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Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


1

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administra...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

2

The future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. nuclear weapons policy .  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??This thesis addresses the viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT for short – in light of U.S. nuclear weapons… (more)

Claussen, Bjørn Ragnar

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

3

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and regime theories .  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??Since the beginning of the atomic age, nuclear weapons proliferation has been on of the major security issues facing the international society, and a growing… (more)

Søndenaa, Erik

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

4

Nuclear Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

With an explosion equivalent of about 20kT of TNT, the Trinity test was the first demonstration of a nuclear weapon. Conducted on July 16, 1945 in Alamogordo, NM this site is now a Registered National Historic Landmark. The concept and applicability of nuclear power was demonstrated on December 20, 1951 with the Experimental Breeder Reactor Number One (EBR-1) lit four light bulbs. This reactor is now a Registered National Historic Landmark, located near Arco, ID. From that moment forward it had been clearly demonstrated that nuclear energy has both peaceful and military applications and that the civilian and military fuel cycles can overlap. For the more than fifty years since the Atoms for Peace program, a key objective of nuclear policy has been to enable the wider peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Volumes have been written on the impact of these two actions on the world by advocates and critics; pundits and practioners; politicians and technologists. The nations of the world have woven together a delicate balance of treaties, agreements, frameworks and handshakes that are representative of the timeframe in which they were constructed and how they have evolved in time. Collectively these vehicles attempt to keep political will, nuclear materials and technology in check. This paper captures only the briefest abstract of the more significant aspects on the Nonproliferation Regime. Of particular relevance to this discussion is the special nonproliferation sensitivity associated with the uranium isotope separation and spent fuel reprocessing aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Atkins-Duffin, C E

2008-12-10T23:59:59.000Z

5

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

American Draft Non-proliferation Treaty: Will it Work? Ins) NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NWS: Nuclear Weaponon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and since its

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

6

Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability LANL has strengthened its capability in a key aspect of...

7

Law as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Treaty, 155 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 156 the3435. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21

Yoo, John C.

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

8

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). Prevent the spread of nuclear and eliminate nuclear weapons (1953). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entersPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle

Gilfoyle, Jerry

9

Milan Document on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Delhi on the project was a separate issue from India's avoidance of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, she said. "There is the non-proliferation issue and we are pursuing that with the Indians as part despite its refusal to sign a global treaty barring the spread of atomic weapons. That move was seen

De Cindio, Fiorella

10

Law as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 156 the Intermediate-23 U.S.T. 3435. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Yoo, John C.

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

11

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

weapons (1953). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1

Gilfoyle, Jerry

12

Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices One of the gravest threats the United States and the international

13

Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices One of the gravest threats the United States and the international

14

Impact of contributions of Glenn T. Seaborg on nuclear science  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and took thebegun. The non- proliferation treaty (NPT) was negotiatedtest ban treaty, nuclear non-proliferation and the use of

Hoffman, Darleane C.

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

15

Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability Reorganization bolsters nuclear nonproliferation capability LANL has strengthened its capability in a key aspect of nuclear nonproliferation by combining two groups within its Global Security organization. June 27, 2012 Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory sits on top of a once-remote mesa in northern New Mexico with the Jemez mountains as a backdrop to research and innovation covering multi-disciplines from bioscience, sustainable energy sources, to plasma physics and new materials.

16

The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing Fence-Sitters in the Post-Cold War Era  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

both Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member-states,ratifying the non- proliferation treaty, is different fromembedded in the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) bargain. The

Solingen, Etel

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

17

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

| National Nuclear Security Administration | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nonproliferation Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation Nonproliferation One of the gravest threats the United States and the international community face is the possibility that terrorists or rogue nations will acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NNSA,

18

Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the inherent danger of diminishing or dismissing lower-level threats in exchange for enhanced focus on high priority special nuclear materials with the basis for this emphasis being solely on the magnitude of the consequences of a single event. Mitigating all possible or likely terrorist attacks is impossible; however, weaponized sources, in the form of a radiological dispersal device, have been a declared target material of Al-Qaida. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative promoted the spread of the paradoxical beneficial yet destructive properties of the atom. Typically, the focus of nonproliferation efforts focuses on the fissile materials associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, with less emphasis on radioactive materials that could be used for a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Most nonproliferation policy discussion involves securing or preventing the diversion of weapons grade fissile materials (uranium (U) with concentration of over 90% of the isotope {sup 235}U (HEU) and plutonium with more than 90% of the isotope {sup 239}Pu), with scant attention given to the threat posed by a prolific quantity of sources spread worldwide. Further acerbating the problem of inattention, it appears that the momentum of the continued evolution in the beneficial applications of sources will only increase in the near future. Several expert studies have demonstrated on the potentially devastating economic, psychological and public health impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or radiation emitting device (ROD/RED) in a metropolis. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the radioactive material to the technical knowledge needed to fashion it into an ROD, is many orders of magnitude easier than diverting enough fissile material for and fabrication/acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, worldwide, there are many well documented accounts of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. As of the end of 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database had logge

Streeper, Charles Blamires [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

19

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the New  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

/11 CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Not supported by administration. No change. NPT Non-Proliferation influence on US security and non-proliferation. · One of the highest hurdles to obtaining a nuclear weapon Proliferation, Science and Global Security, 9, 81 (2001). #12;The Nuclear Tagging Scheme #12;Seize New

Gilfoyle, Jerry

20

Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nonproliferation & International Security Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation & International Security Nonproliferation & International Security

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


21

Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security Nonproliferation & International Security | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nonproliferation & International Security Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation & International Security Nonproliferation & International Security

22

Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs | ORNL  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

and development to 'boots-on-the-ground' implementation. This work ranges from uranium fuel cycle research to detection technologies and nuclear forensics. The nuclear...

23

Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation  

SciTech Connect

The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

Joeck, N

2007-02-05T23:59:59.000Z

24

EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning...

25

BNL Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security (NNSS)  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

nonproliferation regime and U.S. programs and policies developed to meet the emerging nuclear proliferation threats to our security. The course will present students with critical...

26

Non-Nuclear Treaties | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Treaties Non-Nuclear Treaties The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction off...

27

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. TestingPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

Gilfoyle, Jerry

28

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 4. Testing The TestPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

Gilfoyle, Jerry

29

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

to IAEA inspectors and withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty are evidence of an active and advanced proliferation of nuclear weapons. The first conclusion is that proliferation is easy and inevitable. The second-backed conventional attacks on non-nuclear states which are not securely under a great power's nuclear umbrella

Gilfoyle, Jerry

30

Nonproliferation and National Security - Nuclear Engineering Division  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and Nonproliferation and National Security CAPABILITIES Overview Nuclear Systems Modeling and Design Analysis Nuclear Systems Technologies Risk and Safety Assessments Nonproliferation and National Security Materials Testing Engineering Computation & Design Engineering Experimentation Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE on Flickr Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of Chicago Pile 1 (CP-1) Argonne OutLoud on Nuclear Energy Argonne Energy Showcase 2012 Capabilities Nonproliferation and National Security Bookmark and Share Nuclear Export Controls Nuclear Exports Controls We provide technical advisory services to DOE in the implementation of U.S. nonproliferation policy. This includes assessments of proliferation risks presented by emerging technologies and

31

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Principal Associate Directorate for...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nancy Jo Nicholas Administrator Peggy Maez Phone: 1-505-667-4877 Fax: 1-505-665-4078 Nuclear Nonproliferation The proliferation of nuclear weapons, either by nation-states or...

32

Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

IAEA or the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are notof course the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and thethe Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985

Kaneko, Kumao; Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Choi, Jor-Shan; Fei, Edward

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

33

Administrator D'Agostino on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency...

34

Proactive Intelligence for Nuclear Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The project described in this paper leverages predictive models for proliferation detection in order to assess the complementary questions of capability and intent as they relate to the potential for nuclear weapon development. The ability to proactively assess the likelihood of a state to engage in nuclear power acquisition and development for non-peaceful purposes is one of the greatest challenges for analysts and policy makers working on proliferation detection and deterrence. Of further difficulty is determining whether a state is at risk to provide indirect support for proliferation via the relationship between industrial input/output and the legal framework of trade. In general, it is possible to gather evidence about precursor activities to the achieved nuclear potential of a state that function as indicators of the state's intent to acquire and develop capabilities to support nuclear weapons. Reasoning with these indicators to predict intent and capability to proliferate is of utmost importance to facilitate nuclear safeguards, e.g. through proactive implementation of countermeasures. Such a predictive reasoning task is difficult to perform without computational aid. While the need for a proactive and multi-perspective approach to proliferation detection is widely recognized, there is a lamentable lack of computational tools applied directly to the task. Applications of predictive modeling to the domain of nuclear nonproliferation are limited to physical/chemical properties of nuclear materials, such as nuclear weapons simulations and stockpile stewardship. The aim of this project is to address this gap by leveraging methods and data from different mission areas in support of proliferation detection and prevention in innovative ways. More specifically, the approach implemented in this project combines methods in information analysis and probabilistic evidentiary reasoning with expert knowledge from discipline areas germane to proliferation detection, and evidence extracted from relevant data sources, to assess alternative hypotheses about specific proliferation detection problems.

Peterson, Danielle J.; Sanfilippo, Antonio P.; Baddeley, Robert L.; Franklin, Lyndsey

2008-05-12T23:59:59.000Z

35

Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy: Neutronic Design Aspects of a Hybrid Fusion-Fission Nuclear Energy System  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

surrounding nuclear non-proliferation are contin- uouslyfrom associated non-proliferation treaties and operating thethe LFFH engine design, non-proliferation aspects and code

Kramer, Kevin James

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

36

NBL Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

NBL Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is owned and operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). NBL is the U.S. Government's...

37

Impact of contributions of Glenn T. Seaborg on nuclear science  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and took thetalks were begun. The non- proliferation treaty (NPT) wasban treaty, nuclear non-proliferation and the use of nuclear

Hoffman, Darleane C.

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

38

Environmental Challenges of Climate-Nuclear Fusion: A Case Study of India  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 82because of India's good non-proliferation record 83 and itsNuclear India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, THE HERITAGE

Badrinarayan, Deepa

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

39

Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Safety » Nuclear Security & Safety » Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation Highly trained nuclear emergency response personnel and more than 17,000 pounds of equipment were sent to Japan as part of the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration’s effort to assist Japanese personnel with nuclear issues related to the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Above, scientists, technicians and engineers from the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nevada Site Office board an Air Force C-17. | Photo courtesy of NNSA. Highly trained nuclear emergency response personnel and more than 17,000 pounds of equipment were sent to Japan as part of the Department of Energy

40

2011 Annual Planning Summary for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The ongoing and projected Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact Statements for 2011 and 2012 within Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20).

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


41

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear...

42

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

43

Proceedings of the Symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment: Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, Rockville, Maryland, April 19-21, 1994  

SciTech Connect

To address a critical verification issue for the current Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for a possible future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Department of Energy sought to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical test in the same geology, so that other explosions could be identified. This was done in a field experiment code-named the NonProliferation Experiment (NPE).This comprehensive experiment was designed to determine the signatures of chemical explosions for a broad range of phenomena for comparison with those of previous nuclear tests. If significant differences can be measured, then these measures can be used to discriminate between the two types of explosions. In addition, when these differences are understood, large chemical explosions can be used to seismically calibrate regions to discriminate earthquakes from explosions. Toward this end, on-site and off-site measurements of transient phenomena were made, and on-site measurements of residual effects are in progress.Perhaps the most striking result was that the source function for the chemical explosion was identical to that of a nuclear one of about twice the yield. These proceedings provide more detailed results of the experiment.

Denny, Marvin D

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

44

Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

and will continue to work cooperatively with Russia to ensure the long-term sustainability of the systems and procedures already in place. However, not all nuclear material...

45

Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

Richardson, J

2009-01-21T23:59:59.000Z

46

FINAL (PNNL-20432) Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Primer  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

.g., North Korea, Pakistan). Fissile materials, nuclear reactors, reprocessing and enrichment technologyFINAL (PNNL-20432) 1 Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Primer Prepared for the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future Although the list of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and arms control

47

Limited Test Ban Treaty Signed | National Nuclear Security Administrat...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Limited Test Ban Treaty Signed | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

48

Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administrat...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response...

49

Workshop on nuclear power growth and nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

It is widely viewed that an expansion of nuclear power would have positive energy, economic and environmental benefits for the world. However, there are concerns about the economic competitiveness, safety and proliferation and terrorism risks of nuclear power. The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power will depend on the ability of governments and industry to address these concerns, including the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen nonproliferation, nuclear materials accountability and nuclear security. In his Prague speech, President Obama stated: 'we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programs. And no approach will succeed if it's based on the denial of rights to nations that play by the rules. We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change, and to advance peace opportunity for all people.' How can the President's vision, which will rekindle a vigorous public debate over the future of nuclear power and its relation to proliferation, be realized? What critical issues will frame the reemerging debate? What policies must be put into place to address these issues? Will US policy be marked more by continuity or change? To address these and other questions, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars will host a workshop on the future of nuclear power and nonproliferation.

Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

50

Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report  

SciTech Connect

Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

51

Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report  

SciTech Connect

Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

52

Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Who We Are > In The Spotlight > Steve Mladineo Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific

53

EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy 18: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS-0218: Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel SUMMARY This study analyzes the potential environmental impacts of adopting a policy to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. In particular, the study examines the comparative impacts of several alternative approaches to managing the spent fuel. The analysis demonstrates that the impacts on the environmental, workers and the general public of implementing any of the alternative management approaches would be small and within applicable Federal and state regulator limits. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES

54

Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Who We Are > In The Spotlight > Steve Mladineo Senior Adviser, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs Sector, Pacific

55

Nonproliferation and National Security Program - Nuclear Engineering  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Major Programs > Nonproliferation and Major Programs > Nonproliferation and National Security Program Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral Export Control Arrangements Interdiction Engagement & Training INECP INSEP GIPP Safeguards Concepts and Approaches Human Capital Development Additional Protocol Technical Assistance National Security Systems & Assessments National Security Information Systems Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Radiation Detection & Response (RDR) Contact NPNS Other Major Programs Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE Division on Flickr Nonproliferation and National Security Program (NPNS)

56

Systems resilience : a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

2011-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

57

Office Of NONprOliferatiON  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

objectives for nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements; Develop technologies tailored for monitoring compliance with nonproliferation and arms control...

58

Administrator D'Agostino on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation | National  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Speeches > Administrator D'Agostino on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation Speech Administrator D'Agostino on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation Oct 28, 2010 As prepared for delivery at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for

59

Science and society test V: Nuclear nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Numerical estimates are carried out on questions affecting the nation’s nonproliferation policy. We have considered some aspects of thermal recycle

David W. Hafemeister

1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

60

Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

America's nuclear agenda, which affirms the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." - President Obama on the Nuclear Posture Review, April 6, 2010 "The...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


61

Neutron Sensors and Their Role in Nuclear Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Perhaps the most familiar application of neutron detection technology to nonproliferation resides in materials accounting, where the quantification of plutonium has a rich history. With a changing dynamic in nuclear security, the application of sensor technology to further other nonproliferation objectives has received considerable attention. This fact, amplified by a dwindling supply of 3He, has stimulated considerable interest in neutron detection technology development for applications ranging from interdicting smuggled nuclear material to the verification of stockpile reductions. This manuscript briefly overviews the application of neutron sensors to nonproliferation and examines three specific examples that highlight the constraints applied to field-deployed technology.

Runkle, Robert C.

2011-10-04T23:59:59.000Z

62

FY 2012 Budget Hearing Testimony on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactor Programs before the House Appropriations Committee, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > FY 2012 Budget Hearing Testimony on Nuclear ...

63

Statement on Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy & Water Development | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > Statement on Defense Nuclear

64

FY 2012 Budget Hearing Testimony on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactor Programs before the House Appropriations Committee, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > FY 2012 Budget Hearing Testimony on Nuclear ...

65

Statement on Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors Activities before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy & Water Development | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > Statement on Defense Nuclear

66

Nonproliferation Human Capital Development in Malaysia | National Nuclear  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Human Capital Development in Malaysia | National Nuclear Human Capital Development in Malaysia | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > Nonproliferation Human Capital Development in Malaysia Nonproliferation Human Capital Development in Malaysia Posted By NNSA Public Affairs NNSA Blog Photo Credit: National University of Malaysia

67

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, supported by the European Parliament, that the implementing decision on the non-proliferation of small arms combina- tions 1. Introduction Soon after the Treaty of Maastricht had created the so-called three-pillar structure of the Union, the question arose of which part of the EU Treaty those decisions had to be based

Gilfoyle, Jerry

68

DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation DNN | Open Energy Information  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation DNN Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation DNN Jump to: navigation, search Name DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Place Washington, Washington, DC Zip 20585 Product String representation "Washington D.C. ... ear operations." is too long. Coordinates 38.89037°, -77.031959° Loading map... {"minzoom":false,"mappingservice":"googlemaps3","type":"ROADMAP","zoom":14,"types":["ROADMAP","SATELLITE","HYBRID","TERRAIN"],"geoservice":"google","maxzoom":false,"width":"600px","height":"350px","centre":false,"title":"","label":"","icon":"","visitedicon":"","lines":[],"polygons":[],"circles":[],"rectangles":[],"copycoords":false,"static":false,"wmsoverlay":"","layers":[],"controls":["pan","zoom","type","scale","streetview"],"zoomstyle":"DEFAULT","typestyle":"DEFAULT","autoinfowindows":false,"kml":[],"gkml":[],"fusiontables":[],"resizable":false,"tilt":0,"kmlrezoom":false,"poi":true,"imageoverlays":[],"markercluster":false,"searchmarkers":"","locations":[{"text":"","title":"","link":null,"lat":38.89037,"lon":-77.031959,"alt":0,"address":"","icon":"","group":"","inlineLabel":"","visitedicon":""}]}

69

Radiation Detection Laboratory The Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation Lab is used to explore novel techniques for radiation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

NERS Radiation Detection Laboratory The Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation Lab is used to explore novel techniques for radiation detection and characterization for nuclear nonproliferation

Eustice, Ryan

70

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

C. Frank. 1969. Nonproliferation Negotiations, 1961-1968. InCooperation on Nonproliferation Export Controls. Ann Arbor,to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. International

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

71

Nonproliferation Policy | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

72

Office Of NONprOliferatiON  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Of NONprOliferatiON Of NONprOliferatiON aNd iNterNatiONal Security July 2011 www.nnsa.doe.gov National Nuclear Security Administration ENERGY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF Develop and implement DOE/NNSA nonproliferation and arms control policy to reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction. control the spread of WMD-related material, equipment, technology and expertise. Safeguard and Secure nuclear material to prevent its diversion, theft and sabotage. Negotiate, monitor and verify compliance with international nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements. NNSA's Office of Nonproliferation and international Security (NiS) provides leadership in the formulation and implementation of nonproliferation, nuclear security and arms control

73

Keeping the atom's club exclusive:- the nuclear non-proliferation regime, 1945-2007.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??This thesis examines the development of nuclear non-proliferation policies since 1945. It takes the reader from the first conception of plans for nuclear disarmament, to… (more)

Bar, Allon

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

74

Treaties and Agreements | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

75

Limited Test Ban Treaty Signed | National Nuclear Security Administrat...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Timeline > Limited Test Ban Treaty Signed Limited Test Ban Treaty Signed August 05, 1963 Washington, DC Limited Test Ban Treaty Signed The United States, Great Britain, and the...

76

Application of granularity computing to confirm compliance with non-proliferation treaty  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfillment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives ...

A. Fattah; V. Pouchkarev; A. Belenki; A. Ryjov; L. A. Zadeh

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

77

Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The North’sNye, "Maintaining a Non-Proliferation Regime," InternationalKenneth Waltz “wars of non-proliferation”—against them. 31

Waltz, Kenneth N.

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

78

MCNPX-PoliMi for Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In the past few years, efforts to develop new measurement systems to support nuclear nonproliferation and homeland security have increased substantially. Monte Carlo radiation transport is one of the simulation methods of choice for the analysis of data from existing systems and for the design of new measurement systems; it allows for accurate description of geometries, detailed modeling of particle-nucleus interactions, and event-by-event detection analysis. This paper describes the use of the Monte Carlo code MCNPX-PoliMi for nuclear-nonproliferation applications, with particular emphasis on the simulation of spontaneous and neutron-induced nuclear fission. In fact, of all possible neutron-nucleus interactions, neutron-induced fission is the most defining characteristic of special nuclear material (such as U-235 and Pu-239), which is the material of interest in nuclear-nonproliferation applications. The MCNP-PoliMi code was originally released from the Radiation Safety Shielding Center (RSSIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 2003 [1]; the MCNPX-PoliMi code contains many enhancements and is based on MCNPX ver. 2.7.0. MCNPX-PoliMi ver. 2.0 was released through RSICC in 2012 as a patch to MCNPX ver. 2.7.0 and as an executable [2].

S. A. Pozzi; S. D. Clarke; W. Walsh; E. C. Miller; J. Dolan; M. Flaska; B. M. Wieger; A. Enqvist; E. Padovani; J. K. Mattingly; D. L. Chichester; P. Peerani

2012-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

79

Gamma-Ray Bursts Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Lecture 18 Gamma-Ray Bursts #12;Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963 First Vela satellite pair launched and their predecessors, Vela 4, discovered the first gamma-ray bursts. The discovery was announced by Klebesadel, Strong, and Olson (ApJ, 182, 85) in 1973. #12;First Gamma-Ray Burst The Vela 5 satellites functioned from July, 1969

Harrison, Thomas

80

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms a

Doyle, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Meek, Elizabeth [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


81

Integration of Facility Modeling Capabilities for Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Humberto E. Garcia

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

82

INTEGRATION OF FACILITY MODELING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ANALYSIS  

SciTech Connect

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

2011-07-18T23:59:59.000Z

83

Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis  

SciTech Connect

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Garcia, Humberto [Idaho National Laboratory (INL); Burr, Tom [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Coles, Garill A [ORNL; Edmunds, Thomas A. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); Garrett, Alfred [Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL); Gorensek, Maximilian [Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL); Hamm, Luther [Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL); Krebs, John [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL); Kress, Reid L [ORNL; Lamberti, Vincent [Y-12 National Security Complex; Schoenwald, David [ORNL; Tzanos, Constantine P [ORNL; Ward, Richard C [ORNL

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

84

Nuclear Nonproliferation | Y-12 National Security Complex  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

matter experts who secure vulnerable materials around the world (including from Libya, pictured), Y-12 is leveraging its expertise to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons...

85

Nuclear Security & Nonproliferation | Department of Energy  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Taste Like? At Sandia National Laboratories, researchers have developed pods that can survey and "taste" radioactive particles without exposing a human crew to nuclear hazards....

86

Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors in Lisbon, Portugal | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering...

87

Assessing the Institution of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is facing a crisis of effectiveness. During the Cold War, the regime was relatively effective in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and building an institutional structure that could, under certain conditions, ensure continued success. However, in the evolving global context, the traditional approaches are becoming less appropriate. Globalization has introduced new sets of stresses on the nonproliferation regime, such as the rise of non-state actors, broadening extensity and intensity of supply chains, and the multipolarization of power. This evolving global context demands an analytical and political flexibility in order to meet future threats. Current institutional capabilities established during the Cold War are now insufficient to meet the nonproliferation regime’s current and future needs. The research was based on information gathered through interviews and reviews of the relevant literature, and two dominant themes emerged. First, that human security should be integrated into the regime to account for the rise of non-state actors and networked violence. Second, confidence in the regime’s overall effectiveness has eroded at a time where verification-based confidence is becoming more essential. The research postulates that a critical analysis of the regime that fully utilizes institutional theory, with its focus on rules, normative structures, and procedures will be essential to adapting the regime to the current global context, building mechanisms for generating trust, creating better enforcement, and providing flexibility for the future.

Toomey, Christopher

2010-05-14T23:59:59.000Z

88

Nonproliferation Graduate Program | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services Sep 17, 2013 NNSA, Republic of Korea Ministry Agree to Minimize Use of HEU in Nuclear Reactors Sep 3, 2013 NNSA Conducts...

89

The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices  

SciTech Connect

When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

90

Working Paper 2010/1 The time has come for a treaty to  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Corporation (NERC) 5. Oct. 5: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT--including international institutions, national and sub-national governments, multi-national corporations, non

Botea, Adi

91

Arms Reduction Treaties | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services Sep 17, 2013 NNSA, Republic of Korea Ministry Agree to Minimize Use of HEU in Nuclear Reactors Sep 3, 2013 NNSA Conducts...

