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Sample records for nuclear nonproliferation treaty

  1. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4)9 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 2 / Tuesday,09Treaty

  2. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administra...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

  3. NNSA Labs host U.S. and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Labs host U.S. and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Non-Nuclear Weapon State Representatives | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS...

  4. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Graham, Thomas Jr. [7609 Glenbrook Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  5. Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995. Workshop summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chrzanowski, P.L.

    1993-05-07

    About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation.

  6. Non-Proliferation Treaty at 25

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cooper, M.H.

    1995-01-20

    This article is a review of nuclear nonproliferation issues during the 25 years that have passed since the signing of the first nonproliferation treaty. A historical background is provided, both declared and undeclared nuclear powers are noted, and considerable attention is given to issues brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and by the renegade actions of a number of signatories, e.g. Iraq, and several of the non-signatories. Present/future policies are discussed, as is the impact of the present Administration in Washington.

  7. NNSA Labs host U.S. and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Head of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission Visits NNSA's Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for First Time NNSA sites take home 15...

  8. Nuclear Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Atkins-Duffin, C E

    2008-12-10

    With an explosion equivalent of about 20kT of TNT, the Trinity test was the first demonstration of a nuclear weapon. Conducted on July 16, 1945 in Alamogordo, NM this site is now a Registered National Historic Landmark. The concept and applicability of nuclear power was demonstrated on December 20, 1951 with the Experimental Breeder Reactor Number One (EBR-1) lit four light bulbs. This reactor is now a Registered National Historic Landmark, located near Arco, ID. From that moment forward it had been clearly demonstrated that nuclear energy has both peaceful and military applications and that the civilian and military fuel cycles can overlap. For the more than fifty years since the Atoms for Peace program, a key objective of nuclear policy has been to enable the wider peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Volumes have been written on the impact of these two actions on the world by advocates and critics; pundits and practioners; politicians and technologists. The nations of the world have woven together a delicate balance of treaties, agreements, frameworks and handshakes that are representative of the timeframe in which they were constructed and how they have evolved in time. Collectively these vehicles attempt to keep political will, nuclear materials and technology in check. This paper captures only the briefest abstract of the more significant aspects on the Nonproliferation Regime. Of particular relevance to this discussion is the special nonproliferation sensitivity associated with the uranium isotope separation and spent fuel reprocessing aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

  9. Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Initiatives Nonproliferation Technology Nonproliferation Systems Safeguards and Security Technology International Safeguards Nuclear Material Detection and Characterization For...

  10. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle and the Soviet Union. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). Prevent the spread is nine. Cold War leads to nuclear arms race between US and its allies and the Soviet Union. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

  11. Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Joeck, N

    2007-02-05

    The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

  12. EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...

  13. Proceedings of the Symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment: Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, Rockville, Maryland, April 19-21, 1994

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Denny, Marvin D

    1994-01-01

    To address a critical verification issue for the current Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for a possible future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Department of Energy sought to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical test in the same geology, so that other explosions could be identified. This was done in a field experiment code-named the NonProliferation Experiment (NPE).This comprehensive experiment was designed to determine the signatures of chemical explosions for a broad range of phenomena for comparison with those of previous nuclear tests. If significant differences can be measured, then these measures can be used to discriminate between the two types of explosions. In addition, when these differences are understood, large chemical explosions can be used to seismically calibrate regions to discriminate earthquakes from explosions. Toward this end, on-site and off-site measurements of transient phenomena were made, and on-site measurements of residual effects are in progress.Perhaps the most striking result was that the source function for the chemical explosion was identical to that of a nuclear one of about twice the yield. These proceedings provide more detailed results of the experiment.

  14. treaties | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

  15. Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richardson, J

    2009-01-21

    The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

  16. Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    community face is the possibility that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NNSA, through its Office of...

  17. Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    and Response, recently announced the merger of the former Nuclear Design and Risk Analysis Group (D-5) and the former Safeguards and Security Systems Group (N-4) into a new...

  18. Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

    2012-01-01

    Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

  19. Supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Bowyer, Ted

    2014-06-12

    PNNL operates the only certified laboratory in the U.S. for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty's International Monitoring System (IMS).

  20. Supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowyer, Ted

    2014-11-20

    PNNL operates the only certified laboratory in the U.S. for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty's International Monitoring System (IMS).

  1. Systems resilience : a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-12-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

  2. U.S. and Tunisia to Cooperate on Nuclear Safeguards, Nonproliferation...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Tunisia to Cooperate on Nuclear Safeguards, Nonproliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Energy Infrastructure | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr...

  3. Report of a Workshop in Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Review and the 2010 Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The issues discussed are at the heart of the debate on nuclear policy issues such asfuture nuclear weapons requirements and nonproliferation, but also the stockpile stewardship program and infrastructure modernization. The workshop discussions reflected the importance of the NPRfor defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21s1 century threats and providing guidance that will shape NNSA and DoD programs. They also highlighted its importancefor NPT diplomacy. The discussion noted the report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and the expectation that the NPR would likely reflect its consensus to a large degree (although the Administration was not bound by the report). There was widespread support for developing thefoundationsfor a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. The discussion also revealed a convergence of views, but no consensus, on a number of important issues, including the diminished role but continued importance of nuclear weapons; the need to take action to ensure the sustainability of the stockpile, and the recapitalization of the infrastructure and expertise; and the need to take action to promote nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives.

  4. Neutron Sensors and Their Role in Nuclear Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Runkle, Robert C.

    2011-10-04

    Perhaps the most familiar application of neutron detection technology to nonproliferation resides in materials accounting, where the quantification of plutonium has a rich history. With a changing dynamic in nuclear security, the application of sensor technology to further other nonproliferation objectives has received considerable attention. This fact, amplified by a dwindling supply of 3He, has stimulated considerable interest in neutron detection technology development for applications ranging from interdicting smuggled nuclear material to the verification of stockpile reductions. This manuscript briefly overviews the application of neutron sensors to nonproliferation and examines three specific examples that highlight the constraints applied to field-deployed technology.

  5. Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation | National Nuclear...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    National Nuclear Security Administration (DOENNSA) and the U.K. Department of Energy and Climate Change concluded a workshop at Wilton Park, About This Site Budget IG Web Policy...

  6. EXAMINING THE ROLE AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL FOR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL TREATY VERIFICATION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Henry, Michael J.; Cramer, Nicholas O.; Benz, Jacob M.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Kreyling, Sean J.; West, Curtis L.

    2014-05-13

    Traditional arms control treaty verification activities typically involve a combination of technical measurements via physical and chemical sensors, state declarations, political agreements, and on-site inspections involving international subject matter experts. However, the ubiquity of the internet, and the electronic sharing of data that it enables, has made available a wealth of open source information with the potential to benefit verification efforts. Open source information is already being used by organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the verification of state-declared information, prepare inspectors for in-field activities, and to maintain situational awareness . The recent explosion in social media use has opened new doors to exploring the attitudes, moods, and activities around a given topic. Social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, offer an opportunity for individuals, as well as institutions, to participate in a global conversation at minimal cost. Social media data can also provide a more data-rich environment, with text data being augmented with images, videos, and location data. The research described in this paper investigates the utility of applying social media signatures as potential arms control and nonproliferation treaty verification tools and technologies, as determined through a series of case studies. The treaty relevant events that these case studies touch upon include detection of undeclared facilities or activities, determination of unknown events recorded by the International Monitoring System (IMS), and the global media response to the occurrence of an Indian missile launch. The case studies examine how social media can be used to fill an information gap and provide additional confidence to a verification activity. The case studies represent, either directly or through a proxy, instances where social media information may be available that could potentially augment the evaluation of an event. The goal of this paper is to instigate a discussion within the verification community as to where and how social media can be effectively utilized to complement and enhance traditional treaty verification efforts. In addition, this paper seeks to identify areas of future research and development necessary to adapt social media analytic tools and techniques, and to form the seed for social media analytics to aid and inform arms control and nonproliferation policymakers and analysts. While social media analysis (as well as open source analysis as a whole) will not ever be able to replace traditional arms control verification measures, they do supply unique signatures that can augment existing analysis.

  7. Environmental Challenges of Climate-Nuclear Fusion: A Case Study of India

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Badrinarayan, Deepa

    2011-01-01

    foreign policy on nuclear proliferation; India is one of theagainst nuclear proliferation." ). 76. Agreement fornot signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 82

  8. Non-Proliferation Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    This Site Budget IG Web Policy Privacy No Fear Act Accessibility FOIA Sitemap Federal Government The White House DOE.gov USA.gov Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA...

  9. Non-Proliferation Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal of HonorPoster Session |SecurityNSDDfor 5th NEWS MEDIAAbout Us

  10. The moral implications of the subversion of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Doyle, Thomas

    2009-01-01

    Law’. in Nuclear Proliferation and International Security,C. Schelling, ‘Managing Nuclear Proliferation’; Derek D.C. ‘Managing Nuclear Proliferation’. UC Irvine Chancellor’s

  11. The moral implications of the subversion of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Doyle, Thomas

    2009-01-01

    exports of sensitive nuclear technology and materials fromKhan network traded nuclear technology and materials withinternational nuclear fuel and technology industry at the

  12. The moral implications of the subversion of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Doyle, Thomas

    2009-01-01

    320. Richard Smoke, ‘National Security and the Nuclear21, 2007). Richard Smoke, ‘National Security and the NuclearNuclear Weapons and India’s National Security’; Katherine K.

  13. The moral implications of the subversion of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Doyle, Thomas

    2009-01-01

    will look after their nuclear-related security interests. Asin Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, ed.Smoke, ‘National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An

  14. The moral implications of the subversion of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Doyle, Thomas

    2009-01-01

    Its History’. in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: ConfrontingF. Chyba. ‘U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies for a New Era’.in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats,

  15. Nonproliferation Policy | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJessework usesofPublications64Newsroom NewsroomNominationNonproliferation

  16. The moral implications of the subversion of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Doyle, Thomas

    2009-01-01

    to prevent an expansion of the nuclear club beyond theexpansion and modernization of the Chinese submarine force, along with its capacity to project nuclear

  17. Gamma-Ray Bursts Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Harrison, Thomas

    Lecture 18 Gamma-Ray Bursts #12;Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963 First Vela satellite pair launched and their predecessors, Vela 4, discovered the first gamma-ray bursts. The discovery was announced by Klebesadel, Strong, and Olson (ApJ, 182, 85) in 1973. #12;First Gamma-Ray Burst The Vela 5 satellites functioned from July, 1969

  18. Nonproliferation

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    en Under U.S.-Russia Partnership, Final Shipment of Fuel Converted From 20,000 Russian Nuclear Warheads Arrives in United States and Will Be Used for U.S. Electricity http:...

  19. Integration of Facility Modeling Capabilities for Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Humberto E. Garcia

    2012-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  20. INTEGRATION OF FACILITY MODELING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ANALYSIS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

    2011-07-18

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  1. NNSA Sites Host Head of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Sites Host Head of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing...

  2. Assessing the Institution of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Toomey, Christopher

    2010-05-14

    The nuclear nonproliferation regime is facing a crisis of effectiveness. During the Cold War, the regime was relatively effective in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and building an institutional structure that could, under certain conditions, ensure continued success. However, in the evolving global context, the traditional approaches are becoming less appropriate. Globalization has introduced new sets of stresses on the nonproliferation regime, such as the rise of non-state actors, broadening extensity and intensity of supply chains, and the multipolarization of power. This evolving global context demands an analytical and political flexibility in order to meet future threats. Current institutional capabilities established during the Cold War are now insufficient to meet the nonproliferation regime’s current and future needs. The research was based on information gathered through interviews and reviews of the relevant literature, and two dominant themes emerged. First, that human security should be integrated into the regime to account for the rise of non-state actors and networked violence. Second, confidence in the regime’s overall effectiveness has eroded at a time where verification-based confidence is becoming more essential. The research postulates that a critical analysis of the regime that fully utilizes institutional theory, with its focus on rules, normative structures, and procedures will be essential to adapting the regime to the current global context, building mechanisms for generating trust, creating better enforcement, and providing flexibility for the future.

  3. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  4. A parameter study to optimizing scintillator characteristics for increased sensitivity in nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security based applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shy, Daniel

    2014-08-01

    A parameter study to optimizing scintillator characteristics for increased sensitivity in nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security based applications

  5. Non-Proliferation Treaty

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 2012 Guidance/%2A en20120DepartmentNext

  6. Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Saunders, Emily C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rowberry, Ariana N. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fearey, Bryan L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-12

    In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

  7. Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pregenzer, Arian L.

    2014-05-09

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation.

  8. Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burr, Tom [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Gorensek, M. B. [Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL); Krebs, John [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL); Kress, Reid L [ORNL; Lamberti, Vincent [Y-12 National Security Complex; Schoenwald, David [ORNL; Ward, Richard C [ORNL

    2012-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclearnonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facilitymodeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facilitymodeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facilitymodelingcapabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferationanalysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facilitymodeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facilitymodelingcapabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  9. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the New

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the New Millennium G.P.Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. How can nuclear materials hurt me? 2 with unmatched speed. ­ food processing. ­ waste stream treatment. #12;Nuclear Weapons 101 Fissile materials

  10. NNSA Signs Memorandum with Kuwait to Increase Cooperation on Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2010-09-01

    On June 23, 2010, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation topics with the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC). NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino and KNNEC's Secretary General, Dr. Ahmad Bishara, signed the memorandum at a ceremony at U.S. Department of Energy headquarters in Washington.

  11. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Seminar - June 29, 2011 ­ p. #12;Nuclear Weapons 101 - Basic Weapons Designs Uranium, gun-type weapon Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. Testing The Test

  12. NNSA Labs host U.S. and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Non-Nuclear

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJessework usesof Energy Moving BasicSecurityAdministration Investment

  13. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Weapons Designs Uranium, gun-type weapon - High explo- sive fires highly-enriched uranium slug down Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. Testing

  14. Examination of the proposed conversion of the U.S. Navy nuclear fleet from highly enriched Uranium to low enriched Uranium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McCord, Cameron (Cameron Liam)

    2013-01-01

    .The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons creates a loophole that allows a non-nuclear-weapon country to avoid international safeguards governing fissile materials if it claims that the materials will be used ...

  15. Use of open source information and commercial satellite imagery for nuclear nonproliferation regime compliance verification by a community of academics 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Solodov, Alexander

    2009-06-02

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board...

  16. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Primer Prepared for the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, Laura S.

    2011-05-25

    To provide a brief overview of key arms control and nonproliferation arrangements for the layperson that may be relevant to the Commission's comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Primer would be published by the Commission and made publicly available, probably as an appendix to a larger Commission report.

  17. Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Leek, K. M.

    2006-07-31

    Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat of proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.

  18. Some thoughts on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Krikorian N.H.; Hawkins, H.T.

    1996-05-01

    This paper discusses factors controlling the dissemination of nuclear technologies and especially fissile materials.

  19. Sensitive Change Detection for Remote Monitoring of Nuclear Treaties

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    is examined in case studies involving underground nuclear testing and location of clandestine uranium mining studies involving the location of underground nuclear explosions and detection of uranium mining sites

  20. FINAL (PNNL-20432) Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Primer

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    .g., North Korea, Pakistan). Fissile materials, nuclear reactors, reprocessing and enrichment technology the export of "plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equipment especially designed

  1. Nuclear proliferation and testing: A tale of two treaties

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Corden, Pierce S.; Hafemeister, David

    2014-04-01

    Despite progress in reducing stockpiles after the end of the Cold War, the disturbing actions of some nations could spread nuclear weapon capabilities and enlarge existing arsenals.

  2. Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal ofNational Nuclear SecuritySecurityriver siteL,UnderNorthwest

  3. NA 20 - Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 2012 Guidance for HighNational Nuclear Security

  4. Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal ofNational Nuclear SecuritySecurityriver siteL,Under Budget

  5. Limited Test Ban Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration would likeUniverseIMPACTThousand CubicResourcelogo and-E C H2015Tray and| National Nuclear

  6. The Physics and Nuclear Nonproliferation Goals of WATCHMAN: A WAter CHerenkov Monitor for ANtineutrinos

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    M. Askins; M. Bergevin; A. Bernstein; S. Dazeley; S. T. Dye; T. Handler; A. Hatzikoutelis; D. Hellfeld; P. Jaffke; Y. Kamyshkov; B. J. Land; J. G. Learned; P. Marleau; C. Mauger; G. D. Orebi Gann; C. Roecker; S. D. Rountree; T. M. Shokair; M. B. Smy; R. Svoboda; M. Sweany; M. R. Vagins; K. A. van Bibber; R. B. Vogelaar; M. J. Wetstein; M. Yeh

    2015-02-04

    This article describes the physics and nonproliferation goals of WATCHMAN, the WAter Cherenkov Monitor for ANtineutrinos. The baseline WATCHMAN design is a kiloton scale gadolinium-doped (Gd) light water Cherenkov detector, placed 13 kilometers from a civil nuclear reactor in the United States. In its first deployment phase, WATCHMAN will be used to remotely detect a change in the operational status of the reactor, providing a first- ever demonstration of the potential of large Gd-doped water detectors for remote reactor monitoring for future international nuclear nonproliferation applications. During its first phase, the detector will provide a critical large-scale test of the ability to tag neutrons and thus distinguish low energy electron neutrinos and antineutrinos. This would make WATCHMAN the only detector capable of providing both direction and flavor identification of supernova neutrinos. It would also be the third largest supernova detector, and the largest underground in the western hemisphere. In a follow-on phase incorporating the IsoDAR neutrino beam, the detector would have world-class sensitivity to sterile neutrino signatures and to non-standard electroweak interactions (NSI). WATCHMAN will also be a major, U.S. based integration platform for a host of technologies relevant for the Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF) and other future large detectors. This white paper describes the WATCHMAN conceptual design,and presents the results of detailed simulations of sensitivity for the project's nonproliferation and physics goals. It also describes the advanced technologies to be used in WATCHMAN, including high quantum efficiency photomultipliers, Water-Based Liquid Scintillator (WbLS), picosecond light sensors such as the Large Area Picosecond Photo Detector (LAPPD), and advanced pattern recognition and particle identification methods.

  7. Nonproliferation impacts assessment for the management of the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-12-01

    On May 13, 1996, the US established a new, 10-year policy to accept and manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the US. The goal of this policy is to reduce civilian commerce in weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Two key disposition options under consideration for managing this fuel include conventional reprocessing and new treatment and packaging technologies. The Record of Decision specified that, while evaluating the reprocessing option, ``DOE will commission or conduct an independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.`` DOE`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation conducted this study consistent with the aforementioned Record of Decision. This report addresses the nonproliferation implications of the technologies under consideration for managing aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site. Because the same technology options are being considered for the foreign research reactor and the other aluminum-based spent nuclear fuels discussed in Section ES.1, this report addresses the nonproliferation implications of managing all the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel, not just the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The combination of the environmental impact information contained in the draft EIS, public comment in response to the draft EIS, and the nonproliferation information contained in this report will enable the Department to make a sound decision regarding how to manage all aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site.

  8. Nuclear Nonproliferation,

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Signal Processing System Identification Controls Embedded systems Aerospace Systems Robotics Structural Health Monitoring Thinking Telescopes Machine Learning Los Alamos Dynamics...

  9. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IV. Commercial potential

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-06-01

    This volume of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) report provides time and cost estimates for positioning new nuclear power systems for commercial deployment. The assessment also estimates the rates at which the new systems might penetrate the domestic market, assuming the continuing viability of the massive light-water reactor network that now exists worldwide. This assessment does not recommend specific, detailed program plans and budgets for individual systems; however, it is clear from this analysis that any of the systems investigated could be deployed if dictated by national interest.

  10. National Nuclear Security Administration Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report in Brief: October 2007 - May 2008

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.; Sandusky, Jessica A.

    2009-05-01

    This abbreviated Annual Report covers program activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) from October 2007 through May 2008--the timeframe between the last Annual Report (which covered activities through September 2007) and the next report (which will begin with June 2008 activities). In that timeframe, the NGFP continued building a solid foundation as the program began reaping the benefits of recently implemented changes. This report is organized by Fellowship class and the pertinent program activities for each, including: October 2007 Recruiting events and final applications (Class of 2008) Winter 2007 Selection and hiring (Class of 2008) Spring 2008 Career development roundtables (Class of 2007) Orientation planning (Class of 2008) Recruitment planning and university outreach (Class of 2009) May 2008 Closing ceremony (Class of 2007)

  11. A Nuclear Iran? Why this particular topic?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    New Hampshire, University of

    A Nuclear Iran? #12;#12;Why this particular topic? · State Department internship · Personal · NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) developed after WWII and Japan · IAEA (International Atomic of capacity #12;Iran's nuclear program · Initiated in 1959 · Strong ties to Russia, China and Pakistan · 2002

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation regime effectiveness : an integrated methodology for analyzing highly enriched uranium production scenarios at gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kwak, Taeshin (Taeshin S.)

    2010-01-01

    The dramatic change in the international security environment after the collapse of the bipolar system has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the success ...

  13. Tags and seals for controling nuclear materials, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies. Second quarter 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Staehle, G; Talaber, C; Stull, S; Moulthrop, P [eds.

    1993-12-31

    This issue of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies summarizes demonstrations and addresses related topics. The first article, ``Basic Nuclear Material Control and Accountability Concepts as Might be Applied to the Uranium from the US-Russian HEU Purchase,`` describes safeguards sybsystems necessary for effective nuclear material safeguards. It also presents a general discussion on HEU-to-low-enrichment uranium (LEU) commingling processes and suggests applicable key measurement points. The second article, ``A Framework for Evaluating Tamper-Indicating-Device Technologies (TIDs),`` describes their uses, proper selection, and evaluation. The final three articles discuss the tags and seals applications and general characteristics of several nuclear material containers: the Type 30B uranium hexafluoride container, the AT-400R container, and the DOT Specification 6M container for SNM. Finally, the Appendix displays short descriptions and illustrations of seven tags and seals, including: the E-cup and wire seal, the python seal, the secure loop inspectable tag/seal (SLITS), bolt-and-loop type electronic identification devices, and the shrink-wrap seal.

  14. Preliminary Results from an Investigation into Nanostructured Nuclear Radiation Detectors for Non-Proliferation Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    ,

    2012-10-01

    In recent years, the concept of embedding composite scintillators consisting of nanosized inorganic crystals in an organic matrix has been actively pursued. Nanocomposite detectors have the potential to meet many of the homeland security, non-proliferation, and border and cargo-screening needs of the nation and, by virtue of their superior nuclear identification capability over plastic, at roughly the same cost as plastic, have the potential to replace all plastic detectors. Nanocomposites clearly have the potential of being a gamma ray detection material that would be sensitive yet less expensive and easier to produce on a large scale than growing large, whole crystals of similar sensitivity. These detectors would have a broad energy range and a sufficient energy resolution to perform isotopic identification. The material can also be fabricated on an industrial scale, further reducing cost. This investigation focused on designing and fabricating prototype core/shell and quantum dot (QD) detectors. Fourteen core/shell and four QD detectors, all with the basic consistency of a mixture of nanoparticles in a polymer matrix with different densities of nanoparticles, were prepared. Nanoparticles with sizes <10 nm were fabricated, embedded in a polystyrene matrix, and the resultant scintillators’ radiation detector properties were characterized. This work also attempted to extend the gamma energy response on both low- and high-energy regimes by demonstrating the ability to detect low-energy and high-energy gamma rays. Preliminary results of this investigation are consistent with a significant response of these materials to nuclear radiation.

  15. National Center for Nuclear Security: The Nuclear Forensics Project (F2012)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Klingensmith, A. L.

    2012-03-21

    These presentation visuals introduce the National Center for Nuclear Security. Its chartered mission is to enhance the Nation’s verification and detection capabilities in support of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation through R&D activities at the NNSS. It has three focus areas: Treaty Verification Technologies, Nonproliferation Technologies, and Technical Nuclear Forensics. The objectives of nuclear forensics are to reduce uncertainty in the nuclear forensics process & improve the scientific defensibility of nuclear forensics conclusions when applied to nearsurface nuclear detonations. Research is in four key areas: Nuclear Physics, Debris collection and analysis, Prompt diagnostics, and Radiochemistry.

  16. Report of a workshop on nuclear forces and nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC October 28, 2010

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-12-08

    A workshop sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was held at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on October 28, 2010. The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The discussions reflected the importance of the NPR for defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats and providing guidance for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) programs and, for many but not all participants, highlighted its role in the successful outcome of the NPT RevCon. There was widespread support for the NPR and its role in developing the foundations for a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. However, some participants raised concerns about its implementation and its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

  17. Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online Chapter Title Seismic Monitoring of Nuclear Explosions

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Foulger, G. R.

    as nuclear weapons states by the 45Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Listing them in the 46order in whichMetadata of the chapter that will be visualized online Chapter Title Seismic Monitoring of Nuclear Page Number: 0 Date:20/9/10 Time:20:22:18 1 S 2 SEISMIC MONITORING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONSAu1 3 Paul G

  18. National Center for Nuclear Security - NCNS

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2015-01-09

    As the United States embarks on a new era of nuclear arms control, the tools for treaty verification must be accurate and reliable, and must work at stand-off distances. The National Center for Nuclear Security, or NCNS, at the Nevada National Security Site, is poised to become the proving ground for these technologies. The center is a unique test bed for non-proliferation and arms control treaty verification technologies. The NNSS is an ideal location for these kinds of activities because of its multiple environments; its cadre of experienced nuclear personnel, and the artifacts of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons explosions. The NCNS will provide future treaty negotiators with solid data on verification and inspection regimes and a realistic environment in which future treaty verification specialists can be trained. Work on warhead monitoring at the NCNS will also support future arms reduction treaties.

  19. National Center for Nuclear Security - NCNS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2014-11-12

    As the United States embarks on a new era of nuclear arms control, the tools for treaty verification must be accurate and reliable, and must work at stand-off distances. The National Center for Nuclear Security, or NCNS, at the Nevada National Security Site, is poised to become the proving ground for these technologies. The center is a unique test bed for non-proliferation and arms control treaty verification technologies. The NNSS is an ideal location for these kinds of activities because of its multiple environments; its cadre of experienced nuclear personnel, and the artifacts of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons explosions. The NCNS will provide future treaty negotiators with solid data on verification and inspection regimes and a realistic environment in which future treaty verification specialists can be trained. Work on warhead monitoring at the NCNS will also support future arms reduction treaties.

  20. Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Walter, Andrew

    2009-06-01

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

  1. Proceedings of the 21st Seismic Research Symposium: Technologies for Monitoring The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Warren, N. Jill

    1999-09-21

    These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 21st Seismic Research Symposium: Technologies for Monitoring The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held 21-24 September 1999 in Las Vegas, Nevada. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Department of Defense (DoD), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

  2. Robust Indicators of Nonproliferation Performance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cowan, Mara R.; Kurzrok, Andrew J.

    2014-02-13

    Understanding how the nuclear industry may benefit from self-regulation is closely linked with understanding how to report compliance activities for nonproliferation and export control objectives, as well as how to distinguish high and low compliance performance. Drawing on the corporate sustainability reporting model, nuclear and dual-use commodities industries can frame socially responsible self-regulatory activities to distinguish themselves as good nonproliferators.

  3. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kristensen, Hans M. [Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  4. Report of a workshop on nuclear power growth and nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC, April 21, 2010

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph F

    2010-01-01

    The workshop addressed the future of nuclear power and nonproliferation in light of global nuclear energy developments, changing US policy and growing concerns about nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The discussion reflected wide agreement on the need for nuclear power, the necessity of mitigating any proliferation and terrorism risks and support for international cooperation on solutions. There were considerable differences on the nature and extent of the risks of differing fuel cycle choices. There was some skepticism about the prospects for a global nuclear energy renaissance, but there was a recognition that nuclear power would expand somewhat in the decades ahead with some states expanding capacity dramatically (e.g., China) and at least a few new states developing nuclear power programs. It was also argued by some participants that under the right conditions, a genuine renaissance could occur some decades from now. The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power will depend on the ability of governments and industry to address these concerns, including the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen nonproliferation, nuclear materials accountability and nuclear security Several participants noted that the United States will not be able to continue to lead global nonproliferation efforts and to shape the growth of nuclear power as well as the global environment and energy debates without a robust US nuclear energy program. Some participants argued that fully integrating nuclear energy growth and nonproliferation, proliferation resistance and physical protection objectives was possible. The growing consensus on these objectives and the growing concern about the potential impact of further proliferation on the industry was one reason for optimism. The Blue Ribbon commission led by Scowcroft and Hamilton was seen as going far beyond the need to find an alternative to Yucca Mountain, and the preeminent forum in the next years to address the back end of the fuel cycle and other issues. Some argued that addressing these issues is the critical missing element, or the final piece of the puzzle to ensure the benefits of nuclear power and to promote nonproliferation. In this context, many argued that R&D on closed as well as open fuel cycle options in order to ensure a suite of long-term options was essential.

