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Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
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1

EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...

2

EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy 18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel SUMMARY This study analyzes the potential environmental impacts of adopting a policy to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. In particular, the study examines the comparative impacts of several alternative approaches to managing the spent fuel. The analysis demonstrates that the impacts on the environmental, workers and the general public of implementing any of the alternative management approaches would be small and within applicable Federal and state regulator limits. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES

3

The future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. nuclear weapons policy .  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??This thesis addresses the viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT for short – in light of U.S. nuclear weapons… (more)

Claussen, Bjørn Ragnar

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

4

Some thoughts on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper discusses factors controlling the dissemination of nuclear technologies and especially fissile materials.

Krikorian N.H.; Hawkins, H.T.

1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

5

Nuclear Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

With an explosion equivalent of about 20kT of TNT, the Trinity test was the first demonstration of a nuclear weapon. Conducted on July 16, 1945 in Alamogordo, NM this site is now a Registered National Historic Landmark. The concept and applicability of nuclear power was demonstrated on December 20, 1951 with the Experimental Breeder Reactor Number One (EBR-1) lit four light bulbs. This reactor is now a Registered National Historic Landmark, located near Arco, ID. From that moment forward it had been clearly demonstrated that nuclear energy has both peaceful and military applications and that the civilian and military fuel cycles can overlap. For the more than fifty years since the Atoms for Peace program, a key objective of nuclear policy has been to enable the wider peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Volumes have been written on the impact of these two actions on the world by advocates and critics; pundits and practioners; politicians and technologists. The nations of the world have woven together a delicate balance of treaties, agreements, frameworks and handshakes that are representative of the timeframe in which they were constructed and how they have evolved in time. Collectively these vehicles attempt to keep political will, nuclear materials and technology in check. This paper captures only the briefest abstract of the more significant aspects on the Nonproliferation Regime. Of particular relevance to this discussion is the special nonproliferation sensitivity associated with the uranium isotope separation and spent fuel reprocessing aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Atkins-Duffin, C E

2008-12-10T23:59:59.000Z

6

Record of Decision for the Final EIS on Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

5091 5091 Friday May 17, 1996 Part IV Department of Energy Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel; Notice 25092 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Record of decision. SUMMARY: DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided to implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy as specified in the Preferred Alternative contained in the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed

7

A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

8

Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability LANL has strengthened its capability in a key aspect of...

9

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

| National Nuclear Security Administration | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nonproliferation Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation Nonproliferation One of the gravest threats the United States and the international community face is the possibility that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NNSA,

10

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Principal Associate Directorate for...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nancy Jo Nicholas Administrator Peggy Maez Phone: 1-505-667-4877 Fax: 1-505-665-4078 Nuclear Nonproliferation The proliferation of nuclear weapons, either by nation-states or...

11

Nuclear Weapons  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

nuclear science that has had a significant global influence. Following the observation of fission products of uranium by Hahn and Strassmann in 1938, a uranium fission weapon...

12

Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation  

SciTech Connect

The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

Joeck, N

2007-02-05T23:59:59.000Z

13

Nuclear Weapons Journal Archive  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Weapons Journal Archive Nuclear Weapons Journal The Nuclear Weapons Journal ceased publication after Issue 2, 2009. Below are Nuclear Weapons Journal archived issues. Issue...

14

Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

Richardson, J

2009-01-21T23:59:59.000Z

15

Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices One of the gravest threats the United States and the international

16

Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices One of the gravest threats the United States and the international

17

Proactive Intelligence for Nuclear Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The project described in this paper leverages predictive models for proliferation detection in order to assess the complementary questions of capability and intent as they relate to the potential for nuclear weapon development. The ability to proactively assess the likelihood of a state to engage in nuclear power acquisition and development for non-peaceful purposes is one of the greatest challenges for analysts and policy makers working on proliferation detection and deterrence. Of further difficulty is determining whether a state is at risk to provide indirect support for proliferation via the relationship between industrial input/output and the legal framework of trade. In general, it is possible to gather evidence about precursor activities to the achieved nuclear potential of a state that function as indicators of the state's intent to acquire and develop capabilities to support nuclear weapons. Reasoning with these indicators to predict intent and capability to proliferate is of utmost importance to facilitate nuclear safeguards, e.g. through proactive implementation of countermeasures. Such a predictive reasoning task is difficult to perform without computational aid. While the need for a proactive and multi-perspective approach to proliferation detection is widely recognized, there is a lamentable lack of computational tools applied directly to the task. Applications of predictive modeling to the domain of nuclear nonproliferation are limited to physical/chemical properties of nuclear materials, such as nuclear weapons simulations and stockpile stewardship. The aim of this project is to address this gap by leveraging methods and data from different mission areas in support of proliferation detection and prevention in innovative ways. More specifically, the approach implemented in this project combines methods in information analysis and probabilistic evidentiary reasoning with expert knowledge from discipline areas germane to proliferation detection, and evidence extracted from relevant data sources, to assess alternative hypotheses about specific proliferation detection problems.

Peterson, Danielle J.; Sanfilippo, Antonio P.; Baddeley, Robert L.; Franklin, Lyndsey

2008-05-12T23:59:59.000Z

18

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). Prevent the spread of nuclear and eliminate nuclear weapons (1953). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entersPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle

Gilfoyle, Jerry

19

Milan Document on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Delhi on the project was a separate issue from India's avoidance of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, she said. "There is the non-proliferation issue and we are pursuing that with the Indians as part despite its refusal to sign a global treaty barring the spread of atomic weapons. That move was seen

De Cindio, Fiorella

20

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

weapons (1953). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1

Gilfoyle, Jerry

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


21

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons  

SciTech Connect

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described.

Vaughen, V.C.A.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

22

Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability LANL has strengthened its capability in a key aspect of nuclear nonproliferation by combining two groups within its Global Security organization. June 27, 2012 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials.

23

Reassessing U.S. nuclear weapons policy Harold Brown[1] and John Deutch[2  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

2 / 28 The world-wide nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Entry into force: 1970 Three "pillars": - Non Proliferation (of nuclear-weapon capabilities), - Nuclear of the globe. The collapse of the world-wide regime of nuclear- weapon non-proliferation might happen in two

Deutch, John

24

Reconversion of nuclear weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

Kapitza, Sergei P

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

25

Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nonproliferation & International Security Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation & International Security Nonproliferation & International Security

26

Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nonproliferation & International Security Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation & International Security Nonproliferation & International Security

27

Systems resilience : a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

2011-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

28

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The North’sNye, "Maintaining a Non-Proliferation Regime," InternationalKenneth Waltz “wars of non-proliferation”—against them. 31

Waltz, Kenneth N.

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

29

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Much About North Korean Nuclear Weapons,” unpublished paper,the South and use nuclear weapons in doing so. How concernedout how to use nuclear weapons except for deterrence. Is a

Waltz, Kenneth N.

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

30

Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs | ORNL  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

and development to 'boots-on-the-ground' implementation. This work ranges from uranium fuel cycle research to detection technologies and nuclear forensics. The nuclear...

31

Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort.

Travelli, A.; Gaines, L.L.; Minkov, V.; Olson, A.P.; Snelgrove, J.

1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

32

Identification of nuclear weapons  

DOE Patents (OSTI)

A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

1987-04-10T23:59:59.000Z

33

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the New  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

/11 CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Not supported by administration. No change. NPT Non-Proliferation influence on US security and non-proliferation. · One of the highest hurdles to obtaining a nuclear weapon Proliferation, Science and Global Security, 9, 81 (2001). #12;The Nuclear Tagging Scheme #12;Seize New

Gilfoyle, Jerry

34

Workshop on nuclear power growth and nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

It is widely viewed that an expansion of nuclear power would have positive energy, economic and environmental benefits for the world. However, there are concerns about the economic competitiveness, safety and proliferation and terrorism risks of nuclear power. The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power will depend on the ability of governments and industry to address these concerns, including the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen nonproliferation, nuclear materials accountability and nuclear security. In his Prague speech, President Obama stated: 'we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programs. And no approach will succeed if it's based on the denial of rights to nations that play by the rules. We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change, and to advance peace opportunity for all people.' How can the President's vision, which will rekindle a vigorous public debate over the future of nuclear power and its relation to proliferation, be realized? What critical issues will frame the reemerging debate? What policies must be put into place to address these issues? Will US policy be marked more by continuity or change? To address these and other questions, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars will host a workshop on the future of nuclear power and nonproliferation.

Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

35

BNL Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security (NNSS)  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

nonproliferation regime and U.S. programs and policies developed to meet the emerging nuclear proliferation threats to our security. The course will present students with critical...

36

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test BanPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

Gilfoyle, Jerry

37

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. TestingPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

Gilfoyle, Jerry

38

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. Testing The TestPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

Gilfoyle, Jerry

39

Nonproliferation and National Security - Nuclear Engineering Division  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and Nonproliferation and National Security CAPABILITIES Overview Nuclear Systems Modeling and Design Analysis Nuclear Systems Technologies Risk and Safety Assessments Nonproliferation and National Security Materials Testing Engineering Computation & Design Engineering Experimentation Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE on Flickr Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of Chicago Pile 1 (CP-1) Argonne OutLoud on Nuclear Energy Argonne Energy Showcase 2012 Capabilities Nonproliferation and National Security Bookmark and Share Nuclear Export Controls Nuclear Exports Controls We provide technical advisory services to DOE in the implementation of U.S. nonproliferation policy. This includes assessments of proliferation risks presented by emerging technologies and

40

Administrator D'Agostino on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


41

NBL Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

NBL Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is owned and operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). NBL is the U.S. Government's...

42

Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war  

SciTech Connect

This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

Bing, G.F.

1991-08-20T23:59:59.000Z

43

Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administra...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

> Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes September 01, 1961 Washington, DC Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes The Soviet Union breaks the nuclear test...

44

Will our nuclear weapons work?  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Will our nuclear weapons work? Will our nuclear weapons work? National Security Science magazine Latest Issue:April 2013 All Issues » submit Supercomputers are essential for assessing the health of the U.S. nuclear stockpile Supercomputers provide assurance by simulating nuclear weapons performance March 25, 2013 Graphic of a missile being tested through computer simulation Los Alamos uses supercomputers to make high-resolution 3D simulations that help to assess the health of nuclear weapons like this B-61 bomb. Contact Managing Editor Clay Dillingham Email The nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile were designed and built to be replaced with new designs and builds every 10 to 15 years. These weapons have lived beyond their expected lifespans. Supercomputers provide the high-resolution 3D simulations needed for

45

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

to IAEA inspectors and withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty are evidence of an active and advanced proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first conclusion is that proliferation is easy and inevitable. The second-backed conventional attacks on non-nuclear states which are not securely under a great power's nuclear umbrella

Gilfoyle, Jerry

46

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The worldwide nuclear non-proliferation regime may becomeand its partners in the non-proliferation effort do not have

May, Michael M

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

47

Nuclear Nonproliferation | Y-12 National Security Complex  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

matter experts who secure vulnerable materials around the world (including from Libya, pictured), Y-12 is leveraging its expertise to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons...

48

F. Calogero / Prospects of nuclear proliferation, or of transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world CIC, Cuernavaca / 02.12.2010 / page 1 / 28  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

or military use. ­ It is a major component of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has the goal acquisition of a nuclear weapon by an adversary could have a dev- astating influence on US security and non-proliferation. Enhancing nuclear weapons material security in Russia. 4. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 5. Other

Mejía-Monasterio, Carlos

49

Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Weapons Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Weapons Weapons The New START Treaty, which was signed in 2010, between the United States and Russian Federation will cap the strategic deployed nuclear arsenals of each country at 1,550 warheads, a nearly 75% reduction compared with the

50

Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Safety » Nuclear Security & Safety » Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation Highly trained nuclear emergency response personnel and more than 17,000 pounds of equipment were sent to Japan as part of the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration’s effort to assist Japanese personnel with nuclear issues related to the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Above, scientists, technicians and engineers from the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nevada Site Office board an Air Force C-17. | Photo courtesy of NNSA. Highly trained nuclear emergency response personnel and more than 17,000 pounds of equipment were sent to Japan as part of the Department of Energy

51

2011 Annual Planning Summary for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The ongoing and projected Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact Statements for 2011 and 2012 within Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20).

52

Assessing the Institution of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is facing a crisis of effectiveness. During the Cold War, the regime was relatively effective in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and building an institutional structure that could, under certain conditions, ensure continued success. However, in the evolving global context, the traditional approaches are becoming less appropriate. Globalization has introduced new sets of stresses on the nonproliferation regime, such as the rise of non-state actors, broadening extensity and intensity of supply chains, and the multipolarization of power. This evolving global context demands an analytical and political flexibility in order to meet future threats. Current institutional capabilities established during the Cold War are now insufficient to meet the nonproliferation regime’s current and future needs. The research was based on information gathered through interviews and reviews of the relevant literature, and two dominant themes emerged. First, that human security should be integrated into the regime to account for the rise of non-state actors and networked violence. Second, confidence in the regime’s overall effectiveness has eroded at a time where verification-based confidence is becoming more essential. The research postulates that a critical analysis of the regime that fully utilizes institutional theory, with its focus on rules, normative structures, and procedures will be essential to adapting the regime to the current global context, building mechanisms for generating trust, creating better enforcement, and providing flexibility for the future.

Toomey, Christopher

2010-05-14T23:59:59.000Z

53

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear...

54

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

55

Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

Alfred Tang

2008-05-26T23:59:59.000Z

56

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

57

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

58

The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices  

SciTech Connect

When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

59

Nuclear power and nuclear-weapons proliferation  

SciTech Connect

The danger that fissile isotopes may be diverted from nuclear power production to the construction of nuclear weapons would be aggravated by a switch to the plutonium breeder: but future uranium supplies are uncertain.

Moniz, E.J.; Neff, T.L.

1978-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

60

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

and will continue to work cooperatively with Russia to ensure the long-term sustainability of the systems and procedures already in place. However, not all nuclear material...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


61

FINAL (PNNL-20432) Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Primer  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

.g., North Korea, Pakistan). Fissile materials, nuclear reactors, reprocessing and enrichment technologyFINAL (PNNL-20432) 1 Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Primer Prepared for the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future Although the list of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and arms control

62

Request For Records Disposition Authority-Nuclear Weapons | Department...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

For Records Disposition Authority-Nuclear Weapons Request For Records Disposition Authority-Nuclear Weapons This document identifies the nuclear weapon records generated by the...

63

Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report  

SciTech Connect

Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

64

Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report  

SciTech Connect

Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

65

Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

Not Available

1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

66

Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Who We Are > In The Spotlight > Steve Mladineo Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific

67

Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Who We Are > In The Spotlight > Steve Mladineo Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific

68

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapons Testing Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing July 03, 1993 Washington, DC Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing President Clinton...

69

Nonproliferation and National Security Program - Nuclear Engineering  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Major Programs > Nonproliferation and Major Programs > Nonproliferation and National Security Program Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral Export Control Arrangements Interdiction Engagement & Training INECP INSEP GIPP Safeguards Concepts and Approaches Human Capital Development Additional Protocol Technical Assistance National Security Systems & Assessments National Security Information Systems Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Radiation Detection & Response (RDR) Contact NPNS Other Major Programs Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE Division on Flickr Nonproliferation and National Security Program (NPNS)

70

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administra...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

71

Administrator D'Agostino on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation | National  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Speeches > Administrator D'Agostino on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation Speech Administrator D'Agostino on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation Oct 28, 2010 As prepared for delivery at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for

72

Science and society test V: Nuclear nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Numerical estimates are carried out on questions affecting the nation’s nonproliferation policy. We have considered some aspects of thermal recycle

David W. Hafemeister

1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

73

The National Nuclear Security Administration's Weapons Dismantlement...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

National Nuclear Security Administration's Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition Program OAS-L-13-06 January 2013 Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 January 29, 2013...

74

Neutron Sensors and Their Role in Nuclear Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Perhaps the most familiar application of neutron detection technology to nonproliferation resides in materials accounting, where the quantification of plutonium has a rich history. With a changing dynamic in nuclear security, the application of sensor technology to further other nonproliferation objectives has received considerable attention. This fact, amplified by a dwindling supply of 3He, has stimulated considerable interest in neutron detection technology development for applications ranging from interdicting smuggled nuclear material to the verification of stockpile reductions. This manuscript briefly overviews the application of neutron sensors to nonproliferation and examines three specific examples that highlight the constraints applied to field-deployed technology.

Runkle, Robert C.

2011-10-04T23:59:59.000Z

75

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing August 22, 1958 Washington, DC Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing

76

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

77

FY 2012 Budget Hearing Testimony on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactor Programs before the House Appropriations Committee, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > FY 2012 Budget Hearing Testimony on Nuclear ...

78

Statement on Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy & Water Development | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > Statement on Defense Nuclear

79

FY 2012 Budget Hearing Testimony on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactor Programs before the House Appropriations Committee, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > FY 2012 Budget Hearing Testimony on Nuclear ...

80

Statement on Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy & Water Development | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > Statement on Defense Nuclear

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


81

Philippine Bases and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

BASES AN-fJ U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY In 1947, when Unitedcould bring as many nuclear weapons as It wanted onto theinclude opposition to U.S. nuclear weapons and bases In the

Schirmer, Daniel Boone

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

82

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

1990 What Do We Do with Nuclear Weapons Now? by Michael M.for the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy MICHAEL M. MAYan electoral majority in nuclear weapons states. Unlike

May, Michael M

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

83

Nonproliferation Human Capital Development in Malaysia | National Nuclear  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Human Capital Development in Malaysia | National Nuclear Human Capital Development in Malaysia | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > Nonproliferation Human Capital Development in Malaysia Nonproliferation Human Capital Development in Malaysia Posted By NNSA Public Affairs NNSA Blog Photo Credit: National University of Malaysia

84

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and regime theories .  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??Since the beginning of the atomic age, nuclear weapons proliferation has been on of the major security issues facing the international society, and a growing… (more)

Søndenaa, Erik

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

85

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

... Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program January 19, 1975 Washington, DC Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program The Energy...

86

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Engineering Sciences October 12-14, 2011, Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Understanding and Reducing...

87

DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation DNN | Open Energy Information  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation DNN Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation DNN Jump to: navigation, search Name DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Place Washington, Washington, DC Zip 20585 Product String representation "Washington D.C. ... ear operations." is too long. Coordinates 38.89037°, -77.031959° Loading map... {"minzoom":false,"mappingservice":"googlemaps3","type":"ROADMAP","zoom":14,"types":["ROADMAP","SATELLITE","HYBRID","TERRAIN"],"geoservice":"google","maxzoom":false,"width":"600px","height":"350px","centre":false,"title":"","label":"","icon":"","visitedicon":"","lines":[],"polygons":[],"circles":[],"rectangles":[],"copycoords":false,"static":false,"wmsoverlay":"","layers":[],"controls":["pan","zoom","type","scale","streetview"],"zoomstyle":"DEFAULT","typestyle":"DEFAULT","autoinfowindows":false,"kml":[],"gkml":[],"fusiontables":[],"resizable":false,"tilt":0,"kmlrezoom":false,"poi":true,"imageoverlays":[],"markercluster":false,"searchmarkers":"","locations":[{"text":"","title":"","link":null,"lat":38.89037,"lon":-77.031959,"alt":0,"address":"","icon":"","group":"","inlineLabel":"","visitedicon":""}]}

88

AEC and control of nuclear weapons  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

control of nuclear weapons The Atomic Energy Commission took control of the atomic energy project known originally as the Manhattan Project on January 1, 1947. This shift from the...

89

Radiation Detection Laboratory The Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation Lab is used to explore novel techniques for radiation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

NERS Radiation Detection Laboratory The Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation Lab is used to explore novel techniques for radiation detection and characterization for nuclear nonproliferation

Eustice, Ryan

90

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

C. Frank. 1969. Nonproliferation Negotiations, 1961-1968. InCooperation on Nonproliferation Export Controls. Ann Arbor,to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. International

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

91

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

in South Asia, Pakistan’s nuclear military capability, alongof the nuclear club: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Ifand then India became nuclear powers, and Pakistan naturally

Waltz, Kenneth N.

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

92

The history of nuclear weapon safety devices  

SciTech Connect

The paper presents the history of safety devices used in nuclear weapons from the early days of separables to the latest advancements in MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS). Although the paper focuses on devices, the principles of Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety implementation will also be presented.

Plummer, D.W.; Greenwood, W.H.

1998-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

93

Nonproliferation Policy | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

94

Nonproliferation Position Statement  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

For its many benefits to be realized, nuclear technology should continue to be applied in such a way that it does not contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, the public must have confidence that the diversion of civil nuclear materials into weapons programs will not happen. An effective nonproliferation policy should prevent diversion by States of fissile material from the nuclear fuel cycle; theft of fissile material by subnational or terrorist groups; clandestine operation of a fissile material production facility. It is the position of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) that the following actions are required to deal with these threats effectively: 1. Nuclear science and technology can be applied for peaceful purposes in a manner that fully supports and is compatible with achieving nonproliferation goals, as embodied in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To prevent proliferation, sovereign states should adhere to the NPT and its safeguards system including the Additional Protocol and adopt effective export controls. Incentives to acquire nuclear weapons must also be addressed through foreign policies that discourage clandestine

unknown authors

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

95

Effects of nuclear weapons. Third edition  

SciTech Connect

Since the last edition of ''The Effects of Nuclear Weapons'' in 1962 much new information has become available concerning nuclear weapon effects. This has come in part from the series of atmospheric tests, including several at very high altitudes, conducted in the Pacific Ocean area in 1962. In addition, laboratory studies, theoretical calculations, and computer simulations have provided a better understanding of the various effects. A new chapter has been added on the electromagnetic pulse. The chapter titles are as follows: general principles of nuclear explosions; descriptions of nuclear explosions; air blast phenomena in air and surface bursts; air blast loading; structural damage from air blast; shock effects of surface and subsurface bursts; thermal radiation and its effects; initial nuclear radiation; residual nuclear radiation and fallout; radio and radar effects; the electromagnetic pulse and its effects; and biological effects. (LTN)

Glasstone, S.; Dolan, P.J.