92

Politics and the bomb: exploring the Role of epistemic communities in nuclear non-proliferation outcomes.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??The role of epistemic communities in influencing policy formulation is underexplored in International Relations theory in general and in nuclear non-proliferation studies in particular. This… (more)

Kutchesfahani, S.Z.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

93

2012 Annual Planning Summary for NNSA Defense Nuclear NonProliferation  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The ongoing and projected Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact Statements for 2012 and 2013 within the NNSA Defense Nuclear NonProliferation.

94

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Kotter. 1994. Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Global Order,1981. Supply-Side Non-Proliferation. Foreign Policy 42:125-about Nuclear Non-Proliferation. International Affairs (

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

95

Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty | National Nuclear Security Administrat...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Timeline > Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty October 13, 1999 Washington, DC Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty The Senate votes 48-51 to reject the...

96

A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

97

Nuclear nonproliferation and safety: Challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency  

SciTech Connect

The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Govermental Affairs asked the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the safeguards and nuclear power plant safety programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This report examines (1) the effectiveness of IAEA`s safeguards program and the adequacy of program funding, (2) the management of U.S. technical assistance to the IAEA`s safeguards program, and (3) the effectiveness of IAEA`s program for advising United Nations (UN) member states about nuclear power plant safety and the adequacy of program funding. Under its statute and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA is mandated to administer safeguards to detect diversions of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses. Because of limits on budget growth and unpaid contributions, IAEA has had difficulty funding the safeguards program. IAEA also conducts inspections of facilities or locations containing declared nuclear material, and manages a program for reviewing the operational safety of designated nuclear power plants. The U.S. technical assistance program for IAEA safeguards, overseen by an interagency coordinating committee, has enhanced the agency`s inspection capabilities, however, some weaknesses still exist. Despite financial limitations, IAEA is meeting its basic safety advisory responsibilities for advising UN member states on nuclear safety and providing requested safety services. However, IAEA`s program for reviewing the operational safety of nuclear power plants has not been fully effective because the program is voluntary and UN member states have not requested IAEA`s review of all nuclear reactors with serious problems. GAO believes that IAEA should have more discretion in selecting reactors for review.

Not Available

1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

98

Nonproliferation Position Statement  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

For its many benefits to be realized, nuclear technology should continue to be applied in such a way that it does not contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, the public must have confidence that the diversion of civil nuclear materials into weapons programs will not happen. An effective nonproliferation policy should prevent diversion by States of fissile material from the nuclear fuel cycle; theft of fissile material by subnational or terrorist groups; clandestine operation of a fissile material production facility. It is the position of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) that the following actions are required to deal with these threats effectively: 1. Nuclear science and technology can be applied for peaceful purposes in a manner that fully supports and is compatible with achieving nonproliferation goals, as embodied in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To prevent proliferation, sovereign states should adhere to the NPT and its safeguards system including the Additional Protocol and adopt effective export controls. Incentives to acquire nuclear weapons must also be addressed through foreign policies that discourage clandestine

unknown authors

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

99

Securing special nuclear material: Recent advances in neutron detection and their role in nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Neutrondetection is an integral part of the global effort to prevent the proliferation of special nuclear material (SNM). Applications relying on neutron-detection technology range from traditional nuclear nonproliferation objectives

R. C. Runkle; A. Bernstein; P. E. Vanier

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

100

Treaty Verification | ornl.gov  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Verification SHARE Treaty Verification ORNL is a strong contributor to future nonproliferation and arms control initiatives through research and development of radiation...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


101

Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

Saunders, Emily C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rowberry, Ariana N. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fearey, Bryan L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

102

U.N. report concludes that Syrian site destroyed in 2007 was a nuclear reactor  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). Prevent the spread of nuclear weaponsPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Plan to dismantle US arsenal and eliminate nuclear weapons (1953). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

103

Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support | U.S. DOE Office of  

Office of Science (SC) Website

Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) NBL Home About Programs Certified Reference Materials Program Measurement Evaluation Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support Measurement Services Measurement Development Training Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) Training Categorical Exclusion Determinations News Contact Information New Brunswick Laboratory U.S. Department of Energy Building 350 9800 South Cass Avenue Argonne, IL 60439-4899 P: (630) 252-2442 (NBL) P: (630) 252-2767 (CRM sales) F: (630) 252-6256 E: usdoe.nbl@ch.doe.gov Programs Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support Print Text Size: A A A RSS Feeds FeedbackShare Page New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is owned and operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). NBL is the U.S. Government's Certifying Authority for

104

Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclearnonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facilitymodeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facilitymodeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facilitymodelingcapabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferationanalysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facilitymodeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facilitymodelingcapabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Burr, Tom [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Gorensek, M. B. [Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL); Krebs, John [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL); Kress, Reid L [ORNL; Lamberti, Vincent [Y-12 National Security Complex; Schoenwald, David [ORNL; Ward, Richard C [ORNL

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

105

Evaluating Nonproliferation Bona Fides  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Anticipated growth of global nuclear energy in a difficult international security environment heightens concerns that states could decide to exploit their civilian nuclear fuel cycles as a means of acquiring nuclear weapons. Such concerns partly reflect a fundamental tension in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the one hand, Articles II and III of the NPT clearly prohibit each non-nuclear-weapon state party from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Article IV of the NPT confers the “inalienable right” of Parties to the treaty to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…,” and directs all Parties to “facilitate… the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…,” and “cooperate in contributing…to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes….” This juxtaposition raises the possibility that a state could exercise its Article IV right to develop a civilian nuclear fuels cycle and then use the equipment, materials and technology to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of its Article II and III obligations.

Seward, Amy M.; Mathews, Caroline E.; Kessler, Carol E.

2008-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

106

Use of open source information and commercial satellite imagery for nuclear nonproliferation regime compliance verification by a community of academics  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to enhance the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared production of fissile materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to enhance the IAEA’s mission. The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these tools in academic community was developed. As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This community analyzes all types of unclassified publicly and commercially available information to aid in detection of violations of the non-proliferation regime. INMAC shares all of this information with the IAEA and the public. Since INMAC is composed solely by members of the academic community, this organization would not demonstrate any biases in its investigations or reporting.

Solodov, Alexander

2007-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

107

F. Calogero / Prospects of nuclear proliferation, or of transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world CIC, Cuernavaca / 02.12.2010 / page 1 / 28  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

or military use. ­ It is a major component of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has the goal acquisition of a nuclear weapon by an adversary could have a dev- astating influence on US security and non-proliferation. Enhancing nuclear weapons material security in Russia. 4. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 5. Other

Mejía-Monasterio, Carlos

108

Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Collaboration Following Russian Delegation Visit to the United States Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Collaboration Following Russian Delegation Visit to the United States December 10, 2013 - 2:30pm Addthis News Media Contact (202) 586-4940 U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and State Corporation for Nuclear Energy (Rosatom) Director General Sergey Kirienko today held talks in Washington, D.C., about the future of U.S.-Russia collaborative work in the nuclear energy field, including nuclear research and development, commercial aspects of cooperation, nuclear safety, and nonproliferation. The meeting coincided with the arrival of the final shipment of low

109

Mine seismicity and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty  

SciTech Connect

Surface and underground mining operations generate seismic ground motions which are created by chemical explosions and ground failures. It may come as a surprise to some that the ground failures (coal bumps, first caves, pillar collapses, rockbursts, etc.) can send signals whose magnitudes are as strong or stronger than those from any mining blast. A verification system that includes seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide sensors is being completed as part of the CTBT. The largest mine blasts and ground failures will be detected by this system and must be identified as distinct from signals generated by small nuclear explosions. Seismologists will analyze the seismic records and presumably should be able to separate them into earthquake-like and non earthquake-like categories, using a variety of so-called seismic discriminants. Non-earthquake essentially means explosion- or implosion-like. Such signals can be generated not only by mine blasts but also by a variety of ground failures. Because it is known that single-fired chemical explosions and nuclear explosion signals of the same yield give very similar seismic records, the non-earthquake signals will be of concern to the Treaty verification community. The magnitude of the mine-related events is in the range of seismicity created by smaller nuclear explosions or decoupled tests, which are of particular concern under the Treaty. It is conceivable that legitimate mining blasts or some mine-induced ground failures could occasionally be questioned. Information such as shot time, location and design parameters may be all that is necessary to resolve the event identity. In rare instances where the legitimate origin of the event could not be resolved by a consultation and clarification procedure, it might trigger on On-Site Inspection (OSI). Because there is uncertainty in the precise location of seismic event as determined by the International Monitoring System (IMS), the OSI can cover an area of up to 1,000 squared kilometers. In active mining districts this area could include several different mining operations. So, an OSI could be disruptive both to the mining community and to the US Government which must host the foreign inspection team. Accordingly, it is in the best interest of all US parties to try and eliminate the possible occurrence of false alarms. This can be achieved primarily by reducing the ambiguity of mine-induced seismic signals, so that even if these remain visible to the IMS they are clearly consistent with recognizable mining patterns.

Chiappetta, F. [Blasting Analysis International, Allentown, PA (United States); Heuze, F.; Walter, W. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Hopler, R. [Powderman Consulting Inc., Oxford, MD (United States); Hsu, V. [Air Force Technical Applications Center, Patrick AFB, FL (United States); Martin, B. [Thunder Basin Coal Co., Wright, WY (United States); Pearson, C. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Stump, B. [Southern Methodist Univ., Dallas, TX (United States); Zipf, K. [Univ. of New South Wales (Australia)

1998-12-09T23:59:59.000Z

110

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons 101. 3. The Comprehensive Test BanPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1. Some Bits of History. 2. Nuclear Weapons

Gilfoyle, Jerry

111

Rethinking the Offer: The Impact on Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Providing North Korea or Iran with Light Water Reactors.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??This paper examines the impact on nuclear non-proliferation efforts of providing the DPRK and Iran with light water reactors (LWRs). I argue that LWRs in… (more)

Lee, Eun Joo

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

112

Top UN officials call on hold-out States to ratify treaty banning nuclear tests  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Top UN officials call on hold-out States to ratify treaty banning nuclear tests 29 August 2011 in Kurchatov, Kazakhstan. (June 2010) 29 August 2011 ­ Warning that voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon War, hundreds of nuclear weapon tests left behind a devastating legacy for local citizens

113

Nuclear nonproliferation: Concerns with US delays in accepting foregin research reactors` spent fuel  

SciTech Connect

One key US nonproliferation goal is to discourage use of highly enriched uranium fuel (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear bombs, in civilian nuclear programs worldwide. DOE`s Off-Site Fuels Policy for taking back spent HEU from foreign research reactors was allowed to expire due to environmental reasons. This report provides information on the effects of delays in renewing the Off-Site Fuels Policy on US nonproliferation goals and programs (specifically the reduced enrichment program), DOE`s efforts to renew the fuels policy, and the price to be charged to the operators of foreign reactors for DOE`s activities in taking back spent fuel.

1994-03-25T23:59:59.000Z

114

Print this article Close This Window EU OKs India joining ITER nuclear reactor project  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Delhi on the project was a separate issue from India's avoidance of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, she said. "There is the non-proliferation issue and we are pursuing that with the Indians as part despite its refusal to sign a global treaty barring the spread of atomic weapons. That move was seen

115

Analysis and Models of Bilateral Investment Treaties using a Social Networks Approach  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Organization NC0 noncommissioned officer NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty OCS Officer Candidate School OPD independently targetable reentry vehicle MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology NATO North Atlantic Treaty

Bonomo, Flavia

116

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Washington,Considerations of a Nuclear- Test Ban. In Arms Control,The VELA Incident: nuclear test or meteoriod? : National

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

117

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

118

2010 Annual Planning Summary for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Annual Planning Summary for National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center (NNSA-SC) 2010 Annual Planning Summary for Nuclear Energy (NE) Energy.gov Careers & Internships...

119

Reassessing U.S. nuclear weapons policy Harold Brown[1] and John Deutch[2  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

2 / 28 The world-wide nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Entry into force: 1970 Three "pillars": - Non Proliferation (of nuclear-weapon capabilities), - Nuclear of the globe. The collapse of the world-wide regime of nuclear- weapon non-proliferation might happen in two

Deutch, John

120

Some thoughts on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper discusses factors controlling the dissemination of nuclear technologies and especially fissile materials.

Krikorian N.H.; Hawkins, H.T.

1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


121

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control Primer Prepared for the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

To provide a brief overview of key arms control and nonproliferation arrangements for the layperson that may be relevant to the Commission's comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Primer would be published by the Commission and made publicly available, probably as an appendix to a larger Commission report.

Williams, Laura S.

2011-05-25T23:59:59.000Z

122

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICE APPROACHES: ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION MERITS OF NUCLEAR FUEL LEASING  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The goal of international nuclear policy since the dawn of nuclear power has been the peaceful expansion of nuclear energy while controlling the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Numerous initiatives undertaken in the intervening decades to develop international agreements on providing nuclear fuel supply assurances, or reliable nuclear fuel services (RNFS) attempted to control the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In order to inform the international debate and the development of government policy, PNNL has been developing an analytical framework to holistically evaluate the economics and non-proliferation merits of alternative approaches to managing the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., cradle-to-grave). This paper provides an overview of the analytical framework and discusses preliminary results of an economic assessment of one RNFS approach: full-service nuclear fuel leasing. The specific focus of this paper is the metrics under development to systematically evaluate the non-proliferation merits of fuel-cycle management alternatives. Also discussed is the utility of an integrated assessment of the economics and non-proliferation merits of nuclear fuel leasing.

Kreyling, Sean J.; Brothers, Alan J.; Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

2010-08-11T23:59:59.000Z

123

Superconducting calorimetric alpha particle sensors for nuclear nonproliferation applications  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Identification of trace nuclear materials is usually accomplished by alpha spectrometry. Current detectors cannot distinguish critical elements and isotopes. We have developed a detector called a microcalorimeter

Robert D. Horansky; Joel N. Ullom; James A. Beall; Gene C. Hilton; Kent D. Irwin; Donald E. Dry; Elizabeth P. Hastings; Stephen P. Lamont; Clifford R. Rudy; Michael W. Rabin

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

124

The Los Alamos nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation technology development program  

SciTech Connect

For nearly three decades, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed and implemented nuclear measurement technology and training in support of national and international nuclear safeguards. This paper outlines the major elements of those technologies and highlights some of the latest developments.

Smith, H.A. Jr.; Menlove, H.O.; Reilly, T.D.; Bosler, G.E.; Hakkila, E.A.; Eccleston, G.W.

1994-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

125

Record of Decision for the Final EIS on Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

5091 5091 Friday May 17, 1996 Part IV Department of Energy Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel; Notice 25092 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Record of decision. SUMMARY: DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided to implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy as specified in the Preferred Alternative contained in the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed

126

Examination of the proposed conversion of the U.S. Navy nuclear fleet from highly enriched Uranium to low enriched Uranium  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

.The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons creates a loophole that allows a non-nuclear-weapon country to avoid international safeguards governing fissile materials if it claims that the materials will be used ...

McCord, Cameron (Cameron Liam)

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

127

Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat of proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.

Leek, K. M.

2006-07-31T23:59:59.000Z

128

Changing Perspectives on Nonproliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycles  

SciTech Connect

The concepts of international control over technologies and materials in the proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, specifically those related to enrichment and reprocessing, have been the subject of many studies and initiatives over the years. For examples: the International Fissionable Material Storage proposal in President Eisenhower's Speech on Atoms for Peace, and in the Charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) when the organization was formed in 1957; the regional nuclear fuel cycle center centers proposed by INFCE in the 80's; and most recently and notably, proposals by Dr. ElBaradei, the Director General of IAEA to limit production and processing of nuclear weapons usable materials to facilities under multinational control; and by U.S. President George W. Bush, to limit enrichment and reprocessing to States that have already full scale, functioning plants. There are other recent proposals on this subject as well. In this paper, the similarities and differences, as well as the effectiveness and challenges in proliferation prevention of these proposals and concepts will be discussed. The intent is to articulate a ''new nuclear regime'' and to develop concrete steps to implement such regime for future nuclear energy and deployment.

Choi, J; Isaacs, T H

2005-03-29T23:59:59.000Z

129

A Role for Industry in Promoting Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation  

SciTech Connect

Industry has a unique opportunity and critical role to play in strengthening governmental efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear, radiological, and dual-use materials and technologies that could be used in a nuclear or radiological weapon. Governmental regulations and policies are in effect at both the national and international levels to inhibit access to such materials and technologies by illegitimate end-users. However, the discovery of an illegal nuclear network, spearheaded by Pakistani scientist A Q Khan, increased international concern about what more could be done to prevent proliferation. Industry is well-poised and has a strong incentive to take a more proactive role to complement existing governmental efforts. Companies can be a tremendous help in ensuring that illicit diversions do not occur by increasing their oversight over the supply chain.

Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.; Elkhamri, Oksana O.

2009-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

130

ABOUT THE DEGREE The Master of Nuclear Science degree is a coursework  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

by the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or the so-called P-5 countries, to play a leadership role ourselves to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear build on but broaden the periodic dialogue on non- proliferation issues among the United States, Russia

Chen, Ying

131

Economic and Nonproliferation Analysis Framework for Assessing Reliable Nuclear Fuel Service Arrangements  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nuclear power is now broadly recognized as an essential technology in national strategies to provide energy security while meeting carbon management goals. Yet a long standing conundrum remains: how to enable rapid growth in the global nuclear power infrastructure while controlling the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies that lie at the heart of nuclear fuel supply and nuclear weapons programs. Reducing the latent proliferation risk posed by a broader horizontal spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology has been a primary goal of national nuclear supplier policies since the beginning of the nuclear power age. Attempts to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technology have been the subject of numerous initiatives in the intervening decades sometimes taking the form of calls to develop fuel supply and service assurances to reduce market pull to increase the number of states with fuel cycle capabilities. A clear understanding of what characteristics of specific reliable nuclear fuel service (RNFS) and supply arrangements qualify them as 'attractive offers' is critical to the success of current and future efforts. At a minimum, RNFS arrangements should provide economic value to all participants and help reduce latent proliferation risks posed by the global expansion of nuclear power. In order to inform the technical debate and the development of policy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been developing an analytical framework to evaluate the economics and nonproliferation merits of alternative approaches to RNFS arrangements. This paper provides a brief overview of the economic analysis framework developed and applied to a model problem of current interest: full-service nuclear fuel leasing arrangements. Furthermore, this paper presents an extended outline of a proposed analysis approach to evaluate the non-proliferation merits of various RNFS alternatives.

Phillips, Jon R.; Kreyling, Sean J.; Short, Steven M.; Weimar, Mark R.

2010-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

132

Securing Special Nuclear Material: Recent Advances in Neutron Detection and Their Role in Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Neutron detection is an integral part of the global effort to prevent the proliferation of special nuclear material (SNM). Applications relying on neutron-detection technology range from traditional nuclear non-proliferation objectives, such as safeguarding nuclear material and verifying stockpile reductions, to the interdiction of SNM—a goal that has recently risen in priority to a level on par with traditional applications. Large multi-national programs targeting detection and safeguards have deployed radiation-detection assets across the globe. Alongside these deployments of commercially available technology, significant research and development efforts have been directed towards the creation of next-generation assets. While much of this development has focused on gamma-ray spectrometers, neutron-detection technology remains an important component of the global strategy because of the capability of neutrons to penetrate materials that readily absorb gamma rays and the unique multiplicity signatures offered by neutrons. One particularly acute technology-development challenge results from dwindling supplies of 3He, partially triggered by widespread deployment of high-efficiency systems for portal monitoring. Other emerging missions, such as the desire to detect SNM at greater standoff distances, have also stimulated neutron-detection technology development. In light of these needs for novel neutron-detection technologies, this manuscript reviews the signatures of neutrons emitted by SNM, the principles of neutron detection, and various strategies under investigation for detection in the context of nonproliferation.

Runkle, Robert C.; Bernstein, A.; Vanier, Peter

2010-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

133

Nonproliferation & Forensics | Argonne National Laboratory  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation & Nuclear Forensics Argonne strives to strengthen the nation's ability to detect, prevent, and interdict proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and...

134

Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy: Neutronic Design Aspects of a Hybrid Fusion-Fission Nuclear Energy System  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

from associated non-proliferation treaties and operating thenon-proliferation effort verifiable by inspections and enforceable by international treaties.

Kramer, Kevin James

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

135

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IV. Commercial potential  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This volume of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) report provides time and cost estimates for positioning new nuclear power systems for commercial deployment. The assessment also estimates the rates at which the new systems might penetrate the domestic market, assuming the continuing viability of the massive light-water reactor network that now exists worldwide. This assessment does not recommend specific, detailed program plans and budgets for individual systems; however, it is clear from this analysis that any of the systems investigated could be deployed if dictated by national interest.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

136

Improving the nuclear data base for non-proliferation and homeland security  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Many of the technical advances in non-proliferation and homeland security require calculations of transport of neutrons and gamma-rays through materials. The nuclear data base on which these calculations are made must be of high quality in order for the calculated responses to be credible. At the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, three spallation neutron sources are being used to provide high-quality cross section and structure data with reactions induced by neutrons. Neutron transmission, neutron-induced fission and capture cross sections, neutron emission in fission, and gamma-ray production by neutrons are principal areas of research. Furthermore, these sources are also being used to validate calculations of the characterization and response of new detectors and detection techniques. Current research activities are summarized here.

Haight, Robert C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bitteker, Leo J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Couture, Aaron J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Devlin, Matthew J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fotiadis, Nikolaos [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Gavron, Avigdor [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hill, Tony S [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Laptev, Alexander B [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Nelson, Ronald O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; O'donnell, John M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Taddeucci, Terry N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tovesson, Fredrik K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ulmann, John L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wender, Stephen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

137

The Case Against Consent in International Law  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The   Nuclear  Non-­?Proliferation  Treaty  (NPT)  came  the  Treaties,”  Treaty  on  the  Non-­?Proliferation  of  

Guzman, Andrew T

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

138

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young Professionals to Careers in Nonproliferation and National Security | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission...

139

Nonproliferation - Tell-tale seals | ornl.gov  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

SHARE SHARE Nonproliferation - Tell-tale seals Using an Oak Ridge National Laboratory technology, inspectors of containers of nuclear material will be able to know with unprecedented confidence whether an intruder has tampered with a seal. The system uses a light source of entangled photons to verify the continuity of a fiber-based seal, according to Travis Humble, who led the development team. Entanglement is a feature of quantum physics that describes how two spatially disparate systems exhibit strong correlations in otherwise independent behaviors. The work, sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, is vital to ensure compliance with nonproliferation treaties because inspectors must confirm the uninterrupted containment and surveillance of any nuclear material.

140

Nuclear non-proliferation regime effectiveness : an integrated methodology for analyzing highly enriched uranium production scenarios at gas centrifuge enrichment plants  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The dramatic change in the international security environment after the collapse of the bipolar system has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the success ...

Kwak, Taeshin (Taeshin S.)

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


141

Comparison of chemical and nuclear explosions: Numerical simulations of the Non-Proliferation Experiment  

SciTech Connect

In this paper the authors discuss numerical simulations of the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), which was an underground explosion conducted in September 1993 in the volcanic tuff of the Nevada Test Site. The NPE source consisted of 1.29 {times} 10{sup 6} kg of ANFO-emulsion blasting agent, with the approximate energy of 1.1 kt, emplaced 389 m beneath the surface of Rainier Mesa. The authors compare detailed numerical simulations of the NPE with data collected from that experiment, and with calculations of an equally energetic nuclear explosion in identical geology. Calculated waveforms, at ranges out to approximately 1 km, agree moderately well in the time domain with free-field data, and are in qualitative agreement with free-surface records. Comparison of computed waveforms for equally energetic chemical and nuclear sources reveals relatively minor differences beyond the immediate near-source region, with the chemical source having an {approximately}25% greater seismic moment but otherwise indistinguishable (close-in) seismic source properties. 41 refs., 67 figs., 7 tabs.

Kamm, J.R.; Bos, R.J.