  5. Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: The non-proliferation experiment. First quarter 1994

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Staehle, G.; Stull, S.; Talaber, C.

    1994-05-01

    In this issue of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies we present the initial findings of the recent Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), conducted by the Department of Energy at the Nevada Test Site. Through an introduction and pictorial walk-through, Marv Denny and Jay Zucca of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory describe the overall experiment. This is followed by scientific and technical abstracts of the complex suite of experiments and analyses, which were presented at the Symposium on Non-Proliferation Experiment Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, April 19--21, 1994. Questions regarding the ongoing analysis and conclusions from the NPE should be directed to Leslie Casey in the Office of Research and Development within the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security of DOE. Her phone number is 202-586-2151.

  6. Dynamic Agent Based Modeling Using Bayesian Framework for Addressing Intelligence Adaptive Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Elmore, Royal A

    2014-10-03

    Realistically, no two nuclear proliferating or defensive entities are exactly identical; Agent Based Modeling (ABM) is a computational methodology addressing the uniqueness of those facilitating or preventing nuclear proliferation. The modular...

  7. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    a weapon. NYSSAPS - April 24, 2010 ­ p. #12;Nuclear Weapons 101 - Basic Weapons Designs A uranium, gun-type nuclear weapon - High explosive pushes highly-enriched uranium at high speed down the gun tube Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

  8. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    a weapon. Catholic University - April 6, 2011 ­ p. #12;Nuclear Weapons 101 - Basic Weapons Designs Uranium, gun-type weapon - High explo- sive fires highly-enriched uranium slug down the gun tube Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

  9. Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Designs Uranium, gun-type weapon - High explo- sive fires highly-enriched uranium slug down the gun tube Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban

  10. The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kroenig, Matthew

    2006-01-01

    T. 1993. The Nuclear Suppliers Group. Nonproliferationeds. 1985. The nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation:of the emerging nuclear suppliers. Lexington, MA: Lexington

  11. Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

    2012-03-06

    This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited. They are expected to anticipate and react quickly to prevent a potential threat while staying accountable to their public stakeholders, many of whom remain unaware of the very threats the organization is trying to address. When budgets are flush, it is easy to believe that money will solve all problems; but during times of economic hardship, managers must rely on creative and cost-effective management approaches to implement their missions. Fortunately, managers of nonproliferation organizations can draw on a wealth of research on organizational design and culture to help them identify the management strategies most appropriate for them. Such research can help nonproliferation managers think about their own organizational structures and cultures and adapt accepted management principles to their unique organizational mission. This analytical process is not straight forward, as some managers may find themselves taking risks that others might not take, such as making ostensibly risky investments for the common good, or supporting creative thinking to help mission accomplishment. Some management principles that are relatively straightforward for other organizations may be difficult to envision and implement in a nonproliferation organization. Therefore, the goal of this study is to help nonproliferation managers identify management principles that can be implemented in a nonproliferation organization and, in the process, help maximize the value of the organization's products and effectiveness of its mission.

  12. Report of the Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE: Alternative FuelsofProgram: Report Appendices |ProjectKnowRedoxRelatedFraud to theNuclear

  13. Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hayes, Timothy; Nelson, Roger

    2012-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an over-pack container, similar to the pipe component, called the criticality control over-pack, which will significantly enhance the efficiency of disposal. Hundreds of shipments of transuranic SNM, suitably packaged to meet WIPP waste acceptance criteria and with safeguards terminated have been successfully emplaced at WIPP (primarily from the Rocky Flats site clean-up) since WIPP opened. DOE expects that thousands more may eventually result from SNM consolidation efforts throughout the weapons complex. (authors)

  14. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2012-08-20

    Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  15. Conservatives and the Law of the Sea Time The treaty has been improved in ways Reagan wanted and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Huang, Wei

    submerged transit through international straits for our nuclear submarines. The treaty also extends U

  16. A Digest of Nonproliferation Literature.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duggan, Ruth A.

    2006-04-01

    In preparation for the 2005 US/Russian Weapons Laboratories Directors Meeting, the six laboratories participating in the meeting endeavored to develop a strategy for nonproliferation technology research and development. A literature review was conducted to identify possible areas of technical collaboration and technology opportunities associated with improving nonproliferation associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The issue of multinationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also researched. This digest is the compilation of one-page summaries used by management of the three US nuclear weapons laboratories in preparation for strategy development. Where possible, the Web site address of the complete paper is referenced.3 AcknowledgementsThe author wishes to thank Jessica Ruyle, Nancy Orlando-Gay, and Barbara Dry for their research assistance and contributions.4

  17. The nuclear materials control technology briefing book

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hartwell, J.K.; Fernandez, S.J.

    1992-03-01

    As national and international interests in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, intensify, it becomes ever more important that contributors be aware of the technologies available for the measurement and control of the nuclear materials important to nuclear weapons development. This briefing book presents concise, nontechnical summaries of various special nuclear material (SNM) and tritium production monitoring technologies applicable to the control of nuclear materials and their production. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates a multinational, on-site-inspector-based safeguards program in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), many (but not all) of the technologies reported in this document are in routine use or under development for IAEA safeguards.

  18. Preliminary results of calculations for heavy-water nuclear-power-plant reactors employing {sup 235}U, {sup 233}U, and {sup 232}Th as a fuel and meeting requirements of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ioffe, B. L.; Kochurov, B. P. [Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics (Russian Federation)

    2012-02-15

    A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of {sup 235}U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving {sup 233}U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.

  19. Bibliography of Environmental Treaties

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gieg, Lisa

    ......................................................................................... 40 Treaties which Directly Impede Oil & Gas Production............................................................................................................................ 82 Treaties which May Impact Oil & Gas Production and the stakeholders involved, with a lens on the way these impact both the environment and oil and gas production

  20. Arms control and nonproliferation technologies. Fourth quarter 1992

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Staehle, G.; Talaber, C.; Stull, S.

    1992-12-31

    This report includes information concerning: the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation; the nuclear inspections in Iraq, lessons for verification; detection technologies needed for each step of nuclear weapon development; nuclear proliferation problems; strengthening the nuclear reactor fuel cycle against proliferation; monitoring using unattended remote nondestructive assay; seismic monitoring in a proliferation environment; forensic science center, remote infrared spectrometry for nonproliferation applications; and acoustic instrument for identifying chemical munitions.

  1. A new type of Neutrino Detector for Sterile Neutrino Search at Nuclear Reactors and Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    C. Lane; S. M. Usman; J. Blackmon; C. Rasco; H. P. Mumm; D. Markoff; G. R. Jocher; R. Dorrill; M. Duvall; J. G. Learned; V. Li; J. Maricic; S. Matsuno; R. Milincic; S. Negrashov; M. Sakai; M. Rosen; G. Varner; P. Huber; M. L. Pitt; S. D. Rountree; R. B. Vogelaar; T. Wright; Z. Yokley

    2015-01-27

    We describe a new detector, called NuLat, to study electron anti-neutrinos a few meters from a nuclear reactor, and search for anomalous neutrino oscillations. Such oscillations could be caused by sterile neutrinos, and might explain the "Reactor Antineutrino Anomaly". NuLat, is made possible by a natural synergy between the miniTimeCube and mini-LENS programs described in this paper. It features a "Raghavan Optical Lattice" (ROL) consisting of 3375 boron or $^6$Li loaded plastic scintillator cubical cells 6.3\\,cm (2.500") on a side. Cell boundaries have a 0.127\\,mm (0.005") air gap, resulting in total internal reflection guiding most of the light down the 3 cardinal directions. The ROL detector technology for NuLat gives excellent spatial and energy resolution and allows for in-depth event topology studies. These features allow us to discern inverse beta decay (IBD) signals and the putative oscillation pattern, even in the presence of other backgrounds. We discuss here test venues, efficiency, sensitivity and project status.

  2. A new type of Neutrino Detector for Sterile Neutrino Search at Nuclear Reactors and Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lane, C; Blackmon, J; Rasco, C; Mumm, H P; Markoff, D; Jocher, G R; Dorrill, R; Duvall, M; Learned, J G; Li, V; Maricic, J; Matsuno, S; Milincic, R; Negrashov, S; Sakai, M; Rosen, M; Varner, G; Huber, P; Pitt, M L; Rountree, S D; Vogelaar, R B; Wright, T; Yokley, Z

    2015-01-01

    We describe a new detector, called NuLat, to study electron anti-neutrinos a few meters from a nuclear reactor, and search for anomalous neutrino oscillations. Such oscillations could be caused by sterile neutrinos, and might explain the "Reactor Antineutrino Anomaly". NuLat, is made possible by a natural synergy between the miniTimeCube and mini-LENS programs described in this paper. It features a "Raghavan Optical Lattice" (ROL) consisting of 3375 boron or $^6$Li loaded plastic scintillator cubical cells 6.3\\,cm (2.500") on a side. Cell boundaries have a 0.127\\,mm (0.005") air gap, resulting in total internal reflection guiding most of the light down the 3 cardinal directions. The ROL detector technology for NuLat gives excellent spatial and energy resolution and allows for in-depth event topology studies. These features allow us to discern inverse beta decay (IBD) signals and the putative oscillation pattern, even in the presence of other backgrounds. We discuss here test venues, efficiency, sensitivity an...

  3. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  4. Before the 20th century there were few seismometers. So Earth's dynamic geophysical processes were poorly un-

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    of seismic sources are relevant to monitoring for violations of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty

  5. Proceedings of the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nichols, James W., LTC

    2000-09-15

    These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), held 13-15 September 2000 in New Orleans, Louisiana. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Department of Defense (DoD), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

  6. Verifying the INF and START treaties

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ifft, Edward [School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    The INF and START Treaties form the basis for constraints on nuclear weapons. Their verification provisions are one of the great success stories of modern arms control and will be an important part of the foundation upon which the verification regime for further constraints on nuclear weapons will be constructed.

  7. Development of Superconducting High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers for Nuclear Safeguards

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dreyer, Jonathan

    2012-01-01

    and Allison Macfarlane. Nuclear proliferation: Time to burySupport to Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation. ESARDAfor nuclear attribution and non-proliferation applications.

  8. Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

    2008-09-01

    The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

  9. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IX. Reactor and fuel cycle description

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-06-01

    The Nonproliferation Alterntive Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) has characterized and assessed various reactor/fuel-cycle systems. Volume IX provides, in summary form, the technical descriptions of the reactor/fuel-cycle systems studied. This includes the status of the system technology, as well as a discussion of the safety, environmental, and licensing needs from a technical perspective. This information was then used in developing the research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) program, including its cost and time frame, to advance the existing technology to the level needed for commercial use. Wherever possible, the cost data are given as ranges to reflect the uncertainties in the estimates.

  10. Nuclear Regulatory legislation: 103d Congress. Volume 2, No. 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-08-01

    This document is a compilation of nuclear regulatory legislation and other relevant material through the 103d Congress, 2d Session. This compilation has been prepared for use as a resource document, which the NRC intends to update at the end of every Congress. The contents of NUREG-0980 include the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and NRC Authorization and Appropriations Acts. Other materials included are statutes and treaties on export licensing, nuclear non-proliferation, and environmental protection.

  11. Nuclear regulatory legislation, 102d Congress. Volume 2, No. 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-10-01

    This document is a compilation of nuclear regulatory legislation and other relevant material through the 102d Congress, 2d Session. This compilation has been prepared for use as a resource document, which the NRC intends to update at the end of every Congress. The contents of NUREG-0980 include The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and NRC Authorization and Appropriations Acts. Other materials included are statutes and treaties on export licensing, nuclear non-proliferation, and environmental protection.

  12. Nuclear regulatory legislation: 102d Congress. Volume 1, No. 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-10-01

    This document is a compilation of nuclear regulatory legislation and other relevant material through the 102d Congress, 2d Session. This compilation has been prepared for use as a resource document, which the NRC intends to update at the end of every Congress. The contents of NUREG-0980 include: The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and NRC Authorization and Appropriations Acts. Other materials included are statutes and treaties on export licensing, nuclear non-proliferation, and environmental protection.

  13. Nuclear Regulatory legislation: 103d Congress. Volume 1, No. 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-08-01

    This document is a compilation of nuclear regulatory legislation and other relevant material through the 103d Congress, 2d Session. This compilation has been prepared for use as a resource document, which the NRC intends to update at the end of every Congress. The contents of NUREG-0980 include the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and NRC Authorization and Appropriations Acts. Other materials included are statutes and treaties on export licensing, nuclear non-proliferation, and environmental protection.

  14. Columbia River Treaty

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    to usually one or more every year since the mid-1990s. The Libby Coordination Agreement (LCA) is another agreement under the Treaty that often has resulted in operations that help...

  15. The Case Against Consent in International Law

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Guzman, Andrew T

    2012-01-01

    the   problem   of   nuclear   proliferation.    change   to   nuclear   proliferation   to   terrorism  The   Nuclear  Non-­?Proliferation  Treaty  (NPT)  came  

  16. Reservations to human rights treaties 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McCall-Smith, Kasey Lowe

    2012-06-26

    This thesis examines the default application of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reservation rules to reservations to human rights treaties. The contemporary practice of formulating reservations allows ...

  17. A systems framework for nonproliferation research and development

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Olinger, C.T.; Voss, S.S.

    1995-08-01

    International safeguards and nonproliferation regimes are currently in a state of rapid flux. Changes in the scope of nonproliferation activities over the next few years will likely bring an overall larger fraction of the world`s nuclear material under some form of international inspection. Without a commensurate increase in resources, the unintended net effect of this could conceivably reduce overall international safeguards effectiveness. One possible solution is to increase available fiscal resources, but this may be unrealistic considering the current political climate. Alternatively, technological advances and hard political decisions can help to increase the effectiveness of nonproliferation resources. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the many nonproliferation drivers to determine how to be proactive in a changing political environment.

  18. Beyond Compliance: Integrating Nonproliferation into Corporate Sustainability

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hund, Gretchen; Kurzrok, Andrew J.

    2013-06-01

    This paper investigates nonproliferation as a potential corporate sustainability value. It reviews the history of corporate sustainability, builds the case for nonproliferation as a sustainability value, and develops recommendations for the integration of nonproliferation into the frameworks of sustainability.

  19. Microsoft PowerPoint - Australian Nuclear Cooperation Agreements...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Dr Vanessa Robertson, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 2 Director General...

  20. Nuclear proliferation: Lessons learned from the Iraqi case. Master's thesis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dixon, T.A.

    1992-12-01

    The nuclear weapons inspection regime implemented in Iraq following the United Nations coalition victory in Desert Storm is the most intrusive in history. Important conclusions about the current non-proliferation regime can therefore be determined from a study of Iraq's progress. This thesis examines Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The supply side of the equation is also studied, with a concentration upon the contributions of NATO nations. The strategic culture of Iraq is discussed, in an effort to discover why Iraq sought nuclear weapons. Finally, policy prescriptions are advanced. The current non-proliferation regime needs to be improved if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be halted, or even slowed. The most promising way to improve this regime is to involve the U.N. Special Commission and the U.N. Security Council in the management of the problem of nuclear proliferation.... Iraq, Strategic culture, Non-Proliferation treaty, International atomic energy agency, Nuclear weapons, Middle east security, Nuclear suppliers group, United Nations.

  1. Nuclear Energy Readiness Indicator Index (NERI): A benchmarking tool for assessing nuclear capacity in developing countries

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Saum-Manning,L.

    2008-07-13

    Declining natural resources, rising oil prices, looming climate change and the introduction of nuclear energy partnerships, such as GNEP, have reinvigorated global interest in nuclear energy. The convergence of such issues has prompted countries to move ahead quickly to deal with the challenges that lie ahead. However, developing countries, in particular, often lack the domestic infrastructure and public support needed to implement a nuclear energy program in a safe, secure, and nonproliferation-conscious environment. How might countries become ready for nuclear energy? What is needed is a framework for assessing a country's readiness for nuclear energy. This paper suggests that a Nuclear Energy Readiness Indicator (NERI) Index might serve as a meaningful basis for assessing a country's status in terms of progress toward nuclear energy utilization under appropriate conditions. The NERI Index is a benchmarking tool that measures a country's level of 'readiness' for nonproliferation-conscious nuclear energy development. NERI first identifies 8 key indicators that have been recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as key nonproliferation and security milestones to achieve prior to establishing a nuclear energy program. It then measures a country's progress in each of these areas on a 1-5 point scale. In doing so NERI illuminates gaps or underdeveloped areas in a country's nuclear infrastructure with a view to enable stakeholders to prioritize the allocation of resources toward programs and policies supporting international nonproliferation goals through responsible nuclear energy development. On a preliminary basis, the indicators selected include: (1) demonstrated need; (2) expressed political support; (3) participation in nonproliferation and nuclear security treaties, international terrorism conventions, and export and border control arrangements; (4) national nuclear-related legal and regulatory mechanisms; (5) nuclear infrastructure; (6) the utilization of IAEA technical assistance; (7) participation in regional arrangements; and (8) public support for nuclear power. In this paper, the Index aggregates the indicators and evaluates and compares the level of readiness in seven countries that have recently expressed various degrees of interest in establishing a nuclear energy program. The NERI Index could be a valuable tool to be utilized by: (1) country officials who are considering nuclear power; (2) the international community, desiring reassurance of a country's capacity for the peaceful, safe, and secure use of nuclear energy; (3) foreign governments/NGO's, seeking to prioritize and direct resources toward developing countries; and (4) private stakeholders interested in nuclear infrastructure investment opportunities.

  2. Argentina`s nuclear industry

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1988-02-01

    Argentina occupies a somewhat unusual position among the world`s nuclear nations, in that, while possessing a rather diverse nuclear industry, it has managed to remain largely outside the system of international controls, and is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Argentina currently has two operating reactors, Atucha Unit 1 (335-MWe PHWR) and Embalse (600-MWe CANDU), with another under unit, Atucha Unit 2 (698-MWe PHWR) under construction. Commercial nuclear development is primarily under the control of the Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA), which also manages a modest uranium production industry. Fuel cycle facilities, notably an enrichment plant at Pilcaniyeu and a pilot reprocessing plant at Ezeiza, are under development.

  3. Security Science & Technology | Nuclear Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Security Treaty Verification Nuclear Systems Modeling, Simulation & Validation Nuclear Systems Technology Reactor Technology Nuclear Science Home | Science & Discovery |...

  4. Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious RankADVANCED MANUFACTURINGEnergy Bills and ReduceNovemberDOE's PrioritiesOctober 2013 Pradeep/201215,

  5. Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal Gas &SCE-SessionsSouthReport for the t-) S/,,5 'a C O09 ThisApply forOurcontentNo

  6. Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal of HonorPoster Session |SecurityNSDDfor 5th NEWS MEDIAAbout

  7. Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 2012 Guidance/%2A0348Diversity in theAPAC w/HR8

  8. Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservation of Fe(II) by Carbon-RichProtonAbout UsRegionalScientificRenewables Sign

  9. The Division System in Crisis: Essays on Contemporary Korea

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nak-chung, Paik

    2011-01-01

    the international nuclear non proliferation regime. 1) TheTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) andTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to

  10. Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Baliga, Sandeep; Sjostrom, Tomas

    2006-01-01

    Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, known asand Proliferation,” Testimony Before Subcommittee on Prevention of Biological and Nuclear

  11. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Satkowiak, Lawrence

    2014-05-09

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

  12. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    Impact of American Nuclear Proliferation Policy, 1970-1980:Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem: the firstAssistance and Nuclear Proliferation: Harvard University.

  13. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    in a variety of nuclear technology-related projects, fromto medical applications of nuclear technology. A military orto terminate any nuclear technology transfers to the ROK.

  14. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    Weapons Reductions and Nuclear Security Cooperation. Sarov,of Foreign Nuclear Installations: National Security Archive.Past: Nuclear Proliferation and American Security Policy.

  15. Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy: Neutronic Design Aspects of a Hybrid Fusion-Fission Nuclear Energy System

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kramer, Kevin James

    2010-01-01

    potentially mitigates nuclear proliferation concerns andto potentially reducing nuclear proliferation by eliminatingchallenges surrounding nuclear non-proliferation are contin-

  16. A Mass Spectrometry Study of Isotope Separation in the Laser Plume

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Suen, Timothy Wu

    2012-01-01

    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”,for Nuclear Attribution and Non-Proliferation Applications”,of nuclear safeguards, as detailed in the Non-Proliferation

  17. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program, Annual Report, Class of 2012

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2013-09-23

    This 32-pp annual report/brochure describes the accomplishments of the Class of 2012 of the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (the last class of this program), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The time period covers Sept 2011 through June 2013.

  18. Former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow Served at U.S. Mission

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2014-10-01

    Because of her training and professional experiences, Rosalyn Leitch, a Security Specialist at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow with NIS (2012-2013) was able to transition into temporary assignment as UNVIE Acting Nuclear Security Attaché from November 2013 through February 2014.

  19. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    2002. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. 2nd2003. North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S.Medalia, Jonathan. 1998. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test

  20. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    2002. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. 2nd2003. North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S.Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, edited by C. F.

  1. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    and then the expansion of the nuclear industry amongof the dramatic expansion of the nuclear industry and couldCrisis. The 1970s expansion of the nuclear industry and the

  2. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    George H. 1973. The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation.Managing Nuclear Proliferation: The Politics of Limitedpolitics and even more so for security issues such as the proliferation of nuclear,

  3. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    The Advantages of Being a Nuclear Power: Harvard University.Agency. IAEA. 2006. Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. Inthe first commercial nuclear power reactors came on-line

  4. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    and Tomoko Yasaka. 2007. Iraq Profile: Nuclear Overview [webe_research/profiles/Iraq/Nuclear/index.html. Findlay,Intelligence, verification and Iraq's WMDs. In Verification

  5. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    centrifuge enrichment technology puts nuclear weapons prerequisites within reach of technologically advanced

  6. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    nuclear weapons: weapons with a “unique” contribution to a situation because of either their high energy (

  7. Of carrots and sticks or air power as a nonproliferation tool

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wolf, F.R.

    1994-07-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons has become one of the principal threats to international peace and security. Postwar revelations from Iraq demonstrate how close a determined nation can come to covertly developing nuclear weapons without detection. In the past two years the issue of nonproliferation has increased in importance and the regime is becoming more intrusive. On the other hand, a number of nations hostile to the international order are attempting to develop or otherwise obtain nuclear weapons These states include North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. This paper argues that the use or threat of force must be incorporated into the nonproliferation regime. When properly integrated into nonproliferation strategy, force offers positive effects in terms of deterrence, compellence, and defense. Thus, the paper calls for the institutionalization of force options into the nonproliferation tool kit, ideally as part of chapter 7 enforcement actions under the authority of the UN Security Council.

  8. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    nuclear reactor and then later chemically extract plutonium from the spent fuel. For years after the basic theory

  9. Security Science & Technology | Nuclear Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Nuclear Security Science & Technology Border Security Comprehensive Vulnerability and Threat Analysis Consequence Management, Safeguards, and Non-Proliferation Tools Export...

  10. The Nonproliferation Review

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    RAJEN,GAURAV; BIRINGER,KENT L.

    2000-07-28

    The aim of this paper is to understand the numerous nuclear-related agreements that involve India and Pakistan, and in so doing identify starting points for future confidence-creating and confidence-building projects. Existing nuclear-related agreements provide a framework under which various projects can be proposed that foster greater nuclear transparency and cooperation in South Asia. The basic assumptions and arguments underlying this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) Increased nuclear transparency between India and Pakistan is a worthwhile objective, as it will lead to the irreversibility of extant nuclear agreements, the prospects of future agreements; and the balance of opacity and transparency required for stability in times of crises; (2) Given the current state of Indian and Pakistani relations, incremental progress in increased nuclear transparency is the most likely future outcome; and (3) Incremental progress can be achieved by enhancing the information exchange required by existing nuclear-related agreements.

  11. Department of Energy/ National Nuclear Security Administration FY 2007 Congressional Budget

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Department of Energy/ National Nuclear Security Administration FY 2007 Congressional Budget Volume..................................................................................................................25 Weapons Activities..............................................................................................................................51 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

  12. Office of the Assistant General Counsel for Civilian Nuclear...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    of Nuclear Materials and Non-HLW Nuclear Fuel Cycle Energy Research and Development Non-Proliferation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory and Licensing Matters Nuclear...

  13. Nuclear Naval Propulsion: A Feasible Proliferation Pathway?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Swift, Alicia L.

    2014-01-31

    There is no better time than now to close the loophole in Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that excludes military uses of fissile material from nuclear safeguards. Several countries have declared their intention to pursue and develop naval reactor technology, including Argentina, Brazil, Iran, and Pakistan, while other countries such as China, India, Russia, and the United States are expanding their capabilities. With only a minority of countries using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in their naval reactors, it is possible that a state could produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the guise of a nuclear navy while actually stockpiling the material for a nuclear weapon program. This paper examines the likelihood that non-nuclear weapon states exploit the loophole to break out from the NPT and also the regional ramifications of deterrence and regional stability of expanding naval forces. Possible solutions to close the loophole are discussed, including expanding the scope of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, employing LEU fuel instead of HEU fuel in naval reactors, amending the NPT, creating an export control regime for naval nuclear reactors, and forming individual naval reactor safeguards agreements.

  14. North Korea: The next nuclear nightmare

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Spector, L.S.; Smith, J.R.

    1991-03-01

    The crisis in the Persian Gulf has reawakened concerns over the spread of nuclear arms. Even before its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq's history of aggression and support for international terrorism triggered fears in Washington that its acquisition of nuclear weapons might damage international stability and US interests far more than the emergence of India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa as de facto nuclear powers. Thus, when the Gulf War began on January 16, Iraq's nuclear sites were among the first attacked by allied air strikes. Unfortunately, Iraq has not been the only hostile proliferator looming on the horizon. North Korea, which has been no less dedicated than Iraq to the use of violence to advance its expansionist goals, has also tenaciously pursued a nuclear-weapons capability. Moreover, the North Korean program is considerably closer to bearing fruit than the Iraqi effort. And although North Korea, like Iraq, has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, unlike Iraq it has refused to conclude the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency that the treaty requires.

  15. Computational Nuclear Forensics Analysis of Weapons-grade Plutonium Separated from Fuel Irradiated in a Thermal Reactor 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Coles, Taylor Marie

    2014-04-27

    of bundle 16.4 kg Weight of U per bundle 13.4 kg Active Core Length 500 cm II.C. Monte Carlo N-Particle Code For the thesis work presented here, a code called Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) was used. The manual describes MCNP as "a general... Working Group LWR- Light Water Reactor MCNP- Monte Carlo Neutral Particle MOX- Mixed Oxide NPT- Non-Proliferation Treaty NSG- Nuclear Suppliers Group ORNL- Oak Ridge National Laboratory PHWR- Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor PUREX- Plutonium Uranium...

  16. Trace Fission Product Ratios for Nuclear Forensics Attribution of Weapons-Grade Plutonium from Fast Breeder Reactor Blankets 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Osborn, Jeremy

    2014-08-13

    for the 500-MWe Indian PFBR was obtained from Chirayath et al.22 and essential parameters are listed in Table II. There is an active core, one meter in height, which consists of an inner core and outer core of MOX “driver” fuel. The MOX fuel of the active...-Particle MOX – Mixed Oxide MWd/kg – Megawatt-day per kilogram of heavy metal MWe – Megawatt electric NPT – Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ORNL – Oak Ridge National Laboratory PFBR – Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor PHWR...

  17. Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 2012 Guidance/%2A0348 Federal

  18. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    itself by selling fuel reprocessing technologies that the USnot exports of nuclear reprocessing or enrichment plants,few states and plutonium reprocessing was feasible only if a

  19. Limited Test Ban Treaty

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Satellite Carrying NNSA-provided Nuclear Detonation Detection Sensors http:www.nnsa.energy.govmediaroompressreleasesafsatellite

  20. SNIF: A Futuristic Neutrino Probe for Undeclared Nuclear Fission Reactors

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lasserre, Thierry; Mention, Guillaume; Reboulleau, Romain; Cribier, Michel; Letourneau, Alain; Lhuillier, David

    2010-01-01

    Today reactor neutrino experiments are at the cutting edge of fundamental research in particle physics. Understanding the neutrino is far from complete, but thanks to the impressive progress in this field over the last 15 years, a few research groups are seriously considering that neutrinos could be useful for society. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works with its Member States to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. In a context of international tension and nuclear renaissance, neutrino detectors could help IAEA to enforce the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this article we discuss a futuristic neutrino application to detect and localize an undeclared nuclear reactor from across borders. The SNIF (Secret Neutrino Interactions Finder) concept proposes to use a few hundred thousand tons neutrino detectors to unveil clandestine fission reactors. Beyond previous studies we provide estimates of all known background sources as a function of the detecto...