1977-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

96

Keeping the atom's club exclusive:- the nuclear non-proliferation regime, 1945-2007.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??This thesis examines the development of nuclear non-proliferation policies since 1945. It takes the reader from the first conception of plans for nuclear disarmament, to… (more)

Bar, Allon

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

97

MCNPX-PoliMi for Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In the past few years, efforts to develop new measurement systems to support nuclear nonproliferation and homeland security have increased substantially. Monte Carlo radiation transport is one of the simulation methods of choice for the analysis of data from existing systems and for the design of new measurement systems; it allows for accurate description of geometries, detailed modeling of particle-nucleus interactions, and event-by-event detection analysis. This paper describes the use of the Monte Carlo code MCNPX-PoliMi for nuclear-nonproliferation applications, with particular emphasis on the simulation of spontaneous and neutron-induced nuclear fission. In fact, of all possible neutron-nucleus interactions, neutron-induced fission is the most defining characteristic of special nuclear material (such as U-235 and Pu-239), which is the material of interest in nuclear-nonproliferation applications. The MCNP-PoliMi code was originally released from the Radiation Safety Shielding Center (RSSIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 2003 [1]; the MCNPX-PoliMi code contains many enhancements and is based on MCNPX ver. 2.7.0. MCNPX-PoliMi ver. 2.0 was released through RSICC in 2012 as a patch to MCNPX ver. 2.7.0 and as an executable [2].

S. A. Pozzi; S. D. Clarke; W. Walsh; E. C. Miller; J. Dolan; M. Flaska; B. M. Wieger; A. Enqvist; E. Padovani; J. K. Mattingly; D. L. Chichester; P. Peerani

2012-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

98

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing July 03, 1993 Washington, DC

99

Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Nuclear weapons are developed, produced, and maintained in the stockpile, and then retired and dismantled. This sequence of events is known as the

100

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


101

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms a

Doyle, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Meek, Elizabeth [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

102

Integration of Facility Modeling Capabilities for Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Humberto E. Garcia

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

103

INTEGRATION OF FACILITY MODELING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ANALYSIS  

SciTech Connect

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

2011-07-18T23:59:59.000Z

104

Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis  

SciTech Connect

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Garcia, Humberto [Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Burr, Tom [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Coles, Garill A [ORNL; Edmunds, Thomas A. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); Garrett, Alfred [Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL); Gorensek, Maximilian [Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL); Hamm, Luther [Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL); Krebs, John [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL); Kress, Reid L [ORNL; Lamberti, Vincent [Y-12 National Security Complex; Schoenwald, David [ORNL; Tzanos, Constantine P [ORNL; Ward, Richard C [ORNL

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

105

Y-12, the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement ? Or:...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement - Or: The Cold War and nuclear weapons dismantlement (title used in The Oak Ridger) The Cold War heated up over the years with such...

106

Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation | Department of Energy  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Taste Like? At Sandia National Laboratories, researchers have developed pods that can survey and "taste" radioactive particles without exposing a human crew to nuclear hazards....

107

Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors in Lisbon, Portugal | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering...

108

Nonproliferation Graduate Program | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services Sep 17, 2013 NNSA, Republic of Korea Ministry Agree to Minimize Use of HEU in Nuclear Reactors Sep 3, 2013 NNSA Conducts...

109

Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

Lehman, R.F. II

1993-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

110

Economic and Nonproliferation Analysis Framework for Assessing Reliable Nuclear Fuel Service Arrangements  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nuclear power is now broadly recognized as an essential technology in national strategies to provide energy security while meeting carbon management goals. Yet a long standing conundrum remains: how to enable rapid growth in the global nuclear power infrastructure while controlling the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies that lie at the heart of nuclear fuel supply and nuclear weapons programs. Reducing the latent proliferation risk posed by a broader horizontal spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology has been a primary goal of national nuclear supplier policies since the beginning of the nuclear power age. Attempts to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technology have been the subject of numerous initiatives in the intervening decades sometimes taking the form of calls to develop fuel supply and service assurances to reduce market pull to increase the number of states with fuel cycle capabilities. A clear understanding of what characteristics of specific reliable nuclear fuel service (RNFS) and supply arrangements qualify them as 'attractive offers' is critical to the success of current and future efforts. At a minimum, RNFS arrangements should provide economic value to all participants and help reduce latent proliferation risks posed by the global expansion of nuclear power. In order to inform the technical debate and the development of policy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been developing an analytical framework to evaluate the economics and nonproliferation merits of alternative approaches to RNFS arrangements. This paper provides a brief overview of the economic analysis framework developed and applied to a model problem of current interest: full-service nuclear fuel leasing arrangements. Furthermore, this paper presents an extended outline of a proposed analysis approach to evaluate the non-proliferation merits of various RNFS alternatives.

Phillips, Jon R.; Kreyling, Sean J.; Short, Steven M.; Weimar, Mark R.

2010-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

111

Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administration Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes September 01, 1961 Washington, DC Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes The Soviet Union breaks the nuclear test moratorium and the United States

112

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

American Draft Non-proliferation Treaty: Will it Work? Ins) NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NWS: Nuclear Weaponon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and since its

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

113

Politics and the bomb: exploring the Role of epistemic communities in nuclear non-proliferation outcomes.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??The role of epistemic communities in influencing policy formulation is underexplored in International Relations theory in general and in nuclear non-proliferation studies in particular. This… (more)

Kutchesfahani, S.Z.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

114

2012 Annual Planning Summary for NNSA Defense Nuclear NonProliferation  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The ongoing and projected Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact Statements for 2012 and 2013 within the NNSA Defense Nuclear NonProliferation.

115

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the...

116

Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

117

Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

118

Office Of NONprOliferatiON  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Of NONprOliferatiON Of NONprOliferatiON aNd iNterNatiONal Security July 2011 www.nnsa.doe.gov National Nuclear Security Administration ENERGY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF Develop and implement DOE/NNSA nonproliferation and arms control policy to reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction. control the spread of WMD-related material, equipment, technology and expertise. Safeguard and Secure nuclear material to prevent its diversion, theft and sabotage. Negotiate, monitor and verify compliance with international nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements. NNSA's Office of Nonproliferation and international Security (NiS) provides leadership in the formulation and implementation of nonproliferation, nuclear security and arms control

119

The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.

Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

120

SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

http://www.nnsa.energy.gov Office of Nuclear Weapon Surety and Quality http://www.nnsa.energy.gov Office of Nuclear Weapon Surety and Quality SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE Approved: 7-7-11 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF CONTROLS TO PREVENT DELIBERATE UNAUTHORIZED USE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Office of Defense Programs NA SD 452.4 NA SD 452.4 1 7-7-11 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF CONTROLS TO PREVENT DELIBERATE UNAUTHORIZED USE 1. PURPOSE. This NNSA Supplemental Directive (SD) supports the requirements of DOE O 452.4B, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons. Specifically, this SD supports the Order's requirements to implement deliberate unauthorized use (DUU) preventive measures for nuclear explosive operations (NEO) and associated activities and to perform independent evaluations to determine if NEOs

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


121

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Kotter. 1994. Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Global Order,1981. Supply-Side Non-Proliferation. Foreign Policy 42:125-about Nuclear Non-Proliferation. International Affairs (

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

122

Report of a workshop on nuclear forces and nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC October 28, 2010  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A workshop sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was held at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on October 28, 2010. The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The discussions reflected the importance of the NPR for defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats and providing guidance for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) programs and, for many but not all participants, highlighted its role in the successful outcome of the NPT RevCon. There was widespread support for the NPR and its role in developing the foundations for a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. However, some participants raised concerns about its implementation and its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-12-08T23:59:59.000Z

123

Use of open source information and commercial satellite imagery for nuclear nonproliferation regime compliance verification by a community of academics  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to enhance the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared production of fissile materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to enhance the IAEA’s mission. The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these tools in academic community was developed. As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This community analyzes all types of unclassified publicly and commercially available information to aid in detection of violations of the non-proliferation regime. INMAC shares all of this information with the IAEA and the public. Since INMAC is composed solely by members of the academic community, this organization would not demonstrate any biases in its investigations or reporting.

Solodov, Alexander

2007-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

124

Nuclear weapons issues in South Asia  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report discusses how the US can play a productive mediating role in South Asia by engaging India and Pakistan in an international forum to manage nuclear weapons, as Edward Teller advocated. India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear capabilities because they fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten the US. The appropriate response for the US, therefore, is diplomatic engagement and negotiations. In addition to the international approach, encouragement and facilitation of regional and bilateral interactions will also be important. Formal arms control agreements have been reached, but less formal confidence-building measures, and unilateral security pledges may well be combined to form a more secure strategic environment in South Asia than a nuclear armed confrontation across the porous South Asian border.

Joeck, N.

1993-07-02T23:59:59.000Z

125

Evaluating Nonproliferation Bona Fides  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Anticipated growth of global nuclear energy in a difficult international security environment heightens concerns that states could decide to exploit their civilian nuclear fuel cycles as a means of acquiring nuclear weapons. Such concerns partly reflect a fundamental tension in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the one hand, Articles II and III of the NPT clearly prohibit each non-nuclear-weapon state party from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Article IV of the NPT confers the “inalienable right” of Parties to the treaty to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…,” and directs all Parties to “facilitate… the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…,” and “cooperate in contributing…to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes….” This juxtaposition raises the possibility that a state could exercise its Article IV right to develop a civilian nuclear fuels cycle and then use the equipment, materials and technology to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of its Article II and III obligations.

Seward, Amy M.; Mathews, Caroline E.; Kessler, Carol E.

2008-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

126

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities.This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues More Documents & Publications Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 00-03: Specific Issues on Applicability of

127

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities. This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues More Documents & Publications Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 00-03: Specific Issues on Applicability of

128

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities. This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues More Documents & Publications Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Enforcement Guidance Supplement 00-03: Specific Issues on Applicability of

129

Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat of proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.

Leek, K. M.

2006-07-31T23:59:59.000Z

130

U.N. report concludes that Syrian site destroyed in 2007 was a nuclear reactor  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). Prevent the spread of nuclear weaponsPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Plan to dismantle US arsenal and eliminate nuclear weapons (1953). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

131

Nuclear power and nuclear-weapons proliferation  

SciTech Connect

Concern over the risk of nuclear proliferation has led to extensive reexamination of the technical, economic, and political assumptions underlying both national and international nuclear policies. An attempt is made in the present article to clarify the basic technical and political issues. The connections between various fuel cycles and their possible proliferation risks are discussed. As the resolution of the existing differing views on proliferation risks will be largely a political process, solutions to the problem are not proposed. (JSR)

Moniz, E.J.; Neff, T.L.

1978-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

132

A thousand suns : political motivations for nuclear weapons testing  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Nuclear weapon testing is the final step in the nuclear development process, an announcement of ability and strength. The consequences of a nuclear test are far from easy to bear, however: economic sanctions can be crippling ...

Raas, Whitney

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

133

National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Workers National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers Third Radiation Effects Research Foundation Board of Councilors Meeting Held in Hiroshima...

134

EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Act of 1988. The following case examples are provided to help illustrate how PAAA NTS reporting interfaces with nuclear weapon program NCR processes: Example 1: A reservoir...

135

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01, Nuclear Weapon Program...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Act of 1988. The following case examples are provided to help illustrate how PAAA NTS reporting interfaces with nuclear weapon program NCR processes: Example 1: A reservoir...

136

DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives "DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship" FOR...

137

DOE O 452.8, Control of Nuclear Weapon Data  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

The directive establishes the policy, process and procedures for control of nuclear weapon data to ensure that dissemination of the information is restricted ...

2011-07-21T23:59:59.000Z

138

Securing special nuclear material: Recent advances in neutron detection and their role in nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Neutrondetection is an integral part of the global effort to prevent the proliferation of special nuclear material (SNM). Applications relying on neutron-detection technology range from traditional nuclear nonproliferation objectives

R. C. Runkle; A. Bernstein; P. E. Vanier

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

139

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

McMakin, Andrea H.

2012-08-20T23:59:59.000Z

140

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume I. Program summary  

SciTech Connect

This report summarizes the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP): its background, its studies, and its results. The introductory chapter traces the growth of the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and the organization and objectives of NASAP. Chapter 2 summarizes the program's assessments, findings, and recommendations. Each of Volumes II-VII reports on an individual assessment (Volumn II: Proliferation Resistance; Volume III: Resources and Fuel Cycle Facilities; Volume IV: Commercial Potential; Volume V: Economics and Systems Analysis; Volume VI: Safety and Environmental Considerations for Licensing; Volume VII: International Perspectives). Volume VIII (Advanced Concepts) presents a combined assessment of several less fully developed concepts, and Volume IX (Reactor and Fuel Cycle Descriptions) provides detailed descriptions of the reactor and fuel-cycle systems studied by NASAP.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


141

Nuclear nonproliferation and safety: Challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency  

SciTech Connect

The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Govermental Affairs asked the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the safeguards and nuclear power plant safety programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This report examines (1) the effectiveness of IAEA`s safeguards program and the adequacy of program funding, (2) the management of U.S. technical assistance to the IAEA`s safeguards program, and (3) the effectiveness of IAEA`s program for advising United Nations (UN) member states about nuclear power plant safety and the adequacy of program funding. Under its statute and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA is mandated to administer safeguards to detect diversions of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses. Because of limits on budget growth and unpaid contributions, IAEA has had difficulty funding the safeguards program. IAEA also conducts inspections of facilities or locations containing declared nuclear material, and manages a program for reviewing the operational safety of designated nuclear power plants. The U.S. technical assistance program for IAEA safeguards, overseen by an interagency coordinating committee, has enhanced the agency`s inspection capabilities, however, some weaknesses still exist. Despite financial limitations, IAEA is meeting its basic safety advisory responsibilities for advising UN member states on nuclear safety and providing requested safety services. However, IAEA`s program for reviewing the operational safety of nuclear power plants has not been fully effective because the program is voluntary and UN member states have not requested IAEA`s review of all nuclear reactors with serious problems. GAO believes that IAEA should have more discretion in selecting reactors for review.

Not Available

1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

142

Source options for nuclear weapons identification system  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report briefly presents the advantages and disadvantages of two timed sources of neutrons that can be used with the source-driven noise analysis method: (1) {sup 252}Cf in an ionization chamber and (2) an associated-particle sealed tube neutron generator (APSTNG). These sources can be used with frequency and time analysis methods for nuclear weapons identification, quality assurance in production, special nuclear materials assay, criticality safety, and provision of measured data for verification of neutron and gamma ray transport calculational methods. The advantages of {sup 252}Cf for a nuclear materials identification system are that it is simple, reliable, and small and that all source events are detected. The disadvantages are that it cannot be turned off, leads to small radiation doses in handling, and produces more than one neutron per fission event. The advantages of APSTNG are that it is directional, can be turned off, and has one particle per deuterium-tritium reaction. The disadvantages are that it is large and complicated compared to {sup 252}Cf.

Mihalczo, J.T.; Koehler, P.E.; Valentine, T.E.; Phillips, L.D.

1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

143

A Role for Industry in Promoting Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation  

SciTech Connect

Industry has a unique opportunity and critical role to play in strengthening governmental efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear, radiological, and dual-use materials and technologies that could be used in a nuclear or radiological weapon. Governmental regulations and policies are in effect at both the national and international levels to inhibit access to such materials and technologies by illegitimate end-users. However, the discovery of an illegal nuclear network, spearheaded by Pakistani scientist A Q Khan, increased international concern about what more could be done to prevent proliferation. Industry is well-poised and has a strong incentive to take a more proactive role to complement existing governmental efforts. Companies can be a tremendous help in ensuring that illicit diversions do not occur by increasing their oversight over the supply chain.

Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.; Elkhamri, Oksana O.

2009-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

144

Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP Posted By Office of Public Affairs Participants in Sandia's Weapon Intern Program recently visited and

145

U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

146

Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support | U.S. DOE Office of  

Office of Science (SC) Website

Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) NBL Home About Programs Certified Reference Materials Program Measurement Evaluation Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support Measurement Services Measurement Development Training Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) Training Categorical Exclusion Determinations News Contact Information New Brunswick Laboratory U.S. Department of Energy Building 350 9800 South Cass Avenue Argonne, IL 60439-4899 P: (630) 252-2442 (NBL) P: (630) 252-2767 (CRM sales) F: (630) 252-6256 E: usdoe.nbl@ch.doe.gov Programs Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support Print Text Size: A A A RSS Feeds FeedbackShare Page New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is owned and operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). NBL is the U.S. Government's Certifying Authority for

147

Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclearnonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facilitymodeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facilitymodeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facilitymodelingcapabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferationanalysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facilitymodeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facilitymodelingcapabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Burr, Tom [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Gorensek, M. B. [Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL); Krebs, John [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL); Kress, Reid L [ORNL; Lamberti, Vincent [Y-12 National Security Complex; Schoenwald, David [ORNL; Ward, Richard C [ORNL

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

148

Changing Perspectives on Nonproliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycles  

SciTech Connect

The concepts of international control over technologies and materials in the proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, specifically those related to enrichment and reprocessing, have been the subject of many studies and initiatives over the years. For examples: the International Fissionable Material Storage proposal in President Eisenhower's Speech on Atoms for Peace, and in the Charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) when the organization was formed in 1957; the regional nuclear fuel cycle center centers proposed by INFCE in the 80's; and most recently and notably, proposals by Dr. ElBaradei, the Director General of IAEA to limit production and processing of nuclear weapons usable materials to facilities under multinational control; and by U.S. President George W. Bush, to limit enrichment and reprocessing to States that have already full scale, functioning plants. There are other recent proposals on this subject as well. In this paper, the similarities and differences, as well as the effectiveness and challenges in proliferation prevention of these proposals and concepts will be discussed. The intent is to articulate a ''new nuclear regime'' and to develop concrete steps to implement such regime for future nuclear energy and deployment.

Choi, J; Isaacs, T H

2005-03-29T23:59:59.000Z

149

Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Collaboration Following Russian Delegation Visit to the United States Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Collaboration Following Russian Delegation Visit to the United States December 10, 2013 - 2:30pm Addthis News Media Contact (202) 586-4940 U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and State Corporation for Nuclear Energy (Rosatom) Director General Sergey Kirienko today held talks in Washington, D.C., about the future of U.S.-Russia collaborative work in the nuclear energy field, including nuclear research and development, commercial aspects of cooperation, nuclear safety, and nonproliferation. The meeting coincided with the arrival of the final shipment of low

150

U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff, "Assessment Report: Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons-Related Security Oversight Process," March 1998  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

August 5, 1977 DOE, "Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization from 1944 Through 1994 GAO/RCED-92-39, "Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE's Weapons Facilities," December 13, 1991 GAO/RCED/AIMD-95-5, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities are Limited," December 27, 1994 GAO/AIMD-95-165, "Department of Energy: Poor Management of Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities Are Limited," August 3, 1995 Classified DOE report.

Gao Rced- Major

1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

151

Tiny device can detect hidden nuclear weapons, materials  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Tiny Tiny device can detect hidden nuclear weapons, materials Director's Welcome Organization Achievements Highlights Fact Sheets, Brochures & Other Documents Multimedia Library About Nuclear Energy Nuclear Reactors Designed by Argonne Argonne's Nuclear Science and Technology Legacy Opportunities within NE Division Visit Argonne Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE on Flickr Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of Chicago Pile 1 (CP-1) Argonne OutLoud on Nuclear Energy Argonne Energy Showcase 2012 Highlights Bookmark and Share Tiny device can detect hidden nuclear weapons, materials This tiny wafer can detect hidden nuclear weapons and materials NUCLEAR DETECTOR -- This small wafer could become the key component in

152

An assessment of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

In February of 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear weapons test. Speculations are that this test was conducted to further develop a warhead small enough to fit on an intercontinental ballistic missile. This test ...

Sivels, Ciara (Ciara Brooke)

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

153

Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Test Site, Volume I Terrence R. Fehner and F.G. Gosling. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I (pdf)....

154

Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

located in closed cities. In some cases, these industrial sites are the size of small cities and contain hundreds of metric tons of highly attractive weapons-usable nuclear...

155

Briefing, Classification of Nuclear Weapons-Related Information- June 2012  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

This brief will familiarize individuals from agencies outside of DOE who may come in contact with RD and FRD with the procedures for identifying, classifying, marking, handling, and declassifying documents containing Nuclear Weapons-Related Information.

156

DOE O 452.4B, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety ...

2010-01-22T23:59:59.000Z

157

Rethinking the Offer: The Impact on Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Providing North Korea or Iran with Light Water Reactors.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??This paper examines the impact on nuclear non-proliferation efforts of providing the DPRK and Iran with light water reactors (LWRs). I argue that LWRs in… (more)

Lee, Eun Joo

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

158

The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000  

SciTech Connect

This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

Not Available

1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

159

Bombs Versus Budgets: Inside the Nuclear Weapons Lobby  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The battle over deficits and defense has focused attention on the costs of nuclear weapons. Estimates of the full costs of nuclear weapons-related activities are hotly debated, but there is no question that they will reach hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade. At a time of tight budgets, there is a real possibility that some of the systems and facilities described so far could be reduced, delayed, or cancelled outright. For example, former Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright noted in July 2011, “The challenge here is that we have to re-capitalize all three legs [of the nuclear triad], and we don’t have the money to do it. ” That same month, General Robert Kehler, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, asserted, “We’re not going to be able to go forward with weapon systems that cost what weapon systems cost today.” This report provides a profile of the nuclear weapons lobby, noting along the way that in a constrained budgetary environment different parts of the lobby may either collaborate to promote higher nuclear weapons spending or compete for their share of a shrinking pie. An Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN), slated to be replaced by a Next Generation Sub.

D. Hartung; Christine Anderson

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

160

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


161

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

162

SRS - Programs - Nonproliferation Programs  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

3/2012 3/2012 SEARCH GO spacer SRS Home Nonproliferation Programs In the crucial field of nuclear nonproliferation, SRS employee contributions helped to advance all three of the planned plutonium disposition facilities at the Savannah River Site: the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF); Waste Solidification Building (WSB); and the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. A $345 million project, the WSB will process liquid waste from the MOX facility. After material is processed at the WSB, transuranic waste will be packaged and sent to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, and low-level waste will be packaged and sent to onsite or commercial off-site low-level waste disposal facilities. The mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility will be a major component in the United States' program to dispose of excess weapons grade plutonium.