1995-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

142

Preliminary Results from an Investigation into Nanostructured Nuclear Radiation Detectors for Non-Proliferation Applications  

SciTech Connect

In recent years, the concept of embedding composite scintillators consisting of nanosized inorganic crystals in an organic matrix has been actively pursued. Nanocomposite detectors have the potential to meet many of the homeland security, non-proliferation, and border and cargo-screening needs of the nation and, by virtue of their superior nuclear identification capability over plastic, at roughly the same cost as plastic, have the potential to replace all plastic detectors. Nanocomposites clearly have the potential of being a gamma ray detection material that would be sensitive yet less expensive and easier to produce on a large scale than growing large, whole crystals of similar sensitivity. These detectors would have a broad energy range and a sufficient energy resolution to perform isotopic identification. The material can also be fabricated on an industrial scale, further reducing cost. This investigation focused on designing and fabricating prototype core/shell and quantum dot (QD) detectors. Fourteen core/shell and four QD detectors, all with the basic consistency of a mixture of nanoparticles in a polymer matrix with different densities of nanoparticles, were prepared. Nanoparticles with sizes <10 nm were fabricated, embedded in a polystyrene matrix, and the resultant scintillators’ radiation detector properties were characterized. This work also attempted to extend the gamma energy response on both low- and high-energy regimes by demonstrating the ability to detect low-energy and high-energy gamma rays. Preliminary results of this investigation are consistent with a significant response of these materials to nuclear radiation.

,

2012-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

143

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume I. Program summary  

SciTech Connect

This report summarizes the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP): its background, its studies, and its results. The introductory chapter traces the growth of the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and the organization and objectives of NASAP. Chapter 2 summarizes the program's assessments, findings, and recommendations. Each of Volumes II-VII reports on an individual assessment (Volumn II: Proliferation Resistance; Volume III: Resources and Fuel Cycle Facilities; Volume IV: Commercial Potential; Volume V: Economics and Systems Analysis; Volume VI: Safety and Environmental Considerations for Licensing; Volume VII: International Perspectives). Volume VIII (Advanced Concepts) presents a combined assessment of several less fully developed concepts, and Volume IX (Reactor and Fuel Cycle Descriptions) provides detailed descriptions of the reactor and fuel-cycle systems studied by NASAP.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

144

A Nuclear Iran? Why this particular topic?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

A Nuclear Iran? #12;#12;Why this particular topic? · State Department internship · Personal · NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) developed after WWII and Japan · IAEA (International Atomic of capacity #12;Iran's nuclear program · Initiated in 1959 · Strong ties to Russia, China and Pakistan · 2002

New Hampshire, University of

145

Free-field ground motions for the nonproliferation experiment: Preliminary comparisons with nearby nuclear events  

SciTech Connect

Since 1987, we have installed fixed arrays of tri-axial accelerometers in the fire-field near the shot horizons for low-yield ({le} 20 kt) nuclear events in the N-tunnel complex beneath Rainier Mesa. For the Nonproliferation Experiment (NPE) we augmented the array to achieve 23 free-field stations. Goals are: (a) to examine robustness and stability of various free-field source function estimates -- e.g., reduced displacement potentials (RDP) and spectra; (b) to compare close-in with regional estimates to test whether detailed close-in free-field and/or surface ground motion data can improve predictability of regional-teleseismic source functions; (c) to provide experimental data for checking two-dimensional numerical simulations. We report preliminary comparisons between experimental free-field data for NPE (1993) and three nearby nuclear events (MISTY ECHO, 1988; MINERAL QUARRY, 1990; HUNTERS TROPHY, 1992). All four working points are within 1 km of each other in the same wet tuff bed, thus reducing concerns about possible large differences in material properties between widely separated shots. Initial comparison of acceleration and velocity seismograms for the four events reveals: (1) There is a large departure from the spherical symmetry commonly assumed in analytic treatments of source theory; both vertical and tangential components are surprisingly large. (2) All shots show similar first-peak particle-velocity amplitude decay rates suggesting significant attenuation even in the supposedly purely elastic region. (3) Sharp (>20 Hz) arrivals are not observed at tunnel level from near-surface pP reflections or spall-closure sources -- but broadened peaks are seen that suggest more diffuse reflected energy from the surface and from the Paleozoic limestone basement below tunnel level.

Olsen, K.H.; Peratt, A.L.

1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

146

Nuclear Detonation Detection | National Nuclear Security Administratio...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices > Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development > Nuclear Detonation Detection Nuclear Detonation Detection Develop, Demonstrate, and...

147

Report of a workshop on nuclear forces and nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC October 28, 2010  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A workshop sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was held at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on October 28, 2010. The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The discussions reflected the importance of the NPR for defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats and providing guidance for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) programs and, for many but not all participants, highlighted its role in the successful outcome of the NPT RevCon. There was widespread support for the NPR and its role in developing the foundations for a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. However, some participants raised concerns about its implementation and its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-12-08T23:59:59.000Z

148

Measurement of 37Ar to support technology for On-site Inspection under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

On-Site Inspection (OSI) is a key component of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Measurements of radionuclide isotopes created by an underground nuclear explosion are a valuable signature of a Treaty violation. Argon-37 is produced from neutron interaction with calcium in soil, 40Ca(n,{\\alpha})37Ar. For OSI, the 35-day half-life of 37Ar provides both high specific activity and sufficient time for completion of an inspection before decay limits sensitivity. This paper presents a low-background internal-source gas proportional counter with an 37Ar measurement sensitivity level equivalent to 45.1 mBq/SCM in whole air.

C. E. Aalseth; A. R. Day; D. A. Haas; E. W. Hoppe; B. J. Hyronimus; M. E. Keillor; E. K. Mace; J. L. Orrell; A. Seifert; V. T. Woods

2010-08-04T23:59:59.000Z

149

The emerging nuclear suppliers: some guidelines for policy (U)  

SciTech Connect

Lewis A. Dunn, a former Assistant Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and now a senior analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, looks to the future to offer "The Emerging Nuclear Suppliers: Some Guidelines for Policy ." Mr. Dunn notes that although most emerging suppliers are cautious, many are not party to existing nonproliferation treaties. He calls upon the nonproliferation community to continue the present policy of not supporting unsafeguarded nuclear activities. He suggests that the nonproliferation community work within existing standards and infrastructures of nuclear suppliers to convince emerging supplier nations of the merits of nuclear export control.

Dunn, Lewis A.

1988-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

150

The Consent Problem in International Law  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the  Nuclear  Non-­?Proliferation  Treaty  in  1968   and  Nuclear   Non-­? Proliferation   Treaty   (NPT)   came  Treaties,”   Treaty   on   the   Non-­?Proliferation   of  

Guzman, Andrew

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

151

Loose Nukes: Nuclear Material Security in G.P.Gilfoyle  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Not supported by administration. No change. NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty See CTBT. No change. ABM Anti of a nuclear weapon by an adversary could have a devastating influence on US security and non-proliferation.A.Parmentola, Using Nuclear Materials to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation, Science and Global Security, 9, 81 (2001). #12

Gilfoyle, Jerry

152

Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East III  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) byof its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations;

Lehman, Ronald; Jones, Peter; Lodgaard, Sverre; Chipman, John

1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

153

Workshop on Arms Control and Security in the Middle East III  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by all partiesof its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations;

Lehman, Ronald; Jones, Peter; Lodgaard, Sverre; Chipman, John

1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

154

Who’s Watching the Nuclear Watchdog? A Critique of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This EnergyScience Briefing Paper raises serious concerns regarding the competence and professionalism of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO). ASNO’s mission, to prevent nuclear proliferation dangers associated with Australia’s uranium exports, is a task vital to the long-term security of Australians and all people. This paper details a large number of statements made by ASNO which are false or misleading. The evidence compiled raises critical questions of good governance, and leads inescapably to the conclusion that the safeguards on Australian uranium which ASNO is responsible for implementing are deeply flawed both in their design and in their execution.

Richard Broinowski; Tilman Ruff; Alan Roberts; Jim Green

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

155

Newsletter Fall 1993  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), andnature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NFT) is notefforts is the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Some

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

156

The Military Balance in the Middle East: An Executive Summary  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

non-proliferation treaties..arms control and non-proliferation treaties IAEA Full-Scopethe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological and

Cordesman, Anthony H.

1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

157

Newsletter Fall 1993  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and medianature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NFT) is notis the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Some 160

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

158

National Center for Nuclear Security: The Nuclear Forensics Project (F2012)  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

These presentation visuals introduce the National Center for Nuclear Security. Its chartered mission is to enhance the Nation’s verification and detection capabilities in support of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation through R&D activities at the NNSS. It has three focus areas: Treaty Verification Technologies, Nonproliferation Technologies, and Technical Nuclear Forensics. The objectives of nuclear forensics are to reduce uncertainty in the nuclear forensics process & improve the scientific defensibility of nuclear forensics conclusions when applied to nearsurface nuclear detonations. Research is in four key areas: Nuclear Physics, Debris collection and analysis, Prompt diagnostics, and Radiochemistry.

Klingensmith, A. L.

2012-03-21T23:59:59.000Z

159

Proceedings of the 21st Seismic Research Symposium: Technologies for Monitoring The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 21st Seismic Research Symposium: Technologies for Monitoring The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held 21-24 September 1999 in Las Vegas, Nevada. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Department of Defense (DoD), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Warren, N. Jill [Editor

1999-09-21T23:59:59.000Z

160

Terror Management in Response to Contemporary Political Issues  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

marijuana Nuclear non-proliferation treaty OutsourcingMarijuana Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty Outsourcing

Kinon, Marc Donald

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


161

Non-Proliferation | Department of Energy  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Non-Proliferation Non-Proliferation Non-Proliferation GC-52 provides legal advice to DOE regarding the transfer, storage or disposition of nuclear materials recovered by DOE for public health, safety or nonproliferation purposes. DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) operates several domestic and international programs aimed at securing vulnerable nuclear materials, such as orphan and disused sealed sources and foreign research reactor fuel, in support of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security initiatives. GC-52 also supports DOE in its interactions with other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the public. Applicable Laws Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 National Nuclear Security Administration Act Further Information

162

Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, which date back to the 1950s. The proliferation of international and regional courts has prompted some or related trade arrangements. Paradoxically, while we have witnessed the proliferation of international for Ethics, Justice, and Public Life Brandeis University 6 is by treaty and by custom - the two formal

Gilfoyle, Jerry

163

Explaining Soft Law  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 37 For each of thesecontained in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (“NPT”) notoutside of the nuclear nonproliferation regime threatened

Guzman, Andrew T.; Meyer, Timothy L.

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

164

Explaining Soft Law  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 38 For each of thesecontained in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (“NPT”) notoutside of the nuclear nonproliferation regime threatened

Guzman, Andrew; Meyer, Timothy L.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

165

Practices and their Failures: Arab-Israeli Relations and the Barcelona Process  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) inextension to the non-proliferation treaty unless Israel

Peters, Joel

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

166

Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue II: Conference Papers  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 34 This raises anthose states. ) Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): prohibiting

Young-Koo, Cha; Kang, Choi; JI, Guoxing; Mack, Andrew; Pregenzer, Arian L.; Dobrovolski, Vassili

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

167

Practices and their Failures: Arab-Israeli Relations and the Barcelona Process  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in April 1995.extension to the non-proliferation treaty unless Israel

Peters, Joel

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

168

The Nuclear Revolution, Relative Gains, and International Nuclear Assistance  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

nuclear trade and nonproliferation. Lexington, MA: LexingtonA challenge for nonproliferation. Disarmament Diplomacy. (Nuclear Suppliers Group. Nonproliferation Review 1(1):1–10.

Kroenig, Matthew

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

169

Report of a workshop on nuclear power growth and nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC, April 21, 2010  

SciTech Connect

The workshop addressed the future of nuclear power and nonproliferation in light of global nuclear energy developments, changing US policy and growing concerns about nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The discussion reflected wide agreement on the need for nuclear power, the necessity of mitigating any proliferation and terrorism risks and support for international cooperation on solutions. There were considerable differences on the nature and extent of the risks of differing fuel cycle choices. There was some skepticism about the prospects for a global nuclear energy renaissance, but there was a recognition that nuclear power would expand somewhat in the decades ahead with some states expanding capacity dramatically (e.g., China) and at least a few new states developing nuclear power programs. It was also argued by some participants that under the right conditions, a genuine renaissance could occur some decades from now. The prospects for a dramatic growth in nuclear power will depend on the ability of governments and industry to address these concerns, including the effectiveness of, and the resources devoted to, plans to develop and implement technologies and approaches that strengthen nonproliferation, nuclear materials accountability and nuclear security Several participants noted that the United States will not be able to continue to lead global nonproliferation efforts and to shape the growth of nuclear power as well as the global environment and energy debates without a robust US nuclear energy program. Some participants argued that fully integrating nuclear energy growth and nonproliferation, proliferation resistance and physical protection objectives was possible. The growing consensus on these objectives and the growing concern about the potential impact of further proliferation on the industry was one reason for optimism. The Blue Ribbon commission led by Scowcroft and Hamilton was seen as going far beyond the need to find an alternative to Yucca Mountain, and the preeminent forum in the next years to address the back end of the fuel cycle and other issues. Some argued that addressing these issues is the critical missing element, or the final piece of the puzzle to ensure the benefits of nuclear power and to promote nonproliferation. In this context, many argued that R&D on closed as well as open fuel cycle options in order to ensure a suite of long-term options was essential.

Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

170

Using Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Nondestructive Isotopic Analysis  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

screening and nuclear nonproliferation applications[2,3].of the Office of Nonproliferation and International

Ludewigt, Bernhard A.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

171

Nuclear Power: "Made in China" Andrew C. Kadak, Ph.D.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the proliferation threat. China is a signatory to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and the "Additional of nuclear waste and non- proliferation. As the world stands at the threshold of this ambitious and dynamic management and waste volume reduction. Non-proliferation One of the major concerns about expanding the use

172

Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support (TNPS), Nonproliferation and  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support (TNPS) Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral Export Control Arrangements Interdiction Engagement & Training INECP INSEP GIPP Safeguards Concepts and Approaches Human Capital Development Additional Protocol Technical Assistance National Security Systems & Assessments National Security Information Systems Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Radiation Detection & Response (RDR) Contact NPNS Other Major Programs Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE Division on Flickr Nonproliferation and National Security Program Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support (TNPS)

173

Understanding Europe’s "New" Common Foreign and Security Policy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Organization Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Organizationwith the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This is thefor renewal of the Non- Proliferation Treaty in 1995 Russian

Smith, Michael

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

174

SRS - Programs - Nonproliferation Programs  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

3/2012 3/2012 SEARCH GO spacer SRS Home Nonproliferation Programs In the crucial field of nuclear nonproliferation, SRS employee contributions helped to advance all three of the planned plutonium disposition facilities at the Savannah River Site: the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF); Waste Solidification Building (WSB); and the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. A $345 million project, the WSB will process liquid waste from the MOX facility. After material is processed at the WSB, transuranic waste will be packaged and sent to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, and low-level waste will be packaged and sent to onsite or commercial off-site low-level waste disposal facilities. The mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility will be a major component in the United States' program to dispose of excess weapons grade plutonium.

175

Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: The non-proliferation experiment. First quarter 1994  

SciTech Connect

In this issue of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies we present the initial findings of the recent Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), conducted by the Department of Energy at the Nevada Test Site. Through an introduction and pictorial walk-through, Marv Denny and Jay Zucca of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory describe the overall experiment. This is followed by scientific and technical abstracts of the complex suite of experiments and analyses, which were presented at the Symposium on Non-Proliferation Experiment Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, April 19--21, 1994. Questions regarding the ongoing analysis and conclusions from the NPE should be directed to Leslie Casey in the Office of Research and Development within the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security of DOE. Her phone number is 202-586-2151.

Staehle, G.; Stull, S.; Talaber, C. [eds.

1994-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

176

Detection Technologies, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies. Third/fourth quarters 1993  

SciTech Connect

This issue of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies is another in a series of issues about specific means for detecting and identifying proliferation and other suspect activities outside the realm of arms control treaties. All the projects discussed are funded by the Office of Research and Development of the Department of Energy`s Office of Nonproliferation and National Security.

Staehle, G; Stull, S; Talaber, C; Moulthrop, P [eds.

1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

177

Nonproliferation and National Security Multimedia - Argonne National  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and National Security Nonproliferation and National Security > Multimedia Multimedia Nuclear Systems Analysis Engineering Analysis Nonproliferation and National Security Detection & Diagnostic Systems Engineering Development & Applications Argonne's Nuclear Science & Technology Legacy Other Multimedia Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE on Flickr Bookmark and Share Nonproliferation and National Security: Multimedia Related Resources Nonproliferation and National Security Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Click on the "Date" header to sort the videos/podcasts in chronological order (ascending or descending). You may also search for a specific keyword; click on the reset button refresh to remove the keyword filter and show again all the Videos/Podcasts.

178

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

179

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

180

Making the World Safe for Nuclear Energy 65 John Deutch, Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, served as  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

such as the NPT (Treaty on Non Proliferation of NuclearWeapons) and its review process. 2. These are therefore climate of mainstream activity on these international security issues ('non-proliferation' and disarmament back-tracking from that forthright position on the disarmament-non- proliferation link (and pleading

Deutch, John

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


181

Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations  

SciTech Connect

This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited. They are expected to anticipate and react quickly to prevent a potential threat while staying accountable to their public stakeholders, many of whom remain unaware of the very threats the organization is trying to address. When budgets are flush, it is easy to believe that money will solve all problems; but during times of economic hardship, managers must rely on creative and cost-effective management approaches to implement their missions. Fortunately, managers of nonproliferation organizations can draw on a wealth of research on organizational design and culture to help them identify the management strategies most appropriate for them. Such research can help nonproliferation managers think about their own organizational structures and cultures and adapt accepted management principles to their unique organizational mission. This analytical process is not straight forward, as some managers may find themselves taking risks that others might not take, such as making ostensibly risky investments for the common good, or supporting creative thinking to help mission accomplishment. Some management principles that are relatively straightforward for other organizations may be difficult to envision and implement in a nonproliferation organization. Therefore, the goal of this study is to help nonproliferation managers identify management principles that can be implemented in a nonproliferation organization and, in the process, help maximize the value of the organization's products and effectiveness of its mission.

Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

2012-03-06T23:59:59.000Z

182

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume V. Economics and systems analysis  

SciTech Connect

This NASAP assessment considers the economics of alternative nuclear reactor and fuel-cycle systems in the light of possible patterns of uranium supply and energy demand, as well as the economic implications of improvng the proliferation resistance of the various systems. The assessment focuses on the costs of alternative nuclear technologies and the possible timing of their implementation, based on their economic attractiveness.

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

183

GARS | Nonproliferation and National Security Department  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and National Security Department Nonproliferation The Nonproliferation and National Security Department carries out research and development, provides technical...

184

The United States and Japan in Asia: Conference Papers  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the global nuclear non-proliferation regime—including theof renewing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995—and

Romberg, Alan D.; Nakanishi, Hiroshi; Endo, Seiji; Haggard, Stephan; Keller, Kenneth H.; Tamura, Jiro

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

185

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

McMakin, Andrea H.

2012-08-20T23:59:59.000Z

186

Speaker Dr. Richard Olsen will be discussing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in verifying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy where he worked for 21 years  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

such as the NPT (Treaty on Non Proliferation of NuclearWeapons) and its review process. 2. These are therefore climate of mainstream activity on these international security issues ('non-proliferation' and disarmament back-tracking from that forthright position on the disarmament-non- proliferation link (and pleading

Olsen, Stephen L.

187

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance  

SciTech Connect

Volume II assesses proliferation resistance. Chapters are devoted to: assessment of civilian nuclear systems (once-through fuel-cycle systems, closed fuel cycle systems, research reactors and critical facilities); assessment of associated sensitive materials and facilities (enrichment, problems with storage of spent fuel and plutonium content, and reprocessing and refabrication facilities); and safeguards for alternative fuel cycles.

1979-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

188

NuclearScienceandEngineeringLaboratory Sustainable  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

computational and visualization tools for application in nuclear power, nuclear security, nonproliferation of nuclear power to the electric grid. In the nuclear security, nonproliferation, and safeguards areas, ongoi

Beex, A. A. "Louis"

189

Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Article 3 of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear61: 265-298. [22] Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear

Baliga, Sandeep; Sjostrom, Tomas

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

190

The nuclear materials control technology briefing book  

SciTech Connect

As national and international interests in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, intensify, it becomes ever more important that contributors be aware of the technologies available for the measurement and control of the nuclear materials important to nuclear weapons development. This briefing book presents concise, nontechnical summaries of various special nuclear material (SNM) and tritium production monitoring technologies applicable to the control of nuclear materials and their production. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates a multinational, on-site-inspector-based safeguards program in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), many (but not all) of the technologies reported in this document are in routine use or under development for IAEA safeguards.

Hartwell, J.K.; Fernandez, S.J.

1992-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

191

What do we do with Nuclear Weapons Now?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The worldwide nuclear non-proliferation regime may becomeand its partners in the non-proliferation effort do not have

May, Michael M

2005-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

192

Implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union's Common Security Defense Policy and the Emerging Strategic  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, such as those involving Iran and North Korea; significant strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security regimes, including bringing India, Israel and Pakistan into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of states not conforming to international rules and norms. In the nuclear non-proliferation regime

193

Law as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of485. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere,Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S.

Yoo, John C.

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

194

Understanding Europe’s "New" Common Foreign and Security Policy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

measures. 2. Nuclear non-proliferation. 3. Economic aspectsOrganization Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Organizationarms control in Europe; non-proliferation of weapons of mass

Smith, Michael

2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

195

Development of Superconducting High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers for Nuclear Safeguards  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation. ESARDA Bulletin,Cycles: Safeguards and Non-Proliferation. KIT Scientificnuclear attribution and non-proliferation applications. In

Dreyer, Jonathan

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

196

The Office of Nuclear Verification | National Nuclear Security...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

at NNSA Blog The Office of Nuclear Verification Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation & International Security > The Office of Nuclear Verification...

197

Quantifiable Effects of Nuclear Conflict on Health and Society  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The much-heralded Non-Proliferation Treaty is now taking hard knocks—sadly and paradoxically from its initial proponents, and governments are glibly talking.

198

The Division System in Crisis: Essays on Contemporary Korea  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while the otherLimit Line Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 212, 222n6,NPT, see Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear development, 156,

Nak-chung, Paik

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

199

Proceedings of the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)  

SciTech Connect

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), held 13-15 September 2000 in New Orleans, Louisiana. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Department of Defense (DoD), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Nichols, James W., LTC [Editor

2000-09-15T23:59:59.000Z

200

Small Island States in the Face of Climatic Change: The End of the Line in International Environmental Responsibility  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

the 108. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,al- ready engaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty with its

Gillespie, Alexander

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


201

The Military Balance in the Middle East: An Executive Summary  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

parties to international arms control and non-proliferationarms control and non-proliferation treaties IAEA Full-Scopereinforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Biological

Cordesman, Anthony H.

1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

202

A Mass Spectrometry Study of Isotope Separation in the Laser Plume  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

as detailed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is toUnited Nations, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Suen, Timothy Wu

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

203

Global Nuclear Security Technology Division (GNSTD)  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Systems Nonproliferation Technology Nuclear Material Detection & Characterization Nuclear Security Advanced Technologies Safeguards & Security Technology Threat Reduction...

204

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young Professionals to Careers in Nonproliferation and National Security | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber ... Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Attracts High Caliber Young

205

Nuclear Security & Safety  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The Energy Department is working to enhance nuclear security through defense, nonproliferation, and environmental efforts.

206

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IX. Reactor and fuel cycle description  

SciTech Connect

The Nonproliferation Alterntive Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) has characterized and assessed various reactor/fuel-cycle systems. Volume IX provides, in summary form, the technical descriptions of the reactor/fuel-cycle systems studied. This includes the status of the system technology, as well as a discussion of the safety, environmental, and licensing needs from a technical perspective. This information was then used in developing the research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) program, including its cost and time frame, to advance the existing technology to the level needed for commercial use. Wherever possible, the cost data are given as ranges to reflect the uncertainties in the estimates.

Not Available

1980-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

207

Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

2008-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

208

Nonproliferation and National Security Program Contacts, Argonne...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Contacts Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral...

209

A Mass Spectrometry Study of Isotope Separation in the Laser Plume  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Attribution and Non-Proliferation Applications”, IEEETreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”,as detailed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is to

Suen, Timothy Wu

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

210

NEUTRON S ATTER AMERA FOR RADIATION DETE TION  

POTENTIAL APPLI ATIONS For more information or Treaty verification & monitoring licensing opportunities Nuclear safeguards & nonproliferation

211

The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation &...

212

Nuclear regulatory legislation, 102d Congress. Volume 2, No. 2  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This document is a compilation of nuclear regulatory legislation and other relevant material through the 102d Congress, 2d Session. This compilation has been prepared for use as a resource document, which the NRC intends to update at the end of every Congress. The contents of NUREG-0980 include The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and NRC Authorization and Appropriations Acts. Other materials included are statutes and treaties on export licensing, nuclear non-proliferation, and environmental protection.