  1. The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kroenig, Matthew

    2006-01-01

    Without the bomb: The politics of nuclear nonproliferation.impact of nuclear weapons on international politics. Statesnuclear/missile ties and balance of power politics. The

  2. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    nuclear expertise in the Manhattan Project in just this way.Fearon 1995). As in the Manhattan Project example above, theits participation in the Manhattan Project. There remained a

  3. The Consent Problem in International Law

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Guzman, Andrew

    2011-01-01

    problem   of   nuclear   proliferation.     The   Nuclear  change   to   nuclear  proliferation  to  terrorism  to  member  of  the  Nuclear  Non-­?Proliferation  Treaty  in  

  4. Nuclear regulatory legislation, 104th Congress. Volume 2, No. 4

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-12-01

    This document is the second of two volumes compiling statutes and material pertaining to nuclear regulatory legislation through the 104th Congress, 2nd Session. It is intended for use as a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) internal resource document. Legislative information reproduced in this document includes portions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, various acts pertaining to low-level radioactive waste, the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, the West Valley Demonstration Project Act, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Licensing Statutes, and selected treaties, agreements, and executive orders. Other information provided pertains to Commissioner tenure, NRC appropriations, the Chief Financial Officers Act, information technology management reform, and Federal civil penalties.

  5. HOW MIGHT INDUSTRY GOVERNANCE BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE NONPROLIFERATION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

    2009-10-06

    Broadening industry governance to support nonproliferation could provide significant new leverage in preventing the spread/diversion of nuclear, radiological, or dual-use material or technology that could be used in making a nuclear or radiological weapon. Industry is defined broadly to include 1) the nuclear industry, 2) dual-use industries, and 3) radioactive source manufacturers and selected radioactive source-user industries worldwide. This paper describes how industry can be an important first line of defense in detecting and thwarting proliferation, such as an illicit trade network or an insider theft case, by complementing and strengthening existing governmental efforts. For example, the dual-use industry can play a critical role by providing export, import, or security control information that would allow a government or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to integrate this information with safeguards, export, import, and physical protection information it has to create a more complete picture of the potential for proliferation. Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies worked together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide self-regulation program. Performance measures could be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. Nonproliferation is the overarching driver that industry needs to consider in adopting and implementing a self-regulation approach. A few foreign companies have begun such an approach to date; it is believed that, ultimately, broad engagement of global industry leaders in self regulation is needed to result in the greatest nonproliferation benefit.

  6. Nuclear Excitation by Electronic Transition of U-235

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chodash, Perry Adam

    2015-01-01

    2.3 Nuclear Excitation by Electronic Transition Theory 2.41.2 Nuclear Nonproliferation . . . . . .M. B. Trzhaskovskaya, “Nuclear internal conversion between

  7. Limited Test Ban Treaty

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia NationalSecurityNuclearH-canyon |I 14/%2A1/%2A

  8. Nuclear Symbiosis - A Means to Achieve Sustainable Nuclear Growth while Limiting the Spread of Sensititive Nuclear Technology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    David Shropshire

    2009-09-01

    Global growth of nuclear energy in the 21st century is creating new challenges to limit the spread of nuclear technology without hindering adoption in countries now considering nuclear power. Independent nuclear states desire autonomy over energy choices and seek energy independence. However, this independence comes with high costs for development of new indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. Nuclear supplier states and expert groups have proposed fuel supply assurance mechanisms such as fuel take-back services, international enrichment services and fuel banks in exchange for recipient state concessions on the development of sensitive technologies. Nuclear states are slow to accept any concessions to their rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To date, decisions not to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities have been driven primarily by economics. However, additional incentives may be required to offset a nuclear state’s perceived loss of energy independence. This paper proposes alternative economic development incentives that could help countries decide to forgo development of sensitive nuclear technologies. The incentives are created through a nuclear-centered industrial complex with “symbiotic” links to indigenous economic opportunities. This paper also describes a practical tool called the “Nuclear Materials Exchange” for identifying these opportunities.

  9. Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hippel, Frank N. von [Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 221 Nassau St., 2nd floor, Princeton, NJ 08542 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material - in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium - for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international - most likely International Atomic Energy Agency - monitoring. Many non-weapon states argue that the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. This paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.

  10. Nonproliferation

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 2012 Guidance/%2A en20120DepartmentNext/%2A en

  11. Development of Superconducting High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers for Nuclear Safeguards

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dreyer, Jonathan

    2012-01-01

    of smuggling. Today, nuclear security is significantly morecritical importance of nuclear security, stating that thereJ. Doyle. Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation:

  12. Nuclear Energy Governance and the Politics of Social Justice: Technology, Public Goods, and Redistribution in Russia and France

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Grigoriadis, Theocharis N

    2009-01-01

    power generation and nonproliferation purposes, state responsibility may be the only sufficient regulatory clause to confine nuclear waste disposal risks

  13. A Critical Step Toward Sustainable Nuclear Fuel Disposal | Department...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    that the United States remains at the forefront of nuclear safety and security, non-proliferation, and nuclear energy technology we must develop an effective strategy and...

  14. National Nuclear Science Week Day 4: NNSA Highlights Science...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    4: NNSA Highlights Science of Nuclear Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile...

  15. Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mian, Zia

    2014-05-09

    India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also for nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.

  16. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-12-19

    NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.

  17. Nonproliferation, Nuclear Security, and the Insider Threat

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Balatsky, Galya I. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Duggan, Ruth [SNL

    2012-07-12

    Insider threat concept is evolving and getting more attention: (1) Domestically, internationally and in foreign countries, (2) At the government, academia, and industry levels, and (3) Public awareness and concerns are also growing. Negligence can be an insider's action. Technology advancements provide more opportunities, new tools for the insider. Our understanding of the insider is shaped by our cultural, social and ethnic perceptions and traditions. They also can limit our recognition of the issues and response actions.

  18. non-proliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    This Site Budget IG Web Policy Privacy No Fear Act Accessibility FOIA Sitemap Federal Government The White House DOE.gov USA.gov Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA...

  19. Nonproliferation Graduate Program | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    about the program and application information and deadlines, please visit the NGP web site off site link or call Program Manager Phyllis B. Byrd at (202) 586-2061 or e-mail...

  20. Nonproliferation issues in the nuclear energy future

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Jones, Christopher Michael, 1976-

    2003-01-01

    The continuing increases in annual greenhouse gas emissions, in the absence of stringent mitigation measures, will produce a doubling of pre-industrial atmospheric concentrations in the second half of this century and a ...

  1. Nuclear Nonproliferation | Y-12 National Security Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration wouldMass map shinesSolarNewsusceptometer under pressureNavy Turns 50 | National

  2. Nonproliferation Graduate Program | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) AugustA.MOXAdministrationOfficialsA

  3. Contact Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) AugustA. Geographic Available for

  4. non-proliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust,Field-effectWorkingLosThe 26th AnnualHistoryMIII:National1-2130 1 AN APPROACH6,nnssnoc

  5. Presentation: DOE Nuclear Nonproliferation | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirley Ann JacksonDepartment ofOffice|inWest KentuckyRestoration Program wasdesignSandyOneCeilingAA

  6. Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirley Ann JacksonDepartment of Energy FacilitiesCleantechthe openControllingDr.FreezersPresident

  7. Nonproliferation and Arms Control | National Nuclear Security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJessework usesofPublications64Newsroom

  8. Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE: Alternative Fuels Data CenterFinancialInvesting inServices » NEPANews » Newsletter

  9. Treaties and Agreements | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 20123/%2A en SignatureThanksgivingToys for

  10. Arms Reduction Treaties | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) AugustA. Geographic Available for sale to2

  11. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia National 1 PAGE 1 OF2Guidance to the1

  12. treaty verification | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust,Field-effectWorkingLosThe 26thI D- 6 0 4 2 r m m mDiurnalCarbonUC.47Weak Water 4

  13. Export Controls and International Safeguards: Strengthening Nonproliferation through Interdisciplinary Integration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peterson, Danielle J.; Goorevich, Richard; Hooper, Rich; Scheinman, Lawrence; Tape, James W.

    2008-11-03

    International safeguards and export controls are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of international safeguards and export controls rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.

  14. The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kroenig, Matthew

    2006-01-01

    1982. Yugoslavia. In Nuclear power in developing countries,Potter, W.C. 1982. Nuclear power and nonproliferation: AnNorth Korea is coded as nuclear power beginning in 1993.

  15. NNSA: Securing Domestic Radioactive Material | National Nuclear...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to, as quickly as possible, identify, secure, remove andor...

  16. Goals, Objectives, and Requirements (GOR) of the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team for the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Casey, Leslie A.

    2014-01-13

    The goal, objectives, and requirements (GOR) presented in this document define a framework for describing research directed specifically by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The intent of this document is to provide a communication tool for the GNDD Team with NNSA management and with its stakeholder community. It describes the GNDD expectation that much of the improvement in the proficiency of nuclear explosion monitoring will come from better understanding of the science behind the generation, propagation, recording, and interpretation of seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and radionuclide signals and development of "game-changer" advances in science and technology.

  17. Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex - NPTEC

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2014-11-10

    The Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex, or NPTEC, is the world's largest facility for open air testing of hazardous toxic materials and biological simulants. NPTEC is used for testing, experimentation, and training for technologies that require the release of toxic chemicals or biological simulants into the environment.

  18. Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex - NPTEC

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2015-01-09

    The Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex, or NPTEC, is the world's largest facility for open air testing of hazardous toxic materials and biological simulants. NPTEC is used for testing, experimentation, and training for technologies that require the release of toxic chemicals or biological simulants into the environment.

  19. Stopping the emergence of nuclear weapon states in the Third World: An examination of the Iraq weapons inspection program. Study project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Block, D.A.

    1993-01-31

    The end of the Gulf War and the implementation of United Nation (UN) resolutions uncovered an Iraqi multi-billion dollar nuclear weapons program. Iraq's ability to pursue this clandestine program for more than a decade, despite periodic inspections, suggest that the myriad of treaties and agreements designed to curb proliferation may be inadequate. Clearly more must be done to deter and counter the spread of these deadly weapon. The UN weapons inspections in Iraq provide insight into possible solutions to the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology in the developing world. This study examines the policy and operational aspects associated with an intrusive United Nations inspection program. In its final analysis, this paper suggests that an effective challenge inspection program is a necessary element in countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Further, it suggests that the UN, as the only internationally accepted enforcement organization, be fully engaged in nonproliferation issues and support the challenge inspection program.

  20. Policy issues facing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and prospects for the future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sweeney, J.

    1999-04-01

    This report is divided into the following 5 sections: (1) Background; (2) Major Issues Facing Ratification of CTBT; (3) Current Status on CTBT Ratification; (4) Status of CTBT Signatories and Ratifiers; and (5) CTBT Activities Not Prohibited. The major issues facing ratification of CTBT discussed here are: impact on CTBT of START II and ABM ratification; impact of India and Pakistan nuclear tests; CTBT entry into force; and establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

  1. Nuclear Weapons Latency 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sweeney, David J

    2014-07-25

    in certain cases. However, use of MAUA for adversary modeling also significantly increased the number of assumptions necessary. A Latency investigation of South Korean nuclear fuel cycle facility development, a current nonproliferation policy concern...

  2. Nuclear Science Center - 5 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Unknown

    2009-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy ...

  3. Nuclear Proliferation Using Laser Isotope Separation -- Verification Options

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Erickson, S A

    2001-10-15

    Two levels of nonproliferation verification exist. Signatories of the basic agreements under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) agree to open their nuclear sites to inspection by the IAEA. A more detailed and intrusive level was developed following the determination that Iraq had begun a nuclear weapons development program that was not detected by the original level of verification methods. This level, referred to as 93+2 and detailed in model protocol INFCIRC/540, allows the IAEA to do environmental monitoring of non-declared facilities that are suspected of containing proliferation activity, and possibly further inspections, as well as allowing more detailed inspections of declared sites. 56 countries have signed a Strengthened Safeguards Systems Additional Protocol as of 16 July 2001. These additional inspections can be done on the instigation of the IAEA itself, or after requests by other parties to the NPT, based on information that they have collected. Since information able to cause suspicion of proliferation could arrive at any country, it is important that countries have procedures in place that will assist them in making decisions related to these inspections. Furthermore, IAEA inspection resources are limited, and therefore care needs to be taken to make best use of these resources. Most of the nonproliferation verification inspections may be concentrated on establishing that diversion of nuclear materials is not occurring, but some fraction will be related to determining if undeclared sites have nuclear materials production taking place within them. Of these, most suspicions will likely be related to the major existing technologies for uranium enrichment and reprocessing for plutonium extraction, as it would seem most likely that nations attempting proliferation would use tested means of producing nuclear materials. However, as technology continues to advance and new methods of enrichment and reprocessing are developed, inspection-related procedures will need to be adapted to keep up with them. In order to make 93+2 inspections more useful, a systematic way of finding clues to nuclear proliferation would be useful. Also, to cope with the possible use of newer technology for proliferation, the list of clues might need to be expanded. This paper discusses the development and recognition of such clues. It concentrates on laser isotope separation (LIS) as a new proliferation technology, and uses Uranium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (U-AVLIS) as an example of LIS that is well known.

  4. A new era of nuclear test verification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Auer, Matthias; Prior, Mark K.

    2014-09-01

    The global network of sensors commissioned to monitor compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has proven capable of that task and more.

  5. High-Resolution Fast-Neutron Spectrometry for Arms Control and Treaty Verification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    David L. Chichester; James T. Johnson; Edward H. Seabury

    2012-07-01

    Many nondestructive nuclear analysis techniques have been developed to support the measurement needs of arms control and treaty verification, including gross photon and neutron counting, low- and high-resolution gamma spectrometry, time-correlated neutron measurements, and photon and neutron imaging. One notable measurement technique that has not been extensively studied to date for these applications is high-resolution fast-neutron spectrometry (HRFNS). Applied for arms control and treaty verification, HRFNS has the potential to serve as a complimentary measurement approach to these other techniques by providing a means to either qualitatively or quantitatively determine the composition and thickness of non-nuclear materials surrounding neutron-emitting materials. The technique uses the normally-occurring neutrons present in arms control and treaty verification objects of interest as an internal source of neutrons for performing active-interrogation transmission measurements. Most low-Z nuclei of interest for arms control and treaty verification, including 9Be, 12C, 14N, and 16O, possess fast-neutron resonance features in their absorption cross sections in the 0.5- to 5-MeV energy range. Measuring the selective removal of source neutrons over this energy range, assuming for example a fission-spectrum starting distribution, may be used to estimate the stoichiometric composition of intervening materials between the neutron source and detector. At a simpler level, determination of the emitted fast-neutron spectrum may be used for fingerprinting 'known' assemblies for later use in template-matching tests. As with photon spectrometry, automated analysis of fast-neutron spectra may be performed to support decision making and reporting systems protected behind information barriers. This paper will report recent work at Idaho National Laboratory to explore the feasibility of using HRFNS for arms control and treaty verification applications, including simulations and experiments, using fission-spectrum neutron sources to assess neutron transmission through composite low-Z attenuators.

  6. Developing Effluent Analysis Technologies to Support Nonproliferation Initiatives, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies, Third quarter 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schubert, S A; Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M [eds.] [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This issue provides an overview of the Effluent Research Program of the DOE Office of Research and Development, highlighting a number of representative projects within this program in support of nonproliferation initiatives. Technologies reported include portable instruments for on-site inspections, standoff detectors, fieldable, real-time instruments, field collection techniques, and ultrasensitive laboratory techniques.

  7. Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal of HonorPoster Session

  8. SNIF: A Futuristic Neutrino Probe for Undeclared Nuclear Fission Reactors

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Thierry Lasserre; Maximilien Fechner; Guillaume Mention; Romain Reboulleau; Michel Cribier; Alain Letourneau; David Lhuillier

    2010-11-16

    Today reactor neutrino experiments are at the cutting edge of fundamental research in particle physics. Understanding the neutrino is far from complete, but thanks to the impressive progress in this field over the last 15 years, a few research groups are seriously considering that neutrinos could be useful for society. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works with its Member States to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. In a context of international tension and nuclear renaissance, neutrino detectors could help IAEA to enforce the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this article we discuss a futuristic neutrino application to detect and localize an undeclared nuclear reactor from across borders. The SNIF (Secret Neutrino Interactions Finder) concept proposes to use a few hundred thousand tons neutrino detectors to unveil clandestine fission reactors. Beyond previous studies we provide estimates of all known background sources as a function of the detector's longitude, latitude and depth, and we discuss how they impact the detectability.

  9. Broadening Industry Governance to Include Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-11-11

    As industry is the first line of defense in detecting and thwarting illicit trade networks, the engagement of the private sector is critical to any government effort to strengthen existing mechanisms to protect goods and services throughout the supply chain. This study builds on previous PNNL work to continue to evaluate means for greater industry engagement to complement and strengthen existing governmental efforts to detect and stem the trade of illicit goods and to protect and secure goods that could be used in making a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, the study evaluates the concept of Industry Self Regulation, defined as a systematic voluntary program undertaken by an industry or by individual companies to anticipate, implement, supplement, or substitute for regulatory requirements in a given field, generally through the adoption of best practices. Through a series of interviews with companies with a past history of non-compliance, trade associations and NGOs, the authors identify gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, drivers for a self regulation approach and the form such an approach might take, as well as obstacles to be overcome. The authors conclude that it is at the intersection of industry, government, and security that—through collaborative means—the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation system—can be most effectively strengthened to the mutual benefit of both government and the private sector. Industry has a critical stake in the success of this regime, and has the potential to act as an integrating force that brings together the existing mechanisms of the global nonproliferation regime: export controls, physical protection, and safeguards. The authors conclude that industry compliance is not enough; rather, nonproliferation must become a central tenant of a company’s corporate culture and be viewed as an integral component of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

  10. Non-Nuclear Treaties | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) AugustA.MOXAdministrationOfficialsA 1Steam

  11. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization | National Nuclear

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal Gas &SCE-SessionsSouthReporteeo | National NuclearaCSGFNuclear

  12. Nonproliferation & Forensics | Argonne National Laboratory

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJessework usesofPublications64Newsroom NewsroomNominationNonproliferation &

  13. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad range of subjects, including nuclear material accountancy principles, legal definitions and the regulatory base and inspection tools and techniques. This 60% core part is given by representatives from regulatory bodies (The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, Directorate General for Nuclear Energy and Transport), industry (AREVA, British Nuclear Group), and research (Stockholm University, Hamburg University, Joint Research Centre-Institute of Transuranic Elements, and Joint Research Centre-Institute for the Protection of the Citizen). The remaining part is completed with topical lectures addressed by invited lecturers, such as from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the IAEA addressing topics of physical protection, illicit trafficking, the Iraq case study, exercises, including satellite imagery interpretation etc. With this structure of a stable core plus a variable set of invited lectures, the course will remain sustainable and up-to-date. A syllabus provides the students a homogeneous set of information material in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation matters at the European and international level. In this way, the ESARDA TKMWG aims to contribute to a two-fold scientific-technical and political-juridical education and training.

  14. Development of the fundamental attributes and inputs for proliferation resistance assessments of nuclear fuel cycles 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Giannangeli, Donald D. J., III

    2007-09-17

    Robust and reliable quantitative proliferation resistance assessment tools are critical to a strengthened nonproliferation regime and to the future deployment of nuclear fuel cycle technologies. Efforts to quantify ...

  15. Columbia River Treaty Review #2 - April 2009.indd

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    the Columbia River Treaty has provided signifi cant benefi ts to the United States and Canada through coordinated river management by the two countries. It remains the standard...

  16. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a legal document. As such, it is written in a legalese that is understood by specialists in international law and treaties, but not by most outside of this field, including designers of nuclear facilities. For this reason, many of the requirements have been simplified and restated. However, in all cases, the relevant source document and passage is noted so that readers may trace the requirement to the source. This is a helpful living guide, since some of these requirements are subject to revision over time. More importantly, the practices by which the requirements are met are continuously modernized by the IAEA and nuclear facility operators to improve not only the effectiveness of international nuclear safeguards, but also the efficiency. As these improvements are made, the following guidelines should be updated and revised accordingly.

  17. China and Europe enhance cooperation 09 December 2004

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    a number of cooperative agreements on 8 December, some covering nuclear non-proliferation and technology. The agreement is focused on compliance with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, control in The Hague, Netherlands. Among the agreements signed were a Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms

  18. The CFE Treaty and changed conditions in Europe

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allentuck, J.

    1994-08-01

    The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed in November 1990 by sixteen nations, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and six nations, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). It was resigned to prevent a major surprise attack in Europe by the conventional forces of one Treaty Organization against those of the other and was the first major arms control treaty to address conventional weapons. This paper focuses on how CFE adapted to changes in the military-political situation in Europe which occurred after 1990 and failed to adapt to others. Suggestions are offered on how it might be changed to make it more relevant under these changed conditions.

  19. Post-Cold War Effects on the Non-proliferation Regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kessler, Carol E.

    2006-03-31

    This journal article analyzes nuclear and security related events of the past 15 years to illustrate the changes in geopolitics and the shifting balance of power following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reflection upon these events establishes the context for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The author concludes that post Soviet communism hastened the movement towards a unipolar system with hegemonic power vested in the United States, and this geopolitical imbalance fostered insecurities and greater threats. Multilateral cooperation and commitment from the US would help this leader achieve its goal of security through increased global confidence in the international system.

  20. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Kirk, Bernadette Lugue

    2015-01-01

    The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

  1. NONPROLIFERATION PROMOTED BY INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    , Mohamed Elbaradei's calls for an increased role of the nuclear industry in combating nuclear proliferation Mohamed Elbaradei's call for an increased role by the nuclear industry to combat nuclear proliferation). The need for an industry self-regulation approach results from the nexus between terrorism and nuclear

  2. A Visual Analytics Approach to Structured Data Analysis to Enhance Nonproliferation and Arms Control Verification Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gillen, David S.

    2014-08-07

    Analysis activities for Nonproliferation and Arms Control verification require the use of many types of data. Tabular structured data, such as Excel spreadsheets and relational databases, have traditionally been used for data mining activities, where specific queries are issued against data to look for matching results. The application of visual analytics tools to structured data enables further exploration of datasets to promote discovery of previously unknown results. This paper discusses the application of a specific visual analytics tool to datasets related to the field of Arms Control and Nonproliferation to promote the use of visual analytics more broadly in this domain. Visual analytics focuses on analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces (Wong and Thomas 2004). It promotes exploratory analysis of data, and complements data mining technologies where known patterns can be mined for. Also with a human in the loop, they can bring in domain knowledge and subject matter expertise. Visual analytics has not widely been applied to this domain. In this paper, we will focus on one type of data: structured data, and show the results of applying a specific visual analytics tool to answer questions in the Arms Control and Nonproliferation domain. We chose to use the T.Rex tool, a visual analytics tool developed at PNNL, which uses a variety of visual exploration patterns to discover relationships in structured datasets, including a facet view, graph view, matrix view, and timeline view. The facet view enables discovery of relationships between categorical information, such as countries and locations. The graph tool visualizes node-link relationship patterns, such as the flow of materials being shipped between parties. The matrix visualization shows highly correlated categories of information. The timeline view shows temporal patterns in data. In this paper, we will use T.Rex with two different datasets to demonstrate how interactive exploration of the data can aid an analyst with arms control and nonproliferation verification activities. Using a dataset from PIERS (PIERS 2014), we will show how container shipment imports and exports can aid an analyst in understanding the shipping patterns between two countries. We will also use T.Rex to examine a collection of research publications from the IAEA International Nuclear Information System (IAEA 2014) to discover collaborations of concern. We hope this paper will encourage the use of visual analytics structured data analytics in the field of nonproliferation and arms control verification. Our paper outlines some of the challenges that exist before broad adoption of these kinds of tools can occur and offers next steps to overcome these challenges.

  3. Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 1: Summary of exercise

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Libby, R.A.; Davis, C. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Segal, J.E.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1995-08-01

    In a September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton announced a new nonproliferation and export control policy that established a framework for US efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The new policy proposed that the US undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material. One of the key elements was for the US to support a special nuclear materials (SNM) multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards. This policy is often referred to as the President`s Cutoff Initiative or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Because both the US Department of Energy (DOE) and foreign reprocessing facilities similar to PUREX will likely to be inspected under a FMCT, the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Negotiations and Analysis Division (DOE/NN-41) tasked Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to perform an information gathering exercise, the PUREX Exercise, using the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant located on the Hanford Site in Washington State. PUREX is a former production reactor fuel reprocessing plant currently undergoing a transition to a ``decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) ready`` mode. The PUREX Exercise was conducted March 29--30, 1994, to examine aspects of the imposition of several possible cutoff regimes and to study verification of non-production of SNM for nuclear weapons purposes or outside of safeguards. A follow-up activity to further examine various additional verification regimes was held at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) on May 10, 1994.

  4. Secretary Chu's Remarks at the 2012 IAEA General Conference ...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    the 1950s. We reduced the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been upheld, and at the Nuclear Security...

  5. The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kemp, R. Scott

    Technology has been long understood to play a central role in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Evolving nuclear technology, increased access to information, and systematic improvements in design and manufacturing ...

  6. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A 582 (2007) 629637 Monte Carlo and analytical models of neutron detection with organic

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pázsit, Imre

    2007-01-01

    Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A 582 (2007) 629­637 Monte Carlo and analytical materials in applications such as nuclear nonproliferation, homeland security, and basic physics research unfolding, which have a variety of applications, including nuclear nonproliferation and homeland security

  7. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-02-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage on options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to bum the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE`s Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the nonproliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative.

  8. Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    2000-03-01

    This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community.

  9. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Reasoner: PNNL FY12 Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hohimer, Ryan E.; Pomiak, Yekaterina G.; Neorr, Peter A.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Strasburg, Jana D.

    2013-05-03

    Building on previous internal investments and leveraging ongoing advancements in semantic technologies, PNNL implemented a formal reasoning framework and applied it to a specific challenge in nuclear nonproliferation. The Semantic Nonproliferation Analysis Platform (SNAP) was developed as a preliminary graphical user interface to demonstrate the potential power of the underlying semantic technologies to analyze and explore facts and relationships relating to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). In developing this proof of concept prototype, the utility and relevancy of semantic technologies to the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) has been better understood.

  10. Scoping study of SNM detection and indentification for adjunct on-site treaty monitoring. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Murray, W.S.; Morgado, R.E.; Frankle, C.M.

    1995-07-01

    Following the fall of the Soviet Union, political pressure to negotiate meaningful nuclear arms agreements with Russia and the former soviet republics has increased. Anticipating the monitoring requirements of a future treaty for the decommissioning and disassembly of nuclear warheads presents opportunities to review existing monitoring technologies and to explore new methods to detect and analyze intrinsic radiation. Fully instrumented radiation-detection systems with a range of monitoring capabilities are available, but special-purpose instruments will still need to be developed to match increasing demands for high-confidence, low-intrusion monitoring in a specific scenario. As a guide to present capabilities in monitoring technologies, we have categorized their relevant attributes to detect and identify special nuclear material based on levels of confidence, intrusiveness, vulnerability, and other critical concerns. To add additional flexibility, we review emerging technologies and estimate the development time to bring them to operational status.

  11. Lessons Learned from Nonproliferation Successes and Failures

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Katz, Jonathan I.

    , Iran and North Korea each successfully concealed uranium enrichment programs for many years private industry, any of which could conceal a centrifuge cascade. The acknowledged nuclear powers all

  12. A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Parker, Frank L. [Vanderbilt University (United States)

    2012-07-01

    Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded emissions), long term care, reduced access to 'dirty' bomb materials, the social and political costs of siting new facilities and the psychological impact of no solution to the nuclear waste problem, were taken into account, the costs would be far lower than those of the present fuel cycle. (authors)

  13. NA 20 - Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Us Our Operations Management and Budget Office of Civil Rights Workforce Statistics NA 20 - Deputy Administrator for Defense ... NA 20 - Deputy Administrator for...

  14. EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i n c iGoldendale Energy Project BonnevilleHigh-LevelSiteForeign Research

  15. FY 2012 Budget Hearing Testimony on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal Gas &SCE-SessionsSouthReport for the t-) S/,,5 'aExecutive Positions |Energy andReactor

  16. Statement on Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal Gas &SCE-SessionsSouthReport forRetirement Plan | NationalSourcing

  17. U.S. - Kazakhstan Cooperation on Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal Gas &SCE-SessionsSouthReport forRetirement PlanSupplementalEmergency ResponseNational

  18. DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation DNN | Open Energy Information

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on QA:QA J-E-1 SECTION J APPENDIX ECoopButtePower VenturesInformation9) Wind Farm JumpAlum|CycloneOpenDHDNV

  19. Tag: nuclear nonproliferation | Y-12 National Security Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust,Field-effectWorking With U.S. Coal StocksSuppliers Tag: Suppliers Displayingdeterrence...