163

Interdicting a Nuclear-Weapons Project  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A “proliferator” seeks to complete a first small batch of fission weapons as quickly as possible, whereas an “interdictor” wishes to delay that completion for as long as possible. We develop and solve a max-min model that identifies ... Keywords: CPM, defense, foreign policy, government, integer, linear, military, programming, project management, targeting

Gerald G. Brown; W. Matthew Carlyle; Robert C. Harney; Eric M. Skroch; R. Kevin Wood

2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

164

DOE O 452.6A, Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of Defense  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This Order establishes Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration requirements and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon ...

2009-05-14T23:59:59.000Z

165

Weapon Detonation Forensics | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

166

Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM,  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM, DOE O 452.2D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM, DOE O 452.2D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY "To prevent accidents and inadvertent or unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives. In conjunction with the Department of Defense (DoD), to protect the public health and safety by providing dual-agency judgment and responsibility for the safety, security, and use control (surety) of nuclear weapons. To establish nuclear explosive surety standards and nuclear weapon design surety requirements. To address surety vulnerabilities during all phases of the nuclear weapon life cycle and to upgrade surety during weapon stockpile refurbishments and/or new weapon

167

Nuclear nonproliferation: Concerns with US delays in accepting foregin research reactors` spent fuel  

SciTech Connect

One key US nonproliferation goal is to discourage use of highly enriched uranium fuel (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear bombs, in civilian nuclear programs worldwide. DOE`s Off-Site Fuels Policy for taking back spent HEU from foreign research reactors was allowed to expire due to environmental reasons. This report provides information on the effects of delays in renewing the Off-Site Fuels Policy on US nonproliferation goals and programs (specifically the reduced enrichment program), DOE`s efforts to renew the fuels policy, and the price to be charged to the operators of foreign reactors for DOE`s activities in taking back spent fuel.

1994-03-25T23:59:59.000Z

168

Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings  

SciTech Connect

The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

Not Available

1992-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

169

National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program Workers October 28, 2013 - 3:11pm Addthis Color Guard | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Color Guard | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 US Representative Dina Titus (1st Congressional District of Nevada) | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 US Representative Dina Titus (1st Congressional District of Nevada) | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Mr. Al Tseu | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Mr. Al Tseu | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013 Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Chief Health Safety and Security Officer | National Day of Remembrance - October 25, 2013

170

U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons May 10, 1992 Washington, DC U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons

171

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

2002. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. 2nd2003. North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S.Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, edited by C. F.

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

172

Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives  

SciTech Connect

This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

173

Radiations from nuclear weapons - signal detectors - NASA program information  

SciTech Connect

This letter is for the purpose of supplying the information that you requested at the meeting of the sub-committee on Project Vela. It is divided into three parts: (1) Radiations from nuclear weapons; (2) Backgrounds for Vela Signal Detectors; (3) Discussion of the NASA program.

White, R. S.

1960-02-10T23:59:59.000Z

174

An analysis of technical and policy drivers in Current U.S. nuclear weapons force structure  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

U.S. nuclear weapons force structure accounts for the number and types of strategic and nonstrategic weapon systems in various locations that comprise the nuclear arsenal. While exact numbers, locations, and detailed designs ...

Baker, Amanda, S. B. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

175

The Association between Cancers and Low Level Radiation: an evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

and Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant. Rad Res 1989;120:19-Evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility MASTERAT T H E HANFORD NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITY JULIE BRITTON

Britton, Julie

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

176

Environmental Restoration Strategic Plan. Remediating the nuclear weapons complex  

SciTech Connect

With the end of the cold war, the US has a reduced need for nuclear weapons production. In response, the Department of Energy has redirected resources from weapons production to weapons dismantlement and environmental remediation. To this end, in November 1989, the US Department of Energy (DOE) established the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (renamed the Office of Environmental Management in 1994). It was created to bring under a central authority the management of radioactive and hazardous wastes at DOE sites and inactive or shut down facilities. The Environmental Restoration Program, a major component of DOE`s Environmental Management Program, is responsible for the remediation and management of contaminated environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater, sediments) and the decommissioning of facilities and structures at 130 sites in over 30 states and territories.

1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

177

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

178

President Obama Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > President Obama Calls for an End to ... President Obama Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons April 05, 2009 Prague, Czech Republic President Obama Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons

179

Examination of the proposed conversion of the U.S. Navy nuclear fleet from highly enriched Uranium to low enriched Uranium  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

.The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons creates a loophole that allows a non-nuclear-weapon country to avoid international safeguards governing fissile materials if it claims that the materials will be used ...

McCord, Cameron (Cameron Liam)

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

180

2010 Annual Planning Summary for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Annual Planning Summary for National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center (NNSA-SC) 2010 Annual Planning Summary for Nuclear Energy (NE) Energy.gov Careers & Internships...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


181

Impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on strategic stability  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This presentation is to discuss the impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on the strategic stability. Methodologies used to study strategic stability issues include what are basically strategic-force exchange models. These models are used to simulate a massive nuclear exchange in which one side attacks and the other side retaliates. These models have been of interest to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Researchers have been looking at issues concerning the stability of the transition period, during which some defenses have been deployed and during which deterrence and war-fighting capability reply partly on defense and partly on offense. Also, more recently, with interest in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and force reductions beyond START, the same calculation engines have been used to examine the impact of reduced forces on strategic stability. For both the SDI and the START reduction cases, exchange models are able to address only a rather narrow class of strategic stability issues. Other broader stability questions that are unrelated to nuclear weapons or that relate to nuclear weapons but are not addressed by the calculational tools which are not included in this discussion. 6 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab. (BN)

Chrzanowski, P.

1991-03-20T23:59:59.000Z

182

EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Enforcement Guidance Supplement Enforcement Guidance Supplement EGS:01-01 Appendix E-Operational Procedures for Enforcement Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 October 15, 2001 MEMORANDUM FOR: DOE PAAA COORDINATORS CONTRACTOR PAAA COORDINATORS FROM: R. KEITH CHRISTOPHER DIRECTOR OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION SUBJECT: Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement activities. This enforcement guidance focuses on the applicability of 10 CFR Part 830 to nuclear weapon programs and several related enforcement issues.

183

Use of commercial manipulator to handle a nuclear weapon component  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has developed a manipulator workcell to load and unload nuclear weapon pit assemblies from a cart. To develop this workcell, PNL procured a commercially available manipulator, equipped it with force-sensing and vision equipment, and developed manipulator control software. Manipulator workcell development demonstrated that commercially available manipulator systems can successfully perform this task if the appropriate manipulator is selected and the manipulator workcell tooling and software are carefully designed.

Baker, C.P.

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

184

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Primer Prepared for the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

To provide a brief overview of key arms control and nonproliferation arrangements for the layperson that may be relevant to the Commission's comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Primer would be published by the Commission and made publicly available, probably as an appendix to a larger Commission report.

Williams, Laura S.

2011-05-25T23:59:59.000Z

185

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICE APPROACHES: ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION MERITS OF NUCLEAR FUEL LEASING  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The goal of international nuclear policy since the dawn of nuclear power has been the peaceful expansion of nuclear energy while controlling the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Numerous initiatives undertaken in the intervening decades to develop international agreements on providing nuclear fuel supply assurances, or reliable nuclear fuel services (RNFS) attempted to control the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In order to inform the international debate and the development of government policy, PNNL has been developing an analytical framework to holistically evaluate the economics and non-proliferation merits of alternative approaches to managing the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., cradle-to-grave). This paper provides an overview of the analytical framework and discusses preliminary results of an economic assessment of one RNFS approach: full-service nuclear fuel leasing. The specific focus of this paper is the metrics under development to systematically evaluate the non-proliferation merits of fuel-cycle management alternatives. Also discussed is the utility of an integrated assessment of the economics and non-proliferation merits of nuclear fuel leasing.

Kreyling, Sean J.; Brothers, Alan J.; Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

2010-08-11T23:59:59.000Z

186

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Nuclear Weapons In a nuclear power plant, a nuclear reactionused for fuel in a nuclear power plant (Barnaby 1993). Theon converting nuclear power plants to fighting malaria with

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

187

Superconducting calorimetric alpha particle sensors for nuclear nonproliferation applications  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Identification of trace nuclear materials is usually accomplished by alpha spectrometry. Current detectors cannot distinguish critical elements and isotopes. We have developed a detector called a microcalorimeter

Robert D. Horansky; Joel N. Ullom; James A. Beall; Gene C. Hilton; Kent D. Irwin; Donald E. Dry; Elizabeth P. Hastings; Stephen P. Lamont; Clifford R. Rudy; Michael W. Rabin

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

188

The Los Alamos nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation technology development program  

SciTech Connect

For nearly three decades, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed and implemented nuclear measurement technology and training in support of national and international nuclear safeguards. This paper outlines the major elements of those technologies and highlights some of the latest developments.

Smith, H.A. Jr.; Menlove, H.O.; Reilly, T.D.; Bosler, G.E.; Hakkila, E.A.; Eccleston, G.W.

1994-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

189

Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

Saunders, Emily C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rowberry, Ariana N. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fearey, Bryan L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

190

A hazard separation system for dismantlement of nuclear weapon components  

SciTech Connect

Over the next decade, the US Department of Energy (DOE) must retire and dismantle many nuclear weapon systems. In support of this effort, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed the Hazard Separation System (HSS). The HSS combines abrasive waterjet cutting technology and real-time radiography. Using the HSS, operators determine the exact location of interior, hazardous sub-components and remove them through precision cutting. The system minimizes waste and maximizes the recovery of recyclable materials. During 1994, the HSS was completed and demonstrated. Weapon components processed during the demonstration period included arming, fusing, and firing units; preflight control units; neutron generator subassemblies; and x-units. Hazards removed included radioactive krytron tubes and gap tubes, thermal batteries, neutron generator tubes, and oil-filled capacitors. Currently, the HSS is being operated at SNL in a research and development mode to facilitate the transfer of the technology to other DOE facilities for support of their dismantlement operations.

Lutz, J.D.; Purvis, S.T.; Hospelhorn, R.L.; Thompson, K.R.

1995-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

191

Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations  

SciTech Connect

This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited. They are expected to anticipate and react quickly to prevent a potential threat while staying accountable to their public stakeholders, many of whom remain unaware of the very threats the organization is trying to address. When budgets are flush, it is easy to believe that money will solve all problems; but during times of economic hardship, managers must rely on creative and cost-effective management approaches to implement their missions. Fortunately, managers of nonproliferation organizations can draw on a wealth of research on organizational design and culture to help them identify the management strategies most appropriate for them. Such research can help nonproliferation managers think about their own organizational structures and cultures and adapt accepted management principles to their unique organizational mission. This analytical process is not straight forward, as some managers may find themselves taking risks that others might not take, such as making ostensibly risky investments for the common good, or supporting creative thinking to help mission accomplishment. Some management principles that are relatively straightforward for other organizations may be difficult to envision and implement in a nonproliferation organization. Therefore, the goal of this study is to help nonproliferation managers identify management principles that can be implemented in a nonproliferation organization and, in the process, help maximize the value of the organization's products and effectiveness of its mission.

Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

2012-03-06T23:59:59.000Z

192

LANL | Physics | Nuclear Weapons and Global Security Data Analysis  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Weapons and Global Security Data Analysis Nuclear Weapons and Global Security Data Analysis Physics Division applies advanced imaging techniques to many applications, from brain imaging to neutron imaging in inertial fusion to threat detection from airborne cameras. A particular strength is the quantitative analysis of penetrating radiography using techniques such as the Bayesian Inference Engine (BIE). An example from the Nuclear Event Analysis Team shows a test object (Figure 1) that is subsequently radiographed using the Dual-Axis Radiography Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility. Figures 2 and 3 show the radiograph and the inferred density of the object using the BIE, which can be compared to the known object to determine accurate error estimation. Test object Figure 1. The test object consists of a 1 cm-radius cavity void surrounded by a 4.5 cm radius surrogate fissile material of tungsten, tantalum, or depleted uranium. This sphere is surrounded by a 6.5 cm-radius copper sphere. At is thickest point, the tantalum test object has an areal density of 180 g/cm2, equivalent to 9" of steel.

193

Swords into Plowshares: Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement, Evaluation, and Maintenance at Pantex  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The end of the Cold War changed the missions of facilities in the US nuclear weapons complex. They ceased production of new weapons and focused on dismantling old weapons and maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of those remaining. The Pantex ... Keywords: Government--programs, Production/scheduling--planning

Edwin A. Kjeldgaard; Dean A. Jones; George F. List; Mark A. Turnquist; James W. Angelo; Richard D. Hopson; John Hudson; Terry Holeman

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

194

Development of the nuclear weapons complex EP architecture  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Nuclear Weapons Guidance Team is an interagency committee led by Earl Whiteman, DOE that chartered the generation of EP40100, Concurrent Qualification and its successor EP401099, Concurrent Engineering and Qualification. As this new philosophy of concurrent operations has evolved and as implementation has been initiated, conflicts and insufficiencies in the remaining Engineering Procedures (EPs) have become more apparent. At the Guidance Team meeting in November 1995, this issue was explored and several approaches were considered. It was concluded at this meeting, that a smaller set of interagency EPs described in a hierarchical system could provide the necessary interagency direction to support complex-wide implementation. This set consolidates many existing EP processes where consistency and commonality are critical to success of the extended enterprise. The Guidance Team subsequently chartered an interagency team to initiate development activity associated with the envisioned new EP set. This team had participation from seven Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) sites as well as DOE/AL and DP-14 (team members are acknowledged later in this report). Per the Guidance Team, this team, referred to as the Architecture Subcommittee, was to map out and define an EP Architecture for the interagency EPs, make recommendations regarding a more agile process for EP approval and suggest an aggressive timeline to develop the combined EPs. The Architecture Subcommittee was asked to brief their output at the February Guidance Team meeting. This SAND report documents the results of the Architecture Subcommittee`s recommendations.

Murray, C.; Halbleib, L.

1996-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

195

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress July 24, 2007 - 2:55pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC -U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman joined the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State in sending to Congress the Bush Administration's nuclear weapons strategy. This document not only describes the history of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, but reinforces how deterrence applies to present and future security threats, and what a nuclear stockpile of the 21st century will need to look like in order to meet those threats. The strategy emphasizes President Bush's goal of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons. It is consistent with the Moscow Treaty that sets U.S. and Russian

196

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress July 24, 2007 - 2:55pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC -U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman joined the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State in sending to Congress the Bush Administration's nuclear weapons strategy. This document not only describes the history of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, but reinforces how deterrence applies to present and future security threats, and what a nuclear stockpile of the 21st century will need to look like in order to meet those threats. The strategy emphasizes President Bush's goal of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons. It is consistent with the Moscow Treaty that sets U.S. and Russian

197

INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE ASPECTS OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST DEBRIS RECOVERY  

SciTech Connect

The formation of a collapse crater by underground nuclear explosions is described. Safety problems associated with the re-entry of underground nuclear explosion areas include cavity collapse, toxic gases, explosive gases, radioactive gases, radioactive core, and hazards from the movement of heavy equipment on unstable ground. Data irom television, geophones, and telemetered radiation detectors determine when radiation and toxic material surveys of the area can be made and drills can be used to obtain samples of the bubble crust for analysis. Hazards to persornel engaged in obtaining weapon debris samples are reviewed. Data are presented on the radiation dose received by personnel at the Nevada Test Site engaged in this work during 1962. (C.H.)

Wilcox, F.W.

1963-03-27T23:59:59.000Z

198

Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering...

199

Securing Special Nuclear Material: Recent Advances in Neutron Detection and Their Role in Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Neutron detection is an integral part of the global effort to prevent the proliferation of special nuclear material (SNM). Applications relying on neutron-detection technology range from traditional nuclear non-proliferation objectives, such as safeguarding nuclear material and verifying stockpile reductions, to the interdiction of SNM—a goal that has recently risen in priority to a level on par with traditional applications. Large multi-national programs targeting detection and safeguards have deployed radiation-detection assets across the globe. Alongside these deployments of commercially available technology, significant research and development efforts have been directed towards the creation of next-generation assets. While much of this development has focused on gamma-ray spectrometers, neutron-detection technology remains an important component of the global strategy because of the capability of neutrons to penetrate materials that readily absorb gamma rays and the unique multiplicity signatures offered by neutrons. One particularly acute technology-development challenge results from dwindling supplies of 3He, partially triggered by widespread deployment of high-efficiency systems for portal monitoring. Other emerging missions, such as the desire to detect SNM at greater standoff distances, have also stimulated neutron-detection technology development. In light of these needs for novel neutron-detection technologies, this manuscript reviews the signatures of neutrons emitted by SNM, the principles of neutron detection, and various strategies under investigation for detection in the context of nonproliferation.

Runkle, Robert C.; Bernstein, A.; Vanier, Peter

2010-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

200

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Weapons Reductions and Nuclear Security Cooperation. Sarov,of Foreign Nuclear Installations: National Security Archive.Past: Nuclear Proliferation and American Security Policy.

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


201

Nonproliferation & Forensics | Argonne National Laboratory  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation & Nuclear Forensics Argonne strives to strengthen the nation's ability to detect, prevent, and interdict proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and...

202

Nuclear Surety This revisiono Implements DOD Directive 5210.42, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

o Updates the responsibilities to reflect the fact that the Army no longer has custody of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems (para 1-4). o Designates the DCSOPS (DAMO-SS) as approval authority for waivers and exceptions to policy requirements and reclamas to nuclear surety inspections o Deletes the requirement that commanders with nuclear surety missions establish a nuclear surety board, making it an optional requirement as determined by the commander; and retains guidance on the functioning of a surety board to assist commanders who want to establish one (para 1-6). o Deletes guidance on Physical Security and Survivability. AR 190-54 now covers applicable physical security requirements at Army nuclear reactor facilities (chap 2). o Reorganizes the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), to more closely follow the sequence of events in certifying an individual into and out of the PRP

unknown authors

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

203

Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

Dombey, Norman

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

204

Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

NONE

1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

205

Abdus Salam: A Reappraisal. Part II Salam's Part in the Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Programme  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Salam's biographies claim that he was opposed to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. This is somewhat strange given that he was the senior Science Advisor to the Pakistan government for at least some of the period between 1972 when the programme was initiated and 1998 when a successful nuclear weapon test was carried out. I look at the evidence for his participation in the programme.

Norman Dombey

2011-12-10T23:59:59.000Z

206

A quantitative assessment of nuclear weapons proliferation risk utilizing probabilistic methods  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

A comparative quantitative assessment is made of the nuclear weapons proliferation risk between various nuclear reactor/fuel cycle concepts using a probabilistic method. The work presented details quantified proliferation ...

Sentell, Dennis Shannon, 1971-

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

207

Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World | National  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World | National Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Fact Sheets > Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a ... Fact Sheet Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World Jan 2, 2009 The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has several missions

208

Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Participants in Sandia's Weapon Intern Program recently visited and toured NNSA's Kansas City Plant. The program, established in 1998, was created to meet Sandia's changing mission...

209

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IV. Commercial potential  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This volume of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) report provides time and cost estimates for positioning new nuclear power systems for commercial deployment. The assessment also estimates the rates at which the new systems might penetrate the domestic market, assuming the continuing viability of the massive light-water reactor network that now exists worldwide. This assessment does not recommend specific, detailed program plans and budgets for individual systems; however, it is clear from this analysis that any of the systems investigated could be deployed if dictated by national interest.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

210

Improving the nuclear data base for non-proliferation and homeland security  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Many of the technical advances in non-proliferation and homeland security require calculations of transport of neutrons and gamma-rays through materials. The nuclear data base on which these calculations are made must be of high quality in order for the calculated responses to be credible. At the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, three spallation neutron sources are being used to provide high-quality cross section and structure data with reactions induced by neutrons. Neutron transmission, neutron-induced fission and capture cross sections, neutron emission in fission, and gamma-ray production by neutrons are principal areas of research. Furthermore, these sources are also being used to validate calculations of the characterization and response of new detectors and detection techniques. Current research activities are summarized here.

Haight, Robert C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bitteker, Leo J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Couture, Aaron J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Devlin, Matthew J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fotiadis, Nikolaos [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Gavron, Avigdor [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hill, Tony S [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Laptev, Alexander B [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Nelson, Ronald O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; O'donnell, John M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Taddeucci, Terry N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tovesson, Fredrik K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ulmann, John L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wender, Stephen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

211

Fourth generation nuclear weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects, Report ISRI-05-03  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons range, greatly enhanced coupling to targets, possibility to drive powerful shaped-charge jets and forged fragments, enhanced prompt radiation effects, reduced collateral damage and residual radioactivity, etc.

Andre Gsponer

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

212

DETERMINATION OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF NONPROLIFERATION FACTORS  

SciTech Connect

Methodologies to determine the proliferation resistance (PR) of nuclear facilities often rely on either expert elicitation, a resource-intensive approach without easily reproducible results, or numeric evaluations, which can fail to take into account the institutional knowledge and expert experience of the nonproliferation community. In an attempt to bridge the gap and bring the institutional knowledge into numeric evaluations of PR, a survey was conducted of 33 individuals to find the relative importance of a set of 62 nonproliferation factors, subsectioned into groups under the headings of Diversion, Transportation, Transformation, and Weaponization. One third of the respondents were self-described nonproliferation professionals, and the remaining two thirds were from secondary professions related to nonproliferation, such as industrial engineers or policy analysts. The factors were taken from previous work which used multi-attribute utility analysis with uniform weighting of attributes and did not include institutional knowledge. In both expert and non-expert groups, all four headings and the majority of factors had different relative importance at a confidence of 95% (p=0.05). This analysis and survey demonstrates that institutional knowledge can be brought into numeric evaluations of PR, if there is a sufficient investment of resources made prior to the evaluation.