Not Available

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

213

Nuclear Regulatory legislation: 103d Congress. Volume 2, No. 3  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This document is a compilation of nuclear regulatory legislation and other relevant material through the 103d Congress, 2d Session. This compilation has been prepared for use as a resource document, which the NRC intends to update at the end of every Congress. The contents of NUREG-0980 include the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and NRC Authorization and Appropriations Acts. Other materials included are statutes and treaties on export licensing, nuclear non-proliferation, and environmental protection.

NONE

1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

214

Nuclear regulatory legislation: 102d Congress. Volume 1, No. 2  

SciTech Connect

This document is a compilation of nuclear regulatory legislation and other relevant material through the 102d Congress, 2d Session. This compilation has been prepared for use as a resource document, which the NRC intends to update at the end of every Congress. The contents of NUREG-0980 include: The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and NRC Authorization and Appropriations Acts. Other materials included are statutes and treaties on export licensing, nuclear non-proliferation, and environmental protection.

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

215

Nuclear Regulatory legislation: 103d Congress. Volume 1, No. 3  

SciTech Connect

This document is a compilation of nuclear regulatory legislation and other relevant material through the 103d Congress, 2d Session. This compilation has been prepared for use as a resource document, which the NRC intends to update at the end of every Congress. The contents of NUREG-0980 include the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and NRC Authorization and Appropriations Acts. Other materials included are statutes and treaties on export licensing, nuclear non-proliferation, and environmental protection.

1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

216

DETERMINATION OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF NONPROLIFERATION FACTORS  

SciTech Connect

Methodologies to determine the proliferation resistance (PR) of nuclear facilities often rely on either expert elicitation, a resource-intensive approach without easily reproducible results, or numeric evaluations, which can fail to take into account the institutional knowledge and expert experience of the nonproliferation community. In an attempt to bridge the gap and bring the institutional knowledge into numeric evaluations of PR, a survey was conducted of 33 individuals to find the relative importance of a set of 62 nonproliferation factors, subsectioned into groups under the headings of Diversion, Transportation, Transformation, and Weaponization. One third of the respondents were self-described nonproliferation professionals, and the remaining two thirds were from secondary professions related to nonproliferation, such as industrial engineers or policy analysts. The factors were taken from previous work which used multi-attribute utility analysis with uniform weighting of attributes and did not include institutional knowledge. In both expert and non-expert groups, all four headings and the majority of factors had different relative importance at a confidence of 95% (p=0.05). This analysis and survey demonstrates that institutional knowledge can be brought into numeric evaluations of PR, if there is a sufficient investment of resources made prior to the evaluation.

Richard Metcalf

2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

217

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Nuclear Weapons In a nuclear power plant, a nuclear reactionused for fuel in a nuclear power plant (Barnaby 1993). Theon converting nuclear power plants to fighting malaria with

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

218

Global Security Directorate - Nonproliferation, Safeguards, and...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Home Centers & Programs Nonproliferation, Safeguards, and Security Programs click for full size image of Megatons to megawatts The Global Security and Nonproliferation Programs...

219

Consequence Management, Safeguards & Non-Proliferation Tools...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Consequence Management, Safeguards, and Non-Proliferation Tools SHARE Consequence Management, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Tools UF 6 Enrichment Facility Visualization of the...

220

U.S. and UAE Bolster Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Energy...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Bolster Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation U.S. and UAE Bolster Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation February 24, 2010 -...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


221

National security and the comprehensive test ban treaty  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

For nearly three years now, the US, UK, and USSR have been working on the draft of a treaty that would ban all nuclear explosions (both peaceful applications and weapon tests) and institute verification and monitoring provisions to ensure compliance with the treaty. The status of the draft treaty is summarized. The question, Is a CTBT really in the interest of US national security. is analyzed with arguments used by both proponents and opponents of the CTBT. It is concluded that there are arguments both for and against a CTBT, but, for those whose approach to national security can be expressed as peace through preparedness, the arguments against a CTBT appear persuasive. (LCL)

Landauer, J.K.

1980-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

222

Newsletter  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties (p. 8); and excerptobservance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, verified cessa­Non- peace agreements have been signed with all states in the proliferation Treaty (

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

223

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of a US or French nuclear reactor design may simply comelegitimate civilian uses: nuclear reactors produce plutoniumto 20%-30%) in a nuclear reactor and then later chemically

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

224

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Weapons Reductions and Nuclear Security Cooperation. Sarov,of Foreign Nuclear Installations: National Security Archive.Past: Nuclear Proliferation and American Security Policy.

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

225

Export control guide: Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and preparation of plutonium metal  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states in Article III, paragraph 2(b) that {open_quotes}Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide . . . equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.{close_quotes} This guide was prepared to assist export control officials in the interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws and controls relating to the international Trigger List for irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, components, and materials. The guide also contains information related to the production of plutonium metal. Reprocessing and its place in the nuclear fuel cycle are described briefly; the standard procedure to prepare metallic plutonium is discussed; steps used to prepare Trigger List controls are cited; descriptions of controlled items are given; and special materials of construction are noted. This is followed by a comprehensive description of especially designed or prepared equipment, materials, and components of reprocessing and plutonium metal processes and includes photographs and/or pictorial representations. The nomenclature of the Trigger List has been retained in the numbered sections of this document for clarity.

NONE

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

226

Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue II: Conference Papers  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

interest in regional non- proliferation. China’s nuclearstrengthening the nuclear non-proliferation re- gime. ” 33be members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 34 This

Young-Koo, Cha; Kang, Choi; JI, Guoxing; Mack, Andrew; Pregenzer, Arian L.; Dobrovolski, Vassili

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

227

Deputy Secretary Poneman's Remarks at the International Conference...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

nonproliferation regime and ensure a successful outcome of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May. We strongly encourage the peaceful use of nuclear...

228

Nonproliferation Education at the University of Washington PNNL-SA-50160  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

.S. government agencies, including the Nonproliferation Graduate Program at the National Nuclear Security for Global and Regional Security Studies (IGRSS) The nonproliferation curriculum at the University of Washington (UW) is the product of collaboration between Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security (PNWCGS

229

The Role of science in treaty verification  

SciTech Connect

Technologically advanced nations are currently applying more science to treaty verification than ever before. Satellites gather a multitude of information relating to proliferation concerns using thermal imaging analysis, nuclear radiation measurements, and optical and radio frequency signals detection. Ground stations gather complementary signals such as seismic events and radioactive emissions. Export controls in many countries attempt to intercept materials and technical means that could be used for nuclear proliferation. Never the less, we have witnessed a plethora of nuclear proliferation episodes, that were undetected (or were belatedly detected) by these technologies - the Indian nuclear tests in 1998, the Libyan nuclear buildup, the Iranian enrichment program and the North Korea nuclear weapons program are some prime examples. In this talk we will discuss some of the technologies used for proliferation detection. In particular, we will note some of the issues relating to nuclear materials control agreements that epitomize political difficulties as they impact the implementation of science and technology.

Gavron, A. I. (Avigdor I.)

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

230

Shaping the energy Future Nuclear Energy R&D  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

associated with the need to increase nuclear fuel resources and the perceived non-proliferation advantages

Kemner, Ken

231

Security Science & Technology | Nuclear Science | ORNL  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Security Treaty Verification Nuclear Systems Modeling, Simulation & Validation Nuclear Systems Technology Reactor Technology Nuclear Science Home | Science & Discovery |...

232

PROCEEDINGS OF 1976 SUMMER WORKSHOP ON AN ENERGY EXTENSION SERVICE  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

not ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) j('hich has not ratified the Treaty

Authors, Various

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

233

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

2002. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. 2nd2003. North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified U.S.Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, edited by C. F.

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

234

Nuclear Security and Terrorism in the New G.P.Gilfoyle  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, Paul: 134, 147-148, 150, 151, 172 Nixon, Richard M.: 142 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): 198 Normandy-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty: 55, 146, 159-160, 165, 185 Ap Bac incident: 82-83 Arbatov, Georgi: 156 Armed forces summit: 173-180 START Treaty: 182, 183, 184, 185 Washington summit: 180-181 Bush election campaign

Gilfoyle, Jerry

235

The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Policy...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Policy Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation &...

236

Current developments in laser ablation-inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry for use in geology, forensics, and nuclear nonproliferation research  

SciTech Connect

This dissertation focused on new applications of laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS). The diverse fields that were investigated show the versatility of the technique. In Chapter 2, LA-ICP-MS was used to investigate the rare earth element (REE) profiles of garnets from the Broken Hill Deposit in New South Wales, Australia. The normalized REE profiles helped to shed new light on the formation of deposits of sulfide ores. This information may be helpful in identifying the location of sulfide ore deposits in other locations. New sources of metals such as Pg, Zn, and Ag, produced from these ores, are needed to sustain our current technological society. The application of LA-ICP-MS presented in Chapter 3 is the forensics analysis of automotive putty and caulking. The elemental analysis of these materials was combined with the use of Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The PCA comparison was able to differentiate the automotive putty samples by manufacturer and lot number. The analysis of caulk was able to show a differentiation based on manufacturer, but no clear differentiation was shown by lot number. This differentiation may allow matching of evidence in the future. This will require many more analyses and the construction of a database made up of many different samples. The 4th chapter was a study of the capabilities of LA-ICP-MS for fast and precise analysis of particle ensembles for nuclear nonproliferation applications. Laser ablation has the ability to spatially resolve particle ensembles which may contain uranium or other actinides from other particles present in a sample. This is of importance in samples obtained from air on filter media. The particle ensembles of interest may be mixed in amongst dust and other particulates. A problem arises when ablating these particle ensembles directly from the filter media. Dust particles other than ones of interest may be accidentally entrained in the aerosol of the ablated particle ensemble. This would cause the analysis to be skewed. The use of a gelatin substrate allows the ablation a particle ensemble without disturbing other particles or the gelatin surface. A method to trap and ablate particles on filter paper using collodion was also investigated. The laser was used to dig through the collodion layer and into the particle ensemble. Both of these methods fix particles to allow spatial resolution of the particle ensembles. The use of vanillic acid as a possible enhancement to ablation was also studied. A vanillic acid coating of the particles fixed on top of the gelatin substrate was not found to have any positive effect on either signal intensity or precision. The mixing of vanillic acid in the collodion solution used to coat the filter paper increased ablation signal intensity by a factor of 4 to 5. There was little effect on precision, though. The collodion on filter paper method and the gelatin method of resolving particles have shown themselves to be possible tools in fighting proliferation of nuclear weapons and material. Future applications of LA-ICP-MS are only limited by the imagination of the investigator. Any material that can be ablated and aerosolized is a potential material for analysis by LA-ICP-MS. Improvements in aerosol transport, ablation chamber design, and laser focusing can make possible the ablation and analysis of very small amounts of material. This may perhaps lead to more possible uses in forensics. A similar method to the one used in Chapter 3 could perhaps be used to match drug residue to the place of origin. Perhaps a link could be made based on the elements leached from the soil by plants used to make drugs. This may have a specific pattern based on where the plant was grown. Synthetic drugs are produced in clandestine laboratories that are often times very dirty. The dust, debris, and unique materials in the lab environment could create enough variance to perhaps match drugs produced there to samples obtained off the street. Even if the match was not strong enough to be evidence, the knowledge that many sa

Messerly, Joshua D.

2008-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

237

Nuclear Energy Readiness Indicator Index (NERI): A benchmarking tool for assessing nuclear capacity in developing countries  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Declining natural resources, rising oil prices, looming climate change and the introduction of nuclear energy partnerships, such as GNEP, have reinvigorated global interest in nuclear energy. The convergence of such issues has prompted countries to move ahead quickly to deal with the challenges that lie ahead. However, developing countries, in particular, often lack the domestic infrastructure and public support needed to implement a nuclear energy program in a safe, secure, and nonproliferation-conscious environment. How might countries become ready for nuclear energy? What is needed is a framework for assessing a country's readiness for nuclear energy. This paper suggests that a Nuclear Energy Readiness Indicator (NERI) Index might serve as a meaningful basis for assessing a country's status in terms of progress toward nuclear energy utilization under appropriate conditions. The NERI Index is a benchmarking tool that measures a country's level of 'readiness' for nonproliferation-conscious nuclear energy development. NERI first identifies 8 key indicators that have been recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as key nonproliferation and security milestones to achieve prior to establishing a nuclear energy program. It then measures a country's progress in each of these areas on a 1-5 point scale. In doing so NERI illuminates gaps or underdeveloped areas in a country's nuclear infrastructure with a view to enable stakeholders to prioritize the allocation of resources toward programs and policies supporting international nonproliferation goals through responsible nuclear energy development. On a preliminary basis, the indicators selected include: (1) demonstrated need; (2) expressed political support; (3) participation in nonproliferation and nuclear security treaties, international terrorism conventions, and export and border control arrangements; (4) national nuclear-related legal and regulatory mechanisms; (5) nuclear infrastructure; (6) the utilization of IAEA technical assistance; (7) participation in regional arrangements; and (8) public support for nuclear power. In this paper, the Index aggregates the indicators and evaluates and compares the level of readiness in seven countries that have recently expressed various degrees of interest in establishing a nuclear energy program. The NERI Index could be a valuable tool to be utilized by: (1) country officials who are considering nuclear power; (2) the international community, desiring reassurance of a country's capacity for the peaceful, safe, and secure use of nuclear energy; (3) foreign governments/NGO's, seeking to prioritize and direct resources toward developing countries; and (4) private stakeholders interested in nuclear infrastructure investment opportunities.

Saum-Manning,L.

2008-07-13T23:59:59.000Z

238

DOE Statement on UK Government's "Road to 2010" Report on Nuclear Security  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Statement on UK Government's "Road to 2010" Report on Nuclear Statement on UK Government's "Road to 2010" Report on Nuclear Security DOE Statement on UK Government's "Road to 2010" Report on Nuclear Security July 17, 2009 - 12:00am Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - Thomas P. D'Agostino, the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, today applauded the British government's new report on advancing the global nuclear security agenda. Issued yesterday, "The Road to 2010 - Addressing the Nuclear Question in the Twenty First Century" outlines a strategy for addressing the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons ahead of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Among other steps, it includes the creation of a UK Center for Nuclear

239

Terry C. Wallace Principal Associate Director"  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Counterterrorism Focus Area Barry Charles" Intelligence! Focus Area Kerry Habiger" Nuclear Nonproliferation & Security Program Office! NJ Nicholas" Nonproliferation Deployment ! Focus Area Jon Nielsen (A)" Nonproliferation & Space R&D! Focus Area Allen Camp" Nonproliferation and Treaty Verification! Focus Area! Kory

240

Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A 582 (2007) 629637 Monte Carlo and analytical models of neutron detection with organic  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

unfolding, which have a variety of applications, including nuclear nonproliferation and homeland security materials in applications such as nuclear nonproliferation, homeland security, and basic physics research

Pázsit, Imre

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


241

The Division System in Crisis: Essays on Contemporary Korea  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

international nuclear non proliferation regime. 1) The DPRKto the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Nak-chung, Paik

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

242

Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, New START Treaty  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, New START Treaty Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, New START Treaty Hearing | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Congressional Testimony > Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, ... Congressional Testimony Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, New START Treaty

243

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program, Annual Report, Class of 2012  

SciTech Connect

This 32-pp annual report/brochure describes the accomplishments of the Class of 2012 of the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (the last class of this program), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The time period covers Sept 2011 through June 2013.

McMakin, Andrea H.

2013-09-23T23:59:59.000Z

244

NPT Signed | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Signed | National Nuclear Security Administration Signed | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline > NPT Signed NPT Signed March 05, 1970 New York, United States NPT Signed The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and forty-five other nations sign the Treaty for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

245

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

reactor or India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests) or commendnuclear weapons programs in Argentina, Brazil, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan,nuclear program led to India’s which in turn led to Pakistan’

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

246

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

nuclear reactor and then later chemically extract plutonium from the spent fuel. For years after the basic theory

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

247

The Nonproliferation Review  

SciTech Connect

The aim of this paper is to understand the numerous nuclear-related agreements that involve India and Pakistan, and in so doing identify starting points for future confidence-creating and confidence-building projects. Existing nuclear-related agreements provide a framework under which various projects can be proposed that foster greater nuclear transparency and cooperation in South Asia. The basic assumptions and arguments underlying this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) Increased nuclear transparency between India and Pakistan is a worthwhile objective, as it will lead to the irreversibility of extant nuclear agreements, the prospects of future agreements; and the balance of opacity and transparency required for stability in times of crises; (2) Given the current state of Indian and Pakistani relations, incremental progress in increased nuclear transparency is the most likely future outcome; and (3) Incremental progress can be achieved by enhancing the information exchange required by existing nuclear-related agreements.

RAJEN,GAURAV; BIRINGER,KENT L.

2000-07-28T23:59:59.000Z

248

Applications of boron-loaded scintillating fibers as NDA tools for nuclear safeguards  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation rely on nondestructive analytical tools for prompt and noninvasive detection

Douglas R. Mayo; Norbert Ensslin; Ronald F. Grazioso; A. Sharif Heger; David J. Mercer; Michael C. Miller; Phyllis A. Russo; Martin R. Sweet

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

249

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

designs. For example, CANDU-type nuclear reactors are morenegotiations with Canada for a CANDU reactor and with Franceearlier acquisition of a CANDU reactor, did the US become

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

250

Technical and Political Assessment of Peaceful Nuclear Power Program Prospects in North Africa and the  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

technical, political, legislative, nonproliferation, and safety infrastructure required for the capability in nuclear energy programs with regard to safety, nonproliferation and physical security

251

NONPROLIFERATION PROMOTED BY INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

NONPROLIFERATION PROMOTED BY INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION PNNL SA-50880 Gretchen E. Hund Center nonproliferation. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, the A.Q. Khan illicit trade network, and IAEA Director General nonproliferation by ensuring that these materials are secure throughout the whole supply chain. This paper analyzes

252

Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium, and Nonproliferation  

Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium Siegfried S. Hecker, Plutonium and Nuclear Nonproliferation Resources with Additional Information · Awards Siegfried S. Hecker Photo Credit: Courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratory LeRoy Sanchez On September 17, 2009, U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu named Siegfried S. Hecker as a winner of the Enrico Fermi Award 'in recognition for his contributions to plutonium metallurgy, his broad scientific leadership and for his energetic and continuing efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons around the globe. Dr. Hecker is credited with resolving a long-standing controversy involving the stability of certain structures (or phases) in plutonium alloys near equilibrium that arose from significant discrepancies between U.S. and former USSR research on plutonium metallurgy.'1

253

Challenges in Implementing Methodologies for Nonproliferation Assessments  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A handful of models for explaining and predicting States’ development of nuclear weapons programs have been proposed since the 1970s. Despite the array of techno-social variables and computational concepts employed in these models, no model has yet been established as an agreed-upon standard. Likewise, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—one of the main institutions evaluating social, political, and technological information for assessments of States’ current nuclear capabilities—uses only a qualitative framework by which to evaluate such information to assess the correctness and completeness of a State’s declaration. In this paper, analysts familiar with both the development of techno-social modelling and the IAEA’s implementation of a safeguards system that is information driven discuss the challenges faced in the development, implementation, and evaluation of models and methodologies for nonproliferation assessments, based on experiences at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the IAEA.

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Dalton, Angela C.; Coles, Garill A.

2011-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

254

PROCEEDINGS OF 1976 SUMMER WORKSHOP ON AN ENERGY EXTENSION SERVICE  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

oj the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)fundamental non- proliferation principles governing (1) thethe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The

Authors, Various

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

255

Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

3 of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,22] Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,the risk of arms proliferation. Player A uses a “non-convex”

Baliga, Sandeep; Sjostrom, Tomas

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

256

Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security  

SciTech Connect

Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security - sometimes referred to as the '3S' concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of nuclear safeguards infrastructure in countries with credible plans for nuclear energy as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. Developing an adequate safeguards infrastructure is critical to becoming a responsible 'owner' of nuclear power. The 3S concept is the optimal path forward to achieving this goal.

Kovacic, Donald N [ORNL; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia [ORNL; McClelland-Kerr, John [U.S. Department of Energy; Van sickle, Matthew [U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration; Bissani, Mo [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

257

Nonproliferation through delegation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

nuclear expertise in the Manhattan Project in just this way.Fearon 1995). As in the Manhattan Project example above, theits participation in the Manhattan Project. There remained a

Brown, Robert Louis

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

258

Strategic Trade Control: Nonproliferation Engagement and Training  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation Engagement and Training Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral Export Control Arrangements Interdiction Engagement & Training INECP INSEP GIPP Safeguards Concepts and Approaches Human Capital Development Additional Protocol Technical Assistance National Security Systems & Assessments National Security Information Systems Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Radiation Detection & Response (RDR) Contact NPNS Other Major Programs Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE Division on Flickr Nonproliferation and National Security Program Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support (TNPS)

259

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR SCIENCE, VOL. 53, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2006 3021 New Readout Electronics for 3-D Position Sensitive  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

for homeland security and nuclear non-proliferation applications. Mechanically cooled HPGe detectors

He, Zhong

260

OF THE EURATOM TREATY  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

FACILITIES: Installations for off-site surveillance of the environment during normal operations of the Sellafield Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant Installations for monitoring and controlling liquid radioactive effluent discharges from the Lillyhall Very Low Level Radioactive Landfill Site. LOCATIONS:

Alan Ryan; Finlay Maclean; Alan Ryan

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


261

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty research and development FY95-96 program plan  

SciTech Connect

The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the United States Government`s (USG) research and development (R&D) functions for monitoring nuclear explosions in the context of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This responsibility includes the November 1993 transfer of the Department of Defense`s (DoD) CTBT R&D responsibility to DOE. The DOE research program builds on the broad base of USG expertise developed historically and includes R&D for detecting, locating, identifying, and characterizing nuclear explosions in all environments. The Office of Research and Development (NN-20), within the Department of Energy`s Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, formulates and executes the efforts necessary to meet the Department`s responsibilities. The following DOE laboratories as a team will support NN-20 in implementing the program plan: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories. DOE has committed to a cooperative program that draws upon the core competencies of the national laboratories and upon the strengths of other government agencies and the private sector (academia and industry). The integration of resources under a common direction will allow the program to be flexible and responsive to changing technical and policy requirements while maximizing the effectiveness of funding appropriations. DOE will develop and demonstrate appropriate technologies, algorithms, procedures, and integrated systems in a cost-effective and timely manner. The program comprises seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound monitoring; on-site inspection; space-based monitoring; and automated data processing elements.

1994-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

262

Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2a  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), or to a similar international legally-binding nuclear non-proliferation terrorism, and of the need to separate the issue of non-proliferation or non-diversion assurances from

263

Sodium Reaction Experimental Test Facility (SRETF) - Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Form Modeling Departments Engineering Analysis Nuclear Systems Analysis Research & Test Reactor Nonproliferation and National Security Detection & Diagnostic Systems...

264

Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center | Y-12 National Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Detection and ... Detection and ... Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center As part of our increased global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, Y-12 commissioned the Nuclear Detection and Sensor Testing Center, which offers dedicated facilities for the testing of radiation detection capabilities using enriched and highly enriched uranium. In addition to supporting measurements of instrumentation for detecting ionizing radiation, non-destructive measurements of both fissile and non-fissile materials may be deployed at NDSTC. The NDSTC supports proliferation detection, nuclear safeguards, emergency response, treaty verification, and university research. We can test devices with various forms and quantities of HEU, and the Center offers subject matter experts to assist in planning measurements, safely deploy material,

265

SNIF: A Futuristic Neutrino Probe for Undeclared Nuclear Fission Reactors  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Today reactor neutrino experiments are at the cutting edge of fundamental research in particle physics. Understanding the neutrino is far from complete, but thanks to the impressive progress in this field over the last 15 years, a few research groups are seriously considering that neutrinos could be useful for society. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works with its Member States to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. In a context of international tension and nuclear renaissance, neutrino detectors could help IAEA to enforce the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this article we discuss a futuristic neutrino application to detect and localize an undeclared nuclear reactor from across borders. The SNIF (Secret Neutrino Interactions Finder) concept proposes to use a few hundred thousand tons neutrino detectors to unveil clandestine fission reactors. Beyond previous studies we provide estimates of all known background sources as a function of the detecto...