  20. Interim Report of the Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation | Department

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE: Alternative Fuelsof EnergyApril 2014 | DepartmentDepartment ofInsuranceof Energy DOEof

  1. Meeting the Next Generation of Nuclear Nonproliferation Specialists |

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration wouldMass map shines light on dark matter By SarahMODELING Release date:MeetMeetDepartment

  2. Head of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    (CTBTO), visited NNSA's Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) on November 23, as part of a multi-day itinerary that also included tours of national laboratories overseen by the...

  3. Head of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformation Current HABFESOpportunitiesNERSCGrid-based29HaiWhy Is ItHarry

  4. Limited Test Ban Treaty Signed | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration would likeUniverseIMPACTThousand CubicResourcelogo and-E C H2015Tray and

  5. January 3, 2007 National Nuclear Security AdministrationNational Nuclear Security Administration

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Learned, John

    & Objectives Reduce the threat to national security posed by nuclear weapons proliferation: Objectives: Develop and demonstrate technologies for detecting the stages of a foreign nuclear weapons · Detection of nuclear weapon and material smuggling Nonproliferation R&D #12;4 Nuclear Detonation Detection

  6. 16 years of successful projects in16 years of successful projects in Nuclear Science & TechnologyNuclear Science & Technology

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    & TechnologyNuclear Science & Technology 13th CERNISTC SAC Seminar New Perspectives of High Energy Physics 01 in Nuclear Science & Technology · Fundamental Nuclear/High Energy Physics · Nuclear safety and efficiency; · Nuclear technologies for medicine; · Fusion; ....observing carefully nonproliferation aspects in all

  7. Neutrinos and Non-proliferation in Europe

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    M. Cribier

    2007-04-04

    Triggered by the demand of the IAEA, neutrino physicists in Europe involved with the Double Chooz experiment are studying the potential of neutrino detection to monitor nuclear reactors. In particular a new set of experiments at the ILL is planned to improve the knowledge of the neutrino spectrum emitted in the fission of 235U and 239Pu.

  8. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Reasoner: PNNL FY13 Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hohimer, Ryan E.; Strasburg, Jana D.

    2013-09-30

    In Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) PNNL implemented a formal reasoning framework and applied it to a specific challenge in nuclear nonproliferation. The Semantic Nonproliferation Analysis Platform (SNAP) was developed as a preliminary graphical user interface to demonstrate the potential power of the underlying semantic technologies to analyze and explore facts and relationships relating to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). In Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) the SNAP demonstration was enhanced with respect to query and navigation usability issues.

  9. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    planning and oversight for programs funded by the Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Non- proliferation, for Weapons Ac- tivities and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Federal employees at the NNSA service379 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Federal Funds General and special

  10. Print this Page Close The nuclear deal

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    league. B At least in the eyes of the United States, India is now a nuclear weapons state. The gamble 'Entity List', which was drawn up outside the non-proliferation laws after our nuclear weapon testsPrint this Page Close The nuclear deal July 20, 2005 | 19:05 ISTT P Sreenivasan | y assuming

  11. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    and oversight for programs funded by the Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Non- proliferation, and Naval pro- gram direction for Weapons Activities and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Federal employees361 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Federal Funds General and special

  12. Nonproliferation and safeguarding via ionization detection

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Koster, J.E.; Johnson, J.P.; Steadman, P.

    1995-05-01

    A significant signature of the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) is ionizing radiation. SNM naturally decays with the emission of alpha particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. Detecting and monitoring these emissions is an important capability for international safeguards. A new detection method collects the ions produced by such radiation in ambient air. Alpha particles in particular are specific to heavy nuclei but have very short range. The ions produced by an alpha, however, can be transported tens of meters to an ion detector. These new monitors are rugged, very sensitive, respond in real time, and in most cases are quite portable.

  13. India's baseline plan for nuclear energy self-sufficiency.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bucher, R .G.; Nuclear Engineering Division

    2009-01-01

    India's nuclear energy strategy has traditionally strived for energy self-sufficiency, driven largely by necessity following trade restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) following India's 'peaceful nuclear explosion' of 1974. On September 6, 2008, the NSG agreed to create an exception opening nuclear trade with India, which may create opportunities for India to modify its baseline strategy. The purpose of this document is to describe India's 'baseline plan,' which was developed under constrained trade conditions, as a basis for understanding changes in India's path as a result of the opening of nuclear commerce. Note that this treatise is based upon publicly available information. No attempt is made to judge whether India can meet specified goals either in scope or schedule. In fact, the reader is warned a priori that India's delivery of stated goals has often fallen short or taken a significantly longer period to accomplish. It has been evident since the early days of nuclear power that India's natural resources would determine the direction of its civil nuclear power program. It's modest uranium but vast thorium reserves dictated that the country's primary objective would be thorium utilization. Estimates of India's natural deposits vary appreciably, but its uranium reserves are known to be extremely limited, totaling approximately 80,000 tons, on the order of 1% of the world's deposits; and nominally one-third of this ore is of very low uranium concentration. However, India's roughly 300,000 tons of thorium reserves account for approximately 30% of the world's total. Confronted with this reality, the future of India's nuclear power industry is strongly dependent on the development of a thorium-based nuclear fuel cycle as the only way to insure a stable, sustainable, and autonomous program. The path to India's nuclear energy self-sufficiency was first outlined in a seminal paper by Drs. H. J. Bhabha and N. B. Prasad presented at the Second United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1958. The paper described a three stage plan for a sustainable nuclear energy program consistent with India's limited uranium but abundant thorium natural resources. In the first stage, natural uranium would be used to fuel graphite or heavy water moderated reactors. Plutonium extracted from the spent fuel of these thermal reactors would drive fast reactors in the second stage that would contain thorium blankets for breeding uranium-233 (U-233). In the final stage, this U-233 would fuel thorium burning reactors that would breed and fission U-233 in situ. This three stage blueprint still reigns as the core of India's civil nuclear power program. India's progress in the development of nuclear power, however, has been impacted by its isolation from the international nuclear community for its development of nuclear weapons and consequent refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Initially, India was engaged in numerous cooperative research programs with foreign countries; for example, under the 'Atoms for Peace' program, India acquired the Cirus reactor, a 40 MWt research reactor from Canada moderated with heavy water from the United States. India was also actively engaged in negotiations for the NPT. But, on May 18, 1974, India conducted a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' at Pokharan using plutonium produced by the Cirus reactor, abruptly ending the era of international collaboration. India then refused to sign the NPT, which it viewed as discriminatory since it would be required to join as a non-nuclear weapons state. As a result of India's actions, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created in 1975 to establish guidelines 'to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities. These nuclear export controls have forced India to be largely self-sufficient in all nuclear-related technologies.

  14. Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Facilities in North Korea

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hecker, Siegfried S.

    2004-02-07

    Actions of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have precipitated two nuclear crises in the past 10 years. The 1994 crisis was resolved through the 'Agreed Framework.' North Korea agreed to 'freeze' and eventually dismantle its nuclear program (with U.S. help to store spent fuel safely and under IAEA inspection). In return, the United States agreed (with the KEDO international consortium) to build two light-water reactors and supply North Korea with heavy-fuel oil until the reactors come on line. In addition, both sides agreed to move towards full normalization of relations, work for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and work on strengthening the international nonproliferation regime. The second nuclear crisis erupted when North Korean Government officials allegedly admitted to having a clandestine uranium enrichment program when confronted with this accusation by U.S. officials in October 2002. The United States (through KEDO) suspended heavy-fuel oil shipments and North Korea responded by expelling the IAEA inspectors, withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and restarting its nuclear program in January 2003. The North Korean Government has invited Professor John Lewis of Stanford University, a China and North Korea scholar, for Track I1 discussions of nuclear and other key issues since 1987. In August 2003, Professor Lewis visited North Korea just before the first six-party talks, which were designed by the United States to solve the current nuclear crisis. Professor Lewis was invited back for the January 2004 visit. He asked Jack Pritchard, former U.S. special envoy for DRPK negotiations, and me to accompany him. Two Asian affairs staff specialists from the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee also joined us. I will report on the visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center on January 8,2004. We toured the 5 MWe reactor, the 50 MWe reactor construction site, the spent fuel pool storage building, and the radiochemical laboratory. We concluded that North Korea has restarted its 5 MWe reactor (which produces roughly 6 kg of plutonium annually), it removed the 8000 spent fuel rods that were previously stored under IAEA safeguards from the spent fuel pool, and that it most likely extracted the 25 to 30 kg of plutonium contained in these fuel rods. Although North Korean officials showed us what they claimed was their plutonium metal product from this reprocessing campaign, we were not able to conclude definitively that it was in fact plutonium metal and that it came from the most recent reprocessing campaign. Nevertheless, our North Korean hosts demonstrated that they had the capability, the facility and requisite capacity, and the technical expertise to produce plutonium metal. We were not shown any facilities or had the opportunity to talk to technical or military experts who were able to address the issue of whether or not North Korea had a 'deterrent' as claimed - that is, we were not able to conclude that North Korea can build a nuclear device and that it can integrate nuclear devices into suitable delivery systems. On the matter of uranium enrichment programs, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan categorically denied that North Korea has a uranium enrichment program - he said, 'we have no program, no equipment, and no technical expertise for uranium enrichment.' Upon return to the United States, I shared my observations and analysis with U.S. Government officials in Washington, DC, including congressional testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and briefings to two House of Representative Committees.

  15. Nuclear proliferation after the Cold War

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reiss, M.; Litwak, R.S.

    1994-01-01

    Today, former Soviet republics threaten to gain control over nuclear weapons sited on their territories, and reports on North Korea, Pakistan, India, and Iraq reveal current or recent weapon development programs. This document offers a timely assessment of the prospects for nuclear nonproliferation.

  16. A Unified Risk-Informed Framework to Assess the Proliferation Risk and License the Proliferation Performace of Nuclear Energy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    d'Oro, Edoardo Cavalieri

    In order to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime it is necessary to guarantee high standards of security for the sites that use, store, produce, or reprocess special nuclear materials (SNM). The current surge ...

  17. A unified risk-Informed framework to assess the proliferation risk and license the proliferation performance of nuclear energy systems

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cavalieri d'Oro, Edoardo

    2011-01-01

    In order to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime it is necessary to guarantee high standards of security for the sites that use, store, produce, or reprocess special nuclear materials (SNM). The current surge ...

  18. Future directions for arms control and nonproliferation. Conference summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-07-06

    This report provides a summary of the presentations and discussions at the Spring 1994 CNSN-Wilton Park Conference. The Conference was one of a series on US-European security cooperation organized by The Center for National Security Negotiations (CNSN) of Science Applications International Corporation. These conferences bring together government and non-government experts, primarily from the United States and Europe, to discuss a range of regional and global security issues. The conferences provide an opportunity to explore, in a frank and off-the-record environment, common interests and concerns, as well as differences in approach that affect trans-Atlantic cooperation. This report is divided into the following three areas: (1) implementation of existing and pending agreements; (2) non-proliferation: prospects for trans-Atlantic cooperation; and (3) future directions in arms control.

  19. Government perspective. [Clinton Administration non-proliferation policy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-08-01

    The Clinton Administration made some initial moves on non-proliferation in July. On July 13, US Dept. of Energy (DOE) Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, announced her decision to reinstate a policy to accept spent fuel from international research reactors. The US State Dept. encouraged DOE to adopt the policy in support of the Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program designed to encourage foreign governments to convert their research reactors from using highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium (below 20 weight-percent [sup 235]U). As part of an earlier agreement, DOE had consented to take back spent fuel if the reactors were converted. Many of these research reactors, however, have such a limited lifetime that backfitting them is not an economic option. Furthermore, the Europeans have been particularly vocal in their opposition to DOE's insistence that low-enriched uranium be used in research reactors, as a condition of its acceptance of spent fuel returns.

  20. A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wogman, Ned A.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Payne, Rosara F.; Seifert, Carolyn E.; Friese, Judah I.; Miley, Harry S.; Bowyer, Ted W.; Hanlen, Richard C.; Onishi, Yasuo; Hayes, James C.; Wigmosta, Mark S.

    2011-02-01

    This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of the sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.

  1. Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bunch, Kyle J. [United States Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Office of Verification and Transparency Technologies, Washington, DC (United States); Jones, Anthony M. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Ramuhalli, Pradeep [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Benz, Jacob M. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Denlinger, Laura Schmidt [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-05-04

    The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.

  2. Nuclear Security Applications of Antineutrino Detectors: Current Capabilities and Future Prospects

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    A. Bernstein; G. Baldwin; B. Boyer; M. Goodman; J. Learned; J. Lund; D. Reyna; R. Svoboda

    2009-08-29

    Antineutrinos are electrically neutral, nearly massless fundamental particles produced in large numbers in the cores of nuclear reactors and in nuclear explosions. In the half century since their discovery, major advances in the understanding of their properties, and in detector technology, have opened the door to a new discipline: Applied Antineutrino Physics. Because antineutrinos are inextricably linked to the process of nuclear fission, many applications of interest are in nuclear nonproliferation. This white paper presents a comprehensive survey of applied antineutrino physics relevant for nonproliferation, summarizes recent advances in the field, describes the overlap of this nascent discipline with other ongoing fundamental and applied antineutrino research, and charts a course for research and development for future applications. It is intended as a resource for policymakers, researchers, and the wider nuclear nonproliferation community.

  3. Nuclear Security Applications of Antineutrino Detectors: Current Capabilities and Future Prospects

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bernstein, A; Boyer, B; Goodman, M; Learned, J; Lund, J; Reyna, D; Svoboda, R

    2009-01-01

    Antineutrinos are electrically neutral, nearly massless fundamental particles produced in large numbers in the cores of nuclear reactors and in nuclear explosions. In the half century since their discovery, major advances in the understanding of their properties, and in detector technology, have opened the door to a new discipline: Applied Antineutrino Physics. Because antineutrinos are inextricably linked to the process of nuclear fission, many applications of interest are in nuclear nonproliferation. This white paper presents a comprehensive survey of applied antineutrino physics relevant for nonproliferation, summarizes recent advances in the field, describes the overlap of this nascent discipline with other ongoing fundamental and applied antineutrino research, and charts a course for research and development for future applications. It is intended as a resource for policymakers, researchers, and the wider nuclear nonproliferation community.

  4. Fresh nuclear fuel measurements at Ukrainian nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kuzminski, Jozef; Ewing, Tom; Dickman, Debbie; Gavrilyuk, Victor; Drapey, Sergey; Kirischuk, Vladimir; Strilchuk, Nikolay

    2009-01-01

    In 2005, the Provisions on Nuclear Material Measurement System was enacted in Ukraine as an important regulatory driver to support international obligations in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. It defines key provisions and requirements for material measurement and measurement control programs to ensure the quality and reliability of measurement data within the framework of the State MC&A System. Implementing the Provisions requires establishing a number of measurement techniques for both fresh and spent nuclear fuel for various types of Ukrainian reactors. Our first efforts focused on measurements of fresh nuclear fuel from a WWR-1000 power reactor.

  5. Introduction to Special Edition on University Nonproliferation Education and Training

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    in tensions across the globe. Nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among but has become more dangerous. The drive to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat acquire nuclear weapons, weapons states on the outside fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them

  6. Columbia River Treaty History and 2014/2024 Review

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2009-02-01

    The Columbia River, the fourth largest river on the continent as measured by average annual ?ow, generates more power than any other river in North America. While its headwaters originate in British Columbia, only about 15 percent of the 259,500 square miles of the Columbia River Basin is actually located in Canada. Yet the Canadian waters account for about 38 percent of the average annual volume, and up to 50 percent of the peak ?ood waters, that ?ow by The Dalles Dam on the Columbia River between Oregon and Washington. In the 1940s, of?cials from the United States and Canada began a long process to seek a joint solution to the ?ooding caused by the unregulated Columbia River and to the postwar demand for greater energy resources. That effort culminated in the Columbia River Treaty, an international agreement between Canada and the United States for the cooperative development of water resources regulation in the upper Columbia River Basin. It was signed in 1961 and implemented in 1964.

  7. Lessons from post-war Iraq for the international full-scope safeguards regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Scheinman, L.

    1993-04-01

    The discovery after the Gulf War of the extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon program severely shook public confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the safeguards program of the IAEA under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular. Iraq provided the justification for evaluating the safeguards regime under new political circumstances, so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken when necessary. It is now up to the individual states within the international system to take advantage of this opportunity.

  8. DOE/NNSA's Nonproliferation Experts Lead First Workshop on the...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Congressional...

  9. Strengthened IAEA Safeguards-Imagery Analysis: Geospatial Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pabian, Frank V

    2012-08-14

    This slide presentation focuses on the growing role and importance of imagery analysis for IAEA safeguards applications and how commercial satellite imagery, together with the newly available geospatial tools, can be used to promote 'all-source synergy.' As additional sources of openly available information, satellite imagery in conjunction with the geospatial tools can be used to significantly augment and enhance existing information gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection and assessment of nonproliferation relevant activities, facilities, and programs. Foremost of the geospatial tools are the 'Digital Virtual Globes' (i.e., GoogleEarth, Virtual Earth, etc.) that are far better than previously used simple 2-D plan-view line drawings for visualization of known and suspected facilities of interest which can be critical to: (1) Site familiarization and true geospatial context awareness; (2) Pre-inspection planning; (3) Onsite orientation and navigation; (4) Post-inspection reporting; (5) Site monitoring over time for changes; (6) Verification of states site declarations and for input to State Evaluation reports; and (7) A common basis for discussions among all interested parties (Member States). Additionally, as an 'open-source', such virtual globes can also provide a new, essentially free, means to conduct broad area search for undeclared nuclear sites and activities - either alleged through open source leads; identified on internet BLOGS and WIKI Layers, with input from a 'free' cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens (a.k.a.: 'crowdsourcing'), that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing information and in-house country knowledge. They also provide a means to acquire ground photography taken by locals, hobbyists, and tourists of the surrounding locales that can be useful in identifying and discriminating between relevant and non-relevant facilities and their associated infrastructure. The digital globes also provide highly accurate terrain mapping for better geospatial context and allow detailed 3-D perspectives of all sites or areas of interest. 3-D modeling software (i.e., Google's SketchUp6 newly available in 2007) when used in conjunction with these digital globes can significantly enhance individual building characterization and visualization (including interiors), allowing for better assessments including walk-arounds or fly-arounds and perhaps better decision making on multiple levels (e.g., the best placement for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) video monitoring cameras).

  10. EA-1238: Proposed Construction and Operation of the Nonproliferation and International Security Center, Los Alamos, New Mexico

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EA evaluates the environmental impacts for the proposal to construct and operate the Nonproliferation and International Security Center within the U.S. Department of Energy's Los Alamos...

  11. NON-PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES IN CONNECTION WITH MAGNETIC FUSION POWER

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    OF MAGNETIC FUSION · The nuclear weapons proliferation risks associated with magnetic fusion power plantsNON-PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES IN CONNECTION WITH MAGNETIC FUSION POWER RICHARD KAMENDJE FPA Annual increasingly focused on the production of fusion energy on an industrial, power plant scale · Many countries

  12. 50 Years of Treaty Verification from Space Operational Satellite

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    of the universe. The Vela satellites discovered bursts of gamma- ray energy emanating from beyond the solar system gamma-ray burst measured with Vela (Credit: R. Klebesadel, I. Strong & R. Olson (LANL) NASA Swift Spacecraft devoted to the study of cosmic gamma-ray bursts (Credit: NASA/GSFC) The U.S. Nuclear Detonation

  13. (12) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) (19) World Intellectual Property Organization

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yao, Y. Lawrence

    ) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) (19) World Intellectual Property.11.2003) PCT WO 03/097291 Al (51) International Patent Classification7: B23K 26/00 (74) Agents: TANG, Henry eta, SD, SE, SG, SK, SL, TJ, TM, TN, TR, TT, TZ, UA, UG, US, UZ, VC, VN, YU, ZA, ZM, ZW. (84) Designated

  14. (12) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) (19) World Intellectual Property

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yao, Y. Lawrence

    ---- (12) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) (19) World.01.2005) PCT WO 2005/005069 A2 (51) International Patent Classification7: B21D (74) Agents: TANG, Henry eta, SG, SK, SL, TJ, TM, TN, TR, TT, TZ, UA, UG, US, UZ, VC, VN, YU, ZA, ZM, ZW. (84) Designated States

  15. ==----iiiiiiii (12) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yao, Y. Lawrence

    ---- (12) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) (19) World.05.2006) (51) International Patent Classification: G06K 9100 (2006.01) G06K 9162 (2006.01) (21) International, SD, SE, SG, SK, SL, SM, SY, TJ, TM, TN, TR, TT, TZ, UA, UG, US, UZ, VC, VN, YU, ZA, ZM, ZW. (84

  16. En Route to Data Mining in Legal Text Corpora: Clustering, Neural Computation, and International Treaties

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rauber,Andreas

    Treaties Dieter Merkl Erich Schweighofer Department of Computer Science Institute of Public International in analyzing data and finding crit­ ical nuggets of useful knowledge. A promising ap­ proach for data mining of such libraries whereby the detec­ tion of similarities between documents is the overall goal. These methods may

  17. ATTACHMENT TO FORM 8233 (For use by students of Egypt who are claiming Tax Treaty exemption).

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Awtar, Shorya

    ATTACHMENT TO FORM 8233 (For use by students of Egypt who are claiming Tax Treaty exemption). 1. I was a resident of Egypt on the date of my arrival in the United States. I am not a United States citizen. I have the United States and Egypt in an amount not in excess of $3000 for any taxable year. I have not previously

  18. NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2008 - May 2009

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

    2010-03-01

    In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 16th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. We provide this annual report to review program activities from June 2008 through May 2009 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2008. Contents include: Welcome Letter Introduction The NGFP Team Program Management Highlights Class of 2008 Incoming Fellows Orientation Travel Career Development Management of the Fellows Performance Highlights Closing Ceremony Encore Performance Where They Are Now Alumnus Career Highlights: Christine Buzzard Class of 2009 Applicant Database Upgrades Fall Recruitment Activities Interviews Hiring and Clearances Introducing the Class of 2009 Class of 2010 Recruitment Strategy On the Horizon Appendix A: Class of 2009 Fellows

  19. NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2009 - May 2010

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

    2011-04-01

    In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 17th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. This annual report to reviews program activities from June 2009 through May 2010 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2009. Contents include: Welcome Letter (Mission Driven: It’s all about results), Introduction, Structure of the NGFP, Program Management Highlights, Annual Lifecycle, Class of 2009 Incoming Fellows, Orientation, Global Support of the Mission, Career Development, Management of the Fellows, Performance Highlights, Closing Ceremony, Where They Are Now, Alumni Highlight - Mission Success: Exceptional Leaders from the NGFP, Class of 2009 Fall Recruitment Activities, Established Partnerships, Face-to-Face, Recruiting Results, Interviews, Hiring and Clearances, Introducing the Class of 2010, Class of 2011 Recruitment Strategy, On the Horizon, Appendix A: Class of 2010 Fellow Biographies

  20. What does the NPT`s history tell us about its future?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sokolski, H.

    1995-12-31

    Although the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty`s (NPT) original objectives, which were first presented by the Irish in 1958, were quite limited and sound, new more sweeping objectives were added to NPT negotiations in the mid 1960s that have proved to be odds with the treaty`s original aims. Unless these more sweeping objectives to end {open_quotes}the nuclear arms race{close_quotes} between the U.S. and Russia and to promote the {open_quotes}fullest{close_quotes} international development of civilian nuclear weapons capabilities will become more difficult. Indeed, those most concerned about stopping the superpower arms race in NPT negotiations actually believed that all nations had a right to acquire nuclear weapons and would be better off having them is a neighbor proliferated or if nuclear disarmament between the superpowers was not achieved fairly soon. Those interested in developing civilian nuclear power (including those interested in developing plutonium-fueled reactors), meanwhile opposed proposals for intrusive inspections and, initially, even argued for sharing {open_quotes}peaceful{close_quotes} nuclear explosive technology. Some of these views are beginning to enjoy a revival. The elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are described and their contribution to a world-wide nonproliferation ethic is evaluated. Problems with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the international safeguards system, multilateral suppliers agreements, export controls, and bi-lateral arrangements are highlighted; and prospects for alleviating these problems are discussed. Specific issues considered include the recent framework agreement with North Korea, the impact of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty on non-proliferation, the U.S. proposed fissile material cutoff, the upcoming NPT Review Conference, and the situation in the Former Soviet Union.

  1. NNSA Administrator D'Agostino's 2010 Nonproliferation Travel Blog |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal of Honor recipients honored atIAEA Reporting,|National Nuclear

  2. Commercial Nuclear Reprocessing in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sherrill, Charles Leland; Balatsky, Galya Ivanovna

    2015-09-09

    The short presentation outline: Reprocessing Overview; Events leading up to Carter’s Policy; Results of the decision; Policy since Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. Conclusions reached: Reprocessing ban has become an easy and visible fix to the public concern about proliferation, but has not completely stopped proliferation; and, Reprocessing needs to become detached from political considerations, so technical research can continue, regardless of the policy decisions we decide to take.

  3. New Y-12 Mill Supports Non-Proliferation | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    This Site Budget IG Web Policy Privacy No Fear Act Accessibility FOIA Sitemap Federal Government The White House DOE.gov USA.gov Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA...

  4. New Y-12 Mill Supports Non-Proliferation | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) AugustA.MOXAdministrationOfficialsA 1

  5. 2012 Annual Planning Summary for NNSA Defense Nuclear NonProliferation |

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i n c i p a l De p u t y A s s i s t aReliability |Department of Energy

  6. Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support | U.S. DOE Office of

    Office of Science (SC) Website

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust,Field-effectWorkingLosThe 26thI D-Nicholas Turro, 1982 The Ernest

  7. Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested Parties - WAPA Public CommentInverted Attic9: JohnofReactor

  8. Initiatives in the US nuclear material tracking system

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, M.R.; Kuzmycz, G. [Department of Energy, Washington, DC (United States); Heaton, E.R. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

    1994-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nonproliferation and National Security is in the process of developing a new worldwide nuclear materials tracking system. Its purpose is for DOE to better fulfill its international and domestic nuclear material tracking obligations and needs. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), is developing the International Nuclear Analysis (INA) Program to meet this goal. LLNL will assume the function and duties of the current Nuclear Materials management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) operated by Martin Marietta Energy Systems. The program is jointly funded by the DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the US Enrichment Corporation.

  9. Micro-Analysis of Actinide Minerals for Nuclear Forensics and Treaty Verification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    M. Morey, M. Manard, R. Russo, G. Havrilla

    2012-03-22

    Micro-Raman spectroscopy has been demonstrated to be a viable tool for nondestructive determination of the crystal phase of relevant minerals. Collecting spectra on particles down to 5 microns in size was completed. Some minerals studied were weak scatterers and were better studied with the other techniques. A decent graphical software package should easily be able to compare collected spectra to a spectral library as well as subtract out matrix vibration peaks. Due to the success and unequivocal determination of the most common mineral false positive (zircon), it is clear that Raman has a future for complementary, rapid determination of unknown particulate samples containing actinides.

  10. NNSA Sites Host Head of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJessework usesof Energy MovingAdministration Dec 1,AboutNational(CTBTO)

  11. Improved Technology To Prevent Nuclear Proliferation And Counter Nuclear Terrorism

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richardson, J; Yuldashev, B; Labov, S; Knapp, R

    2006-06-12

    As the world moves into the 21st century, the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy will impose additional technical requirements to prevent proliferation. In addition to proliferation resistant reactors, a careful examination of the various possible fuel cycles from cradle to grave will provide additional technical and nonproliferation challenges in the areas of conversion, enrichment, transportation, recycling and waste disposal. Radiation detection technology and information management have a prominent role in any future global regime for nonproliferation. As nuclear energy and hence nuclear materials become an increasingly global phenomenon, using local technologies and capabilities facilitate incorporation of enhanced monitoring and detection on the regional level. Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation and countering radiological/nuclear terrorism. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, passive detection, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. For example, various gamma ray imaging approaches are being explored to combine spatial resolution with background suppression in order to enhance sensitivity many-fold at reasonable standoff distances and acquisition times. New materials and approaches are being developed in order to provide adequate energy resolution in field use without the necessity for liquid nitrogen. Different detection algorithms enable fissile materials to be distinguished from other radioisotopes.

  12. in this issuewe offer commentary on the Iran nuclear negotiations and a Q&A about the New Horizons mission to Pluto (below); the From The Faculty Chair

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    de Weck, Olivier L.

    in this issuewe offer commentary on the Iran nuclear negotiations and a Q&A about the New Horizons/October 2015 http://web.mit.edu/fnl Massachusetts Institute of Technology continued on page 8 Iran and the P5.S., China, Russia, France,UK,and Germany) and Iran,with respect to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

  13. Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zentner, Michael D.; Coles, Garill A.; Talbert, Robert J.