Richard Metcalf

2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

213

Quality at Y-12, part 3 -- Or: Quality goes beyond nuclear weapons...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

at Y-12, part 3 Or: Quality goes beyond nuclear weapons (title as it appeared in The Oak Ridger) As we continue our look at the history of Quality at Y-12, Bud Leete, Y-12...

214

A system for the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material aboard cargo cotainerships  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

A new approach to the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material aboard cargo containerships is proposed. The ship-based approach removes the constraints of current thinking by addressing the threat of ...

Gallagher, Shawn P., S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

215

Proceedings: 17th Asilomar conference on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclear weapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

Hickman, R.G.; Meier, C.A. (eds.) [eds.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

216

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young Professionals to Careers in Nonproliferation and National Security | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission...

217

Virtual enterprise model for the electronic components business in the Nuclear Weapons Complex  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The electronic components business within the Nuclear Weapons Complex spans organizational and Department of Energy contractor boundaries. An assessment of the current processes indicates a need for fundamentally changing the way electronic components are developed, procured, and manufactured. A model is provided based on a virtual enterprise that recognizes distinctive competencies within the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at the vendors. The model incorporates changes that reduce component delivery cycle time and improve cost effectiveness while delivering components of the appropriate quality.

Ferguson, T.J.; Long, K.S.; Sayre, J.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hull, A.L. [Sandia National Labs., Livermore, CA (United States); Carey, D.A.; Sim, J.R.; Smith, M.G. [Allied-Signal Aerospace Co., Kansas City, MO (United States). Kansas City Div.

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

218

Nuclear non-proliferation regime effectiveness : an integrated methodology for analyzing highly enriched uranium production scenarios at gas centrifuge enrichment plants  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The dramatic change in the international security environment after the collapse of the bipolar system has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the success ...

Kwak, Taeshin (Taeshin S.)

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

219

Comparison of chemical and nuclear explosions: Numerical simulations of the Non-Proliferation Experiment  

SciTech Connect

In this paper the authors discuss numerical simulations of the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), which was an underground explosion conducted in September 1993 in the volcanic tuff of the Nevada Test Site. The NPE source consisted of 1.29 {times} 10{sup 6} kg of ANFO-emulsion blasting agent, with the approximate energy of 1.1 kt, emplaced 389 m beneath the surface of Rainier Mesa. The authors compare detailed numerical simulations of the NPE with data collected from that experiment, and with calculations of an equally energetic nuclear explosion in identical geology. Calculated waveforms, at ranges out to approximately 1 km, agree moderately well in the time domain with free-field data, and are in qualitative agreement with free-surface records. Comparison of computed waveforms for equally energetic chemical and nuclear sources reveals relatively minor differences beyond the immediate near-source region, with the chemical source having an {approximately}25% greater seismic moment but otherwise indistinguishable (close-in) seismic source properties. 41 refs., 67 figs., 7 tabs.

Kamm, J.R.; Bos, R.J.

1995-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

220

Preliminary Results from an Investigation into Nanostructured Nuclear Radiation Detectors for Non-Proliferation Applications  

SciTech Connect

In recent years, the concept of embedding composite scintillators consisting of nanosized inorganic crystals in an organic matrix has been actively pursued. Nanocomposite detectors have the potential to meet many of the homeland security, non-proliferation, and border and cargo-screening needs of the nation and, by virtue of their superior nuclear identification capability over plastic, at roughly the same cost as plastic, have the potential to replace all plastic detectors. Nanocomposites clearly have the potential of being a gamma ray detection material that would be sensitive yet less expensive and easier to produce on a large scale than growing large, whole crystals of similar sensitivity. These detectors would have a broad energy range and a sufficient energy resolution to perform isotopic identification. The material can also be fabricated on an industrial scale, further reducing cost. This investigation focused on designing and fabricating prototype core/shell and quantum dot (QD) detectors. Fourteen core/shell and four QD detectors, all with the basic consistency of a mixture of nanoparticles in a polymer matrix with different densities of nanoparticles, were prepared. Nanoparticles with sizes <10 nm were fabricated, embedded in a polystyrene matrix, and the resultant scintillators’ radiation detector properties were characterized. This work also attempted to extend the gamma energy response on both low- and high-energy regimes by demonstrating the ability to detect low-energy and high-energy gamma rays. Preliminary results of this investigation are consistent with a significant response of these materials to nuclear radiation.

,

2012-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


221

Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead ... Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program January 19, 1975

222

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

especially as regards nuclear security. Priority efforts inits role in improving nuclear security. It will be essentialin dealing with nuclear security and safety matters. |=j NEW

May, Michael M

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

223

Proliferation concerns in the Russian closed nuclear weapons complex cities : a study of regional migration behavior.  

SciTech Connect

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of the weapons stockpile. The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, closed nuclear weapons complex cities. Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge proliferation. This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six of which contain the ten closed nuclear weapons complex cities. This study finds that the presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration. However, the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities. Further, these results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across time. Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and societal factors became significant in later years. Two significant policy conclusions are derived from this research. First, higher levels of income are found to increase outmigration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive. Second, this study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of potential proliferants.

Flores, Kristen Lee

2004-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

224

Free-field ground motions for the nonproliferation experiment: Preliminary comparisons with nearby nuclear events  

SciTech Connect

Since 1987, we have installed fixed arrays of tri-axial accelerometers in the fire-field near the shot horizons for low-yield ({le} 20 kt) nuclear events in the N-tunnel complex beneath Rainier Mesa. For the Nonproliferation Experiment (NPE) we augmented the array to achieve 23 free-field stations. Goals are: (a) to examine robustness and stability of various free-field source function estimates -- e.g., reduced displacement potentials (RDP) and spectra; (b) to compare close-in with regional estimates to test whether detailed close-in free-field and/or surface ground motion data can improve predictability of regional-teleseismic source functions; (c) to provide experimental data for checking two-dimensional numerical simulations. We report preliminary comparisons between experimental free-field data for NPE (1993) and three nearby nuclear events (MISTY ECHO, 1988; MINERAL QUARRY, 1990; HUNTERS TROPHY, 1992). All four working points are within 1 km of each other in the same wet tuff bed, thus reducing concerns about possible large differences in material properties between widely separated shots. Initial comparison of acceleration and velocity seismograms for the four events reveals: (1) There is a large departure from the spherical symmetry commonly assumed in analytic treatments of source theory; both vertical and tangential components are surprisingly large. (2) All shots show similar first-peak particle-velocity amplitude decay rates suggesting significant attenuation even in the supposedly purely elastic region. (3) Sharp (>20 Hz) arrivals are not observed at tunnel level from near-surface pP reflections or spall-closure sources -- but broadened peaks are seen that suggest more diffuse reflected energy from the surface and from the Paleozoic limestone basement below tunnel level.

Olsen, K.H.; Peratt, A.L.

1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

225

Nuclear Detonation Detection | National Nuclear Security Administratio...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices > Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development > Nuclear Detonation Detection Nuclear Detonation Detection Develop, Demonstrate, and...

226

Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

70th anniversary lecture 70th anniversary lecture Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of next 70th anniversary lecture Lab's role in the development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War period will be discussed by Byron Ristvet of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. September 5, 2013 This photograph captures the expanding fireball of the world's first full-scale hydrogen bomb test, Ivy-Mike, which was conducted Oct. 31, 1952. This photograph captures the expanding fireball of the world's first full-scale hydrogen bomb test, Ivy-Mike, which was conducted Oct. 31, 1952. Contact Steve Sandoval Communications Office (505) 665-9206 Email "Los Alamos National Laboratory's role in conjunction with the Department of Defense in meeting this challenge with new nuclear weapon

227

Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

Darby, John L.

2011-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

228

U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation Project  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation Project with Kazakhstan U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation Project with Kazakhstan September 29, 2006 - 9:01am Addthis Agreement Reached To Downblend HEU and Convert Reactor WASHINGTON, D.C. - The U.S. Department of Energy and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) today announced that they have reached an important agreement-in-principle with the Government of Kazakhstan to move forward with the down-blending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) currently stored at Kazakhstan's Institute of Nuclear Physics. The agreement also calls for the conversion of the VVR-K research reactor to operate on low enriched uranium fuel instead of HEU, which can be used in nuclear weapons. The

229

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

reactor or India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests) or commendnuclear weapons programs in Argentina, Brazil, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan,nuclear program led to India’s which in turn led to Pakistan’

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

230

Who’s Watching the Nuclear Watchdog? A Critique of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This EnergyScience Briefing Paper raises serious concerns regarding the competence and professionalism of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO). ASNO’s mission, to prevent nuclear proliferation dangers associated with Australia’s uranium exports, is a task vital to the long-term security of Australians and all people. This paper details a large number of statements made by ASNO which are false or misleading. The evidence compiled raises critical questions of good governance, and leads inescapably to the conclusion that the safeguards on Australian uranium which ASNO is responsible for implementing are deeply flawed both in their design and in their execution.

Richard Broinowski; Tilman Ruff; Alan Roberts; Jim Green

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

231

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, supported by the European Parliament, that the implementing decision on the non-proliferation of small arms combina- tions 1. Introduction Soon after the Treaty of Maastricht had created the so-called three-pillar structure of the Union, the question arose of which part of the EU Treaty those decisions had to be based

Gilfoyle, Jerry

232

The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

Garaizar, X

2010-01-06T23:59:59.000Z

233

Turning a Nuclear Spotlight on Illegal Weapons Material  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... research neutron source, which bathes material samples with low-energy neutrons. ... count acts as a unique signature of special nuclear material. ...

2013-09-12T23:59:59.000Z

234

Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

against both internal and external threat scenarios. OWMP is also oversees sustainability efforts at a number of nuclear sites in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and...

235

Revised ROD for FEIS on Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

720 720 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 144 / Thursday, July 25, 1996 / Notices 1995 (44 U. S. C. Chapter 35) requires that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provide interested Federal agencies and the public an early opportunity to comment on information collection requests. OMB may amend or waive the requirement for public consultation to the extent that public participation in the approval process would defeat the purpose of the information collection, violate State or Federal law, or substantially interfere with any agency's ability to perform its statutory obligations. The Director of the Information Resources Group publishes this notice containing proposed information collection requests prior to submission of these requests to OMB. Each proposed information collection,

236

Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the inherent danger of diminishing or dismissing lower-level threats in exchange for enhanced focus on high priority special nuclear materials with the basis for this emphasis being solely on the magnitude of the consequences of a single event. Mitigating all possible or likely terrorist attacks is impossible; however, weaponized sources, in the form of a radiological dispersal device, have been a declared target material of Al-Qaida. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative promoted the spread of the paradoxical beneficial yet destructive properties of the atom. Typically, the focus of nonproliferation efforts focuses on the fissile materials associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, with less emphasis on radioactive materials that could be used for a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Most nonproliferation policy discussion involves securing or preventing the diversion of weapons grade fissile materials (uranium (U) with concentration of over 90% of the isotope {sup 235}U (HEU) and plutonium with more than 90% of the isotope {sup 239}Pu), with scant attention given to the threat posed by a prolific quantity of sources spread worldwide. Further acerbating the problem of inattention, it appears that the momentum of the continued evolution in the beneficial applications of sources will only increase in the near future. Several expert studies have demonstrated on the potentially devastating economic, psychological and public health impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or radiation emitting device (ROD/RED) in a metropolis. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the radioactive material to the technical knowledge needed to fashion it into an ROD, is many orders of magnitude easier than diverting enough fissile material for and fabrication/acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, worldwide, there are many well documented accounts of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. As of the end of 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database had logge

Streeper, Charles Blamires [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

237

An Assessment of Tritium Supply Alternatives in Support of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nuclear weapons require the periodic replacement of tritium, a radioactive gas that decays at approximately 5.5 percent per year. Currently no tritium-supply facility exists in the US, and due to the decay, the tritium inventory will fall below the required ... Keywords: Decision Analysis-Multiple Criteria, Government-Defense

Detlof Von Winterfeldt; Eric Schweitzer

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

238

Non-Proliferation | Department of Energy  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Non-Proliferation Non-Proliferation Non-Proliferation GC-52 provides legal advice to DOE regarding the transfer, storage or disposition of nuclear materials recovered by DOE for public health, safety or nonproliferation purposes. DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) operates several domestic and international programs aimed at securing vulnerable nuclear materials, such as orphan and disused sealed sources and foreign research reactor fuel, in support of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security initiatives. GC-52 also supports DOE in its interactions with other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the public. Applicable Laws Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 National Nuclear Security Administration Act Further Information

239

USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: DoD Transportation of U.S. Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

accordance with the authority in DoDD 5134.01 (Reference (b)) to establish policy, update responsibilities, and prescribe procedures for DoD transportation of U.S. nuclear weapons, including logistic transportation, operational transport, and emergency logistic movement as defined in the Glossary. b. Incorporates and cancels DoD 4540.5-M (Reference (c)). c. Authorizes the establishment of the Nuclear Transportation Working Group (NTWG).

unknown authors

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

240

Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium, and Nonproliferation  

Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium and Nuclear Nonproliferation Resources with Additional Information · Awards Siegfried S. Hecker Photo Credit: Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory LeRoy Sanchez On September 17, 2009, U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu named Siegfried S. Hecker as a winner of the Enrico Fermi Award 'in recognition for his contributions to plutonium metallurgy, his broad scientific leadership and for his energetic and continuing efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons around the globe. Dr. Hecker is credited with resolving a long-standing controversy involving the stability of certain structures (or phases) in plutonium alloys near equilibrium that arose from significant discrepancies between U.S. and former USSR research on plutonium metallurgy.'1

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


241

Challenges in Implementing Methodologies for Nonproliferation Assessments  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A handful of models for explaining and predicting States’ development of nuclear weapons programs have been proposed since the 1970s. Despite the array of techno-social variables and computational concepts employed in these models, no model has yet been established as an agreed-upon standard. Likewise, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—one of the main institutions evaluating social, political, and technological information for assessments of States’ current nuclear capabilities—uses only a qualitative framework by which to evaluate such information to assess the correctness and completeness of a State’s declaration. In this paper, analysts familiar with both the development of techno-social modelling and the IAEA’s implementation of a safeguards system that is information driven discuss the challenges faced in the development, implementation, and evaluation of models and methodologies for nonproliferation assessments, based on experiences at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the IAEA.

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Dalton, Angela C.; Coles, Garill A.

2011-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

242

USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incidents References: See Enclosure 1  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

(a)), this Instruction: a. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the DoD response to U.S. nuclear weapon incidents in accordance with DoDD 3150.08 (Reference (b)). b. Authorizes DoD support for the Nuclear Weapons Accident Incident Response Subcommittee (NWAIRS) to the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) Committee of Principals (CoP) to address the Federal Government response to U.S. nuclear weapon incidents. 2. APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands,

unknown authors

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

243

Print this article Close This Window EU OKs India joining ITER nuclear reactor project  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Delhi on the project was a separate issue from India's avoidance of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, she said. "There is the non-proliferation issue and we are pursuing that with the Indians as part despite its refusal to sign a global treaty barring the spread of atomic weapons. That move was seen

244

DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Oversight and Investigations Oversight and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives "DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship" FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY 10:00 AM September 12, 2012 1 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here at your request to testify on matters relating to the Department of Energy's oversight of the nuclear weapons complex. 1 The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 as a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy. This action was intended to allow NNSA to concentrate on its defense-related mission, free from other Departmental operations. Its creation was, in large measure, a reaction to highly

245

Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferation risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.

Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod; Whitney, Paul D.

2010-04-16T23:59:59.000Z

246

Strategic Trade Control - Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

a complete weapon or an adequate stock of the required material, such as highly-enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons. History shows, however, that proliferants...

247

Public distrust and hazard management success at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant  

SciTech Connect

Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclear weapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made.

Hohenemser, C.

1987-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

248

The PEACE PIPE: Recycling nuclear weapons into a TRU storage/shipping container  

SciTech Connect

This paper describes results of a contract undertaken by the National Conversion Pilot Project (NCPP) at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) to fabricate stainless steel ``pipe`` containers for use in certification testing at Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque to qualify the container for both storage of transuranic (TRU) waste at RFETS and other DOE sites and shipping of the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). The paper includes a description of the nearly ten-fold increase in the amount of contained plutonium enabled by the product design, the preparation and use of former nuclear weapons facilities to fabricate the components, and the rigorous quality assurance and test procedures that were employed. It also describes how stainless steel nuclear weapons components can be converted into these pipe containers, a true ``swords into plowshare`` success story.

Floyd, D.; Edstrom, C. [Manufacturing Sciences Corp. (United States); Biddle, K.; Orlowski, R. [BNFL, Inc. (United States); Geinitz, R. [Safe Sites of Colorado, Golden, CO (United States); Keenan, K. [USDOE-RFFO (United States); Rivera, M. [Science Applications International Corp./LATA (United States)

1997-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

249

Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas  

SciTech Connect

The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given.

Reitter, T.A.; McCallen, D.B.; Kang, S.W.

1982-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

250

The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

nuclear trade and nonproliferation. Lexington, MA: LexingtonA challenge for nonproliferation. Disarmament Diplomacy. (Nuclear Suppliers Group. Nonproliferation Review 1(1):1–10.

Kroenig, Matthew

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

251

Report of a workshop on nuclear power growth and nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC, April 21, 2010  

SciTech Connect

The workshop addressed the future of nuclear power and nonproliferation in light of global nuclear energy developments, changing US policy and growing concerns about nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The discussion reflected wide agreement on the need for nuclear power, the necessity of mitigating any proliferation and terrorism risks and support for international cooperation on solutions. There were considerable differences on the nature and extent of the risks of differing fuel cycle choices. There was some skepticism about the prospects for a global nuclear energy renaissance, but there was a recognition that nuclear power would expand somewhat in the decades ahead with some states expanding capacity dramatically (e.g., China) and at least a few new states developing nuclear power programs. It was also argued by some participants that under the right conditions, a genuine renaissance could occur some decades from now. The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power will depend on the ability of governments and industry to address these concerns, including the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen nonproliferation, nuclear materials accountability and nuclear security Several participants noted that the United States will not be able to continue to lead global nonproliferation efforts and to shape the growth of nuclear power as well as the global environment and energy debates without a robust US nuclear energy program. Some participants argued that fully integrating nuclear energy growth and nonproliferation, proliferation resistance and physical protection objectives was possible. The growing consensus on these objectives and the growing concern about the potential impact of further proliferation on the industry was one reason for optimism. The Blue Ribbon commission led by Scowcroft and Hamilton was seen as going far beyond the need to find an alternative to Yucca Mountain, and the preeminent forum in the next years to address the back end of the fuel cycle and other issues. Some argued that addressing these issues is the critical missing element, or the final piece of the puzzle to ensure the benefits of nuclear power and to promote nonproliferation. In this context, many argued that R&D on closed as well as open fuel cycle options in order to ensure a suite of long-term options was essential.

Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

252

Using Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Nondestructive Isotopic Analysis  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

screening and nuclear nonproliferation applications[2,3].of the Office of Nonproliferation and International

Ludewigt, Bernhard A.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

253

North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

Moon, Duk-ho (Korean Consulate General in New York)

2003-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

254

CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing  

Office of Legacy Management (LM)

tudies/B ackground tudies/B ackground Book 1 CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing Areas Vol. 11, April 1988 DISCLAIMER Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available original document. CERCLA PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF DOE'S NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE WCILEAR WEAPONS T E S r n G AREAS Prepared by Water Resources Center Desert Research Institute University of Nevada System ,Prepared for U . S . Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office Las Vegas, Nevada under contract DE-AC08-85NV10384 A p r i l 1988 CONTENTS VOLUME I I. INTRODUCTION 1.1 11. NEVADA TEST SITE TESTING AREAS 2.1 Frenchman Flat (Area 5) 2.1.1 2.2 Yucca Flat (Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 15)

255

Probabilistic cost-benefit analysis of enhanced safety features for strategic nuclear weapons at a representative location  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

We carried out a demonstration analysis of the value of developing and implementing enhanced safety features for nuclear weapons in the US stockpile. We modified an approach that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed in response to a congressional directive that NRC assess the ``value-impact`` of regulatory actions for commercial nuclear power plants. Because improving weapon safety shares some basic objectives with NRC regulations, i.e., protecting public health and safety from the effects of accidents involving radioactive materials, we believe the NRC approach to be appropriate for evaluating weapons-safety cost-benefit issues. Impact analysis includes not only direct costs associated with retrofitting the weapon system, but also the expected costs (or economic risks) that are avoided by the action, i.e., the benefits.

Stephens, D.R.; Hall, C.H.; Holman, G.S.; Graham, K.F.; Harvey, T.F.; Serduke, F.J.D.

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

256

Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington

Charles C. Mayer; Peter R. Lavoy; James A. Russell; Author(s Charles C. Mayer

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

257

Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support (TNPS), Nonproliferation and  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support (TNPS) Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral Export Control Arrangements Interdiction Engagement & Training INECP INSEP GIPP Safeguards Concepts and Approaches Human Capital Development Additional Protocol Technical Assistance National Security Systems & Assessments National Security Information Systems Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Radiation Detection & Response (RDR) Contact NPNS Other Major Programs Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE Division on Flickr Nonproliferation and National Security Program Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support (TNPS)

258

Advancing Methods for Determining the Source of HEU Used in Terrorist Nuclear Weapon  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

An algorithm was developed that uses measured isotopic ratios from fission product residue following the detonation of a high-enriched uranium nuclear weapon to compute the original attributes of the material used in the device. The specific attributes assessed are the uranium isotopics (considering 234U, 235U, 236U, and 238U) and the enrichment process used to create the material (e.g., gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, etc.). Using the original attributes of the weapon significantly increases the probability of identifying the perpetrator of the attack. In this study, research was conducted to perform sensitivity analysis of the calculated values, analyze alternate enrichment methods, determine the source (uranium mine) from which the feed material was taken and assess potential “spoofing” techniques. The purpose of this research was to verify that the analytical method developed would remain valid for a multitude of variations that could be used to disguise the origin of the nuclear material in the device. It is envisioned that this methodology could serve as a preprocessing step to a more computationally intensive and more accurate system in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack.

