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Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
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1

Risk in the Weapons Stockpile  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-08-14T23:59:59.000Z

2

Impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on strategic stability  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This presentation is to discuss the impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on the strategic stability. Methodologies used to study strategic stability issues include what are basically strategic-force exchange models. These models are used to simulate a massive nuclear exchange in which one side attacks and the other side retaliates. These models have been of interest to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Researchers have been looking at issues concerning the stability of the transition period, during which some defenses have been deployed and during which deterrence and war-fighting capability reply partly on defense and partly on offense. Also, more recently, with interest in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and force reductions beyond START, the same calculation engines have been used to examine the impact of reduced forces on strategic stability. For both the SDI and the START reduction cases, exchange models are able to address only a rather narrow class of strategic stability issues. Other broader stability questions that are unrelated to nuclear weapons or that relate to nuclear weapons but are not addressed by the calculational tools which are not included in this discussion. 6 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab. (BN)

Chrzanowski, P.

1991-03-20T23:59:59.000Z

3

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

4

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

5

An Assessment of Tritium Supply Alternatives in Support of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nuclear weapons require the periodic replacement of tritium, a radioactive gas that decays at approximately 5.5 percent per year. Currently no tritium-supply facility exists in the US, and due to the decay, the tritium inventory will fall below the required ... Keywords: Decision Analysis-Multiple Criteria, Government-Defense

Detlof Von Winterfeldt; Eric Schweitzer

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

6

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

7

Stockpile | Y-12 National Security Complex  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

mission. We execute stewardship through refurbishment, dismantlement and surveillance of weapons in the nuclear stockpile. Nuclear Deterrence Stockpile Dismantlement Refurbishment...

8

Nuclear Weapons  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

nuclear science that has had a significant global influence. Following the observation of fission products of uranium by Hahn and Strassmann in 1938, a uranium fission weapon...

9

Nuclear Weapons Journal Archive  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Weapons Journal Archive Nuclear Weapons Journal The Nuclear Weapons Journal ceased publication after Issue 2, 2009. Below are Nuclear Weapons Journal archived issues. Issue...

10

Will our nuclear weapons work?  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Will our nuclear weapons work? Will our nuclear weapons work? National Security Science magazine Latest Issue:April 2013 All Issues » submit Supercomputers are essential for assessing the health of the U.S. nuclear stockpile Supercomputers provide assurance by simulating nuclear weapons performance March 25, 2013 Graphic of a missile being tested through computer simulation Los Alamos uses supercomputers to make high-resolution 3D simulations that help to assess the health of nuclear weapons like this B-61 bomb. Contact Managing Editor Clay Dillingham Email The nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile were designed and built to be replaced with new designs and builds every 10 to 15 years. These weapons have lived beyond their expected lifespans. Supercomputers provide the high-resolution 3D simulations needed for

11

Managing the Stockpile | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The National Nuclear Security Administration Managing the Stockpile Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile...

12

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear...

13

Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Weapons Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Weapons Weapons The New START Treaty, which was signed in 2010, between the United States and Russian Federation will cap the strategic deployed nuclear arsenals of each country at 1,550 warheads, a nearly 75% reduction compared with the

14

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the...

15

Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

16

Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

17

U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

18

Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile  

SciTech Connect

In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

1992-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

19

Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly Newsletter | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The National Nuclear Security Administration Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly Newsletter Home > About Us > Our...

20

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing August 22, 1958 Washington, DC Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


21

Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Nuclear weapons are developed, produced, and maintained in the stockpile, and then retired and dismantled. This sequence of events is known as the

22

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons  

SciTech Connect

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described.

Vaughen, V.C.A.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

23

Reconversion of nuclear weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

Kapitza, Sergei P

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

24

Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Missions Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship Ensuring the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. About Nuclear Weapons Since 1949, Sandia's scientists...

25

Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly Newsletter | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Home > About Us > Our Programs > Defense Programs > Office of Research, Development, Test Capabilities and Evaluation > Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly Newsletter Stockpile...

26

Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

Not Available

1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

27

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Much About North Korean Nuclear Weapons,” unpublished paper,the South and use nuclear weapons in doing so. How concernedout how to use nuclear weapons except for deterrence. Is a

Waltz, Kenneth N.

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

28

Identification of nuclear weapons  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

1987-04-10T23:59:59.000Z

29

Why the Nuclear Stockpile Needs Supercomputers | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Why the Nuclear Stockpile Needs Supercomputers Why the Nuclear Stockpile Needs Supercomputers Why the Nuclear Stockpile Needs Supercomputers April 28, 2011 - 5:20pm Addthis NNSA supercomputers are a key part of our ability to keep our nuclear stockpile safe, secure and effective. Joshua McConaha What does this mean for me? The NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program performs a critical role in implementing President Obama's nuclear security agenda Through a scientific mixture of hardware, software, codes and data and using some of the world's most advanced computer systems, the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program performs a critical role in implementing President Obama's nuclear security agenda. With the end of underground testing in 1992, supercomputers are a key part

30

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing July 03, 1993 Washington, DC

31

Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

32

Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administration Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes September 01, 1961 Washington, DC Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes The Soviet Union breaks the nuclear test moratorium and the United States

33

Weapon Detonation Forensics | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

34

Nuclear stockpile stewardship and Bayesian image analysis (DARHT and the BIE)  

SciTech Connect

Since the end of nuclear testing, the reliability of our nation's nuclear weapon stockpile has been performed using sub-critical hydrodynamic testing. These tests involve some pretty 'extreme' radiography. We will be discussing the challenges and solutions to these problems provided by DARHT (the world's premiere hydrodynamic testing facility) and the BIE or Bayesian Inference Engine (a powerful radiography analysis software tool). We will discuss the application of Bayesian image analysis techniques to this important and difficult problem.

Carroll, James L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2011-01-11T23:59:59.000Z

35

Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administra...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

> Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes September 01, 1961 Washington, DC Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes The Soviet Union breaks the nuclear test...

36

Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war  

SciTech Connect

This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

Bing, G.F.

1991-08-20T23:59:59.000Z

37

Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM,  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM, DOE O 452.2D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM, DOE O 452.2D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY "To prevent accidents and inadvertent or unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives. In conjunction with the Department of Defense (DoD), to protect the public health and safety by providing dual-agency judgment and responsibility for the safety, security, and use control (surety) of nuclear weapons. To establish nuclear explosive surety standards and nuclear weapon design surety requirements. To address surety vulnerabilities during all phases of the nuclear weapon life cycle and to upgrade surety during weapon stockpile refurbishments and/or new weapon

38

The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.

Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

39

Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP Posted By Office of Public Affairs Participants in Sandia's Weapon Intern Program recently visited and

40

Materials and Sensor R&D to Transform the Nuclear Stockpile: Livermore?s Transformational Materials Initiative  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

As the nation's nuclear weapons age and the demands placed on them change, significant challenges face the nuclear stockpile. Risks include material supply issues, ever-increasing lifecycle costs, and loss of technical expertise across the weapons complex. For example, non-nuclear materials are becoming increasingly difficult to replace because manufacturing methods and formulations have evolved in such a way as to render formerly available materials unprofitable, unsafe, or otherwise obsolete. Subtle formulation changes in available materials that occur without the knowledge of the weapons community for proprietary reasons have frequently affected the long-term performance of materials in the nuclear weapon environment. Significant improvements in performance, lifetime, or production cost can be realized with modern synthesis, modeling, and manufacturing methods. For example, there are currently supply and aging issues associated with the insensitive high explosive formulations LX-17 and PBX 9502 that are based on triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) and Kel-F, neither of which are commercially available today. Assuring the reliability of the stockpile through surveillance and regularly scheduled Life Extension Programs is an increasingly expensive endeavor. Transforming our current stockpile surveillance--a system based on destructive testing of increasingly valuable assets--to a system based on embedded sensors has a number of potential advantages that include long-term cost savings, reduced risk associated with asset transportation, state-of-health assessments in the field, and active management of the stockpile.

Maxwell, R; Fried, L; Campbell, G; Saab, A; Kotovsky, J; Carter, C; Chang, J

2009-10-11T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


41

U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons May 10, 1992 Washington, DC U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons

42

Stewarding a Reduced Stockpile  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The future of the US nuclear arsenal continues to be guided by two distinct drivers: the preservation of world peace and the prevention of further proliferation through our extended deterrent umbrella. Timely implementation of US nuclear policy decisions depends, in part, on the current state of stockpile weapons, their delivery systems, and the supporting infrastructure within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In turn, the present is a product of past choices and world events. Now more than ever, the nuclear weapons program must respond to the changing global security environment and to increasing budget pressures with innovation and sound investments. As the nation transitions to a reduced stockpile, the successes of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) present options to transition to a sustainable complex better suited to stockpile size, national strategic goals and budgetary realities. Under any stockpile size, we must maintain essential human capital, forefront capabilities, and have a right-sized effective production capacity. We present new concepts for maintaining high confidence at low stockpile numbers and to effectively eliminate the reserve weapons within an optimized complex. We, as a nation, have choices to make on how we will achieve a credible 21st century deterrent.

Goodwin, B T; Mara, G

2008-04-18T23:59:59.000Z

43

Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering...

44

Stockpile Stewardship at Los Alamos(U)  

SciTech Connect

Stockpile stewardship is the retention of nuclear weapons in the stockpile beyond their original design life. These older weapons have potential changes inconsistent with the original design intent and military specifications. The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires us to develop high-fidelity, physics-based capabilities to predict, assess, certify and design nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test. Each year, the Lab Directors are required to provide an assessment of the safety, security, and reliability our stockpile to the President of the United States. This includes assessing whether a need to return to testing exists. This is a talk to provide an overview of Stockpile Stewardship's scientific requirements and how stewardship has changed in the absence of nuclear testing. The talk is adapted from an HQ talk to the War college, and historical unclassified talks on weapon's physics.

Webster, Robert B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-06-29T23:59:59.000Z

45

Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

Alfred Tang

2008-05-26T23:59:59.000Z

46

Nuclear power and nuclear-weapons proliferation  

SciTech Connect

The danger that fissile isotopes may be diverted from nuclear power production to the construction of nuclear weapons would be aggravated by a switch to the plutonium breeder: but future uranium supplies are uncertain.

Moniz, E.J.; Neff, T.L.

1978-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

47

President Obama Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > President Obama Calls for an End to ... President Obama Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons April 05, 2009 Prague, Czech Republic President Obama Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons

48

Request For Records Disposition Authority-Nuclear Weapons | Department...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

For Records Disposition Authority-Nuclear Weapons Request For Records Disposition Authority-Nuclear Weapons This document identifies the nuclear weapon records generated by the...

49

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapons Testing Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing July 03, 1993 Washington, DC Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing President Clinton...

50

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress July 24, 2007 - 2:55pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC -U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman joined the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State in sending to Congress the Bush Administration's nuclear weapons strategy. This document not only describes the history of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, but reinforces how deterrence applies to present and future security threats, and what a nuclear stockpile of the 21st century will need to look like in order to meet those threats. The strategy emphasizes President Bush's goal of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons. It is consistent with the Moscow Treaty that sets U.S. and Russian

51

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress July 24, 2007 - 2:55pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC -U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman joined the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State in sending to Congress the Bush Administration's nuclear weapons strategy. This document not only describes the history of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, but reinforces how deterrence applies to present and future security threats, and what a nuclear stockpile of the 21st century will need to look like in order to meet those threats. The strategy emphasizes President Bush's goal of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons. It is consistent with the Moscow Treaty that sets U.S. and Russian

52

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

53

Nuclear Deterrence | Y-12 National Security Complex  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

the nation's Uranium Center of Excellence. We employ only the most advanced and failsafe technologies to protect the stockpile. Nuclear Deterrence Stockpile Weapons production...

54

Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World | National  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World | National Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Fact Sheets > Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a ... Fact Sheet Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World Jan 2, 2009 The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has several missions

55

The National Nuclear Security Administration's Weapons Dismantlement...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

National Nuclear Security Administration's Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition Program OAS-L-13-06 January 2013 Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 January 29, 2013...

56

EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...

57

Philippine Bases and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

BASES AN-fJ U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY In 1947, when Unitedcould bring as many nuclear weapons as It wanted onto theinclude opposition to U.S. nuclear weapons and bases In the

Schirmer, Daniel Boone

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

58

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

1990 What Do We Do with Nuclear Weapons Now? by Michael M.for the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy MICHAEL M. MAYan electoral majority in nuclear weapons states. Unlike

May, Michael M

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

59

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

... Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program January 19, 1975 Washington, DC Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program The Energy...

