Sample records for nuclear weapons components

  1. Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved: 5-13-14Russian Nuclear Warheads Arrives in UnitedSecurity

  2. EIS-0225: Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS evaluates the potential environemental impact of a proposal to continue operation of the Pantex Plant and associated storage of nuclear weapon components. Alternatives considered include: ...

  3. Virtual enterprise model for the electronic components business in the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ferguson, T.J.; Long, K.S.; Sayre, J.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hull, A.L. [Sandia National Labs., Livermore, CA (United States); Carey, D.A.; Sim, J.R.; Smith, M.G. [Allied-Signal Aerospace Co., Kansas City, MO (United States). Kansas City Div.

    1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The electronic components business within the Nuclear Weapons Complex spans organizational and Department of Energy contractor boundaries. An assessment of the current processes indicates a need for fundamentally changing the way electronic components are developed, procured, and manufactured. A model is provided based on a virtual enterprise that recognizes distinctive competencies within the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at the vendors. The model incorporates changes that reduce component delivery cycle time and improve cost effectiveness while delivering components of the appropriate quality.

  4. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kristensen, Hans M. [Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC (United States)

    2014-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  5. Nuclear weapons and nuclear war

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cassel, C.; McCally, M.; Abraham, H.

    1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This book examines the potential radiation hazards and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include medical responsibility and thermonuclear war, the threat of nuclear war, nuclear weaponry, biological effects, radiation injury, decontamination, long-term effects, ecological effects, psychological aspects, the economic implications of nuclear weapons and war, ethics, civil defense, arms control, nuclear winter, and long-term biological consequences of nuclear war.

  6. Identification of nuclear weapons

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10T23:59:59.000Z

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  7. Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Waltz, Kenneth N.

    1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    presumably steal nuclear weapons or buy them on the blackEven if they buy or steal the weapons, they will have to

  8. Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home About Us Our History NNSA Timeline Uranium Weapons Components Successfully Dismantled Uranium Weapons Components Successfully...

  9. US nuclear weapons policy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    May, M.

    1990-12-05T23:59:59.000Z

    We are closing chapter one'' of the nuclear age. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union and to Europe, some of the major determinants of nuclear policy will not be what they have been for the last forty-five years. Part of the task for US nuclear weapons policy is to adapt its nuclear forces and the oganizations managing them to the present, highly uncertain, but not urgently competitive situation between the US and the Soviet Union. Containment is no longer the appropriate watchword. Stabilization in the face of uncertainty, a more complicated and politically less readily communicable goal, may come closer. A second and more difficult part of the task is to deal with what may be the greatest potential source of danger to come out of the end of the cold war: the breakup of some of the cooperative institutions that managed the nuclear threat and were created by the cold war. These cooperative institutions, principally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the US-Japan alliance, were not created specifically to manage the nuclear threat, but manage it they did. A third task for nuclear weapons policy is that of dealing with nuclear proliferation under modern conditions when the technologies needed to field effective nuclear weapons systems and their command and control apparatus are ever more widely available, and the leverage over some potential proliferators, which stemmed from superpower military support, is likely to be on the wane. This paper will make some suggestions regarding these tasks, bearing in mind that the unsettled nature of that part of the world most likely to become involved in nuclear weapons decisions today must make any suggestions tentative and the allowance for surprise more than usually important.

  10. Nuclear weapon detection categorization analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1997-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This statement of work is for the Proof of Concept for nuclear weapon categories utility in Arms control. The focus of the project will be to collect, analyze and correlate Intrinsic Radiation (INRAD) calculation results for the purpose of defining measurable signatures that differentiate categories of nuclear weapons. The project will support START III negotiations by identifying categories of nuclear weapons. The categories could be used to clarify sub-limits on the total number of nuclear weapons.

  11. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  12. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    4C, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons by LtCol Karl Basham Functional areas: Nuclear Explosives, Nuclear Weapons, Security The Order establishes...

  13. Nuclear weapons are legal tools

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Almond, H.H. Jr.

    1985-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Responding to an article by Elliot Meyrowitz stating that nuclear weapons are illegal threats, the author observes that international law does not forbid the possession or use of nuclear weapons, whose existence operates as part of the checks and balances process that maintains deterrence. Because nuclear weapons have never been identified among states as illegal, either by treaties or by customary international law, attempts by opposing states to establish illegality through declarations fall short of an effectively shared strategy. The author concludes that we must use the time that deterrence permits to forcefully promote policies optimizing the claims of people for human dignity rather than focusing on the fruitless search to make nuclear weapons illegal.

  14. The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wood, Houston G. [Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia (United States); Glaser, Alexander [Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Program on Science, Technology and Environmental Policy, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey (United States); Kemp, R. Scott [Nuclear Science and Engineering Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)

    2014-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

    Uranium enrichment by centrifugation is the basis for the quick and efficient production of nuclear fuel-or nuclear weapons.

  15. Control of Nuclear Weapon Data

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The directive establishes the policy, process and procedures for control of nuclear weapon data to ensure that dissemination of the information is restricted to individuals with appropriate clearances, approved authorization and valid need-to-know in keeping with the Atomic Energy Act (as amended) stipulation of ensuring common defense and security. Cancels DOE O 5610.2.

  16. Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

  17. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-08-05T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order defines the Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, which was established to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives.

  18. Nuclear weapons are illegal threats

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meyrowitz, E.L.

    1985-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Challenging Harry Almond's position that nuclear deterrence is workable, the author contends that there is no historical basis for believing that anticipation of the horrors of war will be an effective deterrent. He questions the belief that the nuclear balance of terror has maintained the peace for the past 40 years because an arms race is inherently unstable. The argument that the pursuit of national interests takes precedence over any limitation imposed by international law reflects a perception of international law that is comparable to the Third Reich. The bases for a legal evaluation of the status of nuclear weapons under international law come from express and implicit treaty provisions, international custom, general principles of international law, judicial decisions, resolutions at the United Nations, and the opinions of qualified jurists as well as military necessity.

  19. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program - DOE Directives...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program by Angela Chambers Functional areas: Defense Nuclear Facility Safety and Health Requirement, Defense Programs, Nuclear Weapons...

  20. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Maaranen, S.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Center for International Security Affairs

    1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  1. Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    70th anniversary lecture Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of next 70th anniversary lecture Lab's role in the development of nuclear weapons...

  2. Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production Processes to Their Environmental Consequences Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons...

  3. Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963. Battlefield of the Cold War: The Nevada Test Site, Volume I Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963....

  4. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2015-01-26T23:59:59.000Z

    All nuclear explosives and nuclear explosive operations require special safety, security, and use control consideration because of the potentially unacceptable consequences of an accident or unauthorized act; therefore, a Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program is established to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives.

  5. Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of Defense

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-05-14T23:59:59.000Z

    This Order establishes Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration requirements and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system surety activities in conjunction with the Department of Defense. Cancels DOE O 452.6.

  6. Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-12-17T23:59:59.000Z

    This directive establishes requirements and responsibilities to prevent the deliberate unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear explosives and U.S. nuclear weapons. Cancels DOE O 452.4.

  7. Management of the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-06-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order defines and affirms the authorities and responsibilities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for the management of the Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex and emphasizes that the management of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile is the DOE's highest priority for the NNSA and the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. Cancels DOE O 5600.1.

  8. New details on nuclear weapons program bared

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hileman, B.

    1994-07-11T23:59:59.000Z

    In a continuing effort to be more candid about Department of Energy nuclear weapons programs, Energy Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary recently declassified a substantial amount of information. On June 27, she revealed details about total US weapons-grade uranium production, testing of a bomb made of reactor-grade plutonium, radiation experiments conducted on humans since the 1920s, and underground and atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. O'Leary explains the new revelations by saying thousands of people in meetings across the country this year have told her that openness in government is very important. DOE is responding today in a manner that both satisfies the strong public interest and respects critical national security requirements.

  9. Y-12, the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement ? Or:...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    the Cold War, and nuclear weapons dismantlement - Or: The Cold War and nuclear weapons dismantlement (title used in The Oak Ridger) The Cold War heated up over the years with such...

  10. Managing nuclear weapons in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, G.

    1993-03-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This report discusses the management and security of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war United States. The definition of what constitutes security is clearly changing in the US. It is now a much more integrated view that includes defense and the economy. The author tries to bring some semblance of order to these themes in this brief adaptation of a presentation.

  11. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garwin, Richard L., E-mail: RLG2@us.ibm.com [IBM Fellow Emeritus, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, P.O. Box 218, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598 (United States)

    2014-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  12. Macroencapsulation Equivalency Guidance for Classified Weapon Components and NNSSWAC Compliance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Poling, J.

    2012-05-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex has a surplus of classified legacy weapon components generated over the years with no direct path for disposal. The majority of the components have been held for uncertainty of future use or no identified method of sanitization or disposal. As more weapons are retired, there is an increasing need to reduce the amount of components currently in storage or on hold. A process is currently underway to disposition and dispose of the legacy/retired weapons components across the DOE complex.

  13. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile...

  14. Date Set for Closure of Russian Nuclear Weapons Plant - NNSA...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Date Set for Closure of Russian Nuclear Weapons Plant - NNSA Is Helping Make It Happen | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission...

  15. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program - DOE Directives...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    1D Admin Chg 1, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program by Carl Sykes Functional areas: Administrative Change, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety and Health Requirement, Defense...

  16. Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cornwell, G.C.

    1998-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.

  17. Environmental Restoration Strategic Plan. Remediating the nuclear weapons complex

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the end of the cold war, the US has a reduced need for nuclear weapons production. In response, the Department of Energy has redirected resources from weapons production to weapons dismantlement and environmental remediation. To this end, in November 1989, the US Department of Energy (DOE) established the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (renamed the Office of Environmental Management in 1994). It was created to bring under a central authority the management of radioactive and hazardous wastes at DOE sites and inactive or shut down facilities. The Environmental Restoration Program, a major component of DOE`s Environmental Management Program, is responsible for the remediation and management of contaminated environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater, sediments) and the decommissioning of facilities and structures at 130 sites in over 30 states and territories.

  18. GeoffBrumfiel,Washington Nuclear watchdogs and former weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    is supposed to help scientists assess the nation's ageing nuclear stockpile without testing the weaponsGeoffBrumfiel,Washington Nuclear watchdogs and former weapons scientists are taking issue existing bombs detonate, so that the stockpile can be maintained without testing the weapons it contains

  19. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.

  20. Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of Defense

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-10-19T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order prescribes how the Department of Energy participates with the Department of Defense (DoD) to ensure the surety (safety, security and control) of military nuclear weapon systems deployed around the world. The Order establishes National Nuclear Security Administration requirements and responsibilities for addressing joint nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system surety activities in conjunction with the DoD. Cancels DOE O 5610.13. Canceled by DOE O 452.6A.

  1. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-01-22T23:59:59.000Z

    This Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts/deliberate unauthorized use. Cancels DOE O 452.4A.

  2. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-11-19T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control (UC) elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts (DUAs), deliberate unauthorized use (DUU), and denial of authorized use (DAU).

  3. A thousand suns : political motivations for nuclear weapons testing

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Raas, Whitney

    2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear weapon testing is the final step in the nuclear development process, an announcement of ability and strength. The consequences of a nuclear test are far from easy to bear, however: economic sanctions can be crippling ...

  4. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01, Nuclear Weapon Program...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    OF ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION SUBJECT: Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for...

  5. EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    OF ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION SUBJECT: Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues Section 1.3 of the Operational Procedures for...

  6. atmospheric nuclear weapon: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Coles, Taylor Marie 2014-04-27 26 A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons CERN Preprints...

  7. america nuclear weapons: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    power plant Laughlin, Robert B. 27 A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons CERN Preprints...

  8. atmospheric nuclear weapons: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Coles, Taylor Marie 2014-04-27 26 A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons CERN Preprints...

  9. Nuclear energy in a nuclear weapon free world

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The prospect of a nuclear renaissance has revived a decades old debate over the proliferation and terrorism risks of the use of nuclear power. This debate in the last few years has taken on an added dimension with renewed attention to disarmament. Increasingly, concerns that proliferation risks may reduce the prospects for realizing the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world are being voiced.

  10. DOE Nuclear Weapon Reliability Definition: History, Description, and Implementation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wright, D.L.; Cashen, J.J.; Sjulin, J.M.; Bierbaum, R.L.; Kerschen, T.J.

    1999-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The overarching goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapon reliability assessment process is to provide a quantitative metric that reflects the ability of the weapons to perform their intended function successfully. This white paper is intended to provide insight into the current and long-standing DOE definition of nuclear weapon reliability, which can be summarized as: The probability of achieving the specified yield, at the target, across the Stockpile-To-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs.

  11. Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gsponer, A

    2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The paper begins with a general introduction and update to Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons (FGNW), and then addresses some particularly important military aspects on which there has been only limited public discussion so far. These aspects concern the unique military characteristics of FGNWs which make them radically different from both nuclear weapons based on previous-generation nuclear-explosives and from conventional weapons based on chemical-explosives: yields in the 1 to 100 tons range, greatly enhanced coupling to targets, possibility to drive powerful shaped charged jets and forged fragments, enhanced prompt radiation effects, reduced collateral damage and residual radioactivity, etc.

  12. An assessment of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sivels, Ciara (Ciara Brooke)

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In February of 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear weapons test. Speculations are that this test was conducted to further develop a warhead small enough to fit on an intercontinental ballistic missile. This test ...

  13. Briefing, Classification of Nuclear Weapons-Related Information- June 2014

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This brief will familiarize individuals from agencies outside of DOE who may come in contact with RD and FRD with the procedures for identifying, classifying, marking, handling, and declassifying documents containing Nuclear Weapons-Related Information.

  14. The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

  15. Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM, DOE O 452.2D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE SAFETY Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY...

  16. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  17. Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Darby, John L.

    2011-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

  18. Modeling fabrication of nuclear components: An integrative approach

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hench, K.W.

    1996-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Reduction of the nuclear weapons stockpile and the general downsizing of the nuclear weapons complex has presented challenges for Los Alamos. One is to design an optimized fabrication facility to manufacture nuclear weapon primary components in an environment of intense regulation and shrinking budgets. This dissertation presents an integrative two-stage approach to modeling the casting operation for fabrication of nuclear weapon primary components. The first stage optimizes personnel radiation exposure for the casting operation layout by modeling the operation as a facility layout problem formulated as a quadratic assignment problem. The solution procedure uses an evolutionary heuristic technique. The best solutions to the layout problem are used as input to the second stage - a simulation model that assesses the impact of competing layouts on operational performance. The focus of the simulation model is to determine the layout that minimizes personnel radiation exposures and nuclear material movement, and maximizes the utilization of capacity for finished units.

  19. An analysis of technical and policy drivers in Current U.S. nuclear weapons force structure

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Baker, Amanda, S. B. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    U.S. nuclear weapons force structure accounts for the number and types of strategic and nonstrategic weapon systems in various locations that comprise the nuclear arsenal. While exact numbers, locations, and detailed designs ...

  20. UN Security Council: Iran violating ban on nuclear weapons programs

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    UN Security Council: Iran violating ban on nuclear weapons programs 7 September 2011 Denouncement comes after International Atomic Energy Agency submits a report claiming Iran continues to make advances denounced Iran's failure to abide by United Nations resolutions demanding an end to the possible

  1. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-08-06T23:59:59.000Z

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1A. Canceled by DOE O 452.1C.

  2. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1997-01-17T23:59:59.000Z

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1. Canceled by DOE O 452.1B.

  3. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-09-20T23:59:59.000Z

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1B. Canceled by DOE O 452.1D

  4. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1C. Canceled by DOE O 452.1D Admin Chg 1.

  5. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

    This Order provides requirements and responsibilities to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives. Cancels DOE O 452.1C. Admin Chg 1, dated 7-10-13, cancels DOE O 452.1D.

  6. The PEACE PIPE: Recycling nuclear weapons into a TRU storage/shipping container

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Floyd, D.; Edstrom, C. [Manufacturing Sciences Corp. (United States); Biddle, K.; Orlowski, R. [BNFL, Inc. (United States); Geinitz, R. [Safe Sites of Colorado, Golden, CO (United States); Keenan, K. [USDOE-RFFO (United States); Rivera, M. [Science Applications International Corp./LATA (United States)

    1997-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper describes results of a contract undertaken by the National Conversion Pilot Project (NCPP) at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) to fabricate stainless steel ``pipe`` containers for use in certification testing at Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque to qualify the container for both storage of transuranic (TRU) waste at RFETS and other DOE sites and shipping of the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). The paper includes a description of the nearly ten-fold increase in the amount of contained plutonium enabled by the product design, the preparation and use of former nuclear weapons facilities to fabricate the components, and the rigorous quality assurance and test procedures that were employed. It also describes how stainless steel nuclear weapons components can be converted into these pipe containers, a true ``swords into plowshare`` success story.

  7. Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Saunders, Emily C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rowberry, Ariana N. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fearey, Bryan L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

    In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

  8. Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1985-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The President established the Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management at the direction of the Congress to address fiscal accountability and discipline in the nation's nuclear weapons program. The Task Group was asked to ''examine the procedures used by DOD and DOE in establishing requirements for, and providing resources for, the research, development, testing, production, surveillance, and retirement of nuclear weapons,'' and to recommend any needed change in coordination, budgeting, or management procedures. The Task Group was also asked to address ''whether DOD should assume the responsibility for funding current DOE weapon activities and material production programs.'' The Task Group found that the present relationship between DOD and DOE for managing the nuclear weapons program is sound. Accordingly, the Task Group sought a process for improving the integrated determination of nuclear weapon requirements and the management of nuclear weapon production.

  9. Identification and evaluation of the nonradioactive toxic components in LLNL weapon designs, Phase 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, J.A.; Lipska-Quinn, A.E.

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The proper industrial hygiene strategy and response to a weapons accident is dependent upon the nonradioactive toxic materials contained in each weapon system. For example, in order to use the proper sampling and support equipment, e.g., personal protective and air sampling equipment, the Accident Response Group (ARG) Team needs a detailed inventory of nonradioactive toxic and potentially toxic materials in the weapon systems. The DOE Albuquerque Office or Operations funded the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Sandia National Laboratory to identify and evaluate the nonradioactive toxic components of their respective weapons designs. This report summarizes LLNL`s first year`s activities and results.

  10. Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod; Whitney, Paul D.

    2010-04-16T23:59:59.000Z

    A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferation risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.

  11. North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moon, Duk-ho (Korean Consulate General in New York)

    2003-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

  12. Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1993-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

  13. Plus c`est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO`s New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future.

  14. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

  15. A quantitative assessment of nuclear weapons proliferation risk utilizing probabilistic methods

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sentell, Dennis Shannon, 1971-

    2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A comparative quantitative assessment is made of the nuclear weapons proliferation risk between various nuclear reactor/fuel cycle concepts using a probabilistic method. The work presented details quantified proliferation ...

  16. The Meteorological Monitoring program at a former nuclear weapons plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Maxwell, D.R.; Bowen, B.M.

    1994-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of the Meteorological Monitoring program at Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) is to provide meteorological information for use in assessing the transport, and diffusion, and deposition of effluent actually or potentially released into the atmosphere by plant operations. Achievement of this objective aids in protecting health and safety of the public, employees, and environment, and directly supports Emergency Response programs at RFP. Meteorological information supports the design of environmental monitoring networks for impact assessments, environmental surveillance activities, remediation activities, and emergency responses. As the mission of the plant changes from production of nuclear weapons parts to environmental cleanup and economic development, smaller releases resulting from remediation activities become more likely. These possible releases could result from airborne fugitive dust, evaporation from collection ponds, or grass fires.

  17. Progress toward mutual reciprocal inspections of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, M.W. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Gosnell, T.B. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In March 1994, the United States and the Russian Federation announced their intention to conduct mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI) to confirm inventories of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons. Subsequent interactions between the two countries have established the basis for an MRI regime, covering instrumentation, candidate sites for MRI, and protection of information deemed sensitive by the countries. This paper discusses progress made toward MRI, stressing measurement technologies and observables, as well as prospects for MRI implementation. An analysis is presented of observables that might be exploited to provide assurance that the material being measured could have come from a dismantled weapon rather than other sources. Instrumentation to exploit these observables will also be discussed, as will joint US/Russian efforts to demonstrate such instrumentation. Progress toward a so-called ``program of cooperation`` between the two countries in protecting each other`s sensitive information will be reviewed. All of these steps are essential components of an eventual comprehensive regime for controlling fissile materials from weapons.

  18. Advancing Methods for Determining the Source of HEU Used in Terrorist Nuclear Weapon 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    LaFleur, Adrienne; Charlton, William

    2007-09-17T23:59:59.000Z

    ADVANCING METHODS FOR DETERMINING THE SOURCE OF HEU USED IN A TERRORIST NUCLEAR WEAPON Major: Nuclear Engineering April 2007 Submitted to the Office of Undergraduate Research Texas A&M University In partial fulfillment... of the requirements for the designation as UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR A Senior Scholars Thesis by ADRIENNE MARIE LAFLEUR ADVANCING METHODS FOR DETERMINING THE SOURCE OF HEU USED IN A TERRORIST NUCLEAR WEAPON Approved by: Research Advisor...

  19. Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTubahq.na.gov Office of theNuclearNanotechnologies | National

  20. Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated CodesTransparencyDOE Project TapsDOERecoveryNuclearLife Cycle | National

  1. NEW - DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    All nuclear explosives and nuclear explosive operations require special safety, security, and use control consideration because of the potentially unacceptable consequences of an accident or unauthorized act; therefore, a Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program is established to prevent unintended/unauthorized detonation and deliberate unauthorized use of nuclear explosives.

  2. Source terms for plutonium aerosolization from nuclear weapon accidents

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stephens, D.R.

    1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The source term literature was reviewed to estimate aerosolized and respirable release fractions for accidents involving plutonium in high-explosive (HE) detonation and in fuel fires. For HE detonation, all estimates are based on the total amount of Pu. For fuel fires, all estimates are based on the amount of Pu oxidized. I based my estimates for HE detonation primarily upon the results from the Roller Coaster experiment. For hydrocarbon fuel fire oxidation of plutonium, I based lower bound values on laboratory experiments which represent accident scenarios with very little turbulence and updraft of a fire. Expected values for aerosolization were obtained from the Vixen A field tests, which represent a realistic case for modest turbulence and updraft, and for respirable fractions from some laboratory experiments involving large samples of Pu. Upper bound estimates for credible accidents are based on experiments involving combustion of molten plutonium droplets. In May of 1991 the DOE Pilot Safety Study Program established a group of experts to estimate the fractions of plutonium which would be aerosolized and respirable for certain nuclear weapon accident scenarios.

  3. A system for the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material aboard cargo cotainerships

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gallagher, Shawn P., S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A new approach to the detection of concealed nuclear weapons and fissile material aboard cargo containerships is proposed. The ship-based approach removes the constraints of current thinking by addressing the threat of ...

  4. A {open_quotes}New{close_quotes} regime for nuclear weapons and materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-02-15T23:59:59.000Z

    In this paper, I discuss the principal ideas that I covered in my presentation on December 8, 1993, at the Future of Foreign Nuclear Materials Symposium held by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I was asked to discuss issues related to military inventories of plutonium, and I took this opportunity to describe a possible declaratory regime that could encompass military as well as civilian inventories of plutonium. The {open_quote}new{close_quotes} in the title does not imply that the regime discussed here is an original idea. Rather, the regime will be {open_quotes}new,{close_quotes} when it is adopted. The regime proposed here and in other works is one in which all stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are declared. Originally, declarations were proposed as a traditional arms control measure. Here, declarations are proposed to support the prevention of misuse of nuclear weapons and materials, including support for the nonproliferation regime. In the following, I discuss: (1) Worldwide inventories of nuclear weapons and materials, including the fact that military plutonium must be viewed as part of that worldwide inventory. (2) Life cycles of nuclear weapons and materials, including the various stages from the creation of nuclear materials for weapons through deployment and retirement of weapons to the final disposition of the materials. (3) Mechanisms for making declarations. (4) Risks and benefits to be derived from declarations. (5) Possibilities for supporting evidence or verification.

  5. Dose reduction through robotics and automation of nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage procedures at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Thompson, David Andrew

    1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    of Energy' s P antex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. Upon disassembly of nuclear weapons, the plutonium and highly enriched uranium pits are placed in specially designed storage containers and temporarily stored in heavily secured ammunition magazines. Pits... in the stockpile; ~ Disassembly of nuclear weapons no longer required in military stockpiles; and ~ Interim storage of plutonium pits from dismantled weapons. ~ Waste management and decontamination and decommissioning activities. ~ Assembling nuclear explosive...

  6. EA-1035: Relocation of the Weapons Component Testing Facility Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of the proposal to relocate the Weapons Component Testing Facility from Building 450 to Building 207, both within Technical Area 16, at the U.S....

  7. Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bunch, Kyle J. [United States Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Office of Verification and Transparency Technologies, Washington, DC (United States); Jones, Anthony M. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Ramuhalli, Pradeep [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Benz, Jacob M. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Denlinger, Laura Schmidt [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-05-04T23:59:59.000Z

    The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.

  8. Restructuring the DOE Laboratory Complex to Advance Clean Energy, Environmental Sustainability, and a Global Future without Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Restructuring the DOE Laboratory Complex to Advance Clean Energy, Environmental Sustainability, and a Global Future without Nuclear Weapons - December Commission meeting

  9. Detection of uranium-based nuclear weapons using neutron-induced fission

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moss, C.E.; Byrd, R.C.; Feldman, W.C.; Auchampaugh, G.F.; Estes, G.P. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Ewing, R.I.; Marlow, K.W. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1991-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Although plutonium-based nuclear weapons can usually be detected by their spontaneous emission of neutrons and gammas, the radiation emitted by weapons based entirely on highly-enriched uranium can often be easily shielded. Verification of a treaty that limits the number of such weapons may require an active technique, such as interrogating the suspect assembly with an external neutron source and measuring the number of fission neutrons produced. Difficulties include distinguishing between source and fission neutrons, the variations in yield for different materials and geometries, and the possibility of non-nuclear weapons that may contain significant amounts of fissionable depleted uranium. We describe simple measurements that test the induced-fission technique using an isotopic Am-Li source, an novel energy-sensitive neutron detector, and several small assemblies containing {sup 235}U, {sup 238}U, lead, and polyethylene. In all cases studied, the neutron yields above the source energy are larger for the {sup 235}U assemblies than for assemblies containing only lead or depleted uranium. For more complex geometries, corrections for source transmission may be necessary. The results are promising enough to recommend further experiments and calculations using examples of realistic nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. 5 refs., 11 figs.

  10. Detection of uranium-based nuclear weapons using neutron-induced fission

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Moss, C.E.; Byrd, R.C.; Feldman, W.C.; Auchampaugh, G.F.; Estes, G.P. (Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)); Ewing, R.I.; Marlow, K.W. (Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States))

    1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Although plutonium-based nuclear weapons can usually be detected by their spontaneous emission of neutrons and gammas, the radiation emitted by weapons based entirely on highly-enriched uranium can often be easily shielded. Verification of a treaty that limits the number of such weapons may require an active technique, such as interrogating the suspect assembly with an external neutron source and measuring the number of fission neutrons produced. Difficulties include distinguishing between source and fission neutrons, the variations in yield for different materials and geometries, and the possibility of non-nuclear weapons that may contain significant amounts of fissionable depleted uranium. We describe simple measurements that test the induced-fission technique using an isotopic Am-Li source, an novel energy-sensitive neutron detector, and several small assemblies containing {sup 235}U, {sup 238}U, lead, and polyethylene. In all cases studied, the neutron yields above the source energy are larger for the {sup 235}U assemblies than for assemblies containing only lead or depleted uranium. For more complex geometries, corrections for source transmission may be necessary. The results are promising enough to recommend further experiments and calculations using examples of realistic nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. 5 refs., 11 figs.

  11. DOE (Department of Energy) nuclear weapon R and T (research, development, and testing): Objectives, roles, and responsibilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Otey, G.R.

    1989-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An overview of the DOE nuclear weapons research, development, and testing program is given along with a description of the program objectives and the roles and responsibilities of the various involved organizations. The relationship between the DoD and DOE is described and the division of responsibilities for weapon development as well as the coordinated planning and acquisition activities are reviewed. Execution of the RD T program at the nuclear weapons laboratories is outlined. 24 refs., 3 figs.

  12. Some thoughts on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Krikorian N.H.; Hawkins, H.T.

    1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper discusses factors controlling the dissemination of nuclear technologies and especially fissile materials.

  13. The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garaizar, X

    2010-01-06T23:59:59.000Z

    In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

  14. DRAFT - DOE O 452.2C, Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    The Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive security and use control (UC) elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program, to ensure authorized use, when directed by proper authority, and protect against deliberate unauthorized acts (DUAs), deliberate unauthorized use (DUU), and denial of authorized use (DAU).

  15. Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysis andB -Reports|7/%2AAdministration Weapons

  16. Office of Weapons Material Protection | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

  17. EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    environmental impacts of adopting a policy to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. In particular, the study...

  18. Report to Congress on stockpile reliability, weapon remanufacture, and the role of nuclear testing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, G.H.; Brown, P.S.; Alonso, C.T.

    1987-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report analyzes two issues: (1) ''whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability,'' or (2) ''whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems.'' Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al., has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the US Congress for more restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations. Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, ''Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories.'' Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.

  19. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItemResearch > TheNuclearHomeland and Nuclear SecurityHomeland and NuclearPrograms

  20. Nuclear component horizontal seismic restraint

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Snyder, Glenn J. (Lynchburg, VA)

    1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A nuclear component horizontal seismic restraint. Small gaps limit horizontal displacement of components during a seismic occurrence and therefore reduce dynamic loadings on the free lower end. The reactor vessel and reactor guard vessel use thicker section roll-forged rings welded between the vessel straight shell sections and the bottom hemispherical head sections. The inside of the reactor guard vessel ring forging contains local vertical dovetail slots and upper ledge pockets to mount and retain field fitted and installed blocks. As an option, the horizontal displacement of the reactor vessel core support cone can be limited by including shop fitted/installed local blocks in opposing alignment with the reactor vessel forged ring. Beams embedded in the wall of the reactor building protrude into apertures in the thermal insulation shell adjacent the reactor guard vessel ring and have motion limit blocks attached thereto to provide to a predetermined clearance between the blocks and reactor guard vessel ring.

  1. Nuclear weapons. The balance of terror, the quest for peace

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Edwards, A.J.C.