LaFleur, Adrienne; Charlton, William

2007-09-17T23:59:59.000Z

259

Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01, Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Enforcement Guidance Supplement Enforcement Guidance Supplement EGS:01-01 Appendix E-Operational Procedures for Enforcement Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 October 15, 2001 MEMORANDUM FOR: DOE PAAA COORDINATORS CONTRACTOR PAAA COORDINATORS FROM: R. KEITH CHRISTOPHER DIRECTOR OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION SUBJECT: Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for Enforcement, published in June 1998, provides the opportunity for the Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement (OE) to periodically issue clarifying guidance regarding the processes used in its enforcement

260

Los Alamos neutron science center nuclear weapons stewardship and unique national scientific capabilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This presentation gives an overview of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and its contributions to science and the nuclear weapons program. LANSCE is made of multiple experimental facilities (the Lujan Center, the Weapons Neutron Research facility (WNR), the Ultra-Cold Neutron facility (UCN), the proton Radiography facility (pRad) and the Isotope Production Facility (IPF)) served by the its kilometer long linear accelerator. Several research areas are supported, including materials and bioscience, nuclear science, materials dynamics, irradiation response and medical isotope production. LANSCE is a national user facility that supports researchers worldwide. The LANSCE Risk Mitigation program is currently in progress to update critical accelerator equipment to help extend the lifetime of LANSCE as a key user facility. The Associate Directorate of Business Sciences (ADBS) plays an important role in the continued success of LANSCE. This includes key procurement support, human resource support, technical writing support, and training support. LANSCE is also the foundation of the future signature facility MARIE (Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes).

Schoenberg, Kurt F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


261

Loose Nukes: Nuclear Material Security in G.P.Gilfoyle  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Not supported by administration. No change. NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty See CTBT. No change. ABM Anti of a nuclear weapon by an adversary could have a devastating influence on US security and non-proliferation.A.Parmentola, Using Nuclear Materials to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation, Science and Global Security, 9, 81 (2001). #12

Gilfoyle, Jerry

262

A study of residual Cesium 137 contamination in southwestern Utah soil following the nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada Test Site in the 1950's and 1960's.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??The Nevada Test Site (NTS) was the location for at least 100 above ground Nuclear Weapons tests during the 1950's and early 1960's. Radioactive fallout… (more)

[No author

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

263

Classification of Nuclear Weapons-Related Information (Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED INFORMATION Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data (RD and FRD) June 2012 2 3 Purpose To familiarize individuals from agencies outside of DOE who may come in contact with RD and FRD with the procedures for identifying, classifying, marking, handling, and declassifying documents containing that information as required by  The Atomic Energy Act and  10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 1045, Nuclear Classification and Declassification §1045.35 4 Not the Purpose This briefing does not authorize you to classify or declassify documents containing RD or FRD. Additional training is required to classify documents containing RD or FRD or identify RD or FRD within a document for redaction. Only authorized DOE

264

The nuclear materials control technology briefing book  

SciTech Connect

As national and international interests in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, intensify, it becomes ever more important that contributors be aware of the technologies available for the measurement and control of the nuclear materials important to nuclear weapons development. This briefing book presents concise, nontechnical summaries of various special nuclear material (SNM) and tritium production monitoring technologies applicable to the control of nuclear materials and their production. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates a multinational, on-site-inspector-based safeguards program in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), many (but not all) of the technologies reported in this document are in routine use or under development for IAEA safeguards.

Hartwell, J.K.; Fernandez, S.J.

1992-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

265

U.S. and Russia Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Plutonium  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Plutonium U.S. and Russia Reaffirm Commitment to Disposing of Weapon-Grade Plutonium July 13, 2006 - 3:05pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman and Sergey Kiriyenko, the director of Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency, have signed a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium by irradiation in nuclear reactors. "This statement is a clear sign of our mutual commitment to keeping dangerous nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists. We look forward to working together with the Russians to ensure that this important nonproliferation project moves forward in both Russia and the United States," Secretary Bodman said.

266

Nonproliferation and National Security Multimedia - Argonne National  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and National Security Nonproliferation and National Security > Multimedia Multimedia Nuclear Systems Analysis Engineering Analysis Nonproliferation and National Security Detection & Diagnostic Systems Engineering Development & Applications Argonne's Nuclear Science & Technology Legacy Other Multimedia Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE on Flickr Bookmark and Share Nonproliferation and National Security: Multimedia Related Resources Nonproliferation and National Security Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Click on the "Date" header to sort the videos/podcasts in chronological order (ascending or descending). You may also search for a specific keyword; click on the reset button refresh to remove the keyword filter and show again all the Videos/Podcasts.

267

American perspectives on security : energy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism : 2010.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclear weapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

Herron, Kerry Gale (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Silva, Carol L. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK)

2011-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

268

Neutralization of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction using nuclear methods  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This thesis addresses the threat of chemical and biological armed ballistic missiles and their neutralization by nuclear methods. The objective of this effort is twofold. The first objective is to develop a justification for using nuclear interceptors in neutralizing chemical and biological weapons (CBW) based on the current CBW threat to the U.S. The second objective is to reproduce a computer model developed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in 1992 to estimate the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear interceptors to neutralize biological or chemical tactical ballistic missile warheads and to extend the model for high-energy neutrons (20 MeV) to explore the effect of increasing neutron energies. The original model was developed using TARTNP. MCNP4C was the code used to reproduce the model. At least 27 countries now possess - or are in the process of acquiring and developing - ballistic missiles. Furthermore, more than a dozen states are pursuing offensive CBW capabilities, and some have exhibited a willingness to employ them. One particular method of neutralizing biological and chemical ballistic warheads, which has previously been investigated, is by means of nuclear interceptors, i.e., using a low-yield nuclear device to neutralize the weapon by bombarding it with high-energy particles and rendering it ineffective. To investigate the ability of nuclear interceptors to neutralize CBW missiles, a MCNP model was created based on the LLNL data. The results from the new model were compared to the sterilization requirements suggested by LLNL and to the LLNL results. Although there were differences between the two, the MCNP model produced data with the same trend as the LLNL data and all submunitions were given sufficient energy to exceed the sterilization requirements. Finally, a comparison was made of the neutralization capabilities of a fission device, a fusion device, and an advanced neutron source. It was shown that the advanced neutron source, with its 20 MeV neutrons, delivered on average 12 times as much energy per particle to the Sarin as the fission device and 1.6 times as much energy per particle to the Sarin as the fusion device.

McAffrey, Veronica Lynn

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

269

ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of thermonuclear-fusion energy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of "points" highlighting the strategic-political and military-technical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and fo...

Gsponer, A; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

270

Low Prevalence of Chronic Beryllium Disease among Workers at a Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Facility  

SciTech Connect

To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclear weapons research and development facility. We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with HRCT (N=49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and transbronchial biopsies. The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 yrs and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 yrs. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or HRCT); three others had evidence of probable CBD. These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD.

Arjomandi, M; Seward, J P; Gotway, M B; Nishimura, S; Fulton, G P; Thundiyil, J; King, T E; Harber, P; Balmes, J R

2010-01-11T23:59:59.000Z

271

Historical Exposures to Chemicals at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant: A Pilot Retrospective Exposure Assessment  

SciTech Connect

In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

Janeen Denise Robertson

1999-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

272

Weapons Activities/ Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign FY 2011 Congressional Budget  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

agencies, ASC plays an important role in supporting nonproliferation, emergency response, nuclear forensics

273

ABOUT THE DEGREE The Master of Nuclear Science degree is a coursework  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

by the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or the so-called P-5 countries, to play a leadership role ourselves to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear build on but broaden the periodic dialogue on non- proliferation issues among the United States, Russia

Chen, Ying

274

DOE Order Self Study Modules - DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program and  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

CONTINUING TRAINING SELF- CONTINUING TRAINING SELF- STUDY PROGRAM DOE O 452.1D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM DOE O 452.2D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY DOE O 452.1D and DOE O 452.2D Familiar Level June 2011 1 DOE O 452.1D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM DOE O 452.2D NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY FAMILIAR LEVEL OBJECTIVES Given the familiar level of this module and the resources listed below, you will be able to answer the following questions: 1. What are the objectives of implementing U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1D? 2. Define the following terms as they apply to this Order: Abnormal environment High explosive detonation 3. What are the objectives of implementing DOE O 452.2D? 4. What are the general requirements of DOE O 452.2D?

275

National independence and nonproliferation in the new states of Central Asia  

SciTech Connect

Five independent states emerged in Central Asia from the breakup of the USSR. One of these states, Kazakhstan, possesses nuclear weapons. The other four of these states, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, are not known to possess nuclear weapons, however they occupy a geostrategic position which makes them important to non-proliferation efforts. The present report profiles the capabilities and intentions of these four Central Asian states. The analysis of capabilities suggests that none of these states has the capability to develop a usable nuclear weapon. However, all of these countries-- especially Uzbekistan--have components of the old Soviet nuclear weapons complex which are now orphans. They have no use for these facilities and must either re-profile them, destroy them, or transfer them. The analysis of intentions suggests that the dynamics of national independence have created a situation in which Uzbekistan has hegemonic designs in the region. Implications for retarding nuclear proliferation in the Central Asian region are examined. Opportunities for outside influence are assessed.

Gleason, G.

1993-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

276

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume V. Economics and systems analysis  

SciTech Connect

This NASAP assessment considers the economics of alternative nuclear reactor and fuel-cycle systems in the light of possible patterns of uranium supply and energy demand, as well as the economic implications of improvng the proliferation resistance of the various systems. The assessment focuses on the costs of alternative nuclear technologies and the possible timing of their implementation, based on their economic attractiveness.

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

277

TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

2013-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

278

GARS | Nonproliferation and National Security Department  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and National Security Department Nonproliferation The Nonproliferation and National Security Department carries out research and development, provides technical...

279

Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

280

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance  

SciTech Connect

Volume II assesses proliferation resistance. Chapters are devoted to: assessment of civilian nuclear systems (once-through fuel-cycle systems, closed fuel cycle systems, research reactors and critical facilities); assessment of associated sensitive materials and facilities (enrichment, problems with storage of spent fuel and plutonium content, and reprocessing and refabrication facilities); and safeguards for alternative fuel cycles.

1979-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


281

A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing arguments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable -- although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections.

Gsponer, A; Vitale, B; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Vitale, Bruno

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

282

2006 Department of Energy Strategic Plan - Ensuring America's nuclear  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Ensuring America's Ensuring America's nuclear security 2006 Department of Energy Strategic Plan - Ensuring America's nuclear security In 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established as a new element within the Department in response to a Congressional mandate to reinvigorate the security posture throughout the nuclear weapons program and to reaffirm the Nation's commitment to maintaining the nuclear deterrence capabilities of the United States. NNSA was chartered to better focus management attention on enhanced security, proactive management practices, and mission focus within the Department's national defense and nonproliferation programs. The Department performs its national security mission involving nuclear weapons and nuclear materials and technology through the NNSA.

283

NuclearScienceandEngineeringLaboratory Sustainable  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

computational and visualization tools for application in nuclear power, nuclear security, nonproliferation of nuclear power to the electric grid. In the nuclear security, nonproliferation, and safeguards areas, ongoi

Beex, A. A. "Louis"

284

ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of “points ” highlighting the strategic-political and militarytechnical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and foster further nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The safety and environmental problems related to the operation of largescale fusion facilities such as ITER (which contain massive amounts of hazardous and/or radioactive materials such as tritium, lithium, and beryllium, as well as neutron-activated structural materials) are not addressed in this paper.

André Gsponer; Jean-pierre Hurni

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

285

Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

Terrence R. Fehner and F.G. Gosling. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I (pdf). DOE/MA-0003. Washington, D.C.: Department of...

286

The distribution and history of nuclear weapons related contamination in sediments from the Ob River, Siberia as determined by isotopic ratios of Plutonium, Neptunium, and Cesium  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This thesis addresses the sources and transport of nuclear weapons related contamination in the Ob River region, Siberia. In addition to being one of the largest rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean, the bulk of the former ...

Kenna, Timothy C

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

287

Surface water transport and distribution of uranium in contaminated sediments near a nuclear weapons processing facility  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The extent of remobilization of uranium from contaminated soils adjacent to a nuclear weapons processing facility during episodic rain events was investigated. In addition, information on the solid phase associations of U in floodplain and suspended sediments was assessed by an eight-step sequential extraction procedure to gauge U chemical lability and its propensity for transport. Comparisons were drawn between the easily dispersible, or water dispersible clay fraction (WDC) of the floodplain sediments to the stream suspended sediments transported during storms. Mass flux estimates determined from base flow measurements potentially underestimate the amount of U transported from contaminated terrestrial sources to surface water systems. During the storm events measured, approximately 145 7 to 2 8 3 8 % more U was mobilized to Upper Three Runs Creek (UTRC) relative to base flow calculations. The suspended sediment load transports the bulk of U in labile forms predominantly as acid soluble (specifically adsorbed), MnO2 occluded and organically bound phases. This implies that U may be available to the environment under a range of changing conditions (e.g., Eh and pH). Sequential extractions of the floodplain sediments demonstrated the presence of chemically labile forms, but in different proportions to the suspended sediments. More U was associated with the organically bound phases in the floodplain sediments, while the easily dispersible fraction of floodplain sediments correlated with the suspended sediments. A strong relationship exists between the suspended sediments and the WDC fraction, suggesting that fine particles are eroded from the floodplain and transported in labile forms. This study demonstrates the need to revise current monitoring schemes to include mass transport evaluation during storms. In addition, sequential extraction studies provide knowledge of U chemical lability in contaminated sediments, which may suggest environmentally sound and more cost effective remediation techniques than ones currently in use.

Batson, Vicky Lynn

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

288

Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 11-28: Mandatory Review and Update of Record Drawings for Nuclear-Capable Weapons and Munitions Storage and Maintenance Facilities  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

1. Purpose. This ETL provides criteria for munitions and nuclear weapons-capable maintenance and storage facilities (munitions storage areas [MSA] and weapons storage areas [WSA]) which are existing, under design, or under contract, and located in the continental United States (CONUS). It addresses requirements for reviewing and updating record drawings and requirements for as-built drawings for projects under design or under contract. Future project requirements will be addressed in a revision of Air Force instruction (AFI) 32-1065, Grounding Systems. 2. Application: Air Force installations with munitions and nuclear weapons-capable maintenance and storage facilities. The requirements in this ETL are mandatory.

Major Comm; Majcom Electrical Engineers

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

289

Revision to the Record of Decision for the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EIS-218) (7/19/00)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

767 767 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 139 / Wednesday, July 19, 2000 / Notices The office is located in the Pentagon which is guarded. RETENTION AND DISPOSAL: Records are kept until the person is deceased or the person seeks removal of information, whichever is sooner. SYSTEM MANAGER(S) AND ADDRESS: Chief of Naval Operations (N09BC), 2000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-2000. NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE: Individuals seeking to determine whether information about themselves is contained in this system should address written inquiries to the Chief of Naval Operations (N09BC), 2000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-2000. RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES: Individuals seeking access to information about themselves contained in this system should address written inquiries to the Chief of Naval

290

Current developments in laser ablation-inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry for use in geology, forensics, and nuclear nonproliferation research  

SciTech Connect

This dissertation focused on new applications of laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS). The diverse fields that were investigated show the versatility of the technique. In Chapter 2, LA-ICP-MS was used to investigate the rare earth element (REE) profiles of garnets from the Broken Hill Deposit in New South Wales, Australia. The normalized REE profiles helped to shed new light on the formation of deposits of sulfide ores. This information may be helpful in identifying the location of sulfide ore deposits in other locations. New sources of metals such as Pg, Zn, and Ag, produced from these ores, are needed to sustain our current technological society. The application of LA-ICP-MS presented in Chapter 3 is the forensics analysis of automotive putty and caulking. The elemental analysis of these materials was combined with the use of Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The PCA comparison was able to differentiate the automotive putty samples by manufacturer and lot number. The analysis of caulk was able to show a differentiation based on manufacturer, but no clear differentiation was shown by lot number. This differentiation may allow matching of evidence in the future. This will require many more analyses and the construction of a database made up of many different samples. The 4th chapter was a study of the capabilities of LA-ICP-MS for fast and precise analysis of particle ensembles for nuclear nonproliferation applications. Laser ablation has the ability to spatially resolve particle ensembles which may contain uranium or other actinides from other particles present in a sample. This is of importance in samples obtained from air on filter media. The particle ensembles of interest may be mixed in amongst dust and other particulates. A problem arises when ablating these particle ensembles directly from the filter media. Dust particles other than ones of interest may be accidentally entrained in the aerosol of the ablated particle ensemble. This would cause the analysis to be skewed. The use of a gelatin substrate allows the ablation a particle ensemble without disturbing other particles or the gelatin surface. A method to trap and ablate particles on filter paper using collodion was also investigated. The laser was used to dig through the collodion layer and into the particle ensemble. Both of these methods fix particles to allow spatial resolution of the particle ensembles. The use of vanillic acid as a possible enhancement to ablation was also studied. A vanillic acid coating of the particles fixed on top of the gelatin substrate was not found to have any positive effect on either signal intensity or precision. The mixing of vanillic acid in the collodion solution used to coat the filter paper increased ablation signal intensity by a factor of 4 to 5. There was little effect on precision, though. The collodion on filter paper method and the gelatin method of resolving particles have shown themselves to be possible tools in fighting proliferation of nuclear weapons and material. Future applications of LA-ICP-MS are only limited by the imagination of the investigator. Any material that can be ablated and aerosolized is a potential material for analysis by LA-ICP-MS. Improvements in aerosol transport, ablation chamber design, and laser focusing can make possible the ablation and analysis of very small amounts of material. This may perhaps lead to more possible uses in forensics. A similar method to the one used in Chapter 3 could perhaps be used to match drug residue to the place of origin. Perhaps a link could be made based on the elements leached from the soil by plants used to make drugs. This may have a specific pattern based on where the plant was grown. Synthetic drugs are produced in clandestine laboratories that are often times very dirty. The dust, debris, and unique materials in the lab environment could create enough variance to perhaps match drugs produced there to samples obtained off the street. Even if the match was not strong enough to be evidence, the knowledge that many sa

Messerly, Joshua D.

2008-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

291

Development of Superconducting High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers for Nuclear Safeguards  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation. ESARDA Bulletin,Cycles: Safeguards and Non-Proliferation. KIT Scientificnuclear attribution and non-proliferation applications. In

Dreyer, Jonathan

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

292

The Office of Nuclear Verification | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

at NNSA Blog The Office of Nuclear Verification Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation & International Security > The Office of Nuclear Verification...

293

Use of Lasers to Study the Impact of Fractionation and Condensation on the Toxicity of Nuclear Weapon Fallout  

SciTech Connect

An experimental concept has been developed to collect data to aid in the refinement of simulation programs designed to predict the fallout effects arising from surface and shallowly buried nuclear weapon detonations. These experiments, called the Condensation Debris Experiments (CDE), are intended to study the condensation/fractionation of material that is liberated following an initial deposition of laser energy onto a small, characterized target. The CDE effort also encompasses target development and material studies as well as supporting computational efforts studying radiation hydrodynamics, computational fluid dynamics, and relevant neutron activation processes (not discussed here).

Vidnovic III, T; Bradley, K S; Debonnel, C S; Dipeso, G; Fournier, K; Karpenko, V P; Tobin, M

2005-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

294

Ground motion from earthquakes and underground nuclear weapons tests: a comparison as it relates to siting a nuclear waste storage facility at NTS  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Ground motion generated by a magnitude 4.3 earthquake at Massachusetts Mountain on the Nevada Test Site was measured at the control point and compared with ground motion generated at about the same distance by four underground nuclear weapons tests. The depth of the earthquake was between 4 and 4.6 km. The resulting signal at the distance considered was almost entirely body-wave components and had little or no contribution from the surface wave. The motion from the relatively shallower weapons tests had a signal with a pronounced surface-wave component. Comparison of the Pseudo Relative Response Velocity (PSRV) plots shows the earthquake signal richer in high frequencies and the weapons-test signals richer in low frequencies. If relationship between ground motion from the two sources can be confirmed for other earthquakes, weapons test ground motion could be used to estimate earthquake ground motion for magnitudes for which probability of occurrence in a given montoring period would be very small.

Vortman, L.J.

1982-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

295

Global Nuclear Security Technology Division (GNSTD)  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Systems Nonproliferation Technology Nuclear Material Detection & Characterization Nuclear Security Advanced Technologies Safeguards & Security Technology Threat Reduction...

296

Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy: Neutronic Design Aspects of a Hybrid Fusion-Fission Nuclear Energy System  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

surrounding nuclear non-proliferation are contin- uouslyfrom associated non-proliferation treaties and operating thethe LFFH engine design, non-proliferation aspects and code

Kramer, Kevin James

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

297

Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software  

SciTech Connect

This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

2007-05-02T23:59:59.000Z

298

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young Professionals to Careers in Nonproliferation and National Security | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber ... Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young

299

Nuclear Security & Safety  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The Energy Department is working to enhance nuclear security through defense, nonproliferation, and environmental efforts.

300

U.S. Department of Energy Strategic Plan 13 In 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

3 3 In 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established as a new element within the Department in response to a Congressional mandate to reinvigorate the security posture throughout the nuclear weapons program and to reaffirm the Nation's commitment to maintaining the nuclear deterrence capabilities of the United States. NNSA was chartered to better focus management attention on enhanced security, proactive management practices, and mission focus within the Department's national defense and nonproliferation programs. The Department performs its national security mission involving nuclear weapons and nuclear materials and technology through the NNSA. Over the next six years, the Department will apply

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


301

Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy 65 John Deutch, Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, served as  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

such as the NPT (Treaty on Non Proliferation of NuclearWeapons) and its review process. 2. These are therefore climate of mainstream activity on these international security issues ('non-proliferation' and disarmament back-tracking from that forthright position on the disarmament-non- proliferation link (and pleading

Deutch, John

302

DOE O 452.1D Admin Chg 1, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. ...