60

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Engineering Sciences October 12-14, 2011, Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Understanding and Reducing...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


61

LEP: Extending stockpile life | Y-12 National Security Complex  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

LEP: Extending stockpile ... LEP: Extending stockpile ... LEP: Extending stockpile life Posted: February 7, 2013 - 6:10pm | Y-12 Report | Volume 9, Issue 2 | 2013 The Life Extension Program allows safe, effective weapons to remain in the stockpile well beyond their original service life. Nuclear weapons are intricate and, in a sense, handmade devices that cannot be stored indefinitely - and be expected to function - without ongoing care and maintenance. Weapon components periodically require evaluation and replacement. Fifteen years ago the Life Extension Program, or LEP, funded by Defense Programs, was established to care for and prolong the safety and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile. Today Y-12 and other sites across the Nuclear Security Enterprise collaborate in that effort.

62

Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons Science & Technology National labs provide the science and technology to maintain and certify the nuclear stockpile in the absence of full-scale weapons testing. The...

63

AEC and control of nuclear weapons  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

control of nuclear weapons The Atomic Energy Commission took control of the atomic energy project known originally as the Manhattan Project on January 1, 1947. This shift from the...

64

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead ... Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program January 19, 1975

65

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

in South Asia, Pakistan’s nuclear military capability, alongof the nuclear club: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Ifand then India became nuclear powers, and Pakistan naturally

Waltz, Kenneth N.

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

66

The history of nuclear weapon safety devices  

SciTech Connect

The paper presents the history of safety devices used in nuclear weapons from the early days of separables to the latest advancements in MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS). Although the paper focuses on devices, the principles of Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety implementation will also be presented.

Plummer, D.W.; Greenwood, W.H.

1998-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

67

Largest Federally Owned Wind Farm Breaks Ground at U.S. Weapons...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

site for the assembly, disassembly, and maintenance of the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile. Under the Obama Administration, federal agencies have reduced greenhouse...

68

Effects of nuclear weapons. Third edition  

SciTech Connect

Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

Glasstone, S.; Dolan, P.J.

1977-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

69

Y-12, the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement ? Or:...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement - Or: The Cold War and nuclear weapons dismantlement (title used in The Oak Ridger) The Cold War heated up over the years with such...

70

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The North’sNye, "Maintaining a Non-Proliferation Regime," InternationalKenneth Waltz “wars of non-proliferation”—against them. 31

Waltz, Kenneth N.

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

71

SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

http://www.nnsa.energy.gov Office of Nuclear Weapon Surety and Quality http://www.nnsa.energy.gov Office of Nuclear Weapon Surety and Quality SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE Approved: 7-7-11 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF CONTROLS TO PREVENT DELIBERATE UNAUTHORIZED USE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Office of Defense Programs NA SD 452.4 NA SD 452.4 1 7-7-11 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF CONTROLS TO PREVENT DELIBERATE UNAUTHORIZED USE 1. PURPOSE. This NNSA Supplemental Directive (SD) supports the requirements of DOE O 452.4B, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons. Specifically, this SD supports the Order's requirements to implement deliberate unauthorized use (DUU) preventive measures for nuclear explosive operations (NEO) and associated activities and to perform independent evaluations to determine if NEOs

72

Probabilistic cost-benefit analysis of enhanced safety features for strategic nuclear weapons at a representative location  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

We carried out a demonstration analysis of the value of developing and implementing enhanced safety features for nuclear weapons in the US stockpile. We modified an approach that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed in response to a congressional directive that NRC assess the ``value-impact`` of regulatory actions for commercial nuclear power plants. Because improving weapon safety shares some basic objectives with NRC regulations, i.e., protecting public health and safety from the effects of accidents involving radioactive materials, we believe the NRC approach to be appropriate for evaluating weapons-safety cost-benefit issues. Impact analysis includes not only direct costs associated with retrofitting the weapon system, but also the expected costs (or economic risks) that are avoided by the action, i.e., the benefits.

Stephens, D.R.; Hall, C.H.; Holman, G.S.; Graham, K.F.; Harvey, T.F.; Serduke, F.J.D.

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

73

Proliferation concerns in the Russian closed nuclear weapons complex cities : a study of regional migration behavior.  

SciTech Connect

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of the weapons stockpile. The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, closed nuclear weapons complex cities. Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge proliferation. This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six of which contain the ten closed nuclear weapons complex cities. This study finds that the presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration. However, the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities. Further, these results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across time. Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and societal factors became significant in later years. Two significant policy conclusions are derived from this research. First, higher levels of income are found to increase outmigration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive. Second, this study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of potential proliferants.

Flores, Kristen Lee

2004-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

74

Nuclear weapons issues in South Asia  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report discusses how the US can play a productive mediating role in South Asia by engaging India and Pakistan in an international forum to manage nuclear weapons, as Edward Teller advocated. India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear capabilities because they fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten the US. The appropriate response for the US, therefore, is diplomatic engagement and negotiations. In addition to the international approach, encouragement and facilitation of regional and bilateral interactions will also be important. Formal arms control agreements have been reached, but less formal confidence-building measures, and unilateral security pledges may well be combined to form a more secure strategic environment in South Asia than a nuclear armed confrontation across the porous South Asian border.

Joeck, N.

1993-07-02T23:59:59.000Z

75

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities. This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues More Documents & Publications Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 00-03: Specific Issues on Applicability of

76

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities. This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues More Documents & Publications Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 00-03: Specific Issues on Applicability of

77

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities.This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues More Documents & Publications Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 00-03: Specific Issues on Applicability of

78

List of Major Information Systems,National Nuclear Security Administra...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

emerging information networking technology to production processes in support of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. National Nuclear Security Administration ADaPT Network...

79

Office of Inertial Confinement Fusion | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

required to support the nuclear weapon stockpile. ICF's experimental capabilities are an essential component of the overall NNSA plan to manage the assessment of nuclear...

80

Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

Darby, John L.

2011-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


81

A thousand suns : political motivations for nuclear weapons testing  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Nuclear weapon testing is the final step in the nuclear development process, an announcement of ability and strength. The consequences of a nuclear test are far from easy to bear, however: economic sanctions can be crippling ...

Raas, Whitney

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

82

National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Workers National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers Third Radiation Effects Research Foundation Board of Councilors Meeting Held in Hiroshima...

83

EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Act of 1988. The following case examples are provided to help illustrate how PAAA NTS reporting interfaces with nuclear weapon program NCR processes: Example 1: A reservoir...

84

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01, Nuclear Weapon Program...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Act of 1988. The following case examples are provided to help illustrate how PAAA NTS reporting interfaces with nuclear weapon program NCR processes: Example 1: A reservoir...

85

DOE O 452.8, Control of Nuclear Weapon Data  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

The directive establishes the policy, process and procedures for control of nuclear weapon data to ensure that dissemination of the information is restricted ...

2011-07-21T23:59:59.000Z

86

DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives "DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship" FOR...

87

Non-Nuclear Treaties | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Treaties Non-Nuclear Treaties The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction off...

88

Nuclear power and nuclear-weapons proliferation  

SciTech Connect

Concern over the risk of nuclear proliferation has led to extensive reexamination of the technical, economic, and political assumptions underlying both national and international nuclear policies. An attempt is made in the present article to clarify the basic technical and political issues. The connections between various fuel cycles and their possible proliferation risks are discussed. As the resolution of the existing differing views on proliferation risks will be largely a political process, solutions to the problem are not proposed. (JSR)

Moniz, E.J.; Neff, T.L.

1978-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

89

EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy 18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel SUMMARY This study analyzes the potential environmental impacts of adopting a policy to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. In particular, the study examines the comparative impacts of several alternative approaches to managing the spent fuel. The analysis demonstrates that the impacts on the environmental, workers and the general public of implementing any of the alternative management approaches would be small and within applicable Federal and state regulator limits. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES

90

Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort.

Travelli, A.; Gaines, L.L.; Minkov, V.; Olson, A.P.; Snelgrove, J.

1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

91

Source options for nuclear weapons identification system  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report briefly presents the advantages and disadvantages of two timed sources of neutrons that can be used with the source-driven noise analysis method: (1) {sup 252}Cf in an ionization chamber and (2) an associated-particle sealed tube neutron generator (APSTNG). These sources can be used with frequency and time analysis methods for nuclear weapons identification, quality assurance in production, special nuclear materials assay, criticality safety, and provision of measured data for verification of neutron and gamma ray transport calculational methods. The advantages of {sup 252}Cf for a nuclear materials identification system are that it is simple, reliable, and small and that all source events are detected. The disadvantages are that it cannot be turned off, leads to small radiation doses in handling, and produces more than one neutron per fission event. The advantages of APSTNG are that it is directional, can be turned off, and has one particle per deuterium-tritium reaction. The disadvantages are that it is large and complicated compared to {sup 252}Cf.

Mihalczo, J.T.; Koehler, P.E.; Valentine, T.E.; Phillips, L.D.

1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

92

ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear-fusion energy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of "points" highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and fo...

Gsponer, A; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

93

The future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. nuclear weapons policy .  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??This thesis addresses the viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT for short – in light of U.S. nuclear weapons… (more)

Claussen, Bjørn Ragnar

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

94

Sequoia ranked third in TOP500 list | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Program, helps ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of the nation's aging nuclear weapons stockpile without the use of underground testing. Sequoia was first...

95

NNSA honors Y-12 employees | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

of Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Director Joseph Oder recently visited the Y-12 National Security Complex to present Defense Programs Awards of Excellence. Fifteen teams consisting...

96

Tiny device can detect hidden nuclear weapons, materials  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Tiny Tiny device can detect hidden nuclear weapons, materials Director's Welcome Organization Achievements Highlights Fact Sheets, Brochures & Other Documents Multimedia Library About Nuclear Energy Nuclear Reactors Designed by Argonne Argonne's Nuclear Science and Technology Legacy Opportunities within NE Division Visit Argonne Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE on Flickr Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of Chicago Pile 1 (CP-1) Argonne OutLoud on Nuclear Energy Argonne Energy Showcase 2012 Highlights Bookmark and Share Tiny device can detect hidden nuclear weapons, materials This tiny wafer can detect hidden nuclear weapons and materials NUCLEAR DETECTOR -- This small wafer could become the key component in

97

Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

located in closed cities. In some cases, these industrial sites are the size of small cities and contain hundreds of metric tons of highly attractive weapons-usable nuclear...

98

An assessment of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

In February of 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear weapons test. Speculations are that this test was conducted to further develop a warhead small enough to fit on an intercontinental ballistic missile. This test ...

Sivels, Ciara (Ciara Brooke)

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

99

Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Test Site, Volume I Terrence R. Fehner and F.G. Gosling. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I (pdf)....

100

Briefing, Classification of Nuclear Weapons-Related Information- June 2012  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

This brief will familiarize individuals from agencies outside of DOE who may come in contact with RD and FRD with the procedures for identifying, classifying, marking, handling, and declassifying documents containing Nuclear Weapons-Related Information.

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


101

DOE O 452.4B, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety ...

2010-01-22T23:59:59.000Z

102

Science and technology in the stockpile stewardship program, S & TR reprints  

SciTech Connect

This document reports on these topics: Computer Simulations in Support of National Security; Enhanced Surveillance of Aging Weapons; A New Precision Cutting Tool: The Femtosecond Laser; Superlasers as a Tool of Stockpile Stewardship; Nova Laser Experiments and Stockpile Stewardship; Transforming Explosive Art into Science; Better Flash Radiography Using the FXR; Preserving Nuclear Weapons Information; Site 300Õs New Contained Firing Facility; The Linear Electric Motor: Instability at 1,000 gÕs; A Powerful New Tool to Detect Clandestine Nuclear Tests; High Explosives in Stockpile Surveillance Indicate Constancy; Addressing a Cold War Legacy with a New Way to Produce TATB; JumpinÕ Jupiter! Metallic Hydrogen; Keeping the Nuclear Stockpile Safe, Secure, and Reliable; The Multibeam FabryÐPerot Velocimeter: Efficient Measurements of High Velocities; Theory and Modeling in Material Science; The Diamond Anvil Cell; Gamma-Ray Imaging Spectrometry; X-Ray Lasers and High-Density Plasma

Storm, E

1998-04-08T23:59:59.000Z

103

The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000  

SciTech Connect

This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

Not Available

1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

104

Bombs Versus Budgets: Inside the Nuclear Weapons Lobby  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The battle over deficits and defense has focused attention on the costs of nuclear weapons. Estimates of the full costs of nuclear weapons-related activities are hotly debated, but there is no question that they will reach hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade. At a time of tight budgets, there is a real possibility that some of the systems and facilities described so far could be reduced, delayed, or cancelled outright. For example, former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright noted in July 2011, “The challenge here is that we have to re-capitalize all three legs [of the nuclear triad], and we don’t have the money to do it. ” That same month, General Robert Kehler, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, asserted, “We’re not going to be able to go forward with weapon systems that cost what weapon systems cost today.” This report provides a profile of the nuclear weapons lobby, noting along the way that in a constrained budgetary environment different parts of the lobby may either collaborate to promote higher nuclear weapons spending or compete for their share of a shrinking pie. An Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN), slated to be replaced by a Next Generation Sub.

D. Hartung; Christine Anderson

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

105

DOE O 452.6A, Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of Defense  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This Order establishes Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration requirements and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon ...

2009-05-14T23:59:59.000Z

106

Interdicting a Nuclear-Weapons Project  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A “proliferator” seeks to complete a first small batch of fission weapons as quickly as possible, whereas an “interdictor” wishes to delay that completion for as long as possible. We develop and solve a max-min model that identifies ... Keywords: CPM, defense, foreign policy, government, integer, linear, military, programming, project management, targeting

Gerald G. Brown; W. Matthew Carlyle; Robert C. Harney; Eric M. Skroch; R. Kevin Wood

2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

107

Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings  

SciTech Connect

The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

Not Available

1992-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

108

National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers October 28, 2013 - 3:11pm Addthis Color Guard | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Color Guard | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 US Representative Dina Titus (1st Congressional District of Nevada) | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 US Representative Dina Titus (1st Congressional District of Nevada) | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Mr. Al Tseu | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Mr. Al Tseu | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Chief Health Safety and Security Officer | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013

109

An Introduction to Risk with a Focus on Design Diversity in the Stockpile  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The maintenance and security of nuclear weapons in the stockpile involves decisions based on risk analysis and quantitative measures of risk. Risk is a factor in all decisions, a particularly important factor in decisions of a large scale. One example of high-risk decisions we will discuss is the risk involved in design diversity within the stockpile of nuclear weapons arsenal. Risk is defined as 'possibility of loss or injury' and the 'degree of probability of such loss' (Kaplan and Garrick 12). To introduce the risk involved with maintaining the weapons stockpile we will draw a parallel to the design and maintenance of Southwest Airlines fleet of Boeing 737 planes. The clear benefits for cost savings in maintenance of having a uniform fleet are what historically drove Southwest to have only Boeing 737s in their fleet. Less money and resources are need for maintenance, training, and materials. Naturally, risk accompanies those benefits. A defect in a part of the plane indicates a potential defect in that same part in all the planes of the fleet. As a result, safety, business, and credibility are at risk. How much variety or diversity does the fleet need to mitigate that risk? With that question in mind, a balance is needed to accommodate the different risks and benefits of the situation. In a similar way, risk is analyzed for the design and maintenance of nuclear weapons in the stockpile. In conclusion, risk must be as low as possible when it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk, and to help balance options in stockpile stewardship.

Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-08-13T23:59:59.000Z

110

Follow-up Audit on Stockpile Surveillance Testing, IG-0744 | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Follow-up Audit on Stockpile Surveillance Testing, IG-0744 Follow-up Audit on Stockpile Surveillance Testing, IG-0744 Follow-up Audit on Stockpile Surveillance Testing, IG-0744 Significant backlogs existed in each of the three types of tests Surveillance Testing conducted in the Surveillance Testing Program---laboratory tests, flight tests, and component tests---as of September 30? 2005. Laboratory tests are conducted on weapons' non-nuclear systems to detect defects due to handling, aging, manufacturing, or design. Flight tests involve dropping or launching a weapon, with its nuclear components removed, to assess performance and reliability. Component tests involve the destructive analysis of the five primary weapon components: pits, secondaries, detonators, cable assemblies, and the gas transfer valves systems

111

Follow-up Audit on Stockpile Surveillance Testing, IG-0744 | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Follow-up Audit on Stockpile Surveillance Testing, IG-0744 Follow-up Audit on Stockpile Surveillance Testing, IG-0744 Follow-up Audit on Stockpile Surveillance Testing, IG-0744 Significant backlogs existed in each of the three types of tests Surveillance Testing conducted in the Surveillance Testing Program---laboratory tests, flight tests, and component tests---as of September 30? 2005. Laboratory tests are conducted on weapons' non-nuclear systems to detect defects due to handling, aging, manufacturing, or design. Flight tests involve dropping or launching a weapon, with its nuclear components removed, to assess performance and reliability. Component tests involve the destructive analysis of the five primary weapon components: pits, secondaries, detonators, cable assemblies, and the gas transfer valves systems

112

Reassessing U.S. nuclear weapons policy Harold Brown[1] and John Deutch[2  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

2 / 28 The world-wide nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Entry into force: 1970 Three "pillars": - Non Proliferation (of nuclear-weapon capabilities), - Nuclear of the globe. The collapse of the world-wide regime of nuclear- weapon non-proliferation might happen in two

Deutch, John

113

NNSA's Summary of Experiments Conducted in Support of Stockpile  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

for the 1st quarter of FY2012 prepared by NNSA's for the 1st quarter of FY2012 prepared by NNSA's Office of Defense Programs provides descriptions of key NNSA facilities that conduct stockpile stewardship experiments. These include some of the most sophisticated scientific research facilities in the world including, the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories. The summary also provides the number of experiments performed at each facility during each quarter of the fiscal year. The U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program is a robust program of scientific inquiry used to sustain and assess the nuclear weapons stockpile without the use of underground nuclear tests. The experiments carried out within

114

NNSA's Summary of Experiments Conducted in Support of Stockpile  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

for the 1st quarter of FY2012 prepared by NNSA's for the 1st quarter of FY2012 prepared by NNSA's Office of Defense Programs provides descriptions of key NNSA facilities that conduct stockpile stewardship experiments. These include some of the most sophisticated scientific research facilities in the world including, the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories. The summary also provides the number of experiments performed at each facility during each quarter of the fiscal year. The U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program is a robust program of scientific inquiry used to sustain and assess the nuclear weapons stockpile without the use of underground nuclear tests. The experiments carried out within

115

Radiations from nuclear weapons - signal detectors - NASA program information  

SciTech Connect

This letter is for the purpose of supplying the information that you requested at the meeting of the sub-committee on Project Vela. It is divided into three parts: (1) Radiations from nuclear weapons; (2) Backgrounds for Vela Signal Detectors; (3) Discussion of the NASA program.

White, R. S.

1960-02-10T23:59:59.000Z

116

The Association between Cancers and Low Level Radiation: an evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

and Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant. Rad Res 1989;120:19-Evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility MASTERAT T H E HANFORD NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITY JULIE BRITTON

Britton, Julie

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

117

An analysis of technical and policy drivers in Current U.S. nuclear weapons force structure  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

U.S. nuclear weapons force structure accounts for the number and types of strategic and nonstrategic weapon systems in various locations that comprise the nuclear arsenal. While exact numbers, locations, and detailed designs ...

Baker, Amanda, S. B. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

118

Environmental Restoration Strategic Plan. Remediating the nuclear weapons complex  

SciTech Connect

With the end of the cold war, the US has a reduced need for nuclear weapons production. In response, the Department of Energy has redirected resources from weapons production to weapons dismantlement and environmental remediation. To this end, in November 1989, the US Department of Energy (DOE) established the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (renamed the Office of Environmental Management in 1994). It was created to bring under a central authority the management of radioactive and hazardous wastes at DOE sites and inactive or shut down facilities. The Environmental Restoration Program, a major component of DOE`s Environmental Management Program, is responsible for the remediation and management of contaminated environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater, sediments) and the decommissioning of facilities and structures at 130 sites in over 30 states and territories.

1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

119

ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of “points ” highlighting the strategic-political and militarytechnical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and foster further nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The safety and environmental problems related to the operation of largescale fusion facilities such as ITER (which contain massive amounts of hazardous and/or radioactive materials such as tritium, lithium, and beryllium, as well as neutron-activated structural materials) are not addressed in this paper.

André Gsponer; Jean-pierre Hurni

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

120

EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Enforcement Guidance Supplement Enforcement Guidance Supplement EGS:01-01 Appendix E-Operational Procedures for Enforcement Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 October 15, 2001 MEMORANDUM FOR: DOE PAAA COORDINATORS CONTRACTOR PAAA COORDINATORS FROM: R. KEITH CHRISTOPHER DIRECTOR OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION SUBJECT: Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities. This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues.

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


121

Use of commercial manipulator to handle a nuclear weapon component  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has developed a manipulator workcell to load and unload nuclear weapon pit assemblies from a cart. To develop this workcell, PNL procured a commercially available manipulator, equipped it with force-sensing and vision equipment, and developed manipulator control software. Manipulator workcell development demonstrated that commercially available manipulator systems can successfully perform this task if the appropriate manipulator is selected and the manipulator workcell tooling and software are carefully designed.

Baker, C.P.

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

122

Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

Saunders, Emily C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rowberry, Ariana N. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fearey, Bryan L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

123

A hazard separation system for dismantlement of nuclear weapon components  

SciTech Connect

Over the next decade, the US Department of Energy (DOE) must retire and dismantle many nuclear weapon systems. In support of this effort, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed the Hazard Separation System (HSS). The HSS combines abrasive waterjet cutting technology and real-time radiography. Using the HSS, operators determine the exact location of interior, hazardous sub-components and remove them through precision cutting. The system minimizes waste and maximizes the recovery of recyclable materials. During 1994, the HSS was completed and demonstrated. Weapon components processed during the demonstration period included arming, fusing, and firing units; preflight control units; neutron generator subassemblies; and x-units. Hazards removed included radioactive krytron tubes and gap tubes, thermal batteries, neutron generator tubes, and oil-filled capacitors. Currently, the HSS is being operated at SNL in a research and development mode to facilitate the transfer of the technology to other DOE facilities for support of their dismantlement operations.

Lutz, J.D.; Purvis, S.T.; Hospelhorn, R.L.; Thompson, K.R.

1995-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

124

National Security, Weapons Science  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

National Security, Weapons Science National Security, Weapons Science /science-innovation/_assets/images/icon-science.jpg National Security, Weapons Science National security depends on science and technology. The United States relies on Los Alamos National Laboratory for the best of both. No place on Earth pursues a broader array of world-class scientific endeavors. Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at LANL is part of the DOE's stockpile stewardship program. It uses two large X-ray machines to record three-dimensional interior images of materials. In most experiments, materials (including plutonium) undergo hydrodynamic shock to simulate the implosion process in nuclear bombs and/or the effects of severe hydrodynamic stress. The tests are described as "full-scale mockups

125

NNSA highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th Anniversary of Last Underground Nuclear Test | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile...

126

LANL | Physics | Nuclear Weapons and Global Security Data Analysis  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Weapons and Global Security Data Analysis Nuclear Weapons and Global Security Data Analysis Physics Division applies advanced imaging techniques to many applications, from brain imaging to neutron imaging in inertial fusion to threat detection from airborne cameras. A particular strength is the quantitative analysis of penetrating radiography using techniques such as the Bayesian Inference Engine (BIE). An example from the Nuclear Event Analysis Team shows a test object (Figure 1) that is subsequently radiographed using the Dual-Axis Radiography Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility. Figures 2 and 3 show the radiograph and the inferred density of the object using the BIE, which can be compared to the known object to determine accurate error estimation. Test object Figure 1. The test object consists of a 1 cm-radius cavity void surrounded by a 4.5 cm radius surrogate fissile material of tungsten, tantalum, or depleted uranium. This sphere is surrounded by a 6.5 cm-radius copper sphere. At is thickest point, the tantalum test object has an areal density of 180 g/cm2, equivalent to 9" of steel.

127

Swords into Plowshares: Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement, Evaluation, and Maintenance at Pantex  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The end of the Cold War changed the missions of facilities in the US nuclear weapons complex. They ceased production of new weapons and focused on dismantling old weapons and maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of those remaining. The Pantex ... Keywords: Government--programs, Production/scheduling--planning

Edwin A. Kjeldgaard; Dean A. Jones; George F. List; Mark A. Turnquist; James W. Angelo; Richard D. Hopson; John Hudson; Terry Holeman

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

128

Development of the nuclear weapons complex EP architecture  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Nuclear Weapons Guidance Team is an interagency committee led by Earl Whiteman, DOE that chartered the generation of EP40100, Concurrent Qualification and its successor EP401099, Concurrent Engineering and Qualification. As this new philosophy of concurrent operations has evolved and as implementation has been initiated, conflicts and insufficiencies in the remaining Engineering Procedures (EPs) have become more apparent. At the Guidance Team meeting in November 1995, this issue was explored and several approaches were considered. It was concluded at this meeting, that a smaller set of interagency EPs described in a hierarchical system could provide the necessary interagency direction to support complex-wide implementation. This set consolidates many existing EP processes where consistency and commonality are critical to success of the extended enterprise. The Guidance Team subsequently chartered an interagency team to initiate development activity associated with the envisioned new EP set. This team had participation from seven Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) sites as well as DOE/AL and DP-14 (team members are acknowledged later in this report). Per the Guidance Team, this team, referred to as the Architecture Subcommittee, was to map out and define an EP Architecture for the interagency EPs, make recommendations regarding a more agile process for EP approval and suggest an aggressive timeline to develop the combined EPs. The Architecture Subcommittee was asked to brief their output at the February Guidance Team meeting. This SAND report documents the results of the Architecture Subcommittee`s recommendations.

Murray, C.; Halbleib, L.

1996-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

129

INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE ASPECTS OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST DEBRIS RECOVERY  

SciTech Connect

The formation of a collapse crater by underground nuclear explosions is described. Safety problems associated with the re-entry of underground nuclear explosion areas include cavity collapse, toxic gases, explosive gases, radioactive gases, radioactive core, and hazards from the movement of heavy equipment on unstable ground. Data irom television, geophones, and telemetered radiation detectors determine when radiation and toxic material surveys of the area can be made and drills can be used to obtain samples of the bubble crust for analysis. Hazards to persornel engaged in obtaining weapon debris samples are reviewed. Data are presented on the radiation dose received by personnel at the Nevada Test Site engaged in this work during 1962. (C.H.)

Wilcox, F.W.

1963-03-27T23:59:59.000Z

130

Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

Lehman, R.F. II

1993-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

131

Nuclear Surety This revisiono Implements DOD Directive 5210.42, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

o Updates the responsibilities to reflect the fact that the Army no longer has custody of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems (para 1-4). o Designates the DCSOPS (DAMO-SS) as approval authority for waivers and exceptions to policy requirements and reclamas to nuclear surety inspections o Deletes the requirement that commanders with nuclear surety missions establish a nuclear surety board, making it an optional requirement as determined by the commander; and retains guidance on the functioning of a surety board to assist commanders who want to establish one (para 1-6). o Deletes guidance on Physical Security and Survivability. AR 190-54 now covers applicable physical security requirements at Army nuclear reactor facilities (chap 2). o Reorganizes the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), to more closely follow the sequence of events in certifying an individual into and out of the PRP

unknown authors

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

132

Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

NONE

1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

133

Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

Norman Dombey

2011-12-10T23:59:59.000Z

134

Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

Dombey, Norman

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

135

A quantitative assessment of nuclear weapons proliferation risk utilizing probabilistic methods  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

A comparative quantitative assessment is made of the nuclear weapons proliferation risk between various nuclear reactor/fuel cycle concepts using a probabilistic method. The work presented details quantified proliferation ...

Sentell, Dennis Shannon, 1971-

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

136

U.S. Nuclear Policy and the NPT  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Demonstrating the U.S. Demonstrating the U.S. Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament October 18, 2011 Thomas P. D'Agostino, Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration 2 Outline - Reducing nuclear weapons - Ceasing production of weapons materials - Disposing of excess weapons materials - Managing a smaller stockpile - Strengthening the nuclear security enterprise - Transparency and verification 3 Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons * President Obama stated the U.S. commitment to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons * Continue focus on preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism * Strengthen regional security architectures while placing increased reliance on non-nuclear deterrence capabilities * Engage with Russia in negotiations aimed at achieving substantial

137

Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Participants in Sandia's Weapon Intern Program recently visited and toured NNSA's Kansas City Plant. The program, established in 1998, was created to meet Sandia's changing mission...

138

Fourth generation nuclear weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects, Report ISRI-05-03  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons range, greatly enhanced coupling to targets, possibility to drive powerful shaped-charge jets and forged fragments, enhanced prompt radiation effects, reduced collateral damage and residual radioactivity, etc.

Andre Gsponer

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

139

Quality at Y-12, part 3 -- Or: Quality goes beyond nuclear weapons...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

at Y-12, part 3 Or: Quality goes beyond nuclear weapons (title as it appeared in The Oak Ridger) As we continue our look at the history of Quality at Y-12, Bud Leete, Y-12...

140

A system for the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material aboard cargo cotainerships  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

A new approach to the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material aboard cargo containerships is proposed. The ship-based approach removes the constraints of current thinking by addressing the threat of ...

Gallagher, Shawn P., S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


141

Proceedings: 17th Asilomar conference on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclear weapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

Hickman, R.G.; Meier, C.A. (eds.) [eds.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

142

Dose reduction through automation of nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage procedures at the Department of Energy`s Pantex Facility  

SciTech Connect

With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile now greatly exceeds any foreseeable future need. To compensate for this excess an estimated 20,000 nuclear warheads have been earmarked for dismantlement and storage at the Department of Energy`s Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. It is anticipated that the majority of these warheads will arrive at the Pantex facility by the year 2000. At that time, it is estimated that current dismantlement and inventory procedures will not be adequate to control worker radiation exposure within administrative and federal dose limits. To control these exposures alternate approaches to dismantlement and inventory must be developed. One attractive approach is to automate as many activities as possible, thus reducing worker exposure. To facilitate automation of dismantlement and storage procedures, current procedures were investigated in terms of collective dose to workers, time to completion, ease of completion, and cost of automation for each task. A cost-benefit comparison was then performed in order to determine which procedures would be most cost-effective to automate.

Thompson, D.A.; Poston, J.W. [Texas A& M Univ., College Station, TX (United States)

1996-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

143

Dose reduction through robotics and automation of nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage procedures at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

With the end of the Cold War and subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile now greatly exceeds any foreseeable future need (Quirck et al., 1993). To compensate for this excess, an estimated 20,000 nuclear warheads have been earmarked for dismantlement and storage at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. It is anticipated that the majority of these warheads will arrive at the Pantex facility by the year 2000. At that time, the cur-rent dismantlement and inventory procedures may not be adequate to control worker radiation exposure within administrative and federal dose limits, To control these exposures, alternate approaches to dismantlement and inventory procedures may need to be developed. One attractive approach is to automate as many activities as possible, thus reducing worker exposure. To facilitate automation of dismantlement and storage procedures, current procedures were investigated in terms of collective dose to workers, time to completion, ease of completion, and cost of automation for each task. Then a cost-benefit comparison was performed to determine which procedures would be most cost-effective to automate.

Thompson, David Andrew

1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

144

Virtual enterprise model for the electronic components business in the Nuclear Weapons Complex  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The electronic components business within the Nuclear Weapons Complex spans organizational and Department of Energy contractor boundaries. An assessment of the current processes indicates a need for fundamentally changing the way electronic components are developed, procured, and manufactured. A model is provided based on a virtual enterprise that recognizes distinctive competencies within the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at the vendors. The model incorporates changes that reduce component delivery cycle time and improve cost effectiveness while delivering components of the appropriate quality.

Ferguson, T.J.; Long, K.S.; Sayre, J.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hull, A.L. [Sandia National Labs., Livermore, CA (United States); Carey, D.A.; Sim, J.R.; Smith, M.G. [Allied-Signal Aerospace Co., Kansas City, MO (United States). Kansas City Div.

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

145

NNSA highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th Anniversary of Last Underground Nuclear Test | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > NNSA highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th ... NNSA highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th

146

NNSA highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th Anniversary of Last Underground Nuclear Test | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > NNSA highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th ... NNSA highlights Stockpile Stewardship Program, commemorates 20th

147

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

especially as regards nuclear security. Priority efforts inits role in improving nuclear security. It will be essentialin dealing with nuclear security and safety matters. |=j NEW

May, Michael M

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

148

Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

1, Number 3 * October 2011 1, Number 3 * October 2011 Message from the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Stockpile Stewardship, Chris Deeney Comments Questions or comments regarding the Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly should be directed to Terri.Batuyong@nnsa.doe.gov Technical Editor: Chris Werner, Publication Editor: Millicent Mischo Defense Programs Stockpile Stewardship in Action Volume 1, Number 3 Inside this Issue 2 Simulation: A Window into the Detonation of High Explosives 3 Modeling of High-Explosive Detonation Performance 5 The Detonation Sandwich 6 Joint DoD/DOE Munitions Technology Development Program-High Explosives 9 New Faces at the Office of Stockpile Stewardship

149

Site map | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

map | National Nuclear Security Administration map | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Site map Site map Front page Front page of National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA Site Navigation Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Stockpile Stewardship Program Quarterly Experiments Dismantlement and Disposition Weapons NPT Compliance

150

Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

70th anniversary lecture 70th anniversary lecture Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of next 70th anniversary lecture Lab's role in the development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War period will be discussed by Byron Ristvet of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. September 5, 2013 This photograph captures the expanding fireball of the world's first full-scale hydrogen bomb test, Ivy-Mike, which was conducted Oct. 31, 1952. This photograph captures the expanding fireball of the world's first full-scale hydrogen bomb test, Ivy-Mike, which was conducted Oct. 31, 1952. Contact Steve Sandoval Communications Office (505) 665-9206 Email "Los Alamos National Laboratory's role in conjunction with the Department of Defense in meeting this challenge with new nuclear weapon

151

Some thoughts on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper discusses factors controlling the dissemination of nuclear technologies and especially fissile materials.

Krikorian N.H.; Hawkins, H.T.

1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

152

US, UK, France Discuss Stockpile Stewardship, Arms Control and...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

US, UK, France Discuss Stockpile Stewardship, Arms Control and Nonproliferation and Visit the Nevada National Security Site | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission...

153

The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

Garaizar, X

2010-01-06T23:59:59.000Z

154

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The worldwide nuclear non-proliferation regime may becomeand its partners in the non-proliferation effort do not have

May, Michael M

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

155

Turning a Nuclear Spotlight on Illegal Weapons Material  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... research neutron source, which bathes material samples with low-energy neutrons. ... count acts as a unique signature of special nuclear material. ...

2013-09-12T23:59:59.000Z

156

Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

against both internal and external threat scenarios. OWMP is also oversees sustainability efforts at a number of nuclear sites in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and...

157

USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: DoD Transportation of U.S. Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

accordance with the authority in DoDD 5134.01 (Reference (b)) to establish policy, update responsibilities, and prescribe procedures for DoD transportation of U.S. nuclear weapons, including logistic transportation, operational transport, and emergency logistic movement as defined in the Glossary. b. Incorporates and cancels DoD 4540.5-M (Reference (c)). c. Authorizes the establishment of the Nuclear Transportation Working Group (NTWG).

unknown authors

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

158

USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incidents References: See Enclosure 1  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

(a)), this Instruction: a. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the DoD response to U.S. nuclear weapon incidents in accordance with DoDD 3150.08 (Reference (b)). b. Authorizes DoD support for the Nuclear Weapons Accident Incident Response Subcommittee (NWAIRS) to the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) Committee of Principals (CoP) to address the Federal Government response to U.S. nuclear weapon incidents. 2. APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands,

unknown authors

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

159

DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Oversight and Investigations Oversight and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives "DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship" FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY 10:00 AM September 12, 2012 1 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here at your request to testify on matters relating to the Department of Energy's oversight of the nuclear weapons complex. 1 The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 as a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy. This action was intended to allow NNSA to concentrate on its defense-related mission, free from other Departmental operations. Its creation was, in large measure, a reaction to highly

160

Record of Decision for the Final EIS on Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

5091 5091 Friday May 17, 1996 Part IV Department of Energy Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel; Notice 25092 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Record of decision. SUMMARY: DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided to implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy as specified in the Preferred Alternative contained in the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


161

Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferation risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.

Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod; Whitney, Paul D.

2010-04-16T23:59:59.000Z

162

F. Calogero / Prospects of nuclear proliferation, or of transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world CIC, Cuernavaca / 02.12.2010 / page 1 / 28  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

or military use. ­ It is a major component of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has the goal acquisition of a nuclear weapon by an adversary could have a dev- astating influence on US security and non-proliferation. Enhancing nuclear weapons material security in Russia. 4. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 5. Other

Mejía-Monasterio, Carlos

163

Public distrust and hazard management success at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant  

SciTech Connect

Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclear weapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made.

Hohenemser, C.

1987-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

164

The PEACE PIPE: Recycling nuclear weapons into a TRU storage/shipping container  

SciTech Connect

This paper describes results of a contract undertaken by the National Conversion Pilot Project (NCPP) at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) to fabricate stainless steel ``pipe`` containers for use in certification testing at Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque to qualify the container for both storage of transuranic (TRU) waste at RFETS and other DOE sites and shipping of the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). The paper includes a description of the nearly ten-fold increase in the amount of contained plutonium enabled by the product design, the preparation and use of former nuclear weapons facilities to fabricate the components, and the rigorous quality assurance and test procedures that were employed. It also describes how stainless steel nuclear weapons components can be converted into these pipe containers, a true ``swords into plowshare`` success story.

Floyd, D.; Edstrom, C. [Manufacturing Sciences Corp. (United States); Biddle, K.; Orlowski, R. [BNFL, Inc. (United States); Geinitz, R. [Safe Sites of Colorado, Golden, CO (United States); Keenan, K. [USDOE-RFFO (United States); Rivera, M. [Science Applications International Corp./LATA (United States)

1997-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

165

Stockpile tritium production from fusion  

SciTech Connect

A fusion breeder holds the promise of a new capability - ''dialable'' reserve capacity at little additional cost - that offers stockpile planners a new way to deal with today's uncertainties in forecasting long range needs. Though still in the research stage, fusion can be developed in time to meet future military requirements. Much of the necessary technology will be developed by the ongoing magnetic fusion energy program. However, a specific program to develop the nuclear technology required for materials production is needed if fusion is to become a viable option for a new production complex around the turn of the century.

Lokke, W.A.; Fowler, T.K.

1986-03-21T23:59:59.000Z

166

Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas  

SciTech Connect

The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given.

Reitter, T.A.; McCallen, D.B.; Kang, S.W.

1982-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

167

Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

2 * July 2012 2 * July 2012 Message from the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Stockpile Stewardship, Chris Deeney Defense Programs Stockpile Stewardship in Action Volume 2, Number 2 Inside this Issue 2 Exploring Shock-Induced Chemistry on Ultrafast Timescales 3 Toward Exascale Simulation of Re-Entry Flight Environment 4 Probing Inertial Confinement Fusion Plasmas 5 Shock Physics 6 Inertial Confinement Fusion 7 Modeling Polar Direct Drive Implosions on NIF 8 Developing Improved Physics Models for Predictive Simulations 9 Developing X-ray Sources for Extreme Radiation Environments on the Z Machine 11 Awards and Highlights O ur NNSA laboratories-Los Alamos National

168

Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

2, Number 3 * November 2012 2, Number 3 * November 2012 Message from the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Stockpile Stewardship, Chris Deeney Defense Programs Stockpile Stewardship in Action Volume 2, Number 3 Inside this Issue 2 Jupiter - An Intermediate-Scale Laser User Facility 4 Trident Intermediate-Scale Laser Facility 5 Mach-Zehnder Fiber-Optic Links for Inertial Confinement Fusion Diagnostics 7 High Energy Density Experiments at the OMEGA Laser Facility 9 Doubling the Electric Power Generated by an LTD Cavity 10 Reproducibility of Sandia National Laboratories' 80-terawatt Z Accelerator

169

Quality Control of Meteorological Data for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Meteorological Support Project ensures the accuracy and reliability of data acquired by meteorological monitoring stations located at seven U.S. Army chemical weapons depots where storage and ...

James C. Liljegren; Stephen Tschopp; Kevin Rogers; Fred Wasmer; Lucia Liljegren; Michael Myirski

2009-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

170

North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

Moon, Duk-ho (Korean Consulate General in New York)

2003-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

171

CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing  

Office of Legacy Management (LM)

tudies/B ackground tudies/B ackground Book 1 CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing Areas Vol. 11, April 1988 DISCLAIMER Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available original document. CERCLA PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF DOE'S NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE WCILEAR WEAPONS T E S r n G AREAS Prepared by Water Resources Center Desert Research Institute University of Nevada System ,Prepared for U . S . Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office Las Vegas, Nevada under contract DE-AC08-85NV10384 A p r i l 1988 CONTENTS VOLUME I I. INTRODUCTION 1.1 11. NEVADA TEST SITE TESTING AREAS 2.1 Frenchman Flat (Area 5) 2.1.1 2.2 Yucca Flat (Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 15)

172

Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington

Charles C. Mayer; Peter R. Lavoy; James A. Russell; Author(s Charles C. Mayer

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

173

Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly, Volume 2, Number 1  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

1 * May 2012 1 * May 2012 Message from the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Stockpile Stewardship, Chris Deeney Defense Programs Stockpile Stewardship in Action Volume 2, Number 1 Inside this Issue 2 LANL and ANL Complete Groundbreaking Shock Experiments at the Advanced Photon Source 3 Characterization of Activity-Size-Distribution of Nuclear Fallout 5 Modeling Mix in High-Energy-Density Plasma 6 Quality Input for Microscopic Fission Theory 8 Fiber Reinforced Composites Under Pressure: A Case Study in Non-hydrostatic Behavior in the Diamond Anvil Cell 8 Emission of Shocked Inhomogeneous Materials 9 2012 NNSA Stewardship Science Academic

174

Advancing Methods for Determining the Source of HEU Used in Terrorist Nuclear Weapon  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

An algorithm was developed that uses measured isotopic ratios from fission product residue following the detonation of a high-enriched uranium nuclear weapon to compute the original attributes of the material used in the device. The specific attributes assessed are the uranium isotopics (considering 234U, 235U, 236U, and 238U) and the enrichment process used to create the material (e.g., gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, etc.). Using the original attributes of the weapon significantly increases the probability of identifying the perpetrator of the attack. In this study, research was conducted to perform sensitivity analysis of the calculated values, analyze alternate enrichment methods, determine the source (uranium mine) from which the feed material was taken and assess potential “spoofing” techniques. The purpose of this research was to verify that the analytical method developed would remain valid for a multitude of variations that could be used to disguise the origin of the nuclear material in the device. It is envisioned that this methodology could serve as a preprocessing step to a more computationally intensive and more accurate system in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack.

LaFleur, Adrienne; Charlton, William

2007-09-17T23:59:59.000Z

175

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01, Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Enforcement Guidance Supplement Enforcement Guidance Supplement EGS:01-01 Appendix E-Operational Procedures for Enforcement Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 October 15, 2001 MEMORANDUM FOR: DOE PAAA COORDINATORS CONTRACTOR PAAA COORDINATORS FROM: R. KEITH CHRISTOPHER DIRECTOR OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION SUBJECT: Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement

176

National Nuclear Security Administration Overview  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

1, 2011 - 1, 2011 - Page 1 National Transportation Stakeholders Forum Denver, Colorado May 11, 2011 Ahmad Al-Daouk Manager, National Security Department (NSD) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Service Center - Albuquerque, NM May 11, 2011 - Page 2 National Transportation Stakeholders Forum (NTSF) * Introduction * NNSA Certifying Official Role * Offsite Source Recovery Project * Waste Shipments * Nuclear Materials Management Planning * Summary May 11, 2011 - Page 3 NNSA Plays a Critical Role: Ensuring our Nation's Security * Maintaining the safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing * Reducing the global danger from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials * Provide safe and effective nuclear propulsion for the

177

A study of residual Cesium 137 contamination in southwestern Utah soil following the nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site in the 1950's and 1960's.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??The Nevada Test Site (NTS) was the location for at least 100 above ground Nuclear Weapons tests during the 1950's and early 1960's. Radioactive fallout… (more)

[No author

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

178

Los Alamos neutron science center nuclear weapons stewardship and unique national scientific capabilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This presentation gives an overview of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and its contributions to science and the nuclear weapons program. LANSCE is made of multiple experimental facilities (the Lujan Center, the Weapons Neutron Research facility (WNR), the Ultra-Cold Neutron facility (UCN), the proton Radiography facility (pRad) and the Isotope Production Facility (IPF)) served by the its kilometer long linear accelerator. Several research areas are supported, including materials and bioscience, nuclear science, materials dynamics, irradiation response and medical isotope production. LANSCE is a national user facility that supports researchers worldwide. The LANSCE Risk Mitigation program is currently in progress to update critical accelerator equipment to help extend the lifetime of LANSCE as a key user facility. The Associate Directorate of Business Sciences (ADBS) plays an important role in the continued success of LANSCE. This includes key procurement support, human resource support, technical writing support, and training support. LANSCE is also the foundation of the future signature facility MARIE (Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes).

Schoenberg, Kurt F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

179

Classification of Nuclear Weapons-Related Information (Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED INFORMATION Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data (RD and FRD) June 2012 2 3 Purpose To familiarize individuals from agencies outside of DOE who may come in contact with RD and FRD with the procedures for identifying, classifying, marking, handling, and declassifying documents containing that information as required by  The Atomic Energy Act and  10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 1045, Nuclear Classification and Declassification §1045.35 4 Not the Purpose This briefing does not authorize you to classify or declassify documents containing RD or FRD. Additional training is required to classify documents containing RD or FRD or identify RD or FRD within a document for redaction. Only authorized DOE

180

Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates at Los Alamos National Laboratory New leadership position will allow for greater integration in the planning and execution of the stockpile stewardship program. August 18, 2009 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


181

American perspectives on security : energy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism : 2010.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclear weapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

Herron, Kerry Gale (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Silva, Carol L. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK)

2011-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

182

Neutralization of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction using nuclear methods  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This thesis addresses the threat of chemical and biological armed ballistic missiles and their neutralization by nuclear methods. The objective of this effort is twofold. The first objective is to develop a justification for using nuclear interceptors in neutralizing chemical and biological weapons (CBW) based on the current CBW threat to the U.S. The second objective is to reproduce a computer model developed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in 1992 to estimate the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear interceptors to neutralize biological or chemical tactical ballistic missile warheads and to extend the model for high-energy neutrons (20 MeV) to explore the effect of increasing neutron energies. The original model was developed using TARTNP. MCNP4C was the code used to reproduce the model. At least 27 countries now possess - or are in the process of acquiring and developing - ballistic missiles. Furthermore, more than a dozen states are pursuing offensive CBW capabilities, and some have exhibited a willingness to employ them. One particular method of neutralizing biological and chemical ballistic warheads, which has previously been investigated, is by means of nuclear interceptors, i.e., using a low-yield nuclear device to neutralize the weapon by bombarding it with high-energy particles and rendering it ineffective. To investigate the ability of nuclear interceptors to neutralize CBW missiles, a MCNP model was created based on the LLNL data. The results from the new model were compared to the sterilization requirements suggested by LLNL and to the LLNL results. Although there were differences between the two, the MCNP model produced data with the same trend as the LLNL data and all submunitions were given sufficient energy to exceed the sterilization requirements. Finally, a comparison was made of the neutralization capabilities of a fission device, a fusion device, and an advanced neutron source. It was shown that the advanced neutron source, with its 20 MeV neutrons, delivered on average 12 times as much energy per particle to the Sarin as the fission device and 1.6 times as much energy per particle to the Sarin as the fusion device.

McAffrey, Veronica Lynn

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

183

Statement on Budget Priorities for NNSA Weapons Activities before...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering...

184

Low Prevalence of Chronic Beryllium Disease among Workers at a Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Facility  

SciTech Connect

To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclear weapons research and development facility. We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with HRCT (N=49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and transbronchial biopsies. The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 yrs and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 yrs. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or HRCT); three others had evidence of probable CBD. These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD.

Arjomandi, M; Seward, J P; Gotway, M B; Nishimura, S; Fulton, G P; Thundiyil, J; King, T E; Harber, P; Balmes, J R

2010-01-11T23:59:59.000Z

185

Historical Exposures to Chemicals at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant: A Pilot Retrospective Exposure Assessment  

SciTech Connect

In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

Janeen Denise Robertson

1999-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

186

DOE Order Self Study Modules - DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program and  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

CONTINUING TRAINING SELF- CONTINUING TRAINING SELF- STUDY PROGRAM DOE O 452.1D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM DOE O 452.2D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY DOE O 452.1D and DOE O 452.2D Familiar Level June 2011 1 DOE O 452.1D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM DOE O 452.2D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY FAMILIAR LEVEL OBJECTIVES Given the familiar level of this module and the resources listed below, you will be able to answer the following questions: 1. What are the objectives of implementing U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1D? 2. Define the following terms as they apply to this Order: Abnormal environment High explosive detonation 3. What are the objectives of implementing DOE O 452.2D? 4. What are the general requirements of DOE O 452.2D?

187

B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement | National Nuclear Security Administration B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Video Gallery > B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantlement The elimination of the B53 by Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is consistent with the goal President Obama announced in his April 2009 Prague speech to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. The President said, "We will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same." The dismantlement of the last remaining B53 ensures that the system will never again be part of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. As a key part of its national security mission, NNSA is actively responsible for safely dismantling weapons that are no longer needed, and disposing of the excess material and components.

188

ORISE: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) Training The Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) works closely with the Chemical Stockpile Emergency...

189

TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

2013-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

190

List of Major Information Systems,National Nuclear Security Administration  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

List of Major Information Systems,National Nuclear Security List of Major Information Systems,National Nuclear Security Administration ADaPT Networked: List of Major Information Systems,National Nuclear Security Administration ADaPT Networked: List of Major Information Systems, Defense Line of Business National Nuclear Security Administration ADaPT Networked: Develops and deploys emerging information networking technology to production processes in support of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. National Nuclear Security Administration ADaPT Network Infrastructure: Develops and deploys emerging information networking technology to production processes in support of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. .major_information_systems.pdf List of Major Information Systems,National Nuclear Security Administration ADaPT Networked:

191

A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing arguments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable -- although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections.

Gsponer, A; Vitale, B; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Vitale, Bruno

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

192

Notice of Intent to Prepare a Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement-Complex 2030 (DOE/EIS-0236-S4)(October 19, 2006)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

31 Federal Register 31 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 202 / Thursday, October 19, 2006 / Notices 1 A pit is the central core of a nuclear weapon typically containing plutonium-239 that undergoes fission when compressed by high explosives. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement-Complex 2030 AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice of intent. SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE or Department), announces its intent to prepare a Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement-Complex 2030 (Complex

193

Countering Nuclear Terrorism | National Nuclear Security Administratio...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Countering Nuclear Terrorism | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

194

Chernobyl Nuclear Accident | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Chernobyl Nuclear Accident | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

195

Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

Terrence R. Fehner and F.G. Gosling. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I (pdf). DOE/MA-0003. Washington, D.C.: Department of...

196

The distribution and history of nuclear weapons related contamination in sediments from the Ob River, Siberia as determined by isotopic ratios of Plutonium, Neptunium, and Cesium  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This thesis addresses the sources and transport of nuclear weapons related contamination in the Ob River region, Siberia. In addition to being one of the largest rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean, the bulk of the former ...

Kenna, Timothy C

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

197

Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 11-28: Mandatory Review and Update of Record Drawings for Nuclear-Capable Weapons and Munitions Storage and Maintenance Facilities  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

1. Purpose. This ETL provides criteria for munitions and nuclear weapons-capable maintenance and storage facilities (munitions storage areas [MSA] and weapons storage areas [WSA]) which are existing, under design, or under contract, and located in the continental United States (CONUS). It addresses requirements for reviewing and updating record drawings and requirements for as-built drawings for projects under design or under contract. Future project requirements will be addressed in a revision of Air Force instruction (AFI) 32-1065, Grounding Systems. 2. Application: Air Force installations with munitions and nuclear weapons-capable maintenance and storage facilities. The requirements in this ETL are mandatory.

Major Comm; Majcom Electrical Engineers

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

198

U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff, "Assessment Report: Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons-Related Security Oversight Process," March 1998  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

August 5, 1977 DOE, "Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization from 1944 Through 1994 GAO/RCED-92-39, "Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE's Weapons Facilities," December 13, 1991 GAO/RCED/AIMD-95-5, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities are Limited," December 27, 1994 GAO/AIMD-95-165, "Department of Energy: Poor Management of Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities Are Limited," August 3, 1995 Classified DOE report.

Gao Rced- Major

1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

199

Surface water transport and distribution of uranium in contaminated sediments near a nuclear weapons processing facility  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The extent of remobilization of uranium from contaminated soils adjacent to a nuclear weapons processing facility during episodic rain events was investigated. In addition, information on the solid phase associations of U in floodplain and suspended sediments was assessed by an eight-step sequential extraction procedure to gauge U chemical lability and its propensity for transport. Comparisons were drawn between the easily dispersible, or water dispersible clay fraction (WDC) of the floodplain sediments to the stream suspended sediments transported during storms. Mass flux estimates determined from base flow measurements potentially underestimate the amount of U transported from contaminated terrestrial sources to surface water systems. During the storm events measured, approximately 145 7 to 2 8 3 8 % more U was mobilized to Upper Three Runs Creek (UTRC) relative to base flow calculations. The suspended sediment load transports the bulk of U in labile forms predominantly as acid soluble (specifically adsorbed), MnO2 occluded and organically bound phases. This implies that U may be available to the environment under a range of changing conditions (e.g., Eh and pH). Sequential extractions of the floodplain sediments demonstrated the presence of chemically labile forms, but in different proportions to the suspended sediments. More U was associated with the organically bound phases in the floodplain sediments, while the easily dispersible fraction of floodplain sediments correlated with the suspended sediments. A strong relationship exists between the suspended sediments and the WDC fraction, suggesting that fine particles are eroded from the floodplain and transported in labile forms. This study demonstrates the need to revise current monitoring schemes to include mass transport evaluation during storms. In addition, sequential extraction studies provide knowledge of U chemical lability in contaminated sediments, which may suggest environmentally sound and more cost effective remediation techniques than ones currently in use.

Batson, Vicky Lynn

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

200

Honoring Nuclear Security Workers on the National Day of Remembrance |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Honoring Nuclear Security Workers on the National Day of Honoring Nuclear Security Workers on the National Day of Remembrance Honoring Nuclear Security Workers on the National Day of Remembrance October 31, 2011 - 11:54am Addthis Workers dismantle a remaining B53, ensuring that the system will never again be part of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. | Credit: NNSA photo Workers dismantle a remaining B53, ensuring that the system will never again be part of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. | Credit: NNSA photo Secretary Chu Secretary Chu Former Secretary of Energy On October 30th, our nation honored the men and women who have served and sacrificed to support America's nuclear security mission. From World War II, through the dark days of the Cold War, to the present day, these patriots have worked to keep our country safe and secure.

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


201

Phase 6.X Process | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Phase 6.X Process | National Nuclear Security Administration Phase 6.X Process | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Phase 6.X Process Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle > Phase 6.X Process Phase 6.X Process The Phase 6.x Process is based on the original Joint Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Process, which includes Phases 1 through 7 and covers all phases of a

202

Defense and nuclear technologies  

SciTech Connect

Fulfilling our national security and stockpile stewardship responsibilities requires tremendous scientific and technical breadth: from esoteric theoretical physics and computational modeling to materials science and precision engineering. Because there exists no broad industrial or university base from which to draw expertise in nuclear weapon science and technology, we rely heavily on formal peer reviews and informal exchanges with our sister laboratory at Los Alamos. LLNL has an important, long-term role in the nation`s nuclear weapons program. We are responsible for four of the ten weapon systems in the enduring US stockpile (three of nine after 2002), including the only systems that incorporate all modern safety features. For years to come, we will be responsible for these weapons and for the problems that will inevitably arise. Our nuclear expertise will also play a crucial role as the US attempts to deal effectively with the threat of nuclear proliferation. This past year brought the culmination of our response to profound changes in the nation`s defense needs as we restructured and refocused our activities to address the Administration`s goal of reducing global nuclear danger. We made major contributions to important national security issues in spite of severe fiscal constraints.

NONE

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

203

DOE to Remove 200 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium from U.S. Nuclear  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

to Remove 200 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium from U.S. to Remove 200 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium from U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile DOE to Remove 200 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium from U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile November 7, 2005 - 12:38pm Addthis Will Be Redirected to Naval Reactors, Down-blended or Used for Space Programs WASHINGTON, DC - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove up to 200 metric tons (MT) of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), in the coming decades, from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons and prepare this material for other uses. Secretary Bodman made this announcement while addressing the 2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference in Washington, DC.

204

Use of Lasers to Study the Impact of Fractionation and Condensation on the Toxicity of Nuclear Weapon Fallout  

SciTech Connect

An experimental concept has been developed to collect data to aid in the refinement of simulation programs designed to predict the fallout effects arising from surface and shallowly buried nuclear weapon detonations. These experiments, called the Condensation Debris Experiments (CDE), are intended to study the condensation/fractionation of material that is liberated following an initial deposition of laser energy onto a small, characterized target. The CDE effort also encompasses target development and material studies as well as supporting computational efforts studying radiation hydrodynamics, computational fluid dynamics, and relevant neutron activation processes (not discussed here).

Vidnovic III, T; Bradley, K S; Debonnel, C S; Dipeso, G; Fournier, K; Karpenko, V P; Tobin, M

2005-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

205

Ground motion from earthquakes and underground nuclear weapons tests: a comparison as it relates to siting a nuclear waste storage facility at NTS  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Ground motion generated by a magnitude 4.3 earthquake at Massachusetts Mountain on the Nevada Test Site was measured at the control point and compared with ground motion generated at about the same distance by four underground nuclear weapons tests. The depth of the earthquake was between 4 and 4.6 km. The resulting signal at the distance considered was almost entirely body-wave components and had little or no contribution from the surface wave. The motion from the relatively shallower weapons tests had a signal with a pronounced surface-wave component. Comparison of the Pseudo Relative Response Velocity (PSRV) plots shows the earthquake signal richer in high frequencies and the weapons-test signals richer in low frequencies. If relationship between ground motion from the two sources can be confirmed for other earthquakes, weapons test ground motion could be used to estimate earthquake ground motion for magnitudes for which probability of occurrence in a given montoring period would be very small.

Vortman, L.J.

1982-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

206

A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

207

GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats | National Nuclear Security Administrat...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Reducing Nuclear Threats | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

208

Nuclear Forensics | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

209

Nuclear Incident Team | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

210

Nuclear / Radiological Advisory Team | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

211

Countering Nuclear Terrorism and Trafficking | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

212

Nuclear Safeguards | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

213

Nuclear Controls | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

214

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administra...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

215

Nuclear Verification | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Verification | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

216

Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP): Process and project requirements  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP) is aimed at identifying weapon components suitable for use in more than one weapon and for qualifying components so identified for multiple use. Work includes identifying the means to maintain the manufacturing capability for these items. This document provides the participants in STEP a common, consistent understanding of the process and requirements. The STEP objectives are presented and the activities are outlined. The STEP project selections are based on the customer needs, product applicability, and maturity of the technology used. A formal project selection process is described and the selection criteria are defined. The concept of {open_quotes}production readiness{close_quotes} is introduced, along with a summary of the project requirements and deliverables to demonstrate production readiness.

Ma, Kwok Kee

1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

217

Microsoft PowerPoint - RD-Classifiers-Course-Complete-08-20-2012...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Formerly Restricted Data? Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Quantities Nuclear Weapon Locations of Nuclear Weapons (past and present) Nuclear Weapon Safety and Storage p Yields and Storage...

218

Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software  

SciTech Connect

This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

2007-05-02T23:59:59.000Z

219

Risk communications and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency-Planning Program  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The CSEPP (Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program) was created to improve emergency planning and response capabilities at the eight sites around the country that store chemical weapons. These weapons are scheduled to be destroyed in the near future. In preparation of the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DPEIS) for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP), it was proposed that the Army mitigate accidents through an enhanced community emergency preparedness program at the eight storage sites. In 1986, the Army initiated the development of an Emergency Response Concept Plan (ERCP) for the CSDP, one of 12 technical support studies conducted during preparation of the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS). The purpose of this document is to provide a fairly comprehensive source book on risk, risk management, risk communication research and recommended risk communication practices. It does not merely summarize each publication in the risk communication literature, but attempts to synthesize them along the lines of a set of organizing principles. Furthermore, it is not intended to duplicate other guidance manuals (such as Covello et al.`s manual on risk comparison). The source book was developed for the CSEPP in support of the training module on risk communications. Although the examples provided are specific to CSEPP, its use goes beyond that of CSEPP as the findings apply to a broad spectrum of risk communication topics. While the emphasis is on communication in emergency preparedness and response specific to the CSEPP, the materials cover other non-emergency communication settings. 329 refs.

Vogt, B.M.; Sorensen, J.H.

1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

220

National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


221

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) : are we safer?  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is designed to make world safer by reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. U.S. also seeks to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforce regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities. But recent studies suggest that nuclear proliferation is a direct response to the perceived threat of U.S. conventional capabilities not U.S. nuclear stockpile. If this is true, then the intent of the NPR to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons and strengthen conventional military capabilities may actually make the world less safe. First stated objective of NPR is to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and move step by step toward eliminating them. Second stated objective is a reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong deterrent which forms the basis of U.S. assurances to allies and partners. The pathway - made explicit throughout the NPR - for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures is to give conventional forces and capabilities and missile defenses (e.g. non-nuclear elements) a greater share of the deterrence burden.

Brune, Nancy E.

2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

222

NNSA releases summary of Stockpile Stewardship experiments |...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

computational models and NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing Program to assess the safety, security and effectiveness of the stockpile. Posted on August 19, 2013 at 12:33...

223

ORISE: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercise...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercise Training and Analysis Tool Training Tool Improves Information Sharing Between CSEPP and its Response Partners In 2006,...

224

Utilization of Surplus Weapons Plutonium As Mixed Oxide Fuel Background Information  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

with worldwide stockpiles of plutonium, both civil and military. The 1995 position statement included an endorsement of the use of reactor irradiation for disposition of surplus U.S. and Russian weapons

unknown authors

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

225

DOE O 452.1D Admin Chg 1, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. ...

2009-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

226

Our Leadership | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Leadership | National Nuclear Security Administration Leadership | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Our Leadership Home > About Us > Our Leadership Our Leadership The NNSA plays a critical role in ensuring the security of our Nation by maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; reducing the global danger from

227

Our Leadership | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Leadership | National Nuclear Security Administration Leadership | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Our Leadership Home > About Us > Our Leadership Our Leadership The NNSA plays a critical role in ensuring the security of our Nation by maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; reducing the global danger from

228

The association betweeen cancers and low level radiation: An evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Cancer has traditionally been linked to exposure to high doses of radiation, but there is considerable controversy regarding the carcinogenicity of low doses of ionizing radiation in humans. Over the past 30 years there have been 14 studies conducted on employees at the Hanford nuclear weapons facility to investigate the relationship between exposure to low doses of radiation and mortality due to cancer (1-14). Interest in this issue was originally stimulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which was trying to determine whether the linear extrapolation of health effects from high to low dose exposure was accurate. If the risk has been underestimated, then the maximum permissible occupational radiation exposure in the United States had been set too high. Because the health risk associated with low level radiation are unclear and controversial it seems appropriate to review the studies relating to Hanford at this time.

Britton, J. [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States). School of Public Health]|[Lawrence Berkeley National Lab., CA (United States)

1993-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

229

The Final B61 Refurbished Warhead Returns to the U.S. Stockpile | National  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Final B61 Refurbished Warhead Returns to the U.S. Stockpile | National Final B61 Refurbished Warhead Returns to the U.S. Stockpile | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > The Final B61 Refurbished Warhead Returns to ... The Final B61 Refurbished Warhead Returns to the U.S. Stockpile January 09, 2009

230

The University and the Nuclear Predicament  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

34. Living with Nuclear Weapons, Harvard Nuclear Studythe proliferation of nuclear weapons states (from one to atMIT Summer Program on Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control.

Kohn, Walter; Badash, Lawrence

1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

231

DOE O 452.3, Management of the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

The Order defines and affirms the authorities and responsibilities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for the management of the Department ...

2005-06-08T23:59:59.000Z

232

Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Concerns about terrorists smuggling nuclear bombs into the United States in container freight have led to demands for 100% inspection at either U.S. or foreign ports. However, under some circumstances, it may be possible to deter nuclear smuggling attempts ... Keywords: applications, decision analysis, game theory, military, public policy, risk analysis, terrorism

Naraphorn Haphuriwat; Vicki M. Bier; Henry H. Willis

2011-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

233

Life Extension Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Life Extension Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Life Extension Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Life Extension Programs Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Life Extension Programs Life Extension Programs The term "life extension program (LEP)" means a program to repair/replace components of nuclear weapons to ensure the ability to meet

234

Life Extension Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Extension Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Extension Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Life Extension Programs Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Life Extension Programs Life Extension Programs The term "life extension program (LEP)" means a program to repair/replace components of nuclear weapons to ensure the ability to meet

235

Defense Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Defense Programs Home > About Us > Our Programs > Defense Programs Defense Programs One of the primary missions of NNSA is to maintain and enhance the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA,

236

Utilization of Surplus Weapons Plutonium As Mixed Oxide Fuel Position Statement  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The American Nuclear Society (ANS) endorses the rapid application of mixed uraniumplutonium oxide (MOX) fuel technology to accomplish the timely disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The end of the Cold War has led to universal recognition that both the United States and Russia possess stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium that far exceed their defense requirements. In 1994 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) stated the following: “The existence of this material [surplus weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium] constitutes a clear and present danger to national and international security. 1 ” Russia and the United States have held extensive discussions on plutonium disposition, culminating in a September 2000 agreement 2 to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weaponsgrade plutonium in each country. The U.S. Department of Energy has completed two major Environmental Impact Statements on surplus plutonium disposition. 3,4 Implementation of the associated Records of Decision 5,6 has resulted in an ongoing program to dispose of surplus U.S. weapons-grade plutonium by fabricating the material into MOX fuel and using the fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. As with the blend-down of highly enriched uranium, a

unknown authors

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

237

NNSA: Working To Prevent Nuclear Terrorism | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

238

Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Warhead Protection | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

239

GTRI's Nuclear and Radiological Material Removal | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Removal | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

240

The Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection (NDD) | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Detonation Detection (NDD) | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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241

Nuclear Safeguards and Security | National Nuclear Security Administra...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

242

FOIA | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

243

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear...

244

Pollux | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Pollux | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

245

Testimonials | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Testimonials | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

246

Training | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

247

Counterterrorism | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

248

Vocabulary | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

249

Pantex | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

250

Awards | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

251

Policy | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

252

Supercomputers | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

253

Engineering | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

254

Contacts | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

255

Accomplishments | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

256

Preparedness | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

257

Public | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

258

Recovery | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

259

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

260

Overview | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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261

Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

262

Operations | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

263

Conferences | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

264

Planning | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

265

Compensation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

266

Convert | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

267

Protect | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

268

Leave | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

269

International | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

270

Remove | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

271

Interdiction | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

272

Features | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

| National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

273

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

| National Nuclear Security Administration | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nonproliferation Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation Nonproliferation One of the gravest threats the United States and the international community face is the possibility that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NNSA,

274

DOE - Office of Legacy Management -- Falls City Uranium Ore Stockpile...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Uranium Ore Stockpile - TX 04A FUSRAP Considered Sites Site: Falls City Uranium Ore Stockpile (TX.04A ) Designated Name: Alternate Name: Location: Evaluation Year: Site Operations:...

275

Dealing With the Issues of Nuclear Energy | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Dealing With the Issues of Nuclear Energy Dealing With the Issues of Nuclear Energy Dealing With the Issues of Nuclear Energy September 17, 2010 - 12:39pm Addthis Secretary Chu Secretary Chu Former Secretary of Energy What does this mean for me? The U.S. is working to reduce our own reliance on nuclear weapons and to lock down dangerous nuclear material so terrorists can't use it. Editorial Note: This has been cross-posted from Huffington Post. Next week I have the honor of leading the U.S. delegation to an annual conference that is critical to our national and energy security. Every year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nuclear watchdog arm of the UN, gathers ministers from around the world to discuss ways to promote nuclear energy, strengthen efforts to keep other countries from illegally acquiring nuclear weapons, reduce stockpiles of nuclear

276

Nuclear Operations | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering...

277

The Social and Ethical Aspects of Nuclear Waste  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

people feel toward nuclear weapons seem to have generalizedwaste left over from nuclear weapons and nuclear powerfor nuclear waste facility planners to derail weapons/waste

Marshall, Alan

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

278

Administrator D'Agostino on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

279

The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

coupled and complex systems like nuclear weapons arsenals.The complex technology required to build nuclear weapons is

Kroenig, Matthew

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

280

ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT - 11052  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical Separation Facilities (canyons).

Bergren, C.; Flora, M.; Belencan, H.

2010-11-17T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


281

ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical processing canyons.

Bergren, C

2009-01-16T23:59:59.000Z

282

EVALUATION OF FCDA FAMILY SHELTER, MARK I, FOR PROTECTION AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Preliminary Report  

SciTech Connect

An underground reinforced-concrete family shelter designed for six persons was tested at three anticipated nuclear blast overpressures: 30, 48, and 65 psi. The structures were calculated to sustain a 30-psi long-duration overpressure. Postshot examination of all shelters lndicated there was little or no deflection in the reinforced-concrete members. Although the actual blast load was of short duration, the natural period for the structures was also shortp therefore it is felt that the structures would withstand similar overpressures from long-duration blast loadings. The average attenuation factor for gamma radiation varied from 3000 to 4500. Permanent damage was confined to the exposed portions of the ventilation pipes, which were bent to a nearly horizontal position. The steel-plate door at the 65-psi level was dished inward about 1 1/4 in., but it opened and closed easily. (authl

FitzSimons, N.

1957-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

283

Charles Verdon selected as Lawrence Livermore principal associate...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

support the current stockpile and the transformation to a future stockpile and Nuclear Weapons Complex infrastructure, ensuring stockpile safety, security, reliability and...

284

ASC Newsletter Subscription | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

285

Performance Evaluations | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

286

Mission Statements | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

287

Whistleblower Program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

288

January 2014 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

289

Green Week 2011 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

290

Long Term Care | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

291

January 2011 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

292

March 2011 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

293

NNSA Production Office | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Production Office | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing...

294

Performance Evaluations | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Performance Evaluations | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

295

Workforce Statistics - Sandia Field Office | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Sandia Field Office | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

296

Major Contract Solicitations | National Nuclear Security Administratio...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Solicitations | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

297

Employee Concerns Reporting Form | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Reporting Form | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing...

298

NNSA has 'Natitude' | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

has 'Natitude' | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing...

299

Workforce Statistics - Pantex Field Office | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Pantex Field Office | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

300

Albuquerque Complex | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Albuquerque Complex | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


301

May 2013 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

3 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

302

August 2012 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

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2 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

303

September 2013 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

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3 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

304

November 2013 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

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3 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

305

June 2011 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

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1 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

306

February 2013 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

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3 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

307

January 2014 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

4 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

308

Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Program | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

309

Contact Us | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

310

August 2010 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

311

July 2010 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

312

New Solicitations | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

313

Career Paths | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

314

Current Awards | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

315

Public Affairs | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

316

Annual Reports | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Annual Reports | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing...

317

NEPA Terminology | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

NEPA Terminology | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing...

318

BSL-3 Links | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Links | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

319

Electronic Comment Form | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Electronic Comment Form | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

320

BSL-3 Documents | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Documents | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


321

NNSA Announces 2013 Sustainability Awards | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

2013 Sustainability Awards | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

322

NNSA: Securing Domestic Radioactive Material | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Securing Domestic Radioactive Material | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

323

Verification & Validation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

324

Russian Locations | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

325

March 2012 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

326

Timeline Print | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

327

July 2013 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

328

Research Areas | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

329

Senior Executive Service | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

330

Protective Forces | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

331

Research and Development | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

332

Working with Interpreters | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

333

November 2011 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

334

February 2012 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

335

Site map | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

336

Executive Positions | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

337

Personnel Security Program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

338

Career Fitter | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

339

Operations Center | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

340

Radiological Assistance Program | National Nuclear Security Administra...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

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341

Presidential Initiatives | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

342

February 2013 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

343

March 2013 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

344

Cindy Lersten | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

345

Emergency Operations Training Academy | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

346

NPO Press Releases | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

347

University Partnerships | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

348

Our Operations | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

349

Radiological Triage | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

350

Frequently Asked Questions | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

351

NNSA Policy System | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

352

Responding to Emergencies | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

353

Render Safe | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

354

Bruce Diamond | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

355

First Responders | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

356

Exercise Program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

357

Planning for Emergencies | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

358

Program Activities | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

359

Steve Asher | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

360

START Signed | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

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361

In The Spotlight | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

362

January 2012 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

363

International Exercises | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

364

Supplemental Directives | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

365

Consequence Management | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

366

Russian Culture | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

367

Pay-banding | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

368

Production Technology | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

369

ASC Program Elements | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

370

Pay Chart | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

371

Aerial Measuring System | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

372

Construction Projects | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

373

Robert B. Raines | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

374

Recruitment Schedule | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

375

Grant Application Process | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

376

Travel Resources | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

377

DEMO Project Goals | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

378

Small Business Opportunity Sessions | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

379

Program Structure | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

380

NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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381

NNSA Established | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

382

Emergency Communications | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

383

December 2012 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

384

International Engagement | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

385

June 2012 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

386

Other Academic Alliances | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

387

International Partners | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

388

Management and Administration | National Nuclear Security Administrati...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

389

Forrestal Watch Office | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

390

ASC Publications | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

391

Program Objectives | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

392

ASC Newsletters | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

393

Readiness Assurance | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

394

Alternate Watch Office | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

395

Background Links | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

396

Search Response Team | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

397

Accident Response Group | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

398

Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Program | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

399

About ASC | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

400

Integrated Codes | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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401

Hispanic Student Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

402

Program Requirements | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Requirements | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

403

Scientist Engagement & Redirection | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

404

Major Contract Solicitation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

405

International Export Control Cooperation | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

406

Nuclear Radiological Threat Task Force Established | National...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Radiological Threat Task Force Established | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

407

December 2011 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

1 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

408

Our Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

409

Career Growth | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

410

Recent Accomplishments | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

411

Domestic Export Licensing | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

412

Signatures and Observables | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

413

Mission Areas | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

414

Enabling Technologies | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

415

Treaties and Agreements | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

416

Life Insurance | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

417

Transit Subsidies | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

418

Work Schedules | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

419

Nonproliferation Policy | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

420

Plutonium Pits | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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421

Radiological Security | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

422

Mentoring Program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

423

Corporate Culture | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

424

Megaports Initiative | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

425

Dismantlement and Disposition | National Nuclear Security Administrati...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

426

Proliferation Detection | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Proliferation Detection | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

427

InTeach | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

428

Foreign WMD Proliferation Detection | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

WMD Proliferation Detection | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

429

Plutonium Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administrati...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

430

Research Reactor Conversion | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

431

Core Program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

432

Plutonium Disposition | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

433

Health Benefits | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

434

Individualized Site Training | National Nuclear Security Administratio...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Individualized Site Training | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

435

Search Response Team | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Search Response Team | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

436

March 2012 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

2 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

437

Continuing Management Reform | National Nuclear Security Administratio...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Continuing Management Reform | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

438

Material Removal and Disposition | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Removal and Disposition | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

439

NNSA Timeline | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Timeline | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

440

Our History | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

History | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
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We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
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441

Video Gallery | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Gallery | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

442

November 2012 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

2 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

443

Our Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

444

July 2012 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

2 | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our...

445

Manager, Sandia National Laboratories | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Sandia National Laboratories | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

446

Law Enforcement & Emergency Management Liaison | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Law Enforcement & Emergency Management Liaison | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

447

Statement on B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > Statement on B61 Life Extension Program and ... Congressional Testimony

448

Statement on B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > Statement on B61 Life Extension Program and ... Congressional Testimony

449

Use of hazard assessments to achieve risk reduction in the USDOE Stockpile Stewardship (SS-21) Program  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper summarizes the nuclear explosive hazard assessment activities performed to support US Department of Energy (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship Demonstration Project SS-21, better known as the ``Seamless Safety`` program. Past practice within the DOE Complex has dictated the use of a significant number of post-design/fabrication safety reviews to analyze the safety associated with operations on nuclear explosives and to answer safety questions. These practices have focused on reviewing-in or auditing-in safety vs incorporating safety in the design process. SS-21 was proposed by the DOE as an avenue to develop a program to ``integrate established, recognized, verifiable safety criteria into the process at the design stage rather than continuing the reliance on reviews, evaluations and audits.`` The entire Seamless Safety design and development process is verified by a concurrent hazard assessment (HA). The primary purpose of the SS-21 Demonstration Project HA was to demonstrate the feasibility of performing concurrent HAs as part of an engineering design and development effort and then to evaluate the use of the HA to provide an indication in the risk reduction or gain in safety achieved. To accomplish this objective, HAs were performed on both baseline (i.e., old) and new (i.e. SS-21) B61-0 Center Case Section disassembly processes. These HAs were used to support the identification and documentation of weapon- and process-specific hazards and safety-critical operating steps. Both HAs focused on identifying accidents that had the potential for worker injury, public health effects, facility damage, toxic gas release, and dispersal of radioactive materials. A comparison of the baseline and SS-21 process risks provided a semi-quantitative estimate of the risk reduction gained via the Seamless Safety process.

Fischer, S.R.; Konkel, H.; Bott, T.; Eisenhawer, S.W. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); DeYoung, L.; Hockert, J. [Odgen Environmental and Energy Services, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

450

Improving weapons of mass destruction intelligence Arnold Kanter  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

weapons developments in Pakistan are primarily, if not exclusively, influenced by nuclear developments of nuclear capability by sub-national states and the security of WMD weapons, materials, and technology so for the foreseeable future. WMD includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but also

Deutch, John

451

Explaining Soft Law  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. If Russia subsequently

Guzman, Andrew T.; Meyer, Timothy L.

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

452

Explaining Soft Law  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. If Russia subsequently

Guzman, Andrew; Meyer, Timothy L.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

453

Stockpile Stewardship Quarterly Volume 1, Number 4  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

1, Number 4 * February 2012 1, Number 4 * February 2012 Message from the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Stockpile Stewardship, Chris Deeney Defense Programs Stockpile Stewardship in Action Volume 1, Number 4 Inside this Issue 2 Applying Advanced Simulation Models to Neutron Tube Ion Extraction 3 Advanced Optical Cavities for Subcritical and Hydrodynamic Experiments 5 Progress Toward Ignition on the National Ignition Facility 7 Commissioning URSA Minor: The First LTD-Based Accelerator for Radiography 8 Publication Highlights 9 2011 NNSA Stewardship Science Graduate Fellowship Class S tockpile Stewardship Science is not for wimps, and

454

Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union  

SciTech Connect

The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

Not Available

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

455

Living in the Question? The Berlin Nuclear Crisis Critical Oral History, Part II  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

also McGeorge Bundy, “Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf”, ForeignNitze talked about nuclear weapons in public, “Berlinthrough a prism of nuclear weapons, and therefore nuclear

Gould, Benina Berger

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

456

Nuclear Fission: Reaction to the Discovery in 1939  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

consequences of nuclear weapons in 1939, such informationdevelopment of both nuclear weapons and civilian reactorsresponsible for nuclear weapons—or to absolve them. Rather,

Hodes, Elizabeth; Tiddens, Adolph; Badash, Lawrence

1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

457

Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

through its clandestine nuclear weapons program. If KEDOand construction of its nuclear weapons program. A regionalabandon its clandestine nuclear weapons program, and to more

Kaneko, Kumao; Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Choi, Jor-Shan; Fei, Edward

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

458

Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Materials Assay  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

screening of cargo for nuclear weapons materials [2],[3].peaceful nuclear activities are not diverted to weapons

Quiter, Brian J.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

459

WEAPONS EFFECTS FOR PROTECTIVE DESIGN  

SciTech Connect

A lecture intended to provide a general background in weapons effects is presented. Specific areas of nuclear explosion phenomena pertinent to the design of hardened systems discussed include nuclear radiation and shielding, fireball growth and effects, thermal radiation, air blast, cratering and throwout, ground shock effects, fallout, and afterwinds. (J.R.D.)

Brode, H.L.

1960-03-31T23:59:59.000Z

460

Los Alamos Neutron Science Center | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Neutron Science Center | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


461

NNSA interns visit Sandia National Laboratories | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

interns visit Sandia National Laboratories | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

462

Current News and Information | National Nuclear Security Administratio...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

News and Information | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

463

2013 NNSA Science Council | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

NNSA Science Council | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

464

Office of Inspector General | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Inspector General | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing...

465

U.S. HEU Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administratio...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

466

Entry-Level Positions | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

467

ASCeNews Quarterly Newsletter - September 2011 | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

468

Conference on Advances in Materials Science | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

469

Los Alamos Field Office NEPA Documents | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

470

ASC Logo Use Guidelines | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

471

US/Russian Collaborations | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

472

NNSA, Philippine Nuclear Research Institute to Prevent Radiological...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

473

Joint Technical Operations Team | National Nuclear Security Administra...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

474

Anne Harrington at Sandia National Labs | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

475

Pantex supports career expo | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

476

High Energy Density Laboratory Plasmas Program | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

477

ASC at the Labs | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

478

Draft Environmental Assessment for NorthStar | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

479

The Office of Proliferation Detection (PD) | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Proliferation Detection (PD) | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

480

Bruce Held visits Pantex | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons stockpile" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


481

NNSA, Philippine Nuclear Research Institute to Prevent Radiological...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Philippine Nuclear Research Institute to Prevent Radiological Terrorism | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation...

482

Pantex flushes fire hydrants | National Nuclear Security Administratio...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

483

Controlling WMD Materials and Expertise | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

484

Remarks by Conference Chairman Adam Scheinman | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

485

Bruce Held visits LLNL | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

486

2009 NMMSS Users Training Meeting | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Training Meeting | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing...

487

Office of Fissile Materials Disposition | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Fissile Materials Disposition | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

488

Office of Global Threat Reduction | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Global Threat Reduction | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

489

Nuclear Material Management Abstract  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nevada Test Site (NTS) has transitioned from its historical and critical role of weapons testing to another critical role for the nation. This new role focuses on being a integral element in solving the multiple challenges facing the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) with nuclear material management. NTS is positioned to be a solution for other NNSA sites challenged with safe nuclear materials storage and disposition. NNSA, with site involvement, is currently transforming the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure to meet the 2030 vision. Efforts are under way to consolidate and modernize the production complex . With respect to the nuclear material stockpile, the NNSA sites are currently reducing the complex nuclear material inventory through disposition and consolidation. This includes moving material from other sites to NTS. State of the art nuclear material management and control practices at NTS are essential for NTS to ensure that assigned activities are accomplished in a safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally responsible manner. NTS activities and challenges will be addressed.

Jesse C. Schreiber

2007-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

490

Examination of the role of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: a systems analysis approach  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spread of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.

Martz, Joseph C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stevens, Patrice A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Branstetter, Linda [SNL; Hoover, Edward [SNL; O' Brien, Kevin [SNL; Slavin, Adam [SNL; Caswell, David [STANFORD UNIV

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

491

Ground-Based Nuclear Detonation Detection | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Ground-Based Nuclear Detonation Detection | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

492

Our Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Home > Our Mission Our Mission NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States

493

Responsible stewardship of nuclear materials  

SciTech Connect

The ability to tap the massive energy potential of nuclear fission was first developed as a weapon to end a terrible world war. Nuclear fission is also a virtually inexhaustible energy resource, and is the only energy supply in certain areas in Russia, Kazakhstan and elsewhere. The potential link between civilian and military applications has been and continues to be a source of concern. With the end of the Cold War, this issue has taken a dramatic turn. The U.S. and Russia have agreed to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles by as much as two-thirds. This will make some 100 tonnes of separated plutonium and 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium available, in a form that is obviously directly usable for weapons. The total world inventory of plutonium is now around 1000 tonnes and is increasing at 60-70 tonnes per year. There is even more highly enriched uranium. Fortunately the correct answer to what to do with excess weapons material is also the most attractive. It should be used and reused as fuel for fast reactors. Material in use (particularly nuclear material) is very easy to monitor and control, and is quite unattractive for diversion. Active management of fissile materials not only makes a major contribution to economic stability and well-being, but also simplifies accountability, inspection and other safeguards processes; provides a revenue stream to pay for the necessary safeguards; and, most importantly, limits the prospective world inventory of plutonium to only that which is used and useful.

Hannum, W.H.

1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

494

Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

2012 Congressional Budget Campaign and a major goal for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The ICF Campaign supports the NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program. The NIF provides NNSA extraordinary opportunities for scientific progress and discovery in the areas

495

Supplement Analysis for the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

D D E P A R T M E N T O F E N E R G Y U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A SUPPLEMENT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE PANTEX PLANT AND ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON COMPONENTS DOE/EIS-0225/SA-03 United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Pantex Site Operations P.O. Box 30030 Amarillo, Texas 79120-0030 February 2003 i Summary The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing Procedures at 10 CFR 1021.330(d) require evaluation of its site-wide environmental impact statements (EISs) at least every 5 years by preparation of a supplement analysis (SA), as provided in 10 CFR 1021.314. Based on the SA, a determination is made as to whether the existing EIS remains

496

An investigation of the feasibility of building a harbor on the West coast of South America using explosive power of nuclear weapons, a preliminary report  

SciTech Connect

There is an interest in discovering the various peace time uses of nuclear explosives. One of the proposals is the building of harbors. There are several ports along the west coast of South America where lighterage is necessary. This implies a need for expanded harbor facilities. The problem is to find a good location for creating a harbor, and the feasibility of accomplishing this with the use of nuclear force. Feasibility includes blast effects, radiation hazards, the number of weapons needed, and economic considerations. Economic considerations include the cost of treating a harbor of sufficient depth and area, the building of harbor facilities, and the estimated savings and advantages of the new harbor. Several meetings were held with naval personnel of the Military Liaison group at UCRL to discuss the general problems of harbors. Thirty-three different ports were given a preliminary investigation.

Zodtner, H. H.

1971-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

497

Development of Superconducting High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers for Nuclear Safeguards  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Safeguards indetonation of the first nuclear weapon in the desert of Newby the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and

Dreyer, Jonathan

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

498

Living in the Question? The Berlin Nuclear Crisis Critical Oral History  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions andOrigins of Overkill Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy,thirty five thousand nuclear weapons remain in the world,

Gould, Benina Berger

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

499

Asians Resist Nuclear Threat  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Midway carries soma 100 nuclear weapons and the missiles onthe removal of U. S. nuclear weapons from Asia. It is ti-aeof U. S. tactical nuclear weapons This set the figure for

Schirmer, Daniel Boone

1981-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

500

Review: Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer by Helen Caldicott  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

and the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation make itto a discussion of nuclear weapons proliferation. In the

Mirza, Umar Karim

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z