    1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This book provides a study from first principles of nuclear strategy and the balance of terror. This book addresses the most fundamental issues of our time - what is the balance of terror. How did it come to be. Is it necessary. How has it affected world politics. Will it keep the world at peace. Is it stable in an intrinsic and a dynamic sense. How real a threat is a first strike advantage. What can arms control agreements contribute. What should the objectives of such agreements be. How might a nuclear conflict begin. What would be the chance of containing such a conflict once begun. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the balance of terror. Are there any alternatives to a balance of terror, such as general or nuclear disarmament, which would be both attainable and preferable. If not, what can be done to make a better balance of terror. What are the main threats to stability. What should the West's policies be. What role is there for the independent nuclear deterrents of smaller countries. And how have recent developments such as the American 'star-wars' programme and the 'nuclear winter' hypothesis affected the answers to all these questions.

  2. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItemResearch > TheNuclearHomeland and Nuclear SecurityHomeland and

  3. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItemResearch > TheNuclearHomeland and Nuclear SecurityHomeland andSafety &

  4. Five minutes past midnight: The clear and present danger of nuclear weapons grade fissile materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Roberts, G.B.

    1996-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons grade fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) are a `clear and present danger` to international security. Much of this material is uncontrolled and unsecured in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Access to these materials is the primary technical barrier to a nuclear weapons capability since the technology know-how for a bomb making is available in the world scientific community. Strategies to convince proliferators to give up their nuclear ambitions are problematic since those ambitions are a party of largest regional security. There is no national material control and accounting in Russia. No one knows exactly how much fissile materials they have, and if any is missing. A bankrupt atomic energy industry, unpaid employees and little or no security has created a climate in which more and more fissile materials will likely be sold in black markets or diverted to clandestine nuclear weapons programs or transnational terrorist groups. Control over these materials will ultimately rely on the continuous and simultaneous exercise of several measures. While there is little one can do now to stop a determined proliferator, over time international consensus and a strengthened non-proliferation regime will convince proliferators that the costs outweigh the gains.

  5. Gordon Assesses Security At Nuclear Weapons Complex News...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTubahq.na.gov Office ofDepartment ofrAdministrationNational NuclearAnson

  6. Los Alamos Selected as Atomic Weapons Laboratory | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTubahq.na.govSecurity AdministrationNuclear Security

  7. Sandia Weapon Intern Program visits KCP | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved: 5-13-14 FEDERALAmerica HighSTART Signed |Nuclear

  8. Sandia starts silicon wafer production for three nuclear weapon programs |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved: 5-13-14 FEDERALAmerica HighSTART Signedhosts annualNational Nuclear

  9. Weapons Intern Program participants visit Pantex | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved: 5-13-14Russian Nuclear Warheads Arrives inAdministrationSecurity

  10. NNSA implements nondestructive gas sampling technique for nuclear weapon

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated Codes |IsLoveReferenceAgendaSecurityAbout Us /Administrationcomponents

  11. Neutralization of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction using nuclear methods

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McAffrey, Veronica Lynn

    2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    of these radioactive particles would be carried into the upper atmosphere and would undergo decay and fall to the earth very slowly. Thus, they would likely not pose an immcd(a(e danger to health, although there (s potential for a long-term hazard (Glasstone... the differences in results. This information could be used to validate the MCNP inodel so thai it can be used in future research in neutralization using nuclear devices. REFERENCFS Glasstone, S. and Dolan, P. J. , ed. The El'fects of Nuclear Weapons. 3rd...

  12. Nuclear Safety Design Principles & the Concept of Independence: Insights from Nuclear Weapon Safety for Other High-Consequence Applications.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brewer, Jeffrey D.

    2014-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Insights developed within the U.S. nuclear weapon system safety community may benefit system safety design, assessment, and management activities in other high consequence domains. The approach of assured nuclear weapon safety has been developed that uses the Nuclear Safety Design Principles (NSDPs) of incompatibility, isolation, and inoperability to design safety features, organized into subsystems such that each subsystem contributes to safe system responses in independent and predictable ways given a wide range of environmental contexts. The central aim of the approach is to provide a robust technical basis for asserting that a system can meet quantitative safety requirements in the widest context of possible adverse or accident environments, while using the most concise arrangement of safety design features and the fewest number of specific adverse or accident environment assumptions. Rigor in understanding and applying the concept of independence is crucial for the success of the approach. This paper provides a basic description of the assured nuclear weapon safety approach, in a manner that illustrates potential application to other domains. There is also a strong emphasis on describing the process for developing a defensible technical basis for the independence assertions between integrated safety subsystems.

  13. Nuclear Weapons in Regional Contexts: The Cases of Argentina and Brazil

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Junior, Olival Freire; Moreira, Ildeu C; Barros, Fernando de Souza

    2015-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both countries, lasted a long time. After WWII these countries took part in the race to obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game. In the mid 1980s, the end of military dictatorships and the successful establishing of democratic institutions put an end to the race. Thus regional and national interests in addition to the establishment of democracies in Latin America have been responsible for the building of trust between the two countries. Meaningful international initiatives are once again needed in the framework of worldwide cooperation. This cooperation is better developed when democratic regimes are in place.

  14. A Sandia nuclear weapon knowledge management program plan for FY 1998--2003. Volume 1: Synopsis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This volume contains a synopsis and briefing charts for a five-year plan which describes a Knowledge Management Program needed to meet Sandia`s responsibility for maintaining safety, security, reliability, and operational effectiveness of the nuclear weapon stockpile. Although the knowledge and expertise required to maintain and upgrade the stockpile continues to be critical to the country`s defense, Sandia`s historical process for developing and advancing future knowledge and expertise needs to be addressed. This plan recommends implementing an aggressive Knowledge Management Program to assure retention and furtherance of Sandia`s expertise, beginning in fiscal year 1998, as an integrated approach to solving the expertise dilemma.

  15. Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mishra, Sitakanta; Ahmed, Mansoor

    2014-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measures to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.

  16. Los Alamos neutron science center nuclear weapons stewardship and unique national scientific capabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schoenberg, Kurt F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

    This presentation gives an overview of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and its contributions to science and the nuclear weapons program. LANSCE is made of multiple experimental facilities (the Lujan Center, the Weapons Neutron Research facility (WNR), the Ultra-Cold Neutron facility (UCN), the proton Radiography facility (pRad) and the Isotope Production Facility (IPF)) served by the its kilometer long linear accelerator. Several research areas are supported, including materials and bioscience, nuclear science, materials dynamics, irradiation response and medical isotope production. LANSCE is a national user facility that supports researchers worldwide. The LANSCE Risk Mitigation program is currently in progress to update critical accelerator equipment to help extend the lifetime of LANSCE as a key user facility. The Associate Directorate of Business Sciences (ADBS) plays an important role in the continued success of LANSCE. This includes key procurement support, human resource support, technical writing support, and training support. LANSCE is also the foundation of the future signature facility MARIE (Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes).

  17. Technology diffusion of a different nature: Applications of nuclear safeguards technology to the chemical weapons verification regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kadner, S.P. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Reisman, A. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Turpen, E. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Cambridge, MA (United States)

    1996-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

  18. Mobile Pit verification system design based on passive special nuclear material verification in weapons storage facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Paul, J. N.; Chin, M. R.; Sjoden, G. E. [Nuclear and Radiological Engineering Program, George W. Woodruff School of Mechanical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 770 State St, Atlanta, GA 30332-0745 (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reaction rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)

  19. American perspectives on security : energy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism : 2010.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Herron, Kerry Gale (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK); Silva, Carol L. (University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK)

    2011-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclear weapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

  20. Low Prevalence of Chronic Beryllium Disease among Workers at a Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Arjomandi, M; Seward, J P; Gotway, M B; Nishimura, S; Fulton, G P; Thundiyil, J; King, T E; Harber, P; Balmes, J R

    2010-01-11T23:59:59.000Z

    To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclear weapons research and development facility. We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with HRCT (N=49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and transbronchial biopsies. The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 yrs and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 yrs. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or HRCT); three others had evidence of probable CBD. These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD.

  1. Physical and Mathematical Description of Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) Signatures

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mattingly, J.K.; Mihalczo, J.T.; Mullens, J.A.; Valentine, T.E.

    1997-09-26T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes all time and frequency analysis parameters measured with the new Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) processor with three input channels: (1) the 252Cf source ionization chamber (2) a detection channel; and (3) a second detection channel for active measurements. An intuitive and physical description of the various functions is given as well as a brief mathematical description and a brief description of how the data are acquired. If the fill five channel capability is used, the number of functions increases in number but not in type. The parameters provided by this new NWIS processor can be divided into two general classes: time analysis signatures including multiplicities and frequency analysis signatures. Data from measurements with an 18.75 kg highly enriched uranium (93.2 wt 0/0, 235U) metai casting for storage are presented to illustrate the various time and frequency analysis parameters.

  2. Historical Exposures to Chemicals at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant: A Pilot Retrospective Exposure Assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Janeen Denise Robertson

    1999-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

  3. NNSA implements nondestructive gas sampling technique for nuclear...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    implements ... NNSA implements nondestructive gas sampling technique for nuclear weapon components Posted: June 12, 2012 - 1:34pm The National Nuclear Security Administration...

  4. Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese, and United States nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands: A bibliography

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robison, W.L. (ed.) (Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)); Schultz, V. (Washington State Univ., Pullman, WA (USA)); Schultz, S.C. (Oregon Univ., Eugene, OR (USA))

    1991-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A considerable literature exists on the Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese and their atolls; however, this literature consists of a large number of governmental documents that are relatively unknown and difficult to locate. This is particularly true of the documents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and those related to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. Because a comprehensive bibliography on the impact of nuclear weapons testing on the Marshallese and their atolls does not exist, the preparation of a bibliography that includes sufficient information to locate all types of reports seems justified. Primary sources of information in preparing this bibliography were bibliographies on Oceania, citations in published papers, CIS Index and Abstracts, Monthly Catalog of United States Government Publications, Nuclear Science Abstracts, Energy Research Abstracts, numerous bibliographies on radiation ecology, and suggestions by many individuals whom we contacted. One goal in this bibliography is to include complete documentation of the source of congressional reports and other government-related publications. In addition, page numbers for material in this bibliography are provided in parentheses when the subject matter of a book or document is not restricted to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands.

  5. Intelligent Component Monitoring for Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lefteri Tsoukalas

    2010-07-30T23:59:59.000Z

    Reliability and economy are two major concerns for a nuclear power generation system. Next generation nuclear power reactors are being developed to be more reliable and economic. An effective and efficient surveillance system can generously contribute toward this goal. Recent progress in computer systems and computational tools has made it necessary and possible to upgrade current surveillance/monitoring strategy for better performance. For example, intelligent computing techniques can be applied to develop algorithm that help people better understand the information collected from sensors and thus reduce human error to a new low level. Incidents incurred from human error in nuclear industry are not rare and have been proven costly. The goal of this project is to develop and test an intelligent prognostics methodology for predicting aging effects impacting long-term performance of nuclear components and systems. The approach is particularly suitable for predicting the performance of nuclear reactor systems which have low failure probabilities (e.g., less than 10-6 year-). Such components and systems are often perceived as peripheral to the reactor and are left somewhat unattended. That is, even when inspected, if they are not perceived to be causing some immediate problem, they may not be paid due attention. Attention to such systems normally involves long term monitoring and possibly reasoning with multiple features and evidence, requirements that are not best suited for humans.

  6. A comparison of delayed radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus fourth-generation nuclear weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gsponer, A; Vitale, B; Gsponer, Andre; Hurni, Jean-Pierre; Vitale, Bruno

    2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    It is shown that the radiological burden due to the battle-field use of circa 400 tons of depleted-uranium munitions in Iraq (and of about 40 tons in Yugoslavia) is comparable to that arising from the hypothetical battle-field use of more than 600 kt (respectively 60 kt) of high-explosive equivalent pure-fusion fourth-generation nuclear weapons. Despite the limited knowledge openly available on existing and future nuclear weapons, there is sufficient published information on their physical principles and radiological effects to make such a comparison. In fact, it is shown that this comparison can be made with very simple and convincing arguments so that the main technical conclusions of the paper are undisputable -- although it would be worthwhile to supplement the hand calculations presented in the paper by more detailed computer simulations in order to consolidate the conclusions and refute any possible objections.

  7. The distribution and history of nuclear weapons related contamination in sediments from the Ob River, Siberia as determined by isotopic ratios of Plutonium, Neptunium, and Cesium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kenna, Timothy C

    2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This thesis addresses the sources and transport of nuclear weapons related contamination in the Ob River region, Siberia. In addition to being one of the largest rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean, the bulk of the former ...

  8. ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    André Gsponer; Jean-pierre Hurni

    2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper contains two parts: (I) A list of “points ” highlighting the strategic-political and militarytechnical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) in Japan, which should be confirmed sometimes in early 2004. (II) A technical analysis of the nuclear weapons proliferation implications of inertial- and magnetic-confinement fusion systems substantiating the technical points highlighted in the first part, and showing that while full access to the physics of thermonuclear weapons is the main implication of ICF, full access to large-scale tritium technology is the main proliferation impact of MCF. The conclusion of the paper is that siting ITER in a country such as Japan, which already has a large separated-plutonium stockpile, and an ambitious laser-driven ICF program (comparable in size and quality to those of the United States or France) will considerably increase its latent (or virtual) nuclear weapons proliferation status, and foster further nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The safety and environmental problems related to the operation of largescale fusion facilities such as ITER (which contain massive amounts of hazardous and/or radioactive materials such as tritium, lithium, and beryllium, as well as neutron-activated structural materials) are not addressed in this paper.

  9. U.S. No Longer Building Any Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved: 5-13-14 FEDERALAmericaAdministrationLastNATIONAL NUCLEAR For

  10. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  11. Advancing Methods for Determining the Source of HEU Used in Terrorist Nuclear Weapon

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    LaFleur, Adrienne; Charlton, William

    2007-09-17T23:59:59.000Z

    attributes assessed are the uranium isotopics (considering 234U, 235U, 236U, and 238U) and the enrichment process used to create the material (e.g., gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, etc.). Using the original attributes of the weapon significantly increases...

  12. Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Walter, Andrew

    2009-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

  13. President Truman Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon ...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Orders Development of Thermonuclear Weapon | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing...

  14. On the public perception of the risks from nuclear weapons: Would oralloy be more acceptable than plutonium?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kunsman, D.M.

    1993-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant difference between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.

  15. On the public perception of the risks from nuclear weapons: Would oralloy be more acceptable than plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kunsman, D.M.

    1993-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant difference between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.

  16. SIGNAL GROUPING FOR CONDITION MONITORING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT COMPONENTS

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Paris-Sud XI, Université de

    SIGNAL GROUPING FOR CONDITION MONITORING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT COMPONENTS Piero Baraldi Chevalier EDF R&D ­ Simulation and information Technologies for Power generation system Department 6, Quai Monitoring, Empirical Modeling, Power Plants, Safety Critical Nuclear Instrumentation, Autoassociative models

  17. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02T23:59:59.000Z

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  18. Audit Report on "The National Nuclear Security Administration...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Department of Energy's Sandia National Laboratories are refurbishing the Spin Rocket Motor, a prime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the original motor produced...

  19. Toward a more rigorous application of margins and uncertainties within the nuclear weapons life cycle : a Sandia perspective.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Klenke, Scott Edward; Novotny, George Charles; Paulsen Robert A., Jr.; Diegert, Kathleen V.; Trucano, Timothy Guy; Pilch, Martin M.

    2007-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper presents the conceptual framework that is being used to define quantification of margins and uncertainties (QMU) for application in the nuclear weapons (NW) work conducted at Sandia National Laboratories. The conceptual framework addresses the margins and uncertainties throughout the NW life cycle and includes the definition of terms related to QMU and to figures of merit. Potential applications of QMU consist of analyses based on physical data and on modeling and simulation. Appendix A provides general guidelines for addressing cases in which significant and relevant physical data are available for QMU analysis. Appendix B gives the specific guidance that was used to conduct QMU analyses in cycle 12 of the annual assessment process. Appendix C offers general guidelines for addressing cases in which appropriate models are available for use in QMU analysis. Appendix D contains an example that highlights the consequences of different treatments of uncertainty in model-based QMU analyses.

  20. Opportunities for Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute developing computer-aided design programs for pharmaceutical drug discovery. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-09-23T23:59:59.000Z

    The goal of this study is to determine whether physicists at the Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute can profitably service the need for computer aided drug design (CADD) programs. The Russian physicists` primary competitive advantage is their ability to write particularly efficient code able to work with limited computing power; a history of working with very large, complex modeling systems; an extensive knowledge of physics and mathematics, and price competitiveness. Their primary competitive disadvantage is their lack of biology, and cultural and geographic issues. The first phase of the study focused on defining the competitive landscape, primarily through interviews with and literature searches on the key providers of CADD software. The second phase focused on users of CADD technology to determine deficiencies in the current product offerings, to understand what product they most desired, and to define the potential demand for such a product.

  1. Analysis of nuclear power plant component failures

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Items are shown that have caused 90% of the nuclear unit outages and/or deratings between 1971 and 1980 and the magnitude of the problem indicated by an estimate of power replacement cost when the units are out of service or derated. The funding EPRI has provided on these specific items for R and D and technology transfer in the past and the funding planned in the future (1982 to 1986) are shown. EPRI's R and D may help the utilities on only a small part of their nuclear unit outage problems. For example, refueling is the major cause for nuclear unit outages or deratings and the steam turbine is the second major cause for nuclear unit outages; however, these two items have been ranked fairly low on the EPRI priority list for R and D funding. Other items such as nuclear safety (NRC requirements), reactor general, reactor and safety valves and piping, and reactor fuel appear to be receiving more priority than is necessary as determined by analysis of nuclear unit outage causes.

  2. Packaging and Transporting of Nuclear Explosives, Nuclear Components and Special Assemblies

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1979-09-09T23:59:59.000Z

    The order establishes Department of Energy (DOE) policy and assigns responsibilities and authorities for the packaging and transporting of nuclear explosives, nuclear components, and special assemblies. Cancels ERDA directive 0561, dated 9-15-75

  3. UNSUPERVISED CLUSTERING FOR FAULT DIAGNOSIS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT COMPONENTS

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Boyer, Edmond

    1 UNSUPERVISED CLUSTERING FOR FAULT DIAGNOSIS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT COMPONENTS Piero Baraldi1 of prototypical behaviors. Its performance is tested with respect to an artificial case study and then applied on transients originated by different faults in the pressurizer of a nuclear power reactor. Key Words: Fault

  4. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Appointed to Lead Nuclear Weapons Program | National

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved: 5-13-14 FEDERALAmerica High EnergyNational NuclearNuclear Security

  5. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Noone, Bailey C [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-14T23:59:59.000Z

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  6. ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT - 11052

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bergren, C.; Flora, M.; Belencan, H.

    2010-11-17T23:59:59.000Z

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical Separation Facilities (canyons).

  7. ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bergren, C

    2009-01-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical processing canyons.

  8. Order Module--DOE O 452.1D, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM,

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742Energy ChinaofSchaeferAprilOverviewEfficiencyof EnergyOokie MaStateDOE O 452.2D, NUCLEAR

  9. Securing NNSA's Nuclear Weapons Complex in a Post-9/11 World | National

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of ScienceandMesa del Sol HomeFacebook TwitterSearch-Comments Sign InNuclear Security Administration

  10. Contracting in the national interest: Establishing the legal framework for the interaction of science, government, and industry at a nuclear weapons laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Furman, N.S.

    1988-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Sandia National Laboratories, the nation's nuclear ordnance laboratory, is operated on a no-profit, no-fee basis by ATandT Technologies, Inc., as a prime contractor for the Department of Energy. This unique arrangement began in 1949 when President Harry Truman personally requested that ATandT assume management of the nuclear weapons laboratory as a service in the national interest. The story of how this unusual relationship came about makes for an interesting chapter in the annals of US legal and institutional history. This report describes the historical background, political negotiations, and prime contract provisos that established the legal framework for the Labs.

  11. Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition NNSS Capabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pat Arnold

    2011-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has tasked the WDD working group to disposition the large inventory of legacy classified weapon components scattered across the complex.

  12. Weapons labs in a new world

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anderson, C.

    1993-10-08T23:59:59.000Z

    This article describes the diversification and downsizing that is taking place in the weapons programs at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore now that nuclear weapons testing has been discontinued. R D and testing programs budgets have been reduced and personnel number about half that of 1986. Some scientists will take early retirement, some will move to other projects, and some will continue to do nuclear weapons design without testing.

  13. Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

  14. Measurement techniques for the verification of excess weapons materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J.W.; Eccleston, G.W.; Yates, M.A.

    1998-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The end of the superpower arms race has resulted in an unprecedented reduction in stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons. Numerous proposals have been put forward and actions have been taken to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, including unilateral initiatives such as those made by President Clinton in September 1993 to place fissile materials no longer needed for a deterrent under international inspection, and bilateral and multilateral measures currently being negotiated. For the technologist, there is a unique opportunity to develop the technical means to monitor nuclear materials that have been declared excess to nuclear weapons programs, to provide confidence that reductions are taking place and that the released materials are not being used again for nuclear explosive programs. However, because of the sensitive nature of these materials, a fundamental conflict exists between the desire to know that the bulk materials or weapon components in fact represent evidence of warhead reductions, and treaty commitments and national laws that require the protection of weapons design information. This conflict presents a unique challenge to technologists. The flow of excess weapons materials, from deployed warheads through storage, disassembly, component storage, conversion to bulk forms, and disposition, will be described in general terms. Measurement approaches based on the detection of passive or induced radiation will be discussed along with the requirement to protect sensitive information from release to unauthorized parties. Possible uses of measurement methods to assist in the verification of arms reductions will be described. The concept of measuring attributes of items rather than quantitative mass-based inventory verification will be discussed along with associated information-barrier concepts required to protect sensitive information.

  15. Nuclear reactor spacer grid and ductless core component

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Christiansen, David W. (Kennewick, WA); Karnesky, Richard A. (Richland, WA)

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The invention relates to a nuclear reactor spacer grid member for use in a liquid cooled nuclear reactor and to a ductless core component employing a plurality of these spacer grid members. The spacer grid member is of the egg-shell type and is constructed so that the walls of the cell members of the grid member are formed of a single thickness of metal to avoid tolerance problems. Within each cell member is a hydraulic spring which laterally constrains the nuclear material bearing rod which passes through each cell member against a hardstop in response to coolant flow through the cell member. This hydraulic spring is also suitable for use in a water cooled nuclear reactor. A core component constructed of, among other components, a plurality of these spacer grid members, avoids the use of a full length duct by providing spacer sleeves about the sodium tubes passing through the spacer grid members at locations between the grid members, thereby maintaining a predetermined space between adjacent grid members.

  16. Nuclear Weapons Latency

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sweeney, David J

    2014-07-25T23:59:59.000Z

    .S. case of proliferation in the Manhattan Project. Network and operational parameters were found that drove expected Latencies high while others increased the Latency distribution variance. Further confidence was built with historical analyses...

  17. Nuclear Weapons Latency 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sweeney, David J

    2014-07-25T23:59:59.000Z

    was useful but left untreated the time associated with proliferation pathway progression. Further pathway analysis work has been done from an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards perspective. Listner et al. determine the most preferred... diversion pathway for a state given a specific set of resources and technologies in order to more appropriately allocate IAEA safeguarding resources.25 This methodology employs software to solve a shortest path algorithm with path length characterized...

  18. Sandia's Nuclear Weapons Mission

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of ScienceandMesa del Sol HomeFacebook Twitter YouTubeCenters:FacebookContractor/Bidder|BRUthENuclear

  19. Nuclear Weapons Journal

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's Possible for Renewable Energy:Nanowire3627 Federal Register /76SafeguardsSystems

  20. Preliminary results of calculations for heavy-water nuclear-power-plant reactors employing {sup 235}U, {sup 233}U, and {sup 232}Th as a fuel and meeting requirements of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ioffe, B. L.; Kochurov, B. P. [Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics (Russian Federation)

    2012-02-15T23:59:59.000Z

    A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of {sup 235}U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving {sup 233}U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.

  1. Dose reduction through robotics and automation of nuclear weapons dismantlement and storage procedures at the Department of Energy's Pantex Plant 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Thompson, David Andrew

    1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    , based on 2, 000 weapons dismantled per year. . . . DOE transportation safeguards operations dosimeter history and projected maximum yearly dose. . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of 1993 interzone... made Irom U are eventually returned to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee for reprocessing. Plutonium pits, however, remain on-site at Pantex, where they will be stored for an indefinite period. Plutonium warheads have been arriving...

  2. Early retirement for weaponeers?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Weisman, J.

    1994-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Department of Energy`s Lawrence Livermore Laboratory`s once-vital nuclear weapons division is now in dire straits. The laboratory was established in 1952, during the titanic struggle over the hydrogen bomb, has grown steadily from $7 million to its peak of $1.1 billion in 1991. The future for key members of their most experienced weapons design team is uncertain. Over the past two years, Livermore`s operating budget has fallen by 12.5 percent or $127.6 million. Nearly 750 employees, 10 percent of the work force, accepted early retirement offers last year. Further budget cuts will force another 300 to 600 personnel out by the end of 1995. The future resides in the U.S. Congress.

  3. Weapons dismantlement issues in independent Ukraine

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zack, N.R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Kirk, E.J. [American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, DC (United States)

    1994-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The American Association for the Advancement of Science sponsored a seminar during September 1993, in Kiev, Ukraine, entitled ``Toward a Nuclear Free Future -- Barriers and Problems.`` It brought together Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Americans to discuss the legal, political, safeguards and security, economic, and technical dimensions of nuclear weapons dismantlement and destruction. US representatives initiated discussions on legal and treaty requirements and constraints, safeguards and security issues surrounding dismantlement, storage and disposition of nuclear materials, warhead transportation, and economic considerations. Ukrainians gave presentations on arguments for and against the Ukraine keeping nuclear weapons, Ukrainian Parliament non-approval of START I, alternative strategies for dismantling silos and launchers, and economic and security implications of nuclear weapons removal from the Ukraine. Participants from Belarus discussed proliferation and control regime issues, This paper will highlight and detail the issues, concerns, and possible impacts of the Ukraine`s dismantlement of its nuclear weapons.

  4. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o`clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course.

  5. army weapon systems: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems CiteSeer Summary: This paper contains two parts: (I) A...

  6. alamos thermonuclear weapon: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems CiteSeer Summary: This paper contains two parts: (I) A...

  7. Joint Venture Established Between Russian Weapons Plant And the...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Venture Established Between Russian Weapons Plant And the Largest Dialysis Provider in the U.S. | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS...

  8. The National Nuclear Security Administration's B61 Spin Rocket...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    cf Energy's Sandia National Laboratories are refurbishing the Spin Rocket Motor, a 1:rime component of the B61 nuclear weapon system. Both the originai motor produced i2 i906 and...

  9. Seismic fragility of nuclear power plant components (Phase II)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bandyopadhyay, K.K.; Hofmayer, C.H.; Kassir, M.K.; Pepper, S.E. (Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (USA))

    1990-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    As part of the Component Fragility Program which was initiated in FY 1985, three additional equipment classes have been evaluated. This report contains the fragility results and discussions on these equipment classes which are switchgear, I and C panels and relays. Both low and medium voltage switchgear assemblies have been considered and a separate fragility estimate for each type is provided. Test data on cabinets from the nuclear instrumentation/neutron monitoring system, plant/process protection system, solid state protective system and engineered safeguards test system comprise the BNL data base for I and C panels (NSSS). Fragility levels have been determined for various failure modes of switchgear and I C panels, and the deterministic results are presented in terms of test response spectra. In addition, the test data have been evaluated for estimating the respective probabilistic fragility levels which are expressed in terms of a median value, an uncertainty coefficient, a randomness coefficient and an HCLPF value. Due to a wide variation of relay design and the fragility level, a generic fragility level cannot be established for relays. 7 refs., 13 figs., 12 tabs.

  10. Introduction to Pits and Weapons Systems (U)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kautz, D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-02T23:59:59.000Z

    A Nuclear Explosive Package includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components. This is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield and it converts mechanical energy into nuclear energy. The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to electromagnetic energy. Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility: casting, forming, machining and welding. Some of the materials used in pits include: Plutonium, Uranium, Stainless Steel, Beryllium, Titanium, and Aluminum. Gloveboxes are used for three reasons: (1) Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides - (a) Plutonium is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides, (b) While not the 'Most dangerous material in the world' of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled; (2) Protect plutonium from reactive materials - (a) Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen, (b) As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control, (c) As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product; and (3) Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: {alpha}, {gamma}, and {eta} are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as {sup 241}Am and {sup 238}Pu.

  11. Pantex Plant final safety analysis report, Zone 4 magazines. Staging or interim storage for nuclear weapons and components: Issue D

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) contains a detailed description and evaluation of the significant environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) issues associated with the operations of the Pantex Plant modified-Richmond and steel arch construction (SAC) magazines in Zone 4. It provides (1) an overall description of the magazines, the Pantex Plant, and its surroundings; (2) a systematic evaluations of the hazards that could occur as a result of the operations performed in these magazines; (3) descriptions and analyses of the adequacy of the measures taken to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards; and (4) analyses of potential accidents and their associated risks.

  12. Nuclear Power Plant Components Condition Monitoring by Probabilistic Support Vector , Redouane Seraouib

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Boyer, Edmond

    Nuclear Power Plant Components Condition Monitoring by Probabilistic Support Vector Machine Jie.zio@ecp.fr Abstract In this paper, an approach for the prediction of the condition of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP monitoring, Nuclear power plant, Point prediction hal-00790421,version1-12Jun2013 Author manuscript

  13. REVIEW OF INDUSTRIES AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR TECHNOLOGIES APPLICABLE TO DEACTIVATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reilkoff, T. E.; Hetland, M. D.; O'Leary, E. M.

    2002-02-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The Deactivation and Decommissioning Focus Area's (DDFA's) mission is to develop, demonstrate, and deploy improved deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) technologies. This mission requires that emphasis be continually placed on identifying technologies currently employed or under development in other nuclear as well as nonnuclear industries and government agencies. In support of DDFA efforts to clean up the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) radiologically contaminated surplus facilities using technologies that improve worker safety, reduce costs, and accelerate cleanup schedules, a study was conducted to identify innovative technologies developed for use in nonnuclear arenas that are appropriate for D&D applications.

  14. Nuclear Archeology in a Bottle: Evidence of Pre-Trinity U.S. Weapons Activities from a Waste Burial Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schwantes, Jon M.; Douglas, Matthew; Bonde, Steven E.; Briggs, David; Farmer, Orville T.; Greenwood, Lawrence R.; Lepel, Elwood A.; Orton, Christopher R.; Wacker, John F.; Luksic, Andrzej T.