    2005-10-04

    A process is underway to develop mature, integrated methodologies to address nonproliferation issues. A variety of methodologies (both qualitative and quantitative) are being considered. All have one thing in common, a need for a consistent set of proliferation related data that can be used as a basis for application. One approach to providing a basis for predicting and evaluating future proliferation events is to understand past proliferation events, that is, the different paths that have actually been taken to acquire or attempt to acquire special nuclear material. In order to provide this information, this report describing previous material acquisition activities (obtained from open source material) has been prepared. This report describes how, based on an evaluation of historical trends in nuclear technology development, conclusions can be reached concerning: (1) The length of time it takes to acquire a technology; (2) The length of time it takes for production of special nuclear material to begin; and (3) The type of approaches taken for acquiring the technology. In addition to examining time constants, the report is intended to provide information that could be used to support the use of the different non-proliferation analysis methodologies. Accordingly, each section includes: (1) Technology description; (2) Technology origin; (3) Basic theory; (4) Important components/materials; (5) Technology development; (6) Technological difficulties involved in use; (7) Changes/improvements in technology; (8) Countries that have used/attempted to use the technology; (9) Technology Information; (10) Acquisition approaches; (11) Time constants for technology development; and (12) Required Concurrent Technologies.

  14. Nuclear rapprochement in Argentina and Brazil: Workshop summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    James E. Doyle

    1999-10-01

    On October 21 and 22, 1998, the Center for International Security Affairs at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Center for Global Security and Cooperation at Science Applications International Corporation hosted the first of a series of work-shops on states that have chosen to roll back their pursuit of nuclear arms. The objective of the workshop series is to conduct a systematic evaluation of the roles played by U.S. nonproliferation policy in cases of nuclear rollback or restraint and to provide recommendations for future nonproliferation efforts based on lessons learned. Key attendees at the workshop included officials and former officials from the foreign ministries of Argentina and Brazil, and current and former officials from the U.S. Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the Department of Energy (DOE). Scholars and independent researchers who have examined nuclear policy in Argentina and Brazil also participated. This workshop report includes important background information that helps set the stage for assessing nuclear policies in Argentina and Brazil. It describes national perspectives and areas of consensus and debate among the participants, particularly on the questions of lessons learned and their salience to proliferation challenges in other states. It also summarizes key questions and propositions regarding the roles played in these cases by U.S. nonproliferation policy.

  15. Improving the Safeguardability of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bari; D. Hebditch; P. Peterson; M. Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferation hazards while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significant expansion of nuclear energy use may occur. Correspondingly, the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives to contribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to apply SBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure. Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical protection, and safety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be applied usefully today within most national regulatory environments. Development of a mature approach to implementing SBD requires work in the areas of requirements definition, design processes, technology and methodology, and institutionalization. The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBD work for international safeguards that has recently been initiated by the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders including member States, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers, nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferation community.

  16. Annual Report of the Columbia River Treaty, Canadian and United States Entities, October 1, 1995--September 30, 1996.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Columbia River Treaty Operating Committee; B.C. Hydro; United States. Bonneville Power Administration

    1996-11-01

    Agreements approved by the Entities during the period of this report include: (1) Columbia River Treaty Entity Agreement on the Detailed Operating Plan for Columbia River Storage for 1 August 1995 through 31 July 1996, signed 31 January 1996. (2) Columbia River Treaty Entity Agreement on the Detailed Operating Plan for Columbia River Storage for 1 August 1996 through 31 July 1997, signed 29 August 1996. (3) Columbia River Treaty Entity Agreement on Resolving the Dispute on Critical Period Determination, the Capacity Entitlement for the 1998/99, 1999/00, and 2000/01 AOP/DDPB`s, and Operating Procedures for the 2001/02 and Future AOP`s, signed 29 August 1996.

  17. treaty verification

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 20123/%2Anational lab8/%2A en Global Material

  18. Measuring of fissile isotopes partial antineutrino spectra in direct experiment at nuclear reactor

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    V. V. Sinev

    2009-02-22

    The direct measuring method is considered to get nuclear reactor antineutrino spectrum. We suppose to isolate partial spectra of the fissile isotopes by using the method of antineutrino spectrum extraction from the inverse beta decay positron spectrum applied at Rovno experiment. This admits to increase the accuracy of partial antineutrino spectra forming the total nuclear reactor spectrum. It is important for the analysis of the reactor core fuel composition and could be applied for non-proliferation purposes.

  19. Nuclear forensics: Soil content

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beebe, Merilyn Amy

    2015-08-31

    Nuclear Forensics is a growing field that is concerned with all stages of the process of creating and detonating a nuclear weapon. The main goal is to prevent nuclear attack by locating and securing nuclear material before it can be used in an aggressive manner. This stage of the process is mostly paperwork; laws, regulations, treaties, and declarations made by individual countries or by the UN Security Council. There is some preliminary leg work done in the form of field testing detection equipment and tracking down orphan materials; however, none of these have yielded any spectacular or useful results. In the event of a nuclear attack, the first step is to analyze the post detonation debris to aid in the identification of the responsible party. This aspect of the nuclear forensics process, while reactive in nature, is more scientific. A rock sample taken from the detonation site can be dissolved into liquid form and analyzed to determine its chemical composition. The chemical analysis of spent nuclear material can provide valuable information if properly processed and analyzed. In order to accurately evaluate the results, scientists require information on the natural occurring elements in the detonation zone. From this information, scientists can determine what percentage of the element originated in the bomb itself rather than the environment. To this end, element concentrations in soils from sixty-nine different cities are given, along with activity concentrations for uranium, thorium, potassium, and radium in various building materials. These data are used in the analysis program Python.

  20. Virtual nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  1. A review of "Paper Sovereigns: Anglo-Native Treaties and the Law of Nations, 1604-1664" by Jeffrey Glover 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Scheick, William J.

    2014-01-01

    Sovereigns: Anglo-Native Treaties and the Law of Nations, 1604-1664. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. ix + 312 pp. $59.95. Review by william j. scheick, university of texas at austin. In Paper Sovereigns Jeffrey Glover necessarily...

  2. Comparison of Radionuclide Ratios in Atmospheric Nuclear Explosions and Nuclear Releases from Chernobyl and Fukushima seen in Gamma Ray Spectormetry

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Friese, Judah I.; Kephart, Rosara F.; Lucas, Dawn D.

    2013-05-01

    The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has remote radionuclide monitoring followed by an On Site Inspection (OSI) to clarify the nature of a suspect event. An important aspect of radionuclide measurements on site is the discrimination of other potential sources of similar radionuclides such as reactor accidents or medical isotope production. The Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear reactor disasters offer two different reactor source term environmental inputs that can be compared against historical measurements of nuclear explosions. The comparison of whole-sample gamma spectrometry measurements from these three events and the analysis of similarities and differences are presented. This analysis is a step toward confirming what is needed for measurements during an OSI under the auspices of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

  3. s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s NuclearSecurityandTerrorism

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    in the Bottle: Nuclear Non-proliferation in the New Millennium The end of the Cold War did not, as some hopeds s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s FUNSTEN SCIENCE LECTURE SERIES Nuclear-2054 www.smv.org #12;The Herbert O. Funsten Endowment of the Science Museum of Virginia presents Nuclear

  4. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

  5. Technical cooperation on nuclear security between the United States and China : review of the past and opportunities for the future.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-12-01

    The United States and China are committed to cooperation to address the challenges of the next century. Technical cooperation, building on a long tradition of technical exchange between the two countries, can play an important role. This paper focuses on technical cooperation between the United States and China in the areas of nonproliferation, arms control and other nuclear security topics. It reviews cooperation during the 1990s on nonproliferation and arms control under the U.S.-China Arms Control Exchange, discusses examples of ongoing activities under the Peaceful Uses of Technology Agreement to enhance security of nuclear and radiological material, and suggests opportunities for expanding technical cooperation between the defense nuclear laboratories of both countries to address a broader range of nuclear security topics.

  6. Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Doyle, James

    2010-01-01

    Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 committed to a continuing process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions beyond the new START treaty that was signed April 8, 2010 and to the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, the US Nuclear Posture review released April 6, 2010 commits the US to initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures. It is impossible to predict the specific directions that US-RU nuclear arms reductions will take over the 5-10 years. Additional bilateral treaties could be reached requiring effective verification as indicated by statements made by the Obama administration. There could also be transparency agreements or other initiatives (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) that require monitoring with a standard of verification lower than formal arms control, but still needing to establish confidence to domestic, bilateral and multilateral audiences that declared actions are implemented. The US Nuclear Posture Review and other statements give some indication of the kinds of actions and declarations that may need to be confirmed in a bilateral or multilateral setting. Several new elements of the nuclear arsenals could be directly limited. For example, it is likely that both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads (deployed and in storage), warhead components, and aggregate stocks of such items could be accountable under a future treaty or transparency agreement. In addition, new initiatives or agreements may require the verified dismantlement of a certain number of nuclear warheads over a specified time period. Eventually procedures for confirming the elimination of nuclear warheads, components and fissile materials from military stocks will need to be established. This paper is intended to provide useful background information for establishing a conceptual approach to a five-year technical program plan for research and development of nuclear arms reductions verification and transparency technologies and procedures.

  7. Reducing nuclear danger through intergovernmental technical exchanges on nuclear materials safety management

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Peddicord, K.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States); Witmer, F.E.; Krumpe, P.F. [USDOE, Washington, DC (United States); Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M. [Radievyj Inst., Leningrad (Russian Federation)

    1997-04-09

    The United States and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons and generating hundreds of tons of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium fissile nuclear materials that require disposition. The U.S. Department of Energy and Russian Minatom organizations.are planning and implementing safe, secure storage and disposition operations for these materials in numerous facilities. This provides a new opportunity for technical exchanges between Russian and Western scientists that can establish an improved and sustained common safety culture for handling these materials. An initiative that develops and uses personal relationships and joint projects among Russian and Western participants involved in fissile nuclear materials safety management contributes to improving nuclear materials nonproliferation and to making a safer world. Technical exchanges and workshops are being used to systematically identify opportunities in the nuclear fissile materials facilities to improve and ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment.

  8. Nuclear export controls and the CTBT: Where we`ve been and challenges ahead -- Views of an engineer

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lundy, A.S.

    1998-09-01

    The paper discusses the following topics: the importance of export controls; the uniqueness of nuclear weapons and their export control requirements; ``dual-use`` controls; and recent developments in nonproliferation beyond export control. Also discussed are some non-obvious challenges which include computer modeling and visualization, and fissile material availability and instant nukes. The author concludes by asking the Nuclear Suppliers Group to consider whether there are ways to make its controls more effective.

  9. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  10. Strengthening the nonproliferation regime : using case studies to determine the potential of multilateral arrangements

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Youchak, Paul (Paul M.)

    2011-01-01

    The resurgence of global interest in nuclear energy is fueled by growing energy demands, concerns of global warming, and the desire to diversify energy supply. In order for the nuclear renaissance to be safely realized, a ...

  11. The Nuclear Education and Staffing Challenge: Rebuilding Critical Skills in Nuclear Science and Technology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wogman, Ned A.; Bond, Leonard J.; Waltar, Alan E.; Leber, R E.

    2005-01-01

    The United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Laboratories, including the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), are facing a serious attrition of nuclear scientists and engineers and their capabilities through the effects of aging staff. Within the DOE laboratories, 75% of nuclear personnel will be eligible to retire by 2010. It is expected that there will be a significant loss of senior nuclear science and technology staff at PNNL within five years. PNNL's nuclear legacy is firmly rooted in the DOE Hanford site, the World War II Manhattan Project, and subsequent programs. Historically, PNNL was a laboratory were 70% of its activities were nuclear/radiological, and now just under 50% of its current business science and technology are nuclear and radiologically oriented. Programs in the areas of Nuclear Legacies, Global Security, Nonproliferation, Homeland Security and National Defense, Radiobiology and Nuclear Energy still involve more than 1,000 of the 3,800 current laboratory staff, and these include more than 420 staff who are certified as nuclear/radiological scientists and engineers. This paper presents the current challenges faced by PNNL that require an emerging strategy to solve the nuclear staffing issues through the maintenance and replenishment of the human nuclear capital needed to support PNNL nuclear science and technology programs.

  12. The Nuclear Education and Staffing Challenge: Rebuilding Critical Skills in Nuclear Science and Technology.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wogman, Ned A.; Bond, Leonard J.; Waltar, Alan E.; Leber, R. E.

    2005-01-01

    The United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Laboratories, including the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), are facing a serious attrition of nuclear scientists and engineers and their capabilities through the effects of aging staff. Within the DOE laboratories, 75% of nuclear personnel will be eligible to retire by 2010. It is expected that there will be a significant loss of senior nuclear science and technology staff at PNNL within five years. PNNL's nuclear legacy is firmly rooted in the DOE Hanford site, the World War II Manhattan Project, and subsequent programs. Historically, PNNL was a laboratory where 70% of its activities were nuclear/radiological, and now just under 50% of its current business science and technology are nuclear and radiologically oriented. Programs in the areas of Nuclear Legacies, Global Security, Nonproliferation, Homeland Security and National Defense, Radiobiology and Nuclear Energy still involve more than 1,000 of the 3,800 current laboratory staff, and these include more than 420 staff who are certified as nuclear/radiological scientists and engineers. This paper presents the current challenges faced by PNNL that require an emerging strategy to solve the nuclear staffing issues through the maintenance and replenishment of the human nuclear capital needed to support PNNL nuclear science and technology programs.

  13. Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Technology Roadmap

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Casey, Leslie A.

    2014-01-13

    This GNDD Technology Roadmap is intended to provide guidance to potential researchers and help management define research priorities to achieve technology advancements for ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring science being pursued by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team within the Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Four science-based elements were selected to encompass the entire scope of nuclear monitoring research and development (R&D) necessary to facilitate breakthrough scientific results, as well as deliver impactful products. Promising future R&D is delineated including dual use associated with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Important research themes as well as associated metrics are identified along with a progression of accomplishments, represented by a selected bibliography, that are precursors to major improvements to nuclear explosion monitoring.

  14. Believing Your Eyes: Strengthening the Reliability of Tags and Seals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brim, Cornelia P.; Denlinger, Laura S.

    2013-07-01

    NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) is working together with scientific experts at the DOE national laboratories to develop the tools needed to safeguard and secure nuclear material from diversion, theft, and sabotage--tasks critical to support future arms control treaties that may involve the new challenge of monitoring nuclear weapons dismantlement. Use of optically stimulated luminescent material is one method to enhance the security and robustness of existing tamper indicating devices such as tags and seals.

  15. Emergence of the nuclear industry and associated crime. Master's thesis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vaught, J.W.

    1991-08-01

    Nuclear energy, in weapons production and electrical power generation, is a technology that has endured public scrutiny since the late 1940s. Societal acceptance of this industry has been affected by controversy in the following areas: health effects of exposure to radiation, possible consequences resulting from accidents, and nuclear nonproliferation. The literature review begins in Chapter 2 by examining the changing public perceptions of nuclear energy over the last forty years. Support for the ideals and practices of the industry has often wavered, due to media representation of incidents, accidents, and potential catastrophic events. The second part of the chapter highlights the crimes associated with nuclear energy in a chronological order of concern by nuclear industry security specialists. Research has found certain types of crime to be more prevalent during particular eras than others. Crimes instigated by spies, peace activists, terrorists, and the insider (employee) are reviewed, with an emphasis on insider crime.

  16. Utility of Social Modeling in Assessment of a State’s Propensity for Nuclear Proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Whitney, Paul D.; Dalton, Angela C.; Olson, Jarrod; White, Amanda M.; Cooley, Scott K.; Youchak, Paul M.; Stafford, Samuel V.

    2011-06-01

    This report is the third and final report out of a set of three reports documenting research for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Security Administration (NASA) Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling program that investigates how social modeling can be used to improve proliferation assessment for informing nuclear security, policy, safeguards, design of nuclear systems and research decisions. Social modeling has not to have been used to any significant extent in a proliferation studies. This report focuses on the utility of social modeling as applied to the assessment of a State's propensity to develop a nuclear weapons program.

  17. Issues Associated with IAEA Involvement in Assured Nuclear Fuel Supply Arrangements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kessler, Carol E.; Mathews, Carrie E.

    2008-02-08

    Assured nuclear fuel supply has been discussed at various times as a mechanism to help limit expansion of enrichment and reprocessing (E&R) capability beyond current technology holders. Given the events in the last few years in North Korea and Iran, concern over weapons capabilities gained from acquisition of E&R capabilities has heightened and brought assured nuclear fuel supply (AFS) again to the international agenda. Successful AFS programs can be valuable contributions to strengthening the nonproliferation regime and helping to build public support for expanding nuclear energy.

  18. Recommendations for a Department of Energy Nuclear Energy R and D Agenda Volume 2 Appendices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1997-12-01

    The current US nuclear energy policy is primarily formulated as part of the nation`s overall energy policy. In addition, nuclear energy policy is impacted by other US policies, such as those for defense and environment, and by international obligations through their effects on nuclear weapons dismantlement and stewardship, continued reliance on space and naval nuclear power sources, defense waste cleanup, and on nuclear nonproliferation. This volume is composed of the following appendices: Appendix 1--Objectives of the Federal Government Nuclear Energy Related Policies and Research and Development Programs; Appendix 2--Nuclear Energy and Related R and D in the US; Appendix 3--Summary of Issues That Drive Nuclear Energy Research and Development; Appendix 4: Options for Policy and Research and Development; Appendix 5--Pros and Cons of Objectives and Options; and Appendices 6--Recommendations.

  19. Applications of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Warren, Glen A.; Detwiler, Rebecca S.; Peplowski, Patrick N.

    2010-11-11

    Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) has the potential of addressing a wide variety of applications, which require isotopic and/or elemental information about a sample. We have investigated a variety of non-proliferation applications that may be addressed by NRF. From these applications, we have selected two, measuring uranium enrichment in UF6 cylinders and material verification in dismantlement, to investigate in more detail. Analytical models have been developed to evaluate these applications, and test measurements have been conducted to validate those models. We found that it is unlikely with current technology to address the requirements for UF6 cylinder enrichment measurements. In contrast, NRF is a very promising approach for material verification for dismantlement.

  20. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-04-01

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  1. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph F

    2009-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferati

  2. A Nonproliferation Third Party for Dual-use Industries - Legal Issues for Consideration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Morris, Frederic A.; Seward, Amy M.; Kurzrok, Andrew J.

    2012-10-01

    This paper discusses legal issues in connection with formation of a “third party” to facilitate information sharing and best practices by companies in nuclear-related dual-use industries.

  3. NON-PROLIFERATION IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR GNEP: ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORTATION.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Radel, Ross; Rochau, Gary E.

    2008-03-01

    This report evaluates transportation issues for nuclear material in the proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) fuel cycle. Since many details of the GNEP program are yet to be determined, this document is intended only to identify general issues. The existing regulatory environment is determined to be largely prepared to incorporate the changes that the GNEP program will introduce. Nuclear material vulnerability and attractiveness are considered with respect to the various transport stages within the GNEP fuel cycle. Physical protection options are then outlined for the transportation of this nuclear material. It is determined that increased transportation security will be required for the GNEP fuel cycle, particularly for international transport. Finally, transportation considerations for several fuel cycle scenarios are discussed. These scenarios compare the current %22once-through%22 fuel cycle with various aspects of the proposed GNEP fuel cycle. 3

  4. U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    HEU and Convert Reactor WASHINGTON, D.C. - The U.S. Department of Energy and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) today announced that they have reached an important...

  5. Evolution of the Kazakstan export control system: The critical role of technical expertise

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wolfe, K.D.; Cernicek, A.T.

    1997-11-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Transfer and Supplier Policy Division is sponsoring technical cooperative agreements between Kazakstani partners and U.S. National Laboratories. Those agreements allow Kazakstan to make both political and technical advances in their nuclear export control policy. Kazakstan has shown a very serious commitment to nonproliferation ever since its independence and the subsequent rapid closing of the Semipalatinsk test site in 1991. The experience Kazakstan had with the test site, which was one of the more active in the world, has largely shaped its strong commitment to global nonproliferation. Kazakstan has taken seriously its responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation. Some of the many examples of that commitment are the complete disarmament of all inherited nuclear weapons, the 1994 signing of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the completion of a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and the transfer of 600 kg of highly enriched uranium to the United States through Project Sapphire. These actions all exhibit a strong Kazakstani devotion to nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, there are a variety of programs dealing with the very sensitive and important topic of material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) for the many nuclear sites within Kazakstan.

  6. United States Department of Energy Nuclear Materials Stewardship

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Newton, J. W.

    2002-02-27

    The Department of Energy launched the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative in January 2000 to accelerate the work of achieving integration and cutting long-term costs associated with the management of the Department's nuclear materials, with the principal focus on excess materials. Management of nuclear materials is a fundamental and enduring responsibility that is essential to meeting the Department's national security, nonproliferation, energy, science, and environmental missions into the distant future. The effective management of nuclear materials is important for a set of reasons: (1) some materials are vital to our national defense; (2) the materials pose physical and security risks; (3) managing them is costly; and (4) costs are likely to extend well into the future. The Department currently manages nuclear materials under eight programs, with offices in 36 different locations. Through the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative, progress was during calendar year 20 00 in achieving better coordination and integration of nuclear materials management responsibilities and in evaluating opportunities to further coordinate and integrate cross-program responsibilities for the treatment, storage, and disposition of excess nuclear materials. During CY 2001 the Departmental approach to nuclear materials stewardship changed consistent with the business processes followed by the new administration. This paper reports on the progress of the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative in evaluating and implementing these opportunities, and the remaining challenges in integrating the long-term management of nuclear materials.

  7. Recent Fast Neutron Imaging Measurements with the Fieldable Nuclear Materials Identification System

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wellington, Tracey; Palles, Blake A; Mullens, James Allen; Mihalczo, John T; Archer, Daniel E; Thompson, Thad; Britton Jr, Charles L; Ezell, N Dianne Bull; Ericson, Milton Nance; Farquhar, Ethan; Lind, Randall F; Carter, Jake

    2015-01-01

    This paper describes some recent fast neutron imaging measurements of the fieldable nuclear materials identification system (FNMIS) under development by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA-NA-22) for possible future use in arms control and nonproliferation applications. The general configuration of FNMIS has been previously described, and a description of the application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) electronics designed for FNMIS has been reported. This paper presents initial imaging measurements performed at ORNL with a Thermo Fisher API 120 DT generator and the fast-neutron imaging module of FNMIS.

  8. International Legal Framework for Denuclearization and Nuclear Disarmament – Present Situation and Prospects

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gastelum, Zoe N.

    2012-12-16

    This thesis is the culminating project for my participation in the OECD NEA International School of Nuclear Law. This paper will begin by providing a historical background to current disarmament and denuclearization treaties. This paper will discuss the current legal framework based on current and historical activities related to denuclearization and nuclear disarmament. Then, it will propose paths forward for the future efforts, and describe the necessary legal considerations. Each treaty or agreement will be examined in respect to its requirements for: 1) limitations and implementation; 2) and verification and monitoring. Then, lessons learned in each of the two areas (limitations and verification) will be used to construct a proposed path forward at the end of this paper.

  9. A Practical Approach to a Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Sustained Nuclear Energy - 12383

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Collins, Emory D.; Del Cul, Guillermo D.; Spencer, Barry B.; Williams, Kent A. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P.O. Box 2008, MS-6152, Oak Ridge TN 37831 (United States)

    2012-07-01

    Recent systems analysis studies at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have shown that sufficient information is available from previous research and development (R and D), industrial experience, and current studies to make rational decisions on a practical approach to a closed nuclear fuel cycle in the United States. These studies show that a near-term decision is needed to recycle used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the United States, to encourage public recognition that a practical solution to disposal of nuclear energy wastes, primarily UNF, is achievable, and to ensure a focus on essential near-term actions and future R and D. Recognition of the importance of time factors is essential, including the multi-decade time period required to implement industrial-scale fuel recycle at the capacity needed, and the effects of radioactive decay on proliferation resistance, recycling complexity, radioactive emissions, and high-level-waste storage, disposal form development, and eventual emplacement in a geologic repository. Analysis of time factors led to identification of the benefits of processing older fuel and an 'optimum decay storage time'. Further benefits of focused R and D can ensure more complete recycling of UNF components and minimize wastes requiring disposal. Analysis of recycling costs and nonproliferation requirements, which are often cited as reasons for delaying a decision to recycle, shows that (1) the differences in costs of nuclear energy with open or closed fuel cycles are insignificant and (2) nonproliferation requirements can be met by a combination of 'safeguards-by-design' co-location of back-end fuel cycle facilities, and applied engineered safeguards and monitoring. The study shows why different methods of separating and recycling used fuel components do not have a significant effect on nonproliferation requirements and can be selected on other bases, such as process efficiency, maturity, and cost-effectiveness. Finally, the study concludes that continued storage of UNF without a decision to recycle is not a solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal, but can be a deterrent to public confidence in nuclear energy. In summary, our studies have shown, in contrast to findings of the more prominent studies, that today we do have sufficient knowledge to make informed choices for the values and essential methods of UNF recycling, based on previous research, industrial experience, and current analyses. We have shown the significant importance of time factors, including the benefits of an optimum decay storage time on deploying effective nonproliferation safeguards, enabling reduced recycling complexity and environmental emissions, and optimizing waste management and disposal. Together with the multi-decade time required to implement industrial-scale UNF recycle at the capacity needed to match generation rate, our conclusion is that a near-term decision to recycle as many UNF components as possible is vitally needed. Further indecision and procrastination can lead to a loss of public confidence and favorable perception of nuclear energy. With no near-term decision, the path forward for UNF disposal will remain uncertain, with many diverse technologies being considered and no possible focus on a practical solution to the problem. However, a near-term decision to recycle UNF fuel and to take advantage of processing UNF and surface storing HLW, together with development and incorporation of more-complete recycling of UNF components, can provide the focus needed for a practical solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal. (authors)

  10. (12) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) (19) W(4orld Intellectual Property Organization III IIIIIIInIIIIIIII p aIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIII III IIIII

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Robins, Gabriel

    (12) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) (19) W(4orld.04.2012) PCT WO 20 12/047559 A2 (51) International Patent Classification: GOIS 5/02 (2010.01) G06K17/00 (2006, VC, VN, ZA, ZM, ZW. (84) Designated States (unless otherwise indicated,for every kind

  11. 10.1177/0270467603256088ARTICLEBULLETIN OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY / August 2003Kulkarni / CLIMATE CHANGE TREATY NEGOTIA-TIONS A Southern Critique of the Globalist

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Delaware, University of

    / CLIMATE CHANGE TREATY NEGOTIA-TIONS A Southern Critique of the Globalist Assumptions About Technology equitable solutions for develop- ing countries. Keywords: Kyoto Protocol, climate change, technology (United Nations, 1997). Technology Transfer in Global Climate Change Policy To make the GHG abatement

  12. Strategic Nuclear Research Collaboration - FY99 Annual Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. J. Leahy

    1999-07-01

    The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) has created the Strategic Nuclear Research Collaboration. The SNRC brings together some of America's finest laboratory and university nuclear researchers in a carefully focused research program intended to produce ''breakthrough'' solutions to the difficult issues of nuclear economics, safety, non-proliferation, and nuclear waste. This integrated program aims to address obstacles that stand in the way of nuclear power development in the US These include fuel cycle concerns related to waste and proliferation, the need for more efficient regulatory practices, and the high cost of constructing and operating nuclear power plants. Funded at an FY99 level of $2.58M, the SNRC is focusing the efforts of scientists and engineers from the INEEL and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to solve complex nuclear energy challenges in a carefully chosen, integrated portfolio of research topics. The result of this collaboration will be research that serves as a catalyst for future direct-funded nuclear research and technology development and which preserves and enhances the INEEL's role as America's leading national laboratory for nuclear power research. In its first year, the SNRC has focused on four research projects each of which address one or more of the four issues facing further nuclear power development (economics, safety, waste disposition and proliferation-resistance). This Annual Report describes technical work and accomplishments during the first year of the SNRC's existence.

  13. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  14. The Department of Energy`s Comprehensive Test Bank Treaty Research and Development Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Simons, D.; Stump, B.; Breding, D.; Casey, L.; Walker, L.; Zucca, J.; Harris, D.; Hannon, J.; Denny, M.; Patton, H.