Lasserre, Thierry; Mention, Guillaume; Reboulleau, Romain; Cribier, Michel; Letourneau, Alain; Lhuillier, David

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

266

International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP)  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and Nonproliferation and National Security Program > TNPS > Strategic Trade Control > International Programs > INECP Nonproliferation & National Security (NPNS) Overview Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support Strategic Trade Control Review of export license applications Multilateral Export Control Arrangements Interdiction Engagement & Training INECP INSEP GIPP Safeguards Concepts and Approaches Human Capital Development Additional Protocol Technical Assistance National Security Systems & Assessments National Security Information Systems Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) Radiation Detection & Response (RDR) Contact NPNS Other Major Programs Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE Division on Flickr

267

THE OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION & NATIONAL SECURITY  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

W. HORAK Chair TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION and PARTNERSHIPS W. COPAN Manager NONPROLIFERATION and NATIONAL SECURITY C. KESSLER Chair RESEARCH OPERATIONS L. Bowerman *Reports...

268

Office of the Assistant General Counsel for Civilian Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Waste (HLW) and Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Management of Nuclear Materials and Non-HLW Nuclear Fuel Cycle Energy Research and Development Non-Proliferation Nuclear Regulatory...

269

Brussels, 07.10.2003 Position paper: Europe should lead the fight against global warming  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, and continuous refinement of treaties and practices. Nuclear non-proliferation treaties can serve as examples become party to agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty continue their support in part-long experience with non-proliferation and arms control apply directly to building a system of adequate network

Laughlin, Robert B.

270

Consequence Management, Safeguards & Non-Proliferation Tools | ORNL  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Consequence Consequence Management, Safeguards, and Non-Proliferation Tools SHARE Consequence Management, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Tools UF 6 Enrichment Facility Visualization of the gamma radiation field in a mock-up of a UF-6 enrichment facility. The solution was generated on a desktop computer using ORNL's Denovo SN transport code and ADVANTG interface, using geometry and material descriptions from an NRL SWORD input file. ORNL is a leader in developing state-of-the-art radiation transport modeling and simulation tools and in applying these tools to solve challenging problems in national and global nuclear security. Recent developments in high-performance, high-fidelity, deterministic Monte Carlo, and hybrid Monte Carlo/deterministic radiation transport codes within

271

Nuclear Science & Engineering  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

§ SC Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) on international terrorism and non-proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-State actors will also be analyzed. Knowledge of the PIL course) � Legal consequences of the international personality: functional protection, treaty

272

U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation Project  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation Project with Kazakhstan U.S. Department of Energy and NTI Announce Key Nonproliferation Project with Kazakhstan September 29, 2006 - 9:01am Addthis Agreement Reached To Downblend HEU and Convert Reactor WASHINGTON, D.C. - The U.S. Department of Energy and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) today announced that they have reached an important agreement-in-principle with the Government of Kazakhstan to move forward with the down-blending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) currently stored at Kazakhstan's Institute of Nuclear Physics. The agreement also calls for the conversion of the VVR-K research reactor to operate on low enriched uranium fuel instead of HEU, which can be used in nuclear weapons. The

273

Proliferation J.A.Parmentola  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

on the United Nations Security Council. Article 4 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) states the limits to the phrase in the Non-Proliferation Treaty `nuclear energy for peaceful purposes'. Much research reactors, and given the Non Proliferation Treaty's protection of all treaty states' rights

Gilfoyle, Jerry

274

ENERGY COMMISSION Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

on the United Nations Security Council. Article 4 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) states the limits to the phrase in the Non-Proliferation Treaty `nuclear energy for peaceful purposes'. Much research reactors, and given the Non Proliferation Treaty's protection of all treaty states' rights

275

Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Lessons Learned  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

January 17, 2013 1 THERESA ALDRIDGE, PACIFIC NORTHWEST SITE OFFICE NEPA Compliance Office Richland Washington Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Lessons Learned Along with 800 other...

276

Nuclear Symbiosis - A Means to Achieve Sustainable Nuclear Growth while Limiting the Spread of Sensititive Nuclear Technology  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Global growth of nuclear energy in the 21st century is creating new challenges to limit the spread of nuclear technology without hindering adoption in countries now considering nuclear power. Independent nuclear states desire autonomy over energy choices and seek energy independence. However, this independence comes with high costs for development of new indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. Nuclear supplier states and expert groups have proposed fuel supply assurance mechanisms such as fuel take-back services, international enrichment services and fuel banks in exchange for recipient state concessions on the development of sensitive technologies. Nuclear states are slow to accept any concessions to their rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To date, decisions not to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities have been driven primarily by economics. However, additional incentives may be required to offset a nuclear state’s perceived loss of energy independence. This paper proposes alternative economic development incentives that could help countries decide to forgo development of sensitive nuclear technologies. The incentives are created through a nuclear-centered industrial complex with “symbiotic” links to indigenous economic opportunities. This paper also describes a practical tool called the “Nuclear Materials Exchange” for identifying these opportunities.

David Shropshire

2009-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

277

Version 2 September 2010 Environmental Studies 900 (Section 1): EAP Seminar 1 credit  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). PreventPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle

Sheridan, Jennifer

278

The Application of Remote Sensing inThe Application of Remote Sensing in Support of Ecosystem ManagementSupport of Ecosystem Management  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). PreventPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle

Columbia University

279

2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference 2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference 2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference November 7, 2005 - 12:36pm Addthis Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Sam Bodman I am very glad to be with all of you today. Let me just say to Rose and to everyone associated with the Carnegie Endowment that the Bush Administration values the work that you do. This is particularly so with this series of conferences dedicated to exploring the complicated issues of nonproliferation policy. And allow me to offer the congratulations of my Department to Director General El Baradei and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the award conferred last month by the Nobel Foundation. We should applaud the Agency's staff and all the member nations that come

280

2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

5 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference 5 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference 2005 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference November 7, 2005 - 12:36pm Addthis Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Sam Bodman I am very glad to be with all of you today. Let me just say to Rose and to everyone associated with the Carnegie Endowment that the Bush Administration values the work that you do. This is particularly so with this series of conferences dedicated to exploring the complicated issues of nonproliferation policy. And allow me to offer the congratulations of my Department to Director General El Baradei and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the award conferred last month by the Nobel Foundation. We should applaud the Agency's staff and all the member nations that come

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


281

The Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection (NDD) | National Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

of Nuclear Detonations: Develops and builds space sensors for the nation's operational nuclear test treaty monitoring and Integrated Threat WarningAttack Assessment...

282

Nonproliferation, Nuclear Security, and the Insider Threat  

SciTech Connect

Insider threat concept is evolving and getting more attention: (1) Domestically, internationally and in foreign countries, (2) At the government, academia, and industry levels, and (3) Public awareness and concerns are also growing. Negligence can be an insider's action. Technology advancements provide more opportunities, new tools for the insider. Our understanding of the insider is shaped by our cultural, social and ethnic perceptions and traditions. They also can limit our recognition of the issues and response actions.

Balatsky, Galya I. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Duggan, Ruth [SNL

2012-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

283

Nonproliferation issues in the nuclear energy future  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The continuing increases in annual greenhouse gas emissions, in the absence of stringent mitigation measures, will produce a doubling of pre-industrial atmospheric concentrations in the second half of this century and a ...

Jones, Christopher Michael, 1976-

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

284

Contact Nonproliferation Program Offices | National Nuclear Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press...

285

Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

attendees agreed to encourage the use of LEU targets and other proliferation-resistant technologies in various commercial applications such as isotope production. This was a...

286

Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and the IAEA in Tomorrow's World  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards have evolved considerably during the last five decades and have become an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and the global security system. To carry on serving well the international community, they need to continue to move with the times -- especially in light of the renewed interest in nuclear energy and its projected expansion in the coming years, which could bring additional nuclear facilities, material and activities under IAEA safeguards. The projected nuclear ˜renaissance" may pose increased proliferation risks as nuclear material, technology and know-how spread in an increasingly globalized world. The presentation will provide an overview of the IAEA safeguards system and describe current verification challenges and potential new IAEA roles.

Cooley, Jill (IAEA)

2008-09-08T23:59:59.000Z

287

Congressional Research Service ~ The Library of Congress Issue Brief for Congress  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other nuclear accords it had signed. North to determine whether North Korea is in full compliance with the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, to which to Pyongyang's obligations as a signatoryof the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); North Korea had signed

288

Cluster Munitions Prohibition Bill 2010 -Submissions by Australian Lawyers for Human Rights -Jan 2011 Provisions of the Criminal Code  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

they made in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.8 1997), p.77-83. 8 Non-Proliferation Treaty, Art.VI. #12;The two countries have been using non-treaty This report on non-binding, non-treaty approaches to arms control draws upon research and discussion

289

http://ann.sagepub.com Academy of Political and Social  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

was strengthened by confidence-building measures (e.g., the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States defense." The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (http://www.un.org/ Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/), which limits agreement. The result might be embodied in a formal treaty or a less formal understanding, like

Andrews, Peter B.

290

Livermore scientist, engineers train to be inspectors for test ban treaty  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

scientist, engineers train to be inspectors for test ban treaty scientist, engineers train to be inspectors for test ban treaty organization | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > NNSA Blog > Livermore scientist, engineers train to be inspectors ... Livermore scientist, engineers train to be inspectors for test ban treaty organization

291

Feasibility study on using fast calorimetry technique to measure a mass attribute as part of a treaty verification regime  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The attribute measurement technique provides a method for determining whether or not an item containing special nuclear material (SNM) possesses attributes that fall within an agreed upon range of values. One potential attribute is whether the mass of an SNM item is larger than some threshold value that has been negotiated as part of a nonproliferation treaty. While the historical focus on measuring mass attributes has been on using neutron measurements, calorimetry measurements may be a viable alternative for measuring mass attributes for plutonium-bearing items. Traditionally, calorimetry measurements have provided a highly precise and accurate determination of the thermal power that is being generated by an item. In order to achieve this high level of precision and accuracy, the item must reach thermal equilibrium inside the calorimeter prior to determining the thermal power of the item. Because the approach to thermal equilibrium is exponential in nature, a large portion of the time spent approaching equilibrium is spent with the measurement being within {approx}10% of its final equilibrium value inside the calorimeter. Since a mass attribute measurement only needs to positively determine if the mass of a given SNM item is greater than a threshold value, performing a short calorimetry measurement to determine how the system is approaching thermal equilibrium may provide sufficient information to determine if an item has a larger mass than the agreed upon threshold. In previous research into a fast calorimetry attribute technique, a two-dimensional heat flow model of a calorimeter was used to investigate the possibility of determining a mass attribute for plutonium-bearing items using this technique. While the results of this study looked favorable for developing a fast calorimetry attribute technique, additional work was needed to determine the accuracy of the model used to make the calculations. In this paper, the results from the current work investigating the fast calorimetry attribute technique will be presented.

Hauck, Danielle K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bracken, David S [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mac Arthur, Duncan W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Santi, Peter A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Thron, Jonathan [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

292

Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies • Second Quarter 1993I................................................................................................................................................................  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Observers from the Department of Energy and the Defense Nuclear Agency watch as a tag/seal is applied to a uranium hexafluoride cylinder during the demonstration held at Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. In June 1993, the Department of Energy conducted a demonstration of the ability to tag and seal potential nuclear material containers appropriate for the U.S.-Russian conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to lowenrichment uranium (LEU). Begun in the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the task was carried out after DOE's reorganization by the Qffice of Research and Development. Tags and seals that were previously developed at the DOE national laboratories and under the sponsorship of the Defense Nuclear Agency were demonstrated on three possible containers: the Department of Transportation Specification 6M HEU container, the AT-400R HEU container, and the Type 30B uranium hexafluoride cylinder.

Thepurposeof Armscontroland

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

293

Export possibilities for small nuclear reactors  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The worldwide deployment of peaceful nuclear technology is predicated on conformance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1972. Under this international treaty, countries have traded away pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for access to commercial nuclear technology that could help them grow economically. Realistically, however, most nuclear technology has been beyond the capacity of the NPT developing countries to afford. Even if the capital cost of the plant is managed, the costs of the infrastructure and the operational complexity of most nuclear technology have taken it out of the hands of the nations who need it the most. Now, a new class of small sodium cooled reactors has been specifically designed to meet the electrical power, water, hydrogen and heat needs of small and remote users. These reactors feature small size, long refueling interval, no onsite fuel storage, and simplified operations. Sized in the 10 MW(e) to 50 MW(e) range these reactors are modularized for factory production and for rapid site assembly. The fuel would be <20% U-235 uranium fuel with a 30-year core life. This new reactor type more appropriately fills the needs of countries for lower power distributed systems that can fill the gap between large developed infrastructure and primitive distributed energy systems. Looking at UN Resolution 1540 and the impact of other agreements, there is a need to address the issues of nuclear security, fuel, waste, and economic/legal/political-stakeholder concerns. This paper describes the design features of this new reactor type that specifically address these issues in a manner that increases the availability of commercial nuclear technology to the developing nations of the world. (authors)

Campagna, M.S.; Hess, C.; Moor, P. [Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc., Oradell, NJ (United States); Sawruk, W. [ABSG Consulting, Inc., Shillington, PA (United States)

2007-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

294

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study  

SciTech Connect

NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.

1995-12-19T23:59:59.000Z

295

ME 379M-Nuclear Safety and Security ABET EC2000 syllabus  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

assessment models and nuclear non-proliferation. Failure classifications, failure modes, effects and Roger Cooke, Cambridge University Press, 2006, ISBN: 0-521-77320-2. Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Primer consists of two parts ­ Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Nuclear Nonproliferation. The students will learn

Ben-Yakar, Adela

296

Development of Superconducting High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers for Nuclear Safeguards  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of smuggling. Today, nuclear security is significantly morecritical importance of nuclear security, stating that thereJ. Doyle. Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation:

Dreyer, Jonathan

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

297

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Inaugural Conference |...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty produced a resilient global framework for nuclear cooperation and...

298

Introduction to Special Edition on University Nonproliferation Education and Training  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Introduction to Special Edition on University Nonproliferation Education and Training PNNL-SA-50159 Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold destruction has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another

299

GLOBAL SECURITY & NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS MISSION STATEMENT AND FACT SHEET  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

GLOBAL SECURITY & NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS MISSION STATEMENT AND FACT SHEET MISSION The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Global Security & Nonproliferation Programs (GS&N) develop, coordinate a strategic threat to the United States. Through its nonproliferation programs, the ORNL GS&N is a primary

Pennycook, Steve

300

10 CFR Part 810 | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Nuclear power plant 10 CFR Part 810 Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nuclear...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


301

Prospects and Challenges for a Global Expansion of Nuclear Energy  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... in such countries will be challenging, as will be the additional strain that a global spread of nuclear power will put on the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

302

Nuclear Material Recovery | Y-12 National Security Complex  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Recovery Securing nuclear material domestically and internationally is one part of Y-12's nuclear nonproliferation business. Miscellaneous scrap material is a diverse group of...

303

2010 Annual Planning Summary for Nuclear Energy (NE) | Department...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Annual Planning Summary for National Nuclear Security Administration Service Center (NNSA-SC) 2010 Annual Planning Summary for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20) 2010 Annual...

304

Report, Long-Term Nuclear Technology Research and Development...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

safeguards and nonproliferation, environmental management and waste cleanup, and Navy nuclear propulsion systems development resides outside the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science...

305

Administrator D'Agostino on NNSA Nuclear Safeguards and Security...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

global challenges of nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards and security. Understanding, developing and implementing proper nuclear safeguards is an important part of any...

306

Newsletter  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

In This Issue: Nuclear Non-proliferation pp. 1-9 Feature:students in non- proliferation issues and initiatives (p.Test Ban and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties (p. 8); and

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

307

The Sisterhood of the Traveling Packets Matt Bishop  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Research reactors · Material Testing Reactors · Neutron sources OSIRIS-Saclay International treaty for non-proliferation-Cadarache International treaty for non-proliferation: 235U enrichment reduction down to 20% for nuclear fuel materials, Germany 66 UMo/Al nuclear fuel development: presentation Research reactors International treaty for non-proliferation

Bishop, Matt

308

The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing Fence-Sitters in the Post-Cold War Era  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

ment to nuclear non-proliferation over the long- term.1993. “Maintaining a Non- proliferation Regime. ” In NuclearNew Approach to Nuclear Non- proliferation in Argentina and

Solingen, Etel

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

309

Lessons Learned from Nonproliferation Successes and Failures  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

fishes; the effects of non-native species on food supply; and the proliferation of contaminants River to support naturally produced native fishes." Added to this is the proliferation of non columbia river Treaty with Stephen R. Oliver, Vice President of Generation Asset Management

Katz, Jonathan I.

310

Rapid Sampling Tools - Nuclear Engineering Multimedia  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nonproliferation and National Security Nonproliferation and National Security > Multimedia > Rapid Sampling Tools Director's Welcome Organization Achievements Highlights Fact Sheets, Brochures & Other Documents Multimedia Library About Nuclear Energy Nuclear Reactors Designed by Argonne Argonne's Nuclear Science and Technology Legacy Opportunities within NE Division Visit Argonne Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE on Flickr Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of Chicago Pile 1 (CP-1) Argonne OutLoud on Nuclear Energy Argonne Energy Showcase 2012 Nonproliferation and National Security - Multimedia Bookmark and Share NPNS Multimedia, a collection of videos and audios featuring activities related to Nonproliferation and National Security

311

NO 17 The Nuclear Debate in Pakistan  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

old nuclear trade ban on India by approving the Indo-US nuclear agreement. This nuclear deal has managed to end an era of nuclear trade restrictions and has opened the door for regulated proliferation. Also, the international non-proliferation system has accommodated a non-NPT state into the NPT regime. This is unprecedented and has resulted in a structural change in the international system. It is interesting to see how this deal is being viewed in Pakistan, and how the general debate on various nuclear treaties is unfolding in Pakistan. With Indian influence increasing in US policy circles, it should not be taken for granted that since Pakistan is a US ally in its war on terrorism, the latter will ignore the increasing Indian noise about the “instability ” factor in the region and implicating Pakistan. Arguing that “Indian safety and success are strategic assets for the US ” (Tellis 2005), India has carved out a strategic space for itself in the region, confirmed and sealed by this agreement.

Post Indo-us Deal; Rabia Akhtar

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

312

Migratory Bird Treaty Act | Open Energy Information  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

Migratory Bird Treaty Act Migratory Bird Treaty Act Jump to: navigation, search Statute Name Migratory Bird Treaty Act Year 1918 Url [[File:|160px|link=http://law2.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t13t16+6189+0++%28%29%20%20AND%20%28%2816%29%20ADJ%20USC%29%3ACITE%20AND%20%28USC%20w%2F10%20%28703%29%29%3ACITE%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20]] Description References FWS Overview[1] The original 1918 statute implemented the 1916 Convention between the U.S. and Great Britain (for Canada) for the protection of migratory birds. Later amendments implemented treaties between the U.S. and Mexico, the U.S. and Japan, and the U.S. and the Soviet Union (now Russia). Specific provisions in the statute include: Establishment of a Federal prohibition, unless permitted by regulations, to

313

Policy issues facing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and prospects for the future  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report is divided into the following 5 sections: (1) Background; (2) Major Issues Facing Ratification of CTBT; (3) Current Status on CTBT Ratification; (4) Status of CTBT Signatories and Ratifiers; and (5) CTBT Activities Not Prohibited. The major issues facing ratification of CTBT discussed here are: impact on CTBT of START II and ABM ratification; impact of India and Pakistan nuclear tests; CTBT entry into force; and establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Sweeney, J.

1999-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

314

Framework for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection for Nonproliferation Impact Assessments.  

SciTech Connect

This report describes a framework for proliferation resistance and physical protection evaluation for the fuel cycle systems envisioned in the expansion of nuclear power for electricity generation. The methodology is based on an approach developed as part of the Generation IV technical evaluation framework and on a qualitative evaluation approach to policy factors similar to those that were introduced in previous Nonproliferation Impact Assessments performed by DOE.

Bari,R.

2008-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

315

Connecting the Dots. Intelligence and Law Enforcement since 9/11  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

attendant focus on non- proliferation was expressed in theterm approaches and both non- proliferation and disarmamentagreements—the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the

Stalcup, Mary Margaret

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

316

NNSA's Sequoia Supercomputer Transitions to Classified Work,...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

to addressing nonproliferation and counterterrorism issues as well as informing other national security decisions such as nuclear weapon policy and treaty agreements. Delivered...

317

Microsoft Word - NGSI Report.doc  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

mechanism available to monitor nuclear activities in conformance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and safeguards commitments undertaken by states worldwide. They also...

318

DRAFT  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

dual-use equipment, materials and related technologies. (Reference p); Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Exporters (Zangger) Committee at: http:www.zanggercommittee.org...

319

Edward L. Rowny ETO European theater of operations  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

' of the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) implementation framework.3 But the careful balancing of divergent to the extent consistent with the non-proliferation aims codified in Articles I and II of the Treaty. The mere/April 2004. 4 Article IV, Section 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed 1 July

US Army Corps of Engineers

320

Plant Genetic Resources and Food Security  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

' of the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) implementation framework.3 But the careful balancing of divergent to the extent consistent with the non-proliferation aims codified in Articles I and II of the Treaty. The mere/April 2004. 4 Article IV, Section 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed 1 July

Nesterov, Yurii

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


321

ARCHIVED MATERIAL This page is no longer being reviewed/updated.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

for Nonproliferation Studies Site Search Home >About CNS > D.C. > Outreach > 2001 > Page CNS Branch Office: Washington, the CTBT refers to the U.N. more generally. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) does not contain

Sussex, University of

322

Broadening Industry Governance to Include Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

As industry is the first line of defense in detecting and thwarting illicit trade networks, the engagement of the private sector is critical to any government effort to strengthen existing mechanisms to protect goods and services throughout the supply chain. This study builds on previous PNNL work to continue to evaluate means for greater industry engagement to complement and strengthen existing governmental efforts to detect and stem the trade of illicit goods and to protect and secure goods that could be used in making a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, the study evaluates the concept of Industry Self Regulation, defined as a systematic voluntary program undertaken by an industry or by individual companies to anticipate, implement, supplement, or substitute for regulatory requirements in a given field, generally through the adoption of best practices. Through a series of interviews with companies with a past history of non-compliance, trade associations and NGOs, the authors identify gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, drivers for a self regulation approach and the form such an approach might take, as well as obstacles to be overcome. The authors conclude that it is at the intersection of industry, government, and security that—through collaborative means—the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation system—can be most effectively strengthened to the mutual benefit of both government and the private sector. Industry has a critical stake in the success of this regime, and has the potential to act as an integrating force that brings together the existing mechanisms of the global nonproliferation regime: export controls, physical protection, and safeguards. The authors conclude that industry compliance is not enough; rather, nonproliferation must become a central tenant of a company’s corporate culture and be viewed as an integral component of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

2008-11-11T23:59:59.000Z

323

High-Resolution Fast-Neutron Spectrometry for Arms Control and Treaty Verification  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Many nondestructive nuclear analysis techniques have been developed to support the measurement needs of arms control and treaty verification, including gross photon and neutron counting, low- and high-resolution gamma spectrometry, time-correlated neutron measurements, and photon and neutron imaging. One notable measurement technique that has not been extensively studied to date for these applications is high-resolution fast-neutron spectrometry (HRFNS). Applied for arms control and treaty verification, HRFNS has the potential to serve as a complimentary measurement approach to these other techniques by providing a means to either qualitatively or quantitatively determine the composition and thickness of non-nuclear materials surrounding neutron-emitting materials. The technique uses the normally-occurring neutrons present in arms control and treaty verification objects of interest as an internal source of neutrons for performing active-interrogation transmission measurements. Most low-Z nuclei of interest for arms control and treaty verification, including 9Be, 12C, 14N, and 16O, possess fast-neutron resonance features in their absorption cross sections in the 0.5- to 5-MeV energy range. Measuring the selective removal of source neutrons over this energy range, assuming for example a fission-spectrum starting distribution, may be used to estimate the stoichiometric composition of intervening materials between the neutron source and detector. At a simpler level, determination of the emitted fast-neutron spectrum may be used for fingerprinting 'known' assemblies for later use in template-matching tests. As with photon spectrometry, automated analysis of fast-neutron spectra may be performed to support decision making and reporting systems protected behind information barriers. This paper will report recent work at Idaho National Laboratory to explore the feasibility of using HRFNS for arms control and treaty verification applications, including simulations and experiments, using fission-spectrum neutron sources to assess neutron transmission through composite low-Z attenuators.

David L. Chichester; James T. Johnson; Edward H. Seabury

2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

324

Contacts for the Assistant General Counsel for International...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

202-586-6980 JoAnn Williams 202-586-6899 Elliot Oxman 202-586-1755 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); International Atomic Energy...

325

Anne Harrington Announces $25 million for NSSC | National Nuclear...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Nonproliferation announces an award of 25 million to the University of California, Berkeley, to lead a multi-institution consortium that will support the nation's...

326

Summary, Long-Term Nuclear Technology Research and Development...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

and nonproliferation activities, environmental management and waste cleanup, and Navy nuclear propulsion systems development.1 The department has a lead role in insuring that...

327

Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Administration, topics covered in this new book include: The history of the non-proliferation regime A comprehensive review of the IAEA safeguards system and the Nuclear...

328

Professor Yasuji Ishigaki, Tokai University Law School  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970). Prevent the spread of nuclear weaponsPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia

329

Special lecture in memory of Glenn Theodore Seaborg (19 April 1912 - 25 February 1999) Glenn T. Seaborg's multi-faceted career  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

talks were begun. The non-proliferation treaty (NPT) wasthe negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and took the

Hoffman, Darleane C.

2001-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

330

Special lecture in memory of Glenn Theodore Seaborg (19 April 1912 - 25 February 1999) Glenn T. Seaborg's multi-faceted career  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

begun. The non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was negotiated andthe negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and took the

Hoffman, Darleane C.

2001-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

331

The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation  

SciTech Connect

The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad range of subjects, including nuclear material accountancy principles, legal definitions and the regulatory base and inspection tools and techniques. This 60% core part is given by representatives from regulatory bodies (The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, Directorate General for Nuclear Energy and Transport), industry (AREVA, British Nuclear Group), and research (Stockholm University, Hamburg University, Joint Research Centre-Institute of Transuranic Elements, and Joint Research Centre-Institute for the Protection of the Citizen). The remaining part is completed with topical lectures addressed by invited lecturers, such as from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the IAEA addressing topics of physical protection, illicit trafficking, the Iraq case study, exercises, including satellite imagery interpretation etc. With this structure of a stable core plus a variable set of invited lectures, the course will remain sustainable and up-to-date. A syllabus provides the students a homogeneous set of information material in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation matters at the European and international level. In this way, the ESARDA TKMWG aims to contribute to a two-fold scientific-technical and political-juridical education and training.

Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

2010-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

332

The Office of Nuclear Verification | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Verification | National Nuclear Security Nuclear Verification | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The Office of Nuclear Verification Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation & International Security > The Office of Nuclear Verification The Office of Nuclear Verification

333

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

334

Office of Nonproliferation & International Security | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

335

Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

Lehman, R.F. II

1993-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

336

Handbook for the implementation of IAEA inspection activities at Department of Energy nuclear facilities  

SciTech Connect

The Nonproliferation Support Program (NSP) in the United States Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) has responsibility for supporting and aiding implementation of international and multilateral programs, agreements, and treaties at domestic facilities. In late 1995, the {open_quotes}Readiness Planning Guide for Nonproliferation Visits{close_quotes} (DOE 470.1-1) was issued to assist DOE sites prepare for the host foreign delegations visiting DOE facilities. Since then, field and head-quarters programs have expressed a need for a document that addresses domestic safeguards and security activities, specifically planning for and hosting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) technical visits and inspections. As a result, OSS/NSP conducted a workshop to prepare a handbook that would contain guidance on domestic safeguards and security preparation and follow-on activities to ensure that this handbook could be utilized by all facilities to improve operational efficiencies and reduce implementation problems. The handbook has been structured to provide detailed background and guidance concerning the obligation, negotiation, inspection, and reporting processes for IAEH safeguards activities in DOE nuclear facilities as well as the lessons-learned by currently inspected facilities and how-we-do-it implementation examples. This paper will present an overview of the preparation and content of this new Handbook.

Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Coady, K.J.; Desmond, W.J. [Department of Energy, Washington, DC (United States)

1997-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

337

SNIF: A Futuristic Neutrino Probe for Undeclared Nuclear Fission Reactors  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Today reactor neutrino experiments are at the cutting edge of fundamental research in particle physics. Understanding the neutrino is far from complete, but thanks to the impressive progress in this field over the last 15 years, a few research groups are seriously considering that neutrinos could be useful for society. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works with its Member States to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. In a context of international tension and nuclear renaissance, neutrino detectors could help IAEA to enforce the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In this article we discuss a futuristic neutrino application to detect and localize an undeclared nuclear reactor from across borders. The SNIF (Secret Neutrino Interactions Finder) concept proposes to use a few hundred thousand tons neutrino detectors to unveil clandestine fission reactors. Beyond previous studies we provide estimates of all known background sources as a function of the detector's longitude, latitude and depth, and we discuss how they impact the detectability.

Thierry Lasserre; Maximilien Fechner; Guillaume Mention; Romain Reboulleau; Michel Cribier; Alain Letourneau; David Lhuillier

2010-11-16T23:59:59.000Z

338

Beyond integrated safeguards: performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In the future, iE the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a fissile materials cutoff treaty. Performance-based criteria offer one promising way to address the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future.

Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, K. W. (Kory W.)

2001-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

339

PFFPRESEARCH AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR FOREIGN ENTITIESFP AT OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY (ORNL)  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Section 810.3) 23. NPT means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (Source: 10 CFR Act, as amended and Nuclear Non-Proliferation concerns. This requirement is based on the liability. (Source: 10 CFR Section 810.3) 22. NNPA means the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. (Source: 10 CFR

340

a threat transformed The collapse of the Soviet Union was a dramatic geopolitical shift  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

weapons (1953). Vetoed by the Soviets. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enters into force (1970Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Science of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Jerry Gilfoyle Physics Department, University of Richmond, Virginia Outline: 1

Deutch, John

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


341

EA-1238: Proposed Construction and Operation of the Nonproliferation and  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

38: Proposed Construction and Operation of the 38: Proposed Construction and Operation of the Nonproliferation and International Security Center, Los Alamos, New Mexico EA-1238: Proposed Construction and Operation of the Nonproliferation and International Security Center, Los Alamos, New Mexico SUMMARY This EA evaluates the environmental impacts for the proposal to construct and operate the Nonproliferation and International Security Center within the U.S. Department of Energy's Los Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area 3 located at Los Alamos, New Mexico. PUBLIC COMMENT OPPORTUNITIES None available at this time. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD July 22, 1999 EA-1238: Finding of No Significant Impact Proposed Construction and Operation of the Nonproliferation and International Security Center July 22, 1999

342

Carbon dating impacts non-proliferation, drug research and climate...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

25 years of carbon dating. Carbon dating impacts non-proliferation, drug research and climate change Anne M Stark, LLNL, (925) 422-9799, stark8@llnl.gov Lawrence Livermore...

343

First strike Sixty years ago, Albert Einstein  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

or military use. ­ It is a major component of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has the goal acquisition of a nuclear weapon by an adversary could have a dev- astating influence on US security and non-proliferation. Enhancing nuclear weapons material security in Russia. 4. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 5. Other

344

The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Safeguards and Security | National Nuclear Security Safeguards and Security | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation & International Security > The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security

345

Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferat...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Joint Statement on Future U.S.-Russia Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Collaboration Following Russian Delegation Visit to the United States Joint Statement on Future...

346

Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a legal document. As such, it is written in a legalese that is understood by specialists in international law and treaties, but not by most outside of this field, including designers of nuclear facilities. For this reason, many of the requirements have been simplified and restated. However, in all cases, the relevant source document and passage is noted so that readers may trace the requirement to the source. This is a helpful living guide, since some of these requirements are subject to revision over time. More importantly, the practices by which the requirements are met are continuously modernized by the IAEA and nuclear facility operators to improve not only the effectiveness of international nuclear safeguards, but also the efficiency. As these improvements are made, the following guidelines should be updated and revised accordingly.

Robert Bean; Casey Durst

2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

347

Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Warhead Protection | National Nuclear Security Warhead Protection | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices > Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation > Material Protection, Control and Accounting

348

The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Libya and Italy: From an Awkward Past to a Promising Equal Partnership  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Defense (Article 20) o Non-proliferation of WMD (article 21)United Nations Non-proliferation of WMD Sovereigntyof both sides, such as: non-proliferation of WMD (1.63%),

Kashiem, Mustafa Abdalla A.

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

349

Another Viewpoint (AVP)  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Organization NPT: Non-proliferation Treaty NOW: NEW WORLDrefused to sign the non-proliferation treaty and has refusedown commitment to the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Or it

Tuma, Elias H

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

350

Another Viewpoint (AVP)  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Organization NPT: Non-proliferation Treaty NOW: NEW WORLDrefused to sign the non-proliferation treaty and has refusedcommitment to the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Or it may

Tuma, Elias H

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

351

Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community.

NONE

2000-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

352

Strategic Trade Control - Technical Nonproliferation Policy Support...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

a complete weapon or an adequate stock of the required material, such as highly-enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons. History shows, however, that proliferants...

353

THE OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION & NATIONAL SECURITY  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Science and Technology Department William Horak Chairman Lynne Ecker, Acting Deputy Chair Donna Storan, Administrative Assistant Structural & Seismic Engineering J....

354

Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 1: Summary of exercise  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

In a September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton announced a new nonproliferation and export control policy that established a framework for US efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The new policy proposed that the US undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material. One of the key elements was for the US to support a special nuclear materials (SNM) multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards. This policy is often referred to as the President`s Cutoff Initiative or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Because both the US Department of Energy (DOE) and foreign reprocessing facilities similar to PUREX will likely to be inspected under a FMCT, the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Negotiations and Analysis Division (DOE/NN-41) tasked Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to perform an information gathering exercise, the PUREX Exercise, using the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant located on the Hanford Site in Washington State. PUREX is a former production reactor fuel reprocessing plant currently undergoing a transition to a ``decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) ready`` mode. The PUREX Exercise was conducted March 29--30, 1994, to examine aspects of the imposition of several possible cutoff regimes and to study verification of non-production of SNM for nuclear weapons purposes or outside of safeguards. A follow-up activity to further examine various additional verification regimes was held at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) on May 10, 1994.

Libby, R.A.; Davis, C. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Segal, J.E.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

355

The Strategic Defense Initiative: A Critique and Primer  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Administration. N P T Non-Proliferation Treaty. A treatycompliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, among otherBan Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty both call for a

Jungerman, John A

1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

356

Volume 7: Part 1: The challenge of sustaining  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Delhi on the project was a separate issue from India's avoidance of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, she said. "There is the non-proliferation issue and we are pursuing that with the Indians as part despite its refusal to sign a global treaty barring the spread of atomic weapons. That move was seen

Frean, Marcus

357

THE INTEGRATED EQUIPMENT TEST FACILITY AT OAK RIDGE AS A NONPROLIFERATION TEST LOOP  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The apparent renaissance in nuclear power has resulted in a new focus on nonproliferation measures. There is a lot of activity in development of new measurement technologies and methodologies for nonproliferation assessment. A need that is evolving in the United States is for facilities and test loops for demonstration of new technologies. In the late 1970s, the Fuel Recycle Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was engaged in advanced reprocessing technology development. As part of the program, the Integrated Equipment Test (IET) facility was constructed as a test bed for advanced technology. The IET was a full-scale demonstration facility, operable on depleted uranium, with a throughput capacity for 0.5 Mt/d. At the front end, the facility had a feed surge vessel, input accountability tank, and feed vessel for the single cycle of solvent extraction. The basic solvent extraction system was configured to use centrifugal contactors for extraction and scrub and a full-size pulsed column for strip. A surge tank received the solvent extraction product solution and fed a continuous operating thermo-syphon-type product evaporator. Product receiving and accountability vessels were available. Feed material could be prepared using a continuous rotary dissolve or by recycling the product with adjustment as new feed. Continuous operations 24/7 could be realized with full chemical recovery and solvent recycle systems in operation. The facility was fully instrumented for process control and operation, and a full solution monitoring application had been implemented for safeguards demonstrations, including actual diversion tests for sensitivity evaluation. A significant effort for online instrument development was a part of the program at the time. The fuel recycle program at Oak Ridge ended in the early 1990s, and the IET facility was mothballed. However, the equipment and systems remain and could be returned to service to support nonproliferation demonstrations. This paper discusses the status of the facility and operations.

Ehinger, Michael H [ORNL

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

358

Scoping study of SNM detection and indentification for adjunct on-site treaty monitoring. Final report  

SciTech Connect

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, political pressure to negotiate meaningful nuclear arms agreements with Russia and the former soviet republics has increased. Anticipating the monitoring requirements of a future treaty for the decommissioning and disassembly of nuclear warheads presents opportunities to review existing monitoring technologies and to explore new methods to detect and analyze intrinsic radiation. Fully instrumented radiation-detection systems with a range of monitoring capabilities are available, but special-purpose instruments will still need to be developed to match increasing demands for high-confidence, low-intrusion monitoring in a specific scenario. As a guide to present capabilities in monitoring technologies, we have categorized their relevant attributes to detect and identify special nuclear material based on levels of confidence, intrusiveness, vulnerability, and other critical concerns. To add additional flexibility, we review emerging technologies and estimate the development time to bring them to operational status.

Murray, W.S.; Morgado, R.E.; Frankle, C.M.

1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

359

Argonne Chemical Sciences & Engineering - Nuclear & Environmental...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Uranium Nuclear & Environmental Processes Home Eliminating the Use of Highly-Enriched Uranium The mission of the U.S. non-proliferation policy is to minimize and, to the...

360

Sensor Stability of a Low-Cost Attitude Sensor Suitable for Micro Air Vehicles  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, in particular through the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in May 2010 and the International has taken a leading role in national, regional and international non-proliferation and disarmament Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). This seminar addresses three key themes

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


361

Survey of National Programs for Managing High-Level Radioactive  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, in particular through the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in May 2010 and the International has taken a leading role in national, regional and international non-proliferation and disarmament Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). This seminar addresses three key themes

362

Detection of Antineutrinos for Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

We discuss the feasibility of using the detection of electron antineutrinos produced in fission to monitor the time dependence of the Plutonium content of nuclear power reactors and large (> 1 MWatt) research reactors. If practical such a scheme would allow world-wide, automated monitoring of reactors and, thereby, the detection of proliferation attempts. Although this idea shows some promise, we find that a practical scheme is difficult to envision. We also consider using fission antineutrino spectra to determine and attribute the fuel in an unexploded nuclear device. We find it would not be possible to determine the isotopic content of such a device in this manner. Finally, we examine the possibility of antineutrino detection of an unannounced low-yield (~ 1kton) nuclear explosion. We argue this can be ruled out completely.

Nieto, M M; Teeter, C M; Wilson, W B; Stanbro, W D; Nieto, Michael Martin; Teeter, Corinne M.; Wilson, William B.; Stanbro, William D.

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

363

Neutrinos and Non-proliferation in Europe  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Triggered by the demand of the IAEA, neutrino physicists in Europe involved with the Double Chooz experiment are studying the potential of neutrino detection to monitor nuclear reactors. In particular a new set of experiments at the ILL is planned to improve the knowledge of the neutrino spectrum emitted in the fission of 235U and 239Pu.

Cribier, Michel

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

364

National independence and nonproliferation in the new states of Central Asia  

SciTech Connect

Five independent states emerged in Central Asia from the breakup of the USSR. One of these states, Kazakhstan, possesses nuclear weapons. The other four of these states, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, are not known to possess nuclear weapons, however they occupy a geostrategic position which makes them important to non-proliferation efforts. The present report profiles the capabilities and intentions of these four Central Asian states. The analysis of capabilities suggests that none of these states has the capability to develop a usable nuclear weapon. However, all of these countries-- especially Uzbekistan--have components of the old Soviet nuclear weapons complex which are now orphans. They have no use for these facilities and must either re-profile them, destroy them, or transfer them. The analysis of intentions suggests that the dynamics of national independence have created a situation in which Uzbekistan has hegemonic designs in the region. Implications for retarding nuclear proliferation in the Central Asian region are examined. Opportunities for outside influence are assessed.

Gleason, G.

1993-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

365

Timeline of Events: 1951 to 1970 | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

of oil on the North Slope of Alaska at Prudhoe Bay. July 1, 1968 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibiting non-nuclear weapon states from possessing, manufacturing, or...

366

pilat2.indd  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

nuclear disarmament goals set forth in the Preamble and Article VI to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and has a strong record of compliance with its...

367

Los Alamos Lab: National Security Office: Homepage  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

to Delivery (pdf) The Causes of Terrorism (pdf) The Future of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Regime (pdf) Report of a Workshop on Nuclear Power Growth: Domestic...

368

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Reasoner: PNNL FY12 Report  

SciTech Connect

Building on previous internal investments and leveraging ongoing advancements in semantic technologies, PNNL implemented a formal reasoning framework and applied it to a specific challenge in nuclear nonproliferation. The Semantic Nonproliferation Analysis Platform (SNAP) was developed as a preliminary graphical user interface to demonstrate the potential power of the underlying semantic technologies to analyze and explore facts and relationships relating to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). In developing this proof of concept prototype, the utility and relevancy of semantic technologies to the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) has been better understood.

Hohimer, Ryan E.; Pomiak, Yekaterina G.; Neorr, Peter A.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Strasburg, Jana D.

2013-05-03T23:59:59.000Z

369

Bangalore, India NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Not supported by administration. No change. NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty See CTBT (more on this later). #12;The Non-Technical Challenges to Security Build alliances and treaties and deliver it? 5.0% increase 0.5% increase 0.05% increase ­ Many non-weapons-grade nuclear materials

Udgaonkar, Jayant B.

370

Registration required Register here by 17 October 2011  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

conferences, as well as chairing high level meetings under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in discussions around an Arms Trade Treaty. From 2003-2007 he was Deputy Permanent Representative of Austria and humanitarian treaties in more than a decade. This panel of experts, including Ambassador Alexander Marschik who

371

Syllabus_IOs_IR_444_Fall_2011.doc D. L. Tehindrazanarivelo Page 1 of 4 BOSTON UNIVERSITY GENEVA PROGRAM  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

as nuclear weapons states by the 45Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Listing them in the 46order in which into effect in 1963 25 between the USA, the USSR, and the UK. Known as the 26 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT both these countries came to abide by its terms. 31 The concept of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 32

Guenther, Frank

372

China and Europe enhance cooperation 09 December 2004  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

2 / 28 The world-wide nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Entry into force: 1970 Three "pillars": - Non Proliferation (of nuclear-weapon capabilities), - Nuclear of the globe. The collapse of the world-wide regime of nuclear- weapon non-proliferation might happen in two

373

6 Nuclear Fuel Designs  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Message from the Director Message from the Director 2 Nuclear Power & Researrh Reactors 3 Discovery of Promethium 4 Nuclear Isotopes 4 Nuclear Medicine 5 Nuclear Fuel Processes & Software 6 Nuclear Fuel Designs 6 Nuclear Safety 7 Nuclear Desalination 7 Nuclear Nonproliferation 8 Neutron Scattering 9 Semiconductors & Superconductors 10 lon-Implanted Joints 10 Environmental Impact Analyses 11 Environmental Quality 12 Space Exploration 12 Graphite & Carbon Products 13 Advanced Materials: Alloys 14 Advanced Materials: Ceramics 15 Biological Systems 16 Biological Systems 17 Computational Biology 18 Biomedical Technologies 19 Intelligent Machines 20 Health Physics & Radiation Dosimetry 21 Radiation Shielding 21 Information Centers 22 Energy Efficiency: Cooling & Heating

374

Detection of Antineutrinos for Non-Proliferation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

We discuss the feasibility of using the detection of electron antineutrinos produced in fission to monitor the time dependence of the plutonium content of nuclear power reactors. If practical such a scheme would allow world-wide, automated monitoring of reactors and, thereby, the detection of certain proliferation scenarios. For GW$_e$ power reactors the count rates and the sensitivity of the antineutrino spectrum (to the core burn-up) suggest that monitoring of the gross operational status of the reactor from outside the containment vessel is feasible. As the plutonium content builds up in a given burn cycle the total number of antineutrinos steadily drops and this variation is quite detectable, assuming fixed reactor power. The average antineutrino energy also steadily drops, and a measurement of this variation would be very useful to help off set uncertainties in the total reactor power. However, the expected change in the antineutrino signal from the diversion of a significant quantity (SQ) of plutonium, which would typically require the diversion of as little as a single fuel assemblies in a GW$_e$ reactor, would be very difficult to detect.

Michael Martin Nieto; A. C. Hayes; Corinne M. Teeter; William B. Wilson; William D. Stanbro

2003-09-09T23:59:59.000Z

375

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Reasoner: PNNL FY13 Report  

SciTech Connect

In Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) PNNL implemented a formal reasoning framework and applied it to a specific challenge in nuclear nonproliferation. The Semantic Nonproliferation Analysis Platform (SNAP) was developed as a preliminary graphical user interface to demonstrate the potential power of the underlying semantic technologies to analyze and explore facts and relationships relating to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). In Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) the SNAP demonstration was enhanced with respect to query and navigation usability issues.

Hohimer, Ryan E.; Strasburg, Jana D.

2013-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

376

nature physics | VOL 2 | SEPTEMBER 2006 | www.nature.com/naturephysics 1 Proliferating madness  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

states being in possession of nuclear weapons to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, after (S/PRST/2006/41) and 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear-Party-Talks; 3. Decides that after the DPRK may have joined the Six-Party-Talks, there will be a treaty between

Goldstein, Allen

377

Energy Use and Power Levels in New Monitors and Personal Computers  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

states being in possession of nuclear weapons to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, after (S/PRST/2006/41) and 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear-Party-Talks; 3. Decides that after the DPRK may have joined the Six-Party-Talks, there will be a treaty between

378

Design of Computerized Maintenance Management System for Radionuclide Monitoring  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Corporation (NERC) 5. Oct. 5: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT--including international institutions, national and sub-national governments, multi-national corporations, non

Virginia, University of

379

Building Towards Middle East Peace: Working Group Reports from "Cooperative Security in the Middle East"  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

regimes for the non-proliferation of unconventional weapons.ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by states in

Graham, Thomas W

1992-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

380

The Office of Nuclear Controls | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Controls | National Nuclear Security Administration Controls | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The Office of Nuclear Controls Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nonproliferation & International Security > The Office of Nuclear Controls The Office of Nuclear Controls Certain terrorist groups and states are attempting to acquire WMD dual-use

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


381

Los Alamos, NM 87545 505.663.5206 ph  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

/11 CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Not supported by administration. No change. NPT Non-Proliferation influence on US security and non-proliferation. · One of the highest hurdles to obtaining a nuclear weapon Proliferation, Science and Global Security, 9, 81 (2001). #12;The Nuclear Tagging Scheme #12;Seize New

382

The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Policy...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure...

383

Office of National Infrastructure & Sustainability | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

National Infrastructure & Sustainability | National Nuclear National Infrastructure & Sustainability | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Office of National Infrastructure & Sustainability Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices > Office of International Material

384

Office of Material Consolidation & Civilian Sites | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Material Consolidation & Civilian Sites | National Nuclear Material Consolidation & Civilian Sites | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Office of Material Consolidation & Civilian Sites Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Offices > Office of International Material

385

Review Article RADIATION SHIELDING TECHNOLOGY  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

written in 1965. The decade of the 1970's The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prevented the deployment of a nuclear rocket system and the program was ended for the non-hydrogen components. Because the hydrogen cross section increases with decreasing fast

Shultis, J. Kenneth

386

Science in the Public Interest: The American Association for the Advancement of Science  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Milan Document on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 29 January 2010 Below are some Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (May 2010, New York) will examine the treaty implementation and, in particular, the status of the three NPT basic pillars (disarmament, non proliferation and access to nuclear

Gilfoyle, Jerry

387

Investigating Correlated Neutrons from Pulsed Photonuclear Interrogation for Treaty Verification Applications  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The treaty verification field is of renewed importance as continued nuclear weapons disarmament is prioritized nationally in partnership with other nuclear weapons states. This interest has led to research and development on technologies that could support future U.S. verification missions. A technology employing pulses of high-energy photons from an electron linear accelerator is one technique under consideration. High-energy photons are advantageous as an interrogation source because they penetrate thick shielding and can generate neutrons inside a measurement object. The neutrons would then multiply when presented with an object containing fissile material and allow for detection in a time domain immediately after the pulse. The purpose of this work was to develop an understanding of neutron behavior following a high-energy photon pulse and then develop a tool set to analyze data from this region to determine if a measurement object contains multiplying material, the mass of that material if present, and the moderation in the measurement object. Results indicate the tool sets developed were able to determine multiplication was present accurately in 3 out of 4 realistic verification objects. Additionally the state of the moderation in each object was able to be determined, and the mass could potentially be determined by calibrating to representative samples.

Stewart, Scott

2013-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

388

GTRI's Nuclear and Radiological Material Protection | National Nuclear  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Protection | National Nuclear Protection | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog GTRI's Nuclear and Radiological Material Protection Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Global Threat Reduction Initiative > GTRI's Nuclear and Radiological Material Protection GTRI's Nuclear and Radiological Material Protection

389

A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis  

SciTech Connect

This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of the sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.

Wogman, Ned A.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Payne, Rosara F.; Seifert, Carolyn E.; Friese, Judah I.; Miley, Harry S.; Bowyer, Ted W.; Hanlen, Richard C.; Onishi, Yasuo; Hayes, James C.; Wigmosta, Mark S.

2011-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

390

NNSA Highlights Nonproliferation Achievements, 2009-2013 | National...  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

laid out his nuclear security vision in Prague, NNSA and our international partners have led a global effort to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing, consolidating...

391

Simulating Scintillator Light Collection Using Measured Optical Reflectance  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA-22)of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of Nuclear

Janecek, Martin

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

392

Optical Reflectance Measurements for Commonly Used Reflectors  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA-22)of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of Nuclear

Janecek, Petr Martin

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

393

Measuring Light Reflectance of BGO Crystal Surfaces  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA-22)of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of Nuclear

Janecek, Martin

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

394

Design of an Instrument to Measure Optical Reflectance of Scintillating Crystal Surfaces  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA-22)of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of Nuclear

Janecek, Martin

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

395

How Brazil spun the atom [nuclear power reactors  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This paper describes the Resende nuclear complex in Brazil which will house hundreds of uranium centrifuges to produce enriched uranium that will fuel its nuclear power reactors. By consistently fulfilling its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation ...

E. Guizzo

2006-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

396

A P-5 Nuclear Dialogue: Concept, Building Blocks, and Implementation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of the United States. A signatory violating the treaty would be stigmatized as a proliferator before. Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons--by slowing the spread of nuclear capabilities among states for establishing an international norm that forbids the nuclear ambitions of non-nuclear states. (This goal

397

www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk EPRGWORKINGPAPER  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

/11 Status after 9/11 CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Not supported by administration. No change. NPT Non-ProliferationPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the New Millennium G by an adversary could have a devastating influence on US security and non-proliferation. One of the highest

Kraft, Markus

398

P2JW323012-0-A01900-1--------XA AZ,EE,MW,NE,NY,SC,SW,WB,WE P2JW323012-0-A01900-1--------XA  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

/11 Status after 9/11 CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Not supported by administration. No change. NPT Non-ProliferationPutting the Genie Back in the Bottle: Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the New Millennium G by an adversary could have a devastating influence on US security and non-proliferation. One of the highest

Deutch, John

399

Machine Learning and Data Mining for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Monitoring  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is gaining renewed attention in light of growing worldwide interest in mitigating risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and testing. Since the International Monitoring System (IMS) installed the first suite of sensors in the late 1990's, the IMS network has steadily progressed, providing valuable support for event diagnostics. This progress was highlighted at the recent International Scientific Studies (ISS) Conference in Vienna in June 2009, where scientists and domain experts met with policy makers to assess the current status of the CTBT Verification System. A strategic theme within the ISS Conference centered on exploring opportunities for further enhancing the detection and localization accuracy of low magnitude events by drawing upon modern tools and techniques for machine learning and large-scale data analysis. Several promising approaches for data exploitation were presented at the Conference. These are summarized in a companion report. In this paper, we introduce essential concepts in machine learning and assess techniques which could provide both incremental and comprehensive value for event discrimination by increasing the accuracy of the final data product, refining On-Site-Inspection (OSI) conclusions, and potentially reducing the cost of future network operations.

Russell, S; Vaidya, S

2009-07-30T23:59:59.000Z

400

A unified risk-Informed framework to assess the proliferation risk and license the proliferation performance of nuclear energy systems  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

In order to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime it is necessary to guarantee high standards of security for the sites that use, store, produce, or reprocess special nuclear materials (SNM). The current surge ...

Cavalieri d'Oro, Edoardo

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


401

A Unified Risk-Informed Framework to Assess the Proliferation Risk and License the Proliferation Performace of Nuclear Energy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

In order to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime it is necessary to guarantee high standards of security for the sites that use, store, produce, or reprocess special nuclear materials (SNM). The current surge ...

d'Oro, Edoardo Cavalieri

402

Fission-Suppressed Fusion, Thorium-Cycle Breeder and Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Fusion-Fission Hybrids and Transmutation / Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Emerging Nuclear Energy Systems

R. W. Moir

403

Anne Harrington | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Anne Harrington | National Nuclear Security Administration Anne Harrington | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > About Us > Our Leadership > Anne Harrington Anne Harrington Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Anne Harrington Anne Harrington was sworn in as Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation for the National Nuclear Security Administration in

404

Volume 10, Issue 3 Winter 2011 Strategic Insights is a quarterly online journal published by the Center on Contemporary  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty. · A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations." On April 14, Congress will begin examination and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) at the Prague

405

International Amaldi Conferences of Academies of Sciences and National Scientific Societies on Scientific Questions of Global Security  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

; safeguards and non-proliferation) should be included in the new European Constitution. Short term action agreed to abandon nuclear energy. Therefore, the Euratom Treaty must be abolished by 2007, 50 years after provisions of the current Euratom Treaty that are still necessary (safety, heath and environment protection

406

Proliferation of small arms and challenges to post-conflict  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, and Jonathan Unger 21. The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, editedWorking Paper 2010/1 The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space PETER VAN NESS Canberra come for a treaty to ban weapons in space [electronic resource] / Peter Van Ness. ISBN: 9780731531622

Richner, Heinz

407

GRASPING "THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER" Commander James Kraska, JAGC, U.S. Navy  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

, Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, and Jonathan Unger 21. The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, editedWorking Paper 2010/1 The time has come for a treaty to ban weapons in space PETER VAN NESS Canberra come for a treaty to ban weapons in space [electronic resource] / Peter Van Ness. ISBN: 9780731531622

Acton, Scott

408

Underwater Sensor Barriers with Auction Stanley Barr  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

on today's markets are not covered by any nonproliferation treaty, making it possible for nation states

Liu, Benyuan

409

72 Los Alamos Science Number 24 1996 Russian Federation  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

inspection by signing the Nu- clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). However, a number of states, as well

410

Abraham Calls on Global Community to Aggressively Address Nuclear  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Abraham Calls on Global Community to Aggressively Address Nuclear Abraham Calls on Global Community to Aggressively Address Nuclear Nonproliferation Abraham Calls on Global Community to Aggressively Address Nuclear Nonproliferation January 13, 2005 - 9:49am Addthis WASHINGTON, DC - In a lunchtime speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham called on the global community to join in implementing a comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation strategy to address 21st century challenges. Outlining his vision for dealing with constantly evolving proliferation threats in an age of terrorism, Secretary Abraham said the international community must play a greater role in future efforts. "Terrorists have struck not just Washington, New York, Moscow, and Beslan," he said. "The challenge of confronting terrorism falls to every nation. .

411

Treaty on Open Skies sensor technologies with potential international safeguards applications  

SciTech Connect

The Treaty on Open Skies is a precedent-setting agreement that allows signatory states to fly aircraft over each other`s territory with sensor systems. The purpose of the Treaty is to improve confidence and security with respect to military activities of the signatories. This paper reviews the sensor technology that is currently allowed by the Treaty on Open Skies and potential future sensor technology. The Treaty on Open Skies does have provisions to allow for the improvement of the technology of the current sensor systems and for the proposal of new sensors after a period of time. This can occur only after the Treaty has been ratified and has entered into force. If this regime was to be used for other than Treaty on Open Skies applications some modifications to the allowed sensor technology should be examined. This paper presents some ideas on potential improvements to existing allowed sensor technology as well as some suggested new advanced sensor systems that would be useful for future potential monitoring of safeguard`s related activities. This paper addresses advanced imaging sensors and non-imaging sensors for potential use in aerial remote sensing roles that involve international data sharing.

Sandoval, M.B.

1996-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

412

Measurements of NaI(Tl) electron response: comparison of different samples  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) of theof Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of Nuclear

Hull, Giulia

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

413

EU Actorship in the Non-Proliferation area.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

?? The threat of nuclear weapons is depicted by the EU as the potentially greatest threat to security. How then does the EU counter this… (more)

Pettersson, Ylva

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

414

The National Nuclear Security Administration Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Contract Administration, OAS-L-12-01  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Audit and Inspections Audit and Inspections Audit Report The National Nuclear Security Administration Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Contract Administration OAS-L-12-01 October 2011 Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 October 25, 2011 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION FROM: David Sedillo Director Western Audits Division SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Audit Report on "The National Nuclear Security Administration Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Contract Administration" BACKGROUND The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in May 2004, as a vital part of the efforts to combat nuclear and radiological terrorism. GTRI's mission is to reduce

415

Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort.

Travelli, A.; Gaines, L.L.; Minkov, V.; Olson, A.P.; Snelgrove, J.

1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

416

Fissile and Non-Fissile Material Detection Using Nuclear Acoustic Resonance Signatures  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The objective of this project is to develop anovel technique for remote, non-destructive, non-radiation-based detection of materials of interest to Nonproliferation Programs. We propse the development of a detection system based on magnetic resonance principles (NAR), which would work where radiation detection is not possible. The approach would be non-intrusive, penetrating, applicable to many materials of interest for Nonproliferation, and be able to identify the nuclear samples under investigation.

Bernhard R. Tittmann; P.M. Lenahan; David Spears; Rhys Williams

2008-11-25T23:59:59.000Z

417

Nuclear Security Applications of Antineutrino Detectors: Current Capabilities and Future Prospects  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Antineutrinos are electrically neutral, nearly massless fundamental particles produced in large numbers in the cores of nuclear reactors and in nuclear explosions. In the half century since their discovery, major advances in the understanding of their properties, and in detector technology, have opened the door to a new discipline: Applied Antineutrino Physics. Because antineutrinos are inextricably linked to the process of nuclear fission, many applications of interest are in nuclear nonproliferation. This white paper presents a comprehensive survey of applied antineutrino physics relevant for nonproliferation, summarizes recent advances in the field, describes the overlap of this nascent discipline with other ongoing fundamental and applied antineutrino research, and charts a course for research and development for future applications. It is intended as a resource for policymakers, researchers, and the wider nuclear nonproliferation community.

Bernstein, A; Boyer, B; Goodman, M; Learned, J; Lund, J; Reyna, D; Svoboda, R

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

418

Nuclear Security Applications of Antineutrino Detectors: Current Capabilities and Future Prospects  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Antineutrinos are electrically neutral, nearly massless fundamental particles produced in large numbers in the cores of nuclear reactors and in nuclear explosions. In the half century since their discovery, major advances in the understanding of their properties, and in detector technology, have opened the door to a new discipline: Applied Antineutrino Physics. Because antineutrinos are inextricably linked to the process of nuclear fission, many applications of interest are in nuclear nonproliferation. This white paper presents a comprehensive survey of applied antineutrino physics relevant for nonproliferation, summarizes recent advances in the field, describes the overlap of this nascent discipline with other ongoing fundamental and applied antineutrino research, and charts a course for research and development for future applications. It is intended as a resource for policymakers, researchers, and the wider nuclear nonproliferation community.

A. Bernstein; G. Baldwin; B. Boyer; M. Goodman; J. Learned; J. Lund; D. Reyna; R. Svoboda

2009-08-29T23:59:59.000Z

419

Our Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Programs | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Our Programs Home > About Us > Our Programs Our Programs NNSA's program support is divided into several key program areas including Defense, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, Emergency Operations, Infrastructure and Environment, Nuclear Security, Management and

420

Presidential Initiatives | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Presidential Initiatives | National Nuclear Security Administration Presidential Initiatives | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Presidential Initiatives Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Countering Nuclear Terrorism and Trafficking > Presidential Initiatives Presidential Initiatives Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative: President Putin and President

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


421

GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Reducing Nuclear Threats | National Nuclear Security Administration Reducing Nuclear Threats | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Home > Media Room > Fact Sheets > GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats Fact Sheet GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats Apr 12, 2013 Mission In 2004, NNSA established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to, as quickly as possible,

422

Strengthened IAEA Safeguards-Imagery Analysis: Geospatial Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis  

SciTech Connect

This slide presentation focuses on the growing role and importance of imagery analysis for IAEA safeguards applications and how commercial satellite imagery, together with the newly available geospatial tools, can be used to promote 'all-source synergy.' As additional sources of openly available information, satellite imagery in conjunction with the geospatial tools can be used to significantly augment and enhance existing information gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection and assessment of nonproliferation relevant activities, facilities, and programs. Foremost of the geospatial tools are the 'Digital Virtual Globes' (i.e., GoogleEarth, Virtual Earth, etc.) that are far better than previously used simple 2-D plan-view line drawings for visualization of known and suspected facilities of interest which can be critical to: (1) Site familiarization and true geospatial context awareness; (2) Pre-inspection planning; (3) Onsite orientation and navigation; (4) Post-inspection reporting; (5) Site monitoring over time for changes; (6) Verification of states site declarations and for input to State Evaluation reports; and (7) A common basis for discussions among all interested parties (Member States). Additionally, as an 'open-source', such virtual globes can also provide a new, essentially free, means to conduct broad area search for undeclared nuclear sites and activities - either alleged through open source leads; identified on internet BLOGS and WIKI Layers, with input from a 'free' cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens (a.k.a.: 'crowdsourcing'), that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing information and in-house country knowledge. They also provide a means to acquire ground photography taken by locals, hobbyists, and tourists of the surrounding locales that can be useful in identifying and discriminating between relevant and non-relevant facilities and their associated infrastructure. The digital globes also provide highly accurate terrain mapping for better geospatial context and allow detailed 3-D perspectives of all sites or areas of interest. 3-D modeling software (i.e., Google's SketchUp6 newly available in 2007) when used in conjunction with these digital globes can significantly enhance individual building characterization and visualization (including interiors), allowing for better assessments including walk-arounds or fly-arounds and perhaps better decision making on multiple levels (e.g., the best placement for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) video monitoring cameras).

Pabian, Frank V [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-08-14T23:59:59.000Z

423

Winter 2011 COUNCIL QUARTERLY 1 www.nwcouncil.org  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

-nuclear-weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case the US might use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, and the consequences for non- proliferation, reads: "The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non

424

Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

Trond Bjornard; Humberto Garcia; William Desmond; Scott Demuth

2010-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

425

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR SCIENCE, VOL. 54, NO. 4, AUGUST 2007 843 A Prototype Three-Dimensional Position Sensitive  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

for homeland security and nuclear non-proliferation applications. Mechanically cooled HPGe detectorsIEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR SCIENCE, VOL. 54, NO. 4, AUGUST 2007 843 A Prototype Three of Nuclear Engineering and Radi- ological Sciences, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA (e

He, Zhong

426

NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2009 - May 2010  

SciTech Connect

In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 17th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. This annual report to reviews program activities from June 2009 through May 2010 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2009. Contents include: Welcome Letter (Mission Driven: It’s all about results), Introduction, Structure of the NGFP, Program Management Highlights, Annual Lifecycle, Class of 2009 Incoming Fellows, Orientation, Global Support of the Mission, Career Development, Management of the Fellows, Performance Highlights, Closing Ceremony, Where They Are Now, Alumni Highlight - Mission Success: Exceptional Leaders from the NGFP, Class of 2009 Fall Recruitment Activities, Established Partnerships, Face-to-Face, Recruiting Results, Interviews, Hiring and Clearances, Introducing the Class of 2010, Class of 2011 Recruitment Strategy, On the Horizon, Appendix A: Class of 2010 Fellow Biographies

Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

2011-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

427

NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2008 - May 2009  

SciTech Connect

In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 16th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. We provide this annual report to review program activities from June 2008 through May 2009 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2008. Contents include: Welcome Letter Introduction The NGFP Team Program Management Highlights Class of 2008 Incoming Fellows Orientation Travel Career Development Management of the Fellows Performance Highlights Closing Ceremony Encore Performance Where They Are Now Alumnus Career Highlights: Christine Buzzard Class of 2009 Applicant Database Upgrades Fall Recruitment Activities Interviews Hiring and Clearances Introducing the Class of 2009 Class of 2010 Recruitment Strategy On the Horizon Appendix A: Class of 2009 Fellows

Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

2010-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

428

Industry Self-Regulation as a Means to Promote Nonproliferation  

SciTech Connect

Companies within numerous industries that have been “early adopters” of self-regulation concept, considering the environment and society alongside business issues, have realized several benefits and some competitive advantage while substantially improving their environmental performance. Given that proliferation prevention is also a public good, our premise is that the experience gained and lessons learned from the self-regulation initiative in other industries and more broadly in the arena of sustainable development provide a basis for examining the feasibility of developing self-regulation mechanisms applicable to industries involved with sensitive technologies (nuclear, radiological source, and other dual-use industries)

Hund, Gretchen; Elkhamri, Oksana O.

2005-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

429

Use of Social Media to Target Information-Driven Arms Control and Nonproliferation Verification  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

There has been considerable discussion within the national security community, including a recent workshop sponsored by the U.S. State Department, about the use of social media for extracting patterns of collective behavior and influencing public perception in areas relevant to arms control and nonproliferation. This paper seeks to explore if, and how, social media can be used to supplement nonproliferation and arms control inspection and monitoring activities on states and sites of greatest proliferation relevance. In this paper, we set the stage for how social media can be applied in this problem space and describe some of the foreseen challenges, including data validation, sources and attributes, verification, and security. Using information analytics and data visualization capabilities available at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), we provide graphical examples of some social media "signatures" of potential relevance for nonproliferation and arms control purposes. We conclude by describing a proposed case study and offering recommendations both for further research and next steps by the policy community.

Kreyling, Sean J.; Williams, Laura S.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Whattam, Kevin M.; Corley, Courtney D.; Cramer, Nicholas O.; Rose, Stuart J.; Bell, Eric B.; Gregory, Michelle L.

2012-07-19T23:59:59.000Z

430

The non-proliferation experiment and gas sampling as an on-site inspection activity: A progress report  

SciTech Connect

The Non-proliferation Experiment (NPE) is contributing to the development of gas sampling methods and models that may be incorporated into future on-site inspection (OSI) activities. Surface gas sampling and analysis, motivated by nuclear test containment studies, have already demonstrated the tendency for the gaseous products of an underground nuclear test to flow hundreds of meters to the surface over periods ranging from days to months. Even in the presence of a uniform sinusoidal pressure variation, there will be a net flow of cavity gas toward the surface. To test this barometric pumping effect at Rainier Mesa, gas bottles containing sulfur hexaflouride and {sup 3}He were added to the pre-detonation cavity for the 1 kt chemical explosives test. Pre-detonation measurements of the background levels of both gases were obtained at selected sites on top of the mesa. The background levels of both tracers were found to be at or below mass spectrographic/gas chromatographic sensitivity thresholds in the parts-per-trillion range. Post-detonation, gas chromatographic analyses of samples taken during barometric pressure lows from the sampling sites on the mesa indicate the presence of significant levels (300--600 ppt) of sulfur hexaflouride. However, mass spectrographic analyses of gas samples taken to date do not show the presence of {sup 3}He. To explain these observations, several possibilities are being explored through additional sampling/analysis and numerical modeling. For the NPE, the detonation point was approximately 400 m beneath the surface of Rainier Mesa and the event did not produce significant fracturing or subsidence on the surface of the mesa. Thus, the NPE may ultimately represent an extreme, but useful example for the application and tuning of cavity gas detection techniques.

Carrigan, C.R.

1994-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

431

An analytical model of nonproportional scintillator light yield in terms of recombination rates  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA-22)

Bizarri, Gregory

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

432

Performance of a facility for measuring scintillator non-proportionality  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA-22)

Choong, Woon-Seng

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

433

Simple model relating recombination rates and non-proportional light yield in scintillators  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA-22)

Moses, William W.

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

434

Photodetectors for Scintillator Proportionality Measurement  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NA-22)

Moses, William W.

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

435

The 21ST Century National Security Mission at BNL  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

/equipment to enable International Atomic Energy Agency · Nonproliferation Treaty · Not members- India, Pakistan Former Soviet Union Nuclear Material and Facilities Fall of Soviet Union in 1991 brought concerns about security of nuclear material and nuclear weapons in new states formed from USSR MPC&A program began in 1992

Homes, Christopher C.

436

IT IS 5 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT Self-assured destruction  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Not supported by administration. No change. NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty See CTBT. No change. ABM Anti of a nuclear weapon by an adversary could have a devastating influence on US security and non-proliferation.A.Parmentola, Using Nuclear Materials to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation, Science and Global Security, 9, 81 (2001). #12

Robock, Alan

437

2006 Department of Energy Strategic Plan - Ensuring America's nuclear  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Ensuring America's Ensuring America's nuclear security 2006 Department of Energy Strategic Plan - Ensuring America's nuclear security In 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was established as a new element within the Department in response to a Congressional mandate to reinvigorate the security posture throughout the nuclear weapons program and to reaffirm the Nation's commitment to maintaining the nuclear deterrence capabilities of the United States. NNSA was chartered to better focus management attention on enhanced security, proactive management practices, and mission focus within the Department's national defense and nonproliferation programs. The Department performs its national security mission involving nuclear weapons and nuclear materials and technology through the NNSA.

438

China's Nuclear Power Program: Options for the US  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The issue of American nuclear cooperation with the People's Republic of China is examined with regards to political relations, commercial benefits to the United States, and nonproliferation. China's interest in nuclear power is examined, and its nuclear program is briefly reviewed from the 1950's to present. China's international nuclear relations with other countries are discussed, and implications for the United States examined, particularly with regards to China's intentions toward nuclear proliferation, danger of diversion of material for nuclear weapons, use of pressurized water reactor technology for Chinese naval reactors, and the terms of the nuclear cooperation agreement. (LEW)

Suttmeier, R.P.

1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

439

1 iiNuclear Energy Advisory Committee  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

task, NEAC formed two subcommittees, one devoted to nuclear energy policy and one focused on nuclear energy technology. The report calls attention to the role of nuclear power and its impact on energy security, the environment, and nonproliferation. A strategy for nuclear energy policy and technology should be considered not in years but decades. This report identifies important benchmarks in both the policy and technology areas. Importantly, progress on nuclear energy will require bipartisan efforts and our members are representative of both political parties and are drawn from different professional backgrounds. The committee is composed of eminent scientists including a Nobel Prize winner; former senior officials of the U.S. Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. State Department, NASA and the National Security Council; distinguished professors in the field of nuclear energy, including a university president; as well as industry leaders and important non-governmental organizations, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Nuclear Energy Institute, and the Eisenhower Institute. The Department of Energy has played and will continue to play an integral role in securing safe nuclear power for our Nation, including a very important and fundamental role in advancing technology. Nuclear power is experiencing a dramatic expansion internationally that will require safe construction and operation as well as compliance with nonproliferation objectives. Our report emphasizes that a global approach is vital to ensure a sustained U.S. nuclear program

Dr. Samuel Bodman

2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

440

Unattended Radiation Sensor Systems for Remote Terrestrial Applications and Nuclear Nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The design of instrumentation for remote sensing presents special requirements in the areas of power consumption

Lodewijk van den Berg; Alan E. Proctor; Ken R. Pohl; Alex Bolozdynya; Raymond De Vito

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


441

National Nuclear Security Administration  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites

National Nuclear Security Administration National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog US, UK, France Discuss Stockpile Stewardship, Arms Control and Nonproliferation and Visit the Nevada National Security Site Learn More NNSA DOE removes all remaining HEU from Hungary Learn More DOE removes all remaining HEU from Hungary Tiffany A. Blanchard-Case receives 2013 Linton Brooks Medal

442

Nuclear fuel cycle costs  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The costs for the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, which were developed as part of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP), are presented. Total fuel cycle costs are given for the pressurized water reactor once-through and fuel recycle systems, and for the liquid-metal fast breeder reactor system. These calculations show that fuel cycle costs are a small part of the total power costs. For breeder reactors, fuel cycle costs are about half that of the present once-through system. The total power cost of the breeder reactor system is greater than that of light-water reactor at today's prices for uranium and enrichment.

Burch, W.D.; Haire, M.J.; Rainey, R.H.

1982-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

443

Micro-Analysis of Actinide Minerals for Nuclear Forensics and Treaty Verification  

SciTech Connect

Micro-Raman spectroscopy has been demonstrated to be a viable tool for nondestructive determination of the crystal phase of relevant minerals. Collecting spectra on particles down to 5 microns in size was completed. Some minerals studied were weak scatterers and were better studied with the other techniques. A decent graphical software package should easily be able to compare collected spectra to a spectral library as well as subtract out matrix vibration peaks. Due to the success and unequivocal determination of the most common mineral false positive (zircon), it is clear that Raman has a future for complementary, rapid determination of unknown particulate samples containing actinides.

M. Morey, M. Manard, R. Russo, G. Havrilla

2012-03-22T23:59:59.000Z

444

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Peter Gerstoft 1 International Data Centre Introduction to Hydroacoustics  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

energy the arrival time, arrival time uncertainty and SNR is extracted from the hydro_features table is ocean bottom. Usually, long range acoustic energy propagates without bottom interaction for ocean depths scattering is can also be important. Typically, ocean acoustic energy will propagate at grazing angles less

Buckingham, Michael

445

International Politics of Bhutan  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Comprehensive Test Ban treaties, Bhutan has also not ratified them. Bhutan supported India’s nuclear test in 1998. Journal of Bhutan Studies 106 Conclusions In conclusion we could say that no single... characterized by its close and intimate relationship with India. It agreed to be advised by India in international affairs. A treaty to this effect was signed in 1949 (Rose 1977, 77), before the country abandoned its isolation, but took on importance only...

Galay, Karma

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

446

Fissile Materials Disposition | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Fissile Materials Disposition | National Nuclear Security Administration Fissile Materials Disposition | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Fissile Materials Disposition Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Fissile Materials Disposition Fissile Materials Disposition Since the end of the Cold War, significant quantities of plutonium and

447

GTRI's Convert program | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

program | National Nuclear Security Administration program | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog GTRI's Convert program Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Global Threat Reduction Initiative > GTRI's Convert program GTRI's Convert program One of Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) three key pillars is

448

Global Threat Reduction Initiative | National Nuclear Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Threat Reduction Initiative | National Nuclear Security Threat Reduction Initiative | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Global Threat Reduction Initiative Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Global Threat Reduction Initiative Global Threat Reduction Initiative The mission of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is to reduce

449

Global Threat Reduction Initiative | National Nuclear Security  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Threat Reduction Initiative | National Nuclear Security Threat Reduction Initiative | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Global Threat Reduction Initiative Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > Global Threat Reduction Initiative Global Threat Reduction Initiative The mission of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is to reduce

450

International Materials Protection and Cooperation | National Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Materials Protection and Cooperation | National Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog International Materials Protection and Cooperation Home > About Us > Our Programs > Nonproliferation > International Materials Protection and Cooperation International Materials Protection and Cooperation

451

Open Skies and monitoring a fissile materials cut-off treaty  

SciTech Connect

The Treaty on Open Skies (Open Skies) is intended among other things to provide, in the words of its preamble, means ``to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements.`` Open Skies permits overflights of the territory of member states by aircraft equipped with an array of sensors of various types. Their types and capabilities are treaty-limited. To find useful application in monitoring a cut-off treaty Open Skies would need to be amended. The number of signatories would need to be expanded so as to provide greater geographical coverage, and restrictions on sensor-array capabilities would need to be relaxed. To facilitate the detection of impending violations of a cut-off convention by Open Skies overflights, the data base provided by parties to the former should include among other things an enumeration of existing and former fuel cycle and research facilities including those converted to other uses, their precise geographic location, and a site plan.

Allentuck, J.; Lemley, J.R.

1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

452

Nuclear Systems Modeling and Design Analysis - Nuclear Engineering Division  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Systems Nuclear Systems Modeling and Design Analysis CAPABILITIES Overview Nuclear Systems Modeling and Design Analysis Nuclear Systems Technologies Risk and Safety Assessments Nonproliferation and National Security Materials Testing Engineering Computation & Design Engineering Experimentation Work with Argonne Contact us For Employees Site Map Help Join us on Facebook Follow us on Twitter NE on Flickr Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of Chicago Pile 1 (CP-1) Argonne OutLoud on Nuclear Energy Argonne Energy Showcase 2012 Capabilities Nuclear Systems Modeling and Design Analysis Bookmark and Share Reactor Physics and Fuel Cycle Analysis Reactor Physics and Fuel Cycle Analysis We have played a major role in the design and analysis of most existing and past reactor types and of many

453

Science and Security in an Age of Terrorism Jerry Gilfoyle  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

by the US Senate. Other treaties that follow include the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (signed .............................................................................................................................4 B. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY and reliable. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty -The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is a treaty

Gilfoyle, Jerry

454

Chemical Sciences & Engineering - Nuclear & Environmental Processes -  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safeguards Safeguards * Members * Overview Nuclear & Environmental Processes Home Process Safeguards Process Safeguards is the application of chemical and engineering expertise to improve safeguards and nonproliferation of nuclear materials in complex facilities. Researchers in this group are developing novel approaches that integrate process modeling, process monitoring, and radiochemistry to understand, track and confirm the movement of nuclear materials through multistage chemical processes. Recent work includes Describing system response and observables of relevant process changes Developing detectors for nuclear materials Developing techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials More Closing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Improved Safeguards for Spent Fuel Treatment Systems

455

Nuclear Energy | Argonne National Laboratory  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Energy Nuclear Energy Argonne has contributed to the development of civilian nuclear power for over 50 years. Our scientists and engineers conduct research in advanced nuclear energy systems, nonproliferation and national security, and environmental management. Nuclear energy is the largest generator of carbon-free electricity in use today, and it will play an increasing role in worldwide power generation as advanced reactor designs and improved fuel-cycle technologies are brought into commercial application. Nearly every commercial reactor in operation today was developed from Argonne research. Building on this heritage, we are supporting the reliable, safe and secure use of nuclear power worldwide - and fostering its increased use in the future by incorporating science and engineering

456

Europe's Defense Policy and NATO's Strategic Concept A new Atlantic partnership for the 21st century ?  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Organization NC0 noncommissioned officer NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty OCS Officer Candidate School OPD independently targetable reentry vehicle MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology NATO North Atlantic Treaty

457

Using ambient noise to extract coherent environmental information  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Wefrom the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’s (CTBT)of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the

Fried, Stephanie Evelyn

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

458

Statement of Anne M. Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Congressional Testimony > Statement of Anne M. Congressional Testimony > Statement of Anne M. Harrington, Deputy Administrator ... Congressional Testimony Statement of Anne M. Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to the Senate Armed Services Sub Committee On Emerging Threats and Capabilities May 10, 2011 Chairwoman Hagan, Ranking Member Portman, thank you for the opportunity to join you today to discuss the investments the President has requested for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs. But more importantly, thank you for your continued support of the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the 35,000 men and women working across the enterprise to keep our country safe, protect our allies, and enhance global security. We could not do

459

Statement of Anne M. Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Speeches > Statement of Anne M. Harrington, Deputy Speeches > Statement of Anne M. Harrington, Deputy Administrator ... Speech Statement of Anne M. Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to the Senate Armed Services Sub Committee On Emerging Threats and Capabilities May 10, 2011 Chairwoman Hagan, Ranking Member Portman, thank you for the opportunity to join you today to discuss the investments the President has requested for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs. But more importantly, thank you for your continued support of the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the 35,000 men and women working across the enterprise to keep our country safe, protect our allies, and enhance global security. We could not do this work without strong, bipartisan support and engaged leadership from

460

The ‘P5 ’ Conferences: Past Meetings and Policy Considerations for Geneva 2013  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This background briefing gives context, recent history, and key issues affecting the ‘P5 ’ meeting of NPT nuclear weapon states in Geneva this week, and speculates as to what is likely to be on the agenda. The five countries formally recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nuclear weapon

unknown authors

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


461

Fission-suppressed fusion breeder on the thorium cycle and nonproliferation  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Fusion reactors could be designed to breed fissile material while suppressing fissioning thereby enhancing safety. The produced fuel could be used to startup and makeup fuel for fission reactors. Each fusion reaction can produce typically 0.6 fissile atoms and release about 1.6 times the 14 MeV neutron's energy in the blanket in the fission-suppressed design. This production rate is 2660 kg/1000 MW of fusion power for a year. The revenues would be doubled from such a plant by selling fuel at a price of 60/g and electricity at $0.05/kWh for Q=P fusion /Pinput=4. Fusion reactors could be designed to destroy fission wastes by transmutation and fissioning but this is not a natural use of fusion whereas it is a designed use of fission reactors. Fusion could supply makeup fuel to fission reactors that were dedicated to fissioning wastes with some of their neutrons. The design for safety and heat removal and other items is already accomplished with fission reactors. Whereas fusion reactors have geometry that compromises safety with a complex and thin wall separating the fusion zone from the blanket zone where wastes could be destroyed. Nonproliferation can be enhanced by mixing 233U with 238U. Also nonproliferation is enhanced in typical fission-suppressed designs by generating up to 0.05 232U atoms for each 233U atom produced from thorium

R. W. Moir

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

462

Long-Term Planning for Nuclear Energy Systems Under Deep Uncertainty  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Fissile Material. The Nonproliferation Review, 1994. [135]2006. [98] Office of Nonproliferation and InternationalSecurity. Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global

Kim, Lance Kyungwoo

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

463

Fieldable Nuclear Material Identification System  

SciTech Connect

The Fieldable Nuclear Material Identification System (FNMIS), funded by the NA-241 Office of Dismantlement and Transparency, provides information to determine the material attributes and identity of heavily shielded nuclear objects. This information will provide future treaty participants with verifiable information required by the treaty regime. The neutron interrogation technology uses a combination of information from induced fission neutron radiation and transmitted neutron imaging information to provide high confidence that the shielded item is consistent with the host's declaration. The combination of material identification information and the shape and configuration of the item are very difficult to spoof. When used at various points in the warhead dismantlement sequence, the information complimented by tags and seals can be used to track subassembly and piece part information as the disassembly occurs. The neutron transmission imaging has been developed during the last seven years and the signature analysis over the last several decades. The FNMIS is the culmination of the effort to put the technology in a usable configuration for potential treaty verification purposes.

Radle, James E [ORNL; Archer, Daniel E [ORNL; Carter, Robert J [ORNL; Mullens, James Allen [ORNL; Mihalczo, John T [ORNL; Britton Jr, Charles L [ORNL; Lind, Randall F [ORNL; Wright, Michael C [ORNL

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

464

Our Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration Mission | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog The National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Home > Our Mission Our Mission NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States

465

Revised ROD for FEIS on Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

720 720 Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 144 / Thursday, July 25, 1996 / Notices 1995 (44 U. S. C. Chapter 35) requires that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provide interested Federal agencies and the public an early opportunity to comment on information collection requests. OMB may amend or waive the requirement for public consultation to the extent that public participation in the approval process would defeat the purpose of the information collection, violate State or Federal law, or substantially interfere with any agency's ability to perform its statutory obligations. The Director of the Information Resources Group publishes this notice containing proposed information collection requests prior to submission of these requests to OMB. Each proposed information collection,

466

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

467

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile U.S. Removes Nine Metric Tons of Plutonium From Nuclear Weapons Stockpile September 17, 2007 - 2:41pm Addthis Declaration Reinforces U.S. Commitment to Nonproliferation VIENNA, AUSTRIA - Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman today announced that the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will remove nine metric tons of plutonium from further use as fissile material in U.S. nuclear weapons, signifying the Bush Administration's ongoing commitment to nonproliferation. Nine metric tons of plutonium is enough material to make over 1,000 nuclear weapons. The Secretary made today's announcement while speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual general conference.

468

U.S. and Russia Cooperation Continues on Nuclear Security | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Cooperation Continues on Nuclear Security Cooperation Continues on Nuclear Security U.S. and Russia Cooperation Continues on Nuclear Security June 28, 2007 - 2:08pm Addthis Newly Signed Fifth Bratislava Report Highlights Most Recent Advances in Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation WASHINGTON, D.C. - U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman and Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) Director Sergey Kiriyenko today submitted to Presidents Bush and Putin the fifth report on nuclear security cooperation between the two countries. The report is known as the Bratislava Report after the 2005 historic nonproliferation agreement between the two presidents. It details significant work completed by the United States and Russia over the past six months in the areas of emergency response, nuclear security procedures and best practices, security culture,

469

Videos from the National Nuclear Safety Administration's (NNSA) YouTube Channel  

DOE Data Explorer (OSTI)

NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 as a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy, responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. NNSA's program support is divided into several key program areas including Defense, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, Emergency Operations, Infrastructure and Environment, Nuclear Security, Management and Administration and the Office of the Administrator. Each program area is focused on specific challenges. The nuclear security enterprise spans eight sites, including three national laboratories, with more than six decades of cutting-edge nuclear security experience. That history and technical expertise enables NNSA to accomplish its work across its four mission areas. (Copied from http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus). NNSA has more than 80 videos available on its YouTube channel.

470

Newsletter Fall 1996  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

agreements as the Non- Proliferation Treaty or a wide rangeof waste disposal, non-proliferation and safety to compete

1996-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

471

Annual Report of the Columbia River Treaty, Canadian and United States Entities, October 1, 1995--September 30, 1996.  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

Agreements approved by the Entities during the period of this report include: (1) Columbia River Treaty Entity Agreement on the Detailed Operating Plan for Columbia River Storage for 1 August 1995 through 31 July 1996, signed 31 January 1996. (2) Columbia River Treaty Entity Agreement on the Detailed Operating Plan for Columbia River Storage for 1 August 1996 through 31 July 1997, signed 29 August 1996. (3) Columbia River Treaty Entity Agreement on Resolving the Dispute on Critical Period Determination, the Capacity Entitlement for the 1998/99, 1999/00, and 2000/01 AOP/DDPB`s, and Operating Procedures for the 2001/02 and Future AOP`s, signed 29 August 1996.

Columbia River Treaty Operating Committee; B.C. Hydro; United States. Bonneville Power Administration

1996-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

472

TOWARD A RAYLEIGH WAVE ATTENUATION MODEL FOR CENTRAL ASIA AND SURROUNDING REGIONS  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Administration Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Ritzwolle, Mike

473

Nonproportionality of Scintillator Detectors: Theory and Experiment  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) of theOffice of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office

Moses, William

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

474

Crystal growth and scintillation properties of strontium iodide scintillators  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) of the

van Loef, Edgar

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

475

Studies of non-proportionality in alkali halide and strontium iodide scintillators using SLYNCI  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Officeof Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA- 22) of the

Ahle, Larry

2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

476

Evaluating Russian dual-use nuclear exports .  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??Non-proliferation is a major concern of the international community, the United States, and Russia. This thesis examines Russia's role in the nonproliferation regime through 2004.… (more)

Bitterman, Blaine S.

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

477

Annual Report of the Columbia River Treaty, Canadian and United States Entities: 1 October 1992--30 September 1993.  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

This annual Columbia River Treaty Entity Report is for the 1993 Water Year, 1 October 1992 through 30 September 1993. It includes information on the operation of Mica, Arrow, Duncan, and Libby reservoirs during that period with additional information covering the reservoir system operating year, 1 August 1992 through 31 July 1993. The power and flood control effects downstream in Canada and the United States are described. This report is the twenty-seventh of a series of annual reports covering the period since the ratification of the Columbia River Treaty in September 1964.

Columbia River Treaty Operating Committee; B.C. Hydro; United States. Bonneville Power Administration

1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

478

Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Weapons | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Weapons Home > Our Mission > Managing the Stockpile > Weapons Weapons The New START Treaty, which was signed in 2010, between the United States and Russian Federation will cap the strategic deployed nuclear arsenals of each country at 1,550 warheads, a nearly 75% reduction compared with the

479

Laser Inertial Fusion-based Energy: Neutronic Design Aspects of a Hybrid Fusion-Fission Nuclear Energy System  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Nonproliferation Aspects 5.1 Proliferation Resistance ofstudy focuses on the nonproliferation aspects of the LFFH5 focuses on the nonproliferation aspects of the LFFH

Kramer, Kevin James

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

480

Nuclear Energy Governance and the Politics of Social Justice: Technology, Public Goods, and Redistribution in Russia and France  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

with Russia", The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001. 11with Russia", The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001.both power generation and nonproliferation purposes, state

Grigoriadis, Theocharis N

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


481

Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis  

SciTech Connect

A process is underway to develop mature, integrated methodologies to address nonproliferation issues. A variety of methodologies (both qualitative and quantitative) are being considered. All have one thing in common, a need for a consistent set of proliferation related data that can be used as a basis for application. One approach to providing a basis for predicting and evaluating future proliferation events is to understand past proliferation events, that is, the different paths that have actually been taken to acquire or attempt to acquire special nuclear material. In order to provide this information, this report describing previous material acquisition activities (obtained from open source material) has been prepared. This report describes how, based on an evaluation of historical trends in nuclear technology development, conclusions can be reached concerning: (1) The length of time it takes to acquire a technology; (2) The length of time it takes for production of special nuclear material to begin; and (3) The type of approaches taken for acquiring the technology. In addition to examining time constants, the report is intended to provide information that could be used to support the use of the different non-proliferation analysis methodologies. Accordingly, each section includes: (1) Technology description; (2) Technology origin; (3) Basic theory; (4) Important components/materials; (5) Technology development; (6) Technological difficulties involved in use; (7) Changes/improvements in technology; (8) Countries that have used/attempted to use the technology; (9) Technology Information; (10) Acquisition approaches; (11) Time constants for technology development; and (12) Required Concurrent Technologies.

Zentner, Michael D.; Coles, Garill A.; Talbert, Robert J.

2005-10-04T23:59:59.000Z

482

Annual Report of the Columbia River Treaty, Canadian and United States Entities, 1 October 1993--30 September 1994.  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

The report describes the operation of Mica, Arrow, Duncan, and Libby reservoirs for the 1994 Water Year, 1 Oct 1993 through 30 Sept 1994, with additional information covering the reservoir system operating year, 1 August 1993 through 31 July 1994. The report is divided into: introduction, treaty organization, operating arrangements, weather and streamflow, reservoir operation, and power and flood control accomplishments.

Columbia River Treaty Operating Committee; B.C. Hydro; United States. Bonneville Power Administration

1994-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

483

ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF INNOVATIVE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES.  

SciTech Connect

The National Nuclear Security Administration is developing methods for nonproliferation assessments to support the development and implementation of U.S. nonproliferation policy. This paper summarizes the key results of that effort. Proliferation resistance is the degree of difficulty that a nuclear material, facility, process, or activity poses to the acquisition of one or more nuclear weapons. A top-level measure of proliferation resistance for a fuel cycle system is developed here from a hierarchy of metrics. At the lowest level, intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to proliferation are defined. These barriers are recommended as a means to characterize the proliferation characteristics of a fuel cycle. Because of the complexity of nonproliferation assessments, the problem is decomposed into: metrics to be computed, barriers to proliferation, and a finite set of threats. The spectrum of potential threats of nuclear proliferation is complex and ranges from small terrorist cells to industrialized countries with advanced nuclear fuel cycles. Two general categories of methods have historically been used for nonproliferation assessments: attribute analysis and scenario analysis. In the former, attributes of the systems being evaluated (often fuel cycle systems) are identified that affect their proliferation potential. For a particular system under consideration, the attributes are weighted subjectively. In scenario analysis, hypothesized scenarios of pathways to proliferation are examined. The analyst models the process undertaken by the proliferant to overcome barriers to proliferation and estimates the likelihood of success in achieving a proliferation objective. An attribute analysis approach should be used at the conceptual design level in the selection of fuel cycles that will receive significant investment for development. In the development of a detailed facility design, a scenario approach should be undertaken to reduce the potential for design vulnerabilities. While, there are distinctive elements in each approach, an analysis could be performed that utilizes aspects of each approach.

BARI,R.; ROGLANS,J.; DENNING,R.; MLADINEO,S.

2003-06-23T23:59:59.000Z

484

Improving the Safeguardability of Nuclear Facilities  

SciTech Connect

The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferation hazards while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significant expansion of nuclear energy use may occur. Correspondingly, the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives to contribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to apply SBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure. Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical protection, and safety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be applied usefully today within most national regulatory environments. Development of a mature approach to implementing SBD requires work in the areas of requirements definition, design processes, technology and methodology, and institutionalization. The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBD work for international safeguards that has recently been initiated by the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders including member States, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers, nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferation community.

T. Bjornard; R. Bari; D. Hebditch; P. Peterson; M. Schanfein

2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

485

Nuclear rapprochement in Argentina and Brazil: Workshop summary  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

On October 21 and 22, 1998, the Center for International Security Affairs at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Center for Global Security and Cooperation at Science Applications International Corporation hosted the first of a series of work-shops on states that have chosen to roll back their pursuit of nuclear arms. The objective of the workshop series is to conduct a systematic evaluation of the roles played by U.S. nonproliferation policy in cases of nuclear rollback or restraint and to provide recommendations for future nonproliferation efforts based on lessons learned. Key attendees at the workshop included officials and former officials from the foreign ministries of Argentina and Brazil, and current and former officials from the U.S. Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the Department of Energy (DOE). Scholars and independent researchers who have examined nuclear policy in Argentina and Brazil also participated. This workshop report includes important background information that helps set the stage for assessing nuclear policies in Argentina and Brazil. It describes national perspectives and areas of consensus and debate among the participants, particularly on the questions of lessons learned and their salience to proliferation challenges in other states. It also summarizes key questions and propositions regarding the roles played in these cases by U.S. nonproliferation policy.

James E. Doyle

1999-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

486

NNSA Timeline | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Timeline | National Nuclear Security Administration Timeline | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog NNSA Timeline Home > About Us > Our History > NNSA Timeline NNSA Timeline The NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 as a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy, responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation,

487

Our History | National Nuclear Security Administration  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

History | National Nuclear Security Administration History | National Nuclear Security Administration Our Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy Emergency Response Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure Continuing Management Reform Countering Nuclear Terrorism About Us Our Programs Our History Who We Are Our Leadership Our Locations Budget Our Operations Media Room Congressional Testimony Fact Sheets Newsletters Press Releases Speeches Events Social Media Video Gallery Photo Gallery NNSA Archive Federal Employment Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA Blog Our History Home > About Us > Our History Our History The NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 as a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy, responsible for the management and security of the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation,

488

Techniques and methods in nuclear materials traceability  

SciTech Connect

The nonproliferation community is currently addressing concerns that the access to special nuclear materials may increase the illicit trafficking in weapons-usable materials from civil and/or weapons material stores and/or fuel cycles systems. Illicit nuclear traffic usually involves reduced quantities of nuclear materials perhaps as samplings of a potential protracted diversionary flow from sources to users. To counter illicit nuclear transactions requires the development of techniques and methods in nuclear material traceability as an important phase of a broad forensic analysis capability. This report discusses how isotopic signatures and correlation methods were applied to determine the origins of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium samples reported as illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

Persiani, P.J.

1996-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

489

Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives  

SciTech Connect

This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

490

Fission-suppressed fusion breeder on the thorium cycle and nonproliferation  

SciTech Connect

Fusion reactors could be designed to breed fissile material while suppressing fissioning thereby enhancing safety. The produced fuel could be used to startup and makeup fuel for fission reactors. Each fusion reaction can produce typically 0.6 fissile atoms and release about 1.6 times the 14 MeV neutron's energy in the blanket in the fission-suppressed design. This production rate is 2660 kg/1000 MW of fusion power for a year. The revenues would be doubled from such a plant by selling fuel at a price of 60/g and electricity at $0.05/kWh for Q=P{sub fusion}/P{sub input}=4. Fusion reactors could be designed to destroy fission wastes by transmutation and fissioning but this is not a natural use of fusion whereas it is a designed use of fission reactors. Fusion could supply makeup fuel to fission reactors that were dedicated to fissioning wastes with some of their neutrons. The design for safety and heat removal and other items is already accomplished with fission reactors. Whereas fusion reactors have geometry that compromises safety with a complex and thin wall separating the fusion zone from the blanket zone where wastes could be destroyed. Nonproliferation can be enhanced by mixing {sup 233}U with {sup 238}U. Also nonproliferation is enhanced in typical fission-suppressed designs by generating up to 0.05 {sup 232}U atoms for each {sup 233}U atom produced from thorium, about twice the IAEA standards of 'reduced protection' or 'self protection.' With 2.4%{sup 232}U, high explosive material is predicted to degrade owing to ionizing radiation after a little over 1/2 year and the heat rate is 77 W just after separation and climbs to over 600 W ten years later. The fissile material can be used to fuel most any fission reactor but is especially appropriate for molten salt reactors (MSR) also called liquid fluoride thorium reactors (LFTR) because of the molten fuel does not need hands on fabrication and handling.

Moir, R. W. [Vallecitos Molten Salt Research, 607 E. Vallecitos Rd., Livermore, CA 94550 925-447-8804 (United States)

2012-06-19T23:59:59.000Z