    2009-02-15T23:59:59.000Z

    During World War II, the Hanford Site in Washington was chosen for plutonium production. In 2004, a bottle containing a sample of plutonium was recovered from a Hanford waste trench. Isotopic age dating indicated the sample was separated from the fuel pellet 64 ±2.8 years earlier. Detectable products of secondary nuclear reactions, such as 22Na, proved useful as 1) a detectable analog for alpha emitting actinides, 2) an indicator of sample splitting, and 3) a measure of the time since sample splitting. The sample origin was identified as the X-10 reactor, Oak Ridge, TN. Corroborated by historical documents, we concluded this sample was part of the first batch of Pu separated at T-Plant, Hanford, the world’s first industrial-scale reprocessing facility, on December 9, 1944.

  15. Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Luke, S J

    2011-12-20T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the genetic information associated with the various pathogens. In addition, it has been determined that a suitable information barrier could be applied to this technology when the verification regime has been defined. Finally, the report posits a path forward for additional development of information barriers in a biological weapons verification regime. This path forward has shown that a new analysis approach coined as Information Loss Analysis might need to be pursued so that a numerical understanding of how information can be lost in specific measurement systems can be achieved.

  16. Nuclear Safety Component and Services Procurement, June 29, 2011...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    require component and materials replacement identified and implemented? * Are appropriate preventive maintenance requirements for stored safety-related equipment identified and...

  17. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

  18. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan [and others

    1994-03-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository.

  19. Nuclear reactor heat transport system component low friction support system

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Wade, Elman E. (Ruffs Dale, PA)

    1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A support column for a heavy component of a liquid metal fast breeder reactor heat transport system which will deflect when the pipes leading coolant to and from the heavy component expand or contract due to temperature changes includes a vertically disposed pipe, the pipe being connected to the heavy component by two longitudinally spaced cycloidal dovetail joints wherein the distal end of each of the dovetails constitutes a part of the surface of a large diameter cylinder and the centerlines of these large diameter cylinders intersect at right angles and the pipe being supported through two longitudinally spaced cycloidal dovetail joints wherein the distal end of each of the dovetails constitutes a part of the surface of a large diameter cylinder and the centerlines of these large diameter cylinders intersect at right angles, each of the cylindrical surfaces bearing on a flat and horizontal surface.

  20. Nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and their consequences

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Aga Khan, S.

    1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This book presents papers on nuclear weapons proliferation. Topics considered include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its future, the spread of nuclear weapons among nations, the link between horizontal and vertical proliferation, national security, nuclear disarmament, the impact of nuclear weapons on Third World regional conflicts, the global effects of a nuclear war, medical effects on human populations, the nuclear winter, the nuclear arms race, and arms control.

  1. Nuclear winter source-term studies. Volume 1. Ignition of silo-field vegetation by nuclear weapons. Technical report, 1 January 1985-1 February 1986

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bush, B.W.; Small, R.D.

    1986-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Smoke produced by the ignition and burning of live vegetation by nuclear explosions has been suggested as a major contributor to a possible nuclear winter. This report considers the mechanics of live vegetation ignition by a finite-radius nuclear fireball. For specified plant properties, the amount of fireball radiation absorbed by a plant community is calculated as a function of depth into the stand and range from the fireball. The spectral regions of plant energy absorption and the overlap with the emitted fireball thermal spectra are discussed. A simple model for the plant response to the imposed thermal load is developed. First, the temperature is raised; the change depends on the plant structure, moisture content, and plant canopy. Subsequent energy deposition desiccates the plant and finally raises its temperature to the threshold ignition limit. Results show the development of a variable depth ignition zone. Close to the fireball, ignition of the entire plant occurs. At greater distances (several fireball radii) portions of the plant are only partially desiccated, and sustained burning is less probable. Far from the burst, the top of the stand is weakly heated, and only a small transient temperature change results. An estimate of the smoke produced by an exchange involving the U.S. missile fields shows that the burning of live vegetation only slightly increases the total nonurban smoke production.

  2. Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTuba City,EnrichedSupplemental Directives |andAbout Us /Vision forWayne|

  3. Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Facility (NIF) will extend HEDP experiments to include access to thermonuclear burn conditions's Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) through three strategic objectives: Achieve thermonuclear ignition thermonuclear ignition to the national nuclear weapons program was one of the earliest motivations of the ICF

  4. cvm magazine Newest Weapon

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Langerhans, Brian

    21 cvm magazine Newest Weapon in War on Pet Cancer Radiation Oncology Service includes state tightly around the tumor, minimizing effects to healthy tissue. This is done with a multi-leaf collimator

  5. Seismic fragility of nuclear power plant components (Phase 2): A fragility handbook on eighteen components

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bandyopadhyay, K.K.; Hofmayer, C.H.; Kassir, M.K.; Shteyngart, S. (Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States))

    1991-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Fragility estimates of seven equipment classes were published in earlier reports. This report presents fragility analysis results from eleven additional equipment categories. The fragility levels are expressed in probabilistic terms. For users' convenience, this concluding report includes a summary of fragility results of all eighteen equipment classes. A set of conversion factors based on judgment is recommended for use of the information for early vintage equipment. The knowledge gained in conducting the Component Fragility Program and similar other programs is expected to provide a new direction for seismic verification and qualification of equipment. 15 refs., 12 tabs.

  6. DOE's Former Rocky Flats Weapons Production Site to Become National...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Flats nuclear weapons production site to the Department of the Interior's (DOI) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for use as a National Wildlife Refuge. After more than a...

  7. Annular Core Research Reactor - Critical to Science-Based Weapons...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    13. The ACRR is a mission critical asset - the only remaining NNSA capability for high-power, short pulse environments needed to simulate nuclear weapons effects on full-scale...

  8. Application of NUREG/CR-5999 interim fatigue curves to selected nuclear power plant components

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ware, A.G.; Morton, D.K.; Nitzel, M.E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    1995-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Recent test data indicate that the effects of the light water reactor (LWR) environment could significantly reduce the fatigue resistance of materials used in the reactor coolant pressure boundary components of operating nuclear power plants. Argonne National Laboratory has developed interim fatigue curves based on test data simulating LWR conditions, and published them in NUREG/CR-5999. In order to assess the significance of these interim fatigue curves, fatigue evaluations of a sample of the components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary of LWRs were performed. The sample consists of components from facilities designed by each of the four U.S. nuclear steam supply system vendors. For each facility, six locations were studied, including two locations on the reactor pressure vessel. In addition, there are older vintage plants where components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary were designed to codes that did not require an explicit fatigue analysis of the components. In order to assess the fatigue resistance of the older vintage plants, an evaluation was also conducted on selected components of three of these plants. This report discusses the insights gained from the application of the interim fatigue curves to components of seven operating nuclear power plants.

  9. Entry/exit control components for physical protection systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Holmes, J.P.; Kenna, B.T.; Murray, D.W. (Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States))

    1992-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this NUREG is to provide technical information on the major components of entry control systems: identity verifiers, weapons detectors, explosives detectors, and special nuclear material (SNM) detectors. For each type of device, information is presented on principles of operation, hardware features, recommended installation, testing methods, and operational procedures. Applications to personnel, handcarried packages, bulk items, and vehicles are addressed.

  10. Integrated treatment and handling of highly activated components from nuclear facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schneider, K.A.; Kiolbassa, A.; Rose, K.A. [NUKEM GmbH, Alzenau (Germany); Raymont, J.M. Jr. [WasteChem, Houston, TX (United States)

    1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    A complete Underwater Treatment System (UTS) is described for activated/contaminated components of various origins in the nuclear industry. The system comprises different kinds of cutting/compacting equipment: the USC (Underwater Shear/compactor), the SCS (Stellite Corner Shear), the VLS (Velocity Limiter Shear) and the LCS (Light Crusher Shear). Transfer and loading equipment, the STB (Shielded Transfer Bell) provides safe and economic loading of containers with cut components. Operating experience and performance data are presented.

  11. High Explosives Application Facility | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    and counterterrorism. Examples include the following: Stockpile Stewardship, assuring the reliability and safety of our nuclear weapons; Conventional weapon development, including...

  12. Next Generation Nuclear Plant Structures, Systems, and Components Safety Classification White Paper

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pete Jordan

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This white paper outlines the relevant regulatory policy and guidance for a risk-informed approach for establishing the safety classification of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant and sets forth certain facts for review and discussion in order facilitate an effective submittal leading to an NGNP Combined Operating License application under 10 CFR 52.

  13. CORROSION ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH AUSTENITIC STAINLESS STEEL COMPONENTS USED IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS EXTRACTION AND SEPARATION PROCESSES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mickalonis, J.; Louthan, M.; Sindelar, R.

    2012-12-17T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper illustrated the magnitude of the systems, structures and components used at the Savannah River Site for nuclear materials extraction and separation processes. Corrosion issues, including stress corrosion cracking, pitting, crevice corrosion and other corrosion induced degradation processes are discussed and corrosion mitigation strategies such as a chloride exclusion program and corrosion release testing are also discussed.

  14. Detecting Illicit Nuclear Materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kouzes, Richard T.

    2005-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The threat that weapons of mass destruction might enter the United States has led to a number of efforts for the detection and interdiction of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons at our borders. There have been multiple deployments of instrumentation to detect radiation signatures to interdict radiological material, including weapons and weapons material worldwide.

  15. AGE-RELATED DEGRADATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BRAVERMAN,J.

    1999-03-29T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper summarizes and highlights the results of the initial phase of a research project on the assessment of aged and degraded structures and components important to the safe operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs). A review of age-related degradation of structures and passive components at NPPs was performed. Instances of age-related degradation have been collected and reviewed. Data were collected from plant generated documents such as Licensing Event Reports, NRC generic communications, NUREGs and industry reports. Applicable cases of degradation occurrences were reviewed and then entered into a computerized database. The results obtained from the review of degradation occurrences are summarized and discussed. Various trending analyses were performed to identify which structures and components are most affected, whether degradation occurrences are worsening, and what are the most common aging mechanisms. The paper also discusses potential aging issues and degradation-susceptible structures and passive components which would have the greatest impact on plant risk.

  16. Imaging the ionization track of alpha recoils for the directional detection of weapons grade plutonium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Koch, William Lawrence

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Since the dawn of the nuclear weapons era, political, military, and scientific leaders around the world have been working to contain the proliferation of Special Nuclear Material and explosively fissile material. This paper ...

  17. LANSCE Weapons Physics

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville PowerCherries 82981-1cnHigh SchoolIn12electron 9 5 - -/e),,s - 6157Bioenergy »7 LANSCE Weapons

  18. Weapons Program Associate Directors

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over OurThe Iron SpinPrincetonUsing Maps1DOETHE FUTURE LOOKSofthe Geeks:Weapons Program

  19. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  20. Focus Article Nuclear winter

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Robock, Alan

    the climatic effects of nuclear war. Smoke from the fires started by nuclear weapons, especially the black in recorded human history. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the world has fallen from 70,000 at its and Russia could still produce nuclear winter. This theory cannot be tested in the real world. However

  1. Program to Prevent Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Explosive Detonations

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1980-12-18T23:59:59.000Z

    The order establishes the DOE program to prevent accidental or unauthorized nuclear explosive detonations, and to define responsibilities for DOE participation in the Department of Defense program for nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system safety. Does not cancel other directives.

  2. ITAR Categories Category I -Firearms, Close Assault Weapons and Combat Shotguns

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    and Associated Equipment Category XVI - Nuclear Weapons, Design and Testing Related Items Category XVII, Incendiary Agents and Their Constituents. Category VI - Vessels of War and Special Naval Equipment. Category Energy Weapons Category XIX - [Reserved] Category XX - Submersible Vessels, Oceanographic and Associated

  3. Structural aging program to assess the adequacy of critical concrete components in nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Naus, D.J.; Marchbanks, M.F.; Oland, C.B.; Arndt, E.G.

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Structural Aging (SAG) Program is carried out by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) under sponsorship of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). The Program has evolved from preliminary studies conducted to evaluate the long-term environmental challenges to light-water reactor safety-related concrete civil structures. An important conclusion of these studies was that a damage methodology, which can provide a quantitative measure of a concrete structure's durability with respect to potential future requirements, needs to be developed. Under the SAG Program, this issue is being addressed through: establishment of a structural materials information center, evaluation of structural component assessment and repair technologies, and development of a quantitative methodology for structural aging determinations. Progress to date of each of these activities is presented as well as future plans. 7 refs., 5 figs.

  4. Issues in the use of Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel in VVER-1000 Nuclear Reactors: Comparison of UO2 and MOX Fuels

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carbajo, J.J.

    2005-05-27T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this report is to quantify the differences between mixed oxide (MOX) and low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and to assess in reasonable detail the potential impacts of MOX fuel use in VVER-1000 nuclear power plants in Russia. This report is a generic tool to assist in the identification of plant modifications that may be required to accommodate receiving, storing, handling, irradiating, and disposing of MOX fuel in VVER-1000 reactors. The report is based on information from work performed by Russian and U.S. institutions. The report quantifies each issue, and the differences between LEU and MOX fuels are described as accurately as possible, given the current sources of data.

  5. Surplus weapons plutonium: Technologies for pit disassembly/conversion and MOX fuel fabrication

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Toevs, J.W.

    1997-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper will provide a description of the technologies involved in the disposition of plutonium from surplus nuclear weapon components (pits), based on pit disassembly and conversion and on fabrication of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for disposition through irradiation in nuclear reactors. The MOX/Reactor option is the baseline disposition plan for both the US and russian for plutonium from pits and other clean plutonium metal and oxide. In the US, impure plutonium in various forms will be converted to oxide and immobilized in glass or ceramic, surrounded by vitrified high level waste to provide a radiation barrier. A similar fate is expected for impure material in Russia as well. The immobilization technologies will not be discussed. Following technical descriptions, a discussion of options for monitoring the plutonium during these processes will be provided.

  6. A Bayesian Prognostic Algorithm for Assessing Remaining Useful Life of Nuclear Power Components

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ramuhalli, Pradeep; Bond, Leonard J.; Griffin, Jeffrey W.; Dixit, Mukul; Henager, Charles H.

    2010-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A central issue in life extension for the current fleet of light water nuclear power reactors is the early detection and monitoring of significant materials degradation. To meet this need nondestructive measurement methods that are suitable for on-line, continuous, in-plant monitoring over extended time periods (months to years) are needed. A related issue is then, based on a condition assessment or degradation trend, to have the ability to estimate the remaining useful life based of components, structures and systems based on the available materials degradation information. Such measurement and modeling methods form the basis for a new range of advanced diagnostic and prognostic approaches. Prognostic methods that predict remaining life based on large crack growth, and phenomena that can be described by linear elastic fracture mechanics, have been reported by several researchers. The challenge of predicting remaining life for earlier phases of degradation is largely unsolved. Monitoring for early detection of materials degradation requires novel and enhanced sensors and data integration techniques. A recent review has considered the stages of degradation and sensing methods that can potentially be employed to detect and monitor early degradation for nuclear power plant applications. An experimental assessment of selected diagnostic techniques was also reported recently. However, the estimation of remaining useful life (RUL) determined from nondestructive diagnostic measurements for early degradation is still an unsolved problem. This present paper will discuss the application of Bayesian prognostic algorithms applied to the early degradation- life problem.

  7. CRAD, Configuration Management- Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Configuration Management program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Weapons Facility.

  8. Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2015-01-26T23:59:59.000Z

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety (NES) elements of DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, or successor directive, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations (NEOs).

  9. Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety (NES) elements of DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations (NEOs).

  10. The role of the DOE weapons laboratories in a changing national security environment: CNSS papers No. 8, April 1988

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hecker, S.S.

    1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The contributions of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons laboratories to the nation's security are reviewed in testimony before the Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems of the House Armed Services Committee. Also presented are contributions that technology will make in maintaining the strategic balance through deterrence, treaty verification, and a sound nuclear weapons complex as the nation prepares for significant arms control initiatives. The DOE nuclear weapons laboratories can contribute to the broader context of national security, one that recognizes that military strength can be maintained over the long term only if it is built upon the foundations of economic strength and energy security. 9 refs.

  11. Progress on an integrated multi-physics simulation predictive capability for plasma chamber nuclear components

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    A. Ying; M. Abdou; H. Zhang; R. Munipalli; M. Ulrickson; M. Sawan; B. Merrill

    2010-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Understanding the behavior of a plasma chamber component in the fusion environment requires a simulation technique that is capable of integrating multi-disciplinary computational codes while appropriately treating geometric heterogeneity and complexity. Such a tool should be able to interpret phenomena from mutually dependent scientific disciplines and predict performance with sufficient accuracy and consistency. Integrated multi-physics simulation predictive capability (ISPC) relies upon advanced numerical simulation techniques and is being applied to ITER first wall/shield and Test Blanket Module (TBM) designs. In this paper, progress in ISPC development is described through the presentation of a number of integrated simulations. The simulations cover key physical phenomena encountered in a fusion plasma chamber system, including tritium permeation, fluid dynamics, and structure mechanics. Interface engines were developed in order to pass field data, such as surface deformation or nuclear heating rate, from the structural analysis to the thermo-fluid MHD analysis code for magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) velocity profile assessments, or from the neutronics analysis to the thermo-fluid analysis for temperature calculations, respectively. Near-term effort toward further ISPC development is discussed.

  12. In-Plant Reliability Data base for nuclear plant components. Interim report: diesel generators, batteries, chargers and inverters

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kahl, W.K.; Borkowski, R.J.

    1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of the In-Plant Reliability Data (IPRD) program is to develop a comprehensive, component-specific reliability data base for probabilistic risk assessment and for other statistical analyses relevant to component reliability evaluations. This document is the product of a pilot study that was undertaken to demonstrate the methodology and feasibility of applying IPRDS techniques to develop and analyze the reliability characteristics of key electrical components in five nuclear power plants. These electrical components include diesel generators, batteries, battery chargers and inverters. The sources used to develop the data base and produce the component failure rates and mean repair times were the plant equipment lists, plant drawings, maintenance work requests, Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs), and interviews with plant personnel. The data spanned approximately 33 reactor-years of commercial operation.

  13. National Security, Weapons Science

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItemResearch > The EnergyCenterDioxide CaptureSeeNUCLEAR SCIENCE

  14. Development of a Bayesian Network to monitor the probability of nuclear proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Holcombe, Robert (Robert Joseph)

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear Proliferation is a complex problem that has plagued national security strategists since the advent of the first nuclear weapons. As the cost to produce nuclear weapons has continued to decline and the availability ...

  15. Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richardson, J

    2009-01-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

  16. AEC and control of nuclear weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Project on January 1, 1947. This shift from the military control to civilian government control was a major shift in power, yet did not initially impact the former Manhattan...

  17. Working toward a world without nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Drell, Sidney D. [SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory and the Hoover Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, California (United States)

    2014-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

    Limiting the number of warheads is a good beginning, but getting to the end state calls for new thinking. Six specific steps can start us down that path.

  18. Debunking Six Big Myths about Nuclear Weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625govInstrumentstdmadapInactiveVisitingContract Management FermiDavid Turner David TurnerCitizen:DeborahDebunking Six

  19. weapons material protection | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilAElectronic Input Options Gary L. HirschOccurrencei-rapter | ¡ ¢warheadprotection

  20. weapons material | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilAElectronic Input Options Gary L. HirschOccurrencei-rapter | ¡

  1. Weapons engineering tritium facility overview

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Najera, Larry [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-20T23:59:59.000Z

    Materials provide an overview of the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) as introductory material for January 2011 visit to SRS. Purpose of the visit is to discuss Safety Basis, Conduct of Engineering, and Conduct of Operations. WETF general description and general GTS program capabilities are presented in an unclassified format.

  2. DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS (DEWs): A BIBLIOGRAPHY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS (DEWs): A BIBLIOGRAPHY Compiled by Greta E. Marlatt Dudley Knox Library://www.nps.edu/Library/Research%20Tools/Bibliographies/index.html #12;DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS (DEWs): A BIBLIOGRAPHY Complied INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK #12;4 Table of Contents DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS GENERAL

  3. Chemistry and materials science progress report. Weapons-supporting research and laboratory directed research and development: FY 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report covers different materials and chemistry research projects carried out a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory during 1995 in support of nuclear weapons programs and other programs. There are 16 papers supporting weapons research and 12 papers supporting laboratory directed research.

  4. Nuclear disarmament verification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DeVolpi, A.

    1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Arms control treaties, unilateral actions, and cooperative activities -- reflecting the defusing of East-West tensions -- are causing nuclear weapons to be disarmed and dismantled worldwide. In order to provide for future reductions and to build confidence in the permanency of this disarmament, verification procedures and technologies would play an important role. This paper outlines arms-control objectives, treaty organization, and actions that could be undertaken. For the purposes of this Workshop on Verification, nuclear disarmament has been divided into five topical subareas: Converting nuclear-weapons production complexes, Eliminating and monitoring nuclear-weapons delivery systems, Disabling and destroying nuclear warheads, Demilitarizing or non-military utilization of special nuclear materials, and Inhibiting nuclear arms in non-nuclear-weapons states. This paper concludes with an overview of potential methods for verification.

  5. Hegemony and nuclear proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Miller, Nicholas L. (Nicholas LeSuer)

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Contrary to longstanding of predictions of nuclear tipping points, the number of states interested in nuclear weapons has sharply declined in recent decades. In contrast to existing explanations, this dissertation argues ...

  6. Not So Permafrost Viewport for Nuclear Fusion

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons brought the war to a rapid and decisive close, and played an important ceased nuclear testing and the Laboratory entered an era of stockpile stewardship. Today, the LaboratoryNot So Permafrost Under Fire Viewport for Nuclear Fusion Hassle-Free Uranium 1663 LOS ALAMOS

  7. Opportunities exist for the diversion of weapons-usable material at the front end of the fuel cycle, during which

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Laughlin, Robert B.

    , North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa. (South Africa abandoned its nuclear weapons in 1991. Libya of setting up its own enrichment or spent-fuel treat- ment facilities is enormous. Countries with a new

  8. News Release Closure of Russian Nuclear Plant.PDF

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    CONTACTS: FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Jonathan Kiell, 202586-7371 September 27, 2001 Date Set for Closure of Russian Nuclear Weapons Plant U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration...

  9. Unsteady momentum fluxes in two-phase flow and the vibration of nuclear reactor components

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yih, Tien Sieh

    1968-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The steady and unsteady components of the momentum flux in a twophase flow have been measured at the exit of a vertical pipe. Measured momentum flux data has been machine processed by standard random vibration techniques ...

  10. Initial quantification of human error associated with specific instrumentation and control system components in licensed nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Luckas, W.J. Jr.; Lettieri, V.; Hall, R.E.

    1982-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report provides a methodology for the initial quantification of specific categories of human errors made in conjunction with several instrumentation and control (I and C) system components operated, maintained, and tested in licensed nuclear power plants. The resultant human error rates (HER) provide the first real systems bases of comparison for the existing derived and/or best judgement equivalent set of such rates or probabilities. These calculated error rates also provide the first real indication of human performance as it relates directly to specific tasks in nuclear plants. This work of developing specific HERs is both an extension of and an outgrowth of the generic HERs developed for safety system pumpc and valves as reported in NUREG/CR-1880.

  11. Initial quantification of human error associated with specific instrumentation and control system components in licensed nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Luckas, W.J. Jr.; Lettieri, V.; Hall, R.E.

    1982-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report provides a methodology for the initial quantification of specific categories of human errors made in conjunction with several instrumentation and control (I and C) system components operated, maintained, and tested in licensed nuclear power plants. The resultant human error rates (HER) provide the first real systems bases of comparison for the existing derived and/or best judgement equivalent set of such rates or probabilities. These calculated error rates also provide the first real indication of human performance as it relates directly to specific tasks in nuclear plants. This work of developing specific HERs is both an extension of and an outgrowth of the generic HERs developed for safety system pumps and valves as reported in NUREG/CR-1880.

  12. Evaluation of systems and components for hybrid optical firing sets

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Landry, M.J.; Rupert, J.W.; Mittas, A.

    1989-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    High-energy density light appears to be a unique energy form that may be used to enhance the nuclear safety of weapon systems. Hybrid optical firing sets (HOFS) utilize the weak-link/strong-link exclusion region concept for nuclear safety; this method is similar to present systems, but uses light to transmit power across the exclusion region barrier. This report describes the assembling, operating, and testing of fourteen HOFS. These firing sets were required to charge a capacitor-discharge unit to 2.0 and 2.5 kV (100 mJ) in less than 1 s. First, we describe the components, the measurement techniques used to evaluate the components, and the different characteristics of the measured components. Second, we describe the HOFS studied, the setups used for evaluating them, and the resulting characteristics. Third, we make recommendations for improving the overall performance and suggest the best HOFS for packaging. 36 refs., 145 figs., 14 tabs.

  13. Weapons Program Associate Directors named

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of ScienceandMesa del SolStrengthening aTurbulenceUtilizeRural PublicRatesAbout UsWeapons Program

  14. A Procedure for Determination of Degradation Acceptance Criteria for Structures and Passive Components in Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nie, J.; Braverman, J.; Hofmayer, C.; Choun, Y-S.; Hahm, D.; Choi, I-K.

    2012-01-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been collaborating with Brookhaven National Laboratory since 2007 to develop a realistic seismic risk evaluation system which includes the consideration of aging of structures and components in nuclear power plants (NPPs). This collaboration program aims at providing technical support to a five-year KAERI research project, which includes three specific areas that are essential to seismic probabilistic risk assessment: (1) probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, (2) seismic fragility analysis including the effects of aging, and (3) a plant seismic risk analysis. The understanding and assessment of age-related degradations of structures, systems, and components and their impact on plant safety is the major goal of this KAERI-BNL collaboration. Four annual reports have been published before this report as a result of the collaboration research.

  15. Threat of nuclear movement. Research report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Paine, G.M.

    1997-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    While weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include biological, chemical and nuclear material, this paper will focus on the nuclear component. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear material was left throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As these new states focused on economic and social issues, security and safety of nuclear material became secondary. This change in focus has provided conditions for the illicit movement of nuclear material and expertise. CIS admissions that illegal movement has occurred have been limited; however, material and technical expertise has been found in numerous locations. The United States and Russia have initiated many notable programs, but the potential exists for continual illicit movement. As such, continual emphasis needs to be placed on stemming the movement of nuclear material and expertise.

  16. A simple method for rapidly processing HEU from weapons returns

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McLean, W. II; Miller, P.E.

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A method based on the use of a high temperature fluidized bed for rapidly oxidizing, homogenizing and down-blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons is presented. This technology directly addresses many of the most important issues that inhibit progress in international commerce in HEU; viz., transaction verification, materials accountability, transportation and environmental safety. The equipment used to carry out the oxidation and blending is simple, inexpensive and highly portable. Mobile facilities to be used for point-of-sale blending and analysis of the product material are presented along with a phased implementation plan that addresses the conversion of HEU derived from domestic weapons and related waste streams as well as material from possible foreign sources such as South Africa or the former Soviet Union.

  17. Code Analyses Supporting PIE of Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ott, Larry J [ORNL; Bevard, Bruce Balkcom [ORNL; Spellman, Donald J [ORNL; McCoy, Kevin [AREVA Federal Services LLC

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of energy has decided to dispose of a portion of the nation's surplus weapons-grade plutonium by reconstituting it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiating the fuel in commercial power reactors. Four lead test assemblies (LTAs) were manufactured with weapons-grade mixed oxide (WG-MOX) fuel and irradiated in the Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1, to a maximum fuel rod burnup of ~47.3 GWd/MTHM. As part of the fuel qualification process, five rods with varying burnups and initial plutonium contents were selected from one assembly and shipped to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for hot cell examination. ORNL has provided analytical support for the post-irradiation examination (PIE) of these rods via extensive fuel performance modeling which has aided in instrument settings and PIE data interpretation. The results of these fuel performance simulations are compared in this paper with available PIE data.

  18. Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy: Neutronic Design Aspects of a Hybrid Fusion-Fission Nuclear Energy System

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kramer, Kevin James

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    of Con- trolled Nuclear Fusion, CONF-760975-P3, pages 1061–more effective solution, nuclear fusion. Fission Energy Thethe development of nuclear fusion weapons, humankind has

  19. The effects of aging on the fire vulnerability of nuclear power plant components

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nowlen, S.P.

    1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Sandia National Laboratories, under the sponsorship of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has initiated an effort to identify and investigate potential nuclear power plant fire safety issues associated with plant aging. The issues of potential concern, which have been identified are the effects of aging on (1) the vulnerability of electrical equipment to fire induced damage; (2) the propensity with which electrical equipment will initiate, or contribute to the severity of, fires; and (3) the integrity of passive fire protection features. Efforts in this program were initiated late in fiscal year 1988. For fiscal year 1989 efforts will focus on the investigation of the effects of aging on cable damageability and cable flammability. This paper presents the findings of a limited review of past electrical equipment fire aging research and a summary of planned activities for fiscal year 1989. 11 refs., 4 figs.

  20. Intact and Degraded Component Criticality Calculations of N Reactors Spent Nuclear Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    L. Angers

    2001-01-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this calculation is to perform intact and degraded mode criticality evaluations of the Department of Energy's (DOE) N Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel codisposed in a 2-Defense High-Level Waste (2-DHLW)/2-Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Waste Package (WP) and emplaced in a monitored geologic repository (MGR) (see Attachment I). The scope of this calculation is limited to the determination of the effective neutron multiplication factor (k{sub eff}) for both intact and degraded mode internal configurations of the codisposal waste package. This calculation will support the analysis that will be performed to demonstrate the technical viability for disposing of U-metal (N Reactor) spent nuclear fuel in the potential MGR.

  1. Copyright 2006 by Rich Janow Page 1 A First-Principles Model for Estimating Atmospheric Nuclear

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Janow, Rich

    26, 2006 Page 2 REFERENCES 1. Glasstone, S. and P. Dolan, eds., 'The Effects of Nuclear Weapons', 3rd

  2. MN4602 Crouch 2004 REASSESSING WEAPON SYSTEM

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    MN4602 Crouch 2004 REASSESSING WEAPON SYSTEM OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION METHODOLOGIES LTC Thom support assessing a weapon systems true cost and performance characteristics? S1: Can/should cost, operational effectiveness and suitability be assessed independent of one another? S2: Do current test

  3. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. Testing Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons. #12;Some Bits of History US develops and uses nuclear weapons on Japan at the end of World War II

  4. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    . Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. Testing The Test Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons Bits of History US develops and uses nuclear weapons on Japan at the end of World War II (1945). Other

  5. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons Colloquium - January 20, 2012 ­ p. #12;Some Bits of History US develops and uses nuclear weapons on Japan

  6. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

  7. Dry halide method for separating the components of spent nuclear fuels

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Christian, Jerry Dale (Idaho Falls, ID); Thomas, Thomas Russell (Rigby, ID); Kessinger, Glen F. (Idaho Falls, ID)

    1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The invention is a nonaqueous, single method for processing multiple spent nuclear fuel types by separating the fission- and transuranic products from the nonradioactive and fissile uranium product. The invention has four major operations: exposing the spent fuels to chlorine gas at temperatures preferably greater than 1200.degree. C. to form volatile metal chlorides; removal of the fission product chlorides, transuranic product chlorides, and any nickel chloride and chromium chloride in a molten salt scrubber at approximately 400.degree. C.; fractional condensation of the remaining volatile chlorides at temperatures ranging from 164.degree. C. to 2.degree. C.; and regeneration and recovery of the transferred spent molten salt by vacuum distillation. The residual fission products, transuranic products, and nickel- and chromium chlorides are converted to fluorides or oxides for vitrification. The method offers the significant advantages of a single, compact process that is applicable to most of the diverse nuclear fuels, minimizes secondary wastes, segregates fissile uranium from the high level wastes to resolve potential criticality concerns, segregates nonradioactive wastes from the high level wastes for volume reduction, and produces a common waste form glass or glass-ceramic.