    1995-12-31

    The U.S. DOE sponsored research investigating atmospheric infrasound as a means of detecting both atmospheric and underground nuclear tests. Various detection schemes were examined and were found to be effective for different situations. It has been discovered that an enhanced sensitivity is realizable for the very lowest frequency disturbances by detecting the infrasound at the top of the atmosphere using radio sound techniques. These techniques are compared to more traditional measurement schemes.

  15. Technical and Political Assessment of Peaceful Nuclear Power Program Prospects in North Africa and the Middle East

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Windsor, Lindsay K.; Kessler, Carol E.

    2007-09-11

    An exceptional number of Middle Eastern and North African nations have recently expressed interest in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Many of these countries have explored nuclear research in limited ways in the past, but the current focused interest and application of resources towards developing nuclear-generated electricity and nuclear-powered desalination plants is unprecedented. Consequently, questions arise in response to this emerging trend: What instigated this interest? To what end(s) will a nuclear program be applied? Does the country have adequate technical, political, legislative, nonproliferation, and safety infrastructure required for the capability desired? If so, what are the next steps for a country in preparation for a future nuclear program? And if not, what collaboration efforts are possible with the United States or others? This report provides information on the capabilities and interests of 13 countries in the region in nuclear energy programs in light of safety, nonproliferation and security concerns. It also provides information useful for determining potential for offering technical collaboration, financial aid, and/or political support.

  16. RISK-INFORMED BALANCING OF SAFETY, NONPROLIFERATION, AND ECONOMICS FOR THE SFR

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Apostolakis, George; Driscoll, Michael; Golay, Michael; Kadak, Andrew; Todreas, Neil; Aldmir, Tunc; Denning, Richard; Lineberry, Michael

    2011-10-20

    A substantial barrier to the implementation of Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) technology in the short term is the perception that they would not be economically competitive with advanced light water reactors. With increased acceptance of risk-informed regulation, the opportunity exists to reduce the costs of a nuclear power plant at the design stage without applying excessive conservatism that is not needed in treating low risk events. In the report, NUREG-1860, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission describes developmental activities associated with a risk-informed, scenario-based technology neutral framework (TNF) for regulation. It provides quantitative yardsticks against which the adequacy of safety risks can be judged. We extend these concepts to treatment of proliferation risks. The objective of our project is to develop a risk-informed design process for minimizing the cost of electricity generation within constraints of adequate safety and proliferation risks. This report describes the design and use of this design optimization process within the context of reducing the capital cost and levelized cost of electricity production for a small (possibly modular) SFR. Our project provides not only an evaluation of the feasibility of a risk-informed design process but also a practical test of the applicability of the TNF to an actual advanced, non-LWR design. The report provides results of five safety related and one proliferation related case studies of innovative design alternatives. Applied to previously proposed SFR nuclear energy system concepts We find that the TNF provides a feasible initial basis for licensing new reactors. However, it is incomplete. We recommend improvements in terms of requiring acceptance standards for total safety risks, and we propose a framework for regulation of proliferation risks. We also demonstrate methods for evaluation of proliferation risks. We also suggest revisions to scenario-specific safety risk acceptance standards, particularly concerning seismic and aircraft impactrelated risks. Most importantly, within the context of the TNF historical SFR safety concerns about energetic core disruptive accidents are seen to be unimportant, but those of rare scenarios mentioned above are seen to be of dominant concern. In terms of proliferation risks the SFR energy system is seen not to be of considerably greater concern than with other nuclear power technologies, providing that highly effective safeguards are employed. We find the economic performance of proposed SFRs likely, due to the problems of using sodium as a coolant, to be inferior to those of LWRs unless they can be credited for services to improve nuclear waste disposal, nuclear fuel utilization and proliferation risk reductions. None of the design innovations investigated offers the promise to reverse this conclusion. The most promising innovation investigated is that of improving the plant's thermodynamic efficiency via use of the supercritical CO{sub 2} (rather than steam Rankine) power conversion system. We were unable to reach conclusions about the economic and proliferation risk implications of competing nuclear fuel processing methods, as available designs are too little developed to justify any such results. Overall, we find the SFR to be a promising alternative to LWRs should the conditions governing the valuation change substantially from current ones.

  17. Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, L W; Moody, K J; Bradley, K S; Lorenzana, H E

    2011-02-18

    Global appetite for fission power is projected to grow dramatically this century, and for good reason. Despite considerable research to identify new sources of energy, fission remains the most plentiful and practical alternative to fossil fuels. The environmental challenges of fossil fuel have made the fission power option increasingly attractive, particularly as we are forced to rely on reserves in ecologically fragile or politically unstable corners of the globe. Caught between a globally eroding fossil fuel reserve as well as the uncertainty and considerable costs in the development of fusion power, most of the world will most likely come to rely on fission power for at least the remainder of the 21st century. Despite inevitable growth, fission power faces enduring challenges in sustainability and security. One of fission power's greatest hurdles to universal acceptance is the risk of potential misuse for nefarious purposes of fissionable byproducts in spent fuel, such as plutonium. With this issue in mind, we have discussed intrinsic concepts in this report that are motivated by the premise that the utility, desirability, and applicability of nuclear materials can be reduced. In a general sense, the intrinsic solutions aim to reduce or eliminate the quantity of existing weapons usable material; avoid production of new weapons-usable material through enrichment, breeding, extraction; or employ engineering solutions to make the fuel cycle less useful or more difficult for producing weapons-usable material. By their nature, these schemes require modifications to existing fuel cycles. As such, the concomitants of these modifications require engagement from the nuclear reactor and fuel-design community to fully assess their effects. Unfortunately, active pursuit of any scheme that could further complicate the spread of domestic nuclear power will probably be understandably unpopular. Nevertheless, the nonproliferation and counterterrorism issues are paramount, and we posit that the exploration, development, and implementation of intrinsic mechanisms such as discussed here are part of a balanced approach aimed at preventing the misuse of nuclear material for nuclear-energy applications.

  18. Integrated approach to nuclear materials safety management in the U.S. and Russia

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-06-01

    The United States and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons and generating hundreds of tons of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium fissile nuclear materials that require disposition. The U.S. Department of Energy and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (Minatom) organizations are planning and implementing safe, secure storage and disposition operations for these materials in numerous facilities. This provides a new opportunity for technical exchanges between Russian and Western scientists that can establish an integrated and improved common safety culture for handling these materials. The development and use of personal relationships and joint projects among Russian and Western participants involved in fissile nuclear materials safety management contributes to improving nuclear materials nonproliferation and to making a safer world. Technical exchanges and workshops are being used to systematically identify opportunities in the nuclear fissile materials facilities to improve and ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment.

  19. DOE-EIS-0218F Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (February 1996)

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) AugustA. Geographic Available for® ALOHA A R

  20. Columbia River Treaty Review - History and 2014/2024 Review Brochure

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 OutreachProductswsicloudwsiclouddenDVA N C E D BGene NetworkNuclearDNP 20082Innovation Portal CSU

  1. Analysis of Nuclear Reconstitution, Nuclear

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Forbes, Douglass

    CHAPTER Analysis of Nuclear Reconstitution, Nuclear Envelope Assembly, and Nuclear Pore Assembly ....................................................................... 180 8.5 Assaying Assembly and Integrity of the Nuclear Envelope................................... 182 8.6 A Nuclear Pore Complex Assembly Assay Using pore-free Nuclear Intermediates

  2. Nuclear Data Verification and Standardization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Karam, Lisa R.; Arif, Muhammad; Thompson, Alan K.

    2011-10-01

    The objective of this interagency program is to provide accurate neutron interaction verification and standardization data for the U.S. Department of Energy Division of Nuclear Physics programs which include astrophysics, radioactive beam studies, and heavy-ion reactions. The measurements made in this program are also useful to other programs that indirectly use the unique properties of the neutron for diagnostic and analytical purposes. These include homeland security, personnel health and safety, nuclear waste disposal, treaty verification, national defense, and nuclear based energy production. The work includes the verification of reference standard cross sections and related neutron data employing the unique facilities and capabilities at NIST and other laboratories as required; leadership and participation in international intercomparisons and collaborations; and the preservation of standard reference deposits. An essential element of the program is critical evaluation of neutron interaction data standards including international coordinations. Data testing of critical data for important applications is included. The program is jointly supported by the Department of Energy and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

  3. Large-scale Gadolinium-doped Water Cerenkov Detector for Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sweany, M; Bowden, N S; Dazeley, S; Keefer, G; Svoboda, R; Tripathi, M

    2011-01-01

    Fission events from Special Nuclear Material (SNM), such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, can produce simultaneous emission of multiple neutrons and high energy gamma-rays. The observation of time correlations between any of these particles is a significant indicator of the presence of fissionable material. Cosmogenic processes can also mimic these types of correlated signals. However, if the background is sufficiently low and fully characterized, significant changes in the correlated event rate in the presence of a target of interest constitutes a robust signature of the presence of SNM. Since fission emissions are isotropic, adequate sensitivity to these multiplicities requires a high efficiency detector with a large solid angle with respect to the target. Water Cerenkov detectors are a cost-effective choice when large solid angle coverage is required. In order to characterize the neutron detection performance of large-scale water Cerenkov detectors, we have designed and built a 3.5 kL water Cerenko...

  4. Aerial Neutron Detection: Neutron Signatures for Nonproliferation and Emergency Response Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Maurer, Richard J.; Stampahar, Thomas G.; Smith, Ethan X.; Mukhopadhyay, Sanjoy; Wolff, Ronald S.; Rourke, Timothy J.; LeDonne, Jeffrey P.; Avaro, Emanuele; Butler, D. Andre; Borders, Kevin L.; Stampahar, Jezabel; Schuck, William H.; Selfridge, Thomas L.; McKissack, Thomas M.; Duncan, William W.; Hendricks, Thane J.

    2012-10-17

    From 2007 to the present, the Remote Sensing Laboratory has been conducting a series of studies designed to expand our fundamental understanding of aerial neutron detection with the goal of designing an enhanced sensitivity detection system for long range neutron detection. Over 35 hours of aerial measurements in a helicopter were conducted for a variety of neutron emitters such as neutron point sources, a commercial nuclear power reactor, nuclear reactor spent fuel in dry cask storage, depleted uranium hexafluoride and depleted uranium metal. The goals of the project were to increase the detection sensitivity of our instruments such that a 5.4 × 104 neutron/second source could be detected at 100 feet above ground level at a speed of 70 knots and to enhance the long-range detection sensitivity for larger neutron sources, i.e., detection ranges above 1000 feet. In order to increase the sensitivity of aerial neutron detection instruments, it is important to understand the dynamics of the neutron background as a function of altitude. For aerial neutron detection, studies have shown that the neutron background primarily originates from above the aircraft, being produced in the upper atmosphere by galactic cosmic-ray interactions with air molecules. These interactions produce energetic neutrons and charged particles that cascade to the earth’s surface, producing additional neutrons in secondary collisions. Hence, the neutron background increases as a function of altitude which is an impediment to long-range neutron detection. In order to increase the sensitivity for long range detection, it is necessary to maintain a low neutron background as a function of altitude. Initial investigations show the variation in the neutron background can be decreased with the application of a cosmic-ray shield. The results of the studies along with a representative data set are presented.

  5. Director`s series on proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bailey, K.C.; Price, M.E. [eds.] [eds.

    1994-08-12

    This fifth edition contains some of the papers that were presented in July 1994 at the Lawrence Livermore National conference entitled ``NPT: Review and Extension.`` Topics covered include: strategic warning and new nuclear states, the future for nuclear weapons, possibly stopping North Korean nukes without a war, Article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty from the Chinese perspective, Article VI issues, Article VI and other NPT issues form the perspective of Russia, NPT review and extension, and finally problems facing total nuclear disarmament.

  6. The Governance of Nuclear Technology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vergino, E S; May, M

    2003-09-22

    Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech in 1953 is remembered for engaging the world, and the Soviet Union in particular, in a dialogue about arms control and the formulation of a nuclear regime in which national and international security concerns growing from this unprecedented emerging and frightening new weapons capability would be addressed while tapping the civilian promise of nuclear applications for the good of mankind. Out of it came a series of initiatives, leading fifteen years later to the NPT, intended to allow the growth and spread of the beneficial uses of nuclear know-how while constraining the incentives and capabilities for nuclear weapons. The last 50 years has seen a gradual spread in nations with nuclear weapons, other nations with nuclear knowledge and capabilities, and still others with nuclear weapon intentions. Still most nations of the world have forgone weapon development, most have signed and abided by the NPT, and some that have had programs or even weapons, have turned these capabilities off. Yet despite this experience, and despite a relatively successful record up to a few years ago, there is today a clear and generally recognized crisis in nuclear governance, a crisis that affects the future of all the cross-cutting civilian/security issues we have cited. The crux of this crisis is a lack of consensus among the major powers whose support of international efforts is necessary for effective governance of nuclear activities. The lack of consensus focuses on three challenges: what to do about non-compliance, what to do about non-adherence, and what to do about the possible leakage of nuclear materials and technologies to terrorist groups. Short of regaining consensus on the priority to be given to nuclear material and technology controls, it is unlikely that any international regime to control nuclear materials and technologies, let alone oversee a growth in the nuclear power sector, will be successful in the tough cases where it needs to be successful. Regaining that consensus on the other hand means alleviating some fundamental insecurity on the part of states, and weakening the hold that terrorist groups have on some state governments. This in turn requires that some fundamental issues be addressed, with recognition that these are part of a suite of complex and dynamic interactions. Among these issues are: How will states provide for their own security and other central interests while preventing further proliferation, protecting against the use of nuclear weapons, and yet allowing for the possible expansion of nuclear power?; How best can states with limited resources to fight terrorist activities and safeguard nuclear materials be assisted in securing their materials and technologies?; What is the future role of international inspections? Does the IAEA remain the right organization to carry out these tasks? If not, what are the desired characteristics of a successor agency and can there be agreement on one?; How confident can we be of nonproliferation as latent nuclear weapon capabilities spread? The policies to address these and other issues must explicitly deal with NPT members who do not observe their obligations; NPT non-members; illicit trade in SNM and weapon technologies and the possibility of a regional nuclear war.

  7. A Passive Tamper Indicating Enclosure For Use Within A Nuclear Weapons Monitoring Regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    White, Helen; Tanner, Jennifer E.; Allen, Keir; Benz, Jacob M.; McOmish, Sarah; Simmons, Kevin L.

    2012-10-01

    AWE and PNNL are engaged in a technical collaboration investigating techniques to enhance continuity of knowledge over Treaty Accountable Items, with emphasis on a verified nuclear weapons dismantlement process. Tamper Indicating Enclosures (TIE) will likely be deployed as part of a chain of custody regime to indicate an unauthorised attempt to access a Treaty Accountable Item, or secure authenticated monitoring equipment. In 2011, the collaboration presented a paper at the INMM annual conference held in Palm Desert, CA titled “Passive Tamper Indicating Enclosures Incorporating Embedded Optical Fibre”, which discussed the concept of integrating optical fibres into TIEs for use as a passive tamper indicating mechanism. This paper provides an update on the Fibre Optic based TIE and introduces a second passive TIE concept based on the use of Poly(Methyl MethAcrylate) (PMMA). Concepts relating to deployment, tamper indication, and unique identification will be discussed.

  8. Large-scale Gadolinium-doped Water Cerenkov Detector for Non-Proliferation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    M. Sweany; A. Bernstein; N. S. Bowden; S. Dazeley; G. Keefer; R. Svoboda; M. Tripathi

    2011-05-11

    Fission events from Special Nuclear Material (SNM), such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, can produce simultaneous emission of multiple neutrons and high energy gamma-rays. The observation of time correlations between any of these particles is a significant indicator of the presence of fissionable material. Cosmogenic processes can also mimic these types of correlated signals. However, if the background is sufficiently low and fully characterized, significant changes in the correlated event rate in the presence of a target of interest constitutes a robust signature of the presence of SNM. Since fission emissions are isotropic, adequate sensitivity to these multiplicities requires a high efficiency detector with a large solid angle with respect to the target. Water Cerenkov detectors are a cost-effective choice when large solid angle coverage is required. In order to characterize the neutron detection performance of large-scale water Cerenkov detectors, we have designed and built a 3.5 kL water Cerenkov-based gamma-ray and neutron detector, and modeled the detector response in Geant4 [1]. We report the position-dependent neutron detection efficiency and energy response of the detector, as well as the basic characteristics of the simulation.

  9. Press Releases | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Labs Press Release Oct 7, 2015 NNSA Provides Tajikistan Specialized Vehicles to Transport Radiological Materials Press Release Oct 7, 2015 DOENNSA's Nonproliferation Experts...

  10. Plutonium Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administrati...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    irradiating it in fast reactors operating under certain nonproliferation conditions. Irradiation in fast reactors is a technically credible approach for Russian plutonium...

  11. October 2010 | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Completes Largest Fuel Return Campaign 32 Years of Reactor Conversion NNSA Committed to Energy Efficiency, Savings NNSA Nonproliferation Program Develops Cutting-edge Dental...

  12. SAVANNAH RIVER SITE'S H-CANYON FACILITY: IMPACTS OF FOREIGN OBLIGATIONS ON SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Magoulas, V.

    2013-06-03

    The US has a non-proliferation policy to receive foreign and domestic research reactor returns of spent fuel materials of US origin. These spent fuel materials are returned to the Department of Energy (DOE) and placed in storage in the L-area spent fuel basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The foreign research reactor returns fall subject to the 123 agreements for peaceful cooperation. These “123 agreements” are named after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and govern the conditions of nuclear cooperation with foreign partners. The SRS management of these foreign obligations while planning material disposition paths can be a challenge.

  13. Sustainability Indicators for Open-Cycle Thorium-Fuelled Nuclear Energy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ashley, S. F.; Fenner, R. A.; Nuttall, W. J.; Parks, Geoffrey T.

    2012-06-28

    , sustainability and non-proliferation. Analysis techniques discussed. DOE2002a 24 Focus on future nuclear energy systems. Both thermal and fast systems considered. Main focus on reactor technology and safety. Jülich2007a 36 Table 2.1 from RED-IMPACT report... - 0123908124 (1999) (GA2002a) General Atomics “GT-MHR Conceptual Design Description Report” GA/NRC-337-02 (2002) (Guinée2002a) J.B. Guinée, M. Gorrée, R. Heijungs, G. Huppes, R. Kleijn, Ad. Koning et al. “Handbook on Life Cycle Assessment: Operational...

  14. New Horizons and New Strategies in Arms Control

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brown, J. editor

    1998-12-04

    In the last ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, remarkable progress in arms control and disarmament has occurred. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CWC) are indicative of the great strides made in the non- proliferation arena. Simultaneously, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), all associated with US-Soviet Union (now Russia) relations have assisted in redefining European relations and the security landscape. Finally, it now appears that progress is in the offing in developing enhanced compliance measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In sum, all of these achievements have set the stage for the next round of arms control activities, which may lead to a much broader, and perhaps more diffused multilateral agenda. In this new and somewhat unpredictable international setting, arms control and disarmament issues will require solutions that are both more creative and innovative than heretofore.

  15. Environmental Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-04-01

    The Department of Energy has completed the Environmental Assessment (EA) of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the proposed action. The EA and FONSI are enclosed for your information. The Department has decided to accept a limited number of spent nuclear fuel elements (409 elements) containing uranium that was enriched in the United States from eight research reactors in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. This action is necessary to maintain the viability of a major US nuclear weapons nonproliferation program to limit or eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium in civil programs. The purpose of the EA is to maintain the cooperation of the foreign research reactor operators with the nonproliferation program while a more extensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is prepared on a proposed broader policy involving the acceptance of up to 15,000 foreign research reactor spent fuel elements over a 10 to 15 year period. Based on an evaluation of transport by commercial container liner or chartered vessel, five eastern seaboard ports, and truck and train modes of transporting the spent fuel overland to the Savannah River Sits, the Department has concluded that no significant impact would result from any combination of port and made of transport. In addition, no significant impacts were found from interim storage of spent fuel at the Savannah River Site.

  16. Technology diffusion of a different nature: Applications of nuclear safeguards technology to the chemical weapons verification regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kadner, S.P. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Reisman, A. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Turpen, E. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Cambridge, MA (United States)

    1996-10-01

    The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

  17. Elementary! A Nuclear Forensics Workshop Teaches Vital Skills to International Practitioners

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brim, Cornelia P.; Minnema, Lindsay T.

    2014-04-01

    The article describes the Nuclear Forensics Workshop sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) and hosted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory October 28-November 8, 2013 in Richland,Washington. Twenty-six participants from 10 countries attended the workshop. Experts from from Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Pacific Northwest national laboratories collaborated with an internationally recognized cadre of experts from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and other U.S. agencies, IAEA, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, the United Kingdom Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), and the European Union Joint Research Center Institute for Transuranium Elements, to train practitioners in basic methodologies of nuclear forensic examinations.

  18. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Nuclear Materials Assay

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Quiter, Brian Joseph

    2010-01-01

    Potential of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence . . . . . . . .2.9.1 Nuclear ThomsonSections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nuclear Resonance

  19. Active Interrogation Using Electronic Neutron Generators for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    David L. Chichester; Edward H. Seabury

    2008-08-01

    Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. The most commonly used technique for performing active interrogation is to use an electronic neutron generator as the probe radiation source. Exploiting the unique operating characteristics of these devices, including their monoenergetic neutron emissions and their ability to operate in pulsed modes, presents a number of options for performing prompt and delayed signature analyses using both photon and neutron sensors. A review of literature in this area shows multiple applications of the active neutron interrogation technique for performing nuclear nonproliferation measurements. Some examples include measuring the plutonium content of spent fuel, assaying plutonium residue in spent fuel hull claddings, assaying plutonium in aqueous fuel reprocessing process streams, and assaying nuclear fuel reprocessing facility waste streams to detect and quantify fissile material. This paper discusses the historical use of this technique and examines its context within the scope and challenges of next-generation nuclear fuel cycles and advanced concept nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

  20. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    blistering the skin (mustard gas, arsenics, phosgene oxime,stockpile as consisting of mustard gas abandoned by the UK1984–1985 and 16,000 with mustard gas during 1983-1986. In

  1. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    to use natural or low enriched uranium (enriched only toenriched to low-enriched or natural uranium. In some cases

  2. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    Washington, D.C. : The National Security Archive. Wendt,Disarmament, and National Security, edited by D. P. Brennan.Disarmament, and National Security, edited by D. P. Brennan.

  3. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    from progress on uranium centrifuge enrichment (Officialenrich the uranium and the centrifuge method was limited bytubes for uranium enrichment centrifuges, the attempted

  4. Nonproliferation through delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brown, Robert Louis

    2008-01-01

    facilities for spent-fuel reprocessing to extract plutonium.what could be a large spent fuel reprocessing facility. Whendiversion of spent fuel for reprocessing to extract the

  5. non-proliferation

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 20123/%2A en46Afedkcp

  6. Developments in the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Engineering Degree Program at Tomsk Polytechnic University

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boiko, Vladimir I.; Demyanyuk, Dmitry G.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.

    2009-10-06

    Over the last six years, Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU) has developed a 5½ year engineering degree program in the field of Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A). In 2009 the first students graduated with this new degree. There were 25 job offers from nuclear fuel cycle enterprises of Russia and Kazakhstan for 17 graduates of the program. Due to the rather wide selection of workplaces, all graduates have obtained positions at nuclear enterprises. The program was developed within the Applied Physics and Engineering Department (APED). The laboratory and methodological base has been created taking into consideration the experience of the similar program at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI). However, the TPU program has some distinguishing features such as the inclusion of special courses pertaining to fuel enrichment and reprocessing. During the last two years, three MPC&A laboratories have been established at APED. This was made possible due to several factors such as establishment of the State innovative educational program at TPU, assistance of the U.S. Department of Energy through Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the financial support of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and some Russian private companies. All three of the MPC&A laboratories are part of the Innovative Educational Center “Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation,” which deals with many topics including research activities, development of new curricula for experts training and retraining, and training of master’s students. In 2008, TPU developed a relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was familiarized with APED’s current resources and activities. The IAEA has shown interest in creation of a master’s degree educational program in the field of nuclear security at TPU. A future objective is to acquaint nuclear fuel cycle enterprises with new APED capabilities and involve the enterprises in the scientific and educational projects implemented through the Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation Center. This paper describes the development of the MPC&A engineering degree program and future goals of TPU in the field of nonproliferation education.

  7. International and national security applications of cryogenic detectors - mostly nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rabin, Michael W

    2009-01-01

    As with science, so with security - in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma ray, neutron, and alpha particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invi sible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  8. Columbia River Treaty

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    acre-feet KCFS - thousand cubic feet per second KLBC - Kootenay Lake Board of Control LCA - Libby Coordination Agreement KSFD - thousand second-foot-days Maf - million acre-feet...

  9. Columbia River Treaty

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room News PublicationsAuditsCluster Compatibility Mode ClusterProtein structurein008

  10. Measurement and Characterization of Nuclear Material at Idaho National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. L. Dolan; M. Flaska; S. A. Pozzi; D. L. Chichester

    2009-07-01

    A measurement plan and preliminary Monte Carlo simulations are presented for the investigation of well-defined mixed-oxide fuel pins. Measurement analysis including pulse-height distributions and time-dependent cross-correlation functions will be performed separately for neutrons and gamma rays. The utilization of Monte Carlo particle transport codes, specifically MCNP-PoliMi, is discussed in conjunction with the anticipated measurements. Four EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors with an accurate pulse timing and digital, offline, optimized pulse-shape discrimination method will be used to prove the dependency of pulse-height distributions, cross-correlation functions, and material multiplicities upon fuel pin composition, fuel pin quantity, and detector geometry. The objective of the measurements and simulations is to identify novel methods for describing mixed-oxide fuel samples by relating measured quantities to fuel characteristics such as criticality, mass quantity, and material composition. This research has applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation.

  11. Implementation of IAEA safeguards at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Giacomini, J.J.; Finleon, C.A.; Larsen, R.K.; Lucas, M.; Langner, D.

    1995-07-01

    When President Clinton spoke to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1993, he offered to place US excess defense nuclear material under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, before the next Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. This set in motion a flurry of activities at three DOE facilities, including Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Site). With general guidance from DOE Headquarters, the facility selected a suitable storage area, identified appropriate materials, and acquired the necessary instrumentation to implement full-scale IAEA safeguards on excess plutonium oxide.

  12. Nuclear Matter and Nuclear Dynamics

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    M Colonna

    2009-02-26

    Highlights on the recent research activity, carried out by the Italian Community involved in the "Nuclear Matter and Nuclear Dynamics" field, will be presented.

  13. The Myth of International Delegation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Guzman, Andrew T.; Landsidle, Jennifer

    2008-01-01

    degradation, nuclear proliferation, disease – pose threatsnuclear activity and preventing violations of the Non-Proliferation

  14. ANU Annual Report 2008 85 86 ANU Annual Report 2008

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    and Nuclear Safety Agency ASNO Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office ASSDA Australian Social

  15. BAYESLOC

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (OSTI)

    002677WKSTN00 Bayesian Mulitple-Event Location  https://missions.llnl.gov/nonproliferation/nuclear-explosion 

  16. Regional Seminars to Address Current Nuclear Export Control Issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Killinger, Mark H.

    2002-07-01

    The control of nuclear-related exports, a critical component of the nonproliferation regime, is facing several opportunities and challenges. As countries sign and ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards Additional Protocol (AP), they will begin to report far more export information, including exports of a list of items similar to the Nuclear Supplier Group's Trigger List that existed when the AP was developed in the mid-1990s. This positive development contrasts with challenges such as globalization, transshipments, and tracking of end-uses. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is proposing that the US Department of Energy (DOE) develop regional seminars that address these types of issues related to export/import controls. The DOE seminars would be designed to supplement regional seminars sponsored by the IAEA and member states on topics related to the Additional Protocol (referred to as "IAEA seminars"). The topic of nuclear export/import controls is not thoroughly addressed in the IAEA seminars. The proposed DOE seminars would therefore have two objectives: familiarizing countries with the export/import provisions of the Additional Protocol, and addressing challenges such as those noted above. The seminars would be directed particularly at countries that have not ratified the AP, and at regions where export-related problems are particularly prevalent. The intent is to encourage governments to implement more effective nuclear export control systems that meet the challenges of the 21st century.

  17. Fusion Nuclear Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Fusion Nuclear Science Isotope Development and Production Nuclear Security Science & Technology Nuclear Systems Modeling, Simulation & Validation Nuclear Systems Technology...

  18. Production of an English/Russian glossary of terminology for nuclear materials control and accounting

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schachowskoj, S.; Smith, H.A. Jr.

