Crop Genome Plasticity and Its Relevance to Food and Feed Safety of Genetically Engineered Breeding Stacks1 Genetically engineered (GE) stacks, combinations of two or more single

  14. Assessment of Relevant Physical Phenomena Controlling Thermal Performance of Nanofluids

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bahrami, Majid

    Assessment of Relevant Physical Phenomena Controlling Thermal Performance of Nanofluids Majid thermal conductivity of nanofluids. Through an investigation, a large degree of randomness and scatter has and lower bounds are developed for steady-state conduction in stationary nanofluids. Comparisons between

  15. Shock-ignition relevant experiments with planar targets on OMEGA

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hohenberger, M.; Hu, S. X.; Anderson, K. S.; Boehly, T. R.; Sangster, T. C.; Seka, W.; Stoeckl, C.; Yaakobi, B. [Laboratory for Laser Energetics, University of Rochester, 250 East River Road, Rochester, New York 14623 (United States)] [Laboratory for Laser Energetics, University of Rochester, 250 East River Road, Rochester, New York 14623 (United States); Theobald, W.; Lafon, M.; Nora, R. [Laboratory for Laser Energetics, University of Rochester, 250 East River Road, Rochester, New York 14623 (United States) [Laboratory for Laser Energetics, University of Rochester, 250 East River Road, Rochester, New York 14623 (United States); Fusion Science Center, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14623 (United States); Betti, R.; Meyerhofer, D. D. [Laboratory for Laser Energetics, University of Rochester, 250 East River Road, Rochester, New York 14623 (United States) [Laboratory for Laser Energetics, University of Rochester, 250 East River Road, Rochester, New York 14623 (United States); Fusion Science Center, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14623 (United States); Departments of Mechanical Engineering and Physics, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14627 (United States); Casner, A. [CEA, DAM, DIF, Arpajon (France)] [CEA, DAM, DIF, Arpajon (France); Fratanduono, D. E. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P.O. Box 808, Livermore, California 94550 (United States)] [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P.O. Box 808, Livermore, California 94550 (United States); Ribeyre, X.; Schurtz, G. [Centre Lasers Intenses et Applications, CELIA, Université Bordeaux 1-CEA-CNRS, Talence (France)] [Centre Lasers Intenses et Applications, CELIA, Université Bordeaux 1-CEA-CNRS, Talence (France)

    2014-02-15T23:59:59.000Z

    We report on laser-driven, strong-shock generation and hot-electron production in planar targets in the presence of a pre-plasma at shock-ignition (SI) relevant laser and pre-plasma conditions. 2-D simulations reproduce the shock dynamics well, indicating ablator shocks of up to 75 Mbar have been generated. We observe hot-electron temperatures of ?70?keV at intensities of 1.4?×?10{sup 15}?W/cm{sup 2} with multiple overlapping beams driving the two-plasmon decay instability. When extrapolated to SI-relevant intensities of ?10{sup 16}?W/cm{sup 2}, the hot electron temperature will likely exceed 100?keV, suggesting that tightly focused beams without overlap are better suited for launching the ignitor shock.

  16. Relevance of a dilute instanton ensemble to light hadrons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chu, M. (W. K. Kellogg Radiation Laboratory, Caltech 106-38, Pasadena, California 91125 (United States)); Huang, S. (Department of Physics, FM-15, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195 (United States))

    1992-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    We investigate the relevance of a dilute instanton ensemble to the masses and structure of light hadrons by using the lattice-cooling method to suppress all short-wavelength modes in the quenched QCD vacuum while leaving the well-separated instantons more or less intact. Our hadron model-independent results indicate that the masses and sizes of the pion, {rho}, and nucleon are dominated by dilute-instanton configurations and insensitive to perturbative gluon exchange and confinement.

  17. Probabilistic retrieval and visualization of biologically relevant microarray experiments

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    2009-10-19T23:59:59.000Z

    International Society for Computational Biology (ISCB) Student Council Symposium Stockholm, Sweden 27 June 2009 Published: 19 October 2009 BMC Bioinformatics 2009, 10(Suppl 13):P1 doi: 10.1186/1471-2105-10-S13-P1 This article is available from: http... BMC Bioinformatics Poster presentation Probabilistic retrieval and visualization of biologically relevant microarray experiments José Caldas*1, Nils Gehlenborg2,3, Ali Faisal1, Alvis Brazma2 and Samuel Kaski1 Address: 1Helsinki Institute...

  18. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Krichinsky, Alan M [ORNL; Bates, Bruce E [ORNL; Chesser, Joel B [ORNL; Koo, Sinsze [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2009-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F&W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F&W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F&W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF{sub 6} F&W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF{sub 6}. The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under plant operating conditions. The ultimate use of technologies tested on the engineering-scale test bed is to work with safeguards agencies to install them in operating plants (e.g., enrichment and fuel processing plants), thereby promoting new safeguards measures with minimal impact to operating plants. In addition, this system is useful in identifying features for new plants that can be incorporated as part of 'safeguards by design,' in which load cells and other monitoring technologies are specified to provide outputs for automated monitoring and inspector evaluation.

  19. Studies Relevent to Catalytic Activation Co & other small Molecules

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ford, Peter C

    2005-02-22T23:59:59.000Z

    Detailed annual and triannual reports describing the progress accomplished during the tenure of this grant were filed with the Program Manager for Catalysis at the Office of Basic Energy Sciences. To avoid unnecessary duplication, the present report will provide a brief overview of the research areas that were sponsored by this grant and list the resulting publications and theses based on this DOE supported research. The scientific personnel participating in (and trained by) this grant's research are also listed. Research carried out under this DOE grant was largely concerned with the mechanisms of the homogeneous catalytic and photocatalytic activation of small molecules such as carbon monoxide, dihydrogen and various hydrocarbons. Much of the more recent effort has focused on the dynamics and mechanisms of reactions relevant to substrate carbonylations by homogeneous organometallic catalysts. A wide range of modern investigative techniques were employed, including quantitative fast reaction methodologies such as time-resolved optical (TRO) and time-resolved infrared (TRIR) spectroscopy and stopped flow kinetics. Although somewhat diverse, this research falls within the scope of the long-term objective of applying quantitative techniques to elucidate the dynamics and understand the principles of mechanisms relevant to the selective and efficient catalytic conversions of fundamental feedstocks to higher value materials.

  20. Heat transfer education : Keeping it relevant and vibrant.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Khounsary, A. M.

    1998-08-14T23:59:59.000Z

    The motivation for a fresh look at heat transfer education, both in content and in methodology, is generated by a number of trends in engineering practice. These include the increasing demand for engineers with interdisciplinary skills, rapid integration of technology, emergence of computerized and interactive problem-solving tools, shortening time of concept-to-market, availability of new technologies, and an increasing number of new or redesigned products and processes in which heat transfer plays a part. Examination of heat transfer education in this context can be aided by considering the changes, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the student, educator, and researcher populations, employment opportunities, in the needs of corporations, government, industry, and universities, and in the relevant technical problems and issues of the day. Such an overview provides the necessary background for charting a response to the difficult question of how to maintain excellence and continuity in heat transfer education in the face of rapid, widespread, and complex changes. The present paper addresses how to make heat transfer education more relevant and stimulating. This paper represents a written summary of a 1996 panel discussion at the 1996 International Mechanical Engineering Conference and Exhibition (IMECE) of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) in Atlanta, Georgia, on ''Heat Transfer Education: Keeping it Relevant and Vibrant,'' with significant expansion and amplification by the authors and the panelists in the 1997-98 period. The consensus of the participants is that the steps necessary to ensure the desired outcome in heat transfer education should include: (1) a better understanding of the interaction between the student, course content, and market needs; (2) an appreciation of the need in multidisciplinary industrial environments for engineers trained with a broad background: (3) a revision of the introductory heat transfer course to incorporate illustrative and insightful industrial examples and case studies reducible to order-of-magnitude analyses; (4) a reinforcement of real-world problem-solving abilities in students by introducing them to examples that emphasize multidisciplinary issues in modern thermal management problems and finally (5) industrial collaboration that would provide the educator with meaningful thermal management case studies (and possible funding), the student with an appreciation of industrial practices, and the industrial sponsor with access to academia for assistance in problem solving. Also suggested is an effective regular review program to provide assessment, feedback, and suggestions for quality control to interested institutions on their teaching methodology and materials.

  1. 28 a f r i c a b i r d s & b i r d i n ga d u n e w s digital biodiversity

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    de Villiers, Marienne

    science The data originates from the citizen scientists who participate in our projects. We really of the Animal Demography Unit can be summarised in three phrases: digital biodiversity, citizen science ­ are available to taxonomists to examine and compare. The heart of the ADU is a vast digital museum. citizen

  2. Environmental screening tools for assessment of infrastructure plans based on biodiversity preservation and global warming (PEIT, Spain)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garcia-Montero, Luis G., E-mail: luisgonzaga.garcia@upm.e [Dept. Forest Engineering, E.T.S. Ingenieros de Montes, Technical University of Madrid (UPM), Ciudad Universitaria s/n, Madrid 28040 (Spain); Lopez, Elena, E-mail: elopez@caminos.upm.e [TRANSyT, E.T.S. Ingenieros de Caminos, Technical University of Madrid (UPM), Avda. Profesor Aranguren s/n, Madrid 28040 (Spain); Monzon, Andres, E-mail: amonzon@caminos.upm.e [TRANSyT, E.T.S. Ingenieros de Caminos, Technical University of Madrid (UPM), Avda. Profesor Aranguren s/n, Madrid 28040 (Spain); Otero Pastor, Isabel, E-mail: isabel.otero@upm.e [TRANSyT, E.T.S. Ingenieros de Caminos, Technical University of Madrid (UPM), Avda. Profesor Aranguren s/n, Madrid 28040 (Spain)

    2010-04-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Most Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) research has been concerned with SEA as a procedure, and there have been relatively few developments and tests of analytical methodologies. The first stage of the SEA is the 'screening', which is the process whereby a decision is taken on whether or not SEA is required for a particular programme or plan. The effectiveness of screening and SEA procedures will depend on how well the assessment fits into the planning from the early stages of the decision-making process. However, it is difficult to prepare the environmental screening for an infrastructure plan involving a whole country. To be useful, such methodologies must be fast and simple. We have developed two screening tools which would make it possible to estimate promptly the overall impact an infrastructure plan might have on biodiversity and global warming for a whole country, in order to generate planning alternatives, and to determine whether or not SEA is required for a particular infrastructure plan.

  3. Exposure-Relevant Ozone Chemistry in Occupied Spaces

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coleman, Beverly Kaye

    2009-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Ozone, an ambient pollutant, is transformed into other airborne pollutants in the indoor environment. In this dissertation, the type and amount of byproducts that result from ozone reactions with common indoor surfaces, surface residues, and vapors were determined, pollutant concentrations were related to occupant exposure, and frameworks were developed to predict byproduct concentrations under various indoor conditions. In Chapter 2, an analysis is presented of secondary organic aerosol formation from the reaction of ozone with gas-phase, terpene-containing consumer products in small chamber experiments under conditions relevant for residential and commercial buildings. The full particle size distribution was continuously monitored, and ultrafine and fine particle concentrations were in the range of 10 to>300 mu g m-3. Particle nucleation and growth dynamics were characterized.Chapter 3 presents an investigation of ozone reactions with aircraft cabin surfaces including carpet, seat fabric, plastics, and laundered and worn clothing fabric. Small chamber experiments were used to determine ozone deposition velocities, ozone reaction probabilities, byproduct emission rates, and byproduct yields for each surface category. The most commonly detected byproducts included C1?C10 saturated aldehydes and skin oil oxidation products. For all materials, emission rates were higher with ozone than without. Experimental results were used to predict byproduct exposure in the cabin and compare to other environments. Byproduct levels are predicted to be similar to ozone levels in the cabin, which have been found to be tens to low hundreds of ppb in the absence of an ozone converter. In Chapter 4, a model is presented that predicts ozone uptake by and byproduct emission from residual chemicals on surfaces. The effects of input parameters (residue surface concentration, ozone concentration, reactivity of the residue and the surface, near-surface airflow conditions, and byproduct yield) were explored. In Chapter 5, the reaction of ozone with permethrin, a residual insecticide used in aircraft cabins, to form phosgene is investigated. A derivatization technique was developed to detect phosgene at low levels, and chamber experiments were conducted with permethrin-coated cabin materials. It was determined that phosgene formation, if it occurs in the aircraft cabin, is not likely to exceed the relevant, health-based phosgene exposure guidelines.

  4. Behavior of nanoceria in biologically-relevant environments

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kumar, Amit; Das, Soumen; Munusamy, Prabhakaran; Self, William; Baer, Donald R.; Sayle, Dean C.; Seal, Sudipta

    2014-09-08T23:59:59.000Z

    Cerium oxide nanoparticles (CNPs) have gained a considerable attention in biological research due to their anti-oxidant like behaviour and regenerative nature. The current literature on CNPs reports many successful attempts on harnessing the beneficial therapeutic properties in biology. However studies have also shown toxicity effect with some types of CNPs. This review discusses issues associated with the behaviours of CNPs in biological systems and identifies key knowledge gaps. We explore how salient physicochemical properties (size, surface chemistry, surface stabilizers) contribute to the potential positive and negative aspects of nanoceria in biological systems. Based on variations of results reported in the literature, important issues need to be addressed. Are we really studying the same particles with slight variations in size and physicochemical properties or do the particles being examined have fundamentally different behaviours? Are the variations observed in the result of differences in the initial properties of the particles or the results of downstream effects that emerge as the particles are prepared for specific studies and they interact with biological or other environmental moieties? How should particles be appropriately prepared for relevant environmental/toxicology/safety studies? It is useful to recognize that nanoparticles encompass some of the same complexities and variability associated with biological components

  5. Reliability evaluation of the power supply of an electrical power net for safety-relevant applications

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Liberzon, Daniel

    automotive safety-relevant systems. With the introduction of safety-relevant electronic systems in cars the failure mechanisms in order to improve the design. Several system level FMEAs are used to identify of occurrence. A new power net architecture with application to new safety-relevant automotive systems

  6. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Ensures appropriate levels of protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components; espionage; loss or theft of classified matter or Government property; and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security or on the health and safety of Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor employees, the public, or the environment. DOE N 251.40, dated 5/3/01, extends this directive until 12/31/01. Cancels DOE 5630.11B, DOE 5630.13A, DOE 5630.14A, DOE 5630.15, DOE 5630.16A, DOE 5630.17, DOE 5631.1C, DOE 5631.4A, DOE 5634.1B, DOE 5634.3, DOE 5639.3, and Chapter IX of DOE M 5632.1C-1

  7. Safeguards Envelope Methodology

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Metcalf, Richard

    2012-02-14T23:59:59.000Z

    is the earliest known non- simulated data published and analyzed. An Integrated Equipment Test (IET) facility was constructed as an example pilot-scale facility, running synthetic plutonium in depleted uranium.4 A mass-tracking system, integrating a pair of dip...

  8. safeguards and security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysisDarby Dietrich57/%2A0/%2A en4/%2A2/%2A/%2A

  9. Facility Safeguardability Assessment Report

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:Administration Sandia CorporationNuclear Security21698 Prepared for

  10. Annual Report FY2013-- A Kinematically Complete, Interdisciplinary, and Co-Institutional Measurement of the 19F(?,n) Cross-section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peters, William A [ORNL; Smith, Michael Scott [ORNL; Clement, Ryan [INL; Tan, Wanpeng [University of Notre Dame; Stech, Ed [University of Notre Dame; Cizewski, J A [Rutgers University; Febbraro, Michael [University of Michigan; Madurga Flores, Miguel [ORNL

    2013-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The goal of this proposal is to enable neutron detection for precision Non-Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. Neutrons are continuously generated from a UFx matrix in a container or sample as a result of the interaction of alpha particles from uranium-decay ? particles with fluorine nuclei in the matrix. Neutrons from 19F(?,n)22Na were once considered a poorly characterized background for assays of UFx samples via 238U spontaneous fission neutron detection [SMI2010B]. However, the yield of decay-?-driven neutrons is critical for 234,235U LEU and HEU assays, as it can used to determine both the total amount of uranium and the enrichment [BER2010]. This approach can be extremely valuable in a variety of safeguard applications, such as cylinder monitoring in underground uranium storage facilities, nuclear criticality safety studies, nuclear materials accounting, and other nonproliferation applications. The success of neutron-based assays critically depends on an accurate knowledge of the cross section of the (?,n) reaction that generates the neutrons. The 40% uncertainty in the 19F(?,n)22Na cross section currently limits the precision of such assays, and has been identified as a key factor in preventing accurate enrichment determinations [CRO2003]. The need for higher quality cross section data for (?,n) reactions has been a recurring conclusion in reviews of the nuclear data needs to support safeguards. The overarching goal of this project is to enable neutron detection to be used for precision Non- Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. This will significantly advance safeguards verification at existing declared facilities, nuclear materials accounting, process control, nuclear criticality safety monitoring, and a variety of other nonproliferation applications. To reach this goal, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Rutgers University (RU), and the University of Notre Dame (UND), will focus on three specific items: (1) making a precision (better than 10 %) determination of the absolute cross section of the 19F(?,n)22Na reaction as a function of energy; (2) determining the spectrum of neutrons and ?-rays emitted from 19F(?,n)22Na over an energy range pertinent to NDA; and (3) performing simulations with this new cross section to extract the neutron yield (neutrons/gram/second) and resulting neutron- and gamma ray-spectra when ? particles interact with fluorine nuclei in actinide samples, to aid in the design and reduce uncertainty of future NDA measurements and simulations.

  11. Sustaining International CBRN Centers of Excellence with a Focus on Nuclear Security and Safeguards: Initial Scoping Session London, 23-24 September 2013 SUMMARY REPORT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anderson, Roger G.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-12T23:59:59.000Z

    This report provides a summary-level description of the key information, observations, ideas, and recommendations expressed during the subject meeting. The report is organized to correspond to the meeting agenda provided in Appendix 1 and includes references to several of the participants listed in Appendix 2 .The meeting venue was Lloyd’s Register in the City of London. Lloyd’s Register graciously accommodated the request of The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) with whom it works on various safeguards activities commissioned by NNSA. PNNL and NNSA also shared the goal of the meeting/study with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change with whom they coordinated the participant list.

  12. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  13. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Evans, Louise G [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croft, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, S. J. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, H. O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Schear, M. A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Worrall, Andrew [U.K. NNL

    2011-01-13T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/ or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  14. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Evans, Louise G [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croft, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, S. J. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, B. D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, H. O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Schear, M. A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Worrall, Andrew [U.K., NNL

    2010-11-24T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  15. Land use and land cover change: the effects of woody plant encroachment and prescribed fire on biodiversity and ecosystem carbon dynamics in a southern great plains mixed grass savanna

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hollister, Emily Brooke

    2009-05-15T23:59:59.000Z

    LAND USE AND LAND COVER CHANGE: THE EFFECTS OF WOODY PLANT ENCROACHMENT AND PRESCRIBED FIRE ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM CARBON DYNAMICS IN A SOUTHERN GREAT PLAINS MIXED GRASS SAVANNA A Dissertation by EMILY BROOKE HOLLISTER Submitted... PLANT ENCROACHMENT AND PRESCRIBED FIRE ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM CARBON DYNAMICS IN A SOUTHERN GREAT PLAINS MIXED GRASS SAVANNA A Dissertation by EMILY BROOKE HOLLISTER Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial...

  16. The relevance of didactic categories for analysing obstacles in conceptual change

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Prediger, Susanne

    1 The relevance of didactic categories for analysing obstacles in conceptual change Revisiting research like `Grundvorstellungen' and epistemological obstacles. These didactic categories help to make

  17. Solving geometric constraints to verify independence properties for safety-relevant systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Appelrath, Hans-Jürgen

    .baumgart@offis.de WWW home page: http://www.offis.de/ Abstract Safety-relevant systems like an automotive airbag

  18. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOW TEMPERATURE TECHNOLOGY AT STANFORD AND ITS RELEVANCE TO HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS"

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ohta, Shigemi

    % and to indicate their relevance to several applications in high energy physics. 11. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 1I I I I I - . THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOW TEMPERATURE TECHNOLOGY AT STANFORD AND ITS RELEVANCE TO HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS" H. Alan Schwettmant Stanford University Stanford, California Department of Physics

  19. Clinically Relevant Expansion of Hematopoietic Stem Cells with Conserved Function in a Single-Use,

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Zandstra, Peter W.

    Clinically Relevant Expansion of Hematopoietic Stem Cells with Conserved Function in a Single.zandstra@utoronto.ca). Received May 24, 2006; accepted July 7, 2006 ABSTRACT The clinical potential of umbilical cord blood as a method to overcome this limitation. We describe the use of a clinically relevant single-use, closed

  20. An assessment of the attractiveness of material associated with thorium/uranium and uranium closed fuel cycles from a safeguards perspective

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bathke, Charles Gary [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wallace, Richard K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hase, Kevin R [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sleaford, Brad W [LLNL; Ebbinghaus, Bartley B [LLNL; Collins, Brian W [PNNL; Bradley, Keith S [LLNL; Prichard, Andrew W [PNNL; Smith, Brian W [PNNL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper reports the continued evaluation of the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with various proposed nuclear fuel cycles. Specifically, this paper examines two closed fuel cycles. The first fuel cycle examined is a thorium fuel cycle in which a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) is fueled with mixtures of plutonium/thorium and {sup 233}U/thorium. The used fuel is then reprocessed using the THOREX process and the actinides are recycled. The second fuel cycle examined consists of conventional light water reactors (LWR) whose fuel is reprocessed for actinides that are then fed to and recycled until consumed in fast-spectrum reactors: fast reactors and accelerator driven systems (ADS). As reprocessing of LWR fuel has already been examined, this paper will focus on the reprocessing of the scheme's fast-spectrum reactors' fuel. This study will indicate what is required to render these materials as having low utility for use in nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the results of this paper suggest that all reprocessing products evaluated so far need to be rigorously safeguarded and provided high levels of physical protection. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The methodology and key findings will be presented.

  1. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.; Anzelon, G.

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards at almost all of its meeting.

  2. Manufactured solutions for the three-dimensional Euler equations with relevance to Inertial Confinement Fusion

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Waltz, J., E-mail: jwaltz@lanl.gov [Computational Physics Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM (United States); Canfield, T.R. [Theoretical Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM (United States); Morgan, N.R. [Computational Physics Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM (United States); Risinger, L.D.; Wohlbier, J.G. [Computational and Computer Sciences Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-06-15T23:59:59.000Z

    We present a set of manufactured solutions for the three-dimensional (3D) Euler equations. The purpose of these solutions is to allow for code verification against true 3D flows with physical relevance, as opposed to 3D simulations of lower-dimensional problems or manufactured solutions that lack physical relevance. Of particular interest are solutions with relevance to Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) capsules. While ICF capsules are designed for spherical symmetry, they are hypothesized to become highly 3D at late time due to phenomena such as Rayleigh–Taylor instability, drive asymmetry, and vortex decay. ICF capsules also involve highly nonlinear coupling between the fluid dynamics and other physics, such as radiation transport and thermonuclear fusion. The manufactured solutions we present are specifically designed to test the terms and couplings in the Euler equations that are relevant to these phenomena. Example numerical results generated with a 3D Finite Element hydrodynamics code are presented, including mesh convergence studies.

  3. Relevant Links

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItemResearch > TheNuclear Press Releases 2014References by Websitehome / Related

  4. BIODIVERSITY Danielle Sinnett

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    , brownfield sites often offer a vast resource of rare and protected species (Figure 1) and many have been.woodlandtrust.org.uk). Reclaimed and brownfield land provides a valuable resource for counteracting some of these effects not always be assumed that because a site comprises brownfield or restored land it has no ecological value

  5. Empowering and Facilitating Student Learning: An Investigation of Culturally Relevant Pedagogy for High-school Mathematics Instruction

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hubert, Tarcia Lasha

    2013-11-25T23:59:59.000Z

    school students in a 10-day culturally relevant mathematics intervention and measuring their mathematical achievement by a pre- and post- assessment; and 3) determining students’ perspectives of culturally relevant mathematics instruction by interviewing...

  6. Program of technical assistance to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - lessons learned from the U.S. program of technical assistance to IAEA safeguards. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Defense Nuclear Agency is sponsoring a technical study of the requirements of a vehicle to meet the OPCW`s future needs for enhanced chemical weapons verification capabilities. This report provides information about the proven mechanisms by which the U.S. provided both short- and long-term assistance to the IAEA to enhance its verification capabilities. Much of the technical assistance has generic application to international organizations verifying compliance with disarmament treaties or conventions. In addition, some of the equipment developed by the U.S. under the existing arrangements can be applied in the verification of other disarmament treaties or conventions. U.S. technical assistance to IAEA safeguards outside of the IAEA`s regular budget proved to be necessary. The U.S. technical assistance was successful in improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards for its most urgent responsibilities and in providing the technical elements for increased IAEA {open_quotes}readiness{close_quotes} for the postponed responsibilities deemed important for U.S. policy objectives. Much of the technical assistance was directed to generic subjects and helped to achieve a system of international verification. It is expected that the capabilities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to verify a state`s compliance with the {open_quotes}Chemical Weapons Convention{close_quotes} will require improvements. This report presents 18 important lessons learned from the experience of the IAEA and the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), organized into three tiers. Each lesson is presented in the report in the context of the difficulty, need and history in which the lesson was learned. Only the most important points are recapitulated in this executive summary.

  7. New Signal Processing Methods and Information Technologies for the Real Time Control of JET Reactor Relevant Plasmas

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    New Signal Processing Methods and Information Technologies for the Real Time Control of JET Reactor Relevant Plasmas

  8. Citation: Myers, R.A. and C.A. Ottensmeyer.(2005, in press). Extinction Risk in Marine Species. in Norse, E.A. and L.B. Crowder, eds. Marine Conservation Biology: The Science of Maintaining the Sea's Biodiversity. Island

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Myers, Ransom A.

    Citation: Myers, R.A. and C.A. Ottensmeyer.(2005, in press). Extinction Risk in Marine Species's Biodiversity. Island Press, Washington DC (USA) Chapter 5 Extinction Risk in Marine Species Ransom A. Myers C resources seemed inexhaustible, its capacity boundless. Marine species have even been considered "extinction

  9. Control-relevant Modelling and Linear Analysis of Instabilities in Oxy-fuel Combustion

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Foss, Bjarne A.

    Control-relevant Modelling and Linear Analysis of Instabilities in Oxy-fuel Combustion Dagfinn combustion have been proposed as an alternative to conventional gas turbine cycles for achieving CO2-capture for CO2 sequestration purposes. While combustion instabilities is a problem in modern conventional gas

  10. Spectroscopic Studies of Atmospheric Relevant Air-Aqueous and Air-Silica DISSERTATION

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Spectroscopic Studies of Atmospheric Relevant Air-Aqueous and Air-Silica Interfaces DISSERTATION in Environmental Science The Ohio State University 2010 Dissertation Committee: Heather C. Allen, Advisor Linda the interfaces and surfaces of the systems discussed in this dissertation. Complementary vibrational Raman

  11. The value relevance of R&D across profit and loss firms Laurel Franzen *, Suresh Radhakrishnan

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Muðan, Uðurhan

    the relation between stock price and R&D expense, earnings (before R&D expense) and book value of equi- tyThe value relevance of R&D across profit and loss firms Laurel Franzen *, Suresh Radhakrishnan School of Management, SM 41, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083, United States a r t i c

  12. Neural Modeling of Non-Linear Processes: Relevance of the Takens-Ma~ne Theorem

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Masulli, Francesco

    coupled to a 150 MW steam turbine. 1 Introduction The problem of controlling systems characterized by non to be managed (on a typical steam turbine they are about 576,000/hour). Moreover, so far, there are no availableNeural Modeling of Non-Linear Processes: Relevance of the Takens-Ma~n´e Theorem Francesco Masulli

  13. Towards Finding Relevant Information Graphics: Identifying the Independent and Dependent Axis from User-written Queries

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Carberry, Sandra

    Towards Finding Relevant Information Graphics: Identifying the Independent and Dependent Axis from of Computer and Information Science University of Delaware Newark, DE 19716 Abstract Information graphics (non-pictorial graphics such as bar charts and line graphs) contain a great deal of knowl- edge. Information retrieval

  14. Detecting and Representing Relevant Web Deltas in Whoweda Sourav S Bhowmick1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bhowmick, Sourav S.

    Detecting and Representing Relevant Web Deltas in Whoweda Sourav S Bhowmick1 Sanjay Madria2 Wee given the old and new versions of a set of interlinked Web documents, retrieved in response to a user's query. In particular, we show how to detect and represent web deltas, i.e., changes in the Web documents

  15. An Architectural Assessment of SPEC CPU Benchmark Relevance Benjamin C. Lee

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Benjamin C.

    An Architectural Assessment of SPEC CPU Benchmark Relevance Benjamin C. Lee Computer Science 261@deas.harvard.edu Abstract SPEC compute intensive benchmarks are often used to evaluate processors in high-performance systems. However, such evaluations are valid only if these benchmarks are rep- resentative of more

  16. Test blanket modules in ITER: An overview on proposed designs and required DEMO-relevant materials

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Abdou, Mohamed

    Test blanket modules in ITER: An overview on proposed designs and required DEMO-relevant materials, Russian Federation Abstract Within the framework of the ITER Test Blanket Working Group, the ITER Parties have made several proposals for test blanket modules to be tested in ITER from the first day of H

  17. Blast from the Past: Melting Glaciers as a Relevant Source for

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wehrli, Bernhard

    Blast from the Past: Melting Glaciers as a Relevant Source for Persistent Organic Pollutants C H R, 2009. Accepted August 31, 2009. In this study, the hypothesis that melting Alpine glaciers may organic chemicals from melting Alpine glaciers. Considering ongoing global warming and accelerated massive

  18. maintenance. This research is relevant to opera-tions and maintenance challenges facing aging

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    the need for preventive maintenance or other diagnostic activities on the physical system. Simulationsmaintenance. This research is relevant to opera- tions and maintenance challenges facing aging-benefit of extending the time between overhauls. reducing the probability of a failure in the field. and preventive

  19. Are Algae Relevant to the Detritus-Based Food Web in Tank-Bromeliads?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Boyer, Edmond

    Are Algae Relevant to the Detritus-Based Food Web in Tank-Bromeliads? Olivier Brouard1 , Anne, Universite´ Paul Sabatier, UMR CNRS 5245, Toulouse, France Abstract We assessed the occurrence of algae and with regard to the structure of other aquatic microbial communities held in the tanks. Algae were retrieved

  20. PLM: Assessing the industrial relevance 271 Copyright 2007 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Aristomenis, Antoniadis

    PLM: Assessing the industrial relevance 271 Copyright © 2007 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd: The development of PLM systems is closely related to the integration of the design process with the actual capabilities. The development of PLM systems is closely related to the integration of the design process

  1. Physiological relevance of the changes in hemodynamics for circulating blood cells in

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    103 Chapter 5 Physiological relevance of the changes in hemodynamics for circulating blood cells that these changes in the mechanical stimuli might have on the activation state of circulating blood cells have never the magnitude and duration of the shear stresses acting on blood cells circulating inside AAAs

  2. Nuclear structure relevant to neutrinoless double beta decay candidate {sup 130}Te and other recent results

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kay, B. P. [Physics Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois 60439 (United States)

    2013-12-30T23:59:59.000Z

    We have undertaken a series of single-nucleon and pair transfer reaction measurements to help constrain calculations of the nuclear matrix elements for neutrinoless double beta decay. In this talk, a short overview of measurements relevant to the {sup 130}Te?{sup 130}Xe system is given. Brief mention is made of other recent and forthcoming results.

  3. Active recognition enhances the representation of behaviorally relevant information in single auditory forebrain neurons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gentner, Timothy

    auditory forebrain neurons Daniel P. Knudsen1 and Timothy Q. Gentner1,2,3 1 Neurosciences Graduate Program enhances the representation of behaviorally relevant information in single auditory forebrain neurons. J Neurophysiol 109: 1690­1703, 2013. First pub- lished January 9, 2013; doi:10.1152/jn.00461.2012.--Sensory sys

  4. Oceanic processes associated with anomalous events in the Indian Ocean with relevance to 19971998

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Yuqing

    Oceanic processes associated with anomalous events in the Indian Ocean with relevance to 1997 Abstract. An anomalous climatic event occurred in the Indian Ocean (IO) region during 1997­1998, which 1997, warm SSTAs appeared in the western IO, and they peaked in February 1998. An ocean general

  5. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME II/III IAEA COMMITTEE 24, Major Issues Underlying the Model Additional Protocol (1996-1997).

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Volume I of this Review traces the origins of the Model Additional Protocol. It covers the period from 1991, when events in Iraq triggered an intensive review of the safeguards system, until 1996, when the IAEA Board of Governors established Committee 24 to negotiate a new protocol to safeguards agreement. The period from 1991-1996 set the stage for this negotiation and shaped its outcome in important ways. During this 5-year period, many proposals for strengthening safeguards were suggested and reviewed. Some proposals were dropped, for example, the suggestion by the IAEA Secretariat to verify certain imports, and others were refined. A rough consensus was established about the directions in which the international community wanted to go, and this was reflected in the draft of an additional protocol that was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on May 6, 1996 in document GOV/2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System - Proposals For Implementation Under Complementary Legal Authority, A Report by the Director General. This document ended with a recommendation that, 'the Board, through an appropriate mechanism, finalize the required legal instrument taking as a basis the draft protocol proposed by the Secretariat and the explanation of the measures contained in this document.'

  6. Acoustic resonance spectroscopy for safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Olinger, C.T. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Acoustic resonance spectroscopy (ARS) nonintrusively assesses changes in a sealed item, such as a special nuclear material (SNM) container. The acoustic spectrum of a container is a function of its geometry, material of construction, and occupied volume and a function of the parameters of the contents, such as acoustic velocity, viscosity, and composition. Measuring the spectrum establishes a fingerprint for that item. Monitoring for changes in the fingerprint can be used to detect intrinsic changes in the contents or tampering. Spectra are obtained by inducing vibrations in a container at a given frequency with one transducer and detecting the vibrational response at that frequency with a second transducer. The excitation and detection frequency is then incremented until the desired frequency range is sampled. If desired, the signature can then be reduced to a series of resonant peaks, which facilitates the comparison of spectra for many applications. Required measurement time is typically 10 to 40 s, depending on the measurement range and resolution. Useful attributes of ARS are that spectra respond to various parameters differently, only a few seconds are required to perform an ARS measurement, and measurements can be performed without disturbing the container or its contents. Analysis for these applications of ARS is based on comparison of spectra from the same item taken at different times, so anomalies can be detected without any modeling of the system. However, some theoretical modeling can aid in interpreting spectra.

  7. safeguards | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over OurThe Iron4 Self-Scrubbing:,, ,Development ofrluyendi AmesProgramtimed outsadowand|

  8. Safeguarding wetland on Laboratory property

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's PossibleRadiation Protection245C Unlimited ReleaseWelcome ton n uSTEM-A

  9. Another Look at Confidence Intervals: Proposal for a More Relevant and Transparent Approach

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Steven D. Biller; Scott M. Oser

    2015-02-03T23:59:59.000Z

    The behaviors of various confidence/credible interval constructions are explored, particularly in the region of low statistics where methods diverge most. We highlight a number of challenges, such as the treatment of nuisance parameters, and common misconceptions associated with such constructions. An informal survey of the literature suggests that confidence intervals are not always defined in relevant ways and are too often misinterpreted and/or misapplied. This can lead to seemingly paradoxical behaviours and flawed comparisons regarding the relevance of experimental results. We therefore conclude that there is a need for a more pragmatic strategy which recognizes that, while it is critical to objectively convey the information content of the data, there is also a strong desire to derive bounds on models and a natural instinct to interpret things this way. Accordingly, we attempt to put aside philosophical biases in favor of a practical view to propose a more transparent and self-consistent approach that better addresses these issues.

  10. Biodiversity and the Recovery of Threatened and Endangered Salmon Species in the Columbia River Basin : Recovery Issues for Threatened and Endangered Snake River Salmon : Technical Report of 8 of 11.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Steward, C. R. (Cleveland R.)

    1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The stated purpose of the Endangered Species Act is to provide a means whereby the ecosystem upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved. Conservation of the Columbia River ecosystem and the diversity of gene pools, life histories, species, and communities that comprise it, should become a major objective of species recovery and fish and wildlife management programs in the Columbia River Basin. Biodiversity is important to both species and ecosystem health, and is a prerequisite to long-term sustainability of biological resources. In this paper, I provide an overview of various approaches to defining, measuring, monitoring, and protecting biodiversity. A holistic approach is stressed that simultaneously considers diverse species and resource management needs. Emphasis is on threatened and endangered species of salmon and their associated habitat.

  11. PHYSICAL REVIEW B 84, 075144 (2011) Fundamental and excitation gaps in molecules of relevance for organic photovoltaics from an

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Baer, Roi

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    for organic photovoltaics from an optimally tuned range-separated hybrid functional Sivan Refaely-Abramson,1 and optical gaps of relevant molecular systems are of primary importance for organic-based photovoltaics of photovoltaically relevant and other molecular systems. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevB.84.075144 PACS number(s): 71.15.Mb I

  12. SourceRank: Relevance and Trust Assessment for Deep Web Sources Based on Inter-Source Agreement

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kambhampati, Subbarao

    SourceRank: Relevance and Trust Assessment for Deep Web Sources Based on Inter-Source Agreement Tempe AZ USA 85287 rajub@asu.edu, rao@asu.edu ABSTRACT One immediate challenge in searching the deep web-similarity-based relevance assess- ment. When applied to the deep web these methods have two deficiencies. First

  13. Transition to IFRS and value relevance in a small but developed market: A look at Greek evidence

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Paris-Sud XI, Université de

    no significant change in the value relevance of book value of equity and earnings between the 2004 pre IFRS1 Transition to IFRS and value relevance in a small but developed market: A look at Greek evidence 467 284. Paul André, Professor of Accounting and Management Control, ESSEC Business School, Paris

  14. Final Report: Laser-Material Interactions Relevant to Analytic Spectroscopy of Wide Band Gap Materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dickinson, J. T. [Washington State University] [Washington State University

    2014-04-05T23:59:59.000Z

    We summarize our studies aimed at developing an understanding of the underlying physics and chemistry in terms of laser materials interactions relevant to laser-based sampling and chemical analysis of wide bandgap materials. This work focused on the determination of mechanisms for the emission of electrons, ions, atoms, and molecules from laser irradiation of surfaces. We determined the important role of defects on these emissions, the thermal, chemical, and physical interactions responsible for matrix effects and mass-dependent transport/detection. This work supported development of new techniques and technology for the determination of trace elements contained such as nuclear waste materials.

  15. Organizational and social-psychological issues relevant to fallout-shelter evaluation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wernette, D.R.

    1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper presents the results of a preliminary review of the literature on organizational and social-psychological issues relevant to fallout-shelter evaluation. Fallout-shelter options are evaluated along two dimensions: shelter size, and extent of shelteree participation in the shelter construction. Four functional criteria are used in the evaluation: decision-making, member coordination, social control, and maintaining morale. Smaller shelters requiring shelteree participation in construction appear preferable as measured in most of these criteria. Additional factors mentioned include demographic characteristics of the shelter population, degree and type of ventilation system, and availability of medical equipment and personnel. 10 references.

  16. Dana Levine | Center for Gas SeparationsRelevant to Clean Energy

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItem NotEnergy,ARMFormsGas SeparationsRelevantDOE Progress ReviewTechnologies | Blandine

  17. Daqiang Yuan | Center for Gas SeparationsRelevant to Clean Energy

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItem NotEnergy,ARMFormsGas SeparationsRelevantDOE Progress ReviewTechnologies |

  18. David Hopkinson | Center for Gas SeparationsRelevant to Clean Energy

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItem NotEnergy,ARMFormsGas SeparationsRelevantDOE ProgressTechnologies | Blandine

  19. David L. Rogow | Center for Gas SeparationsRelevant to Clean Energy

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItem NotEnergy,ARMFormsGas SeparationsRelevantDOE ProgressTechnologies |

  20. David Luebke | Center for Gas SeparationsRelevant to Clean Energy

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItem NotEnergy,ARMFormsGas SeparationsRelevantDOE ProgressTechnologies |Technologies |