  8. Dry halide method for separating the components of spent nuclear fuels

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Christian, J.D.; Thomas, T.R.; Kessinger, G.F.

    1998-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The invention is a nonaqueous, single method for processing multiple spent nuclear fuel types by separating the fission and transuranic products from the nonradioactive and fissile uranium product. The invention has four major operations: exposing the spent fuels to chlorine gas at temperatures preferably greater than 1200 C to form volatile metal chlorides; removal of the fission product chlorides, transuranic product chlorides, and any nickel chloride and chromium chloride in a molten salt scrubber at approximately 400 C; fractional condensation of the remaining volatile chlorides at temperatures ranging from 164 to 2 C; and regeneration and recovery of the transferred spent molten salt by vacuum distillation. The residual fission products, transuranic products, and nickel- and chromium chlorides are converted to fluorides or oxides for vitrification. The method offers the significant advantages of a single, compact process that is applicable to most of the diverse nuclear fuels, minimizes secondary wastes, segregates fissile uranium from the high level wastes to resolve potential criticality concerns, segregates nonradioactive wastes from the high level wastes for volume reduction, and produces a common waste form glass or glass-ceramic. 3 figs.

  9. Flow Components in a NaK Test Loop Designed to Simulate Conditions in a Nuclear Surface Power Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Polzin, Kurt A.; Godfroy, Thomas J. [NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Propulsion Research and Technology Applications Branch/ER24, MSFC, AL 35812 (United States)

    2008-01-21T23:59:59.000Z

    A test loop using NaK as the working fluid is presently in use to study material compatibility effects on various components that comprise a possible nuclear reactor design for use on the lunar surface. A DC electromagnetic (EM) pump has been designed and implemented as a means of actively controlling the NaK flow rate through the system and an EM flow sensor is employed to monitor the developed flow rate. These components allow for the matching of the flow rate conditions in test loops with those that would be found in a full-scale surface-power reactor. The design and operating characteristics of the EM pump and flow sensor are presented. In the EM pump, current is applied to a set of electrodes to produce a Lorentz body force in the fluid. A measurement of the induced voltage (back-EMF) in the flow sensor provides the means of monitoring flow rate. Both components are compact, employing high magnetic field strength neodymium magnets thermally coupled to a water-cooled housing. A vacuum gap limits the heat transferred from the high temperature NaK tube to the magnets and a magnetically-permeable material completes the magnetic circuit. The pump is designed to produce a pressure rise of 34.5 kPa, and the flow sensor's predicted output is roughly 20 mV at the loop's nominal flow rate of 0.114 m{sup 3}/hr.

  10. The New Nuclear Threat John Deutch

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Deutch, John

    The New Nuclear Threat John Deutch FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 71 · Number 4 Foreign AffairsThe contents. Deutch THE NEW NUCLEAR THREAT he threat of nuclear weapons spread across the world has displaced the fear

  11. Igniting the Light Elements: The Los Alamos Thermonuclear Weapon Project, 1942-1952

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anne C. Fitzpatrick

    1999-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The American system of nuclear weapons research and development was conceived and developed not as a result of technological determinism, but by a number of individual architects who promoted the growth of this large technologically-based complex. While some of the technological artifacts of this system, such as the fission weapons used in World War II, have been the subject of many historical studies, their technical successors--fusion (or hydrogen) devices--are representative of the largely unstudied highly secret realms of nuclear weapons science and engineering. In the postwar period a small number of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's staff and affiliates were responsible for theoretical work on fusion weapons, yet the program was subject to both the provisions and constraints of the US Atomic Energy Commission, of which Los Alamos was a part. The Commission leadership's struggle to establish a mission for its network of laboratories, least of all to keep them operating, affected Los Alamos's leaders' decisions as to the course of weapons design and development projects. Adapting Thomas P. Hughes's ''large technological systems'' thesis, I focus on the technical, social, political, and human problems that nuclear weapons scientists faced while pursuing the thermonuclear project, demonstrating why the early American thermonuclear bomb project was an immensely complicated scientific and technological undertaking. I concentrate mainly on Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's Theoretical, or T, Division, and its members' attempts to complete an accurate mathematical treatment of the ''Super''--the most difficult problem in physics in the postwar period--and other fusion weapon theories. Although tackling a theoretical problem, theoreticians had to address technical and engineering issues as well. I demonstrate the relative value and importance of H-bomb research over time in the postwar era to scientific, politician, and military participants in this project. I analyze how and when participants in the H-bomb project recognized both blatant and subtle problems facing the project, how scientists solved them, and the relationship this process had to official nuclear weapons policies. Consequently, I show how the practice of nuclear weapons science in the postwar period became an extremely complex, technologically-based endeavor.

  12. Celebrating 15 years | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    established NNSA in 2000 as a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy to manage and ensure the security of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, advance...

  13. Accident Response Group | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    involving nuclear weapons. The ARG staff includes scientists, engineers, technicians, health physics and safety specialist from NNSA's and the Department of Energy's national...

  14. Civil defense implications of nuclear winter

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chester, C.V.; Broyles, A.A.

    1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Possible effects of Nuclear Winter on the world's population are summarized. The implications of these effects for strategic weapons planning and civil defense measures are discussed. (ACR)

  15. Depleted-Uranium Weapons the Whys and Wherefores

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gsponer, A

    2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The only military application in which present-day depleted-uranium (DU) alloys out-perform tungsten alloys is long-rod penetration into a main battle-tank's armor. However, this advantage is only on the order of 10% and disappearing when the comparison is made in terms of actual lethality of complete anti-tank systems instead of laboratory-type steel penetration capability. Therefore, new micro- and nano-engineered tungsten alloys may soon out-perform existing DU alloys, enabling the production of tungsten munition which will be better than uranium munition, and whose overall life-cycle cost will be less due to the absence of the problems related to the radioactivity of uranium. The reasons why DU weapons have been introduced and used are analysed from the perspective that their radioactivity must have played an important role in the decision making process. It is found that DU weapons belong to the diffuse category of low-radiological-impact nuclear weapons to which emerging types of low-yield, i.e., fourth...

  16. Reducing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTuba City,Enriched UraniumPhysical Security Systems(PA)About| |

  17. SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved: 5-13-14 FEDERALAmerica High EnergyNationalSpring

  18. Eisenhower Halts Nuclear Weapons Testing | National Nuclear Security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power AdministrationField Campaign:INEAWater Use Goal 4: Efficient Water UseEighth ShullD.

  19. Nuclear Weapons Testing Resumes | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's Possible for Renewable Energy:Nanowire3627 Federal Register /76SafeguardsSystemsTesting Resumes |

  20. Audit Report National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: The FutureComments from TarasaName Affiliation Ahern,5Management of National

  1. COLLOQUIUM: Nuclear Famine: The Threat to Humanity from Nuclear Weapons |

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625govInstrumentstdmadapInactiveVisiting the TWPSuccess StoriesFebruary 26, 2014, 4:00pm to| PrincetonPrinceton Plasma

  2. Review of Recent Aging-Related Degradation Occurrences of Structures and Passive Components in U.S. Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nie,J.; Braverman, J.; Hofmayer, C.; Choun, Y.-S.; Kim, M.K.; Choi, I.-K.

    2009-04-02T23:59:59.000Z

    The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) are collaborating to develop seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures and passive components (SPCs) under a multi-year research agreement. To better understand the status and characteristics of degradation of SPCs in nuclear power plants (NPPs), the first step in this multi-year research effort was to identify and evaluate degradation occurrences of SPCs in U.S. NPPs. This was performed by reviewing recent publicly available information sources to identify and evaluate the characteristics of degradation occurrences and then comparing the information to the observations in the past. Ten categories of SPCs that are applicable to Korean NPPs were identified, comprising of anchorage, concrete, containment, exchanger, filter, piping system, reactor pressure vessel, structural steel, tank, and vessel. Software tools were developed to expedite the review process. Results from this review effort were compared to previous data in the literature to characterize the overall degradation trends.

  3. Minor component study for simulated high-level nuclear waste glasses (Draft)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Li, H.; Langowskim, M.H.; Hrma, P.R.; Schweiger, M.J.; Vienna, J.D.; Smith, D.E.

    1996-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Hanford Site single-shell tank (SSI) and double-shell tank (DSI) wastes are planned to be separated into low activity (or low-level waste, LLW) and high activity (or high-level waste, HLW) fractions, and to be vitrified for disposal. Formulation of HLW glass must comply with glass processibility and durability requirements, including constraints on melt viscosity, electrical conductivity, liquidus temperature, tendency for phase segregation on the molten glass surface, and chemical durability of the final waste form. A wide variety of HLW compositions are expected to be vitrified. In addition these wastes will likely vary in composition from current estimates. High concentrations of certain troublesome components, such as sulfate, phosphate, and chrome, raise concerns about their potential hinderance to the waste vitrification process. For example, phosphate segregation in the cold cap (the layer of feed on top of the glass melt) in a Joule-heated melter may inhibit the melting process (Bunnell, 1988). This has been reported during a pilot-scale ceramic melter run, PSCM-19, (Perez, 1985). Molten salt segregation of either sulfate or chromate is also hazardous to the waste vitrification process. Excessive (Cr, Fe, Mn, Ni) spinel crystal formation in molten glass can also be detrimental to melter operation.

  4. Nuclear Proliferation and the Deterrence of Conventional War: Justin Pollard

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sadoulet, Elisabeth

    Nuclear Proliferation and the Deterrence of Conventional War: A Proposal Justin Pollard April 2009) Introduction It seems counterintuitive to think that the spread of nuclear weapons could make the world a safer of ubiquitous nuclear armament is a more dangerous and unstable one. Certainly, a weapon of the nuclear

  5. AMERICAN POLICY AND IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME: THE CHINA ANALOGY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Heinke, Dietmar

    . The first Chinese nuclear test explosion took place in October 1964, thus breaking into the monopoly held, the PRC had become the rogue state par excellence. What it might do when it acquired nuclear weapons sent against Chinese nuclear facilities (though use of nuclear weapons was an extra option to assure

  6. Identification and Assessment of Material Models for Age-Related Degradation of Structures and Passive Components in Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nie,J.; Braverman, J.; Hofmayer, C.; Kim, M. K.; Choi, I-K.

    2009-04-27T23:59:59.000Z

    When performing seismic safety assessments of nuclear power plants (NPPs), the potential effects of age-related degradation on structures, systems, and components (SSCs) should be considered. To address the issue of aging degradation, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has embarked on a five-year research project to develop a realistic seismic risk evaluation system which will include the consideration of aging of structures and components in NPPs. Three specific areas that are included in the KAERI research project, related to seismic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), are probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, seismic fragility analysis including the effects of aging, and a plant seismic risk analysis. To support the development of seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures and components, KAERI entered into a collaboration agreement with Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) in 2007. The collaborative research effort is intended to continue over a five year period with the goal of developing seismic fragility analysis methods that consider the potential effects of age-related degradation of SSCs, and using these results as input to seismic PRAs. In the Year 1 scope of work BNL collected and reviewed degradation occurrences in US NPPs and identified important aging characteristics needed for the seismic capability evaluations that will be performed in the subsequent evaluations in the years that follow. This information is presented in the Annual Report for the Year 1 Task, identified as BNL Report-81741-2008 and also designated as KAERI/RR-2931/2008. The report presents results of the statistical and trending analysis of this data and compares the results to prior aging studies. In addition, the report provides a description of U.S. current regulatory requirements, regulatory guidance documents, generic communications, industry standards and guidance, and past research related to aging degradation of SSCs. This report describes the research effort performed by BNL for the Year 2 scope of work. This research focused on methods that could be used to represent the long-term behavior of materials used at NPPs. To achieve this BNL reviewed time-dependent models which can approximate the degradation effects of the key materials used in the construction of structures and passive components determined to be of interest in the Year 1 effort. The intent was to review the degradation models that would cover the most common time-dependent changes in material properties for concrete and steel components.

  7. Program Mission Campaigns are multi-year, multi-functional efforts involving, to varying degrees, every site in the nuclear

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    and reliability of aged and remanufactured weapons in the absence of nuclear testing. This technology base must degrees, every site in the nuclear weapons complex. They provide specialized scientific knowledge and technical support to the directed stockpile work on the nuclear weapons stockpile. Deliverables are defined

  8. Radiocesium Discharges and Subsequent Environmental Transport at the Major U.S. Weapons Production Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garten, Jr. C.T.; Hamby, D.M.; Schreckhise, R.G.

    1999-11-14T23:59:59.000Z

    Radiocesium is one of the more prevalent radionuclides in the environment as a result of weapons production related atomic projects in the United States and the former Soviet Union. Radiocesium discharges during the 1950's account for a large fraction of the historical releases from U.S. weapons production facilities. Releases of radiocesium to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems during the early ,years of nuclear weapons production provided the opportunity to conduct multidisciplinary studies on the transport mechanisms of this potentially hazardous radionuclide. The major U.S. Department of Energy facilities (Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, and Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina) are located in regions of the country that have different geographical characteristics. The facility siting provided diverse backgrounds for the development of an understanding of environmental factors contributing to the fate and transport of radiocesium. In this paper, we summarize the significant environmental releases of radiocesium in the early -years of weapons production and then discuss the historically significant transport mechanisms for r37Cs at the three facilities that were part of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

  9. Examination of the proposed conversion of the U.S. Navy nuclear fleet from highly enriched Uranium to low enriched Uranium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McCord, Cameron (Cameron Liam)

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    .The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons creates a loophole that allows a non-nuclear-weapon country to avoid international safeguards governing fissile materials if it claims that the materials will be used ...

  10. Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-18T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  11. Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Components and Enterprise Component Information System (eCIS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    John Minihan; Ed Schmidt; Greg Enserro; Melissa Thompson

    2008-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of the project was to develop the processes for using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) parts for WR production and to put in place a system for implementing the data management tools required to disseminate, store, track procurement, and qualify vendors. Much of the effort was devoted to determining if the use of COTS parts was possible. A basic question: How does the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) begin to use COTS in the weapon Stockpile Life Extension Programs with high reliability, affordability, while managing risk at acceptable levels? In FY00, it was determined that a certain weapon refurbishment program could not be accomplished without the use of COTS components. The elements driving the use of COTS components included decreased cost, greater availability, and shorter delivery time. Key factors that required implementation included identifying the best suppliers and components, defining life cycles and predictions of obsolescence, testing the feasibility of using COTS components with a test contractor to ensure capability, as well as quality and reliability, and implementing the data management tools required to disseminate, store, track procurement, and qualify vendors. The primary effort of this project then was to concentrate on the risks involved in the use of COTS and address the issues of part and vendor selection, procurement and acceptance processes, and qualification of the parts via part and sample testing. The Enterprise Component Information System (eCIS) was used to manage the information generated by the COTS process. eCIS is a common interface for both the design and production of NWC components and systems integrating information between SNL National Laboratory (SNL) and the Kansas City Plant (KCP). The implementation of COTS components utilizes eCIS from part selection through qualification release. All part related data is linked across an unclassified network for access by both SNL and KCP personnel. The system includes not only NWC part information but also includes technical reference data for over 25 Million electronic and electromechanical commercial and military parts via a data subscription. With the capabilities added to the system through this project, eCIS provides decision support, parts list/BOM analysis, editing, tracking, workflows, reporting, and history/legacy information integrating manufacturer reference, company technical, company business, and design data.

  12. Seismic fragility of nuclear power plant components: Phase 2, Motor control center, switchboard, panelboard and power supply

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bandyopadhyay, K.K.; Hofmayer, C.H.; Kassir, M.K.; Pepper, S.E.

    1987-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In Phase I of the Component Fragility Program, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has developed a procedure to establish the seismic fragility of nuclear power plant equipment by use of existing test data and demonstrated its application by considering two equipment pieces. In Phase II of the program, BNL has collected additional test data, and has further advanced and is applying the methodology to determine the fragility levels of selected essential equipment categories. The data evaluation of four equipment families, namely, motor control center, switchboard, panelboard and power supply has been completed. Fragility levels have been determined for various failure modes of each equipment class and the deterministic results are presented in terms of test response spectra. In addition, the test data have been analyzed for determination of the respective probabilistic fragility levels. To this end, a single g-value has been selected to approximately represent the test vibration level and a statistical analysis has been performed with the g-values corresponding to a particular failure mode. The zero period acceleration and the average spectral acceleration over a frequency range of interest are separately used as the single g-value. The resulting parameters are presented in terms of a median value, an uncertainty coefficient and a randomness coefficient. Ultimately, each fragility level is expressed in terms of a single descriptor called an HCLPF value corresponding to a high (95%) confidence of a low (5%) probability of failure. The important observations made in the process of data analysis are included in this report.

  13. Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

    This Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations. Cancels DOE O 452.2C. Admin Chg 1, 7-10-13

  14. Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2009-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety (NES) elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations (NEOs). Cancels DOE O 452.2C. Admin Chg 1, dated 7-10-13, cancels DOE O 452.2D.

  15. Candidate processes for diluting the {sup 235}U isotope in weapons-capable highly enriched uranium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Snider, J.D.

    1996-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering its surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used to produce nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching uranium in the fissile {sup 235}U isotope from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by diluting its concentration of the fissile {sup 235}U isotope in a uranium blending process, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel.

  16. Nuclear proliferation after the Cold War

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reiss, M.; Litwak, R.S.

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Today, former Soviet republics threaten to gain control over nuclear weapons sited on their territories, and reports on North Korea, Pakistan, India, and Iraq reveal current or recent weapon development programs. This document offers a timely assessment of the prospects for nuclear nonproliferation.

  17. Of owl or ostrich. The U.S. policy of calculated ambiguity to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lakamp, M.A.

    1998-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States has adopted a policy of calculated ambiguity regarding the role of nuclear weapons in response to a potential chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attack. Many factors affect decisions about the role nuclear weapons play in US counterproliferation strategy. This thesis describes the policy of calculated ambiguity and offers some observations about its prospects and pitfalls. The thesis presents evidence that suggests nuclear weapons could play a positive role in the US counterproliferation strategy, at least in some circumstances. It also explains how such a role could conflict with the US nonproliferation strategy. Such a role would also violate the nuclear taboo and be seen by a majority of countries as illegal and immoral. The United States has chosen a policy of calculated ambiguity in an attempt to retain the deterrent value of nuclear weapons without paying the political, legal, and moral costs of explicit reliance on nuclear weapons to deter the use of CBW. This may have short-term benefits, but ultimately may damage the national interest.

  18. NEW - DOE O 452.2E, Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety (NES) elements of DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, or successor directive, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations (NEOs).

  19. Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Doyle, James [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 committed to a continuing process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions beyond the new START treaty that was signed April 8, 2010 and to the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, the US Nuclear Posture review released April 6, 2010 commits the US to initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures. It is impossible to predict the specific directions that US-RU nuclear arms reductions will take over the 5-10 years. Additional bilateral treaties could be reached requiring effective verification as indicated by statements made by the Obama administration. There could also be transparency agreements or other initiatives (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) that require monitoring with a standard of verification lower than formal arms control, but still needing to establish confidence to domestic, bilateral and multilateral audiences that declared actions are implemented. The US Nuclear Posture Review and other statements give some indication of the kinds of actions and declarations that may need to be confirmed in a bilateral or multilateral setting. Several new elements of the nuclear arsenals could be directly limited. For example, it is likely that both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads (deployed and in storage), warhead components, and aggregate stocks of such items could be accountable under a future treaty or transparency agreement. In addition, new initiatives or agreements may require the verified dismantlement of a certain number of nuclear warheads over a specified time period. Eventually procedures for confirming the elimination of nuclear warheads, components and fissile materials from military stocks will need to be established. This paper is intended to provide useful background information for establishing a conceptual approach to a five-year technical program plan for research and development of nuclear arms reductions verification and transparency technologies and procedures.

  20. Implementing the chemical weapons convention

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kellman, B.; Tanzman, E. A.

    1999-12-07T23:59:59.000Z

    In 1993, as the CWC ratification process was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the CWC with national law could cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States as to how the CWC would be carried out. As a result, the author's colleagues and the author prepared the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Committee of CWC Legal Experts, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Central Europe, reviewed the Manual. In February 1998, they finished the second edition of the Manual in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Manual tries to increase understanding of the Convention by identifying its obligations and suggesting methods of meeting them. Education about CWC obligations and available alternatives to comply with these requirements can facilitate national response that are consistent among States Parties. Thus, the Manual offers options that can strengthen international realization of the Convention's goals if States Parties act compatibly in implementing them. Equally important, it is intended to build confidence that the legal issues raised by the Convention are finite and addressable. They are now nearing competition of an internet version of this document so that interested persons can access it electronically and can view the full text of all of the national implementing legislation it cites. The internet address, or URL, for the internet version of the Manual is http: //www.cwc.ard.gov. This paper draws from the Manual. It comparatively addresses approximately thirty implementing issues, showing how various States Parties have enacted measures that are responsive to CWC obligations. It is intended to highlight the issues that States Parties must address and to identify trends among States Parties that might be useful to States that have not yet made crucial decisions as to how to resolve key matters. At various points in the text, country names are listed in parenthesis to identify pieces of national legislation that demonstrate the point in the text. It should not be inferred that nations not listed have not addressed the point or have taken a different position. In some cases, a nation's position is explained in somewhat more depth to give specific detail to an assertion in the text. Attached to this paper is a chart which illustrates how States Parties in the Central European region as well as the United States respond to the issues raised. Obviously, in preparing such a chart, many subtle provisions in national legislation must be simplified. The point of the chart is to portray, on a few pages, the major trends of legislation.

  1. INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Removal of Categories I and II Special Nuclear Material from Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico"

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy's (DOE's) Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico (Sandia) develops science-based technologies in support of national security in areas such as nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, military technologies, and homeland security. Sandia's primary mission is ensuring that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable and can fully support the Nation's deterrence policy. Part of this mission includes systems engineering of nuclear weapons; research, design, and development of non-nuclear components; manufacturing of non-nuclear weapons components; the provision of safety, security, and reliability assessments of stockpile weapons; and the conduct of high-explosives research and development and environmental testing. Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, operates Sandia for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). On May 7, 2004, the Secretary announced that the Department would evaluate missions at DOE sites to consolidate Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in the most secure environments possible. The Administrator of the NNSA said that this effort was a key part of an overall plan to transform the nuclear weapons complex into a smaller, safer, more secure, and more efficient national security enterprise. In February 2008, Sandia was the first site to report it had reduced its on-site inventory of nuclear material below 'Categories I and II' levels, which require the highest level of security to protect material such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The Office of Inspector General initiated an inspection to determine if Sandia made appropriate adjustments to its security posture in response to the removal of the Categories I and II SNM. We found that Sandia adjusted its security posture in response to the removal of Categories I and II SNM. For example, security posts were closed; unneeded protective force weapons and equipment were excessed from the site; and, Sandia's Site Safeguards and Security Plan was modified. We also found that some highly enriched uranium in a complex material configuration was not removed from Sandia. This material was designated as Category III material using a methodology for assessing the attractiveness of complex materials that was not specifically addressed in any current DOE directive. Although DOE and NNSA officials believed that this designation was appropriate, the methodology used to support this designation had not, as of the time of our review, been incorporated into the DOE directives system. Historically, the Department has considered the categorization of SNM to be an important national security and public policy issue. Consequently, we believe that expedited action should be taken to formalize this methodology in the DOE directives system and that it be disseminated throughout the Department of Energy complex.

  2. Nuclear proliferation and testing: A tale of two treaties

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Corden, Pierce S.; Hafemeister, David

    2014-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Despite progress in reducing stockpiles after the end of the Cold War, the disturbing actions of some nations could spread nuclear weapon capabilities and enlarge existing arsenals.

  3. Y-12 employees receive awards recognizing excellence in nuclear...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    receive ... Y-12 employees receive awards recognizing excellence in nuclear weapons program Posted: October 6, 2014 - 9:09am Defense Programs 2013 Award of Excellence recipient...

  4. Weapons production | Y-12 National Security Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of ScienceandMesa del SolStrengthening aTurbulenceUtilizeRural PublicRatesAbout UsWeapons ProgramWeapons

  5. Fragility Analysis Methodology for Degraded Structures and Passive Components in Nuclear Power Plants - Illustrated using a Condensate Storage Tank

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nie, J.; Braverman, J.; Hofmayer, C.; Choun, Y.; Kim, M.; Choi, I.

    2010-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is conducting a five-year research project to develop a realistic seismic risk evaluation system which includes the consideration of aging of structures and components in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The KAERI research project includes three specific areas that are essential to seismic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA): (1) probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, (2) seismic fragility analysis including the effects of aging, and (3) a plant seismic risk analysis. Since 2007, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has entered into a collaboration agreement with KAERI to support its development of seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures and components. The collaborative research effort is intended to continue over a five year period. The goal of this collaboration endeavor is to assist KAERI to develop seismic fragility analysis methods that consider the potential effects of age-related degradation of structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The research results of this multi-year collaboration will be utilized as input to seismic PRAs. In the Year 1 scope of work, BNL collected and reviewed degradation occurrences in US NPPs and identified important aging characteristics needed for the seismic capability evaluations. This information is presented in the Annual Report for the Year 1 Task, identified as BNL Report-81741-2008 and also designated as KAERI/RR-2931/2008. The report presents results of the statistical and trending analysis of this data and compares the results to prior aging studies. In addition, the report provides a description of U.S. current regulatory requirements, regulatory guidance documents, generic communications, industry standards and guidance, and past research related to aging degradation of SSCs. In the Year 2 scope of work, BNL carried out a research effort to identify and assess degradation models for the long-term behavior of dominant materials that are determined to be risk significant to NPPs. Multiple models have been identified for concrete, carbon and low-alloy steel, and stainless steel. These models are documented in the Annual Report for the Year 2 Task, identified as BNL Report-82249-2009 and also designated as KAERI/TR-3757/2009. This report describes the research effort performed by BNL for the Year 3 scope of work. The objective is for BNL to develop the seismic fragility capacity for a condensate storage tank with various degradation scenarios. The conservative deterministic failure margin method has been utilized for the undegraded case and has been modified to accommodate the degraded cases. A total of five seismic fragility analysis cases have been described: (1) undegraded case, (2) degraded stainless tank shell, (3) degraded anchor bolts, (4) anchorage concrete cracking, and (5)a perfect combination of the three degradation scenarios. Insights from these fragility analyses are also presented.

  6. Non-lethal weapons and the future of war

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alexander, J.B.

    1995-03-09T23:59:59.000Z

    This presentation provides a discussion of the expanding role of non-lethal weapons as envisioned necessary in future warfare.

  7. Nuclear Futures Analysis and Scenario Building

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Arthur, E.D.; Beller, D.; Canavan, G.H.; Krakowski, R.A.; Peterson, P.; Wagner, R.L.

    1999-07-09T23:59:59.000Z

    This LDRD project created and used advanced analysis capabilities to postulate scenarios and identify issues, externalities, and technologies associated with future ''things nuclear''. ''Things nuclear'' include areas pertaining to nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear energy, examined in the context of future domestic and international environments. Analysis tools development included adaptation and expansion of energy, environmental, and economics (E3) models to incorporate a robust description of the nuclear fuel cycle (both current and future technology pathways), creation of a beginning proliferation risk model (coupled to the (E3) model), and extension of traditional first strike stability models to conditions expected to exist in the future (smaller force sizes, multipolar engagement environments, inclusion of actual and latent nuclear weapons (capability)). Accomplishments include scenario development for regional and global nuclear energy, the creation of a beginning nuclear architecture designed to improve the proliferation resistance and environmental performance of the nuclear fuel cycle, and numerous results for future nuclear weapons scenarios.

  8. Nuclear bargaining : using carrots and sticks in nuclear counter-proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Reardon, Robert J

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This dissertation explores how states can use positive inducements and negative sanctions to successfully bargain with nuclear proliferators and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It seeks to answer the following ...

  9. Aegis Combat and Weapon Systems Overview 24 hours, $1495

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Fork, Richard

    SEprocessensuresthatsystemsaredevelopedtomeet affordable, operationally effective, and timely mission objectives. FocusonengineeringtheWeaponAegis Combat and Weapon Systems Overview 24 hours, $1495 Launched from the Advanced Surface Missile that led to the initiation of Aegis. Topics Include: · AegisOverviewandHistory · AegisBMD · AegisWeapon

  10. Towards Optimal Placement of Bio-Weapon Chris Kiekintveld

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ward, Karen

    . Vice versa, our objective is to minimize the potential effect of a bio-weapon attack. CommentTowards Optimal Placement of Bio-Weapon Detectors Chris Kiekintveld Department of Computer Science, USA Email: lolerma@episd.edu Abstract--Biological weapons are difficult and expensive to detect

  11. Laboratory directed research and development on disposal of plutonium recovered from weapons. FY1994 final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pitts, J.H.; Choi, J.S.

    1994-11-14T23:59:59.000Z

    This research project was conceived as a multi-year plan to study the use of mixed plutonium oxide-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in existing nuclear reactors. Four areas of investigation were originally proposed: (1) study reactor physics including evaluation of control rod worth and power distribution during normal operation and transients; (2) evaluate accidents focusing upon the reduced control rod worth and reduced physical properties of PuO{sub 2}; (3) assess the safeguards required during fabrication and use of plutonium bearing fuel assemblies; and (4) study public acceptance issues associated with using material recovered from weapons to fuel a nuclear reactor. First year accomplishments are described. Appendices contain 2 reports entitled: development and validation of advanced computational capability for MOX fueled ALWR assembly designs; and long-term criticality safety concerns associated with weapons plutonium disposition.