    1995-05-01

    The program plans for Former Soviet Union National Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting (MC and A) Systems Enhancements call for the development of an English/Russian Glossary of MC and A terminology. This glossary was envisioned as an outgrowth of the many interactions, training sessions, and other talking and writing exercises that would transpire in the course of carrying out these programs. This report summarizes the status of the production of this glossary, the most recent copy of which is attached to this report. The glossary contains over 950 terms and acronyms associated with nuclear material control and accounting for safeguards and nonproliferation. This document is organized as follows: English/Russian glossary of terms and acronyms; Russian/English glossary of terms and acronyms; English/Russian glossary of acronyms; and Russian/English glossary of acronyms.

  19. Administrator Highlights U.S.-Georgian Nuclear Security Cooperation in Tbilisi

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2010-09-01

    NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino highlighted the strong U.S.-Georgian cooperation on nuclear security issues during a day-long visit to the Republic of Georgia in mid-June. He briefed the media at availability at the Tbilisi airport. In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, "the greatest danger to the American people." In order to meet that challenge, the President's FY2011 Budget Request includes close to $2.7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program -- an increase of 25.7 percent over FY2010. Included in that request is NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which works around the world to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system.

  20. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Nuclear Materials Assay

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Quiter, Brian Joseph

    2010-01-01

    to Journal of Nuclear Technology. [46] C.J. Hagmann and J.Library for Nuclear Science and Technology,” Nuclear Dataof Standards and Technology daughter nuclear data processing

  1. The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-10-04

    In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives of the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.

  2. Electromagnetic Signature Technique as a Promising Tool to Verify Nuclear Weapons Storage and Dismantlement under a Nuclear Arms Control Regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bunch, Kyle J.; Williams, Laura S.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep

    2012-08-01

    The 2010 ratification of the New START Treaty has been widely regarded as a noteworthy national security achievement for both the Obama administration and the Medvedev-Putin regime, but deeper cuts are envisioned under future arms control regimes. Future verification needs will include monitoring the storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondaries, and other materials. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under future arms control regimes will pose new challenges. Since acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes, non-nuclear non-sensitive signatures may provide a significant verification tool without the use of additional information barriers. The use of electromagnetic signatures to monitor nuclear material storage containers is a promising technology with the potential to fulfill these challenging requirements. Research performed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to confirm the presence of specific components on a “yes/no” basis without revealing classified information. Arms control inspectors might use this technique to verify the presence or absence of monitored items, including both nuclear and non-nuclear materials. Although additional research is needed to study signature aspects such as uniqueness and investigate container-specific scenarios, the technique potentially offers a rapid and cost-effective tool to verify reduction and dismantlement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.

  3. Nuclear Navy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-01-01

    This video tells the story of the Navy's development of nuclear power and its application in long-range submarines and the growing nuclear surface force. Narrated by Frank Blair.

  4. Nuclear Navy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1994-12-31

    This video tells the story of the Navy`s development of nuclear power and its application in long-range submarines and the growing nuclear surface force. Narrated by Frank Blair.

  5. Nuclear Power 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    2010-01-01

    be inherently safe and environmentally benign. These realities of today's world are among the reasons that lead to serious interest in deploying nuclear power as a sustainable energy source. Today's nuclear reactors are safe and highly efficient energy systems...

  6. Nuclear Engineer

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This position is located in the Nuclear Safety Division (NSD) which has specific responsibility for managing the development, analysis, review, and approval of non-reactor nuclear facility safety...

  7. Surface effects of underground nuclear explosions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allen, B.M.; Drellack, S.L. Jr.; Townsend, M.J.

    1997-06-01

    The effects of nuclear explosions have been observed and studied since the first nuclear test (code named Trinity) on July 16, 1945. Since that first detonation, 1,053 nuclear tests have been conducted by the US, most of which were sited underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The effects of underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) on their surroundings have long been the object of much interest and study, especially for containment, engineering, and treaty verification purposes. One aspect of these explosion-induced phenomena is the disruption or alteration of the near-surface environment, also known as surface effects. This report was prepared at the request of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), to bring together, correlate, and preserve information and techniques used in the recognition and documentation of surface effects of UNEs. This report has several main sections, including pertinent background information (Section 2.0), descriptions of the different types of surface effects (Section 3.0), discussion of their application and limitations (Section 4.0), an extensive bibliography and glossary (Section 6.0 and Appendix A), and procedures used to document geologic surface effects at the NTS (Appendix C). Because a majority of US surface-effects experience is from the NTS, an overview of pertinent NTS-specific information also is provided in Appendix B. It is not within the scope of this report to explore new relationships among test parameters, physiographic setting, and the types or degree of manifestation of surface effects, but rather to compile, summarize, and capture surface-effects observations and interpretations, as well as documentation procedures and the rationale behind them.

  8. A {open_quotes}New{close_quotes} regime for nuclear weapons and materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-02-15

    In this paper, I discuss the principal ideas that I covered in my presentation on December 8, 1993, at the Future of Foreign Nuclear Materials Symposium held by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I was asked to discuss issues related to military inventories of plutonium, and I took this opportunity to describe a possible declaratory regime that could encompass military as well as civilian inventories of plutonium. The {open_quote}new{close_quotes} in the title does not imply that the regime discussed here is an original idea. Rather, the regime will be {open_quotes}new,{close_quotes} when it is adopted. The regime proposed here and in other works is one in which all stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are declared. Originally, declarations were proposed as a traditional arms control measure. Here, declarations are proposed to support the prevention of misuse of nuclear weapons and materials, including support for the nonproliferation regime. In the following, I discuss: (1) Worldwide inventories of nuclear weapons and materials, including the fact that military plutonium must be viewed as part of that worldwide inventory. (2) Life cycles of nuclear weapons and materials, including the various stages from the creation of nuclear materials for weapons through deployment and retirement of weapons to the final disposition of the materials. (3) Mechanisms for making declarations. (4) Risks and benefits to be derived from declarations. (5) Possibilities for supporting evidence or verification.

  9. Technosocial Modeling for Determining the Status and Nature of a State’s Nuclear Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Harvey, Julia B.

    2009-09-25

    The International Atomic Energy Agency State Evaluation Process: The Role of Information Analysis in Reaching Safeguards Conclusions (Mathews et al. 2008), several examples of nonproliferation models using analytical software were developed that may assist the IAEA with collecting, visualizing, analyzing, and reporting information in support of the State Evaluation Process. This paper focuses on one of the examples a set of models developed in the Proactive Scenario Production, Evidence Collection, and Testing (ProSPECT) software that evaluates the status and nature of a state’s nuclear activities. The models use three distinct subject areas to perform this assessment: the presence of nuclear activities, the consistency of those nuclear activities with national nuclear energy goals, and the geopolitical context in which those nuclear activities are taking place. As a proof-of-concept for the models, a crude case study was performed. The study, which attempted to evaluate the nuclear activities taking place in Syria prior to September 2007, yielded illustrative, yet inconclusive, results. Due to the inconclusive nature of the case study results, changes that may improve the model’s efficiency and accuracy are proposed.

  10. PROBING DENSE NUCLEAR MATTER VIA NUCLEAR COLLISIONS

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Stocker, H.

    2012-01-01

    shocked nuclear matter during the compression and expansionand isentropic expansion were valid in nuclear collisions.

  11. 2013 Nuclear Workforce Development ...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Nuclear Workforce Development Day Tuesday, October 22, 2013 Nuclear Medicine Topics: Pathways of Practice in Nuclear Medicine Radiopharmacy Patient Care ...

  12. Nuclear Counterterrorism

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-08-26

    The Order defines requirements for the protection of sensitive improvised nuclear device information and provides a framework to support DOE activities related to nuclear counterterrorism. (A supplemental DOE Manual, Control of and Access to Improvised Nuclear Device Information, provides requirements and procedures for protecting Sigma 20 information.) Appendices A and B are Official Use Only. Point of contact is Adam Boyd (NA-82), 202-586-0010. Supersedes DOE O 457.1 and DOE M 457.1-1.

  13. Nuclear shadowing

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    N. Armesto

    2006-07-05

    The phenomenon of shadowing of nuclear structure functions at small values of Bjorken-$x$ is analyzed. First, multiple scattering is discussed as the underlying physical mechanism. In this context three different but related approaches are presented: Glauber-like rescatterings, Gribov inelastic shadowing and ideas based on high-density Quantum Chromodynamics. Next, different parametrizations of nuclear partonic distributions based on fit analysis to existing data combined with Dokshitzer-Gribov-Lipatov-Altarelli-Parisi evolution, are reviewed. Finally, a comparison of the different approaches is shown, and a few phenomenological consequences of nuclear shadowing in high-energy nuclear collisions are presented.

  14. Advanced international training course on state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1981-10-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the Advanced International Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material held April 27 through May 12, 1981 at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards. Major emphasis for the 1981 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at both the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, Richland, Washington.

  15. Survey and discussion of models applicable to the transport and fate thrust area of the Department of Energy Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-09-01

    The availability and easy production of toxic chemical and biological agents by domestic and international terrorists pose a serious threat to US national security, especially to civilian populations in and around urban areas. To address this threat, the Department of Energy (DOE) has established the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP) with the goal of focusing the DOE`s technical resources and expertise on capabilities to deny, deter, mitigate and respond to clandestine releases of chemical and biological agents. With the intent to build on DOE core competencies, the DOE has established six technology thrust areas within the CBNP Program: Biological Information Resources; Point Sensor Systems; Stand-off Detection; Transport and Fate; Decontamination; and Systems Analysis and Integration. The purpose of the Transport and Fate Thrust is to accurately predict the dispersion, concentration and ultimate fate of chemical and biological agents released into the urban and suburban environments and has two major goals: (1) to develop an integrated and validated state-of-the-art atmospheric transport and fate modeling capability for chemical and biological agent releases within the complex urban environment from the regional scale down to building and subway interiors, and (2) to apply this modeling capability in a broad range of simulation case studies of chemical and biological agent release scenarios in suburban, urban and confined (buildings and subways) environments and provide analysis for the incident response user community. Sections of this report discuss subway transport and fate models; buildings interior transport and fate modeling; models for flow and transport around buildings; and local-regional meteorology and dispersion models.

  16. PROBING DENSE NUCLEAR MATTER VIA NUCLEAR COLLISIONS

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Stocker, H.

    2012-01-01

    University of California. LBL-12095 Probing Dense NuclearMatter Nuclear Collisions* v~a H. Stocker, M.Gyulassy and J. Boguta Nuclear Science Division Lawrence

  17. Nuclear Systems Modeling, Simulation & Validation | Nuclear Science...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Research Areas Fuel Cycle Science & Technology Fusion Nuclear Science Isotope Development and Production Nuclear Security Science & Technology Nuclear Systems Modeling, Simulation...

  18. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Nuclear Materials Assay

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Quiter, Brian Joseph

    2010-01-01

    130] International Nuclear Safety Center, Available onlinefrom Inter- national Nuclear Safety Center (INSC) website(from International Nuclear Safety Center (INSC) website(

  19. SIGNATURES OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY APPROACHES AND RESULTS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Webster, Jennifer B.; Erikson, Luke E.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Lewis, Valerie A.; Best, Daniel M.; Hogan, Emilie A.; Chikkagoudar, Satish

    2014-05-12

    The illicit trafficking of strategic nuclear commodities (defined here as the goods needed for a covert nuclear program excluding special nuclear materials) poses a significant challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation community. Export control regulations, both domestically and internationally, seek to inhibit the spread of strategic nuclear commodities by restricting their sale to parties that may use them for nefarious purposes. However, export controls alone are not sufficient for preventing the illicit transfer of strategic nuclear goods. There are two major pitfalls to relying solely on export control regulations for the deterrence of proliferation of strategic goods. First, export control enforcement today relies heavily on the honesty and willingness of participants to adhere to the legal framework already in place. Secondly, current practices focus on the evaluation of single records which allow for the necessary goods to be purchased separately and hidden within the thousands of legitimate commerce transactions that occur each day, disregarding strategic information regarding several purchases. Our research presents two preliminary data-centric approaches for investigating procurement networks of strategic nuclear commodities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been putting significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. In particular, the PNNL Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI) has codified several scientific methodologies for the detection, characterization, and prediction of signatures that are indicative of a phenomenon of interest. The methodologies and tools developed under SDI have already been applied successfully to problems in bio-forensics, cyber security and power grid balancing efforts and they have now made the nonproliferation of strategic goods into a challenge problem for testing their methodology and tools. As a first step towards the detection and characterization of illicit procurement networks, our research examines procurement networks as defined by a system of entities (people or companies) that enter into transactions of specific items with one another. Once we have defined such networks, we are interested in answering questions about the behavior and characterization of such networks. The questions we wish to answer regarding procurement networks are, first, “Can we detect networks within large, noisy datasets?” and second, “To what extent can we compare multiple networks and identify their similarities?” As procurement networks can be naturally viewed as a graph, we have employed several graph analytic tools to aid in these tasks. In particular, Graphscape, an SDI tool, uses a novel method to approximate edit distance, a graph distance measure based on the number of changes needed to transform one graph into another, in order to measure how similar two given graphs are to each other. Given a set of graphs where vertices represent companies and edges represent a shipment from company A to company B, we can calculate an all-for-all comparison of graphs. In this way, we are able to determine which graphs are most similar, and which require more changes to transform one into the other. The set of graphs to be compared can be further specialized to provide more insight, e.g., using different time periods to explore events in a company life cycle.

  20. Persistence of gamma-H2AX and 53BP1 foci in proliferating and nonproliferating human mammary epithelial cells after exposure to gamma-rays or iron ions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Groesser, Torsten; Chang, Hang; Fontenay, Gerald; Chen, James; Costes, Sylvain V.; Barcellos-Hoff, Mary Helen; Parvin, Bahram; Rydberg, Bjorn

    2010-12-22

    To investigate {gamma}-H2AX (phosphorylated histone H2AX) and 53BP1 (tumour protein 53 binding protein No. 1) foci formation and removal in proliferating and non-proliferating human mammary epithelial cells (HMEC) after exposure to sparsely and densely ionizing radiation under different cell culture conditions. HMEC cells were grown either as monolayers (2D) or in extracellular matrix to allow the formation of acinar structures in vitro (3D). Foci numbers were quantified by image analysis at various time points after exposure. Our results reveal that in non-proliferating cells under 2D and 3D cell culture conditions, iron-ion induced {gamma}-H2AX foci were still present at 72 h after exposure, although 53BP1 foci returned to control levels at 48 h. In contrast in proliferating HMEC, both {gamma}-H2AX and 53BP1 foci decreased to control levels during the 24-48 h time interval after irradiation under 2D conditions. Foci numbers decreased faster after {gamma}-ray irradiation and returned to control levels by 12 h regardless of marker, cell proliferation status, and cell culture condition. Conclusions: The disappearance of radiation induced {gamma}-H2AX and 53BP1 foci in HMEC have different dynamics that depend on radiation quality and proliferation status. Notably, the general patterns do not depend on the cell culture condition (2D versus 3D). We speculate that the persistent {gamma}-H2AX foci in iron-ion irradiated non-proliferating cells could be due to limited availability of double strand break (DSB) repair pathways in G0/G1-phase, or that repair of complex DSB requires replication or chromatin remodeling.

  1. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1984-06-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held October 17 through November 4, 1983, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a State system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1983 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Westinghouse Fast Flux Test Facility Visitor Center, and Washington Public Power System nuclear reactor facilities in Richland, Washington. Individual presentations were indexed for inclusion in the Energy Data Base.

  2. RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY; NUCLEAR MEDICINE; HISTORICAL

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    The early days Richards, P. 38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY; NUCLEAR MEDICINE; HISTORICAL ASPECTS; TECHNETIUM 99; COLLOIDS; MOLYBDENUM...

  3. National Nuclear Security Administration | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    National Nuclear Security Administration | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing...

  4. Climate Change, Nuclear Power and Nuclear

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Climate Change, Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation: Magnitude Matters Rob Goldston MIT IAP biomass wind hydro coal CCS coal nat gas CCS nat gas nuclear Gen IV nuclear Gen III nuclear Gen II 5-1 Electricity Generation: CCS and Nuclear Power Technology Options Available Global Electricity Generation WRE

  5. Nuclear Counterterrorism

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-02-07

    The Order defines requirements for the protection of sensitive improvised nuclear device information and provides a framework to support DOE activities related to nuclear counterterrorism. (A supplemental DOE Manual, Control of and Access to Improvised Nuclear Device Information, provides requirements and procedures for protecting Sigma 20 information. The Manual is Official Use Only, and is not available on the Directives Portal. The point of contact for the Manual is Randall Weidman, NA-121.2, 202-586-4582.) Canceled by DOE O 457.1A

  6. Nuclear Science and Engineering

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bahler, Dennis R.

    Nuclear Science and Engineering Education Sourcebook 2014 American Nuclear Society US Department of Energy #12;Nuclear Science & Engineering Education Sourcebook 2014 North American Edition American Nuclear Society Education, Training, and Workforce Division US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear

  7. nuclear navy

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    7%2A en Powering the Nuclear Navy http:www.nnsa.energy.govourmissionpoweringnavy

    Page...

  8. Nuclear Celebrations

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hacker, Randi; Tsutsui, William

    2006-11-01

    Broadcast Transcript: The North Korean situation is frightening for many reasons but none, perhaps, more eerily disturbing than images of North Koreans celebrating in brightly colored costumes just days after the nation's underground nuclear test...

  9. Nuclear Data

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    White, Morgan C.

    2014-01-23

    PowerPoint presentation targeted for educational use. Nuclear data comes from a variety of sources and in many flavors. Understanding where the data you use comes from and what flavor it is can be essential to understand and interpret your results. This talk will discuss the nuclear data pipeline with particular emphasis on providing links to additional resources that can be used to explore the issues you will encounter.

  10. Supporting Organizations | Nuclear Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Nuclear Science Engineering Fusion & Materials for Nuclear Systems Nuclear Science Home | Science & Discovery | Nuclear Science | Supporting Organizations SHARE Supporting...

  11. Nuclear Science/Nuclear Chemistry

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDid you notHeatMaRIEdioxideUser Work FeaturedNuclearNP Home NuclearNuclear

  12. Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Norbo Underground Nuclear Test in U8c, Nevada Nuclear Security Site, and the Impact on Stability of the Ground Surface

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pawloski, G A

    2012-06-18

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys.

  13. Concept of Operations for Nuclear Warhead Embedded Sensors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rockett, P D; Koncher, T R

    2012-05-16

    Embedded arms-control-sensors provide a powerful new paradigm for managing compliance with future nuclear weapons treaties, where deployed warhead numbers will be reduced to 1000 or less. The CONOPS (Concept of Operations) for use with these sensors is a practical tool with which one may help define design parameters, including size, power, resolution, communications, and physical structure. How frequently must data be acquired and must a human be present? Will such data be acquired for only stored weapons or will it be required of deployed weapons as well? Will tactical weapons be subject to such monitoring or will only strategic weapons apply? Which data will be most crucial? Will OSI's be a component of embedded sensor data management or will these sensors stand alone in their data extraction processes? The problem space is massive, but can be constrained by extrapolating to a reasonable future treaty regime and examining the bounded options this scenario poses. Arms control verification sensors, embedded within the warhead case or aeroshell, must provide sufficient but not excessively detailed data, confirming that the item is a nuclear warhead and that it is a particular warhead without revealing sensitive information. Geolocation will be provided by an intermediate transceiver used to acquire the data and to forward the data to a central processing location. Past Chain-of-Custody projects have included such devices and will be primarily responsible for adding such indicators in the future. For the purposes of a treaty regime a TLI will be verified as a nuclear warhead by knowledge of (a) the presence and mass of SNM, (b) the presence of HE, and (c) the reporting of a unique tag ID. All of these parameters can be obtained via neutron correlation measurements, Raman spectroscopy, and fiber optic grating fabrication, respectively. Data from these sensors will be pushed out monthly and acquired nearly daily, providing one of several verification layers in depth, including on-site inspections, NTM, declarations, and semi-annual BCC meetings. Human intervention will not be necessary. The sheer numbers, small size, and wide distribution of warhead TLIs will mandate the added level of remote monitoring that Embedded Sensors can provide. This multilayer protection will limit the need to increase the frequency of OSIs, by adding confidence that declared TLIs remain as declared and that no undeclared items enter the regime without the other States Party's knowledge. Acceptance of Embedded arms control Sensor technologies will require joint development by all State's Parties involved. Principles of operation and robustness of technologies must be individually evaluated to sustain confidence in the strength of this system against attack. Weapons designers must be assured that these sensors will in no way impact weapon performance and operation, will not affect weapons security and safety, and will have a neutral impact upon weapon system surety. Each State's Party will need to conduct an in depth review of their weapons lifecycle to determine where moves may be reduced to minimize vulnerabilities and where random selection may be used to minimize the ability to make undeclared changes. In the end Verification is a political measure, not a technical one. If the potential users can gain sufficient confidence in the application of Embedded arms control Sensors, they could constitute the final layer of glue to hold together the next Nuclear Arms Control agreement.

  14. --No Title--

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Sara Pozzi Applied Nuclear Physics for Nuclear Nonproliferation Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is a top priority for our nation and the world. The Nuclear...

  15. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1986-06-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held June 3 through June 21, 1985, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and San Clemente, California. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1985 course was placed on safeguards methods used at item-control facilities, particularly nuclear power generating stations and test reactors. An introduction to safeguards methods used at bulk handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants, was also included. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Southern California Edison Company. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, San Clemente, California.

  16. Examination of the role of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: a systems analysis approach

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Martz, Joseph C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stevens, Patrice A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Branstetter, Linda [SNL; Hoover, Edward [SNL; O' Brien, Kevin [SNL; Slavin, Adam [SNL; Caswell, David [STANFORD UNIV

    2010-01-01

    Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spread of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.

  17. Proceedings of the 2011 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wetovsky, Marvin A.; Patterson, Eileen F.; Sandoval, Marisa N.

    2011-09-13

    These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2011: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 13-15 September, 2011 in Tucson, Arizona. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), National Science Foundation (NSF), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States' capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

  18. Proceedings of the 2010 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wetovsky, Marvin A.; Patterson, Eileen F.

    2010-09-21

    These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2010: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 21-23 September, 2010 in Orlando, Florida,. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, National Science Foundation (NSF), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

  19. Proceedings of the 30th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wetovsky, Marv A; Aguilar-chang, Julio; Arrowsmith, Marie; Arrowsmith, Stephen; Baker, Diane; Begnaud, Michael; Harste, Hans; Maceira, Monica; Patton, Howard; Phillips, Scott; Randall, George; Revelle, Douglas; Rowe, Charlotte; Stead, Richard; Steck, Lee; Whitaker, Rod; Yang, Xiaoning

    2008-09-23

    These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 30th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 23-25 September, 2008 in Portsmouth, Virginia. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States’ capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

  20. Proceedings of the 28th Seismic Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wetovsky, Marvin A.; Benson, Jody; Patterson, Eileen F.

    2006-09-19

    These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 28th Seismic Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 19-21 September, 2006 in Orlando, Florida. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

  1. Proceedings of the 29th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wetovsky, Marvin A.; Benson, Jody; Patterson, Eileen F.

    2007-09-25

    These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 29th Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 25-27 September, 2007 in Denver, Colorado. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

  2. Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: The non-proliferation

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield MunicipalTechnicalInformation4563AbuseConnectJournal(Conference) |SciTechassociated

  3. NUCLEAR PROXIMITY FORCES

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Randrup, J.

    2011-01-01

    One might summarize of nuclear potential energy has beendegree of freedom) for the nuclear interaction between anyUniversity of California. Nuclear Proximity Forces 'I< at

  4. Nuclear Waste: Forever Contaminated?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    Impacts of the Fukushima nuclear power plants on marineAccident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Epidemiologicand projected nuclear power. Environ. Sci. Technol. , 47,

  5. Nuclear Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    and Reports News and Awards Supporting Organizations Home | Science & Discovery | Nuclear Science Nuclear Science | Nuclear Science SHARE In World War II's Manhattan Project,...

  6. Nuclear Waste: Forever Contaminated?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    Impacts of the Fukushima nuclear power plants on marineBeyond Fukushima: Disasters, nuclear energy, and energy law.Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law (December 20, 2011). Brigham

  7. Nuclear Science & Technology

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Nuclear Science & Technology Nuclear Science & Technology1354608000000Nuclear Science & TechnologySome of these resources are LANL-only and will require Remote Access. No...

  8. Nuclear Reactions

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    C. A. Bertulani

    2010-07-14

    Nuclear reactions generate energy in nuclear reactors, in stars, and are responsible for the existence of all elements heavier than hydrogen in the universe. Nuclear reactions denote reactions between nuclei, and between nuclei and other fundamental particles, such as electrons and photons. A short description of the conservation laws and the definition of basic physical quantities is presented, followed by a more detailed account of specific cases: (a) formation and decay of compound nuclei; (b)direct reactions; (c) photon and electron scattering; (d) heavy ion collisions; (e) formation of a quark-gluon plasma; (f) thermonuclear reactions; (g) and reactions with radioactive beams. Whenever necessary, basic equations are introduced to help understand general properties of these reactions. Published in Wiley Encyclopedia of Physics, ISBN-13: 978-3-527-40691-3 - Wiley-VCH, Berlin, 2009.

  9. Nuclear Models

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fossion, Ruben [Instituto de Ciencias Nucleares, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Apartado Postal 70-543, Mexico D. F., C.P. 04510 (Mexico)

    2010-09-10

    The atomic nucleus is a typical example of a many-body problem. On the one hand, the number of nucleons (protons and neutrons) that constitute the nucleus is too large to allow for exact calculations. On the other hand, the number of constituent particles is too small for the individual nuclear excitation states to be explained by statistical methods. Another problem, particular for the atomic nucleus, is that the nucleon-nucleon (n-n) interaction is not one of the fundamental forces of Nature, and is hard to put in a single closed equation. The nucleon-nucleon interaction also behaves differently between two free nucleons (bare interaction) and between two nucleons in the nuclear medium (dressed interaction).Because of the above reasons, specific nuclear many-body models have been devised of which each one sheds light on some selected aspects of nuclear structure. Only combining the viewpoints of different models, a global insight of the atomic nucleus can be gained. In this chapter, we revise the the Nuclear Shell Model as an example of the microscopic approach, and the Collective Model as an example of the geometric approach. Finally, we study the statistical properties of nuclear spectra, basing on symmetry principles, to find out whether there is quantum chaos in the atomic nucleus. All three major approaches have been rewarded with the Nobel Prize of Physics. In the text, we will stress how each approach introduces its own series of approximations to reduce the prohibitingly large number of degrees of freedom of the full many-body problem to a smaller manageable number of effective degrees of freedom.

  10. Nuclear Astrophysics

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDid you notHeatMaRIEdioxideUser Work FeaturedNuclear & ParticleNuclear

  11. Nuclear Science

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDid you notHeatMaRIEdioxideUser Work FeaturedNuclearNP Home Nuclear

  12. Fighting proliferation new concerns for the nineties

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sokolski, H.

    1996-09-01

    Iraq`s threatened chemical missile strikes against US forces, combined with its efforts to build nuclear weapons, have quite literally put issues about the proliferation of strategic weapons on the map. Indeed, after Operation Desert Shield, both the Bush and Clinton administrations focused considerable attention on the need to dismantle Iraq`s strategic weapons capabilities and to assure that the strategic weapons complex in the former Soviet Union doesn`t end up helping future Iraqs. Since Operation Desert Storm, though, additional proliferation concern devising an effective strategy against proliferation, coping with the spread of space technology, and curbing Iran`s and North Korea`s strategic programs have emerged. Fighting Proliferation examines these challenges and their implications for US policy. The first of these concern how best to reform existing non- proliferation efforts-is examined in part 1. With the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely extended, just exactly how the treaty will be implemented remains unclear. The Clinton administration is on record arguing that the NPT is a model for how the US will curb the proliferation of not only nuclear but all other kinds of strategic weapons. But what does the NPT and its obligations actually mean. Its key proscriptions in Articles 1, 2, and 3 are ambiguous. The treaty also lacks any clear enforcement measures and is nearly impossible to amend.

  13. Assessment of Nuclear Fuels using Radiographic Thickness Measurement Method

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Muhammad Abir; Fahima Islam; Hyoung Koo Lee; Daniel Wachs

    2014-11-01

    The Convert branch of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) focuses on the development of high uranium density fuels for research and test reactors for nonproliferation. This fuel is aimed to convert low density high enriched uranium (HEU) based fuel to high density low enriched uranium (LEU) based fuel for high performance research reactors (HPRR). There are five U.S. reactors that fall under the HPRR category, including: the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR), the Missouri University Research Reactor (UMRR), the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR). U-Mo alloy fuel phase in the form of either monolithic or dispersion foil type fuels, such as ATR Full-size In center flux trap Position (AFIP) and Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor (RERTR), are being designed for this purpose. The fabrication process1 of RERTR is susceptible to introducing a variety of fuel defects. A dependable quality control method is required during fabrication of RERTR miniplates to maintain the allowable design tolerances, therefore evaluating and analytically verifying the fabricated miniplates for maintaining quality standards as well as safety. The purpose of this work is to analyze the thickness of the fabricated RERTR-12 miniplates using non-destructive technique to meet the fuel plate specification for RERTR fuel to be used in the ATR.