2009-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

303

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IX. Reactor and fuel cycle description  

SciTech Connect

The Nonproliferation Alterntive Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) has characterized and assessed various reactor/fuel-cycle systems. Volume IX provides, in summary form, the technical descriptions of the reactor/fuel-cycle systems studied. This includes the status of the system technology, as well as a discussion of the safety, environmental, and licensing needs from a technical perspective. This information was then used in developing the research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) program, including its cost and time frame, to advance the existing technology to the level needed for commercial use. Wherever possible, the cost data are given as ranges to reflect the uncertainties in the estimates.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

304

Nonproliferation and National Security Program Contacts, Argonne...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Contacts Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral...

305

Office Of NONprOliferatiON  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

objectives for nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements; Develop technologies tailored for monitoring compliance with nonproliferation and arms control...

306

The association betweeen cancers and low level radiation: An evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Cancer has traditionally been linked to exposure to high doses of radiation, but there is considerable controversy regarding the carcinogenicity of low doses of ionizing radiation in humans. Over the past 30 years there have been 14 studies conducted on employees at the Hanford nuclear weapons facility to investigate the relationship between exposure to low doses of radiation and mortality due to cancer (1-14). Interest in this issue was originally stimulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which was trying to determine whether the linear extrapolation of health effects from high to low dose exposure was accurate. If the risk has been underestimated, then the maximum permissible occupational radiation exposure in the United States had been set too high. Because the health risk associated with low level radiation are unclear and controversial it seems appropriate to review the studies relating to Hanford at this time.

Britton, J. [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States). School of Public Health]|[Lawrence Berkeley National Lab., CA (United States)

1993-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

307

DOE O 452.3, Management of the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

The Order defines and affirms the authorities and responsibilities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for the management of the Department ...

2005-06-08T23:59:59.000Z

308

Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons in Container Freight Through Detection and Retaliation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Concerns about terrorists smuggling nuclear bombs into the United States in container freight have led to demands for 100% inspection at either U.S. or foreign ports. However, under some circumstances, it may be possible to deter nuclear smuggling attempts ... Keywords: applications, decision analysis, game theory, military, public policy, risk analysis, terrorism

Naraphorn Haphuriwat; Vicki M. Bier; Henry H. Willis

2011-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

309

The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation &...

310

Dose reduction through robotics and automation of nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage procedures at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

With the end of the Cold War and subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile now greatly exceeds any foreseeable future need (Quirck et al., 1993). To compensate for this excess, an estimated 20,000 nuclear warheads have been earmarked for dismantlement and storage at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. It is anticipated that the majority of these warheads will arrive at the Pantex facility by the year 2000. At that time, the cur-rent dismantlement and inventory procedures may not be adequate to control worker radiation exposure within administrative and federal dose limits, To control these exposures, alternate approaches to dismantlement and inventory procedures may need to be developed. One attractive approach is to automate as many activities as possible, thus reducing worker exposure. To facilitate automation of dismantlement and storage procedures, current procedures were investigated in terms of collective dose to workers, time to completion, ease of completion, and cost of automation for each task. Then a cost-benefit comparison was performed to determine which procedures would be most cost-effective to automate.

Thompson, David Andrew

1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

311

Dose reduction through automation of nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage procedures at the Department of Energy`s Pantex Facility  

SciTech Connect

With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent break up of the Soviet Union, the number of weapons in the nuclear stockpile now greatly exceeds any foreseeable future need. To compensate for this excess an estimated 20,000 nuclear warheads have been earmarked for dismantlement and storage at the Department of Energy`s Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. It is anticipated that the majority of these warheads will arrive at the Pantex facility by the year 2000. At that time, it is estimated that current dismantlement and inventory procedures will not be adequate to control worker radiation exposure within administrative and federal dose limits. To control these exposures alternate approaches to dismantlement and inventory must be developed. One attractive approach is to automate as many activities as possible, thus reducing worker exposure. To facilitate automation of dismantlement and storage procedures, current procedures were investigated in terms of collective dose to workers, time to completion, ease of completion, and cost of automation for each task. A cost-benefit comparison was then performed in order to determine which procedures would be most cost-effective to automate.

Thompson, D.A.; Poston, J.W. [Texas A& M Univ., College Station, TX (United States)

1996-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

312

The University and the Nuclear Predicament  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

34. Living with Nuclear Weapons, Harvard Nuclear Studythe proliferation of nuclear weapons states (from one to atMIT Summer Program on Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control.

Kohn, Walter; Badash, Lawrence

1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

313

China's Nuclear Power Program: Options for the US  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The issue of American nuclear cooperation with the People's Republic of China is examined with regards to political relations, commercial benefits to the United States, and nonproliferation. China's interest in nuclear power is examined, and its nuclear program is briefly reviewed from the 1950's to present. China's international nuclear relations with other countries are discussed, and implications for the United States examined, particularly with regards to China's intentions toward nuclear proliferation, danger of diversion of material for nuclear weapons, use of pressurized water reactor technology for Chinese naval reactors, and the terms of the nuclear cooperation agreement. (LEW)

Suttmeier, R.P.

1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

314

Speaker Dr. Richard Olsen will be discussing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in verifying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy where he worked for 21 years  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

such as the NPT (Treaty on Non Proliferation of NuclearWeapons) and its review process. 2. These are therefore climate of mainstream activity on these international security issues ('non-proliferation' and disarmament back-tracking from that forthright position on the disarmament-non- proliferation link (and pleading

Olsen, Stephen L.

315

National Security, Weapons Science  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

National Security, Weapons Science National Security, Weapons Science /science-innovation/_assets/images/icon-science.jpg National Security, Weapons Science National security depends on science and technology. The United States relies on Los Alamos National Laboratory for the best of both. No place on Earth pursues a broader array of world-class scientific endeavors. Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at LANL is part of the DOE's stockpile stewardship program. It uses two large X-ray machines to record three-dimensional interior images of materials. In most experiments, materials (including plutonium) undergo hydrodynamic shock to simulate the implosion process in nuclear bombs and/or the effects of severe hydrodynamic stress. The tests are described as "full-scale mockups

316

Risk in the Weapons Stockpile  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-08-14T23:59:59.000Z

317

Understanding Europe’s "New" Common Foreign and Security Policy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

measures. 2. Nuclear non-proliferation. 3. Economic aspectsOrganization Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Organizationarms control in Europe; non-proliferation of weapons of mass

Smith, Michael

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

318

ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT - 11052  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical Separation Facilities (canyons).

Bergren, C.; Flora, M.; Belencan, H.

2010-11-17T23:59:59.000Z

319

ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical processing canyons.

Bergren, C

2009-01-16T23:59:59.000Z

320

EVALUATION OF FCDA FAMILY SHELTER, MARK I, FOR PROTECTION AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Preliminary Report  

SciTech Connect

An underground reinforced-concrete family shelter designed for six persons was tested at three anticipated nuclear blast overpressures: 30, 48, and 65 psi. The structures were calculated to sustain a 30-psi long-duration overpressure. Postshot examination of all shelters lndicated there was little or no deflection in the reinforced-concrete members. Although the actual blast load was of short duration, the natural period for the structures was also shortp therefore it is felt that the structures would withstand similar overpressures from long-duration blast loadings. The average attenuation factor for gamma radiation varied from 3000 to 4500. Permanent damage was confined to the exposed portions of the ventilation pipes, which were bent to a nearly horizontal position. The steel-plate door at the 65-psi level was dished inward about 1 1/4 in., but it opened and closed easily. (authl

FitzSimons, N.

1957-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


321

EU Actorship in the Non-Proliferation area.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

?? The threat of nuclear weapons is depicted by the EU as the potentially greatest threat to security. How then does the EU counter this… (more)

Pettersson, Ylva

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

322

Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

2008-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

323

Broadening Industry Governance to Include Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

As industry is the first line of defense in detecting and thwarting illicit trade networks, the engagement of the private sector is critical to any government effort to strengthen existing mechanisms to protect goods and services throughout the supply chain. This study builds on previous PNNL work to continue to evaluate means for greater industry engagement to complement and strengthen existing governmental efforts to detect and stem the trade of illicit goods and to protect and secure goods that could be used in making a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, the study evaluates the concept of Industry Self Regulation, defined as a systematic voluntary program undertaken by an industry or by individual companies to anticipate, implement, supplement, or substitute for regulatory requirements in a given field, generally through the adoption of best practices. Through a series of interviews with companies with a past history of non-compliance, trade associations and NGOs, the authors identify gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, drivers for a self regulation approach and the form such an approach might take, as well as obstacles to be overcome. The authors conclude that it is at the intersection of industry, government, and security that—through collaborative means—the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation system—can be most effectively strengthened to the mutual benefit of both government and the private sector. Industry has a critical stake in the success of this regime, and has the potential to act as an integrating force that brings together the existing mechanisms of the global nonproliferation regime: export controls, physical protection, and safeguards. The authors conclude that industry compliance is not enough; rather, nonproliferation must become a central tenant of a company’s corporate culture and be viewed as an integral component of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

2008-11-11T23:59:59.000Z

324

Global Security Directorate - Nonproliferation, Safeguards, and...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Home Centers & Programs Nonproliferation, Safeguards, and Security Programs click for full size image of Megatons to megawatts The Global Security and Nonproliferation Programs...

325

Consequence Management, Safeguards & Non-Proliferation Tools...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Consequence Management, Safeguards, and Non-Proliferation Tools SHARE Consequence Management, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Tools UF 6 Enrichment Facility Visualization of the...

326

The Social and Ethical Aspects of Nuclear Waste  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

people feel toward nuclear weapons seem to have generalizedwaste left over from nuclear weapons and nuclear powerfor nuclear waste facility planners to derail weapons/waste

Marshall, Alan

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

327

Plutonium Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Plutonium Disposition Program Plutonium Disposition Program Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Fissile Materials Disposition > Plutonium Disposition Program Plutonium Disposition Program The U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which entered into force on July 13, 2011, commits each country to dispose of at least 34 metric tons (MT) of weapon-grade plutonium withdrawn from their respective nuclear weapon programs. The U.S. remains firmly committed to its PMDA obligation to dispose of excess weapons plutonium. U.S. Plutonium Disposition The current U.S. plan to dispose of 34 MT of weapon-grade plutonium is to fabricate it into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiate it in existing light water reactors. This approach requires construction of new facilities

328

Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Missions Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship Ensuring the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. About Nuclear Weapons Since 1949, Sandia's scientists...

329

EIS-0218: Revised Record of Decision  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

330

The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

coupled and complex systems like nuclear weapons arsenals.The complex technology required to build nuclear weapons is

Kroenig, Matthew

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

331

U.S. and UAE Bolster Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Energy...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Bolster Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation U.S. and UAE Bolster Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation February 24, 2010 -...

332

Techniques and methods in nuclear materials traceability  

SciTech Connect

The nonproliferation community is currently addressing concerns that the access to special nuclear materials may increase the illicit trafficking in weapons-usable materials from civil and/or weapons material stores and/or fuel cycles systems. Illicit nuclear traffic usually involves reduced quantities of nuclear materials perhaps as samplings of a potential protracted diversionary flow from sources to users. To counter illicit nuclear transactions requires the development of techniques and methods in nuclear material traceability as an important phase of a broad forensic analysis capability. This report discusses how isotopic signatures and correlation methods were applied to determine the origins of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium samples reported as illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

Persiani, P.J.

1996-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

333

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of a US or French nuclear reactor design may simply comelegitimate civilian uses: nuclear reactors produce plutoniumto 20%-30%) in a nuclear reactor and then later chemically

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

334

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Washington,Considerations of a Nuclear- Test Ban. In Arms Control,The VELA Incident: nuclear test or meteoriod? : National

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

335

Improving weapons of mass destruction intelligence Arnold Kanter  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

weapons developments in Pakistan are primarily, if not exclusively, influenced by nuclear developments of nuclear capability by sub-national states and the security of WMD weapons, materials, and technology so for the foreseeable future. WMD includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but also

Deutch, John

336

Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union  

SciTech Connect

The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

Not Available

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

337

Nonproliferation Education at the University of Washington PNNL-SA-50160  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

.S. government agencies, including the Nonproliferation Graduate Program at the National Nuclear Security for Global and Regional Security Studies (IGRSS) The nonproliferation curriculum at the University of Washington (UW) is the product of collaboration between Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security (PNWCGS

338

Environmental Challenges of Climate-Nuclear Fusion: A Case Study of India  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 82because of India's good non-proliferation record 83 and itsNuclear India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, THE HERITAGE

Badrinarayan, Deepa

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

339

Shaping the energy Future Nuclear Energy R&D  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

associated with the need to increase nuclear fuel resources and the perceived non-proliferation advantages

Kemner, Ken

340

WEAPONS EFFECTS FOR PROTECTIVE DESIGN  

SciTech Connect

A lecture intended to provide a general background in weapons effects is presented. Specific areas of nuclear explosion phenomena pertinent to the design of hardened systems discussed include nuclear radiation and shielding, fireball growth and effects, thermal radiation, air blast, cratering and throwout, ground shock effects, fallout, and afterwinds. (J.R.D.)

Brode, H.L.

1960-03-31T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


341

A Mass Spectrometry Study of Isotope Separation in the Laser Plume  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Attribution and Non-Proliferation Applications”, IEEETreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”,as detailed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is to

Suen, Timothy Wu

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

342

Impact of contributions of Glenn T. Seaborg on nuclear science  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and took thebegun. The non- proliferation treaty (NPT) was negotiatedtest ban treaty, nuclear non-proliferation and the use of

Hoffman, Darleane C.

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

343

2006 Department of Energy Strategic Plan - Ensuring America's nuclear  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

2006 Department of Energy Strategic Plan - Ensuring America's 2006 Department of Energy Strategic Plan - Ensuring America's nuclear security 2006 Department of Energy Strategic Plan - Ensuring America's nuclear security In 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established as a new element within the Department in response to a Congressional mandate to reinvigorate the security posture throughout the nuclear weapons program and to reaffirm the Nation's commitment to maintaining the nuclear deterrence capabilities of the United States. NNSA was chartered to better focus management attention on enhanced security, proactive management practices, and mission focus within the Department's national defense and nonproliferation programs. The Department performs its national security mission involving nuclear weapons and nuclear materials

344

The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Policy...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Policy Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation &...

345

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

346

Living in the Question? The Berlin Nuclear Crisis Critical Oral History, Part II  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

also McGeorge Bundy, “Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf”, ForeignNitze talked about nuclear weapons in public, “Berlinthrough a prism of nuclear weapons, and therefore nuclear

Gould, Benina Berger

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

347

Nuclear Fission: Reaction to the Discovery in 1939  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

consequences of nuclear weapons in 1939, such informationdevelopment of both nuclear weapons and civilian reactorsresponsible for nuclear weapons—or to absolve them. Rather,

Hodes, Elizabeth; Tiddens, Adolph; Badash, Lawrence

1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

348

Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

through its clandestine nuclear weapons program. If KEDOand construction of its nuclear weapons program. A regionalabandon its clandestine nuclear weapons program, and to more

Kaneko, Kumao; Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Choi, Jor-Shan; Fei, Edward

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

349

The politics of representation and the social order : in the War on Terror  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Stalinist Gets Nuclear Weapons. ” The NonproliferationWWII, and what to do with nuclear weapons development. Suchof (and spending on) nuclear weapons programs as well as

Chang, Gordon C.

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

350

Videos from the National Nuclear Safety Administration's (NNSA) YouTube Channel  

DOE Data Explorer (OSTI)

NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 as a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy, responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. NNSA's program support is divided into several key program areas including Defense, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, Emergency Operations, Infrastructure and Environment, Nuclear Security, Management and Administration and the Office of the Administrator. Each program area is focused on specific challenges. The nuclear security enterprise spans eight sites, including three national laboratories, with more than six decades of cutting-edge nuclear security experience. That history and technical expertise enables NNSA to accomplish its work across its four mission areas. (Copied from http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus). NNSA has more than 80 videos available on its YouTube channel.

351

Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A 582 (2007) 629637 Monte Carlo and analytical models of neutron detection with organic  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

unfolding, which have a variety of applications, including nuclear nonproliferation and homeland security materials in applications such as nuclear nonproliferation, homeland security, and basic physics research

Pázsit, Imre

352

Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Materials Assay  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

screening of cargo for nuclear weapons materials [2],[3].peaceful nuclear activities are not diverted to weapons

Quiter, Brian J.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

353

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program, Annual Report, Class of 2012  

SciTech Connect

This 32-pp annual report/brochure describes the accomplishments of the Class of 2012 of the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (the last class of this program), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The time period covers Sept 2011 through June 2013.

McMakin, Andrea H.

2013-09-23T23:59:59.000Z

354

DOE to Remove 200 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium from U.S. Nuclear  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

to Remove 200 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium from U.S. to Remove 200 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium from U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile DOE to Remove 200 Metric Tons of Highly Enriched Uranium from U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile November 7, 2005 - 12:38pm Addthis Will Be Redirected to Naval Reactors, Down-blended or Used for Space Programs WASHINGTON, DC - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove up to 200 metric tons (MT) of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), in the coming decades, from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons and prepare this material for other uses. Secretary Bodman made this announcement while addressing the 2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference in Washington, DC.

355

Supplement Analysis for the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

D D E P A R T M E N T O F E N E R G Y U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A SUPPLEMENT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE PANTEX PLANT AND ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON COMPONENTS DOE/EIS-0225/SA-03 United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Pantex Site Operations P.O. Box 30030 Amarillo, Texas 79120-0030 February 2003 i Summary The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing Procedures at 10 CFR 1021.330(d) require evaluation of its site-wide environmental impact statements (EISs) at least every 5 years by preparation of a supplement analysis (SA), as provided in 10 CFR 1021.314. Based on the SA, a determination is made as to whether the existing EIS remains

356

An investigation of the feasibility of building a harbor on the West coast of South America using explosive power of nuclear weapons, a preliminary report  

SciTech Connect

There is an interest in discovering the various peace time uses of nuclear explosives. One of the proposals is the building of harbors. There are several ports along the west coast of South America where lighterage is necessary. This implies a need for expanded harbor facilities. The problem is to find a good location for creating a harbor, and the feasibility of accomplishing this with the use of nuclear force. Feasibility includes blast effects, radiation hazards, the number of weapons needed, and economic considerations. Economic considerations include the cost of treating a harbor of sufficient depth and area, the building of harbor facilities, and the estimated savings and advantages of the new harbor. Several meetings were held with naval personnel of the Military Liaison group at UCRL to discuss the general problems of harbors. Thirty-three different ports were given a preliminary investigation.

Zodtner, H. H.

1971-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

357

Plutonium Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Home > Media Room > Fact Sheets > Plutonium Disposition Program Home > Media Room > Fact Sheets > Plutonium Disposition Program Fact Sheet Plutonium Disposition Program Jun 26, 2013 SUPPORTING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION Weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the critical ingredients for making a nuclear weapon. With the end of the Cold War, hundreds of tons of these materials were determined to be surplus to U.S. and Russian defense needs. Denying access to plutonium and HEU is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist organizations. The most certain method to prevent these materials from falling into the wrong hands is to dispose of them. During the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov signed a protocol

358

Obstacles to US ability to control and track weapons-grade uranium supplied abroad  

SciTech Connect

The United States has exported over 16,000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors in over 40 nations. GAO learned that the central computerized system used for tracking such exports is incomplete and inaccurate. Intended users also consider it inadequate and unreliable. In addition, three other systems gather information on highly enriched uranium. GAO recommends streamlining and consolidating the information maintained on this material in a more accurate, comprehensive, and flexible manner. GAO believes that reducing the use of highly enriched uranium is a sound non-proliferation objective. A number of obstacles, however, must be overcome if the conversion of research reactors to non-weapons grade fuels is to become a reality in the next few years. In the meantime, US ability to ensure adequate physical protection of highly enriched uranium supplied abroad is limited and international safeguards of nuclear material need further improvement.

Bowsher, C.A.

1982-08-02T23:59:59.000Z

359

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

nuclear reactor and then later chemically extract plutonium from the spent fuel. For years after the basic theory

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

360

Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

Trond Bjornard; Humberto Garcia; William Desmond; Scott Demuth

2010-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


361

The Nonproliferation Review  

SciTech Connect

The aim of this paper is to understand the numerous nuclear-related agreements that involve India and Pakistan, and in so doing identify starting points for future confidence-creating and confidence-building projects. Existing nuclear-related agreements provide a framework under which various projects can be proposed that foster greater nuclear transparency and cooperation in South Asia. The basic assumptions and arguments underlying this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) Increased nuclear transparency between India and Pakistan is a worthwhile objective, as it will lead to the irreversibility of extant nuclear agreements, the prospects of future agreements; and the balance of opacity and transparency required for stability in times of crises; (2) Given the current state of Indian and Pakistani relations, incremental progress in increased nuclear transparency is the most likely future outcome; and (3) Incremental progress can be achieved by enhancing the information exchange required by existing nuclear-related agreements.

RAJEN,GAURAV; BIRINGER,KENT L.

2000-07-28T23:59:59.000Z

362

R E S E A R H thE NIttY GRIttY  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

research and de- velopment responsibilities for nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, military technologies

363

Applications of boron-loaded scintillating fibers as NDA tools for nuclear safeguards  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation rely on nondestructive analytical tools for prompt and noninvasive detection

Douglas R. Mayo; Norbert Ensslin; Ronald F. Grazioso; A. Sharif Heger; David J. Mercer; Michael C. Miller; Phyllis A. Russo; Martin R. Sweet

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

364

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

designs. For example, CANDU-type nuclear reactors are morenegotiations with Canada for a CANDU reactor and with Franceearlier acquisition of a CANDU reactor, did the US become

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

365

Technical and Political Assessment of Peaceful Nuclear Power Program Prospects in North Africa and the  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

technical, political, legislative, nonproliferation, and safety infrastructure required for the capability in nuclear energy programs with regard to safety, nonproliferation and physical security

366

NONPROLIFERATION PROMOTED BY INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

NONPROLIFERATION PROMOTED BY INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION PNNL SA-50880 Gretchen E. Hund Center nonproliferation. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, the A.Q. Khan illicit trade network, and IAEA Director General nonproliferation by ensuring that these materials are secure throughout the whole supply chain. This paper analyzes

367

Our Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Home > Our Mission Our Mission NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States

368

Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

America's nuclear agenda, which affirms the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." - President Obama on the Nuclear Posture Review, April 6, 2010 "The...