  12. Nuclear Aerosols: Direct Simulation and Elucidation of the Role of Multiple Components, Radioactivity, Charge, Shape and Spatial Inhomogeneity

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sudarshan K. Loyalka

    2008-10-12T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear aerosols can originate from severe core damae in light water reactors, core disruptive accidents in fast reactors, nuclear accidents during nuclear material transport, at waste disposal sites, or explosions. These aerosols evolve under natural transport processes as well as under the influence of engineered safety features. Such aerosols can be hazardous for the equipment inside the reactor, and when leaked into the environment, pose potential risks to the public. Hence, the origin, movement and distribution of these aerosols need to be studied and controlled.

  13. Concept of Operations for Nuclear Warhead Embedded Sensors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rockett, P D; Koncher, T R

    2012-05-16T23:59:59.000Z

    Embedded arms-control-sensors provide a powerful new paradigm for managing compliance with future nuclear weapons treaties, where deployed warhead numbers will be reduced to 1000 or less. The CONOPS (Concept of Operations) for use with these sensors is a practical tool with which one may help define design parameters, including size, power, resolution, communications, and physical structure. How frequently must data be acquired and must a human be present? Will such data be acquired for only stored weapons or will it be required of deployed weapons as well? Will tactical weapons be subject to such monitoring or will only strategic weapons apply? Which data will be most crucial? Will OSI's be a component of embedded sensor data management or will these sensors stand alone in their data extraction processes? The problem space is massive, but can be constrained by extrapolating to a reasonable future treaty regime and examining the bounded options this scenario poses. Arms control verification sensors, embedded within the warhead case or aeroshell, must provide sufficient but not excessively detailed data, confirming that the item is a nuclear warhead and that it is a particular warhead without revealing sensitive information. Geolocation will be provided by an intermediate transceiver used to acquire the data and to forward the data to a central processing location. Past Chain-of-Custody projects have included such devices and will be primarily responsible for adding such indicators in the future. For the purposes of a treaty regime a TLI will be verified as a nuclear warhead by knowledge of (a) the presence and mass of SNM, (b) the presence of HE, and (c) the reporting of a unique tag ID. All of these parameters can be obtained via neutron correlation measurements, Raman spectroscopy, and fiber optic grating fabrication, respectively. Data from these sensors will be pushed out monthly and acquired nearly daily, providing one of several verification layers in depth, including on-site inspections, NTM, declarations, and semi-annual BCC meetings. Human intervention will not be necessary. The sheer numbers, small size, and wide distribution of warhead TLIs will mandate the added level of remote monitoring that Embedded Sensors can provide. This multilayer protection will limit the need to increase the frequency of OSIs, by adding confidence that declared TLIs remain as declared and that no undeclared items enter the regime without the other States Party's knowledge. Acceptance of Embedded arms control Sensor technologies will require joint development by all State's Parties involved. Principles of operation and robustness of technologies must be individually evaluated to sustain confidence in the strength of this system against attack. Weapons designers must be assured that these sensors will in no way impact weapon performance and operation, will not affect weapons security and safety, and will have a neutral impact upon weapon system surety. Each State's Party will need to conduct an in depth review of their weapons lifecycle to determine where moves may be reduced to minimize vulnerabilities and where random selection may be used to minimize the ability to make undeclared changes. In the end Verification is a political measure, not a technical one. If the potential users can gain sufficient confidence in the application of Embedded arms control Sensors, they could constitute the final layer of glue to hold together the next Nuclear Arms Control agreement.

  14. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR SCIENCE, VOL. 52, NO. 4, AUGUST 2005 1061 Radiation Qualification of Electronics Components

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Fukunaga, Chikara

    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR SCIENCE, VOL. 52, NO. 4, AUGUST 2005 1061 Radiation Qualification@comp.metro-u.ac.jp). T. Sakuma is with the Tokyo University of Agriculture and Engineering, Ko- ganei 183-8538, Japan

  15. Safety issues in fabricating mixed oxide fuel using surplus weapons plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Buksa, J.; Badwan, F.; Barr, M.; Motley, F.

    1998-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper presents an assessment of the safety issues and implications of fabricating mixed oxide (MOX) fuel using surplus weapons plutonium. The basis for this assessment is the research done at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in identifying and resolving the technical issues surrounding the production of PuO{sub 2} feed, removal of gallium from the PuO{sub 2} feed, the fabrication of test fuel, and the work done at the LANL plutonium processing facility. The use of plutonium in MOX fuel has been successfully demonstrated in Europe, where the experience has been almost exclusively with plutonium separated from commercial spent nuclear fuel. This experience in safely operating MOX fuel fabrication facilities directly applies to the fabrication and irradiation of MOX fuel made from surplus weapons plutonium. Consequently, this paper focuses on the technical difference between plutonium from surplus weapons, and light-water reactor recycled plutonium. Preliminary assessments and research lead to the conclusion that no new process or product safety concerns will arise from using surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel.

  16. Measures to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tanzman, E.; Kellman, B.

    1999-11-05T23:59:59.000Z

    This seminar is another excellent opportunity for those involved in preventing chemical weapons production and use to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. The author is grateful to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for inviting him to address this distinguished seminar. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the position of the government of the US nor or of any other institution. In 1993, as the process of CWC ratification was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law would cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Convention would be carried out. As a result the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was prepared and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Manual was reviewed by the Committee of Legal Experts on National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Mica. In February 1998, the second edition of the Manual was published in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The second edition 1998 clarified the national implementation options to reflect post-entry-into-force thinking, added extensive references to national implementing measures that had been enacted by various States Parties, and included a prototype national implementing statute developed by the authors to provide a starting point for those whose national implementing measures were still under development. Last month, the Web Edition of the Manual was completed. It's internet address, or URL, is http://www.cwc.anl.gov/.

  17. Monitoring under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement : the prospects of antineutrino detection as an IAEA verification metric for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in the United States

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Copeland, Christopher Michael, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    After the end of World War II, the world entered an even more turbulent period as it faced the beginnings of the Cold War, during which the prospect of mutually assured destruction between the world's largest nuclear weapon ...

  18. High-value use of weapons-plutonium by burning in molten salt accelerator-driven subcritical systems or reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowman, C.D.; Venneri, F.

    1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The application of thermal-spectrum molten-salt reactors and accelerator-driven subcritical systems to the destruction of weapons-return plutonium is considered from the perspective of deriving the maximum societal benefit. The enhancement of electric power production from burning the fertile fuel {sup 232}Th with the plutonium is evaluated. Also the enhancement of destruction of the accumulated waste from commercial nuclear reactors is considered using the neutron-rich weapons plutonium. Most cases examined include the concurrent transmutation of the long-lived actinide and fission product waste ({sup 99}Tc, {sup 129}I, {sup 135}Cs, {sup 126}Sn and {sup 79}Se).

  19. Long-Term Planning for Nuclear Energy Systems Under Deep Uncertainty

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kim, Lance Kyungwoo

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Following the discovery of nuclear fission in the late 1930’products produced by a nuclear fission re- action present apathways to a nuclear fission weapon. In a nutshell, the

  20. Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Joeck, N

    2007-02-05T23:59:59.000Z

    The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

  1. Quantitative Methodology for Assessing State-Level Nuclear Security Measures 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Myers, Christopher 1985-

    2012-11-29T23:59:59.000Z

    international agreements that are either binding or non-binding. Unlike the international safeguards regime, which is governed primarily by the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, there is no verification regime for nuclear security or even...

  2. Bonus-- Cameras Designed to Strengthen Nuclear Security Can Also Detect Cancer

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Technologies that are improving our ability to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and material are also saving lives on a daily basis.

  3. Nuclear conflict and ozone depletion Quick summary

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Toohey, Darin W.

    Nuclear conflict and ozone depletion Quick summary o Regional nuclear war could cause global which traps pollutants o Nuclear weapons cause explosions, which then causes things around the vicinity to start burning, which in turn releases black carbon; it is not the nuclear material or fallout causing

  4. air weapon fatalities: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    re-kindled with the advent of advanced virtual prototyping of radio frequency (RF) sources for use in high power microwave (HPM) weapons technology. Air breakdown phenomena are...

  5. Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program (Informational Purposes Only)

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-11-21T23:59:59.000Z

    This draft has been scheduled for final review before the Directives Review Board on 12-4-2014. All major comments and concerns should be provided to your DRB representative, following your organization process. If you do not know who your representative is, please see the list of DRB members at https://www.directives.doe.gov/beta/references/directives-review-board. If your office is represented by Ingrid Kolb, Director, Office of Management, please submit your major concerns and comments to the DRB Liaison, Camille Beben (Camille.Beben@hq.doe.gov; 202-586-4014). All major comments and concerns should be submitted by COB 12-2-2014.

  6. National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    veterans were intrigued by a brief account of the history of Oak Ridge presented by Ray Smith, the Y-12 Oak Ridge National Laboratory Historian. Those in attendance also enjoyed...

  7. Gordon Assesses Security At Nuclear Weapons Complex News.....

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    levels of security. During his trip Wednesday and Thursday (Sep. 19-20), he visited the Savannah River Site near Aiken, S. C., the Y-12 National Security Site in Oak Ridge,TN,...

  8. NNSA Administrator Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Press Releases Video Gallery Photo Gallery Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home Media Room Press Releases NNSA Administrator Gordon Assesses Security...

  9. DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    thereby, adversely impacting the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. The heart of these assertions is that oversight of contractors has been excessive, overly...

  10. LANL | Physics | Nuclear Weapons and Global Security Data Analysis

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    void surrounded by a 4.5 cm radius surrogate fissile material of tungsten, tantalum, or depleted uranium. This sphere is surrounded by a 6.5 cm-radius copper sphere. At is...

  11. Fehner and Gosling, Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1951-1963.

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently20,000 Russian NuclearandJunetrackEllen|JulyR--FOIADepartment ofBattlefield of the Cold

  12. Briefing, Classification of Nuclear Weapons-Related Information |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny: Theof Energy Future of CSP: Challenges andAcknowledgmentsEnergy

  13. NNSA Administrator Gordon Assesses Security Of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated Codes |IsLoveReferenceAgenda Workshop AgendaGraphicNIF &

  14. Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport(FactDepartment ofLetterEconomy and Emissions EstimatesLindsey Geisler

  15. Sandia completes major overhaul of key nuclear weapons test facilities |

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of ScienceandMesa del Sol HomeFacebook Twitter YouTubeCenters:FacebookContractor/Bidder|BRUthE NIttYDM

  16. National Day of Remembrance HSS Honors Former Nuclear Weapons Program

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed offOCHCO2:Introduction toManagement ofConverDyn NOPRNancy Sutley About Us NancyForumNationalWorkers

  17. EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny:Revised Finding of98-F, Western22,EERE: Record of Decision4: Supplement

  18. Y-12 employees receive awards recognizing excellence in nuclear weapons

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of ScienceandMesa del SolStrengtheningWildfires may contribute moredetectionSecurityprogram | Y-12

  19. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613 122Commercial602 1,39732 DOE FOrdersServices| DepartmentEnforcement »

  20. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613 122Commercial602 1,39732 DOE FOrdersServices| DepartmentEnforcement »Issues |

  1. Linking Legacies: Connecting the Cold War Nuclear Weapons Production

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYouTube YouTube Note: Since the.pdfBreaking ofOil & Gas »ofMarketing | Department ofEnergyEnergy9LinacProcesses

  2. EGS 01-01: Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic Plan Department ofNotices | Department of36CoolEERE Website

  3. Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over Our Instagram Secretary Moniz9 SeptemberSetting the Stage for the NextSevenSeventy

  4. Assessing the nuclear age

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ackland, L.; McGuire, S.

    1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This book presents papers on nuclear weapons and arms control. Topics considered include historical aspects, the arms race, nuclear power, flaws in the non-proliferation treaty, North-South issues, East-West confrontation, Soviet decision making with regard to national defense, US and Soviet perspectives on national security, ballistic missile defense (''Star Wars''), political aspects, nuclear winter, stockpiles, US foreign policy, and military strategy.

  5. A Safer Nuclear Enterprise - Application to Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES)(U)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Morris, Tommy J. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-05T23:59:59.000Z

    Activities and infrastructure that support nuclear weapons are facing significant challenges. Despite an admirable record and firm commitment to make safety a primary criterion in weapons design, production, handling, and deployment - there is growing apprehension about terrorist acquiring weapons or nuclear material. At the NES Workshop in May 2012, Scott Sagan, who is a proponent of the normal accident cycle, presented. Whether a proponent of the normal accident cycle or High Reliability Organizations - we have to be diligent about our safety record. Constant vigilance is necessary to maintain our admirable safety record and commitment to Nuclear Explosive Safety.

  6. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) : are we safer?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brune, Nancy E.

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is designed to make world safer by reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. U.S. also seeks to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforce regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities. But recent studies suggest that nuclear proliferation is a direct response to the perceived threat of U.S. conventional capabilities not U.S. nuclear stockpile. If this is true, then the intent of the NPR to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons and strengthen conventional military capabilities may actually make the world less safe. First stated objective of NPR is to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and move step by step toward eliminating them. Second stated objective is a reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong deterrent which forms the basis of U.S. assurances to allies and partners. The pathway - made explicit throughout the NPR - for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures is to give conventional forces and capabilities and missile defenses (e.g. non-nuclear elements) a greater share of the deterrence burden.

  7. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Graham, Thomas Jr. [7609 Glenbrook Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 (United States)

    2014-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  8. Multiphysics Thermal-Fluid Design Analysis of a Non-Nuclear Tester for Hot-Hydrogen Materials and Component Development

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wang, T.-S.; Foote, John; Litchford, Ron [NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama, 35812 (United States)

    2006-01-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this effort is to perform design analyses for a non-nuclear hot-hydrogen materials tester, as a first step towards developing efficient and accurate multiphysics, thermo-fluid computational methodology to predict environments for hypothetical solid-core, nuclear thermal engine thrust chamber design and analysis. The computational methodology is based on a multidimensional, finite-volume, turbulent, chemically reacting, thermally radiating, unstructured-grid, and pressure-based formulation. The multiphysics invoked in this study include hydrogen dissociation kinetics and thermodynamics, turbulent flow, convective, and thermal radiative heat transfers. The goals of the design analyses are to maintain maximum hot-hydrogen jet impingement energy and to minimize chamber wall heating. The results of analyses on three test fixture configurations and the rationale for final selection are presented. The interrogation of physics revealed that reactions of hydrogen dissociation and recombination are highly correlated with local temperature and are necessary for accurate prediction of the hot-hydrogen jet temperature.

  9. Assessing alternative strategies for the disposition of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chow, B.G.

    1995-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons and military inventory can be blended down into proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium and used economically as fuel in current nuclear reactors. However, the US can no longer expect the agreement to purchase and resell the uranium blended down from 500 metric tons of Russia`s HEU to be budget neutral. The authors recommend that other countries participate in the repurchase of blended-down uranium from the US and that a multilateral offer to Russia, which acts on behalf of all four former Soviet nuclear republics, be made for the purchase of the blended-down uranium from Russia`s remaining HEU. Since spent fuel in temporary storage worldwide contains enough plutonium to fuel breeders on any realistic buildup schedule in the event that breeders are needed, there is no need to save the weapons-grade plutonium for the future. This paper compares the costs of burning it in existing light water reactors, storing it indefinitely, and burying it after 20 years of storage. They found that the present-valued cost is about $1 to 2 billion in US dollars for all three alternatives. The deciding factor for selection should be an alternative`s proliferation resistance. Prolonged plutonium storage in Russia runs the risk of theft and, if the Russian political scene turns for the worse, the risk of re-use in its nuclear arsenal. The most urgent issue, however, is to determine not the disposition alternative but whether Russia will let its weapons-grade plutonium leave the former Soviet Republics (FSRs). The US should offer to buy and remove such plutonium from the FSRs. If Russia refuses even after the best US efforts, the US should then persuade Russia to burn or bury the plutonium, but not store it indefinitely for future breeder use.

  10. 'Long-Cell Action' Corrosion: A Basic Mechanism Hidden Behind Components Degradation Issues in Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Genn Saji [Ex-Secretariate of Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (Japan)

    2006-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In spite of industries' effort over the last 40 years, corrosion-related issues continue to be one of the largest unresolved problems for nuclear power plants worldwide. There are several types of strange corrosion phenomena from the point of view of our current understanding of corrosion science established in other fields. Some of these are IGSCC, PWSCC, AOA, and FAC (Erosion-Corrosion). Through studying and coping with diverse corrosion phenomena, the author believes that they share a common basis with respect to the assumed corrosion mechanism (e.g., 'local cell action' hypothesis). In general, local cell action is rarely severe since it produces a fairly uniform corrosion. The 'long cell action' that transports electrons through structures far beyond the region of local cell corrosion activities has been identified as a basic mechanism in soil corrosion. If this mechanism is assumed in nuclear power plants, the structure becomes anodic in the area where the potential is less positive and cathodic where this potential is more positive. Metallic ions generated at anodic corrosion sites are transported to remote cathodic sites through the circulation of water and deposits as corrosion products. The SCC, FAC (E-C) and PWSCC occur in the anodic sites as the structure itself acts as a short-circuiting conductor between the two sites, the action is similar to a galvanic cell but in a very large scale. This situation is the same as a battery that has been short-circuited at the terminals. No apparent external potential difference exists between the two electrodes, but an electrochemical reaction is still taking place inside the battery cell with a large internal short current. In this example what is important is the potential difference between the local coolant and the surface of the structural material. Long cell action corrosion is likely enhancing the local cell action's anodic corrosion activities, such as SCC, FAC/E-C, and PWSCC. It tends to be more hazardous because of its localized nature compared with the local cell action corrosion. There exist various mechanisms (electrochemical cell configurations) that induce such potential differences, including: ionic concentration, aeration, temperature, flow velocity, radiation and corrosion potentials. In this paper, the author will discuss these potential differences and their relevance to the un-resolved corrosion issues in nuclear power plants. Due to the importance of this potential mechanism the author is calling for further verification experiments as a joint international project. (author)

  11. Just war and nuclear weapons : just war theory and its application to the Korean nuclear weapons issue in Korean Christianity 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Son, Changwan

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    of Just War has developed over the last two thousand years, adapting as first Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, through the break down of any enforceable norms in Europe‘s 'Dark Ages‘, to the emergence of the concept of the modern...

  12. ORISE: Preparing Nations to Fight Nuclear Smuggling

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Recent seizures of weapon-grade nuclear materials suggest such materials remain in illegal circulation and could be used to kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people. ORISE...

  13. The nuclear materials control technology briefing book

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hartwell, J.K.; Fernandez, S.J.

    1992-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    As national and international interests in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, intensify, it becomes ever more important that contributors be aware of the technologies available for the measurement and control of the nuclear materials important to nuclear weapons development. This briefing book presents concise, nontechnical summaries of various special nuclear material (SNM) and tritium production monitoring technologies applicable to the control of nuclear materials and their production. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates a multinational, on-site-inspector-based safeguards program in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), many (but not all) of the technologies reported in this document are in routine use or under development for IAEA safeguards.

  14. Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Functional Area Qualification Standard

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-05-27T23:59:59.000Z

    A Nuclear Explosive Safety Study (NESS) is performed on all DOE Nuclear Explosive Operations (NEOs) in accordance with DOE O 452.1D, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program; DOE O 452.2D, Nuclear Explosive Safety; and DOE M 452.2-2, Nuclear Explosive Safety Evaluation Processes.

  15. The Military Balance in the Middle East: An Executive Summary

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cordesman, Anthony H.

    1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    attempted to buy nuclear weapons from China in the 1970s. Itto clandestinely buy components for nuclear weapons andweapons acquisition depends heavily on whether Iran can buy

  16. Modeling of the performance of weapons MOX fuel in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alvis, J.; Bellanger, P.; Medvedev, P.G.; Peddicord, K.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States). Nuclear Engineering Dept.; Gellene, G.I. [Texas Tech Univ., Lubbock, TX (United States). Dept. of Chemistry and Biochemistry

    1999-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Both the Russian Federation and the US are pursing mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel in light water reactors (LWRs) for the disposition of excess plutonium from disassembled nuclear warheads. Fuel performance models are used which describe the behavior of MOX fuel during irradiation under typical power reactor conditions. The objective of this project is to perform the analysis of the thermal, mechanical, and chemical behavior of weapons MOX fuel pins under LWR conditions. If fuel performance analysis indicates potential questions, it then becomes imperative to assess the fuel pin design and the proposed operating strategies to reduce the probability of clad failure and the associated release of radioactive fission products into the primary coolant system. Applying the updated code to anticipated fuel and reactor designs, which would be used for weapons MOX fuel in the US, and analyzing the performance of the WWER-100 fuel for Russian weapons plutonium disposition are addressed in this report. The COMETHE code was found to do an excellent job in predicting fuel central temperatures. Also, despite minor predicted differences in thermo-mechanical behavior of MOX and UO{sub 2} fuels, the preliminary estimate indicated that, during normal reactor operations, these deviations remained within limits foreseen by fuel pin design.

  17. Nuclear Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Atkins-Duffin, C E

    2008-12-10T23:59:59.000Z

    With an explosion equivalent of about 20kT of TNT, the Trinity test was the first demonstration of a nuclear weapon. Conducted on July 16, 1945 in Alamogordo, NM this site is now a Registered National Historic Landmark. The concept and applicability of nuclear power was demonstrated on December 20, 1951 with the Experimental Breeder Reactor Number One (EBR-1) lit four light bulbs. This reactor is now a Registered National Historic Landmark, located near Arco, ID. From that moment forward it had been clearly demonstrated that nuclear energy has both peaceful and military applications and that the civilian and military fuel cycles can overlap. For the more than fifty years since the Atoms for Peace program, a key objective of nuclear policy has been to enable the wider peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Volumes have been written on the impact of these two actions on the world by advocates and critics; pundits and practioners; politicians and technologists. The nations of the world have woven together a delicate balance of treaties, agreements, frameworks and handshakes that are representative of the timeframe in which they were constructed and how they have evolved in time. Collectively these vehicles attempt to keep political will, nuclear materials and technology in check. This paper captures only the briefest abstract of the more significant aspects on the Nonproliferation Regime. Of particular relevance to this discussion is the special nonproliferation sensitivity associated with the uranium isotope separation and spent fuel reprocessing aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

  18. Nuclear War. The moral dimension

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Child, J.W.

    1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    U.S. nuclear policy has become the target of increasing criticism during the past decade. Critics often argue that the use of nuclear weapons would be irrational, would destroy humankind, and thus could not serve any rational policy goal. Other critics point to the immortality of the use of nuclear weapons. Both groups condemn U.S. military policy. In Nuclear War, James Child considers and rejects both these lines of criticism. He argues that a policy of deterrence can be both rational and moral; that U.S. nuclear policy is, on balance, based on rational and moral foundations. Child examines near-term consequences of a nuclear war and finds them ghastly but not unthinkable or incomparable to the havoc produced by previous wars. He also analyzes long-term consequences, such as those proposed by the ''nuclear winter'' theory, and finds the fear of total annihilation of humankind to be unfounded.

  19. Nuclear deterrence: New risks, new opportunities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kelleher, C.M.; Kerr, F.J.; Quester, G.H.

    1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This book presents papers on nuclear weapons strategy. Topics considered include new technologies, arms control, risk assessment, nuclear winter, nuclear deterrence, military strategy, ballistic missile defense, proliferation, global military balance, West European politics, the Chinese view, non-proliferation policy, and first-use.

  20. Occupational employment in nuclear-related activities, 1981

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Baker, J.G.; Olsen, K.

    1982-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    1981 employment in nuclear-related activities is described, and compared to previous years. Employment characteristics examined include detailed occupations of scientists, engineers, and technicians; worker involvement in research and development activities; employment by industrial segment (e.g., reactor operation and maintenance, weapons production, and commercial laboratory services); employment by establishment type (government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO), private, and nonprofit); regional employment; and employment by establishment size. Total 1981 nuclear-related employment is estimated to be 249,500 - a growth of 22,600 workers over the 1977 total. GOCO workers make up 36.9% of this total. Among all the nuclear-related workers, scientists comprise 5.1%, engineers, 15.3%; and technicians, 17.5%; the remaining 62.1% is composed of managers, skilled craft and clerical workers, and other support services. Research and development involvement has declined from the 1977 survey results, with 60.4% of scientists and 27.0% of engineers currently involved in R and D. The largest single industrial segment activity is weapons development (16.9% of total employment), followed closely by reactor operation and maintenance employment (16.7%). There has been considerable change in the distribution of employment by industrial segment from 1977 to 1981; the reactor and reactor component design and manufacturing segment fell by over 9700 workers while reactor operation and maintenance employment grew by over 24,000 workers.

  1. Nuclear Physics and National Security in an Age of Jerry Gilfoyle

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Bombs How does it hurt me? Massive release of energy (blast, light) that can cause hundreds of thousands;Nuclear Weapons 101 What Is Radiation? Emission or release of energy from atomic nuclei in the form of sub with unmatched speed. food processing. waste stream treatment. F&M - June 6, 2009 ­ p. 3/2 #12;Nuclear Weapons

  2. International Nuclear Security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Doyle, James E. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-14T23:59:59.000Z

    This presentation discusses: (1) Definitions of international nuclear security; (2) What degree of security do we have now; (3) Limitations of a nuclear security strategy focused on national lock-downs of fissile materials and weapons; (4) What do current trends say about the future; and (5) How can nuclear security be strengthened? Nuclear security can be strengthened by: (1) More accurate baseline inventories; (2) Better physical protection, control and accounting; (3) Effective personnel reliability programs; (4) Minimize weapons-usable materials and consolidate to fewer locations; (5) Consider local threat environment when siting facilities; (6) Implement pledges made in the NSS process; and (7) More robust interdiction, emergency response and special operations capabilities. International cooperation is desirable, but not always possible.

  3. John T. Mihalczo PhD. in Nuclear Engineering : University of Tennessee, 1970

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    , just as his early work in experiments for nuclear criticality safety for Y-12 impacted national in nuclear criticality safety, nuclear weapons identification, nuclear materials processing, and nuclearJohn T. Mihalczo PhD. in Nuclear Engineering : University of Tennessee, 1970 Masters in Physics

  4. Tensor Principal Component Analysis via Convex Optimization

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bo Jiang

    2012-12-11T23:59:59.000Z

    Dec 11, 2012 ... Keywords: Tensor; Principal Component Analysis; Low Rank; Nuclear Norm; Semidefinite Programming Relaxation. Category 1: Convex and ...

  5. Y-12 weapons work expands in 1950s

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    weapons work expands in 1950s During the era immediately following the end of World War II, as early as 1946, evidence of the Cold War was emerging. Russia was working on its own...

  6. The chromosomal polymorphism of Drosophila subobscura: a microevolutionary weapon

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Huey, Raymond B.

    REVIEW The chromosomal polymorphism of Drosophila subobscura: a microevolutionary weapon to monitor the effect of the global rising of temperatures on the genetic composition of populations. Indeed, the long

  7. Paradigms of Development and Employment of Weapon Systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gillespie, Daniel M.

    2008-10-23T23:59:59.000Z

    Weapons procurement decisions are extremely complex, with an unmanageable quantity of variables to take into account. The human brain, unable to process such a complex problem in a strictly rational way, seeks mechanisms ...

  8. Arms Control: US and International efforts to ban biological weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

  9. EA-1137: Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Nonnuclear Consolidation Weapons Production Support Project for the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri

  10. Weapons Activities/ Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign FY 2011 Congressional Budget

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    of the entire weapons lifecycle, from design to safe processes for dismantlement. The ASC simulations play

  11. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  12. A tennis ball size quantity of nuclear fuel commonly

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kemner, Ken

    technologies can reduce the cost and duration of storing and managing nuclear waste significantly, whileA tennis ball size quantity of nuclear fuel commonly used in commercial nuclear plants can power, to generate the same 250 MWe of power. #12;Reducing the threat of nuclear weapon proliferation Argonne

  13. The long darkness: Psychological and moral perspectives on nuclear winter

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Grinspoon, L.

    1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This book presents papers on the risks of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include nuclear war and climatic catastrophe, evolutionary and developmental considerations, a biological comment on Erikson's notion of pseudospeciation, national security, unexamined assumptions and inescapable consequences, opposing the nuclear threat (the convergence of moral analysis and empirical data), and nuclear winter.

  14. Nuclear deterrence and disarmament after the Cold War

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1995-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    During the Cold War, nuclear arms control measures were shaped significantly by nuclear doctrine. Consequently, the negotiation of arms control agreements often became a battleground for different nuclear strategies. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union has been declared over. Today, both nuclear weapons policies and arms control objectives are again being reviewed. This document discusses points of this review.

  15. Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology Evaluation and Training Range

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kevin Larry Young

    2009-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a long history for providing technology evaluation and training for military and other federal level Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response agencies. Currently there are many federal organizations and commercial companies developing technologies related to detecting, assessing, mitigating and protecting against hazards associated with a WMD event. Unfortunately, very few locations exist within the United States where WMD response technologies are realistically field tested and evaluated using real chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. This is particularly true with biological and radiological hazards. Related to this lack of adequate WMD, multi-hazard technology testing capability is the shortage of locations where WMD response teams can train using actual chemical, biological, and radiological material or highly realistic simulates. In response to these technology evaluation and training needs, the INL has assembled a consortium of subject matter experts from existing programs and identified dedicated resources for the purpose of establishing an all-hazards, WMD technology evaluation and training range. The author describes the challenges associated with creating the all-hazards WMD technology evaluation and training range and lists the technical, logistical and financial benefits of an all-hazards technology evaluation and training range. Current resources and capabilities for conducting all-hazard technology evaluation and training at the INL are identified. Existing technology evaluation and training programs at the INL related to radiological, biological and chemical hazards are highlighted, including successes and lessons learned. Finally, remaining gaps in WMD technology evaluation and training capabilities are identified along with recommendations for closing those gaps.

  16. Station blackout at nuclear power plants: Radiological implications for nuclear war

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shapiro, C.S.

    1986-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Recent work on station blackout is reviewed its radiological implications for a nuclear war scenario is explored. The major conclusion is that the effects of radiation from many nuclear weapon detonations in a nuclear war would swamp those from possible reactor accidents that result from station blackout.

  17. Technical advantages and political necessity of public involvement in environmental remediation: The case of the U.S. and Russian weapons complexes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shideler, J.C. [JK Research Associates, Inc., Arlington, VA (United States)

    1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Environmental remediation is an enormous challenge for the governments of the US, Russia, and other states in eastern and central Europe. Historically, governments have withheld issues related to nuclear weapons from public policy debate. As a result of revelations about human health impacts and environmental contamination, serious credibility problems exist for managers of weapons facilities. However, public involvement can contribute to better definition of problems, to identification of a range of potential solutions, and to increased public acceptance of outcomes. Decision makers can maximize the benefits of public involvement by integrating specific processes into their environmental remediation project planning and management.