  14. Neutrino nuclear response and photo nuclear reaction

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    H. Ejiri; A. I. Titov; M. Boswell; A. Young

    2013-11-10

    Photo nuclear reactions are shown to be used for studying neutrino/weak nuclear responses involved in astro-neutrino nuclear interactions and double beta decays. Charged current weak responses for ground and excited states are studied by using photo nuclear reactions through isobaric analog states of those states, while neutral current weak responses for excited states are studied by using photo nuclear reactions through the excited states. The weak interaction strengths are studied by measuring the cross sections of the photo nuclear reactions, and the spin and parity of the state are studied by measuring angular correlations of particles emitted from the photo nuclear reactions. Medium-energy polarized photons obtained from laser photons scattered off GeV electrons are very useful. Nuclear responses studied by photo nuclear reactions are used to evaluate neutrino/weak nuclear responses, i.e. nuclear beta and double beta matrix elements and neutrino nuclear interactions, and to verify theoretical calculations for them.

  15. Non-Treaty Storage Agreement

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJessework usesofPublications64Newsroom NewsroomNomination &ofdefault Sign In

  16. Nuclear Golf

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hacker, Randi; Tsutsui, William

    2006-12-06

    Broadcast Transcript: Pay no attention to that nuclear warhead behind the 18th hole; just shout "Fore!" and drive your Titleist down the fairway. In a development that is bizarre even by North Korean standards, the country is making a move to sell...

  17. Uncertainty quantification in application of the enrichment meter principle for nondestructive assay of special nuclear material

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Burr, Tom; Croft, Stephen; Jarman, Kenneth D.

    2015-09-05

    The various methods of nondestructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM) have applications in nuclear nonproliferation, including detection and identification of illicit SNM at border crossings, and quantifying SNM at nuclear facilities for safeguards. No assay method is complete without “error bars,” which provide one way of expressing confidence in the assay result. Consequently, NDA specialists typically quantify total uncertainty in terms of “random” and “systematic” components, and then specify error bars for the total mass estimate in multiple items. Uncertainty quantification (UQ) for NDA has always been important, but it is recognized that greater rigor is needed andmore »achievable using modern statistical methods. To this end, we describe the extent to which the guideline for expressing uncertainty in measurements (GUM) can be used for NDA. Also, we propose improvements over GUM for NDA by illustrating UQ challenges that it does not address, including calibration with errors in predictors, model error, and item-specific biases. A case study is presented using low-resolution NaI spectra and applying the enrichment meter principle to estimate the U-235 mass in an item. The case study illustrates how to update the current American Society for Testing and Materials guide for application of the enrichment meter principle using gamma spectra from a NaI detector.« less

  18. Nuclear Security Summit | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Summit | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy...

  19. Nuclear Incident Team | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Incident Team | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear...

  20. Nuclear Waste: Forever Contaminated?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, nuclear energy, and energy law.Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law (December 20, 2011). Brigham

  1. The Soviet program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nordyke, M.D.

    1996-10-01

    An extensive review is given of the US and Russian efforts on peaceful uses of nuclear explosions (PNE). The Soviet PNE program was many times larger than the US Plowshare program in terms of both the number of applications explored with field experiments and the extent to which they were introduced into industrial use. Several PNE applications, such as deep seismic sounding and oil stimulation, have been explored in depth and appear to have had a positive cost benefit at minimal public risk. Closure of runaway gas wells is another possible application where all other techniques fail. However, the fundamental problem with PNEs is the fact that, if they are to be economically significant, there must be widespread use of the technology, involving large numbers of sites, each of which presents a potential source of radioactivity to the environment and nearby communities. Russia now has more than 100 sites where significant high-level radioactivity has been buried. Experience over the last 20 years in US and in today`s Russia shows that it is virtually impossible to gain public acceptance of such applications of nuclear energy. In addition, PNEs also pose a difficult problem in the arms control area. Under a comprehensive test ban, any country conducting PNEs would, in appearance if not in fact, receive information useful for designing new nuclear weapons or maintaining an existing nuclear stockpile, information denied to the other parties to the treaty. 6 tabs, 10 figs.

  2. Approaches to integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-06-01

    Historically, U.S. arms control policy and the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise have been reactive to each other, rather than interdependent and mutually reinforcing. One element of the divergence has been the long timescale necessary to plan and create substantive changes in the infrastructure vs. the inherent unpredictability of arms control outcomes. We explore several examples that illustrate this tension, some of the costs and implications associated with this reactive paradigm, and illustrate that, while the nuclear weapons enterprise has long considered the implications of arms control in sizing capacity of its missions, it has not substantively considered arms control in construction requirement for capabilities and products. Since previous arms control agreements have limited numbers and types of deployed systems, with delivery systems as the object of verification, this disconnect has not been forefront. However, as future agreements unfold, the warhead itself may become the treaty limited item and the object of verification. Such a scenario might offer both the need and the opportunity to integrate nuclear weapons and arms control requirements in unprecedented ways. This paper seeks to inspire new thinking on how such integration could be fostered and the extent to which it can facilitate significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles.

  3. Proceedings of the 2009 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wetovsky, Marv A; Aguilar - Chang, Julio; Anderson, Dale; Arrowsmith, Marie; Arrowsmith, Stephen; Baker, Diane; Begnaud, Michael; Harste, Hans; Maceira, Monica; Patton, Howard; Phillips, Scott; Randall, George; Rowe, Charlotte; Stead, Richard; Steck, Lee; Whitaker, Rod; Yang, Xiaoning

    2009-09-21

    These proceedings contain papers prepared for the Monitoring Research Review 2009: Ground -Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, held 21-23 September, 2009 in Tucson, Arizona,. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States’ capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

  4. Nuclear lamins: building blocks of nuclear architecture

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Goldman, Robert D.

    REVIEW Nuclear lamins: building blocks of nuclear architecture Robert D. Goldman,1,3,4 Yosef Biological Laboratory, Woods Hole, Massachusetts 02543, USA Nuclear lamins were initially identified as the major components of the nuclear lamina, a proteinaceous layer found at the interface between chromatin

  5. A Statement from Under Secretary for Science and Energy Franklin...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Security & Safety Home Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation Funding & Financing Science & Innovation Science & Innovation Home National Labs Science & Technology Science &...

  6. Investigation of CTBT OSI Radionuclide Techniques at the DILUTED WATERS Nuclear Test Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Baciak, James E.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Detwiler, Rebecca S.; Kirkham, Randy R.; Keillor, Martin E.; Lepel, Elwood A.; Seifert, Allen; Emer, Dudley; Floyd, Michael

    2012-11-01

    Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a verification regime that includes the ability to conduct an On-Site Inspection (OSI) will be established. The Treaty allows for an OSI to include many techniques, including the radionuclide techniques of gamma radiation surveying and spectrometry and environmental sampling and analysis. Such radioactivity detection techniques can provide the “smoking gun” evidence that a nuclear test has occurred through the detection and quantification of indicative recent fission products. An OSI faces restrictions in time and manpower, as dictated by the Treaty; not to mention possible logistics difficulties due to the location and climate of the suspected explosion site. It is thus necessary to have a good understanding of the possible source term an OSI will encounter and the proper techniques that will be necessary for an effective OSI regime. One of the challenges during an OSI is to locate radioactive debris that has escaped an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) and settled on the surface near and downwind of ground zero. To support the understanding and selection of sampling and survey techniques for use in an OSI, we are currently designing an experiment, the Particulate Release Experiment (PRex), to simulate a small-scale vent from an underground nuclear explosion. PRex will occur at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The project is conducted under the National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS) funded by the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). Prior to the release experiment, scheduled for Spring of 2013, the project scheduled a number of activities at the NNSS to prepare for the release experiment as well as to utilize the nuclear testing past of the NNSS for the development of OSI techniques for CTBT. One such activity—the focus of this report—was a survey and sampling campaign at the site of an old UNE that vented: DILUTED WATERS. Activities at DILUTED WATERS included vehicle-based survey, in situ measurements with high-purity germanium (HPGe) and hand-held LaBr3 systems, soil sampling with a variety of tools, and laboratory gamma spectrometric analysis of those samples. A further benefit of the measurement campaign was to gain familiarity with the many logistical aspects of performing radiological field work at NNSS ahead of the PRex. Many practical lessons concerning the proper methodologies and logistics of using the surveying and sampling equipment were noted. These Lessons Learned are compiled together in Appendix A. The vehicle-based survey was successful in that it found a previously unknown hotspot (determined to be 232Th) while it demonstrated that a better method for keeping a serpentine track without staking was needed. Some of the soil sampling equipment was found to be impractical for the application, though core sampling would not be the correct way to take soil samples for a fresh vent deposit (as opposed to an old site like DILUTED WATERS). Due to the site’s age, 137Cs was the only fission radioisotope identified, though others were searched for. While not enough samples were taken and analyzed to definitively link the 137Cs to DILUTED WATERS as opposed to other NNSS activities, results were consistent with the historical DILUTED WATERS plume. MDAs were compared for soil sampling and in situ measurements.

  7. The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kroenig, Matthew

    2006-01-01

    of selective nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflictmissile and nuclear proliferation: Issues for Congress. CRSSpector, L. 1988. Nuclear proliferation today. Cambridge,

  8. Trends and challenges in global arms control regimes: Implications for the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1994-06-01

    In another sense, however, the nuclear age and ballistic missiles long ago created a much smaller world in which the distinctions between global and regional security have been lessened. In an age of weapons of mass destruction, any point on the earth can find itself suddenly at the center of world attention. This makes it all the more important that we understand all of the arms control tools available, including global approaches. In discussing global arms control regimes, I will focus primarily on those that are open to universal membership such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or which have global reach, such as certain export control and supplier regimes. It is important to remember, however, that certain regional, bilateral, and even unilateral arms control measures can have a global impact as well. One need only witness the impact of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Despite its mere {open_quotes}Atlantic to the Urals{close_quotes} focus, the CFE treaty helped change the political and strategic calculations of the entire world. Likewise, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with its headquarters in Vienna, is centered on Europe but spreads from Vancouver to Vladivostok (or perhaps we should say from Amchitka to Kamchatka), circumnavigating much of the northern hemisphere when measured the long way around via North America. The political significance of its successes and failures outdistance CSCE`s geographical spread.

  9. Towards consistent nuclear models and comprehensive nuclear data...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Towards consistent nuclear models and comprehensive nuclear data evaluations Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Towards consistent nuclear models and comprehensive nuclear...

  10. Research Areas | Nuclear Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Fuel Cycle Science & Technology Fusion Nuclear Science Isotope Development and Production Nuclear Security Science & Technology Nuclear Systems Modeling, Simulation & Validation...

  11. Nuclear Photonics

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    D. Habs; M. M. Guenther; M. Jentschel; P. G. Thirolf

    2012-01-21

    With new gamma-beam facilities like MEGa-ray at LLNL (USA) or ELI-NP at Bucharest with 10^13 g/s and a bandwidth of Delta E_g/E_g ~10^-3, a new era of g-beams with energies <=20 MeV comes into operation, compared to the present world-leading HIGS facility (Duke Univ., USA) with 10^8 g/s and Delta E_g/E_g~0.03. Even a seeded quantum FEL for g-beams may become possible, with much higher brilliance and spectral flux. At the same time new exciting possibilities open up for focused g-beams. We describe a new experiment at the g-beam of the ILL reactor (Grenoble), where we observed for the first time that the index of refraction for g-beams is determined by virtual pair creation. Using a combination of refractive and reflective optics, efficient monochromators for g-beams are being developed. Thus we have to optimize the system of the g-beam facility, the g-beam optics and g-detectors. We can trade g-intensity for band width, going down to Delta E_g/E_g ~ 10^-6 and address individual nuclear levels. 'Nuclear photonics' stresses the importance of nuclear applications. We can address with g-beams individual nuclear isotopes and not just elements like with X-ray beams. Compared to X rays, g-beams can penetrate much deeper into big samples like radioactive waste barrels, motors or batteries. We can perform tomography and microscopy studies by focusing down to micron resolution using Nucl. Reson. Fluorescence for detection with eV resolution and high spatial resolution. We discuss the dominating M1 and E1 excitations like scissors mode, two-phonon quadrupole octupole excitations, pygmy dipole excitations or giant dipole excitations under the new facet of applications. We find many new applications in biomedicine, green energy, radioactive waste management or homeland security. Also more brilliant secondary beams of neutrons and positrons can be produced.

  12. Nuclear Forensics

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDid you notHeatMaRIEdioxideUser Work FeaturedNuclear

  13. NUCLEAR ENERGY

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i nAand DOEDepartment of Energy009At26-2009NSRC_MOU.pdffactsNUCLEAR ENERGY

  14. Reconversion of nuclear weapons

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kapitza, Sergei P

    1993-01-01

    The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

  15. The Tokai Reprocessing Issue: Japan’s Rise to Elite Nation Status in the 1970s

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Shih, Ashanti

    2011-01-01

    that would prevent nuclear proliferation other than givingwith an ambitious nuclear non-proliferation agenda in mind,nuclear fuel into a pure plutonium product, may have proliferation

  16. NNSA and Small Business Partnering for Success

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    with NNSA Our Mission Management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. NNSA responds to nuclear and...

  17. The politics of representation and the social order : in the War on Terror

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chang, Gordon C.

    2008-01-01

    Stalinist Gets Nuclear Weapons. ” The NonproliferationWWII, and what to do with nuclear weapons development. Suchof (and spending on) nuclear weapons programs as well as

  18. Contact: Al Stotts, NNSA Public Affairs For Immediate Release

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile; to provide the Navy with effective nuclear power plants; to promote international nuclear safety and nonproliferation; to...

  19. Nuclear Safety | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Nuclear Safety Nuclear Safety The Office of Nuclear Safety establishes and maintains nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidance including policy and requirements relating to...

  20. Nuclear Data | More Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Data SHARE Nuclear Data Nuclear Data ORNL is a recognized, international leader in nuclear data research and development (R&D) to support nuclear applications analyses. For more...

  1. Nuclear Sciences | More Science | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Nuclear Sciences SHARE Nuclear Sciences In World War II's Manhattan Project, ORNL helped usher in the nuclear age. Today, laboratory scientists are leaders in using nuclear...

  2. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future. Consequently, the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) sponsored a team of U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory nuclear safeguards experts and technologists to conduct a workshop on methods and technologies for improving this activity, under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Approaches Project. The workshop focused on reviewing and discussing the fundamental safeguards needs, and presented technology and/or methods that could potentially address those needs more effectively and efficiently. Conclusions and Recommendations for technology to enhance the performance of DIV inspections are presented by the workshop team.

  3. Nuclear Explosive Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-07-10

    The Order establishes requirements to implement the nuclear explosive safety (NES) elements of DOE O 452.1E, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, for routine and planned nuclear explosive operations (NEOs).

  4. NUCLEAR DEFORMATION ENERGIES

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Blocki, J.

    2009-01-01

    J.R. Nix, Theory of Nuclear Fission and Superheavy Nuclei,energy maps relevant for nuclear fission and nucleus-nucleusof macroscopic aspects of nuclear fission and of collisions

  5. Nuclear Waste: Forever Contaminated?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    into when undergoing nuclear fission. 175-3000 times higheranother byproduct of nuclear fission, but that will receiveNuclear Energy, and Energy Law (December 20, 2011). Brigham Young University Law Review, Fission

  6. NUCLEAR STRUCTURE DATABASE

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Firestone, R.B.

    2010-01-01

    CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR STRUCTURE DATABASE R. B. Firestone and E.11089 NUCLEAR STRUCTURE DATABASE by R.B. Firestone and E.iii- NUCLEAR STRUCTURE DATABASE R.B Firestone and E. Browne

  7. RELATIVISTIC NUCLEAR COLLISIONS: THEORY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gyulassy, M.

    2010-01-01

    Effects in Relativistic Nuclear Collisions", Preprint LBL-Pion Interferometry of Nuclear Collisions. 18.1 M.Gyulassy,was supported by the Office of Nuclear Physics of the U.S.

  8. Nuclear Waste: Forever Contaminated?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    Went Wrong in Japan’s Nuclear Reactors. Retrieved March 28,went-wrong-in-japans-nuclear-reactors World Statistics. (nuclear disaster since Chernobyl. Chernobyl happened on April 26, 1986, when a reactor

  9. Office of Nuclear Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Nuclear Safety establishes nuclear safety requirements and expectations for the Department to ensure protection of workers and the public from the hazards associated with nuclear operations with all Department operations.

  10. Above-ground Antineutrino Detection for Nuclear Reactor Monitoring

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Sweany, Melinda; Brennan, James S.; Cabrera-Palmer, Belkis; Kiff, Scott D.; Reyna, David; Throckmorton, Daniel J.

    2014-08-01

    Antineutrino monitoring of nuclear reactors has been demonstrated many times, however the technique has not as of yet been developed into a useful capability for treaty verification purposes. The most notable drawback is the current requirement that detectors be deployed underground, with at least several meters-water-equivalent of shielding from cosmic radiation. In addition, the deployment of liquid-based detector media presents a challenge in reactor facilities. We are currently developing a detector system that has the potential to operate above ground and circumvent deployment problems associated with a liquid detection media: the system is composed of segments of plastic scintillator surroundedmore »by 6LiF/ZnS:Ag. ZnS:Ag is a radio-luminescent phosphor used to detect the neutron capture products of lithium-6. Because of its long decay time compared to standard plastic scintillators, pulse-shape discrimination can be used to distinguish positron and neutron interactions resulting from the inverse beta decay (IBD) of antineutrinos within the detector volume, reducing both accidental and correlated backgrounds. Segmentation further reduces backgrounds by identifying the positron’s annihilation gammas, which are absent for most correlated and uncorrelated backgrounds. This work explores different configurations in order to maximize the size of the detector segments without reducing the intrinsic neutron detection efficiency. We believe this technology will ultimately be applicable to potential safeguards scenarios such as those recently described.« less

  11. Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D.

    2012-06-18

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  12. Hollow nuclear matter

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gao-Chan Yong

    2015-12-18

    It is generally considered that an atomic nucleus is always compact. Based on the isospin-dependent Boltzmann nuclear transport model, here I show that large block nuclear matter or excited nuclear matter may both be hollow. And the size of inner bubble in these matter is affected by the charge number of nuclear matter. Existence of hollow nuclear matter may have many implications in nuclear or atomic physics or astrophysics as well as some practical applications.

  13. Hollow nuclear matter

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yong, Gao-Chan

    2015-01-01

    It is generally considered that an atomic nucleus is always compact. Based on the isospin-dependent Boltzmann nuclear transport model, here I show that large block nuclear matter or excited nuclear matter may both be hollow. And the size of inner bubble in these matter is affected by the charge number of nuclear matter. Existence of hollow nuclear matter may have many implications in nuclear or atomic physics or astrophysics as well as some practical applications.

  14. The applicability of sample collection and analysis in support of nuclear arms control agreements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McGuire, R.R.

    1995-08-01

    Agreements are being negotiated to halt the spread of nuclear arms both within the declared nuclear weapons states and to states not heretofore declaring their possession. With the verification regime of the recently negotiated Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as a model, negotiators are considering variations of on-site inspection as formulas to enhance the assurance of compliance with future agreements. These on-site inspections may be part of a treaty dictated verification regime or one of a set of voluntary {open_quotes}confidence building{close_quotes} measures. In either case, the collection of material samples for analysis could be an integral component of the inspection as it is in the CWC. The following is an assessment of the applicability of sampling and analysis for compliance monitoring nuclear arms control agreements currently envisioned. There are two essentially orthogonal ways of approaching this question of applicability: the consideration of the analytical questions and the consideration of the specifics of the individual agreements. This study is meant to utilize both approaches in examining the possible impact of sampling and analysis on compliance assessment. First attention must be given to technical questions relating to the efficacy of sampling and analysis.

  15. Assessment of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Spent Nuclear Fuel Assay

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Quiter, Brian

    2012-01-01

    Security of the National Nuclear Security Administration, USof Energys National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

  16. Nuclear Physics: Campaigns

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Free-Electron Laser (FEL) Medical Imaging Physics Topics Campaigns The Structure of the Nuclear Building Blocks The Structure of Nuclei Symmetry Tests in Nuclear Physics Meetings...

  17. Nuclear Waste: Forever Contaminated?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Andrew

    2015-01-01

    Fallout that spread across Fukushima R eferences Buesseler,M. (2011). Impacts of the Fukushima nuclear power plants onL. L. (2011). Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, nuclear energy,

  18. NUCLEAR DEFORMATION ENERGIES

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Blocki, J.

    2009-01-01

    nuclear energies in the absence of a proximity contribution.contributions represent the major part of the potential energy of a nuclear

  19. Advancing Global Nuclear Security

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Today world leaders gathered at The Hague for the Nuclear Security Summit, a meeting to measure progress and take action to secure sensitive nuclear materials.

  20. Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee (NEAC), formerly the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC), was established on October 1, 1998, to provide independent advice to the Office of...

  1. Nuclear Safeguards | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

  2. Nuclear Forensics | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

  3. Nuclear Security Summit | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

  4. Nuclear & Radiological Material Removal | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    & Radiological Material Removal | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation...

  5. Nuclear / Radiological Advisory Team | National Nuclear Security...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Radiological Advisory Team | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering...

  6. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY'S CENTER FOR GLOBAL SECURITY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    the Treaty The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty puts a cap on the development of nuclear weapons by banning nuclear weapon testing. The Treaty Organization will verify the ban on nuclear tests, operatingHOSTED BY: · PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY'S CENTER FOR GLOBAL SECURITY · THE NUCLEAR

  7. The Joys of Nuclear Engineering

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Jon Carmack

    2010-01-08

    Nuclear fuels researcher Jon Carmack talks about the satisfactions of a career in nuclear engineering.

  8. International Workshops to Foster Implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Killinger, Mark H.; Coates, Cameron W.; Bedke, Michael L.

    2003-07-14

    A country’s adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol is an important statement to the world of that country’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Without the Additional Protocol (AP) it is possible, as demonstrated in Iraq, for a country party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to clandestinely work toward nuclear weapons and be undetected by the IAEA. This is because classical safeguards under the NPT are directed at diversion of nuclear material from declared activities. But a country may instead build undeclared activities to produce weapons-grade nuclear material. The AP is directed at detecting those undeclared activities. As of May 2003, 73 countries had signed the AP, but only 35 have entered into force. To further adherence to the AP, the IAEA has held regional, high-level seminars in Japan, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Peru, Romania, and Malaysia to explain AP provisions. To supplement these policy-level seminars, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has undertaken to develop a set of modules of technical competencies required to implement the AP. The intent is to work closely with the IAEA by providing these technical competencies to countries as well as to complement the IAEA’s regional seminars and other outreach efforts. This paper briefly describes the technical competency modules.

  9. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540: Taking Stock

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Durbin, Karyn R.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2006-08-01

    More than two years have passed since the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1540. This seminal measure requires all U.N. Member States to enact and enforce “effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and their means of delivery.” Has this Resolution been successful? Did the 1540 Committee established by the Resolution fulfill its mandate? What does the future hold for Resolution 1540? Will it become an integral part of the web of nonproliferation treaties and regimes or will it recede into history as a well-meaning but unfulfilled attempt to prevent proliferation? These questions are timely and important to the nuclear materials management community and a discourse on their answers is needed.

  10. ANNOUNCEMENT NUCLEAR ENGINEERING FACULTY POSITION

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Tennessee, University of

    ANNOUNCEMENT NUCLEAR ENGINEERING FACULTY POSITION The Department of Nuclear Engineering at the Assistant or Associate Professor level. These areas include, but are not limited to, nuclear system instrumentation & controls, monitoring and diagnostics, reactor dynamics, nuclear security, nuclear materials

  11. Analysis of data from sensitive U.S. monitoring stations for the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear reactor accident

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Biegalski, Steven R.; Bowyer, Ted W.; Eslinger, Paul W.; Friese, Judah I.; Greenwood, Lawrence R.; Haas, Derek A.; Hayes, James C.; Hoffman, Ian; Keillor, Martin E.; Miley, Harry S.; Morin, Marc P.

    2012-12-01

    The March 11, 2011 9.0 magnitude undersea megathrust earthquake off the coast of Japan and subsequent tsunami waves triggered a major nuclear event at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station. At the time of the event, units 1, 2, and 3 were operating and units 4, 5, and 6 were in a shutdown condition for maintenance. Loss of cooling capacity to the plants along with structural damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami resulted in a breach of the nuclear fuel integrity and release of radioactive fission products to the environment. Fission products started to arrive in the United States via atmospheric transport on March 15, 2011 and peaked by March 23, 2011. Atmospheric activity concentrations of 131I reached levels of 3.0 * 10*2 Bqm*3 in Melbourne, FL. The noble gas 133Xe reached atmospheric activity concentrations in Ashland, KS of 17 Bqm*3. While these levels are not health concerns, they were well above the detection capability of the radionuclide monitoring systems within the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

  12. Nuclear reactor

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Thomson, Wallace B. (Severna Park, MD)

    2004-03-16

    A nuclear reactor comprising a cylindrical pressure vessel, an elongated annular core centrally disposed within and spaced from the pressure vessel, and a plurality of ducts disposed longitudinally of the pressure vessel about the periphery thereof, said core comprising an annular active portion, an annular reflector just inside the active portion, and an annular reflector just outside the active a portion, said annular active portion comprising rectangular slab, porous fuel elements radially disposed around the inner reflector and extending the length of the active portion, wedge-shaped, porous moderator elements disposed adjacent one face of each fuel element and extending the length of the fuel element, the fuel and moderator elements being oriented so that the fuel elements face each other and the moderator elements do likewise, adjacent moderator elements being spaced to provide air inlet channels, and adjacent fuel elements being spaced to provide air outlet channels which communicate with the interior of the peripheral ducts, and means for introducing air into the air inlet channels which passes through the porous moderator elements and porous fuel elements to the outlet channel.

  13. Focus Article Nuclear winter

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Robock, Alan

    the climatic effects of nuclear war. Smoke from the fires started by nuclear weapons, especially the black in recorded human history. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the world has fallen from 70,000 at its the United States and the Soviet Union, smoke from the fires started by nuclear weapons, especially the black

  14. INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBMITTING NUCLEAR

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBMITTING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT-RELATED DATA of Submitted Data 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DATA REQUESTS 6 A. Environmental Impacts 6 B. Spent Fuel Generation 8 C. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage 9 D. Spent Nuclear Fuel Transport and Disposal Issues 10 E. Interim Spent

  15. Advanced nuclear fuel

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Terrani, Kurt

    2014-07-15

    Kurt Terrani uses his expertise in materials science to develop safer fuel for nuclear power plants.

  16. Nuclear Engineering Program Ranking

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Evans, Paul G.

    Nuclear Engineering Program Ranking 2 Enrollment Approximately 200 undergraduate students and 120 in Nuclear Engineering (BS) · Bachelor of Science in Engineering Physics (BS) · Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering and Engineering Physics (MS) · Doctor of Philosophy in Nuclear Engineering and Engineering Physics

  17. Advanced nuclear fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Terrani, Kurt

    2014-07-14

    Kurt Terrani uses his expertise in materials science to develop safer fuel for nuclear power plants.

  18. Nuclear Structure Thomas Neff

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Neff, Thomas

    Nuclear Structure in FMD Thomas Neff #12;FMD attributes Fermionic ^Q = C A q1 ··· qA Unitary = ^Q H ^Q ^Q ^Q Nuclear Structure in FMD Thomas Neff­ September 2, 1998 #12;Nuclear Interactions-interactions Nuclear Structure in FMD Thomas Neff­ September 2, 1998 #12;Unitary Correlator How to address the hard

  19. Nuclear Structure Thomas Neff

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Neff, Thomas

    Nuclear Structure in FMD Thomas Neff #12; FMD attributes Fermionic #12; #12; â?? Q #11; =C #24; A #24 #11; Nuclear Structure in FMD Thomas Neff-- September 2, 1998 #12; Nuclear Interactions Effective­interactions Nuclear Structure in FMD Thomas Neff-- September 2, 1998 #12; Unitary Correlator How to address the hard

  20. Nuclear Reactions Some Basics

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gilfoyle, Jerry

    Nuclear Reactions Some Basics I. Reaction Cross Sections #12;Common Units in Nuclear Physics sphere: = (4r2)/r2 = 4 (sr)steradians r A 2 = (r)radians r s = r A O s r O #12;Types of Nuclear Reactions · When a particle strikes a nucleus, the resulting interaction is referred to as a "nuclear