369

Development of Superconducting High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers for Nuclear Safeguards  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: IAEA Safeguards indetonation of the first nuclear weapon in the desert of Newby the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and

Dreyer, Jonathan

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

370

Living in the Question? The Berlin Nuclear Crisis Critical Oral History  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions andOrigins of Overkill Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy,thirty five thousand nuclear weapons remain in the world,

Gould, Benina Berger

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

371

Commerce Control List Overview and the Country Chart Supplement No. 1 to Part 738page 1 Export Administration Regulations September 28, 2001  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

& Biological Weapons Nuclear Nonproliferation National Security Missile Tech Regional Stability Firearms Nonproliferation National Security Missile Tech Regional Stability Firearms Convention Crime Control Anti Weapons Nuclear Nonproliferation National Security Missile Tech Regional Stability Firearms Convention

Bernstein, Daniel

372

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

nuclear expertise in the Manhattan Project in just this way.Fearon 1995). As in the Manhattan Project example above, theits participation in the Manhattan Project. There remained a

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

373

Asians Resist Nuclear Threat  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Midway carries soma 100 nuclear weapons and the missiles onthe removal of U. S. nuclear weapons from Asia. It is ti-aeof U. S. tactical nuclear weapons This set the figure for

Schirmer, Daniel Boone

1981-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

374

Strategic Trade Control: Nonproliferation Engagement and Training  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation Engagement and Training Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral Export Control Arrangements Interdiction Engagement & Training INECP INSEP GIPP Safeguards Concepts and Approaches Human Capital Development Additional Protocol Technical Assistance National Security Systems & Assessments National Security Information Systems Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Radiation Detection & Response (RDR) Contact NPNS Other Major Programs Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE Division on Flickr Nonproliferation and National Security Program Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support (TNPS)

375

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR SCIENCE, VOL. 53, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2006 3021 New Readout Electronics for 3-D Position Sensitive  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

for homeland security and nuclear non-proliferation applications. Mechanically cooled HPGe detectors

He, Zhong

376

Review: Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer by Helen Caldicott  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

and the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation make itto a discussion of nuclear weapons proliferation. In the

Mirza, Umar Karim

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

377

The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing Fence-Sitters in the Post-Cold War Era  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

both Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member-states,ratifying the non- proliferation treaty, is different fromembedded in the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) bargain. The

Solingen, Etel

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

378

Review of the nuclear safeguards problem. [Proliferation; terrorism  

SciTech Connect

The issues surrounding nuclear safeguards are proliferation and terrorism. Protecting the nuclear fuel cycle against nuclear materials diversion has been the function of the NPT and the IAEA. However, because all nations have not signed the NPT and IAEA safeguarding inspections are not foolproof, the fuel cycle itself has been looked to as a possible way to alleviate concerns over proliferation. A civilian nuclear industry is not needed to produce weapon material, since research reactors can provide the necessary weapon-grade uranium or plutonium much cheaper and easier than commercial power reactors. Thus, altering the nuclear fuel cycle does not necessarily reduce the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only strict enforcement of the NPT and of the safeguard guidelines of the IAEA can achieve nonproliferation. Changing the fuel cycle does not present terrorists from stealing highly radioactive material to be used for weapons or from sabotaging nuclear facilities. Policing a nuclear facility by using guards, alarms, barriers, and searching and screening of employees is the only way to protect against terrorism, but these actions raise questions regarding civil liberties.

Poch, L.A.; Wolsko, T.D.

1979-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

379

Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

IAEA or the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are notof course the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and thethe Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985

Kaneko, Kumao; Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Choi, Jor-Shan; Fei, Edward

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

380

The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing Fence-Sitters in the Post-Cold War Era  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Bracken, Paul. 1992. “Nuclear Weapons and state Survival inbut not admitting to—a nuclear weapons capability? Three ofnations veil their nuclear weapons programs and defy widely-

Solingen, Etel

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


381

Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

component of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) responsive infrastructure, supports NNSA an important component of the scientific and technical understanding required to assess the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. The program provides this capability

382

Characterization of U/Pu Particles Originating From the Nuclear Weapon Accidents at Palomares, Spain, 1966 And Thule, Greenland, 1968  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Following the USAF B-52 bomber accidents at Palomares, Spain in 1966 and at Thule, Greenland in 1968, radioactive particles containing uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) were dispersed into the environment. To improve long-term environmental impact assessments for the contaminated ecosystems, particles from the two sites have been isolated and characterized with respect to properties influencing particle weathering rates. Low [239]Pu/[235]U (0.62-0.78) and [240]Pu/[239]Pu (0.055-0.061) atom ratios in individual particles from both sites obtained by Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) show that the particles contain highly enriched U and weapon-grade Pu. Furthermore, results from electron microscopy with Energy Dispersive X-ray analysis (EDX) and synchrotron radiation (SR) based micrometer-scale X-ray fluorescence ({micro}-XRF) 2D mapping demonstrated that U and Pu coexist throughout the 1-50 {micro}m sized particles, while surface heterogeneities were observed in EDX line scans. SR-based micrometer-scale X-ray Absorption Near Edge Structure Spectroscopy ({micro}-XANES) showed that the particles consisted of an oxide mixture of U (predominately UO[2] with the presence ofU[3][8]) and Pu ((III)/(IV), (V)/(V) or (III), (IV) and (V)). Neither metallic U or Pu nor uranyl or Pu(VI) could be observed. Characteristics such as elemental distributions, morphology and oxidation states are remarkably similar for the Palomares and Thule particles, reflecting that they originate from similar source and release scenarios. Thus, these particle characteristics are more dependent on the original material from which the particles are derived (source) and the formation of particles (release scenario) than the environmental conditions to which the particles have been exposed since the late 1960s.

Lind, O.C.; Salbu, B.; Janssens, K.; Proost, K.; Garcia-Leon, M.; Garcia-Tenorio, R.

2007-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

383

Issues Associated with IAEA Involvement in Assured Nuclear Fuel Supply Arrangements  

SciTech Connect

Assured nuclear fuel supply has been discussed at various times as a mechanism to help limit expansion of enrichment and reprocessing (E&R) capability beyond current technology holders. Given the events in the last few years in North Korea and Iran, concern over weapons capabilities gained from acquisition of E&R capabilities has heightened and brought assured nuclear fuel supply (AFS) again to the international agenda. Successful AFS programs can be valuable contributions to strengthening the nonproliferation regime and helping to build public support for expanding nuclear energy.

Kessler, Carol E.; Mathews, Carrie E.

2008-02-08T23:59:59.000Z

384

Utility of Social Modeling in Assessment of a State’s Propensity for Nuclear Proliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report is the third and final report out of a set of three reports documenting research for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Security Administration (NASA) Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling program that investigates how social modeling can be used to improve proliferation assessment for informing nuclear security, policy, safeguards, design of nuclear systems and research decisions. Social modeling has not to have been used to any significant extent in a proliferation studies. This report focuses on the utility of social modeling as applied to the assessment of a State's propensity to develop a nuclear weapons program.

Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Whitney, Paul D.; Dalton, Angela C.; Olson, Jarrod; White, Amanda M.; Cooley, Scott K.; Youchak, Paul M.; Stafford, Samuel V.

2011-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

385

A historical application of social amplification of risk model: Economic impacts of risk events at nuclear weapons facilities?  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Public perceptions of risk have proven to be a critical barrier to the federal government`s extensive, decade-long, technical and scientific effort to site facilities for the interim storage and permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The negative imagery, fear, and anxiety that are linked to ``nuclear`` and ``radioactive`` technologies, activities, and facilities by the public originate from the personal realities and experiences of individuals and the information they receive. These perceptions continue to be a perplexing problem for those responsible for making decisions about federal nuclear waste management policies and programs. The problem of understanding and addressing public perceptions is made even more difficult because there are decidedly different opinions about HLW held by the public and nuclear industry and radiation health experts.

Metz, W.C.

1996-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

386

Sodium Reaction Experimental Test Facility (SRETF) - Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Form Modeling Departments Engineering Analysis Nuclear Systems Analysis Research & Test Reactor Nonproliferation and National Security Detection & Diagnostic Systems...

387

Nonproliferation - Tell-tale seals | ornl.gov  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

SHARE SHARE Nonproliferation - Tell-tale seals Using an Oak Ridge National Laboratory technology, inspectors of containers of nuclear material will be able to know with unprecedented confidence whether an intruder has tampered with a seal. The system uses a light source of entangled photons to verify the continuity of a fiber-based seal, according to Travis Humble, who led the development team. Entanglement is a feature of quantum physics that describes how two spatially disparate systems exhibit strong correlations in otherwise independent behaviors. The work, sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, is vital to ensure compliance with nonproliferation treaties because inspectors must confirm the uninterrupted containment and surveillance of any nuclear material.

388

Alternative dispositioning methods for HEU spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site  

SciTech Connect

The United States has a strong policy on prevention of the international spread of nuclear weapons. This policy was announced in Presidential Directive PDD-13 and summarized in a White House press release September 27, 1993. Two cornerstones of this policy are: seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of highly- enriched uranium or plutonium; propose{hor_ellipsis}prohibiting the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside international safeguards. The Department of Energy is currently struggling to devise techniques that safely and efficiently dispose of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) while satisfying national non-proliferation policies. SRS plans and proposals for disposing of their SNF are safe and cost effective, and fully satisfy non-proliferation objectives.

Krupa, J.F.; McKibben, J.M.; Parks, P.B.; DuPont, M.E.

1995-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

389

NNSA Timeline | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Timeline | National Nuclear Security Administration Timeline | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog NNSA Timeline Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline NNSA Timeline The NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 as a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy, responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation,

390

Our History | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

History | National Nuclear Security Administration History | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Our History Home > About Us > Our History Our History The NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 as a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy, responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation,

391

International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP)  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and Nonproliferation and National Security Program > TNPS > Strategic Trade Control > International Programs > INECP Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral Export Control Arrangements Interdiction Engagement & Training INECP INSEP GIPP Safeguards Concepts and Approaches Human Capital Development Additional Protocol Technical Assistance National Security Systems & Assessments National Security Information Systems Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Radiation Detection & Response (RDR) Contact NPNS Other Major Programs Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE Division on Flickr

392

THE OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION & NATIONAL SECURITY  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

W. HORAK Chair TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION and PARTNERSHIPS W. COPAN Manager NONPROLIFERATION and NATIONAL SECURITY C. KESSLER Chair RESEARCH OPERATIONS L. Bowerman *Reports...

393

Office of the Assistant General Counsel for Civilian Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Waste (HLW) and Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Management of Nuclear Materials and Non-HLW Nuclear Fuel Cycle Energy Research and Development Non-Proliferation Nuclear Regulatory...

394

The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

ambitions: The spread of nuclear weapons 1989-1990. Boulder:Determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation. UnpublishedWhy nations forgo nuclear weapons. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s

Kroenig, Matthew

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

395

Law as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Treaty, 155 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 156 the3435. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21

Yoo, John C.

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

396

REVIEW OF INDUSTRIES AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR TECHNOLOGIES APPLICABLE TO DEACTIVATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITIES  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Deactivation and Decommissioning Focus Area's (DDFA's) mission is to develop, demonstrate, and deploy improved deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) technologies. This mission requires that emphasis be continually placed on identifying technologies currently employed or under development in other nuclear as well as nonnuclear industries and government agencies. In support of DDFA efforts to clean up the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) radiologically contaminated surplus facilities using technologies that improve worker safety, reduce costs, and accelerate cleanup schedules, a study was conducted to identify innovative technologies developed for use in nonnuclear arenas that are appropriate for D&D applications.

Reilkoff, T. E.; Hetland, M. D.; O'Leary, E. M.

2002-02-25T23:59:59.000Z

397

Accelerated Clean-up of the United States Department of Energy, Mound Nuclear Weapons Facility in Miamisburg, Ohio  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

CH2M HILL is executing a performance-based contract with the United States Department of Energy to accelerate the safe closure of the nuclear facilities at the former Mound plant in Miamisburg, Ohio. The contract started in January 2003 with a target completion date of March 31, 2006. Our accelerated baseline targets completion of the project 2 years ahead of the previous baseline schedule, by spring 2006, and for $200 million less than previous estimates. This unique decommissioning and remediation project is located within the City of Miamisburg proper and is designed for transfer of the property to the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation for industrial reuse. The project is being performed with the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation and their tenants co-located on the site creating significant logistical, safety and stakeholder challenges. The project is also being performed in conjunction with the United States Department of Energy, United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency under the Mound 2000 regulatory cleanup process. The project is currently over 95% complete. To achieve cleanup and closure of the Mound site, CH2M HILL's scope includes: - Demolition of 64 nuclear, radiological and commercial facilities - Preparation for Transfer of 9 facilities (including a Category 2 nuclear facility) to the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation for industrial reuse - Removal of all above ground utility structures and components, and preparation for transfer of 9 utility systems to Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation - Investigation, remediation, closure, and documentation of all known Potential Release Sites contaminated with radiological and chemical contamination (73 identified in original contract) - Storage, characterization, processing, packaging and shipment of all waste and excess nuclear materials - Preparation for Transfer of the 306 acre site to the Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation for industrial reuse In the first two and a half years the project has successfully completed more demolition work, more environmental remediation work and more waste shipping than any other period in site history while improving the safety statistics of the site significantly. CH2M HILL Mound established a safety culture to promote line management safety responsibility and continues to place a high emphasis on safety performance even in an accelerated closure environment. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Time Restricted Case (TRC) and Days Away and Restricted Time (DART) rates improved 76% and 90%, respectively, since contract start from 2002 to 2005. These rates are the lowest the site has ever seen. The site has also gone over 1 million hours without a Lost Workday Case accident. Covered below are the key strategies for safety improvement and project delivery that have been successful at the Miamisburg Closure Project are presented. (authors)

Lehew, J.G.; Bradford, J.D.; Cabbil, C.C. [CH2M Hill / CH2M Hill Mound, Inc., 1075 Mound Road, Miamisburg, OH 45343 (United States)

2006-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

398

DOE Statement on UK Government's "Road to 2010" Report on Nuclear Security  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Statement on UK Government's "Road to 2010" Report on Nuclear Statement on UK Government's "Road to 2010" Report on Nuclear Security DOE Statement on UK Government's "Road to 2010" Report on Nuclear Security July 17, 2009 - 12:00am Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - Thomas P. D'Agostino, the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, today applauded the British government's new report on advancing the global nuclear security agenda. Issued yesterday, "The Road to 2010 - Addressing the Nuclear Question in the Twenty First Century" outlines a strategy for addressing the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons ahead of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Among other steps, it includes the creation of a UK Center for Nuclear

399

Consequence Management, Safeguards & Non-Proliferation Tools | ORNL  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Consequence Consequence Management, Safeguards, and Non-Proliferation Tools SHARE Consequence Management, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Tools UF 6 Enrichment Facility Visualization of the gamma radiation field in a mock-up of a UF-6 enrichment facility. The solution was generated on a desktop computer using ORNL's Denovo SN transport code and ADVANTG interface, using geometry and material descriptions from an NRL SWORD input file. ORNL is a leader in developing state-of-the-art radiation transport modeling and simulation tools and in applying these tools to solve challenging problems in national and global nuclear security. Recent developments in high-performance, high-fidelity, deterministic Monte Carlo, and hybrid Monte Carlo/deterministic radiation transport codes within

400

NPT Signed | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Signed | National Nuclear Security Administration Signed | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > NPT Signed NPT Signed March 05, 1970 New York, United States NPT Signed The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and forty-five other nations sign the Treaty for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


401

Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security  

SciTech Connect

Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security - sometimes referred to as the '3S' concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of nuclear safeguards infrastructure in countries with credible plans for nuclear energy as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. Developing an adequate safeguards infrastructure is critical to becoming a responsible 'owner' of nuclear power. The 3S concept is the optimal path forward to achieving this goal.

Kovacic, Donald N [ORNL; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia [ORNL; McClelland-Kerr, John [U.S. Department of Energy; Van sickle, Matthew [U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration; Bissani, Mo [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

402

Impact of contributions of Glenn T. Seaborg on nuclear science  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and took thetalks were begun. The non- proliferation treaty (NPT) wasban treaty, nuclear non-proliferation and the use of nuclear

Hoffman, Darleane C.

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

403

Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile  

SciTech Connect

In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

1992-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

404

EIS-0218: Final Environmental Impact Statement | Department of...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Environmental Impact Statement EIS-0218: Final Environmental Impact Statement Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear...

405

Model-Based Calculations of the Probability of a Country's Nuclear Proliferation Decisions  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The first nuclear weapon was detonated in August 1945 over Japan to end World War II. During the past six decades, the majority of the world's countries have abstained from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, a number of countries have explored the nuclear weapons option, 23 in all. Among them, 14 countries have dropped their interest in nuclear weapons after initiating some efforts. And nine of them today possess nuclear weapons. These countries include the five nuclear weapons states - U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China - and the four non- NPT member states - Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Many of these countries initially used civilian nuclear power technology development as a basis or cover for their military program. Recent proliferation incidents in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea brought the world together to pay much attention to nuclear nonproliferation. With the expected surge in the use of nuclear energy for power generation by developing countries, the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime needs to be better prepared for potential future challenges. For the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime to effectively cope with any future proliferation attempts, early detection of potentially proliferation-related activities is highly desirable. Early detection allows the international community to respond and take necessary actions - ideally using political and diplomatic influences without resorting to harsh measures such as sanctions or military actions. In this regard, a capability to quantitatively predict the chance of a country's nuclear proliferation intent or activities is of significant interest. There have been various efforts in the research community to understand the determinants of nuclear proliferation and develop quantitative tools to predict nuclear proliferation events. These efforts have shown that information about the political issues surrounding a country's security along with economic development data can be useful to explain the occurrences of proliferation decisions. However, predicting major historical proliferation events using model-based predictions has been unreliable. Nuclear proliferation decisions by a country is affected by three main factors: (1) technology; (2) finance; and (3) political motivation [1]. Technological capability is important as nuclear weapons development needs special materials, detonation mechanism, delivery capability, and the supporting human resources and knowledge base. Financial capability is likewise important as the development of the technological capabilities requires a serious financial commitment. It would be difficult for any state with a gross national product (GNP) significantly less than that of about $100 billion to devote enough annual governmental funding to a nuclear weapon program to actually achieve positive results within a reasonable time frame (i.e., 10 years). At the same time, nuclear proliferation is not a matter determined by a mastery of technical details or overcoming financial constraints. Technology or finance is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for nuclear proliferation. At the most fundamental level, the proliferation decision by a state is controlled by its political motivation. To effectively address the issue of predicting proliferation events, all three of the factors must be included in the model. To the knowledge of the authors, none of the exiting models considered the 'technology' variable as part of the modeling. This paper presents an attempt to develop a methodology for statistical modeling and predicting a country's nuclear proliferation decisions. The approach is based on the combined use of data on a country's nuclear technical capability profiles economic development status, security environment factors and internal political and cultural factors. All of the information utilized in the study was from open source literature. (authors)

Li, Jun; Yim, Man-Sung; McNelis, David N. [Department of Nuclear Engineering North Carolina State University (United States)

2007-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

406

Principal Associate Director - Weapons Programs  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons Programs As Principal Associate Director for the Weapons Program, Knapp leads the programs to assure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the systems in the nation's...

407

Deputy Secretary Poneman's Remarks at the Third Annual Nuclear Deterrence  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

at the Third Annual Nuclear at the Third Annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit - As Prepared for Delivery Deputy Secretary Poneman's Remarks at the Third Annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit - As Prepared for Delivery February 17, 2011 - 3:49pm Addthis Third Annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit Thursday, February 17, 2011 Arlington, Virginia "Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation" "We face a choice between the quick and the dead." These are the words that Bernard Baruch used to introduce his plan to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, at the opening session of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, at Hunter College in NYC, in June 1946. Fortunately, throughout the intervening decades, we have been quick, or at least quick enough. Indeed, sometimes we seemed to be just a step or

408

The Division System in Crisis: Essays on Contemporary Korea  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

international nuclear non proliferation regime. 1) The DPRKto the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Nak-chung, Paik

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

409

2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference 2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference 2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference November 7, 2005 - 12:36pm Addthis Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Sam Bodman I am very glad to be with all of you today. Let me just say to Rose and to everyone associated with the Carnegie Endowment that the Bush Administration values the work that you do. This is particularly so with this series of conferences dedicated to exploring the complicated issues of nonproliferation policy. And allow me to offer the congratulations of my Department to Director General El Baradei and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the award conferred last month by the Nobel Foundation. We should applaud the Agency's staff and all the member nations that come

410

2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

5 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference 5 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference 2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference November 7, 2005 - 12:36pm Addthis Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Sam Bodman I am very glad to be with all of you today. Let me just say to Rose and to everyone associated with the Carnegie Endowment that the Bush Administration values the work that you do. This is particularly so with this series of conferences dedicated to exploring the complicated issues of nonproliferation policy. And allow me to offer the congratulations of my Department to Director General El Baradei and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the award conferred last month by the Nobel Foundation. We should applaud the Agency's staff and all the member nations that come

411

Dr. John R. Phillips Chief Scientist -Central Intelligence Agency  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

and nonproliferation, chemical weapons detection and verification, environmental monitoring and remediation, nuclear. Throughout his career at Los Alamos, Dr. Phillips has also participated in numerous nonproliferation

412

Small Island States in the Face of Climatic Change: The End of the Line in International Environmental Responsibility  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the 108. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,al- ready engaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty with its

Gillespie, Alexander

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

413

ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF INNOVATIVE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES.  

SciTech Connect

The National Nuclear Security Administration is developing methods for nonproliferation assessments to support the development and implementation of U.S. nonproliferation policy. This paper summarizes the key results of that effort. Proliferation resistance is the degree of difficulty that a nuclear material, facility, process, or activity poses to the acquisition of one or more nuclear weapons. A top-level measure of proliferation resistance for a fuel cycle system is developed here from a hierarchy of metrics. At the lowest level, intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to proliferation are defined. These barriers are recommended as a means to characterize the proliferation characteristics of a fuel cycle. Because of the complexity of nonproliferation assessments, the problem is decomposed into: metrics to be computed, barriers to proliferation, and a finite set of threats. The spectrum of potential threats of nuclear proliferation is complex and ranges from small terrorist cells to industrialized countries with advanced nuclear fuel cycles. Two general categories of methods have historically been used for nonproliferation assessments: attribute analysis and scenario analysis. In the former, attributes of the systems being evaluated (often fuel cycle systems) are identified that affect their proliferation potential. For a particular system under consideration, the attributes are weighted subjectively. In scenario analysis, hypothesized scenarios of pathways to proliferation are examined. The analyst models the process undertaken by the proliferant to overcome barriers to proliferation and estimates the likelihood of success in achieving a proliferation objective. An attribute analysis approach should be used at the conceptual design level in the selection of fuel cycles that will receive significant investment for development. In the development of a detailed facility design, a scenario approach should be undertaken to reduce the potential for design vulnerabilities. While, there are distinctive elements in each approach, an analysis could be performed that utilizes aspects of each approach.

BARI,R.; ROGLANS,J.; DENNING,R.; MLADINEO,S.

2003-06-23T23:59:59.000Z

414

Nonproliferation, Nuclear Security, and the Insider Threat  

SciTech Connect

Insider threat concept is evolving and getting more attention: (1) Domestically, internationally and in foreign countries, (2) At the government, academia, and industry levels, and (3) Public awareness and concerns are also growing. Negligence can be an insider's action. Technology advancements provide more opportunities, new tools for the insider. Our understanding of the insider is shaped by our cultural, social and ethnic perceptions and traditions. They also can limit our recognition of the issues and response actions.

Balatsky, Galya I. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Duggan, Ruth [SNL

2012-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

415

Nonproliferation issues in the nuclear energy future  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The continuing increases in annual greenhouse gas emissions, in the absence of stringent mitigation measures, will produce a doubling of pre-industrial atmospheric concentrations in the second half of this century and a ...

Jones, Christopher Michael, 1976-

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

416

Contact Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press...

417

Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

attendees agreed to encourage the use of LEU targets and other proliferation-resistant technologies in various commercial applications such as isotope production. This was a...

418

Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and the IAEA in Tomorrow's World  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards have evolved considerably during the last five decades and have become an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and the global security system. To carry on serving well the international community, they need to continue to move with the times -- especially in light of the renewed interest in nuclear energy and its projected expansion in the coming years, which could bring additional nuclear facilities, material and activities under IAEA safeguards. The projected nuclear ˜renaissance" may pose increased proliferation risks as nuclear material, technology and know-how spread in an increasingly globalized world. The presentation will provide an overview of the IAEA safeguards system and describe current verification challenges and potential new IAEA roles.

Cooley, Jill (IAEA)

2008-09-08T23:59:59.000Z

419

Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities Division  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

role in developing science and technology for nuclear power programs, nuclear propulsion, nuclear medicine, and the nation's nuclear weapon program among others. Many...

420

Plutonium Pits | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

nuclear weapons without underground nuclear testing; weapons go through a surveillance process, where they are regularly taken apart, examined, and tests run on their components....

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


421

PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Weapons Data Control Systems PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems PIA PIA - Weapons Data Control Systems...

422

Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies • Second Quarter 1993I................................................................................................................................................................  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Observers from the Department of Energy and the Defense Nuclear Agency watch as a tag/seal is applied to a uranium hexafluoride cylinder during the demonstration held at Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. In June 1993, the Department of Energy conducted a demonstration of the ability to tag and seal potential nuclear material containers appropriate for the U.S.-Russian conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to lowenrichment uranium (LEU). Begun in the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the task was carried out after DOE's reorganization by the Qffice of Research and Development. Tags and seals that were previously developed at the DOE national laboratories and under the sponsorship of the Defense Nuclear Agency were demonstrated on three possible containers: the Department of Transportation Specification 6M HEU container, the AT-400R HEU container, and the Type 30B uranium hexafluoride cylinder.

Thepurposeof Armscontroland

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

423

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study  

SciTech Connect

NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.

1995-12-19T23:59:59.000Z

424

Export control guide: Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and preparation of plutonium metal  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states in Article III, paragraph 2(b) that {open_quotes}Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide . . . equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.{close_quotes} This guide was prepared to assist export control officials in the interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws and controls relating to the international Trigger List for irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, components, and materials. The guide also contains information related to the production of plutonium metal. Reprocessing and its place in the nuclear fuel cycle are described briefly; the standard procedure to prepare metallic plutonium is discussed; steps used to prepare Trigger List controls are cited; descriptions of controlled items are given; and special materials of construction are noted. This is followed by a comprehensive description of especially designed or prepared equipment, materials, and components of reprocessing and plutonium metal processes and includes photographs and/or pictorial representations. The nomenclature of the Trigger List has been retained in the numbered sections of this document for clarity.

NONE

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

425

PROCEEDINGS OF 1976 SUMMER WORKSHOP ON AN ENERGY EXTENSION SERVICE  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

oj the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)fundamental non- proliferation principles governing (1) thethe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The

Authors, Various

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

426

Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

3 of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,22] Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,the risk of arms proliferation. Player A uses a “non-convex”

Baliga, Sandeep; Sjostrom, Tomas

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

427

ME 379M-Nuclear Safety and Security ABET EC2000 syllabus  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

assessment models and nuclear non-proliferation. Failure classifications, failure modes, effects and Roger Cooke, Cambridge University Press, 2006, ISBN: 0-521-77320-2. Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Primer consists of two parts ­ Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Nuclear Nonproliferation. The students will learn

Ben-Yakar, Adela

428

Y-12 National Security Complex | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Home > About Us > Our Locations > Y-12 National Security Complex Home > About Us > Our Locations > Y-12 National Security Complex Y-12 National Security Complex http://www.y12.doe.gov/ Field Office: The NNSA Production Office is responsible for contract management and oversight of the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas and the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn. Y-12 supports the Nuclear Security Enterprise through nuclear material processing, manufacturing and storage operations and nuclear nonproliferation activities and provides enriched uranium feedstock for the U.S. Navy. National Security Complex: The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) serves as the nation's only source of enriched uranium nuclear weapons components and provides enriched uranium for the U.S. Navy. Y-12 is a leader in materials science and precision manufacturing and serves as the

429

SNIF: A Futuristic Neutrino Probe for Undeclared Nuclear Fission Reactors  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Today reactor neutrino experiments are at the cutting edge of fundamental research in particle physics. Understanding the neutrino is far from complete, but thanks to the impressive progress in this field over the last 15 years, a few research groups are seriously considering that neutrinos could be useful for society. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works with its Member States to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. In a context of international tension and nuclear renaissance, neutrino detectors could help IAEA to enforce the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this article we discuss a futuristic neutrino application to detect and localize an undeclared nuclear reactor from across borders. The SNIF (Secret Neutrino Interactions Finder) concept proposes to use a few hundred thousand tons neutrino detectors to unveil clandestine fission reactors. Beyond previous studies we provide estimates of all known background sources as a function of the detecto...

Lasserre, Thierry; Mention, Guillaume; Reboulleau, Romain; Cribier, Michel; Letourneau, Alain; Lhuillier, David

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

430

Development of Superconducting High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers for Nuclear Safeguards  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of smuggling. Today, nuclear security is significantly morecritical importance of nuclear security, stating that thereJ. Doyle. Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation:

Dreyer, Jonathan

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

431

President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon ...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapon President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon January 31, 1950 Washington, DC President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon President...

432

MEND: A Nurturing Voice in the Nuclear Arms Debate  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

for the Meaning of Nuclear Weapons These papers arethe meaning of nuclear weapons in U.S. -USSR relations.the argument about nuclear weapons (Cicourel et al. , 1987),

Wills, John; Mehan, Hugh

1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

433

Introduction to Special Edition on University Nonproliferation Education and Training  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Introduction to Special Edition on University Nonproliferation Education and Training PNNL-SA-50159 Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold destruction has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another

434

GLOBAL SECURITY & NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS MISSION STATEMENT AND FACT SHEET  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

GLOBAL SECURITY & NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS MISSION STATEMENT AND FACT SHEET MISSION The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Global Security & Nonproliferation Programs (GS&N) develop, coordinate a strategic threat to the United States. Through its nonproliferation programs, the ORNL GS&N is a primary

Pennycook, Steve

435

Comparative Assessment of Status and Opportunities for CO2 Capture and Storage and Radioactive Waste Disposal in North America  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Energy Agency), Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons &are protected from proliferation and misuse for non-peaceful

Oldenburg, C.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

436

Sandia National Laboratories: Research: Research Foundations...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

including energy security, defense, intelligence, nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, disaster response, and climate security. Our unique value Expertise in energy production,...

437

10 CFR Part 810 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nuclear power plant 10 CFR Part 810 Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nuclear...

438

Prospects and Challenges for a Global Expansion of Nuclear Energy  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... in such countries will be challenging, as will be the additional strain that a global spread of nuclear power will put on the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

439

Nuclear Material Recovery | Y-12 National Security Complex  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Recovery Securing nuclear material domestically and internationally is one part of Y-12's nuclear nonproliferation business. Miscellaneous scrap material is a diverse group of...

440

2010 Annual Planning Summary for Nuclear Energy (NE) | Department...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Annual Planning Summary for National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center (NNSA-SC) 2010 Annual Planning Summary for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20) 2010 Annual...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


441

Report, Long-Term Nuclear Technology Research and Development...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

safeguards and nonproliferation, environmental management and waste cleanup, and Navy nuclear propulsion systems development resides outside the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science...

442

Administrator D'Agostino on NNSA Nuclear Safeguards and Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

global challenges of nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards and security. Understanding, developing and implementing proper nuclear safeguards is an important part of any...

443

Largest Federally Owned Wind Farm Breaks Ground at U.S. Weapons...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

site for the assembly, disassembly, and maintenance of the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile. Under the Obama Administration, federal agencies have reduced greenhouse...

444

Quality at Y-12, part 2Or: Looking at Y-12 weapons quality ...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

organizational structure. After seeing how all the other contractor sites in the Nuclear Weapons Complex were organized, DOE-AL felt Y-12 should have a specific organization...

445

Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: The non-proliferation experiment. First quarter 1994  

SciTech Connect

In this issue of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies we present the initial findings of the recent Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), conducted by the Department of Energy at the Nevada Test Site. Through an introduction and pictorial walk-through, Marv Denny and Jay Zucca of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory describe the overall experiment. This is followed by scientific and technical abstracts of the complex suite of experiments and analyses, which were presented at the Symposium on Non-Proliferation Experiment Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, April 19--21, 1994. Questions regarding the ongoing analysis and conclusions from the NPE should be directed to Leslie Casey in the Office of Research and Development within the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security of DOE. Her phone number is 202-586-2151.

Staehle, G.; Stull, S.; Talaber, C. [eds.

1994-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

446

Nuclear power and nuclear-weapons proliferation  

SciTech Connect

The material presented in this article attempts to clarify the basic technical and political issues that are being debated in the contest between breeder reactors to insure abundant energy with possible resulting proliferation and the questionable continuation of uranium-fueled reactors with possible future availability of uranium. The connection between various fuel cycles and their possibility for proliferation are discussed. (BLM)

Moniz, E.J.; Neff, T.L.

1978-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

447

Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Global appetite for fission power is projected to grow dramatically this century, and for good reason. Despite considerable research to identify new sources of energy, fission remains the most plentiful and practical alternative to fossil fuels. The environmental challenges of fossil fuel have made the fission power option increasingly attractive, particularly as we are forced to rely on reserves in ecologically fragile or politically unstable corners of the globe. Caught between a globally eroding fossil fuel reserve as well as the uncertainty and considerable costs in the development of fusion power, most of the world will most likely come to rely on fission power for at least the remainder of the 21st century. Despite inevitable growth, fission power faces enduring challenges in sustainability and security. One of fission power's greatest hurdles to universal acceptance is the risk of potential misuse for nefarious purposes of fissionable byproducts in spent fuel, such as plutonium. With this issue in mind, we have discussed intrinsic concepts in this report that are motivated by the premise that the utility, desirability, and applicability of nuclear materials can be reduced. In a general sense, the intrinsic solutions aim to reduce or eliminate the quantity of existing weapons usable material; avoid production of new weapons-usable material through enrichment, breeding, extraction; or employ engineering solutions to make the fuel cycle less useful or more difficult for producing weapons-usable material. By their nature, these schemes require modifications to existing fuel cycles. As such, the concomitants of these modifications require engagement from the nuclear reactor and fuel-design community to fully assess their effects. Unfortunately, active pursuit of any scheme that could further complicate the spread of domestic nuclear power will probably be understandably unpopular. Nevertheless, the nonproliferation and counterterrorism issues are paramount, and we posit that the exploration, development, and implementation of intrinsic mechanisms such as discussed here are part of a balanced approach aimed at preventing the misuse of nuclear material for nuclear-energy applications.

Gray, L W; Moody, K J; Bradley, K S; Lorenzana, H E

2011-02-18T23:59:59.000Z

448

The National Nuclear Security Administration's B61 Spin Rocket...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

essentially identical, produce thrust to arm thz weapon. In Deceinber 2001, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) received Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and...

449

U.S. Nuclear Policy and the NPT  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Disarmament October 18, 2011 Thomas P. D'Agostino, Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration 2 Outline - Reducing nuclear weapons - Ceasing production of weapons...

450

The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing Fence-Sitters in the Post-Cold War Era  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

ment to nuclear non-proliferation over the long- term.1993. “Maintaining a Non- proliferation Regime. ” In NuclearNew Approach to Nuclear Non- proliferation in Argentina and

Solingen, Etel

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

451

JPRS report: Nuclear developments, [June 28, 1989  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Partial contents include: Nuclear Power; Qinshan Plant; Nuclear Weapons; Nuclear Power Plants; Nuclear Waste; Nuclear Policy; Decontamination Devices; and Environmental Protection.

NONE

1989-06-28T23:59:59.000Z

452

Weapons test seismic investigations at Yucca Mountain  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Yucca Mountain, located on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site, is being characterized as part of an ongoing effort to identify a potential high-level nuclear waste repository. This site will be subjected to seismic ground motions induced by underground nuclear explosions. A knowledge of expected ground motion levels from these tests will enable the designers to provide for the necessary structural support in the designs of the various components of the repository. The primary objective of the Weapons Test Seismic Investigation project is to develop a method to predict the ground motions expected at the repository site as a result of future weapons tests. This paper summarizes the data base presently assembled for the Yucca Mountain Project, characteristics of expected ground motions, and characterization of the two-dimensional seismic properties along paths between Yucca Mountain and the testing areas of the Nevada Test Site.

Phillips, J.S.; Shephard, L.E.; Walck, M.C.

1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

453

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferati

Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

454

Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates Bret Knapp to head combined Weapons Engineering, Weapons Physics Directorates at Los Alamos National Laboratory New leadership position will allow for greater integration in the planning and execution of the stockpile stewardship program. August 18, 2009 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy

455

Rapid Sampling Tools - Nuclear Engineering Multimedia  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and National Security Nonproliferation and National Security > Multimedia > Rapid Sampling Tools Director's Welcome Organization Achievements Highlights Fact Sheets, Brochures & Other Documents Multimedia Library About Nuclear Energy Nuclear Reactors Designed by Argonne Argonne's Nuclear Science and Technology Legacy Opportunities within NE Division Visit Argonne Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE on Flickr Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of Chicago Pile 1 (CP-1) Argonne OutLoud on Nuclear Energy Argonne Energy Showcase 2012 Nonproliferation and National Security - Multimedia Bookmark and Share NPNS Multimedia, a collection of videos and audios featuring activities related to Nonproliferation and National Security

456

Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons Science & Technology National labs provide the science and technology to maintain and certify the nuclear stockpile in the absence of full-scale weapons testing. The...

457

Long-Term Planning for Nuclear Energy Systems Under Deep Uncertainty  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

and Demand for Nuclear Weapons . . . 4.3 ProliferationZero: Is Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Too Difficult?Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton University Press,

Kim, Lance Kyungwoo

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

458

Framework for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection for Nonproliferation Impact Assessments.  

SciTech Connect

This report describes a framework for proliferation resistance and physical protection evaluation for the fuel cycle systems envisioned in the expansion of nuclear power for electricity generation. The methodology is based on an approach developed as part of the Generation IV technical evaluation framework and on a qualitative evaluation approach to policy factors similar to those that were introduced in previous Nonproliferation Impact Assessments performed by DOE.

Bari,R.

2008-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

459

Defense programs: A Sandia weapon review bulletin  

SciTech Connect

Sandia`s mission to explore technology that enhances US nuclear weapons capabilities has been the primary impetus for the development of a class of inertial measurement units not available commercially. The newest member of the family is the Ring Laser Gyro Assembly. The product of a five-year joint effort by Sandia and Honeywell`s Space and Strategic Systems Operation, the RLGA is a small, one-nautical-mile-per-hour-class inertial measurement unit that consumes only 16 watts - attributes that are important to a guidance and control capability for new or existing weapons. These same attributes led the Central Inertial Guidance Test Facility at Holloman Air Force Base to select the RLGA for their newest test instrumentation pod. The RLGA sensor assembly is composed of three Honeywell ring laser gyroscopes and three Sundstrand Data Control accelerometers that are selected from three types according to the user`s acceleration range and accuracy needs.

Floyd, H.L.; Goetsch, B.; Doran, L. [eds.

1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

460

Nuclear Reactors  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Reactors Nuclear reactors created not only large amounts of plutonium needed for the weapons programs, but a variety of other interesting and useful radioisotopes. They produced...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear weapons nonproliferation" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


461

Imaging the ionization track of alpha recoils for the directional detection of weapons grade plutonium  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Since the dawn of the nuclear weapons era, political, military, and scientific leaders around the world have been working to contain the proliferation of Special Nuclear Material and explosively fissile material. This paper ...

Koch, William Lawrence

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

462

The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

nature of the nuclear recipient’s security environment. ThisKeywords: Nuclear weapons proliferation; security; securitynature of the nuclear recipient’s security environment. This

Kroenig, Matthew

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

463

DOE/CF-0084  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

4 4 Volume 1 Department of Energy FY 2014 Congressional Budget Request National Nuclear Security Administration Office of the Administrator Weapons Activities Weapons Activities Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Naval Reactors April 2013 Office of Chief Financial Officer Volume 1 DOE/CF-0084 Volume 1 Department of Energy FY 2014 Congressional Budget Request National Nuclear Security Administration Office of the Administrator Weapons Activities Weapons Activities Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Naval Reactors April 2013 Office of Chief Financial Officer Volume 1 Printed with soy ink on recycled paper Office of the Administrator Weapons Activities Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Naval Reactors Office of the Administrator Weapons Activities Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Naval Reactors

464

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials  

SciTech Connect

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

Fishbone, L.G.

1988-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

465

FAQS Job Task Analyses - Weapons Quality Assurance Community  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

NA-121.3 Weapons Quality Assurance Community NA-121.3 Weapons Quality Assurance Community Consolidated JOB/TASK Analysis 12/2011 Job Analysis Worksheet for Tasks WQA Specialist Task Source Import. Freq. #1 Monitors, inspects, analyzes and investigates complex electrical, electronic, mechanical, electro-mechanical, and nuclear components, subassemblies, and assemblies associated with the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other non-nuclear components as applicable QC-1, WQAPM, DesgnDefn 4 3 #2 Conducts Quality Assurance Surveys (including Product Acceptance) and oversight activities of contractor operations QC-1, WQAPM 5 2 #3 Performs verification inspection (including Contractor Acceptance Verification) of product manufactured by NNSA Contractors, QAIP development, QADRs, nonconformance activities/requirements

466

DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Wildlife Refuge DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National Wildlife Refuge July 12, 2007 - 2:54pm Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today announced the transfer of nearly 4,000 acres of its former Rocky Flats nuclear weapons production site to the Department of the Interior's (DOI) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for use as a National Wildlife Refuge. After more than a decade of environmental cleanup work, the transfer creates the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge, 16 miles northwest of Denver, Colorado, and marks completion of the regulatory milestones to transform a formerly contaminated site into an environmental asset. "The Department of Energy's environmental cleanup of the Rocky Flats

467

CRAD, Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Facility CRAD, Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Facility April 2004 A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Configuration Management program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Weapons Facility. CRADs provide a recommended approach and the types of information to gather to assess elements of a DOE contractor's programs. CRAD, Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Facility More Documents & Publications CRAD, Configuration Management - Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST

468

Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas sampling Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas sampling Nondestructive laser welding process far less expensive, no underground testing. June 8, 2012 Nondestructive Laser Gas Sampling Nondestructive Laser Gas Sampling is expected to save several million dollars per year and requires no underground testing. "We're continually innovating and working to improve the way we do business, and NDLGS is a big step for us," said National Nuclear Security Administration Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Don Cook. New weapons assessment technology engineered: nondestructive laser welding process far less expensive, no underground testing Valveless Laser Processing

469

Safety Aspects of Wet Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, OAS-L-13-11  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Safety Aspects of Wet Storage of Safety Aspects of Wet Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel OAS-L-13-11 July 2013 Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 July 10, 2013 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR ADVISOR FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT FROM: Daniel M. Weeber Assistant Inspector General for Audits and Administration Office of Inspector General SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Audit Report on "Safety Aspects of Wet Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel" BACKGROUND The Department of Energy (Department) is responsible for managing and storing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated by weapons and research programs and recovered through nonproliferation programs. The SNF consists of irradiated reactor fuel and cut up assemblies containing uranium, thorium and/or plutonium. The Department stores 34 metric tons of heavy metal SNF primarily

470

EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support...

471

EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

7: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant Kansas City, Missouri EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project...

472

Weapons production | Y-12 National Security Complex  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Weapons production Weapons production An effective production infrastructure is critical to national security. Y-12 continues to replace World War II-era facilities to increase...