  18. Examination of the role of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: a systems analysis approach

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Martz, Joseph C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stevens, Patrice A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Branstetter, Linda [SNL; Hoover, Edward [SNL; O' Brien, Kevin [SNL; Slavin, Adam [SNL; Caswell, David [STANFORD UNIV

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spread of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.

  19. The U.S.-Russian joint studies on using power reactors to disposition surplus weapon plutonium as spent fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chebeskov, A.; Kalashnikov, A. [State Scientific Center, Obninsk (Russian Federation). Inst. of Physics and Power Engineering; Bevard, B.; Moses, D. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Pavlovichev, A. [State Scientific Center, Moscow (Russian Federation). Kurchatov Inst.

    1997-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 1996, the US and the Russian Federation completed an initial joint study of the candidate options for the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium in both countries. The options included long term storage, immobilization of the plutonium in glass or ceramic for geologic disposal, and the conversion of weapons plutonium to spent fuel in power reactors. For the latter option, the US is only considering the use of existing light water reactors (LWRs) with no new reactor construction for plutonium disposition, or the use of Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) heavy water reactors. While Russia advocates building new reactors, the cost is high, and the continuing joint study of the Russian options is considering only the use of existing VVER-1000 LWRs in Russia and possibly Ukraine, the existing BN-60O fast neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia, or the use of the Canadian CANDU reactors. Six of the seven existing VVER-1000 reactors in Russia and the eleven VVER-1000 reactors in Ukraine are all of recent vintage and can be converted to use partial MOX cores. These existing VVER-1000 reactors are capable of converting almost 300 kg of surplus weapons plutonium to spent fuel each year with minimum nuclear power plant modifications. Higher core loads may be achievable in future years.

  20. Nuclear winter attracts additional scrutiny

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, R.J.

    1984-07-06T23:59:59.000Z

    Prodded by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Congress has asked the Pentagon to provide what amounts to an environmental impact statement on the potential for nuclear weapons explosions to create enough soot and dust to cause a nuclear winter. The request has implications for arms control and civil defense as well as for weapons procurement and deployment. Little attention was given to the atmospheric and climatic effects of nuclear war until the nuclear winter concept was introduced in October of 1983. Only the Navy and the DOE took steps to follow up until pressure was put on Congress and the Pentagon for further study. Pentagon criticism of the nuclear winter presentation argues that the scenario assumptions that cities will be targeted and that a conflict will involve 5000-6500 megatons are incorrect.

  1. Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division annual report, FY 1983

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Heiken, J.H.; Lindberg, H.A. (eds.)

    1984-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes progress in the major research and development programs carried out in FY 1983 by the Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division. It covers radiochemical diagnostics of weapons tests; weapons radiochemical diagnostics research and development; other unclassified weapons research; stable and radioactive isotope production, separation, and applications (including biomedical applications); element and isotope transport and fixation; actinide and transition metal chemistry; structural chemistry, spectroscopy, and applications; nuclear structure and reactions; irradiation facilities; advanced analytical techniques; development and applications; atmospheric chemistry and transport; and earth and planetary processes.

  2. DOE weapons laboratories' contributions to the nation's defense technology base

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hecker, S.S.

    1988-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The question of how the Department of Energy (DOE) weapons laboratories can contribute to a stronger defense technology base is addressed in testimony before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The importance of the defense technology base is described, the DOE technology base is also described, and some technology base management and institutional issues are discussed. Suggestions are given for promoting a more stable, long-term relationship between the DOE weapons laboratories and the Department of Defense. 12 refs., 2 figs.

  3. The future of nonnuclear strategic weapons. Final summary report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brody, R.; Digby, J. [Pan Heuristics, Marina del Rey, CA (United States)

    1989-01-31T23:59:59.000Z

    In this brief study, Pan Heuristics (PAN) has (1) evaluated the future importance of nonnuclear strategic weapons (NNSW), (2) considered their impact on forces and operations, and (3) investigated the technical requirements to support NNSW. In drawing conclusions, PAN has emphasized aspects that might be important to Los Alamos National Laboratory over the long run. It presents them here in a format similar to that used in a briefing at the laboratory. This paper reflects independent PAN research as well as conclusions drawn from discussions with other offices and individuals involved in nonnuclear strategic weapons development.

  4. Evaluation of alternatives for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dyer, J.S.; Butler, J.C. [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States); Edmunds, T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)] [and others

    1997-04-04T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy Record of Decision (ROD) selected alternatives for disposition of surplus, weapons grade plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns addressed included economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The analysis reported here was conducted in parallel with technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses; it uses multiattribute utility theory to combine these considerations in order to facilitate an integrated evaluation of alternatives. This analysis is intended to provide additional insight regarding alternative evaluation and to assist in understanding the rationale for the choice of alternatives recommended in the ROD. Value functions were developed for objectives of disposition, and used to rank alternatives. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the ranking of alternatives for the base case was relatively insensitive to changes in assumptions over reasonable ranges. The analyses support the recommendation of the ROD to pursue parallel development of the vitrification immobilization alternative and the use of existing light water reactors alternative. 27 refs., 109 figs., 20 tabs.

  5. Incorporation of Hydride Nuclear Fuels in Commercial Light Water Reactors

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Terrani, Kurt Amir

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Fundamental aspects of nuclear reactor fuel elements.Unlike permanent nuclear reactor core components, nuclearof the first nuclear reactors, commercial nuclear fuel still

  6. Responsible stewardship of nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hannum, W.H.

    1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The ability to tap the massive energy potential of nuclear fission was first developed as a weapon to end a terrible world war. Nuclear fission is also a virtually inexhaustible energy resource, and is the only energy supply in certain areas in Russia, Kazakhstan and elsewhere. The potential link between civilian and military applications has been and continues to be a source of concern. With the end of the Cold War, this issue has taken a dramatic turn. The U.S. and Russia have agreed to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles by as much as two-thirds. This will make some 100 tonnes of separated plutonium and 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium available, in a form that is obviously directly usable for weapons. The total world inventory of plutonium is now around 1000 tonnes and is increasing at 60-70 tonnes per year. There is even more highly enriched uranium. Fortunately the correct answer to what to do with excess weapons material is also the most attractive. It should be used and reused as fuel for fast reactors. Material in use (particularly nuclear material) is very easy to monitor and control, and is quite unattractive for diversion. Active management of fissile materials not only makes a major contribution to economic stability and well-being, but also simplifies accountability, inspection and other safeguards processes; provides a revenue stream to pay for the necessary safeguards; and, most importantly, limits the prospective world inventory of plutonium to only that which is used and useful.

  7. US strategic nuclear forces in the post strategic arms reduction talk world: Is there a future for nuclear deterrence. Research report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Filler, R.J.

    1998-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Following victory in the Cold War, the Soviet threat that shaped United States` nuclear deterrent strategy for the past 40 years, is gone. That defined, monolithic threat has been replaced by a diverse array of new challenges including proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) among regional powers, rogue states and non-state actors. In the face of this emerging WMD threat, the United States is dismantling its chemical and biological weapons stockpile and remains committed to further reductions in its nuclear arsenal. Can a reduced U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal provide a credible deterrent to the growing threat posed by proliferation of WMD. Finally, in light of the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), is it time to reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons and pursue other deterrent options.

  8. Reevaluating nuclear safety and security in a post 9/11 era.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Booker, Paul M.; Brown, Lisa M.

    2005-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report has the following topics: (1) Changing perspectives on nuclear safety and security; (2) Evolving needs in a post-9/11 era; (3) Nuclear Weapons--An attractive terrorist target; (4) The case for increased safety; (5) Evolution of current nuclear weapons safety and security; (6) Integrated surety; (7) The role of safety and security in enabling responsiveness; (8) Advances in surety technologies; and (9) Reevaluating safety.

  9. A P-5 Nuclear Dialogue: Concept, Building Blocks, and Implementation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    #12;A P-5 Nuclear Dialogue: Concept, Building Blocks, and Implementation Paul I. Bernstein, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate affirmed "America's intention to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" and stated

  10. The applicability of sample collection and analysis in support of nuclear arms control agreements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McGuire, R.R.

    1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Agreements are being negotiated to halt the spread of nuclear arms both within the declared nuclear weapons states and to states not heretofore declaring their possession. With the verification regime of the recently negotiated Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as a model, negotiators are considering variations of on-site inspection as formulas to enhance the assurance of compliance with future agreements. These on-site inspections may be part of a treaty dictated verification regime or one of a set of voluntary {open_quotes}confidence building{close_quotes} measures. In either case, the collection of material samples for analysis could be an integral component of the inspection as it is in the CWC. The following is an assessment of the applicability of sampling and analysis for compliance monitoring nuclear arms control agreements currently envisioned. There are two essentially orthogonal ways of approaching this question of applicability: the consideration of the analytical questions and the consideration of the specifics of the individual agreements. This study is meant to utilize both approaches in examining the possible impact of sampling and analysis on compliance assessment. First attention must be given to technical questions relating to the efficacy of sampling and analysis.

  11. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alsaed, A.A.; Adams, M. [Texas A& M Univ., College Station, TX (United States)] [Texas A& M Univ., College Station, TX (United States)

    1998-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The authors have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. They have designed three transition Cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. They found that four-loop Westinghouse reactors such as the Vogtle power plant are capable of handling up to 45 percent weapons-grade MOX loading without any modifications. The authors have also designed two kinds of weapons-grade MOX assemblies with three enrichments per assembly and four total enrichments. Wet annular burnable absorber (WABA) rods were used in all the MOX feed assemblies, some burned MOX assemblies, and some LEU feed assemblies. Integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) was used in the rest of the LEU feed assemblies. The average discharge burnup of MOX assemblies was over 47,000 MWD/MTM, which is more than enough to meet the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard.{close_quotes} One unit is capable of consuming 0.462 MT of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Preliminary analyses showed that important reactor physics parameters for the three transitions cycles are comparable to those of LEU cores including boron levels, reactivity coefficients, peaking factors, and shutdown margins. Further transient analyses will need to be performed.

  12. Proceedings of the Tungsten Workshop for Hard Target Weapons Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mackiewicz-Ludtka, G.; Hayden, H.W.; Davis, R.M.

    1995-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this meeting was to review and exchange information and provide technical input for improving technologies relevant to the Hard Target Weapons Program. This workshop was attended by representatives from 17 organizations, including 4 Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, 8 industrial companies, and 5 laboratories within DOE. Hard targets are defined as reinforced underground structures that house enemy forces, weapon systems, and support equipment. DOE-ORO and Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems) have been involved in advanced materials research and development (R&D) for several DOE and DoD programs. These programs are conducted in close collaboration with Eglin AFB, Department of the Army`s Picatinny Arsenal, and other DoD agencies. As part of this ongoing collaboration, Eglin AFB and Oak Ridge National Laboratory planned and conducted this workshop to support the Hard Target Weapons Program. The objectives of this workshop were to (1) review and identify the technology base that exists (primarily due to anti-armor applications) and assess the applicability of this technology to the Hard Target Weapons Program requirements; (2) determine future directions to establish the W materials, processing, and manufacturing technologies suitable for use in fixed, hard target penetrators; and (3) identify and prioritize the potential areas for technical collaboration among the participants.

  13. Hot Cell Examination of Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Morris, Robert Noel [ORNL; Bevard, Bruce Balkcom [ORNL; McCoy, Kevin [Areva NP

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy has decided to dispose of a portion of the nation s surplus weapons-grade plutonium by reconstituting it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiating it in commercial power reactors. Four lead assemblies were manufactured with weapons-grade MOX and irradiated to a maximum fuel rod burnup of 47.3 MWd/kg. As part of the fuel qualification process, five fuel rods with varying burnups and plutonium contents were selected from one of the assemblies and shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory for hot cell examination. This is the first hot cell examination of weapons-grade MOX fuel. The rods have been examined nondestructively with the ADEPT apparatus and are currently being destructively examined. Examinations completed to date include length measurements, visual examination, gamma scanning, profilometry, eddy-current testing, gas measurement and analysis, and optical metallography. Representative results of these examinations are reviewed and found to be consistent with predictions and with prior experience with reactor-grade MOX fuel. The results will be used to support licensing of weapons-grade MOX for batch use in commercial power reactors.

  14. Modeling most likely pathways for smuggling radioactive and special nuclear materials on a worldwide multimodal transportation network

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Saeger, Kevin J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Cuellar, Leticia [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear weapons proliferation is an existing and growing worldwide problem. To help with devising strategies and supporting decisions to interdict the transport of nuclear material, we developed the Pathway Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT) that provides an analytical approach for evaluating the probability that an adversary smuggling radioactive or special nuclear material will be detected during transit. We incorporate a global, multi-modal transportation network, explicit representation of designed and serendipitous detection opportunities, and multiple threat devices, material types, and shielding levels. This paper presents the general structure of PATRIOT, and focuses on the theoretical framework used to model the reliabilities of all network components that are used to predict the most likely pathways to the target.

  15. Modeling most likely pathways for smuggling radioactive and special nuclear materials on a worldwide multi-modal transportation network

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Saeger, Kevin J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Cuellar, Leticia [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-10-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear weapons proliferation is an existing and growing worldwide problem. To help with devising strategies and supporting decisions to interdict the transport of nuclear material, we developed the Pathway Analysis, Threat Response and Interdiction Options Tool (PATRIOT) that provides an analytical approach for evaluating the probability that an adversary smuggling radioactive or special nuclear material will be detected during transit. We incorporate a global, multi-modal transportation network, explicit representation of designed and serendipitous detection opportunities, and multiple threat devices, material types, and shielding levels. This paper presents the general structure of PATRIOT, all focuses on the theoretical framework used to model the reliabilities of all network components that are used to predict the most likely pathways to the target.

  16. Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mian, Zia [Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey (United States)

    2014-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

    India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also for nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.

  17. Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division annual report FY 1986, October 1985-September 1986

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Heiken, J.H. (ed.)

    1987-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes progress in the major research and development programs carried out in FY 1986 by the Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division. The report includes articles on radiochemical diagnostics and weapons tests; weapons radiochemical diagnostics research and development; other unclassified weapons research; stable and radioactive isotope production and separation; chemical biology and nuclear medicine; element and isotope transport and fixation; actinide and transition metal chemistry; structural chemistry, spectroscopy, and applications; nuclear structure and reactions; irradiation facilities; advanced concepts and technology; and atmospheric chemistry.

  18. Probabilistic Representation of the Threat and Consequences of Weapon Attacks on Commercial

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Hai

    Probabilistic Representation of the Threat and Consequences of Weapon Attacks on Commercial of the Threat and Consequences of Weapon Attacks on Commercial Aircraft CREATE Report 29 November 2005 John P Security has determined that external weapon threats due to surface-air missiles, as well as some

  19. Title: Weapons on Campus Effective Date: October 1, 2011 Responsible Office: William & Mary Police

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Shaw, Leah B.

    Title: Weapons on Campus Effective Date: October 1, 2011 Responsible Office: William & Mary Police the prohibition on weapons, firearms, combustibles, and explosives. II. PURPOSE The purpose of this policy by restricting weapons possession on university property. III.DEFINITIONS "law enforcement officials" means

  20. Research Literature: Effects of Conducted Energy Weapons (CEWs) | p. 1/82 Biomedical research literature

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Adler, Andy

    Research Literature: Effects of Conducted Energy Weapons (CEWs) | p. 1/82 Biomedical research literature with respect to the effects of Conducted Energy Weapons Andy Adler, David P Dawson, Maimaitjian: Institutions involved in research on CEWs 82 #12;Research Literature: Effects of Conducted Energy Weapons (CEWs

  1. Environmental Radiation Dose Reconstruction for U.S. and Russian Weapons Production Facilities: Hanford and Mayak

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ansbaugh, Lynn R.; Degteva, M. O.; Kozheurov, V. P.; Napier, Bruce A.; Tolstykh, E. I.; Vorobiova, M. I.

    2003-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Another way to look at Cold War legacies is to examine the major environmental releases that resulted from past operation of Cold War-related facilities for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Examining these historical releases and the resultant radiation dose to individuals living near these facilities is called environmental dose reconstruction. Dose reconstructions have been performed or are underway at most large Cold War installations in the United States, such as the Hanford facility; several are also underway in other countries, such as at the Mayak facility in Russia. The efforts in the United States are mostly based on historical operating records and current conditions, which are used to estimate environmental releases, transport, and human exposure. The Russian efforts are largely based on environmental measurements and measurements of human subjects; environmental transport modelling, when conducted, is used to organize and validate the measurements. Past operation of Cold War-related facilities for the manufacture of nuclear weapons has resulted in major releases of radionuclides into the environment. Reconstruction of the historical releases and the resultant radiation dose to individuals in the public living near these facilities is called environmental dose reconstruction. Dose reconstructions have been performed or are underway at most large Cold War installations in the United States; several are also underway in other countries. The types of activity performed, the operating histories, and the radionuclide releases vary widely across the different facilities. The U.S. Hanford Site and the Russian Mayak Production Association are used here to illustrate the nature of the assessed problems and the range of approaches developed to solve them.

  2. R t f N l C t T ti Di i GReport of Nuclear Component Testing Discussion Group National Spherical Torus ProgramNational Spherical Torus Program

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Abdou, Mohamed Fusion nuclear technology, VNS UCLA Gates, Dave NSTX plasma experimentation PPPL Hegna 100 IEA ST Agreement, FPCC, 2/27-28/07 3 Tritium self-sufficiency goal (%) ~0 ~100 100 # Abdou et al

  3. Impacts of a nuclear war in South Asia on rice production in Mainland China

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Robock, Alan

    on agriculture is to avoid nuclear war, and this can only be guaranteed with a nuclear-weapon-free world. 1 climate changes due a small regional nuclear war could significantly influence agricultural productivityImpacts of a nuclear war in South Asia on rice production in Mainland China Lili Xia & Alan Robock

  4. ReseaRch at the University of Maryland Nuclear Safety Research at the University of Maryland

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hill, Wendell T.

    Research on nuclear energy started at the University of Maryland just after World War II, when and nuclear weapons was followed by controversial accidents and regulation. Today, nuclear power is considered that analyze the risks involved in the use of nuclear energy. Understanding and Using Radiation The ionizing

  5. Techniques and methods in nuclear materials traceability

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1996-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The nonproliferation community is currently addressing concerns that the access to special nuclear materials may increase the illicit trafficking in weapons-usable materials from civil and/or weapons material stores and/or fuel cycles systems. Illicit nuclear traffic usually involves reduced quantities of nuclear materials perhaps as samplings of a potential protracted diversionary flow from sources to users. To counter illicit nuclear transactions requires the development of techniques and methods in nuclear material traceability as an important phase of a broad forensic analysis capability. This report discusses how isotopic signatures and correlation methods were applied to determine the origins of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium samples reported as illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

  6. Superpower nuclear minimalism

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Graben, E.K.

    1992-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union competed in building weapons -- now it seems like America and Russia are competing to get rid of them the fastest. The lengthy process of formal arms control has been replaced by exchanges of unilateral force reductions and proposals for reciprocal reductions not necessarily codified by treaty. Should superpower nuclear strategies change along with force postures President Bush has yet to make a formal pronouncement on post-Cold War American nuclear strategy, and it is uncertain if the Soviet/Russian doctrine of reasonable sufficiency formulated in the Gorbachev era actually heralds a change in strategy. Some of the provisions in the most recent round of unilateral proposals put forth by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1992 are compatible with a change in strategy. Whether such a change has actually occurred remains to be seen. With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the strategic environment has fundamentally changed, so it would seem logical to reexamine strategy as well. There are two main schools of nuclear strategic thought: a maximalist school, mutual assured destruction (MAD) which emphasizes counterforce superiority and nuclear war- fighting capability, and a MAD-plus school, which emphasizes survivability of an assured destruction capability along with the ability to deliver small, limited nuclear attacks in the event that conflict occurs. The MAD-plus strategy is based on an attempt to conventionalize nuclear weapons which is unrealistic.

  7. Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons (Informational Purposes Only)

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2015-02-24T23:59:59.000Z

    This draft has been scheduled for final review before the Directives Review Board on 3-5-15. All major comments and concerns should be provided to your DRB representative, following your organization process. If you do not know who your representative is, please see the list of DRB members at https://www.directives.doe.gov/beta/references/directives-review-board. If your office is represented by Ingrid Kolb, Director, Office of Management, please submit your major concerns and comments to the DRB Liaison, Camille Beben (Camille.Beben@hq.doe.gov; 202-586-1014). All major comments and concerns should be submitted by COB 3-3-15.

  8. President Obama Calls for an End to Nuclear Weapons | National Nuclear

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's Possible forPortsmouth/Paducah ProjectPRE-AWARDenergy use is projectedEnergyPresidentSecurity

  9. Interaction of electromagnetic pulse with commercial nuclear-power-plant systems. Volume I. Executive summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Strawe, D.F.; Sandberg, S.J.; Jones, V.K.; Rensner, G.D.; Shoup, R.W.; Hanson, R.J.; Williams, C.B.

    1983-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    It has been recognized for many years that the detonation of a nuclear weapon at high altitude leads to the creation of an intense electromagnetic field of very short duration, the electromagnetic pulse (EMP). The EMP from a single burst at the proper altitude could induce large currents and voltages in electrical equipment over the entire continental United States. Commercial nuclear power plants are not required to have protection against EMP. Therefore, the study has the following objectives: determine the vulnerability of systems required for safe shutdown of a specific nuclear plant to the effects of EMP; establish how any safe shutdown systems vulnerable to EMP may best be hardened against it; and characterize to the extent possible, the effects of EMP on nuclear plants in general based upon the results for systems in the example plant. The systems of concern in an example plant were identified and defined. Then, estimates were made of the currents and voltages which might exist at key points if the plant were subjected to EMP. Concurrently, component damage thresholds were estimated. These two sets of estimates were combined to assess the vulnerability of selected components. Because nuclear plants are complex, a modest experimental program was conducted to verify (or reject) conclusions reached about signal distribution and attenuation in the plant electrical systems.

  10. Defining nuclear security in the 21st century

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Doyle, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A conference devoted to Reducing the Risks from Radioactive and Nuclear Materials presupposes that such risks exist. Few would disagree, but what are they? While debate on the nature and severity of risks associated with nuclear energy will always remain, it is easy to define a set of risks that are almost universally acknowledged. These include: (1) Nuclear warfare between states; (2) Continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials to states and non-state actors; (3) Terrorists or non-state actor acquisition or use nuclear weapons or nuclear materials; (4) Terrorists or non-state actors attack on a nuclear facility; and (5) Loss or diversion of nuclear weapons or materials by a state to unauthorized uses. These are listed in no particular order of likelihood or potential consequence. They are also very broadly stated, each one could be broken down into a more detailed set of discrete risks or threats. The fact that there is a strong consensus on the existence of these risks is evidence that we remain in an era of nuclear insecurity. This becomes even clearer when we note that most major trends influencing the probability of these risks continue to run in a negative direction.

  11. Crystalline ceramics: Waste forms for the disposal of weapons plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W. [New Mexico Univ., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Weber, W.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

    1995-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (i) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (ii) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass ``logs``; (iii) deep borehole disposal (National Academy of Sciences Report, 1994). The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramics apatite, pyrochlore, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium.

  12. Chinese strategic weapons and the plutonium option (U)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lewis, John W.; Xui Litai

    1988-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In their article "Chinese Strategic Weapons and the Plutonium Option," John W. Lewis and Xue Litai of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University's International Strategic Institute present an unclassified look at plutonium processing in the PRC. The article draws heavily on unclassified PRC sources for its short look at this important subject. Interested readers will find more detailed information in the recently available works referenced in the article.

  13. SNL/NM weapon hardware characterization process development report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Graff, E.W.; Chambers, W.B.

    1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the process used by Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico to characterize weapon hardware for disposition. The report describes the following basic steps: (1) the drawing search process and primary hazard identification; (2) the development of Disassembly Procedures (DPs), including demilitarization and sanitization requirements; (3) the generation of a ``disposal tree``; (4) generating RCRA waste disposal information; and (5) documenting the information. Additional data gathered during the characterization process supporting hardware grouping and recycle efforts is also discussed.

  14. The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

    2008-12-23T23:59:59.000Z

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission blanket in a fusion-fission hybrid system is subcritical, a LIFE engine can burn any fertile or fissile nuclear material, including unenriched natural or depleted U and SNF, and can extract a very high percentage of the energy content of its fuel resulting in greatly enhanced energy generation per metric ton of nuclear fuel, as well as nuclear waste forms with vastly reduced concentrations of long-lived actinides. LIFE engines could thus provide the ability to generate vast amounts of electricity while greatly reducing the actinide content of any existing or future nuclear waste and extending the availability of low cost nuclear fuels for several thousand years. LIFE also provides an attractive pathway for burning excess weapons Pu to over 99% FIMA (fission of initial metal atoms) without the need for fabricating or reprocessing mixed oxide fuels (MOX). Because of all of these advantages, LIFE engines offer a pathway toward sustainable and safe nuclear power that significantly mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns and minimizes nuclear waste. An important aspect of a LIFE engine is the fact that there is no need to extract the fission fuel from the fission blanket before it is burned to the desired final level. Except for fuel inspection and maintenance process times, the nuclear fuel is always within the core of the reactor and no weapons-attractive materials are available outside at any point in time. However, an important consideration when discussing proliferation concerns associated with any nuclear fuel cycle is the ease with which reactor fuel can be converted to weapons usable materials, not just when it is extracted as waste, but at any point in the fuel cycle. Although the nuclear fuel remains in the core of the engine until ultra deep actinide burn up is achieved, soon after start up of the engine, once the system breeds up to full power, several tons of fissile material is present in the fission blanket. However, this fissile material is widely dispersed in millions of fuel pebbles, which can be tagged as individual accountable items, and thus made difficult to diver

  15. Summary report of the screening process to determine reasonable alternatives for long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-03-29T23:59:59.000Z

    Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials (primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium) have become surplus to national defense needs both in the US and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety and health consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. As announced in the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the Department of Energy is currently conducting an evaluation process for disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials determined surplus to National Security needs, and long-term storage of national security and programmatic inventories, and surplus weapons-usable fissile materials that are not able to go directly from interim storage to disposition. An extensive set of long-term storage and disposition options was compiled. Five broad long-term storage options were identified; thirty-seven options were considered for plutonium disposition; nine options were considered for HEU disposition; and eight options were identified for Uranium-233 disposition. Section 2 discusses the criteria used in the screening process. Section 3 describes the options considered, and Section 4 provides a detailed summary discussions of the screening results.

  16. An overview of the Nuclear Materials Focus Area research program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    ROBERSON,GARY D.; POLANSKY,GARY F.; OSBORNE,KEN K.; RANDALL,VIRGINIA

    2000-02-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The Nuclear Material Focus Area (NMFA) is responsible for providing comprehensive needs identification, integration of technology research and development activities, and technology deployment for stabilization, packaging, and interim storage of surplus nuclear materials within the DOE complex. The NMFA was chartered in April 1999 by the Office of Science and Technology (OST), an organizational component of the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM). OST manages a national program to conduct basic and applied research, and technology development, demonstration, and deployment assistance that is essential to completing a timely and cost-effective cleanup of the DOE nuclear weapons complex. DOE/EM provides environmental research results, as well as cleanup technologies and systems, to meet high-priority end-user needs, reduce EM's major cost centers and technological risks, and accelerate technology deployments. The NMFA represents the segment of EM that focuses on technological solutions for re-using, transforming, and disposing excess nuclear materials and is jointly managed by the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office and the DOE Idaho Operations Office.

  17. Feasibility of very deep borehole disposal of US nuclear defense wastes

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dozier, Frances Elizabeth

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This thesis analyzes the feasibility of emplacing DOE-owned defense nuclear waste from weapons production into a permanent borehole repository drilled ~4 km into granite basement rock. Two canister options were analyzed ...

  18. Preliminary review of the TTAPS nuclear winter scenarios

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chester, C.V.; Kornegay, F.C.; Perry, A.M.

    1984-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The paper by Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollock and Sagan (TTAPS) on Global Consequences of Nuclear War was reviewed. The possibility of climate upset must be taken seriously but the uncertainties are larger than the postulated effects. The effects if real would fall more heavily on the Soviet Union than on the US and would provide incentive for smaller, more accurate weapons, avoiding cities, and earth-penetrating weapons.

  19. The analysis of cracks in high-pressure piping and their effects on strength and lifetime of construction components at the Ignalina nuclear plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Aleev, A.; Petkevicius, K.; Senkus, V. [and others

    1997-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A number of cracks and damages of other sorts have been identified in the high-pressure parts at the Ignalina Nuclear Plant. They are caused by inadequate production- and repair technologies, as well as by thermal, chemical and mechanical processes of their performance. Several techniques are available as predictions of cracks and other defects of pressurized vessels. The choice of an experimental technique should be based on the level of its agreement with the actual processes.

  20. A Statistical Model for Generating a Population of Unclassified Objects and Radiation Signatures Spanning Nuclear Threats

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nelson, K; Sokkappa, P

    2008-10-29T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes an approach for generating a simulated population of plausible nuclear threat radiation signatures spanning a range of variability that could be encountered by radiation detection systems. In this approach, we develop a statistical model for generating random instances of smuggled nuclear material. The model is based on physics principles and bounding cases rather than on intelligence information or actual threat device designs. For this initial stage of work, we focus on random models using fissile material and do not address scenarios using non-fissile materials. The model has several uses. It may be used as a component in a radiation detection system performance simulation to generate threat samples for injection studies. It may also be used to generate a threat population to be used for training classification algorithms. In addition, we intend to use this model to generate an unclassified 'benchmark' threat population that can be openly shared with other organizations, including vendors, for use in radiation detection systems performance studies and algorithm development and evaluation activities. We assume that a quantity of fissile material is being smuggled into the country for final assembly and that shielding may have been placed around the fissile material. In terms of radiation signature, a nuclear weapon is basically a quantity of fissile material surrounded by various layers of shielding. Thus, our model of smuggled material is expected to span the space of potential nuclear weapon signatures as well. For computational efficiency, we use a generic 1-dimensional spherical model consisting of a fissile material core surrounded by various layers of shielding. The shielding layers and their configuration are defined such that the model can represent the potential range of attenuation and scattering that might occur. The materials in each layer and the associated parameters are selected from probability distributions that span the range of possibilities. Once an object is generated, its radiation signature is calculated using a 1-dimensional deterministic transport code. Objects that do not make sense based on physics principles or other constraints are rejected. Thus, the model can be used to generate a population of spectral signatures that spans a large space, including smuggled nuclear material and nuclear weapons.

  1. Nuclear threats from small states

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kahan, J.H.

    1994-06-13T23:59:59.000Z

    What are the policy implications regarding proliferation and counter proliferation of nuclear weapons among Third World states. How does deterrence operate outside the parameters of superpower confrontation as defined by the cold war elaborate system of constraints enforced by concepts like mutual assured destruction, and counter-value and counter-force targeting. How can US policymakers devise contingencies for dealing with nuclear threats posed by countries like North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. These are some of the unsettling but nevertheless important questions addressed by the author in this monograph. In his analysis, Mr. Jerome Kahan examines the likelihood that one or more of these countries will use nuclear weapons before the year 2000. He also offers a framework that policymakers and planners might use in assessing US interests in preempting the use of nuclear weapons or in retaliating for their use. Ironically, with the end of the cold war, it is imperative that defense strategists, policymakers, and military professionals think about the `unthinkable`. In the interest of fostering debate on this important subject, the Strategic Studies Institute commends this insightful monograph.

  2. Reliability guarantees, demonstration, and control for weapon systems proposals

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lanier, Ross Edwin

    1959-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    LIBRARY A AIA OOI. ' gsE IIR TEXA5 RELIABILITY GUARAMTMsS ~ Dr3EOMS' HAT IOM ~ AKD COMTROL ZOR ViIMAPOM SYST3QKS PROPOSALS A Thesis ROSS EII5tIM LAMIER Submitted to the Graduate Sohool of the Agrioultural and Mechanical College of Texas... in partial fulfillment oi the requirements for the PHOPASSIOMAL LbiGkhr IM MMGIMKKRIMG January 1959 Ma)or Sub)sets Sleotrioal MngineeriIIg RELIABILITY GUARANIS, ISMONSTRATION& A53 CONTROL POR WEAPON SYSTEMS PROPOSALS ROSS ~~' WIN LANI' APProved...

  3. Accelerator-based conversion (ABC) of reactor and weapons plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jensen, R.J.; Trapp, T.J.; Arthur, E.D.; Bowman, C.D.; Davidson, J.W.; Linford, R.K.

    1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An accelerator-based conversion (ABC) system is presented that is capable of rapidly burning plutonium in a low-inventory sub-critical system. The system also returns fission power to the grid and transmutes troublesome long-lived fission products to short lived or stable products. Higher actinides are totally fissioned. The system is suited not only to controlled, rapid burning of excess weapons plutonium, but to the long range application of eliminating or drastically reducing the world total inventory of plutonium. Deployment of the system will require the successful resolution of a broad range of technical issues introduced in the paper.

  4. FAQS Job Task Analyses - Weapons Quality Assurance | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,OfficeEnd of Year 2010Salt |ExelonFAQ:Department of Energy SecurityWeapons

  5. FAQS Qualification Card - Weapon Quality Assurance | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,OfficeEnd of Year 2010Salt |ExelonFAQ:DepartmentDepartment of EnergyWeapon

  6. Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over OurThe Iron SpinPrincetonUsing Maps1DOETHE FUTURE LOOKSofthe Geeks:Weapons

  7. Preserving Nuclear Grade Knowledge

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lange, Bob

    2008-02-05T23:59:59.000Z

    When people think of the government they think of the President, or Congress, or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but there are thousands of people in government-related jobs doing things most don’t really notice everyday. You can find them everywhere, from the space science folks at NASA, to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) watching out for the bad guys. There are Rangers, and Social Workers, Nurses and Agricultural Managers. They are people working to keep the many facets of the USA rolling. One very diverse bunch is The Department of Energy (DOE) , a group who is expanding the ways we make and save energy to power our cars, homes, and businesses. Tucked away under the DOE is the National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA is an agency that maintains the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. It works to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction. It provides the U.S. Navy with safe nuclear propulsion, and it responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad, and it supports efforts in science and technology*. (* DOE/NNSA/KCP website info)

  8. Network-centric Warfare and the Globalization of Technology: Transforming simple tools into dangerous weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Oh, Ann

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    simple tools into dangerous weapons New applications ofprogressive, but also dangerous when applied to warfare. Theabove, also a powerful and dangerous tool for terrorists to

  9. James P. Mosquera Director, Reactor Plant Components

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    of the application of nuclear reactor power to capital ships of the U.S. Navy, and other assigned projects. Mr for steam generator technology (within the Nuclear Components Division); and power plant systems engineer working for the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (a.k.a. Naval Reactors). This program is a joint

  10. EIS-0225-SA-01: Supplement Analysis

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components - AL-R8 Sealed Insert Container

  11. Seismic modeling and analysis of a prototype heated nuclear waste storage tunnel, Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Snieder, Roel

    Seismic modeling and analysis of a prototype heated nuclear waste storage tunnel, Yucca Mountain was heated to replicate the effects of long-term storage of decaying nuclear waste and to study the effects for the long- term storage of high-level nuclear waste from reactors and decom- missioned atomic weapons

  12. Achieving competitive excellence in nuclear energy: The threat of proliferation; the challenge of inertial confinement fusion

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nuckolls, J.H.

    1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear energy will have an expanding role in meeting the twenty-first-century challenges of population and economic growth, energy demand, and global warming. These great challenges are non-linearly coupled and incompletely understood. In the complex global system, achieving competitive excellence for nuclear energy is a multi-dimensional challenge. The growth of nuclear energy will be driven by its margin of economic advantage, as well as by threats to energy security and by growing evidence of global warming. At the same time, the deployment of nuclear energy will be inhibited by concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear waste and nuclear reactor safety. These drivers and inhibitors are coupled: for example, in the foreseeable future, proliferation in the Middle East may undermine energy security and increase demand for nuclear energy. The Department of Energy`s nuclear weapons laboratories are addressing many of these challenges, including nuclear weapons builddown and nonproliferation, nuclear waste storage and burnup, reactor safety and fuel enrichment, global warming, and the long-range development of fusion energy. Today I will focus on two major program areas at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL): the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of inertial confinement fusion (ICF) energy.

  13. Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online Chapter Title Seismic Monitoring of Nuclear Explosions

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Foulger, G. R.

    Administration, Beijing, China 6 Introduction 7 The original development of nuclear weapons, and their 8 first,000 10 nuclear test explosions were conducted. About 500 of 11 these were carried out in the atmosphere with some regional concentra- 14 tions, and aroused widespread public opposition to 15 nuclear testing

  14. Near-field millimeter-wave imaging for weapon detection

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sheen, D.M.; McMakin, D.L.; Collins, H.D.; Hall, T.E.

    1992-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Various millimeter-wave imaging systems capable of imaging through clothing for the detection of contraband metal, plastic, or ceramic weapons, have been developed at PNL. Two dimensional scanned holographic systems, developed at 35, 90, and 350 GHz, are used to obtain high resolution images of metal and plastic targets concealed by clothing. Coherent single-frequency amplitude and phase data, which is gathered over a two-dimensional scanned aperture, is reconstructed to the target plane using a holographic wavefront reconstruction technique. Practical weapon detection systems require high-speed scanning. To achieve this goal, a 35 GHz linear sequentially switched array has been built and integrated into a high speed linear scanner. This system poses special challenges on calibration / signal processing of the holographic system. Further, significant improvements in speed are required to achieve real time operation. Toward this goal, a wideband scanned system which allows for a two-dimensional image formation from a one-dimensional scanned (or array) system has been developed . Signal / image processing techniques developed and implemented for this technique are a variation on conventional synthetic aperture radar (SAR) techniques which eliminate far-field and narrow bandwidth requirements. Performance of this technique is demonstrated with imaging results obtained from a K[sub a]-band system.

  15. Near-field millimeter-wave imaging for weapon detection

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sheen, D.M.; McMakin, D.L.; Collins, H.D.; Hall, T.E.

    1992-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Various millimeter-wave imaging systems capable of imaging through clothing for the detection of contraband metal, plastic, or ceramic weapons, have been developed at PNL. Two dimensional scanned holographic systems, developed at 35, 90, and 350 GHz, are used to obtain high resolution images of metal and plastic targets concealed by clothing. Coherent single-frequency amplitude and phase data, which is gathered over a two-dimensional scanned aperture, is reconstructed to the target plane using a holographic wavefront reconstruction technique. Practical weapon detection systems require high-speed scanning. To achieve this goal, a 35 GHz linear sequentially switched array has been built and integrated into a high speed linear scanner. This system poses special challenges on calibration / signal processing of the holographic system. Further, significant improvements in speed are required to achieve real time operation. Toward this goal, a wideband scanned system which allows for a two-dimensional image formation from a one-dimensional scanned (or array) system has been developed . Signal / image processing techniques developed and implemented for this technique are a variation on conventional synthetic aperture radar (SAR) techniques which eliminate far-field and narrow bandwidth requirements. Performance of this technique is demonstrated with imaging results obtained from a K{sub a}-band system.

  16. Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Glauser, H

    2011-03-03T23:59:59.000Z

    Over the next 10-20 years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD. The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic. For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively without crippling the US economy. The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime domain awareness capability. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping, grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why this may be accomplished.

  17. Public perspectives on nuclear security. US national security surveys, 1993--1997

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Herron, K.G.; Jenkins-Smith, H.C. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). UNM Inst. for Public Policy

    1998-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This is the third report in a series of studies to examine how US attitudes about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War era and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of US nuclear security policy. It presents findings from three surveys: a nationwide telephone survey of randomly selected members of the US general public; a written survey of randomly selected members of American Men and Women of Science; and a written survey of randomly selected state legislators from all fifty US states. Key areas of investigation included nuclear security, cooperation between US and Russian scientists about nuclear issues, vulnerabilities of critical US infrastructures and responsibilities for their protection, and broad areas of US national science policy. While international and US national security were seen to be slowly improving, the primary nuclear threat to the US was perceived to have shifted from Russia to China. Support was found for nuclear arms control measures, including mutual reductions in stockpiles. However, respondents were pessimistic about eliminating nuclear armaments, and nuclear deterrence continued to be highly values. Participants favored decreasing funding f/or developing and testing new nuclear weapons, but supported increased investments in nuclear weapons infrastructure. Strong concerns were expressed about nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism. Support was evident for US scientific cooperation with Russia to strengthen security of Russian nuclear assets. Elite and general public perceptions of external and domestic nuclear weapons risks and external and domestic nuclear weapons benefits were statistically significantly related to nuclear weapons policy options and investment preferences. Demographic variables and individual belief systems were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and to policy and spending preferences.

  18. Nuclear winter: Asymmetrical problems and unilateral solutions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reule, F.J.

    1986-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear winter creates a dilemma for policymakers. Awareness of that dilemma may not be new, however. Long before the phrase nuclear winter became popular, policymakers may well have been aware of the possibility that the indirect effects of a nuclear exchange could be more damaging than the direct effects. Nevertheless, the more widespread public awareness of such a possibility deepens the dilemma and makes it more apparent. The policymakers' dilemma arises from their requirement to create a perception of security from any and all threats. To do this they must be able to credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons in order to deter their use by others. These threats can be tacit, arising from the very existence of nuclear delivery systems, or direct, as evidenced by the instances of missile rattling that have occurred over the years. In either case, such threats begin to ring hollow if the policymakers are known to believe that carrying them out could result in nuclear winter. If policymakers keep secret their personal beliefs about nuclear winter they can still credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons but they have difficulty believing their own threats. Further, they cannot capitalize on the deterrent value of nuclear winter and must live in fear that their bluff may some day be called or that any of the other nuclear powers could cause a nuclear winter out of ignorance.

  19. Detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Mariella Jr., Raymond P.

    2004-09-07T23:59:59.000Z

    A system for detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens uses a detector system, an electrostatic precipitator or scrubber, a circulation system, and a control. The precipitator or scrubber is activated in response to a signal from the detector upon the detection of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens.

  20. Underwater Bomb Trajectory Prediction for Stand-off Assault (Mine/IED) Breaching Weapon

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chu, Peter C.

    Underwater Bomb Trajectory Prediction for Stand-off Assault (Mine/IED) Breaching Weapon Fuse To support the development and evaluation of the Stand-off Assault Breaching Weapon Fuse Improvement (SOABWFI for developing an effective system for use against IEDs and mines. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM

  1. Western Michigan University is a weapon free school. By order of the Board of Trustees: "No person shall possess on university property any firearms or other dangerous weapons with the exception of

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    de Doncker, Elise

    person shall possess on university property any firearms or other dangerous weapons with the exception considered a dangerous weapon. Stun gun or taser, or any device that produces electrical current intended

  2. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States). Fission Energy and Systems Safety Program

    1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient.

  3. Measured responses of internal enclosures and cables due to burnthrough penetration of weapon cases by lightning

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schnetzer, G.H.; Fisher, R.J. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Dinallo, M.A. [Quatro Corp., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The electrical effects of lightning penetration of the outer case of a weapon on internal structures, such as a firing set housing, and on samples of a flat, flexline detonator cable have been investigated experimentally. Maximum open-circuit voltages measured on either simulated structures (126 V) or the cable (46 V) located directly behind the point of penetration were well below any level that is foreseen to create a threat to nuclear safety. On the other hand, it was found that once full burnthrough of the barrier occurred, significant fractions of the incident continuing currents coupled to both the simulated internal structure (up to 300 A) or to the cable sample (69 A) when each was electrically connected internally to case ground. No occurrence was observed of the injection of large amplitude currents from return strokes occurring after barrier penetration. Under circumstances in which small volumes of trapped gases exist behind penetration sites, rapid heating of the gas by return strokes occurring after burnthrough has been shown to produced large mechanical impulses to the adjacent surfaces.

  4. Nonlethal weapons as force options for the Army

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alexander, J.B.

    1994-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper suggests that future challenges to US national security will be very different from those previously experienced. In a number of foreseeable circumstances, conventional military force will be inappropriate. The National Command Authority, and other appropriate levels of command, need expanded options available to meet threats for which the application of massive lethal force is counterproductive or inadvisable. It is proposed that nonlethal concepts be developed that provide additional options for military leaders and politicians. Included in this initiative should be exploration of policy, strategy, doctrine, and training issues as well as the development of selected technologies and weapons. In addition, civilian law enforcement agencies have similar requirements for less-than-lethal systems. This may be an excellent example for a joint technology development venture.

  5. Trouble in the Family: New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Policy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hanson, F. Allen

    1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    or deny that a given vessel is carrying nuclear weapons, the port ban effectively barred most U.S. naval craft from docking in New Zealand's ports. Although New Zealand is small, remote, and not strategically located, the significance of this diplomatic.... The matter came to a head in February 1985 when New Zealand refused to accept a visit by the conventionally powered U.S. destroyer Buchanan, on the grounds that the ship might have been carrying nuclear weapons. This was the first test of New Zealand...

  6. Advanced pyrochemical technologies for minimizing nuclear waste

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bronson, M.C.; Dodson, K.E.; Riley, D.C.

    1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is seeking to reduce the size of the current nuclear weapons complex and consequently minimize operating costs. To meet this DOE objective, the national laboratories have been asked to develop advanced technologies that take uranium and plutonium, from retired weapons and prepare it for new weapons, long-term storage, and/or final disposition. Current pyrochemical processes generate residue salts and ceramic wastes that require aqueous processing to remove and recover the actinides. However, the aqueous treatment of these residues generates an estimated 100 liters of acidic transuranic (TRU) waste per kilogram of plutonium in the residue. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing pyrochemical techniques to eliminate, minimize, or more efficiently treat these residue streams. This paper will present technologies being developed at LLNL on advanced materials for actinide containment, reactors that minimize residues, and pyrochemical processes that remove actinides from waste salts.

  7. Contraband Detection with Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence: Feasibility and Impact

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pruet, J; Lange, D

    2007-01-03T23:59:59.000Z

    In this report they show that cargo interrogation systems developed to thwart trafficking of illicit nuclear materials could also be powerful tools in the larger fight against contraband smuggling. In particular, in addition to detecting special nuclear materials, cargo scanning systems that exploit nuclear resonance fluorescence to detect specific isotopes can be used to help find: chemical weapons; some drugs as well as some chemicals regulated under the controlled substances act; precious metals; materials regulated under export control laws; and commonly trafficked fluorocarbons.

  8. Subject:Persons With Weapons at UW Madison Date:Wed, 19 Oct 2011 14:27:43 -0400 (EDT)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Balser, Teri C.

    law goes into effect on November 1, 2011 all weapons will remain prohibited in UW Madison buildingsSubject:Persons With Weapons at UW Madison Date:Wed, 19 Oct 2011 14:27:43 -0400 (EDT) From. If you see a person who is not a police officer in uniform carrying a weapon in a UW Madison building

  9. vol. 166, no. 3 the american naturalist september 2005 Weapon Performance, Not Size, Determines Mating Success and Potential

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Husak, Jerry F.

    with bite force. These results indicate that weapon performance has far stronger effects on fitness thanvol. 166, no. 3 the american naturalist september 2005 Weapon Performance, Not Size, Determines the head (i.e., jaws and associated musculature) as a weapon when territorial interactions escalate

  10. Assessment of the facilities on Jackass Flats and other Nevada test site facilities for the new nuclear rocket program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chandler, G.; Collins, D.; Dye, K.; Eberhart, C.; Hynes, M.; Kovach, R.; Ortiz, R.; Perea, J.; Sherman, D. (Field Test Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 (United States))

    1993-01-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Recent NASA/DOE studies for the Space Exploration Initiative have demonstrated a critical need for the ground-based testing of nuclear rocket engines. Experience in the ROVER/NERVA Program, experience in the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program, and involvement in the new nuclear rocket program has motivated our detailed assessment of the facilities used for the ROVER/NERVA Program and other facilities located at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The ROVER/NERVA facilities are located in the Nevada Research Development Area (NRDA) on Jackass Flats at NTS, approximately 85 miles northwest of Las Vegas. To guide our assessment of facilities for an engine testing program we have defined a program goal, scope, and process. In particular we have assumed that the program goal will be to certify a full engine system design as flight test ready. All nuclear and non-nuclear components will be individually certified as ready for such a test at sites remote from the NRDA facilities, the components transported to NRDA, and the engine assembled. We also assume that engines of 25,000--100,000 lb thrust levels will be tested with burn times of 1 hour or longer. After a test, the engine will be disassembled, time critical inspections will be executed, and a selection of components will be transported to remote inspection sites. The majority of the components will be stored for future inspection at Jackass Flats. To execute this program scope and process will require ten facilities. We considered the use of all relevant facilities at NTS including existing and new tunnels as well as the facilities at NRDA. Aside from the facilities located at remote sites and the inter-site transportation system, all of the required facilities are available at NRDA. In particular we have studied the refurbishment of E-MAD, ETS-1, R-MAD, and the interconnecting railroad.

  11. Some policy implications of nuclear winter

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gertler, J.J.

    1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The theory of nuclear winter has had as checkered a history as any new idea since Darwin published The Origin of Species. There have been questions of its scientific validity, reviews both laudatory and damning, pleas for arms reductions, hosannahs for a newfound hope that nuclear war has at least been rendered completely unthinkable, and frustration that two generations of human toil in weapons laboratories and think tanks have been rendered by a natural doomsday machine. Some have even suggested that nuclear winter might be used as an offensive weapon. Disturbingly, a substantial number of commentators have concluded that nuclear winter carries no immediate implications for policy, because to their way of thinking, nuclear winter is a (a) just one more of the many undesirable effects of nuclear war; (b) the ulimate deterrent to nuclear use, and therefore should be welcomed rather than compensated for; or (c) an unproven theory, meaning that consideration of policy questions is premature. Those who overlook the policy questions are following a dangerous path. The nuclear winter theory contains serious short- and long-term implications for United States foreign and strategic policy. Although the theory may never be confirmed or refuted, discussion of these policy questions should begin now because many of the potential effects of nuclear winter - particularly in foreign policy - will come about regardless of whether or not the phenomenon can actually exist.

  12. Gas Centrifuges and Nuclear Proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Albright, David

    2004-09-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Gas centrifuges have been an ideal enrichment method for a wide variety of countries. Many countries have built gas centrifuges to make enriched uranium for peaceful nuclear purposes. Other countries have secretly sought centrifuges to make highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. In more recent times, several countries have secretly sought or built gas centrifuges in regions of tension. The main countries that have been of interest in the last two decades have been Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Currently, most attention is focused on Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. These states did not have the indigenous abilities to make gas centrifuges, focusing instead on illicit and questionable foreign procurement. The presentation covered the following main sections: Spread of centrifuges through illicit procurement; Role of export controls in stopping proliferation; Increasing the transparency of gas centrifuge programs in non-nuclear weapon states; and, Verified dismantlement of gas centrifuge programs. Gas centrifuges are important providers of low enriched uranium for civil nuclear power reactors. They also pose special nuclear proliferation risks. We all have special responsibilities to prevent the spread of gas centrifuges into regions of tension and to mitigate the consequences of their spread into the Middle East, South Asia, and North Asia.

  13. Assessing the risk from the depleted uranium weapons used in Operation Allied Force

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Liolios, T E

    1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The conflict in Yugoslavia has been a source of great concern for the neighboring countries, about the radiological and toxic hazard posed by the alleged presence of depleted uranium in NATO weapons. In the present study a worst-case scenario is assumed mainly to assess the risk for Greece and other neighboring countries of Yugoslavia at similar distances . The risk of the weapons currently in use is proved to be negligible at distances greater than 100 Km. For shorter distances classified data of weapons composition are needed to obtain a reliable assessment.

  14. Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, L W; Moody, K J; Bradley, K S; Lorenzana, H E

    2011-02-18T23:59:59.000Z

    Global appetite for fission power is projected to grow dramatically this century, and for good reason. Despite considerable research to identify new sources of energy, fission remains the most plentiful and practical alternative to fossil fuels. The environmental challenges of fossil fuel have made the fission power option increasingly attractive, particularly as we are forced to rely on reserves in ecologically fragile or politically unstable corners of the globe. Caught between a globally eroding fossil fuel reserve as well as the uncertainty and considerable costs in the development of fusion power, most of the world will most likely come to rely on fission power for at least the remainder of the 21st century. Despite inevitable growth, fission power faces enduring challenges in sustainability and security. One of fission power's greatest hurdles to universal acceptance is the risk of potential misuse for nefarious purposes of fissionable byproducts in spent fuel, such as plutonium. With this issue in mind, we have discussed intrinsic concepts in this report that are motivated by the premise that the utility, desirability, and applicability of nuclear materials can be reduced. In a general sense, the intrinsic solutions aim to reduce or eliminate the quantity of existing weapons usable material; avoid production of new weapons-usable material through enrichment, breeding, extraction; or employ engineering solutions to make the fuel cycle less useful or more difficult for producing weapons-usable material. By their nature, these schemes require modifications to existing fuel cycles. As such, the concomitants of these modifications require engagement from the nuclear reactor and fuel-design community to fully assess their effects. Unfortunately, active pursuit of any scheme that could further complicate the spread of domestic nuclear power will probably be understandably unpopular. Nevertheless, the nonproliferation and counterterrorism issues are paramount, and we posit that the exploration, development, and implementation of intrinsic mechanisms such as discussed here are part of a balanced approach aimed at preventing the misuse of nuclear material for nuclear-energy applications.

  15. Planet earth in jeopardy: environmental consequences of nuclear war

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dotto, L.

    1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An attempt is made to describe the details of what nuclear war could actually mean for the world. The events during and following a possible large-scale exchange of nuclear weapons and all the associated uncertainties are presented. The first major uncertainty involves how many nuclear weapons could be used in the event of war. The discussion chooses half the world's stockpile, or 6000 megatons, as a basis for judging nuclear war's effects. Shock waves, an electromagnetic pulse, searing heat, and ionizing radiation account for the initial deaths and destruction. Petroleum and other organic materials combust to set up a nuclear winter and all the disturbances to agriculture, forests, waters, etc. This is where the book's greatest message comes through: the seriousness of the aftereffects, especially on agriculture, could far exceed the immediate effects.

  16. Nuclear winter and nuclear policy: implications for US and Soviet deterrence strategies. Master's thesis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Griffin, G.A.

    1987-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear weapons were rapidly incorporated into the policies for maintaining the national security objectives of both the Soviet Union and the United States--in spite of poorly understood nuclear-weapons effects. The nuclear winter hypothesis, the basis of which was first proposed in 1982, directed scientific research into the consequences of massive amounts of dust and smoke, from nuclear detonations, on the earth's climate and subsequently on the ecology of the earth. This thesis presents the evolution of the nuclear winter hypothesis in order to elucidate its unique aspects for global devastation and the consensus of plausibility which the hypothesis holds in the scientific community. The hypothesis has aroused a flurry of debate on its implications for nuclear policy. With the historical aspects of the nuclear era as a backdrop, the question of incorporating new scientific information on the consequences of nuclear war into policy is discussed. The observed responses of the U.S. and Soviet Union and the implications for future actions in response to the nuclear winter hypothesis are examined-- leading to the conclusion that the hypothesis will have little or no impact on U.S. and Soviet nuclear policy.

  17. Deterring regional threats from nuclear proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Spector, L.S.

    1992-03-12T23:59:59.000Z

    The most prominent shift in the National Military Strategy is from the global Soviet threat to a new focus on regional contingencies. No threat looms larger in these contingencies than the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This study examines proliferation trends and proposes a predominately diplomatic strategy for containing the problem. Dr. Spector identifies three waves of proliferation: the first is the five states with declared weapons and doctrine-the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China; the second includes a less visible group that developed a covert capability, without testing weapons or declaring a doctrine of deterrence-for example, Israel, India, and probably Pakistan; and, a third wave of would-be proliferators includes radical states like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Spector's political approach is based on the common interest of wave one and two states to prevent further proliferation. Political-economic incentives have already worked in the cases of Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, and South Africa-states which appear to have abandoned their nuclear weapons programs. Spector does not rule out the option of military force. Force, especially under international sanctions, can be a powerful tool to back diplomatic efforts. Use of force, however, remains a last resort.

  18. Accident Response Group

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1991-09-20T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish Department of Energy (DOE) policy for DOE response to accidents and significant incidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components. Cancels DOE O 5530.1. Canceled by DOE O 153.1.

  19. Bioforensics: Characterization of biological weapons agents by NanoSIMS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Weber, P K; Ghosal, S; Leighton, T J; Wheeler, K E; Hutcheon, I D

    2007-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The anthrax attacks of Fall 2001 highlight the need to develop forensic methods based on multiple identifiers to determine the origin of biological weapons agents. Genetic typing methods (i.e., DNA and RNA-based) provide one attribution technology, but genetic information alone is not usually sufficient to determine the provenance of the material. Non-genetic identifiers, including elemental and isotopic signatures, provide complementary information that can be used to identify the means, geographic location and date of production. Under LDRD funding, we have successfully developed the techniques necessary to perform bioforensic characterization with the NanoSIMS at the individual spore level. We have developed methods for elemental and isotopic characterization at the single spore scale. We have developed methods for analyzing spore sections to map elemental abundance within spores. We have developed rapid focused ion beam (FIB) sectioning techniques for spores to preserve elemental and structural integrity. And we have developed a high-resolution depth profiling method to characterize the elemental distribution in individual spores without sectioning. We used these newly developed methods to study the controls on elemental abundances in spores, characterize the elemental distribution of in spores, and to study elemental uptake by spores. Our work under this LDRD project attracted FBI and DHS funding for applied purposes.

  20. Reprocessing of nuclear fuels at the Savannah River Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, L.W.

    1986-10-04T23:59:59.000Z

    For more than 30 years, the Savannah River Plant (SRP) has been a major supplier of nuclear materials such as plutonium-239 and tritium-3 for nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, plutonium-238 for space exploration, and isotopes of americium, curium, and californium for use in the nuclear research community. SRP is a complete nuclear park, providing most of the processes in the nuclear fuel cycle. Key processes involve fabrication and cladding of the nuclear fuel, target, and control assemblies; rework of heavy water for use as reactor moderator; reactor loading, operation, and unloading; chemical recovery of the reactor transmutation products and spent fuels; and management of the gaseous, liquid, and solid nuclear and chemical wastes; plus a host of support operations. The site's history and the key processes from fabrication of reactor fuels and targets to finishing of virgin plutonium for use in the nuclear weapons complex are reviewed. Emphasis has been given to the chemistry of the recovery and purification of weapons grade plutonium from irradiated reactor targets.

  1. Improving weapons of mass destruction intelligence Arnold Kanter

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Deutch, John

    of Chemistry, Room 6-208 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139 [jmd@mit.edu] A paper. For example, acquiring a nuclear explosive capability depends upon obtaining highly enriched uranium (HEU

  2. Environmental behavior of hafnium : the impact on the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cerefice, Gary Steven

    1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Experimental and analytical studies were performed to examine the environmental behavior of hafnium and its utility as a neutron poison for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Yucca Mountain. The hydrolysis of ...

  3. Mission emphasis and the determination of needs for new weapon systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gillespie, Daniel Mark

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Efforts to understand the determination of needs of new weapon systems must take into account inputs and actions beyond the formally documented requirements generation process. This study analyzes three recent historical ...

  4. Assessment of Non-traditional Isotopic Ratios by Mass Spectrometry for Analysis of Nuclear Activities: Annual Report Year 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Biegalski, S; Buchholz, B

    2009-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this work is to identify isotopic ratios suitable for analysis via mass spectrometry that distinguish between commercial nuclear reactor fuel cycles, fuel cycles for weapons grade plutonium, and products from nuclear weapons explosions. Methods will also be determined to distinguish the above from medical and industrial radionuclide sources. Mass spectrometry systems will be identified that are suitable for field measurement of such isotopes in an expedient manner. Significant progress has been made with this project within the past year: (1) Isotope production from commercial nuclear fuel cycles and nuclear weapons fuel cycles have been modeled with the ORIGEN and MCNPX codes. (2) MCNPX has been utilized to calculate isotopic inventories produced in a short burst fast bare sphere reactor (to approximate the signature of a nuclear weapon). (3) Isotopic ratios have been identified that are good for distinguishing between commercial and military fuel cycles as well as between nuclear weapons and commercial nuclear fuel cycles. (4) Mass spectrometry systems have been assessed for analysis of the fission products of interest. (5) A short-list of forensic ratios have been identified that are well suited for use in portable mass spectrometry systems.

  5. Nuclear Materials Management Program at the NNSS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    ,

    2012-06-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was established in 1951 mainly for weapons testing; because special nuclear materials (SNM) were expended during the tests, a nuclear material management program was not required. That changed in December 2004 with the receipt of Category I SNM for purposes other than weapons testing. At that time, Material Control and Accountability and Nuclear Material Management were a joint laboratory (Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore) effort with nuclear material management being performed at the laboratories. That changed in March 2006 when the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office appointed sole responsibility to the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). Since 2006 the basic nuclear material management work was completed by a combination of M&O employees and subcontractors, but a true Nuclear Material Management (NMM) Program was not determined to be necessary until recently. With expanding missions and more nuclear material (NM) coming to the NNSS, it became imperative to have an organization to manage these materials; therefore, an NMM Manager was officially appointed by NSTec in 2012. In June 2011 a Gap Analysis and white paper was completed by a subcontractor; this presentation will include highlights from those documents along with our plans to resolve the “gaps” and stand up a functional and compliant NMM Program at the NNSS.

  6. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  7. Heavy-ion Accelerators for Testing Microelectronic Components...

    Office of Science (SC) Website

    Heavy-ion Accelerators for Testing Microelectronic Components at LBNL Nuclear Physics (NP) NP Home About Research Facilities Science Highlights Benefits of NP Applications of...

  8. THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND NEXT STEPS TO REDUCE THE DANGER

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Laughlin, Robert B.

    Breach at Necsa on 08 November 2007," Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa, 13 November 2007 nuclear facility in South Africa, where hundreds of kilograms of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU, and then disappeared through the same hole they had cut in the fence. No one on either team was shot or captured. South

  9. Prioritizing Network Interdiction of Nuclear Dennis P. Michalopoulos, David P. Morton, and J. Wesley Barnes

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Morton, David

    to obtain a nuclear weapon. An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) database on illicit trafficking, Energy, and Logistics. H.I. Gassmann, S.W. Wallace, and W.T. Ziemba (eds.), World Scientific. #12, and Al Qaeda has repeatedly attempted to obtain nuclear material, technology, and expertise. Osama bin

  10. in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental EIS

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    and manufacture of critical nuclear weapons components. SRS also manages surplus nuclear materials, solid and transuranic waste, domestic and international used research...

  11. Y-12 continues to push the state-of-the-art in machining - Or...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    While dedicating substantial resources to the separation of lithium-6 for thermonuclear weapons, manu- facturing nuclear and other specialized components for nuclear...

  12. Chlorine-36 in Water, Snow, and Mid-Latitude Glacial Ice of North America: Meteoric and Weapons-Tests Production in the Vicinity of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    L. DeWayne; J. R. Green (USGS); S. Vogt, P. Sharma (Purdue University); S. K. Frape (University of Waterloo); S. N. Davis (University of Arizona); G. L. Cottrell (USGS)

    1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Measurements of chlorine-36 (36Cl) were made for 64 water, snow, and glacial-ice and -runoff samples to determine the meteoric and weapons-tests-produced concentrations and fluxes of this radionuclide at mid-latitudes in North America. The results will facilitate the use of 36Cl as a hydrogeologic tracer at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). This information was used to estimate meteoric and weapons-tests contributions of this nuclide to environmental inventories at and near the INEEL. The data presented in this report suggest a meteoric source 36Cl for environmental samples collected in southeastern Idaho and western Wyoming if the concentration is less than 1 x 10 7 atoms/L. Additionally, concentrations in water, snow, or glacial ice between 1 x 10 7 and 1 x 10 8 atoms/L may be indicative of a weapons-tests component from peak 36Cl production in the late 1950s. Chlorine-36 concentrations between 1 x 10 8 and 1 x 10 9 atoms/L may be representative of re-suspension of weapons-tests fallout airborne disposal of 36Cl from the INTEC, or evapotranspiration. It was concluded from the water, snow, and glacial data presented here that concentrations of 36Cl measured in environmental samples at the INEEL larger than 1 x 10 9 atoms/L can be attributed to waste-disposal practices.

  13. Revisiting Vyacheslav Danilenko: His Origins in the Soviet Nuclear Weapons Complex

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mark Gorwitz

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    methods were initially contained only in secret reports from Chelyabinsk-70. Danilenko also conducted

  14. Quality at Y-12, part 3 -- Or: Quality goes beyond nuclear weapons...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Managers were listening to the ideas of industry experts like Dr. W. E. Deming and Dr. Joseph Juran who both embraced the use of technical tools and statistical methods to...

  15. Surface water transport and distribution of uranium in contaminated sediments near a nuclear weapons processing facility

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Batson, Vicky Lynn

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    , such as the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRSl, Aiken, South Carolina, is a major environmental concern. At SRS, the contamination of soil and rivers was compounded by inadequate regulations during early years of facility operation. As our knowledge...-Steed Pond System Tims Branch is a second-order stream located in the A/M-area of the northwestern section of SRS (Fig. 1). It drains an area of approximately sixteen square kilometers of the drainage basin of the Savannah River and its tributaries. Tims...

  16. Detecting terrorist nuclear weapons at sea: The 10th door problem

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Slaughter, D R

    2008-09-15T23:59:59.000Z

    While screening commercial cargo containers for the possible presence of WMD is important and necessary smugglers have successfully exploited the many other vehicles transporting cargo into the US including medium and small vessels at sea. These vessels provide a venue that is currently not screened and widely used. Physics limits that make screening of large vessels prohibitive impractical do not prohibit effective screening of the smaller vessels. While passive radiation detection is probably ineffective at sea active interrogation may provide a successful approach. The physics limits of active interrogation of ships at sea from standoff platforms are discussed. Autonomous platforms that could carry interrogation systems at sea, both airborne and submersible, are summarized and their utilization discussed. An R&D program to investigate the limits of this approach to screening ships at sea is indicated and limitations estimated.

  17. COLLOQUIUM: Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use in an Era of Proliferation...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    them by e-mail regarding any possible speakers or topics for future colloquia. Carol Ann Austin caustin@pppl.gov Dennis Mueller, Chair mueller@pppl.gov Elena Belova,...

  18. ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    André Gsponer; Jean-pierre Hurni

    2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    militarytechnical reasons and implications of the very probable siting of ITER (the International Thermonuclear

  19. CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing

    Office of Legacy Management (LM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA group currentBradleyTableSelling7111A Lithologic and MonitorBayoBuffalo,/ .- ~r

  20. CERCLA Preliminary Assessment of DOE'S Nevada Operations Office Nuclear Weapons Testing

    Office of Legacy Management (LM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA group currentBradleyTableSelling7111A Lithologic and MonitorBayoBuffalo,/ .-

  1. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01, Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic Plan Departmentof EnergyPublic Law of|EnergyCybersecurity

  2. Enforcement Guidance Supplement 01-01, Nuclear Weapon Program Enforcement Issues

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic Plan Departmentof EnergyPublic Law of|EnergyCybersecurity

  3. Date Set for Closure of Russian Nuclear Weapons Plant - NNSA Is Helping

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625govInstrumentstdmadapInactiveVisitingContract Management Fermi SitePARTOfficeOctoberDanielDTN DataTemplate

  4. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy Delivered to Congress | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed off Energy.gov. Are you sureReportsofDepartmentSeries | Department of Energy

  5. Laboratory's role in Cold War nuclear weapons testing program focus of

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated Codes |Is Your Home asLCLSLaboratoryRowland to receive DOEnear DPnear

  6. AIM-98-3464 RECEIVED THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON SAFETY DEVICES

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItem Not Found Item Not Found The item

  7. U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directedAnnual Siteof Energy 2, 2015 -Helicopter Accident atConference | DepartmentU.S. LNG

  8. DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed off Energy.gov. Are you0and Transparency, and MoreEnergyof Energy

  9. Record-Setting Year for Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Achieved at the Y-12

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysis andBHoneywell9/%2A en7/%2A enNational

  10. COLLOQUIUM: Risks of Nuclear Weapons Use in an Era of Proliferation, Cyber

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625govInstrumentstdmadapInactiveVisiting the TWPSuccess StoriesFebruary 26, 2014, 4:00pm to|Physics Lab19,

  11. Flight Test of Weapons System Body by Navy Successful | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTuba City, Arizona,Site OperationsAboutEnergy andFeaturesFlexible

  12. Optimizing Port of Entry Inspection Securing our ports and harbors is a major component of protecting our homeland. The

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    , such as chemical or biological agents, or nuclear devices requires high vigilance. Even a small event at a major, document screening is the least expensive; physical methods, such as gamma ray detection, are more for intercepting illicit materials and weapons entering US ports. The algorithms we seek aim at finding inspection

  13. Solid tags for identifying failed reactor components

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Bunch, Wilbur L. (Richland, WA); Schenter, Robert E. (Richland, WA)

    1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A solid tag material which generates stable detectable, identifiable, and measurable isotopic gases on exposure to a neutron flux to be placed in a nuclear reactor component, particularly a fuel element, in order to identify the reactor component in event of its failure. Several tag materials consisting of salts which generate a multiplicity of gaseous isotopes in predetermined ratios are used to identify different reactor components.

  14. Status of Iran's nuclear program and negotiations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Albright, David [President, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 236 Massachusetts Avenue, NE 305, Washington, DC 20002 (United States)

    2014-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

    Iran's nuclear program poses immense challenges to international security. Its gas centrifuge program has grown dramatically in the last several years, bringing Iran close to a point where it could produce highly enriched uranium in secret or declared gas centrifuge plants before its breakout would be discovered and stopped. To reduce the risk posed by Iran's nuclear program, the P5+1 have negotiated with Iran short term limits on the most dangerous aspects of its nuclear programs and is negotiating long-term arrangements that can provide assurance that Iran will not build nuclear weapons. These long-term arrangements need to include a far more limited and transparent Iranian nuclear program. In advance of arriving at a long-term arrangement, the IAEA will need to resolve its concerns about the alleged past and possibly on-going military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.

  15. Weapons assessment efficiencies through use of nondestructive laser gas

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    NNSA deliver President Obama's nuclear security agenda and continues to ensure the safety, security. The NNSA also plans to use this capability to improve trending data for aging affects by gas sampling. Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for the Department of Energy's NNSA #12;

  16. LENS repair and modification of metal NW components:materials and applications guide.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smugeresky, John E. (Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA); Gill, David Dennis; Oberhaus, Jason (BWXT Y-12); Adams, Thad (Savannah River National Laboratory); VanCamp, Chad (Kansas City Plant)

    2006-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Laser Engineered Net Shaping{trademark} (LENS{reg_sign}) is a unique, layer additive, metal manufacturing technique that offers the ability to create fully dense metal features and components directly from a computer solid model. LENS offers opportunities to repair and modify components by adding features to existing geometry, refilling holes, repairing weld lips, and many other potential applications. The material deposited has good mechanical properties with strengths typically slightly higher that wrought material due to grain refinement from a quickly cooling weld pool. The result is a material with properties similar to cold worked material, but without the loss in ductility traditionally seen with such treatments. Furthermore, 304L LENS material exhibits good corrosion resistance and hydrogen compatibility. This report gives a background of the LENS process including materials analysis addressing the requirements of a number of different applications. Suggestions are given to aid both the product engineer and the process engineer in the successful utilization of LENS for their applications. The results of testing on interface strength, machinability, weldability, corrosion resistance, geometric effects, heat treatment, and repair strategy testing are all included. Finally, the qualification of the LENS process is briefly discussed to give the user confidence in selecting LENS as the process of choice for high rigor applications. The testing showed LENS components to have capability in repair/modification applications requiring complex castings (W80-3 D-Bottle bracket), thin wall parts requiring metal to be rebuilt onto the part (W87 Firing Set Housing and Y-12 Test Rings), the filling of counterbores for use in reservoir reclamation welding (SRNL hydrogen compatibility study) and the repair of surface defects on pressure vessels (SRNL gas bottle repair). The material is machinable, as testing has shown that LENS deposited material machines similar to that of welded metal. Tool wear is slightly higher in LENS material than in wrought material, but not so much that one would be concerned with increased tooling cost. The LENS process achieved process qualification for the AY1E0125 D-Bottle Bracket from the W80-3 LEP program, and in the effort, also underwent testing in weapons environments. These tests included structural dynamic response testing and drop testing. The LENS deposited parts were compared in these tests with conventionally machined parts and showed equivalency to such an extent that the parts were accepted for use in parallel path subsystem-level weapon environment testing. The evaluation of LENS has shown that the process can be a viable option when either complete metal parts are needed or existing metal parts require modification or repair. The LENS Qualification Technology Investment team successfully investigated new applications for the LENS process and showed that it has great applicability across the Nuclear Weapons Complex as well as in other high rigor applications.

  17. Assessment tool for nuclear material acquisition pathways

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ford, David Grant

    2009-05-15T23:59:59.000Z

    ................ 24 Figure 13 HEU area of the pathways network showing the various chemical forms of uranium that can be enriched ...........................................................................25 Figure 14 Section of the network showing pathways... be obtained. The two types of material used in nuclear weapons are Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium (Pu). Uranium is an element found in nature and is contained in the soil all over the world. However, certain geological formations contain a...

  18. Fluorescence Imaging for Nuclear Arms Control Verification 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Feener, Jessica S

    2014-08-14T23:59:59.000Z

    into a supercritical configuration. A thermonuclear device combines an implosion device, known as the primary, with a secondary fusion device composed of uranium and lithium deuteride. Most modern weapons contain a thermonuclear warhead. Gun... grade Pu typically contains more than 90% 239Pu.10 Additionally, the fissile material must be in metallic form. There are many different nuclear warhead designs, but there are three general warhead types: gun-type, implosion and thermonuclear. In a...

  19. Assessment tool for nuclear material acquisition pathways 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ford, David Grant

    2009-05-15T23:59:59.000Z

    to gap analysis. For 11 example, if one or even multiple pieces of information support the conclusions that the country in question is constructing a clandestine reprocessing facility, it should be relatively straight forward to determine which... is accounted for and properly safeguarded. 13 CHAPTER II II. NETWORK DEVELOPMENT II.A. Network Construction A detailed network illustrating all possible paths for an organization to acquire the SNM needed for a nuclear weapons capability was created...

  20. Nuclear winter: implications for US and Soviet nuclear strategy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Romero, P.J.

    1984-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In November 1983 Dr. Carl Sagan and his colleagues reported to press on the results of their study of the atmospheric consequences of nuclear war. The TTAPS study found that for a wide range of possible U.S. -Soviet nuclear exchanges, including relatively small ones, the fires from nuclear detonations would inject into the stratosphere quantities of dust and soot that would obscure sunlight for months. Under the cloud, which would spread over most of the Northern Hemisphere, temperatures might drop scores of degrees, well below the freezing point of water; thus, nuclear winter. The TTAPS team's findings suggested that the consequences of a nuclear war might be even more gruesome than previously supposed, and the long-term climatic and biological results might be nearly as severe for a war of 100 megatons as for 5,000. From the point of view of informing policymakers and the public concerning the consequences of wars involving nuclear weapons, the politicization of the nuclear winter issue is unfortunate. We can hope that in the next few years the criticism and defense of the initial TTAPS work will give rise to significant additional analyses, to illuminate the question. Realistically, further study will probably include both confirmations and contradictions of the original findings, without necessarily resolving the issue. Sadly, the surrounding political atmosphere may obstruct sober consideration of the policy implications of the possibility of nuclear winter.

  1. Component Fragility Research Program: Phase 1 component prioritization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Holman, G.S.; Chou, C.K.

    1987-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Current probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods for nuclear power plants utilize seismic ''fragilities'' - probabilities of failure conditioned on the severity of seismic input motion - that are based largely on limited test data and on engineering judgment. Under the NRC Component Fragility Research Program (CFRP), the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has developed and demonstrated procedures for using test data to derive probabilistic fragility descriptions for mechanical and electrical components. As part of its CFRP activities, LLNL systematically identified and categorized components influencing plant safety in order to identify ''candidate'' components for future NRC testing. Plant systems relevant to safety were first identified; within each system components were then ranked according to their importance to overall system function and their anticipated seismic capacity. Highest priority for future testing was assigned to those ''very important'' components having ''low'' seismic capacity. This report describes the LLNL prioritization effort, which also included application of ''high-level'' qualification data as an alternate means of developing probabilistic fragility descriptions for PRA applications.

  2. Program for upgrading nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting at all facilities within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Yuferev, V.; Zhikharev, S.; Yakimov, Y. [All-Russian Inst. of Experimental Physics, Moscow (Russian Federation)] [and others

    1998-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    As part of the Department of Energy-Russian program for strengthening nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A), plans have now been formulated to install an integrated MPC and A system at all facilities containing large quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF, Arzamas-16) complex. In addition to storage facilities, the complex houses a number of critical facilities used to conduct nuclear physics research and facilities for developing procedures for disassembly of nuclear weapons.

  3. US Army Weapon Systems Human-Computer Interface (WSHCI) style guide, Version 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Avery, L.W.; O`Mara, P.A.; Shepard, A.P.

    1996-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    A stated goal of the U.S. Army has been the standardization of the human computer interfaces (HCIS) of its system. Some of the tools being used to accomplish this standardization are HCI design guidelines and style guides. Currently, the Army is employing a number of style guides. While these style guides provide good guidance for the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) domain, they do not necessarily represent the more unique requirements of the Army`s real time and near-real time (RT/NRT) weapon systems. The Office of the Director of Information for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4), in conjunction with the Weapon Systems Technical Architecture Working Group (WSTAWG), recognized this need as part of their activities to revise the Army Technical Architecture (ATA). To address this need, DISC4 tasked the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop an Army weapon systems unique HCI style guide. This document, the U.S. Army Weapon Systems Human-Computer Interface (WSHCI) Style Guide, represents the first version of that style guide. The purpose of this document is to provide HCI design guidance for RT/NRT Army systems across the weapon systems domains of ground, aviation, missile, and soldier systems. Each domain should customize and extend this guidance by developing their domain-specific style guides, which will be used to guide the development of future systems within their domains.

  4. Secretary Bodman Announces Federal Risk Insurance for Nuclear...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    the important role that nuclear power can play in delivering clean, emissions-free energy for electricity production. Expanding nuclear power is a key component of the...

  5. Superpower nuclear minimalism in the post-Cold War era

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Graben, E.K.

    1992-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the strategic environment has fundamentally changed, so it would seem logical to reexamine strategy as well. There are two main schools of nuclear strategic thought: a maximalist school, which emphasizes counterforce superiority and nuclear war-fighting capability, and a MAD-plus school, which emphasizes survivability of an assured destruction capability along with the ability to deliver small, limited nuclear attacks in the event that conflict occurs. The MAD-plus strategy is the more logical of the two strategies, because the maximalist strategy is based on an attempt to conventionalize nuclear weapons which is unrealistic.

  6. Nuclear Naval Propulsion: A Feasible Proliferation Pathway?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Swift, Alicia L.

    2014-01-31T23:59:59.000Z

    There is no better time than now to close the loophole in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that excludes military uses of fissile material from nuclear safeguards. Several countries have declared their intention to pursue and develop naval reactor technology, including Argentina, Brazil, Iran, and Pakistan, while other countries such as China, India, Russia, and the United States are expanding their capabilities. With only a minority of countries using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in their naval reactors, it is possible that a state could produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the guise of a nuclear navy while actually stockpiling the material for a nuclear weapon program. This paper examines the likelihood that non-nuclear weapon states exploit the loophole to break out from the NPT and also the regional ramifications of deterrence and regional stability of expanding naval forces. Possible solutions to close the loophole are discussed, including expanding the scope of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, employing LEU fuel instead of HEU fuel in naval reactors, amending the NPT, creating an export control regime for naval nuclear reactors, and forming individual naval reactor safeguards agreements.

  7. A HOST PHASE FOR THE DISPOSAL OF WEAPONS PLUTONIUM

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    WERNER LUTZE; K. B. HELEAN; W. L. GONG - UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO RODNEY C. EWING - UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

    1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Research was conducted into the possible use of zircon (ZrSiO{sub 4}) as a host phase for storage or disposal of excess weapons plutonium. Zircon is one of the most chemically durable minerals. Its structure can accommodate a variety of elements, including plutonium and uranium. Natural zircon contains uranium and thorium together in different quantities, usually in the range of less than one weight percent up to several weight percent. Zircon occurs in nature as a crystalline or a partially to fully metamict mineral, depending on age and actinide element concentration, i.e., on radiation damage. These zircon samples have been studied extensively and the results are documented in the literature in terms of radiation damage to the crystal structure and related property changes, e.g., density, hardness, loss of uranium and lead, etc. Thus, a unique suite of natural analogues are available to describe the effect of decay of {sup 239}Pu on zircon's structure and how zircon's physical and chemical properties will be affected over very long periods of time. Actually, the oldest zircon samples known are over 3 billion years old. This period covers the time for decay of {sup 239}Pu (half-life 24,300 yr.) and most of its daughter {sup 235}U (half-life 700 million yr.). Because of its chemical durability, even under extreme geological conditions, zircon is the most widely used mineral for geochronological dating (7,000 publications). It is the oldest dated mineral on earth and in the universe. Zircon has already been doped with about 10 weight percent of plutonium. Pure PuSiO{sub 4} has also been synthesized and has the same crystal structure as zircon. However, use of zircon as a storage medium or waste form for plutonium requires further materials characterization. Experiments can either be conducted in laboratories where plutonium can be handled or plutonium can be simulated by other elements, and experiments can be done under less restricted conditions. The authors conducted work with zircon doped with thorium, uranium and cerium, respectively. They synthesized various zircon compositions and studied the solid solution properties of mixed (Zr,X)SiO{sub 4} [X represents Th, U, Ce, respectively]. They measured the dissolution rate of pure crystalline zircon at elevated temperatures and of an amorphous hydrated zircon. This final report together with two previous annual reports summarize the accomplishments made in two areas: (1) synthesis of zircon solid solutions with Th, U, and Ce; and (2) measurement of the chemical durability of zircon. The focus of the final report is on the measurement of zircon's dissolution rate in water and on the determination of volubility limits of Th, U, and Ce in zircon.

  8. Chemistry-nuclear chemistry division. Progress report, October 1979-September 1980

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ryan, R.R. (comp.)

    1981-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report presents the research and development programs pursued by the Chemistry-Nuclear Chemistry Division of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics covered include advanced analytical methods, atmospheric chemistry and transport, biochemistry, biomedical research, element migration and fixation, inorganic chemistry, isotope separation and analysis, atomic and molecular collisions, molecular spectroscopy, muonic x rays, nuclear cosmochemistry, nuclear structure and reactions, radiochemical separations, theoretical chemistry, and unclassified weapons research.

  9. aged nuclear power: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    COMPONENTS Physics Websites Summary: SIGNAL GROUPING FOR CONDITION MONITORING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT COMPONENTS Piero Baraldi Monitoring, Empirical Modeling, Power Plants, Safety...

  10. A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L; Sellers, T.A.

    1999-04-20T23:59:59.000Z

    Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must build on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures.

  11. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: The Role of Science and Engineering

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Martz, Joseph C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ventura, Jonathan S [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Twenty-first century security challenges are multi-polar and asymmetric. A few nations have substantial nuclear arsenals and active nuclear weapons programs that still threaten vital US national security directly or by supporting proliferation. Maintaining a credible US nuclear deterrent and containing further proliferation will continue to be critical to US national security. Overlaid against this security backdrop, the rising worldwide population and its effects on global climate, food, and energy resources are greatly complicating the degree and number of security challenges before policy makers.This new paradigm requires new ways to assure allies that the United States remains a trusted security partner and to deter potential adversaries from aggressive actions that threaten global stability. Every U.S. President since Truman has affirmed the role of nuclear weapons as a supreme deterrent and protector of last resort of U.S. national security interests. Recently, President Bush called for a nuclear deterrent consistent with the 'lowest number of nuclear weapons' that still protects U.S. interests. How can this be achieved? And how can we continue on a path of nuclear reductions while retaining the security benefits of nuclear deterrence? Science and engineering have a key role to play in a potential new paradigm for nuclear deterrence, a concept known as 'capability-based deterrence.'

  12. A Methodology for Weapon System Availability Assessment, incorporating Failure, Damage and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Boyer, Edmond

    A Methodology for Weapon System Availability Assessment, incorporating Failure, Damage systems can become unavailable due to system failures or damage to the system; in both cases, system the more specific availability studies take battlefield damage into account. This paper aims to define

  13. Materials Corrosion and Mitigation Strategies for APT, Weapons Neutron Research Facility Experiments

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Materials Corrosion and Mitigation Strategies for APT, Weapons Neutron Research Facility Experiments: The Effects of 800 MeV Proton Irradiation on the Corrosion of Tungsten, Tantalum, Stainless Steel, and Gold R. Scott Lillard, Darryl P. Butt Materials Corrosion & Environmental Effects Laboratory MST-6

  14. Weapons proliferation and organized crime: The Russian military and security force dimension

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Turbiville, G.H.

    1996-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    One dimension of international security of the post-Cold War era that has not received enough attention is how organized crime facilitates weapons proliferation worldwide. The former Soviet Union (FSU) has emerged as the world`s greatest counterproliferation challenge. It contains the best developed links among organized crime, military and security organizations, and weapons proliferation. Furthermore, Russian military and security forces are the principle source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflict, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various dimensions. The flourishing illegal trade in conventional weapons is the clearest and most tangible manifestation of the close links between Russian power ministries and criminal organizations. The magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem from the FSU is less clear and less tangible. There have been many open reports of small-scale fissile material smuggling out of the FSU. The situation with regard to the proliferation of chemical weapon usually receives less attention but may be more serious. With an acknowledged stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the potential for proliferation is enormous.

  15. Panel report: nuclear physics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carlson, Joseph A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hartouni, Edward P [LLNL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear science is at the very heart of the NNSA program. The energy produced by nuclear processes is central to the NNSA mission, and nuclear reactions are critical in many applications, including National Ignition Facility (NIF) capsules, energy production, weapons, and in global threat reduction. Nuclear reactions are the source of energy in all these applications, and they can also be crucial in understanding and diagnosing the complex high-energy environments integral to the work of the NNSA. Nuclear processes are complex quantum many-body problems. Modeling and simulation of nuclear reactions and their role in applications, coupled tightly with experiments, have played a key role in NNSA's mission. The science input to NNSA program applications has been heavily reliant on experiment combined with extrapolations and physical models 'just good enough' to provide a starting point to extensive engineering that generated a body of empirical information. This body of information lacks the basic science underpinnings necessary to provide reliable extrapolations beyond the domain in which it was produced and for providing quantifiable error bars. Further, the ability to perform additional engineering tests is no longer possible, especially those tests that produce data in the extreme environments that uniquely characterize these applications. The end of testing has required improvements to the predictive capabilities of codes simulating the reactions and associated applications for both well known and well characterized cases as well as incompletely known cases. Developments in high performance computing, computational physics, applied mathematics and nuclear theory have combined to make spectacular advances in the theory of fission, fusion and nuclear reactions. Current research exploits these developments in a number of Office of Science and NNSA programs, and in joint programs such as the SciDAC (Science Discovery through Advanced Computing) that supports the project Building a Universal Nuclear Energy Density Fuctional whose goals are to provide the unified approach to calculating the properties of nuclei. The successful outcome of this, and similar projects is a first steps toward a predictive nuclear theory based on fundamental interactions between constituent nucleons. The application of this theory to the domain of nuclei important for national security missions will require computational resources at the extreme scale, beyond what will be available in the near term future.

  16. Treatability Variance Petition for SRS Raschig Ring Packing Material

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hagstrom, T.

    1999-08-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS) is a vital component in the nation's nuclear weapons complex. When in full operation, SRS produced nuclear material by manufacturing fuel and target components that were then irradiated in nuclear reactors.

  17. Licensing issues associated with the use of mixed-oxide fuel in US commercial nuclear reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, D.L. Jr.

    1997-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    On January 14, 1997, the Department of Energy, as part of its Record of Decision on the storage and disposition of surplus nuclear weapons materials, committed to pursue the use of excess weapons-usable plutonium in the fabrication of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for consumption in existing commercial nuclear power plants. Domestic use of MOX fuel has been deferred since the late 1970s, principally due to nuclear proliferation concerns. This report documents a review of past and present literature (i.e., correspondence, reports, etc.) on the domestic use of MOX fuel and provides discussion on the technical and regulatory issues that must be addressed by DOE (and the utility/consortia selected by DOE to effect the MOX fuel consumption strategy) in obtaining approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to use MOX fuel in one or a group of existing commercial nuclear power plants.

  18. U.S. Army weapon systems human-computer interface style guide. Version 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Avery, L.W.; O`Mara, P.A.; Shepard, A.P.; Donohoo, D.T.

    1997-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    A stated goal of the US Army has been the standardization of the human computer interfaces (HCIs) of its system. Some of the tools being used to accomplish this standardization are HCI design guidelines and style guides. Currently, the Army is employing a number of HCI design guidance documents. While these style guides provide good guidance for the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) domain, they do not necessarily represent the more unique requirements of the Army`s real time and near-real time (RT/NRT) weapon systems. The Office of the Director of Information for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4), in conjunction with the Weapon Systems Technical Architecture Working Group (WSTAWG), recognized this need as part of their activities to revise the Army Technical Architecture (ATA), now termed the Joint Technical Architecture-Army (JTA-A). To address this need, DISC4 tasked the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop an Army weapon systems unique HCI style guide, which resulted in the US Army Weapon Systems Human-Computer Interface (WSHCI) Style Guide Version 1. Based on feedback from the user community, DISC4 further tasked PNNL to revise Version 1 and publish Version 2. The intent was to update some of the research and incorporate some enhancements. This document provides that revision. The purpose of this document is to provide HCI design guidance for the RT/NRT Army system domain across the weapon systems subdomains of ground, aviation, missile, and soldier systems. Each subdomain should customize and extend this guidance by developing their domain-specific style guides, which will be used to guide the development of future systems within their subdomains.

  19. Nuclear Engineering Nuclear Criticality Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kemner, Ken

    development, Nuclear Operations Division (NOD) waste management and storage activities and other laboratoryNuclear Engineering Nuclear Criticality Safety The Nuclear Engineering Division (NE) of Argonne National Laboratory is experienced in performing criticality safety and shielding evaluations for nuclear

  20. Reducing nuclear danger through intergovernmental technical exchanges on nuclear materials safety management

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Peddicord, K.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States); Witmer, F.E.; Krumpe, P.F. [USDOE, Washington, DC (United States); Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M. [Radievyj Inst., Leningrad (Russian Federation)

    1997-04-09T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons and generating hundreds of tons of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium fissile nuclear materials that require disposition. The U.S. Department of Energy and Russian Minatom organizations.are planning and implementing safe, secure storage and disposition operations for these materials in numerous facilities. This provides a new opportunity for technical exchanges between Russian and Western scientists that can establish an improved and sustained common safety culture for handling these materials. An initiative that develops and uses personal relationships and joint projects among Russian and Western participants involved in fissile nuclear materials safety management contributes to improving nuclear materials nonproliferation and to making a safer world. Technical exchanges and workshops are being used to systematically identify opportunities in the nuclear fissile materials facilities to improve and ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment.