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Sample records for mobile plutonium facility

  1. Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic Safety Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic Safety Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4)...

  2. Mobile Facility

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDid you notHeatMaRIEdioxide capture |GE PutsgovSitesMobile Facility AMF

  3. DEMOLITION OF HANFORDS 233-S PLUTONIUM CONCENTRATION FACILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BERLIN, G.T.

    2004-01-21

    This paper describes the technical approach being used to demolish a plutonium-contaminated processing facility at the Hanford Site. This project represents the first open-air demolition of a highly-contaminated plutonium facility at the Hanford Site. This project may also represent one of the first plutonium facilities in the DOE complex to be demolished without first decontaminating surfaces to near ''free release'' standards. Demolition of plutonium contamination structures, if not properly managed, can subject cleanup personnel and the environment to significant risk. However, with proper sequencing and innovative use of commercially-available equipment, materials, and services, this project is demonstrating that a plutonium processing facility can be demolished while avoiding the need to perform extensive decontamination or construct large enclosures. The project is utilizing an excavator with purpose-built concrete shears, diamond circular saws, water misting and fogging equipment, specialized fixatives and dust suppressant mixtures, conventional mobile crane and rigging services, and near real-time modeling of meteorological and radiological conditions. Between the months of October and December 2003, approximately 85 percent of the footprint of the 233-S Facility had been demolished and properly disposed. Demolition of the remaining and more technically-challenging portion of the facility is expected to be completed by April 2004.

  4. ARM Mobile Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Orr, Brad; Coulter, Rich

    2010-12-13

    This video provides an overview of the ARM Mobile Facilities, two portable climate laboratories that can deploy anywhere in the world for campaigns of at least six months.

  5. ARM Mobile Facilities

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Orr, Brad; Coulter, Rich

    2014-09-15

    This video provides an overview of the ARM Mobile Facilities, two portable climate laboratories that can deploy anywhere in the world for campaigns of at least six months.

  6. Interim Storage of Plutonium in Existing Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Woodsmall, T.D.

    1999-05-10

    'In this era of nuclear weapons disarmament and nonproliferation treaties, among many problems being faced by the Department of Energy is the safe disposal of plutonium. There is a large stockpile of plutonium at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Center and it remains politically and environmentally strategic to relocate the inventory closer to a processing facility. Savannah River Site has been chosen as the final storage location, and the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) is currently under construction for this purpose. With the ability of APSF to receive Rocky Flats material an estimated ten years away, DOE has decided to use the existing reactor building in K-Area of SRS as temporary storage to accelerate the removal of plutonium from Rocky Flats. There are enormous cost savings to the government that serve as incentive to start this removal as soon as possible, and the KAMS project is scheduled to receive the first shipment of plutonium in January 2000. The reactor building in K-Area was chosen for its hardened structure and upgraded seismic qualification, both resulting from an effort to restart the reactor in 1991. The KAMS project has faced unique challenges from Authorization Basis and Safety Analysis perspectives. Although modifying a reactor building from a production facility to a storage shelter is not technically difficult, the nature of plutonium has caused design and safety analysis engineers to make certain that the design of systems, structures and components included will protect the public, SRS workers, and the environment. A basic overview of the KAMS project follows. Plutonium will be measured and loaded into DOT Type-B shipping packages at Rocky Flats. The packages are 35-gallon stainless steel drums with multiple internal containment boundaries. DOE transportation vehicles will be used to ship the drums to the KAMS facility at SRS. They will then be unloaded, stacked and stored in specific locations throughout the reactor building. The storage life is projected to be ten years to allow the preparation of APSF. DOE has stipulated that there be no credible release during storage, since there are no design features in place to mitigate a release of plutonium (i.e. HEPA filters, facility containment boundaries, etc.). This mandate has presented most of the significant challenges to the safety analysis team. The shipping packages are designed to withstand certain accidents and conditions, but in order to take credit for these the storage environment must be strictly controlled. Damages to the packages from exposure to fire, dropping, crushing and other impact accidents have been analyzed, and appropriate preventative design features have been incorporated. Other efforts include the extension of the shipping life (roughly two years) to a suitable storage life of ten years. These issues include the effects of internal pressure increases, seal degradation and the presence of impurities. A process known as the Container Qualification Program has been conducted to address these issues. The KAMS project will be ready to receive the first shipment from Rocky Flats in January 2000. No credible design basis scenarios resulting in the release of plutonium exist. This work has been useful in the effort to provide a safer disposition of plutonium, but also the lessons learned and techniques established by the team will help with the analysis of future facility modifications.'

  7. TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    perform plutonium metal preparation and recovery operations. Foundry, machining, welding, and assembly operations also are required for pit manufacturing, as well as a...

  8. LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities National Security

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    range of national security programs that involve stockpile stewardship, plutonium processing, nuclear materials stabilization, materials disposition, nuclear forensics, nuclear counter-terrorism, and nuclear of technical capabilities. These capabilities form a center of excellence for actinide science and technology

  9. PROJECT EXPERIENCE REPORT DEMOLITION OF HANFORDS 233-S PLUTONIUM CONCENTRATION FACILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BERLIN, G.T.; ORGILL, T.K.

    2004-07-14

    This report provides a summary of the preparation, operations, innovative work practices, and lessons learned associated with demolition of the 2334 Plutonium Concentration Facility. This project represented the first open-air demolition of a highly-contaminated plutonium facility at the Hanford Site. This project may also represent the first plutonium facility in the US. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to have been demolished without first decontaminating surfaces to near ''free release'' standards. Demolition of plutonium contaminated structures, if not properly managed, can subject cleanup personnel and the environment to significant risk. However, with proper sequencing and innovative use of commercially available equipment, materials, and services, this project demonstrated that a plutonium processing facility can be demolished while avoiding the need to perform extensive decontamination or to construct large enclosures. This project utilized an excavator with concrete shears, diamond circular saws, water misting and fogging equipment, commercially available fixatives and dust suppressants, conventional mobile crane and rigging services, and near real-time modeling of meteorological and radiological conditions. Following a significant amount of preparation, actual demolition of the 233-S Facility began in October 2003 and was completed in late April 2004. The knowledge and experience gained on this project are important to the Hanford Site as additional plutonium processing facilities are scheduled for demolition in the near future. Other sites throughout the DOE Complex may also be faced with similar challenges. Numerous innovations and effective work practices were implemented on this project. Accordingly, a series of ''Lessons Learned and Innovative Practices Fact Sheets'' were developed and are included as an appendix to this report. This collection of fact sheets is not intended to capture every innovative work practice and lesson learned, but rather to describe those that the project believes to be of most benefit to future DOE projects. These fact sheets cover a number of specific topics within the subject areas noted below: (1) Project Management; (2) Organization Structure and Responsibilities; (3) Demolition Approach and Equipment; (4) Planning and Scheduling; (5) Site Preparation and Infrastructure; (6) Radiological Controls; (7) Industrial Safety and Health; and (8) Waste Management.

  10. PROJECT EXPERIENCE REPORT DEMOLITION OF HANFORDS 233-S PLUTONIUM CONCENTRATION FACILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BERLIN, G.T.

    2004-06-25

    This report provides a summary of the preparation, operations, innovative work practices, and lessons learned associated with demolition of the 2334 Plutonium Concentration Facility. This project represented the first open-air demolition of a highly-contaminated plutonium facility at the Hanford Site. This project may also represent the first plutonium facility in the US. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to have been demolished without first decontaminating surfaces to near ''free release'' standards. Demolition of plutonium contaminated structures, if not properly managed, can subject cleanup personnel and the environment to significant risk. However, with proper sequencing and innovative use of commercially available equipment, materials, and services, this project demonstrated that a plutonium processing facility can be demolished while avoiding the need to perform extensive decontamination or to construct large enclosures. This project utilized an excavator with concrete shears, diamond circular saws, water misting and fogging equipment, commercially available fixatives and dust suppressants, conventional mobile crane and rigging services, and near real-time modeling of meteorological and radiological conditions. Following a significant amount of preparation, actual demolition of the 2333 Facility began in October 2003 and was completed in late April 2004. The knowledge and experience gained on this project are important to the Hanford Site as additional plutonium processing facilities are scheduled for demolition in the near future. Other sites throughout the DOE Complex may also be faced with similar challenges. Numerous innovations and effective work practices were implemented on this project. Accordingly, a series of ''Lessons Learned and Innovative Practices Fact Sheets'' were developed and are included as an appendix to this report. This collection of fact sheets is not intended to capture every innovative work practice and lesson learned, but rather to describe those that the project believes to be of most benefit to future DOE projects. These fact sheets cover a number of specific topics within the subject areas noted below: (1) Project Management; (2) Organization Structure and Responsibilities; (3) Demolition Approach and Equipment; (4) Planning and Scheduling; (5) Site Preparation and Infrastructure; (6) Radiological Controls; (7)Industrial Safety and Health; and (8) Waste Management.

  11. CONTAMINATED PROCESS EQUIPMENT REMOVAL FOR THE D&D OF THE 232-Z CONTAMINATED WASTE RECOVERY PROCESS FACILITY AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    HOPKINS, A.M.; MINETTE, M.J.; KLOS, D.B.

    2007-01-25

    This paper describes the unique challenges encountered and subsequent resolutions to accomplish the deactivation and decontamination of a plutonium ash contaminated building. The 232-Z Contaminated Waste Recovery Process Facility at the Plutonium Finishing Plant was used to recover plutonium from process wastes such as rags, gloves, containers and other items by incinerating the items and dissolving the resulting ash. The incineration process resulted in a light-weight plutonium ash residue that was highly mobile in air. This light-weight ash coated the incinerator's process equipment, which included gloveboxes, blowers, filters, furnaces, ducts, and filter boxes. Significant airborne contamination (over 1 million derived air concentration hours [DAC]) was found in the scrubber cell of the facility. Over 1300 grams of plutonium held up in the process equipment and attached to the walls had to be removed, packaged and disposed. This ash had to be removed before demolition of the building could take place.

  12. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wike, L.D.

    2000-12-13

    The purpose of this study is to identify, assess, and rank potential sites for the proposed Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities complex at the Savannah River Site.

  13. Plutonium Finishing Plant 242-Z Americium Recovery Facility

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    of the overall mission to safely and compliantly decommission and demolish Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant. The Plutonium Finishing Plant once produced two-thirds of the...

  14. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Greager, E.M.

    1997-12-11

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan will ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated, at a minimum, every 3 years.

  15. Los Alamos DP West Plutonium Facility decontamination project, 1978-1981

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garde, R.; Cox, E.J.; Valentine, A.M.

    1982-09-01

    The DP West Plutonium Facility operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico was decontaminated between April 1978 and April 1981. The facility was constructed in 1944 to 1945 to produce plutonium metal and fabricate parts for nuclear weapons. It was continually used as a plutonium processing and research facility until mid-1978. Decontamination operations included dismantling and removing gloveboxes and conveyor tunnels; removing process systems, utilities, and exhaust ducts; and decontaminating all remaining surfaces. This report describes glovebox and conveyor tunnel separations, decontamination techniques, health and safety considerations, waste management procedures, and costs of the operation.

  16. Transuranic (Tru) waste volume reduction operations at a plutonium facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cournoyer, Michael E; Nixon, Archie E; Dodge, Robert L; Fife, Keith W; Sandoval, Arnold M; Garcia, Vincent E

    2010-01-01

    Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA 55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). Size-reduction operations on glovebox equipment are a common activity when a process has been discontinued and the room is being modified to support a new customer. The Actin ide Processing Group at TA-55 uses one-meter-long glass columns to process plutonium. Disposal of used columns is a challenge, since they must be size-reduced to get them out of the glovebox. The task is a high-risk operation because the glass shards that are generated can puncture the bag-out bags, leather protectors, glovebox gloves, and the worker's skin when completing the task. One of the Lessons Learned from these operations is that Laboratory management should critically evaluate each hazard and provide more effective measures to prevent personnel injury. A bag made of puncture-resistant material was one of these enhanced controls. We have investigated the effectiveness of these bags and have found that they safely and effectively permit glass objects to be reduced to small pieces with a plastic or rubber mallet; the waste can then be easily poured into a container for removal from the glove box as non-compactable transuranic (TRU) waste. This size-reduction operation reduces solid TRU waste generation by almost 2% times. Replacing one-time-use bag-out bags with multiple-use glass crushing bags also contributes to reducing generated waste. In addition, significant costs from contamination, cleanup, and preparation of incident documentation are avoided. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos National Laboratory Continuous Improvement Program by improving the efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and formality of glovebox operations. In this report, the technical issues, associated with implementing this process improvement are addressed, the results discussed, effectiveness of Lessons Learned evaluated, and waste savings presented.

  17. Decontamination of Battelle-Columbus' Plutonium Facility. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rudolph, A.; Kirsch, G.; Toy, H.L. (comps.)

    1984-11-12

    The Plutonium Laboratory, owned and operated by Battelle Memorial Institute's Columbus Division, was located in Battelle's Nuclear Sciences area near West Jefferson, Ohio, approximately 17 miles west of Columbus, Ohio. Originally built in 1960 for plutonium research and processing, the Plutonium Laboratory was enlarged in 1964 and again in 1967. With the termination of the Advanced Fuel Program in March, 1977, the decision was made to decommission the Plutonium Laboratory and to decontaminate the building for unrestricted use. Decontamination procedures began in January, 1978. All items which had come into contact with radioactivity from the plutonium operations were cleaned or disposed of through prescribed channels, maintaining procedures to ensure that D and D operations would pose no risk to the public, the environment, or the workers. The entire program was conducted under the cognizance of DOE's Chicago Operations Office. The building which housed the Plutonium Laboratory has now been decontaminated to levels allowing it to house ordinary laboratory and office operations. A ''Finding of No Significant Impact'' (FNSI) was issued in May, 1980.

  18. RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS FOR PLUTONIUM CONTAMINATED PROCESS EQUIPMENT REMOVAL FROM 232-Z CONTAMINATED WASTE RECOVERY PROCESS FACILITY AT THE PLUTONIUM FINSHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MINETTE, M.J.

    2007-05-30

    The 232-Z facility at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant operated as a plutonium scrap incinerator for 11 years. Its mission was to recover residual plutonium through incinerating and/or leaching contaminated wastes and scrap material. Equipment failures, as well as spills, resulted in the release of radionuclides and other contamination to the building, along with small amounts to external soil. Based on the potential threat posed by the residual plutonium, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued an Action Memorandum to demolish Building 232-2, Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act (CERC1.A) Non-Time Critical Removal Action Memorandum for Removal of the 232-2 Waste Recovery Process Facility at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (04-AMCP-0486).

  19. Observation challenges in a glovebox environment : behavior based safety at a plutonium facility.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Montalvo, M. L. (Maryrose L.)

    2002-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is one of the Nation's leading scientific and defense laboratories, owned by the Department of Energy and managed by the University of California. LANL is one of the original weapons complex labs dating back to the days of the Manhattan Project during World War II. Since then, radioactive materials research has continued at LANLs Plutonium Facility, and remains a primary responsibility of the Laboratory. The Nuclear Materials Technology Division (NMT) is a multidisciplinary organization responsible for daily operations of the Plutonium Facility and the Chemistry Research Metallurgy Facility. NMT Division is responsible for the saence, engineering and technology of plutonium and other actinides in support of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear materials disposition, and nuclear energy programs. A wide amy of activities are performed within NMT Division, such as analytical chemistry, metallurgical operations, actinide processes, waste operations, radioactive materials research and related administrative tasks.

  20. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wike, L.D.

    2000-08-17

    A site selection study was conducted to evaluate locations for the proposed Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities. Facilities to be located include the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), and the Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) facility. Objectives of the study include: (1) Confirm that the Department of Energy (DOE) selected locations for the MOX and PDCF were suitable based on selected siting criteria, (2) Recommend a site in the vicinity of F Area that is suitable for the PIP, and (3) Identify alternative suitable sites for one or more of these facilities in the event that further geotechnical characterization or other considerations result in disqualification of a currently proposed site.

  1. Investigation of processes for converting weapons plutonium into MOX fuel at the TOMOX facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Polyakov, A.S.; Rovnyi, S.; Skiba, O.V.; Lloubtsev, R.I. [Minotom, Moxcow (Russian Federation)] [and others

    1996-12-31

    On November 12, 1992, the governments of France and Russia signed a cooperation agreement on civil uses of nuclear materials from Russian weapons. This agreement includes the AIDA/mixed-oxide (MOX) program for converting dismantled Russian weapons plutonium into MOX fuel to supply existing and future Russian VVER and BN reactors. AIDA/MOX covers six areas: strategic approaches, the neutronic aspects of loading reactors with military plutonium, the chemistry of alloyed plutonium and conversion into sinterable oxide, MOX fuel fabrication, possible reprocessing of MOX fuel, and incineration of weapons plutonium in new reactors. The short-term use of existing reactors requires a facility for converting weapons plutonium to MOX fuel; the TOMOX-1300 facility should be capable of processing 1300 kg of weapons plutonium annually to fabricate 26.5 tonnes of MOX fuel (1.5 t for the BN-600 reactor and 25 t for four VVER-1000 reactors). Research and development (R&D) undertaken from 1992 to 1996 by several Russian institutes under Minatom and by various Commissariat A l`Energie Atomique (CEA) divisions to select the processes to be implemented in the TOMOX plant is presented and analyzed in this paper.

  2. Guide of good practices for occupational radiological protection in plutonium facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-06-01

    This Technical Standard (TS) does not contain any new requirements. Its purpose is to provide guides to good practice, update existing reference material, and discuss practical lessons learned relevant to the safe handling of plutonium. the technical rationale is given to allow US Department of Energy (DOE) health physicists to adapt the recommendations to similar situations throughout the DOE complex. Generally, DOE contractor health physicists will be responsible to implement radiation protection activities at DOE facilities and DOE health physicists will be responsible for oversight of those activities. This guidance is meant to be useful for both efforts. This TS replaces PNL-6534, Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Plutonium Facilities, by providing more complete and current information and by emphasizing the situations that are typical of DOE`s current plutonium operations; safe storage, decontamination, and decommissioning (environmental restoration); and weapons disassembly.

  3. Evaluation of existing United States` facilities for use as a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beard, C.A.; Buksa, J.J.; Chidester, K.; Eaton, S.L.; Motley, F.E.; Siebe, D.A.

    1995-12-31

    A number of existing US facilities were evaluated for use as a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition. These facilities include the Fuels Material Examination Facility (FMEF) at Hanford, the Washington Power Supply Unit 1 (WNP-1) facility at Hanford, the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) at Barnwell, SC, the Fuel Processing Facility (FPF) at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and the P-reactor at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The study consisted of evaluating each facility in terms of available process space, available building support systems (i.e., HVAC, security systems, existing process equipment, etc.), available regional infrastructure (i.e., emergency response teams, protective force teams, available transportation routes, etc.), and ability to integrate the MOX fabrication process into the facility in an operationally-sound manner that requires a minimum amount of structural modifications.

  4. Options for converting excess plutonium to feed for the MOX fuel fabrication facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Watts, Joe A; Smith, Paul H; Psaras, John D; Jarvinen, Gordon D; Costa, David A; Joyce, Jr., Edward L

    2009-01-01

    The storage and safekeeping of excess plutonium in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar lifecycle cost to the taxpayers and poses challenges to National Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Los Alamos National Laboratory is considering options for converting some portion of the 13 metric tons of excess plutonium that was previously destined for long-term waste disposition into feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). This approach could reduce storage costs and security ri sks, and produce fuel for nuclear energy at the same time. Over the course of 30 years of weapons related plutonium production, Los Alamos has developed a number of flow sheets aimed at separation and purification of plutonium. Flow sheets for converting metal to oxide and for removing chloride and fluoride from plutonium residues have been developed and withstood the test oftime. This presentation will address some potential options for utilizing processes and infrastructure developed by Defense Programs to transform a large variety of highly impure plutonium into feedstock for the MFFF.

  5. Documentation of acceptable knowledge for LANL Plutonium Facility transuranic waste streams

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Montoya, A.J.; Gruetzmacher, K.; Foxx, C.; Rogers, P.S.Z.

    1998-07-01

    Characterization of transuranic waste from the LANL Plutonium Facility for certification and transportation to WIPP includes the use of acceptable knowledge as specified in the WIPP Quality Assurance Program Plan. In accordance with a site-specific procedure, documentation of acceptable knowledge for retrievably stored and currently generated transuranic waste streams is in progress at LANL. A summary overview of the transuranic waste inventory is complete and documented in the Sampling Plan. This document also includes projected waste generation, facility missions, waste generation processes, flow diagrams, times, and material inputs. The second part of acceptable knowledge documentation consists of assembling more detailed acceptable knowledge information into auditable records and is expected to require several years to complete. These records for each waste stream must support final assignment of waste matrix parameters, EPA hazardous waste numbers, and radionuclide characterization. They must also include a determination whether waste streams are defense waste streams for compliance with the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The LANL Plutonium Facility`s mission is primarily plutonium processing in basic special nuclear material (SNM) research activities to support national defense and energy programs. It currently has about 100 processes ranging from SNM recovery from residues to development of plutonium 238 heat sources for space applications. Its challenge is to characterize and certify waste streams from such diverse and dynamic operations using acceptable knowledge. This paper reports the progress on the certification of the first of these waste streams to the WIPP WAC.

  6. Documentation of acceptable knowledge for Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility TRU waste stream

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Montoya, A.J.; Gruetzmacher, K.M.; Foxx, C.L.; Rogers, P.Z.

    1998-03-01

    Characterization of transuranic waste from the LANL Plutonium Facility for certification and transportation to WIPP includes the use of acceptable knowledge as specified in the WIPP Quality Assurance Program Plan. In accordance with a site specific procedure, documentation of acceptable knowledge for retrievably stored and currently generated transuranic waste streams is in progress at LANL. A summary overview of the TRU waste inventory is complete and documented in the Sampling Plan. This document also includes projected waste generation, facility missions, waste generation processes, flow diagrams, times, and material inputs. The second part of acceptable knowledge documentation consists of assembling more detailed acceptable knowledge information into auditable records and is expected to require several years to complete. These records for each waste stream must support final assignment of waste matrix parameters, EPA hazardous waste numbers, and radionuclide characterization. They must also include a determination whether waste streams are defense waste streams for compliance with the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The LANL Plutonium Facility`s mission is primarily plutonium processing in basic special nuclear material (SNM) research activities to support national defense and energy programs. It currently has about 100 processes ranging from SNM recovery from residues to development of plutonium 238 heat sources for space applications. Its challenge is to characterize and certify waste streams from such diverse and dynamic operations using acceptable knowledge. This paper reports the progress on the certification of the first of these waste streams to the WIPP WAC.

  7. THE DEACTIVATION DECONTAMINATION & DECOMMISSIONING OF THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) A FORMER PLUTONIUM PROCESSING FACILITY AT DOE HANFORD SITE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    CHARBONEAU, S.L.

    2006-02-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. The Manhattan Project was developed to usher in the use of nuclear weapons to end the war. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material (SNM) for fabrication of nuclear devices for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race and later the processing of fuel grade mixed plutonium-uranium oxide to support DOE's breeder reactor program. In October 1990, at the close of the production mission for PFP, a shutdown order was prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) in Washington, DC and issued to the Richland DOE field office. Subsequent to the shutdown order, a team from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) analyzed the hazards at PFP associated with the continued storage of certain forms of plutonium solutions and solids. The assessment identified many discrete actions that were required to stabilize the different plutonium forms into stable form and repackage the material in high integrity containers. These actions were technically complicated and completed as part of the PFP nuclear material stabilization project between 1995 and early 2005. The completion of the stabilization project was a necessary first step in deactivating PFP. During stabilization, DOE entered into negotiations with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Washington and established milestones for the Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) of the PFP. The DOE and its contractor, Fluor Hanford (Fluor), have made great progress in deactivating, decontaminating and decommissioning the PFP at the Hanford Site as detailed in this paper. Background information covering the PFP D&D effort includes descriptions of negotiations with the State of Washington concerning consent-order milestones, milestones completed to date, and the vision of bringing PFP to slab-on-grade. Innovative approaches in planning and regulatory strategies, as well new technologies from within the United States and from other countries and field decontamination techniques developed by workforce personnel, such as the ''turkey roaster'' and the ''lazy Susan'' are covered in detail in the paper. Critical information on issues and opportunities during the performance of the work such as concerns regarding the handling and storage of special nuclear material, concerns regarding criticality safety and the impact of SNM de-inventory at PFP are also provided. The continued success of the PFP D&D effort is due to the detailed, yet flexible, approach to planning that applied innovative techniques and tools, involved a team of experienced independent reviewers, and incorporated previous lessons learned at the Hanford site, Rocky Flats, and commercial nuclear D&D projects. Multi-disciplined worker involvement in the planning and the execution of the work has produced a committed workforce that has developed innovative techniques, resulting in safer and more efficient work evolutions.

  8. Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    FRAZIER, T.P.

    1999-10-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U. S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. To ensure the long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems, an update to this facility effluent monitoring plan is required whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document is reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and is updated, at a minimum, every 3 years.

  9. Measurements at Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility in Support of Global Security Mission Space

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stange, Sy [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mayo, Douglas R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Herrera, Gary D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; McLaughlin, Anastasia D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Montoya, Charles M. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Quihuis, Becky A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Trujillo, Julio B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Van Pelt, Craig E. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wenz, Tracy R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-13

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility at Technical Area (TA) 55 is one of a few nuclear facilities in the United States where Research & Development measurements can be performed on Safeguards Category-I (CAT-I) quantities of nuclear material. This capability allows us to incorporate measurements of CAT-IV through CAT-I materials as a component of detector characterization campaigns and training courses conducted at Los Alamos. A wider range of measurements can be supported. We will present an overview of recent measurements conducted in support of nuclear emergency response, nuclear counterterrorism, and international and domestic safeguards. This work was supported by the NNSA Office of Counterterrorism.

  10. Human factors aspects of the major upgrade to the control systems at the LANL plutonium facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Higgins, J.C.; Pope, N.

    1997-04-01

    The Plutonium Facility (TA-55) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been in operation for almost 20 years. The Operations Center of TA-55 is the nerve center of the facility where operators are on duty around the clock and monitor several thousand data points using the Facility Control System (FCS). The FCS monitors, displays, alarms, and provides some limited control of several systems, including: HVAC, fire detection and suppression, radiation detection, and electrical. The FCS was failing and needed to be replaced expeditiously. This paper will discuss the human factors aspects of the design, installation, and testing of the new FCS within the above noted constraints. Particular items to be discussed include the functional requirements definition, operating experience review, screen designs, test program, operator training, and phased activation of the new circuits in an operational facility.

  11. Multisphere neutron spectroscopy measurements at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Harvey, W.F. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Hajnal, F. [USDOE Environmental Measurements Lab., New York, NY (United States)

    1993-06-01

    Multisphere neutron spectroscopy methods are applied to measure representative working fields within the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Plutonium Facility. This facility hosts dynamic processes, which include the fabrication of {sup 238}Pu heat sources for radioisotope generators used to power space equipment and a variety of plutonium research programs that involve recovery, hydrofluorination, and metal production. Neutron fluence per unit lethargy, as a function of neutron energy measured for locations throughout this facility, are described. Dosimeter/remmeter response functions [e.g., determined for a 22.8-cm-diameter neutron rem detector (NRD), an Anderson/Braun-type neutron ``Snoopy`` monitor, track-etch CR-39, BDI-100 bubble detectors, and Kodak type A nuclear track emulsion film, (NTA)] are folded into these spectra to calculate absolute response values of counts, tracks, or bubbles per unit-dose equivalent. The relative response values per unit- dose equivalent for bare and albedo {sup 6}LiF-based thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) are also calculated to estimate response scenarios encountered with use of the LANL-TLD. These results are further compared to more conventional methods of estimating neutron spectral energies such as the ``9-to-3 ratio`` method.

  12. Results of Active Test of Uranium-Plutonium Co-denitration Facility at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Numao, Teruhiko; Nakayashiki, Hiroshi; Arai, Nobuyuki; Miura, Susumu; Takahashi, Yoshiharu [Denitration Section, Plant Operation Dept., Reprocessing Plant, Reprocessing Business Division, Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited Rokkasho-mura, Kamikita-gun, Aomori-ken (Japan); Nakamura, Hironobu; Tanaka, Izumi [Technical Support Dept., Reprocessing Plant, Reprocessing Business Division, Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited Rokkasho-mura, Kamikita-gun, Aomori-ken (Japan)

    2007-07-01

    In the U-Pu co-denitration facility at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), Active Test which composes of 5 steps was performed by using uranium-plutonium nitrate solution that was extracted from spent fuels. During Active Test, two kinds of tests were performed in parallel. One was denitration performance test in denitration ovens, and expected results were successfully obtained. The other was validation and calibration of non-destructive assay (NDA) systems, and expected performances were obtained and their effectiveness as material accountancy and safeguards system was validated. (authors)

  13. Chemical and Radiochemical Composition of Thermally Stabilized Plutonium Oxide from the Plutonium Finishing Plant Considered as Alternate Feedstock for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tingey, Joel M.; Jones, Susan A.

    2005-07-01

    Eighteen plutonium oxide samples originating from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site were analyzed to provide additional data on the suitability of PFP thermally stabilized plutonium oxides and Rocky Flats oxides as alternate feedstock to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). Radiochemical and chemical analyses were performed on fusions, acid leaches, and water leaches of these 18 samples. The results from these destructive analyses were compared with nondestructive analyses (NDA) performed at PFP and the acceptance criteria for the alternate feedstock. The plutonium oxide materials considered as alternate feedstock at Hanford originated from several different sources including Rocky Flats oxide, scrap from the Remote Mechanical C-Line (RMC) and the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF), and materials from other plutonium conversion processes at Hanford. These materials were received at PFP as metals, oxides, and solutions. All of the material considered as alternate feedstock was converted to PuO2 and thermally stabilized by heating the PuO2 powder at 950 C in an oxidizing environment. The two samples from solutions were converted to PuO2 by precipitation with Mg(OH)2. The 18 plutonium oxide samples were grouped into four categories based on their origin. The Rocky Flats oxide was divided into two categories, low- and high-chloride Rocky Flats oxides. The other two categories were PRF/RMC scrap oxides, which included scrap from both process lines and oxides produced from solutions. The two solution samples came from samples that were being tested at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory because all of the plutonium oxide from solutions at PFP had already been processed and placed in 3013 containers. These samples originated at the PFP and are from plutonium nitrate product and double-pass filtrate solutions after they had been thermally stabilized. The other 16 samples originated from thermal stabilization batches before canning at PFP. Samples varied in appearance depending on the original source of material. Rocky Flats items were mostly dark olive green with clumps that crushed easily with a mortar and pestle. PRF/RMC items showed more variability. These items were mostly rust colored. One sample contained white particles that were difficult to crush, and another sample was a dark grey with a mixture of fines and large, hard fragments. The appearance and feel of the fragments indicated they might be an alloy. The color of the solution samples was indicative of the impurities in the sample. The double-pass filtrate solution was a brown color indicative of the iron impurities in the sample. The other solution sample was light gray in color. Radiochemical analyses, including thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS), alpha and gamma energy analysis (AEA and GEA), and kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA), indicate that these materials are all weapons-grade plutonium with consistent plutonium isotopics. A small amount of uranium (<0.14 wt%) is also present in these samples. The isotopic composition of the uranium varied widely but was consistent among each category of material. The primary water-soluble anions in these samples were Cl-, NO3-, SO42-, and PO43-. The only major anion observed in the Rocky Flats materials was Cl-, but the PRF/RMC samples had significant quantities of all of the primary anions observed. Prompt gamma measurements provide a representative analysis of the Cl- concentration in the bulk material. The primary anions observed in the solution samples were NO3-, and PO43-. The concentration of these anions did not exceed the mixed oxide (MOX) specification limits. Cations that exceeded the MOX specification limits included Cr, Fe, Ni, Al, Cu, and Si. All of the samples exceeded at least the 75% specification limit in one element.

  14. The Greening of a Plutonium Facility through Personnel Safety, Operational Efficiency, and Infrastructure Improvements - 12108

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dodge, Robert L.; Cournoyer, Michael E.

    2012-07-01

    Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other hazardous materials account for most activities performed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Plutonium Facility (TA-55). Engineered barriers provide the most effective protection from hazardous materials. These safety features serve to protect workers and provide defense in depth against the hazards associated with operations. Although not designed to specifically meet environmental requirements the safety-based design does meet or exceed the requirements of the environmental regulations enacted during and since its construction. TA-55's Waste Services Group supports this safety methodology by ensuring safe, efficient and compliant management of all radioactive and hazardous wastes generated at the TA-55. A key function of this group is the implementation of measures that lower the overall risk of radiological and hazardous material operations. Processes and procedures that reduce waste generation compared to current, prevalent processes or procedures used for the same purpose are identified. Some of these 'Best Practices' include implementation of a chemical control system, elimination of aerosol cans, reduction in hazardous waste, implementation of zero liquid discharge, and the re-cyclization of nitric acid. P2/WMin opportunities have been implemented in the areas of personnel and facility attributes, environmental compliance, energy conservation, and green focused infrastructure expansion with the overall objective of minimizing raw material and energy consumption and waste generation. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety. (authors)

  15. Treatment of Uranium and Plutonium Solutions Generated in the Atalante Facility, France - 12004

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lagrave, Herve

    2012-07-01

    The Atalante complex operated by the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) at the Rhone Valley Research Center consolidates research programs on actinide chemistry, especially separation chemistry, processing for recycling spent fuel, and fabrication of actinide targets for innovative concepts in future nuclear systems. The design of future systems (Generation IV reactors, material recycling) will increase the uranium and plutonium flows in the facility, making it important to anticipate the stepped-up activity and provide Atalante with equipment dedicated to processing these solutions to obtain a mixed uranium-plutonium oxide that will be stored pending reuse. Ongoing studies for integral recycling of the actinides have highlighted the need for reserving equipment to produce actinides mixed oxide powder and also minor actinides bearing oxide for R and D purpose. To meet this double objective a new shielded line should be built in the facility and should be operational 6 years after go decision. The main functions of the new unit would be to receive, concentrate and store solutions, purify them, ensure group conversion of actinides and conversion of excess uranium. This new unit will be constructed in a completely refurbished building devoted to subcritical and safe geometry of the process equipments. (author)

  16. Plutonium immobilization plant using glass in existing facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DiSabatino, A., LLNL

    1998-06-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a glass immobilization process, converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors.

  17. Retrofit of an Engineered Glove-port to a Los Alamos National Laboratory's Plutonium Facility Glovebox

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rael, P.E.D.; Cournoyer, M.E.Ph.D.; Chunglo, S.D.; Vigil, T.J.; Schreiber, P.E.S.

    2008-07-01

    At the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Plutonium Facility (TA-55), various isotopes of plutonium along with other actinides are routinely handled such that the spread of radiological contamination and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through the use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox coupled with adequate negativity providing primary confinement). The current technique for changing glovebox gloves are the weakest part of this engineering control. 1300 pairs of gloves are replaced each year at TA-55, generating approximately 500 m{sup 3}/yr of transuranic (TRU) waste and Low Level Waste (LLW) waste that represents an annual disposal cost of about 4 million dollars. By retrofitting the LANL 8'' glove-port ring, a modern 'Push-Through' technology is utilized. This 'Push-Through' technology allows relatively fast glove changes to be done by operators with much less training and experience and without breaching containment. A dramatic reduction in waste is realized; exposure of the worker to residual contamination reduced, and the number of breaches due to installation issues is eliminated. In the following presentation, the evolution of the 'Push- Through' technology, the features of the glove-port retrofit, and waste savings are discussed. (author)

  18. Plutonium immobilization plant using glass in new facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-06-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a glass immobilization process, converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors.

  19. PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) 241-Z LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT FACILITY DEACTIVATION AND DEMOLITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    JOHNSTON GA

    2008-01-15

    Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FH) is proud to submit the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition (D&D) Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2008. The decommissioning of the 241-Z Facility presented numerous challenges, many of which were unique with in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The majority of the project budget and schedule was allocated for cleaning out five below-grade tank vaults. These highly contaminated, confined spaces also presented significant industrial safety hazards that presented some of the most hazardous work environments on the Hanford Site. The 241-Z D&D Project encompassed diverse tasks: cleaning out and stabilizing five below-grade tank vaults (also called cells), manually size-reducing and removing over three tons of process piping from the vaults, permanently isolating service utilities, removing a large contaminated chemical supply tank, stabilizing and removing plutonium-contaminated ventilation ducts, demolishing three structures to grade, and installing an environmental barrier on the demolition site . All of this work was performed safely, on schedule, and under budget. During the deactivation phase of the project between November 2005 and February 2007, workers entered the highly contaminated confined-space tank vaults 428 times. Each entry (or 'dive') involved an average of three workers, thus equaling approximately 1,300 individual confined -space entries. Over the course of the entire deactivation and demolition period, there were no recordable injuries and only one minor reportable skin contamination. The 241-Z D&D Project was decommissioned under the provisions of the 'Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (the Tri-Party Agreement or TPA), the 'Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976' (RCRA), and the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980' (CERCLA). The project completed TPA Milestone M-083-032 to 'Complete those activities required by the 241-Z Treatment and Storage Unit's RCRA Closure Plan' four years and seven months ahead of this legally enforceable milestone. In addition, the project completed TPA Milestone M-083-042 to 'Complete transition and dismantlement of the 241-2 Waste Treatment Facility' four years and four months ahead of schedule. The project used an innovative approach in developing the project-specific RCRA closure plan to assure clear integration between the 241-Z RCRA closure activities and ongoing and future CERCLA actions at PFP. This approach provided a regulatory mechanism within the RCRA closure plan to place segments of the closure that were not practical to address at this time into future actions under CERCLA. Lessons learned from th is approach can be applied to other closure projects within the DOE Complex to control scope creep and mitigate risk. A paper on this topic, entitled 'Integration of the 241-Z Building D and D Under CERCLA with RCRA Closure at the PFP', was presented at the 2007 Waste Management Conference in Tucson, Arizona. In addition, techniques developed by the 241-Z D&D Project to control airborne contamination, clean the interior of the waste tanks, don and doff protective equipment, size-reduce plutonium-contaminated process piping, and mitigate thermal stress for the workers can be applied to other cleanup activities. The project-management team developed a strategy utilizing early characterization, targeted cleanup, and close coordination with PFP Criticality Engineering to significantly streamline the waste- handling costs associated with the project . The project schedule was structured to support an early transition to a criticality 'incredible' status for the 241-Z Facility. The cleanup work was sequenced and coordinated with project-specific criticality analysis to allow the fissile material waste being generated to be managed in a bulk fashion, instead of individual waste packages. This approach negated the need for real-time assay of individ

  20. Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in existing facilities at the Savannah River site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DiSabatino, A., LLNL

    1998-06-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources, and through a ceramic immobilization process converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans.

  1. Mobile Pit verification system design based on passive special nuclear material verification in weapons storage facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Paul, J. N.; Chin, M. R.; Sjoden, G. E.

    2013-07-01

    A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reaction rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)

  2. PLUTONIUM-URANIUM EXTRACTION (PUREX) FACILITY ALARACT DEMONSTRATION FOR FILTER HOUSING

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    LEBARON GJ

    2008-11-25

    This document presents an As Low As Reasonably Achievable Control Technology (ALARACT) demonstration for evaluating corrosion on the I-beam supporting filter housing No.9 for the 291-A-l emission unit of the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility, located in the 200 East Area of the Hanford Site. The PUREX facility is currently in surveillance and maintenance mode. During a State of Washington, Department of Health (WDOH) 291-A-l emission unit inspection, a small amount of corrosion was observed at the base of a high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter housing. A series of internal and external inspections identified the source of the corrosion material as oxidation of a small section of one of the carbon steel I-beams that provides support to the stainless steel filter housing. The inspections confirmed the corrosion is isolated to one I-beam support location and does not represent any compromise of the structural support or filter housing integrity. Further testing and inspections of the support beam corrosion and its cause were conducted but did not determine the cause. No definitive evidence was found to support any degradation of the housing. Although no degradation of the housing was found, a conservative approach will be implemented. The following actions will be taken: (1) The current operating filter housing No.9 will be removed from service. (2) The only remaining available filter housings (No.1, No.2, and No.3) will be placed in service. These filter housings have new HEPA filters fitted with stainless steel frames and faceguards which were installed in the spring of 2007. (3) Filter housings No.5 and No.10 will be put on standby as backups. To document the assessment of the unit, a draft ALARACT filter housing demonstration for the PUREX filter housing was prepared, and informally provided to WDOH on August 7, 2008. A follow up WDOH response to the draft ALARACT filter housing demonstration for the PUREX filter housing questioned whether deteriorated galvanized filter faceguards discovered during an internal filter housing inspection met American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) AG-l or Military Specification (MIL) 51068 standards. The filter system was designed and installed prior to the issuance of AG-l, February 1986; however, MIL 51068 did require galvanized faceguards. The faceguards are not necessary for filtration or structural purposes; it is concluded that the system is in compliance with the intent of the applicable standard. Appendix B provides supporting information to address this issue.

  3. ARM Operations and Engineering Procedure Mobile Facility Site Startup

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Voyles, Jimmy W

    2015-05-01

    This procedure exists to define the key milestones, necessary steps, and process rules required to commission and operate an Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) Mobile Facility (AMF), with a specific focus toward on-time product delivery to the ARM Data Archive. The overall objective is to have the physical infrastructure, networking and communications, and instrument calibration, grooming, and alignment (CG&A) completed with data products available from the ARM Data Archive by the Operational Start Date milestone.

  4. Assessment of plutonium storage safety issues at Department of Energy facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) mission for utilization and storage of nuclear materials has recently changed as a result of the end of the ``Cold War`` era. Past and current plutonium storage practices largely reflect a temporary, in-process, or in-use storage condition which must now be changed to accommodate longer-term storage. This report summarizes information concerning current plutonium metal and oxide storage practices which was presented at the Office of Defense programs (DP) workshop in Albuquerque, New Mexico on May 26-27, 1993 and contained in responses to questions by DP-62 from the field organizations.

  5. GrayQbTM Single-Faced Version 2 (SF2) Hanford Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) deployment report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Plummer, J. R.; Immel, D. M.; Serrato, M. G.; Dalmaso, M. J.; Shull, D. J.

    2015-11-18

    The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) in partnership with CH2M Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) deployed the GrayQbTM SF2 radiation imaging device at the Hanford Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) to assist in the radiological characterization of the canyon. The deployment goal was to locate radiological contamination hot spots in the PRF canyon, where pencil tanks were removed and decontamination/debris removal operations are on-going, to support the CHPRC facility decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) effort. The PRF canyon D&D effort supports completion of the CHPRC Plutonium Finishing Plant Decommissioning Project. The GrayQbTM SF2 (Single Faced Version 2) is a non-destructive examination device developed by SRNL to generate radiation contour maps showing source locations and relative radiological levels present in the area under examination. The Hanford PRF GrayQbTM Deployment was sponsored by CH2M Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) through the DOE Richland Operations Office, Inter-Entity Work Order (IEWO), DOE-RL IEWO- M0SR900210.

  6. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 18.2 MT of plutonium using existing facilities at the Savannah River site: alternatives 3A/5A/6A/6B/7A/9A

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DiSabatino, A., LLNL

    1998-06-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 18.2 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium using ceramic in a new facility at Savannah River Site (SRS).

  7. ARM Mobile Facility Surface Meteorology Handbook - October 2008

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MT Ritsche

    2008-10-30

    The ARM Mobile Facility Surface Meteorology station (AMF MET) uses mainly conventional in situ sensors to obtain 1-minute statistics of surface wind speed, wind direction, air temperature, relative humidity, barometric pressure, and rain-rate. Additional sensors may be added to or removed from the base set of sensors depending upon the deployment location, climate regime or programmatic needs. Additionally, sensor types may change depending upon the climate regime of the deployment. These changes/additions are noted in the Deployment Locations and History section.

  8. ARM Mobile Facility - Design and Schedule for Integration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 OutreachProductswsicloudwsicloudden Documentation Data Management Facility PlotsProducts (VAP)Madden-JulianMobile

  9. Storage for the Fast Flux Test Facility unirradiated fuel in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-01-01

    This Environmental Assessment evaluates the proposed action to relocate and store unirradiated Fast Flux Test Facility fuel in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex on the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The US Department of Energy has decided to cease fuel fabrication activities in the 308 Building in the 300 Area. This decision was based on a safety concern over the ability of the fuel fabrication portion of the 308 Building to withstand a seismic event. The proposed action to relocate and store the fuel is based on the savings that could be realized by consolidating security costs associated with storage of the fuel. While the 308 Building belowgrade fuel storage areas are not at jeopardy by a seismic event, the US Department of Energy is proposing to cease storage operations along with the related fabrication operations. The US Department of Energy proposes to remove the unirradiated fuel pins and fuel assemblies from the 308 Building and store them in Room 192A, within the 234-5Z Building, a part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, located in the 200 West Area. Minor modifications to Room 192A would be required to accommodate placement of the fuel. The US Department of Energy estimates that removing all of the fuel from the 308 Building would save $6.5 million annually in security expenditures for the Fast Flux Test Facility. Environmental impacts of construction, relocation, and operation of the proposed action and alternatives were evaluated. This evaluation concluded that the proposed action would have no significant impacts on the human environment.

  10. CHALLENGES OF PRESERVING HISTORIC RESOURCES DURING THE D & D OF HIGHLY CONTAMINATED HISTORICALLY SIGNIFICANT PLUTONIUM PROCESS FACILITIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    HOPKINS, A.M.

    2006-03-17

    The Manhattan Project was initiated to develop nuclear weapons for use in World War II. The Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) was established in eastern Washington State as a production complex for the Manhattan Project. A major product of the HEW was plutonium. The buildings and process equipment used in the early phases of nuclear weapons development are historically significant because of the new and unique work that was performed. When environmental cleanup became Hanford's central mission in 1991, the Department of Energy (DOE) prepared for the deactivation and decommissioning of many of the old process facilities. In many cases, the process facilities were so contaminated, they faced demolition. The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) requires federal agencies to evaluate the historic significance of properties under their jurisdiction for eligibility for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places before altering or demolishing them so that mitigation through documentation of the properties can occur. Specifically, federal agencies are required to evaluate their proposed actions against the effect the actions may have on districts, sites, buildings or structures that ere included or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. In an agreement between the DOE'S Richland Operations Office (RL), the Washington State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), the agencies concurred that the Hanford Site Historic District is eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places and that a Sitewide Treatment Plan would streamline compliance with the NHPA while allowing RL to manage the cleanup of the Hanford Site. Currently, many of the old processing buildings at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) are undergoing deactivation and decommissioning. RL and Fluor Hanford project managers at the PFP are committed to preserving historical artifacts of the plutonium production process. They must also ensure the safety of workers and the full decontamination of buildings or artifacts if they are to be preserved. This paper discusses the real time challenges of working safely, decontaminating process equipment, preserving historical structures and artifacts and documenting their history at PFP.

  11. The Challenges of Preserving Historic Resources During the Deactivation and Decommissioning of Highly Contaminated Historically Significant Plutonium Process Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hopkins, A.; Minette, M.; Sorenson, D.; Heineman, R.; Gerber, M. [Fluor Hanford, Inc., PO Box 1000 Richland WA 99352 (United States); Charboneau, S. [US Department of Energy PO Box 550, Richland WA 99352 (United States); Bond, F. [Washington State Department of Ecology, WDOE 3100 Port of Benton Blvd., Richland WA, 99354 (United States)

    2006-07-01

    The Manhattan Project was initiated to develop nuclear weapons for use in World War II. The Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) was established in eastern Washington State as a production complex for the Manhattan Project. A major product of the HEW was plutonium. The buildings and process equipment used in the early phases of nuclear weapons development are historically significant because of the new and unique work that was performed. When environmental cleanup became Hanford's central mission in 1991, the Department of Energy (DOE) prepared for the deactivation and decommissioning of many of the old process facilities. In many cases, the process facilities were so contaminated, they faced demolition. The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) requires federal agencies to evaluate the historic significance of properties under their jurisdiction for eligibility for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places before altering or demolishing them so that mitigation through documentation of the properties can occur. Specifically, federal agencies are required to evaluate their proposed actions against the effect the actions may have on districts, sites, buildings or structures that are included or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. In an agreement between the DOE's Richland Operations Office (RL), the Washington State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), the agencies concurred that the Hanford Site Historic District is eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places and that a Site-wide Treatment Plan would streamline compliance with the NHPA while allowing RL to manage the cleanup of the Hanford Site. Currently, many of the old processing buildings at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) are undergoing deactivation and decommissioning. RL and Fluor Hanford project managers at the PFP are committed to preserving historical artifacts of the plutonium production process. They must also ensure the safety of workers and the full decontamination of buildings or artifacts if they are to be preserved. This paper discusses the real time challenges of working safely, decontaminating process equipment, preserving historical structures and artifacts and documenting their history at PFP. (authors)

  12. Type A Accident Investigation of the March 16, 2000, Plutonium...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Multiple Intake Event at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico Type A Accident Investigation of the March 16, 2000, Plutonium-238 Multiple Intake...

  13. Investigation of the November 8, 2011, Plutonium Contamination...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    November 8, 2011, Plutonium Contamination in the Zero Power Physics Reactor Facility, at the Idaho National Laboratory Investigation of the November 8, 2011, Plutonium...

  14. Environmental consequences of postulate plutonium releases from Atomics International's Nuclear Materials Development Facility (NMDF), Santa Susana, California, as a result of severe natural phenomena

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jamison, J.D.; Watson, E.C.

    1982-02-01

    Potential environmental consequences in terms of radiation dose to people are presented for postulated plutonium releases caused by severe natural phenomena at the Atomics International's Nuclear Materials Development Facility (NMDF), in the Santa Susana site, California. The severe natural phenomena considered are earthquakes, tornadoes, and high straight-line winds. Plutonium deposition values are given for significant locations around the site. All important potential exposure pathways are examined. The most likely 50-year committed dose equivalents are given for the maximum-exposed individual and the population within a 50-mile radius of the plant. The maximum plutonium deposition values likely to occur offsite are also given. The most likely calculated 50-year collective committed dose equivalents are all much lower than the collective dose equivalent expected from 50 years of exposure to natural background radiation and medical x-rays. The most likely maximum residual plutonium contamination estimated to be deposited offsite following the earthquake, and the 150-mph and 170-mph tornadoes are above the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed guideline for plutonium in the general environment of 0.2 ..mu..Ci/m/sup 2/. The deposition values following the 110-mph and the 130-mph tornadoes are below the EPA proposed guideline.

  15. Title Plutonium Mobility in Soil and Uptake in Plants: A Review Copyright Issue

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4)9 Federal RegisterStorm1 3 6 5 1Geology of theMobility

  16. EIS Data Call Report: Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in new facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-06-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans.

  17. Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-03-01

    This Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan describes the Department of Energy`s response to the vulnerabilities identified in the Plutonium Working Group Report which are a result of the cessation of nuclear weapons production. The responses contained in this document are only part of an overall, coordinated approach designed to enable the Department to accelerate conversion of all nuclear materials, including plutonium, to forms suitable for safe, interim storage. The overall actions being taken are discussed in detail in the Department`s Implementation Plan in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 94-1. This is included as Attachment B.

  18. Implementing waste minimization at an active plutonium processing facility: Successes and progress at technical area (TA) -55 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Balkey, J.J.; Robinson, M.A.; Boak, J.

    1997-12-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory has ongoing national security missions that necessitate increased plutonium processing. The bulk of this activity occurs at Technical Area -55 (TA-55), the nations only operable plutonium facility. TA-55 has developed and demonstrated a number of technologies that significantly minimize waste generation in plutonium processing (supercritical CO{sub 2}, Mg(OH){sub 2} precipitation, supercritical H{sub 2}O oxidation, WAND), disposition of excess fissile materials (hydride-dehydride, electrolytic decontamination), disposition of historical waste inventories (salt distillation), and Decontamination & Decommissioning (D&D) of closed nuclear facilities (electrolytic decontamination). Furthermore, TA-55 is in the process of developing additional waste minimization technologies (molten salt oxidation, nitric acid recycle, americium extraction) that will significantly reduce ongoing waste generation rates and allow volume reduction of existing waste streams. Cost savings from reduction in waste volumes to be managed and disposed far exceed development and deployment costs in every case. Waste minimization is also important because it reduces occupational exposure to ionizing radiation, risks of transportation accidents, and transfer of burdens from current nuclear operations to future generations.

  19. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility.

  20. SWAMI: An Autonomous Mobile Robot for Inspection of Nuclear Waste Storage Facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Stephens, Larry M.

    SWAMI: An Autonomous Mobile Robot for Inspection of Nuclear Waste Storage Facilities Ron Fulbright Inspector (SWAMI) is a prototype mobile robot designed to perform autonomous inspection of nuclear waste user interface building tool called UIM/X. Introduction Safe disposal of nuclear waste is a difficult

  1. Atmospheric deposition, resuspension and root uptake of plutonium in corn and other grain-producing agroecosystems near a nuclear fuel facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pinder, J.E. III; McLeod, K.W.; Adriano, D.C. (Savannah River Ecology Lab., Aiken, SC (United States)); Corey, J.C.; Boni, A.L. (Savannah River Lab., Aiken, SC (United States))

    1989-01-01

    Plutonium released to the environment may contribute to dose to humans through inhalation or ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs. Plutonium contamination of agricultural plants may result from interception and retention of atmospheric deposition, resuspension of Pu-bearing soil particles to plant surfaces, and root uptake and translocation to grain. Plutonium on vegetation surfaces may be transferred to grain surfaces during mechanical harvesting. Data obtained from corn grown near the US Department of Energy's H-Area nuclear fuel chemical separations facility on the Savannah River Site was used to estimated parameters of a simple model of Pu transport in agroecosystems. The parameter estimates for corn were compared to those previously obtained for wheat and soybeans. Despite some differences in parameter estimates among crops, the relative importances of atmospheric deposition, resuspension and root uptake were similar among crops. For even small deposition rates, the relative importances of processes for Pu contamination of corn grain should be: transfer of atmospheric deposition from vegetation surfaces to grain surfaces during combining > resuspension of soil to grain surfaces > root uptake. Approximately 3.9 {times} 10{sup {minus}5} of a year's atmospheric deposition is transferred to grain. Approximately 6.2 {times} 10{sup {minus}9} of the Pu inventory in the soil is resuspended to corn grain, and a further 7.3 {times} 10{sup {minus}10} of the soil inventory is absorbed by roots and translocated to grains.

  2. Atmospheric deposition, resuspension and root uptake of plutonium in corn and other grain-producing agroecosystems near a nuclear fuel facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pinder, J.E. III; McLeod, K.W.; Adriano, D.C. [Savannah River Ecology Lab., Aiken, SC (United States); Corey, J.C.; Boni, A.L. [Savannah River Lab., Aiken, SC (United States)

    1989-12-31

    Plutonium released to the environment may contribute to dose to humans through inhalation or ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs. Plutonium contamination of agricultural plants may result from interception and retention of atmospheric deposition, resuspension of Pu-bearing soil particles to plant surfaces, and root uptake and translocation to grain. Plutonium on vegetation surfaces may be transferred to grain surfaces during mechanical harvesting. Data obtained from corn grown near the US Department of Energy`s H-Area nuclear fuel chemical separations facility on the Savannah River Site was used to estimated parameters of a simple model of Pu transport in agroecosystems. The parameter estimates for corn were compared to those previously obtained for wheat and soybeans. Despite some differences in parameter estimates among crops, the relative importances of atmospheric deposition, resuspension and root uptake were similar among crops. For even small deposition rates, the relative importances of processes for Pu contamination of corn grain should be: transfer of atmospheric deposition from vegetation surfaces to grain surfaces during combining > resuspension of soil to grain surfaces > root uptake. Approximately 3.9 {times} 10{sup {minus}5} of a year`s atmospheric deposition is transferred to grain. Approximately 6.2 {times} 10{sup {minus}9} of the Pu inventory in the soil is resuspended to corn grain, and a further 7.3 {times} 10{sup {minus}10} of the soil inventory is absorbed by roots and translocated to grains.

  3. Colloidal Cutin-like Siderophoric Molecules Mobilize Plutonium from Contaminated Soils of the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS), USA

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Xu, C.; Santschi, P; Roberts, K; Zhong, J; Hatcher, P; Hung, C; Francis, A; Dodge, C; Honeyman, B

    2008-01-01

    Relatively recently, inorganic colloids have been invoked to reconcile the apparent contradictions between expectations based on classical dissolved-phase Pu transport and field observations of 'enhanced' Pu mobility (Kersting et al. Nature 1999, 397, 56-59). A new paradigm for Pu transport is mobilization and transport via biologically produced ligands. This study for the first time reports a new finding of Pu being transported, at sub-pM concentrations, by a cutin-like natural substance containing siderophore-like moieties and virtually all mobile Pu. Most likely, Pu is complexed by chelating groups derived from siderophores that are covalently bound to a backbone of cutin-derived soil degradation products, thus revealing the history of initial exposure to Pu. Features such as amphiphilicity and small size make this macromolecule an ideal collector for actinides and other metals and a vector for their dispersal. Cross-linking to the hydrophobic domains (e.g., by polysaccharides) gives this macromolecule high mobility and a means of enhancing Pu transport. This finding provides a new mechanism for Pu transport through environmental systems that would not have been predicted by Pu transport models.

  4. EIS-0244: Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization, Hanford Site, Richland, WA

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS evaluates the impacts on the human environment of: Stabilization of residual, plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP Facility to a form suitable for interim storage at the PFP Facility. Immobilization of residual plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP Facility. Removal of readily retrievable, plutonium-bearing materials left behind in process equipment, process areas, and air and liquid waste management systems as a result of historic uses.

  5. Removal of Uranium from Plutonium Solutions by Anion Exchange

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rudisill, T.S.

    2002-03-22

    The anion exchange capacity in the HB-Line Phase II Facility will be used to purify plutonium solutions potentially containing significant quantities of depleted uranium. Following purification, the plutonium will be precipitated as an oxalate and calcined to plutonium oxide (PuO2) for storage until final disposition.

  6. Plutonium Equivalent Inventory for Belowground Radioactive Waste at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area 54, Area G Disposal Facility - Fiscal Year 2011

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    French, Sean B.; Shuman, Rob

    2012-04-18

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) generates radioactive waste as a result of various activities. Many aspects of the management of this waste are conducted at Technical Area 54 (TA-54); Area G plays a key role in these management activities as the Laboratory's only disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste (LLW). Furthermore, Area G serves as a staging area for transuranic (TRU) waste that will be shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for disposal. A portion of this TRU waste is retrievably stored in pits, trenches, and shafts. The radioactive waste disposed of or stored at Area G poses potential short- and long-term risks to workers at the disposal facility and to members of the public. These risks are directly proportional to the radionuclide inventories in the waste. The Area G performance assessment and composite analysis (LANL, 2008a) project long-term risks to members of the public; short-term risks to workers and members of the public, such as those posed by accidents, are addressed by the Area G Documented Safety Analysis (LANL, 2011a). The Documented Safety Analysis uses an inventory expressed in terms of plutonium-equivalent curies, referred to as the PE-Ci inventory, to estimate these risks. The Technical Safety Requirements for Technical Area 54, Area G (LANL, 2011b) establishes a belowground radioactive material limit that ensures the cumulative projected inventory authorized for the Area G site is not exceeded. The total belowground radioactive waste inventory limit established for Area G is 110,000 PE-Ci. The PE-Ci inventory is updated annually; this report presents the inventory prepared for 2011. The approach used to estimate the inventory is described in Section 2. The results of the analysis are presented in Section 3.

  7. PLUTONIUM METAL: OXIDATION CONSIDERATIONS AND APPROACH

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Estochen, E.

    2013-03-20

    Plutonium is arguably the most unique of all metals when considered in the combined context of metallurgical, chemical, and nuclear behavior. Much of the research in understanding behavior and characteristics of plutonium materials has its genesis in work associated with nuclear weapons systems. However, with the advent of applications in fuel materials, the focus in plutonium science has been more towards nuclear fuel applications, as well as long term storage and disposition. The focus of discussion included herein is related to preparing plutonium materials to meet goals consistent with non-proliferation. More specifically, the emphasis is on the treatment of legacy plutonium, in primarily metallic form, and safe handling, packaging, and transport to meet non-proliferation goals of safe/secure storage. Elevated temperature oxidation of plutonium metal is the treatment of choice, due to extensive experiential data related to the method, as the oxide form of plutonium is one of only a few compounds that is relatively simple to produce, and stable over a large temperature range. Despite the simplicity of the steps required to oxidize plutonium metal, it is important to understand the behavior of plutonium to ensure that oxidation is conducted in a safe and effective manner. It is important to understand the effect of changes in environmental variables on the oxidation characteristics of plutonium. The primary purpose of this report is to present a brief summary of information related to plutonium metal attributes, behavior, methods for conversion to oxide, and the ancillary considerations related to processing and facility safety. The information provided is based on data available in the public domain and from experience in oxidation of such materials at various facilities in the United States. The report is provided as a general reference for implementation of a simple and safe plutonium metal oxidation technique.

  8. EIS-0219: F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of processing the plutonium solutions to metal form using the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities at the Savannah River Site.

  9. TECHNICAL BASIS FOR DOE STANDARD 3013 EQUIVALENCY SUPPORTING REDUCED TEMPERATURE STABILIZATION OF OXALATE-DERIVED PLUTONIUM OXIDE PRODUCED BY THE HB-LINE FACILITY AT SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duffey, J.; Livingston, R.; Berg, J.; Veirs, D.

    2012-07-02

    The HB-Line (HBL) facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is designed to produce high-purity plutonium dioxide (PuO{sub 2}) which is suitable for future use in production of Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel. The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) requires PuO{sub 2} feed to be packaged per the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard 3013 (DOE-STD-3013) to comply with the facility's safety basis. The stabilization conditions imposed by DOE-STD-3013 for PuO{sub 2} (i.e., 950 C for 2 hours) preclude use of the HBL PuO{sub 2} in direct fuel fabrication and reduce the value of the HBL product as MFFF feedstock. Consequently, HBL initiated a technical evaluation to define acceptable operating conditions for production of high-purity PuO{sub 2} that fulfills the DOE-STD-3013 criteria for safe storage. The purpose of this document is to demonstrate that within the defined operating conditions, the HBL process will be equivalent for meeting the requirements of the DOE-STD-3013 stabilization process for plutonium-bearing materials from the DOE complex. The proposed 3013 equivalency reduces the prescribed stabilization temperature for high-purity PuO{sub 2} from oxalate precipitation processes from 950 C to 640 C and places a limit of 60% on the relative humidity (RH) at the lowest material temperature. The equivalency is limited to material produced using the HBL established flow sheet, for example, nitric acid anion exchange and Pu(IV) direct strike oxalate precipitation with stabilization at a minimum temperature of 640 C for four hours (h). The product purity must meet the MFFF acceptance criteria of 23,600 {micro}g/g Pu (i.e., 2.1 wt %) total impurities and chloride content less than 250 {micro}g/g of Pu. All other stabilization and packaging criteria identified by DOE-STD-3013-2012 or earlier revisions of the standard apply. Based on the evaluation of test data discussed in this document, the expert judgment of the authors supports packaging the HBL product under a 3013 equivalency. Under the defined process conditions and associated material specifications, the high-purity PuO{sub 2} produced in HBL presents no unique safety concerns for packaging or storage in the 3013 required configuration. The PuO{sub 2} produced using the HBL flow sheet conditions will have a higher specific surface area (SSA) than PuO{sub 2} stabilized at 950 C and, consequently, under identical conditions will adsorb more water from the atmosphere. The greatest challenge to HBL operators will be controlling moisture content below 0.5 wt %. However, even at the 0.5 wt % moisture limit, the maximum acceptable pressure of a stoichiometric mixture of hydrogen and oxygen in the 3013 container is greater than the maximum possible pressure for the HBL PuO{sub 2} product.

  10. THE PLUTONIUM STORY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Seaborg, G.T.

    2010-01-01

    Soc. , The occurrence of plutonium in nature. Mastick, D. F.positive oxidation state of plutonium. G. T. Seaborg, J. J.The first isolation of plutonium J. Am. Chem. Soc. , Fermi,

  11. In-situ gamma-ray assay of the west cell line in the 235-F plutonium fuel form facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Couture, A. H.; Diprete, D.

    2014-09-01

    On August 29th, 2013, scientists from SRNL took a series of in-situ gamma-ray measurements in the maintenance trench beneath Cells 6-9 on the west line of the PuFF facility using an uncollimated, highpurity germanium detector. The detector efficiency was estimated using a combination of MCNP simulations and empirical measurements. Data analysis was performed using three gamma-rays emitted by Pu-238 (99.85 keV, 152.7 keV, and 766.4 keV) providing three independent estimates of the mass of Pu-238 holdup in each of the cells. The weighted mean of these three results was used as the best estimate of Pu-238 holdup in the West Cell Line of PuFF. The results of the assay measurements are found in the table below along with the results from the scoping assay performed in 2006. All uncertainties in this table (as well as the rest of the report) are given as 1?. The total holdup in the West Cell Line was 2.4 ± 0.7 grams. This result is 0.6 g higher than the previous estimate, a 0.4? difference.

  12. Cost Estimating for Decommissioning of a Plutonium Facility--Lessons Learned From The Rocky Flats Building 771 Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stevens, J. L.; Titus, R.; Sanford, P. C.

    2002-02-26

    The Rocky Flats Closure Site is implementing an aggressive approach in an attempt to complete Site closure by 2006. The replanning effort to meet this goal required that the life-cycle decommissioning effort for the Site and for the major individual facilities be reexamined in detail. As part of the overall effort, the cost estimate for the Building 771 decommissioning project was revised to incorporate both actual cost data from a recently-completed similar project and detailed planning for all activities. This paper provides a brief overview of the replanning process and the original estimate, and then discusses the modifications to that estimate to reflect new data, methods, and planning rigor. It provides the new work breakdown structure and discusses the reasons for the final arrangement chosen. It follows with the process used to assign scope, cost, and schedule elements within the new structure, and development of the new code of accounts. Finally, it describes the project control methodology used to track the project, and provides lessons learned on cost tracking in the decommissioning environment.

  13. In-situ gamma-ray assay of the east cell line in the 235-F Plutonium fuel form facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Diprete, D.

    2015-08-21

    On September 17th -19th , 2013, scientists from SRNL took a series of in-situ gamma-ray measurements in the maintenance trench beneath Cells 1-5 on the east line of the PuFF facility using a well-collimated, high-purity germanium detector. The cell interiors were assayed along with the furnaces and storage coolers that protrude beneath the cells. The detector efficiency was estimated using a combination of MCNP simulations and empirical measurements. Data analysis was performed using three gamma-rays emitted by Pu-238 (99.85 keV, 152.7 keV, and 766.4 keV) providing three independent estimates of the mass of Pu-238 holdup in each of the cells. The weighted mean of these three results was used as the best estimate of Pu-238 holdup in the East Cell Line of PuFF. The results of the assay measurements are found in the table on the following page along with the results from the scoping assay performed in 2006. All uncertainties in this table (as well as the rest of the report) are reported at 1?. Summing the assay results and treating MDAs as M238Pu= 0 ± MDA, the total holdup in the East Cell Line was 240 ± 40 grams. This result is 100 grams lower than the previous estimate, a 0.55? difference. The uncertainty in the Pu-238 holdup is also reduced substantially relative to the 2006 scoping assay. However, the current assay results are in agreement with the 2006 scoping assay results due to the large uncertainty associated with the 2006 scoping assays. The current assay results support the conclusion that the 2006 results bound the Pu-238 mass in Cells 1-5. These results should be considered preliminary since additional measurements of the East Cell line are scheduled for 2017 and 2018. Those measurements will provide detailed information about the distribution of Pu-238 in the cells to be used to refine the results of the current assay.

  14. Seaborg's Plutonium ?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Norman, Eric B; Telhami, Kristina E

    2014-01-01

    Passive x-ray and gamma-ray analysis was performed on UC Berkeley's EH&S Sample S338. The object was found to contain Pu-239 and no other radioactive isotopes. The mass of Pu-239 contained in this object was determined to be 2.0 +- 0.3 micrograms. These observations are consistent with the identification of this object being the 2.77-microgram plutonium oxide sample described by Glenn Seaborg and his collaborators as the first sample of Pu-239 that was large enough to be weighed.

  15. Seaborg's Plutonium?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Eric B. Norman; Keenan J. Thomas; Kristina E. Telhami

    2015-02-17

    Passive x-ray and gamma-ray analysis was performed on UC Berkeley's EH&S Sample S338. The object was found to contain Pu-239 and no other radioactive isotopes. The mass of Pu-239 contained in this object was determined to be 2.0 +- 0.3 micrograms. These observations are consistent with the identification of this object being the 2.77-microgram plutonium oxide sample described by Glenn Seaborg and his collaborators as the first sample of Pu-239 that was large enough to be weighed.

  16. Design of the improved plutonium canister assay system (IPCAS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Abhold, M. E.; Baker, M. C.; Bourret, S. C.; Polk, P. J.; Vo, Duc T.

    2001-01-01

    The improved Plutonium Canister Assay System (iPCAS) is designed to detect gross and partial defects in the declared plutonium content of plutonium and MOX storage canisters during transfer to storage and process areas of the MOX fuel fabrication facility in Kokkasho, Japan. In addition, an associated Gamma Isotopics System (GIS) will be used to confirm facility-declared plutonium isotopics with accuracy sufficient to reduce the amount of destructive isotopic analysis needed. The design of the iPCAS instrument and its associated GIS is described and the expected performance of the instrument is discussed.

  17. Design-Only Conceptual Design Report: Plutonium Immobilization Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DiSabatino, A.; Loftus, D.

    1999-01-01

    This design-only conceptual design report was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition for engineering and design of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will be used to immobilize up to 50 tonnes of surplus plutonium. The siting for the Plutonium Immobilization Plant will be determined pursuant to the site-specific Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement in a Plutonium Deposition Record of Decision in early 1999. This document reflects a new facility using the preferred technology (ceramic immobilization using the can-in-canister approach) and the preferred site (at Savannah River). The Plutonium Immobilization Plant accepts plutonium from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into mineral-like forms that are subsequently encapsulated within a large canister of high-level waste glass. The final immobilized product must make the plutonium as inherently unattractive and inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors and must be suitable for geologic disposal. Plutonium immobilization at the Savannah River Site uses: (1) A new building, the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will convert non-pit surplus plutonium to an oxide form suitable for the immobilization process, immobilize plutonium in a titanate-based ceramic form, place cans of the plutonium-ceramic forms into magazines, and load the magazines into a canister; (2) The existing Defense Waste Processing Facility for the pouring of high-level waste glass into the canisters; and (3) The Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to receive and store feed materials. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant uses existing Savannah River Site infra-structure for analytical laboratory services, waste handling, fire protection, training, and other support utilities and services. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant may share the disposition of the 50 tonnes of plutonium with the mixed oxide fuel/reactor disposition alternative. For this case, immobilization will process 18.2 tonnes of plutonium in 10 years.

  18. Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE`s independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91.

  19. Plutonium nitrate bottle counter manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Menlove, H.O.; Adams, E.L.; Holbrooks, O.R.

    1984-03-01

    A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for plutonium nitrate assay in large storage bottles. This assay system can be used in the reprocessing plant or in the nitrate-to-oxide conversion facility. The system is based on the family of neutron detectors similar to the high-level neutron coincidence counter. This manual describes the system and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications. 4 references, 11 figures, 9 tables.

  20. THE PLUTONIUM STORY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Seaborg, G.T.

    2010-01-01

    the bulk of the uranium, as uranyl nitrate hexahydrate, fromto separate large- amounts of uranyl nitrate from plutonium.Plutonium. A sample of uranyl nitrate weighing 1.2 kilograms

  1. Clouds, aerosol, and precipitation in the Marine Boundary Layer: An ARM mobile facility deployment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wood, Robert; Luke, Ed; Wyant, Matthew; Bretherton, Christopher S.; Remillard, Jasmine; Kollias, Pavlos; Fletcher, Jennifer; Stemmler, Jayson; deSzoeke, S.; Yuter, Sandra; Miller, Matthew; Mechem, David; Tselioudis, George; Chiu, Christine; Mann, Julia; O Connor, Ewan; Hogan, Robin; Dong, Xiquan; Miller, Mark; Ghate, Virendra; Jefferson, Anne; Min, Qilong; Minnis, Patrick; Palinkonda, Rabindra; Albrecht, Bruce; Hannay, Cecile; Lin, Yanluan

    2014-04-27

    The Clouds, Aerosol, and Precipitation in the Marine Boundary Layer (CAP-MBL) deployment at Graciosa Island in the Azores generated a 21-month (April 2009-December 2010) comprehensive dataset documenting clouds, aerosols, and precipitation using the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Program (ARM) Mobile Facility (AMF). The scientific aim of the deployment is to gain improved understanding of the interactions of clouds, aerosols, and precipitation in the marine boundary layer. Graciosa Island straddles the boundary between the subtropics and midlatitudes in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean and consequently experiences a great diversity of meteorological and cloudiness conditions. Low clouds are the dominant cloud type, with stratocumulus and cumulus occurring regularly. Approximately half of all clouds contained precipitation detectable as radar echoes below the cloud base. Radar and satellite observations show that clouds with tops from 1-11 km contribute more or less equally to surface-measured precipitation at Graciosa. A wide range of aerosol conditions was sampled during the deployment consistent with the diversity of sources as indicated by back-trajectory analysis. Preliminary findings suggest important two-way interactions between aerosols and clouds at Graciosa, with aerosols affecting light precipitation and cloud radiative properties while being controlled in part by precipitation scavenging.The data from Graciosa are being compared with short-range forecasts made with a variety of models. A pilot analysis with two climate and two weather forecast models shows that they reproduce the observed time-varying vertical structure of lower-tropospheric cloud fairly well but the cloud-nucleating aerosol concentrations less well. The Graciosa site has been chosen to be a permanent fixed ARM site that became operational in October 2013.

  2. Clouds, aerosol, and precipitation in the Marine Boundary Layer: An ARM mobile facility deployment

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Wood, Robert; Luke, Ed; Wyant, Matthew; Bretherton, Christopher S.; Remillard, Jasmine; Kollias, Pavlos; Fletcher, Jennifer; Stemmler, Jayson; deSzoeke, S.; Yuter, Sandra; et al

    2014-04-27

    The Clouds, Aerosol, and Precipitation in the Marine Boundary Layer (CAP-MBL) deployment at Graciosa Island in the Azores generated a 21-month (April 2009-December 2010) comprehensive dataset documenting clouds, aerosols, and precipitation using the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Program (ARM) Mobile Facility (AMF). The scientific aim of the deployment is to gain improved understanding of the interactions of clouds, aerosols, and precipitation in the marine boundary layer. Graciosa Island straddles the boundary between the subtropics and midlatitudes in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean and consequently experiences a great diversity of meteorological and cloudiness conditions. Low clouds are the dominant cloud type, with stratocumulusmore »and cumulus occurring regularly. Approximately half of all clouds contained precipitation detectable as radar echoes below the cloud base. Radar and satellite observations show that clouds with tops from 1-11 km contribute more or less equally to surface-measured precipitation at Graciosa. A wide range of aerosol conditions was sampled during the deployment consistent with the diversity of sources as indicated by back-trajectory analysis. Preliminary findings suggest important two-way interactions between aerosols and clouds at Graciosa, with aerosols affecting light precipitation and cloud radiative properties while being controlled in part by precipitation scavenging.The data from Graciosa are being compared with short-range forecasts made with a variety of models. A pilot analysis with two climate and two weather forecast models shows that they reproduce the observed time-varying vertical structure of lower-tropospheric cloud fairly well but the cloud-nucleating aerosol concentrations less well. The Graciosa site has been chosen to be a permanent fixed ARM site that became operational in October 2013.« less

  3. ESTIMATING IMPURITIES IN SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Moore, E.

    2013-07-17

    The United States holds at least 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Many of the items that require disposition are only partially characterized, and SRNL uses a variety of techniques to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that are important for processing through the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and alternative disposition paths. Recent advances in laboratory tools, including Prompt Gamma Analysis and Peroxide Fusion treatment, provide data on the existing inventories that will enable disposition without additional, costly sampling and destructive analysis.

  4. Geomorphology of plutonium in the Northern Rio Grande

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Graf, W.L.

    1993-03-01

    Nearly all of the plutonium in the natural environment of the Northern Rio Grande is associated with soils and sediment, and river processes account for most of the mobility of these materials. A composite regional budget for plutonium based on multi-decadal averages for sediment and plutonium movement shows that 90 percent of the plutonium moving into the system is from atmospheric fallout. The remaining 10 percent is from releases at Los Alamos. Annual variation in plutonium flux and storage exceeds 100 percent. The contribution to the plutonium budget from Los Alamos is associated with relatively coarse sediment which often behaves as bedload in the Rio Grande. Infusion of these materials into the main stream were largest in 1951, 1952, 1957, and 1968. Because of the schedule of delivery of plutonium to Los Alamos for experimentation and weapons manufacturing, the latter two years are probably the most important. Although the Los Alamos contribution to the entire plutonium budget was relatively small, in these four critical years it constituted 71--86 percent of the plutonium in bedload immediately downstream from Otowi.

  5. CHARACTERIZATION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION OPTIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J; Edwin Moore, E; Scott Davies, S

    2008-07-15

    The United States (U.S.) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Except for materials that remain in use for programs outside of national defense, including programs for nuclear-energy development, the surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. Some items will be disposed as transuranic waste, low-level waste, or spent fuel. The remaining surplus plutonium will be managed through: (1) the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (FFF), to be constructed at the Savannah River Site (SRS), where the plutonium will be converted to fuel that will be irradiated in civilian power reactors and later disposed to a high-level waste (HLW) repository as spent fuel; (2) the SRS H-Area facilities, by dissolving and transfer to HLW systems, also for disposal to the repository; or (3) alternative immobilization techniques that would provide durable and secure disposal. From the beginning of the U.S. program for surplus plutonium disposition, DOE has sponsored research to characterize the surplus materials and to judge their suitability for planned disposition options. Because many of the items are stored without extensive analyses of their current chemical content, the characterization involves three interacting components: laboratory sample analysis, if available; non-destructive assay data; and rigorous evaluation of records for the processing history for items and inventory groups. This information is collected from subject-matter experts at inventory sites and from materials stabilization and surveillance programs, in cooperation with the design agencies for the disposition facilities. This report describes the operation and status of the characterization program.

  6. Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Environmental Data Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fledderman, P.D.

    2000-08-24

    This document provides an overview of existing environmental and ecological information at areas identified as potential locations of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) facilities. This information is required to document existing environmental and baseline conditions from which SPD construction and operation impacts can be defined. It will be used in developing the required preoperational monitoring plan to be used at specific SPD facilities construction sites.

  7. EIS-0299: Proposed Production of Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) for Use in Advanced Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) for Space Missions

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS is for the proposed production of plutonium-238 (Pu-238) using one or more DOE research reactors and facilities.

  8. Process modeling of plutonium conversion and MOX fabrication for plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schwartz, K.L. [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States). Dept. of Nuclear Engineering

    1998-10-01

    Two processes are currently under consideration for the disposition of 35 MT of surplus plutonium through its conversion into fuel for power production. These processes are the ARIES process, by which plutonium metal is converted into a powdered oxide form, and MOX fuel fabrication, where the oxide powder is combined with uranium oxide powder to form ceramic fuel. This study was undertaken to determine the optimal size for both facilities, whereby the 35 MT of plutonium metal will be converted into fuel and burned for power. The bounding conditions used were a plutonium concentration of 3--7%, a burnup of 20,000--40,000 MWd/MTHM, a core fraction of 0.1 to 0.4, and the number of reactors ranging from 2--6. Using these boundary conditions, the optimal cost was found with a plutonium concentration of 7%. This resulted in an optimal throughput ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 kg Pu/year. The data showed minimal costs, resulting from throughputs in this range, at 3,840, 2,779, and 3,497 kg Pu/year, which results in a facility lifetime of 9.1, 12.6, and 10.0 years, respectively.

  9. TECHNIQUES FOR MONITORING PLUTONIUM IN THE ENVIRONMENT

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nero Jr., A.V.

    2011-01-01

    of Environmental Plutonium and its Related Nuclides," IEEEJ. Koch, and C. T. Schmidt, "Plutonium Survey with an X-RayDetermination of Plutonium," Talanta!! , 215 (1967). C. E.

  10. Estimated airborne release of plutonium from Atomics International's Nuclear Materials Development Facility in the Santa Susana site, California, as a result of postulated damage from severe wind and earthquake hazard

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mishima, J.; Ayer, J.E.

    1981-09-01

    The potential mass of airborne releases of plutonium (source term) that could result from wind and seismic damage is estimated for the Atomics International Company's Nuclear Materials Development Facility (NMDF) at the Santa Susana site in California. The postulated source terms will be useful as the basis for estimating the potential dose to the maximum exposed individual by inhalation and to the total population living within a prescribed radius of the site. The respirable fraction of airborne particles is thus the principal concern. The estimated source terms are based on the damage ratio, and the potential airborne releases if all enclosures suffer particular levels of damage. In an attempt to provide a realistic range of potential source terms that include most of the normal processing conditions, a best estimate bounded by upper and lower limits is provided. The range of source terms is calculated by combining a high best estimate and a low damage ratio, based on a fraction of enclosures suffering crush or perforation, with the airborne release from enclosures based upon an upper limit, average, and lower limit inventory of dispersible materials at risk. Two throughput levels are considered. The factors used to evaluate the fractional airborne release of materials and the exchange rates between enclosed and exterior atmospheres are discussed. The postulated damage and source terms are discussed for wind and earthquake hazard scenarios in order of their increasing severity.

  11. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  12. Plutonium radiation surrogate

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Frank, Michael I. (Dublin, CA)

    2010-02-02

    A self-contained source of gamma-ray and neutron radiation suitable for use as a radiation surrogate for weapons-grade plutonium is described. The source generates a radiation spectrum similar to that of weapons-grade plutonium at 5% energy resolution between 59 and 2614 keV, but contains no special nuclear material and emits little .alpha.-particle radiation. The weapons-grade plutonium radiation surrogate also emits neutrons having fluxes commensurate with the gamma-radiation intensities employed.

  13. Plutonium dissolution process

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Vest, Michael A. (Oak Park, IL); Fink, Samuel D. (Aiken, SC); Karraker, David G. (Aiken, SC); Moore, Edwin N. (Aiken, SC); Holcomb, H. Perry (North Augusta, SC)

    1996-01-01

    A two-step process for dissolving plutonium metal, which two steps can be carried out sequentially or simultaneously. Plutonium metal is exposed to a first mixture containing approximately 1.0M-1.67M sulfamic acid and 0.0025M-0.1M fluoride, the mixture having been heated to a temperature between 45.degree. C. and 70.degree. C. The mixture will dissolve a first portion of the plutonium metal but leave a portion of the plutonium in an oxide residue. Then, a mineral acid and additional fluoride are added to dissolve the residue. Alteratively, nitric acid in a concentration between approximately 0.05M and 0.067M is added to the first mixture to dissolve the residue as it is produced. Hydrogen released during the dissolution process is diluted with nitrogen.

  14. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-10-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium.

  15. Standard specification for sintered (Uranium-Plutonium) dioxide pellets

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2001-01-01

    1.1 This specification covers finished sintered and ground (uranium-plutonium) dioxide pellets for use in thermal reactors. It applies to uranium-plutonium dioxide pellets containing plutonium additions up to 15 % weight. This specification may not completely cover the requirements for pellets fabricated from weapons-derived plutonium. 1.2 This specification does not include (1) provisions for preventing criticality accidents or (2) requirements for health and safety. Observance of this specification does not relieve the user of the obligation to be aware of and conform to all applicable international, federal, state, and local regulations pertaining to possessing, processing, shipping, or using source or special nuclear material. Examples of U.S. government documents are Code of Federal Regulations Title 10, Part 50Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities; Code of Federal Regulations Title 10, Part 71Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material; and Code of Federal Regulations Tit...

  16. Lithium metal reduction of plutonium oxide to produce plutonium metal

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Coops, Melvin S. (Livermore, CA)

    1992-01-01

    A method is described for the chemical reduction of plutonium oxides to plutonium metal by the use of pure lithium metal. Lithium metal is used to reduce plutonium oxide to alpha plutonium metal (alpha-Pu). The lithium oxide by-product is reclaimed by sublimation and converted to the chloride salt, and after electrolysis, is removed as lithium metal. Zinc may be used as a solvent metal to improve thermodynamics of the reduction reaction at lower temperatures. Lithium metal reduction enables plutonium oxide reduction without the production of huge quantities of CaO--CaCl.sub.2 residues normally produced in conventional direct oxide reduction processes.

  17. Removal of the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor - 13031

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Herzog, C. Brad [CH2M HILL, Inc. (United States)] [CH2M HILL, Inc. (United States); Guercia, Rudolph [US-DOE (United States)] [US-DOE (United States); LaCome, Matt [Meier Engineering Inc (United States)] [Meier Engineering Inc (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The 309 Facility housed the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR), an operating test reactor in the 300 Area at Hanford, Washington. The reactor first went critical in 1960 and was originally used for experiments under the Hanford Site Plutonium Fuels Utilization Program. The facility was decontaminated and decommissioned in 1988-1989, and the facility was deactivated in 1994. The 309 facility was added to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) response actions as established in an Interim Record of Decision (IROD) and Action Memorandum (AM). The IROD directs a remedial action for the 309 facility, associated waste sites, associated underground piping and contaminated soils resulting from past unplanned releases. The AM directs a removal action through physical demolition of the facility, including removal of the reactor. Both CERCLA actions are implemented in accordance with U.S. EPA approved Remedial Action Work Plan, and the Remedial Design Report / Remedial Action Report associated with the Hanford 300-FF-2 Operable Unit. The selected method for remedy was to conventionally demolish above grade structures including the easily distinguished containment vessel dome, remove the PRTR and a minimum of 300 mm (12 in) of shielding as a single 560 Ton unit, and conventionally demolish the below grade structure. Initial sample core drilling in the Bio-Shield for radiological surveys showed evidence that the Bio-Shield was of sound structure. Core drills for the separation process of the PRTR from the 309 structure began at the deck level and revealed substantial thermal degradation of at least the top 1.2 m (4LF) of Bio-Shield structure. The degraded structure combined with the original materials used in the Bio-Shield would not allow for a stable structure to be extracted. The water used in the core drilling process proved to erode the sand mixture of the Bio-Shield leaving the steel aggregate to act as ball bearings against the core drill bit. A redesign is being completed to extract the 309 PRTR and entire Bio-Shield structure together as one monolith weighing 1100 Ton by cutting structural concrete supports. In addition, the PRTR has hundreds of contaminated process tubes and pipes that have to be severed to allow for a uniformly flush fit with a lower lifting frame. Thirty-two 50 mm (2 in) core drills must be connected with thirty-two wire saw cuts to allow for lifting columns to be inserted. Then eight primary saw cuts must be completed to severe the PRTR from the 309 Facility. Once the weight of the PRTR is transferred to the lifting frame, then the PRTR may be lifted out of the facility. The critical lift will be executed using four 450 Ton strand jacks mounted on a 9 m (30 LF) tall mobile lifting frame that will allow the PRTR to be transported by eight 600 mm (24 in) Slide Shoes. The PRTR will then be placed on a twenty-four line, double wide, self powered Goldhofer for transfer to the onsite CERCLA Disposal Cell (ERDF Facility), approximately 33 km (20 miles) away. (authors)

  18. Plutonium 239 Equivalency Calculations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wen, J

    2011-05-31

    This document provides the basis for converting actual weapons grade plutonium mass to a plutonium equivalency (PuE) mass of Plutonium 239. The conversion can be accomplished by performing calculations utilizing either: (1) Isotopic conversions factors (CF{sub isotope}), or (2) 30-year-old weapons grade conversion factor (CF{sub 30 yr}) Both of these methods are provided in this document. Material mass and isotopic data are needed to calculate PuE using the isotopic conversion factors, which will provide the actual PuE value at the time of calculation. PuE is the summation of the isotopic masses times their associated isotopic conversion factors for plutonium 239. Isotopic conversion factors are calculated by a normalized equation, relative to Plutonium 239, of specific activity (SA) and cumulated dose inhalation affects based on 50-yr committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). The isotopic conversion factors for converting weapons grade plutonium to PuE are provided in Table-1. The unit for specific activity (SA) is curies per gram (Ci/g) and the isotopic SA values come from reference [1]. The cumulated dose inhalation effect values in units of rem/Ci are based on 50-yr committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). A person irradiated by gamma radiation outside the body will receive a dose only during the period of irradiation. However, following an intake by inhalation, some radionuclides persist in the body and irradiate the various tissues for many years. There are three groups CEDE data representing lengths of time of 0.5 (D), 50 (W) and 500 (Y) days, which are in reference [2]. The CEDE values in the (W) group demonstrates the highest dose equivalent value; therefore they are used for the calculation.

  19. Characterizing surplus US plutonium for disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, Jeffrey S.; Moore, Edwin N.

    2013-02-26

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems.

  20. Characterizing Surplus US Plutonium for Disposition - 13199

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, Jeffrey S. [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)] [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken SC 29808 (United States); Moore, Edwin N. [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC, Savannah River Site, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)] [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC, Savannah River Site, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems. (authors)

  1. PFPF canister counter for foreign plutonium (PCAS-3) hardware operations and procedures manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Menlove, H.O.; Baca, J.; Kroncke, K.E.; Miller, M.C. ); Takahashi, S.; Seki, S.; Inose, S.; Yamamoto, T. )

    1993-01-01

    A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for the measurement of plutonium powder contained in tall storage canisters. The counter was designed for installation in the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility fabrication plant. Each canister contains from one to five cans of PuO[sub 2]. The neutron counter measures the spontaneous-fission rate from the plutonium and, when this is combined with the plutonium isotopic ratios, the plutonium mass is determined. The system can accommodate plutonium loadings up to 12 kg, with 10 kg being a typical loading. Software has been developed to permit the continuous operation of the system in an unattended mode. Authentication techniques have been developed for the system. This manual describes the system and its operation and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications.

  2. PFPF canister counter for foreign plutonium (PCAS-3) hardware operations and procedures manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Menlove, H.O.; Baca, J.; Kroncke, K.E.; Miller, M.C.; Takahashi, S.; Seki, S.; Inose, S.; Yamamoto, T.

    1993-01-01

    A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for the measurement of plutonium powder contained in tall storage canisters. The counter was designed for installation in the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility fabrication plant. Each canister contains from one to five cans of PuO{sub 2}. The neutron counter measures the spontaneous-fission rate from the plutonium and, when this is combined with the plutonium isotopic ratios, the plutonium mass is determined. The system can accommodate plutonium loadings up to 12 kg, with 10 kg being a typical loading. Software has been developed to permit the continuous operation of the system in an unattended mode. Authentication techniques have been developed for the system. This manual describes the system and its operation and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications.

  3. Atomic spectrum of plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blaise, J.; Fred, M.; Gutmacher, R.G.

    1984-08-01

    This report contains plutonium wavelengths, energy level classifications, and other spectroscopic data accumulated over the past twenty years at Laboratoire Aime Cotton (LAC) Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary purpose was term analysis: deriving the energy levels in terms of quantum numbers and electron configurations, and evaluating the Slater-Condon and other parameters from the levels.

  4. SELECTION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FOR DISPOSITION TO WIPP

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Mcclard, J.; Christopher, J.

    2012-06-08

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing a Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). Included in the evaluation are up to 6 metric tons (MT) of plutonium in the form of impure oxides and metals for which a disposition plan has not been decided, among options that include preparation as feed for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility; disposing to high-level waste through the Savannah River Site (SRS) HB Line and H Canyon; can-in-canister disposal using the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility; and preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE and SRS have identified at least 0.5 MT of plutonium that, because of high levels of chemical and isotopic impurities, is impractical for disposition by methods other than the WIPP pathway. Characteristics of these items and the disposition strategy are discussed.

  5. XANES Identification of Plutonium Speciation in RFETS Samples

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    LoPresti, V.; Conradson, S.D.; Clark, D.L.

    2009-06-03

    Using primarily X-ray absorption near edge spectroscopy (XANES) with standards run in tandem with samples, probable plutonium speciation was determined for 13 samples from contaminated soil, acid-splash or fire-deposition building interior surfaces, or asphalt pads from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). Save for extreme oxidizing situations, all other samples were found to be of Pu(IV) speciation, supporting the supposition that such contamination is less likely to show mobility off site. EXAFS analysis conducted on two of the 13 samples supported the validity of the XANES features employed as determinants of the plutonium valence.

  6. John C. Barnes of Savannah River Operations named 2012 Facility...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    and H-Canyons and the HB-Line. These facilities conduct hazardous nuclear chemistry, packaging, and processing operations on plutonium and transuranic materials. Mr. Barnes...

  7. Rebaselining seismic risks for resumption of Building 707 plutonium operations at the Rocky Flats Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Elia, F. Jr.; Foppe, T.; Stahlnecker, E.

    1993-08-01

    Natural phenomena risks have been assessed for plutonium handling facilities at the Rocky Flats Plant, based on numerous studies performed for the Department of Energy Natural Phenomena Hazards Project. The risk assessment was originally utilized in the facilities Final Safety Analysis Reports and in subsequent risk management decisions. Plutonium production operations were curtailed in 1989 in order for a new operating contractor to implement safety improvements. Since natural phenomena events dominated risks to the public, a re-assessment of these events were undertaken for resumption of plutonium operations.

  8. Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J.; Nass, R.

    1995-08-01

    This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage.

  9. TA-55: LANL Plutonium-Processing Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservationBio-Inspired Solar Fuel Production 1:PhysicsSyndicated Contentwo major newT

  10. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious RankADVANCED MANUFACTURINGEnergy BillsNo. 195 - Oct. 7, 2011REMSViewEnergyRadioactiveDOE.Fthe

  11. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious RankADVANCED MANUFACTURINGEnergy BillsNo. 195 - Oct. 7, 2011REMSViewEnergyRadioactiveDOE.FtheNOT

  12. Manufacturing of Plutonium Tensile Specimens

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Knapp, Cameron M

    2012-08-01

    Details workflow conducted to manufacture high density alpha Plutonium tensile specimens to support Los Alamos National Laboratory's science campaigns. Introduces topics including the metallurgical challenge of Plutonium and the use of high performance super-computing to drive design. Addresses the utilization of Abaqus finite element analysis, programmable computer numerical controlled (CNC) machining, as well as glove box ergonomics and safety in order to design a process that will yield high quality Plutonium tensile specimens.

  13. PLUTONIUM METALLOGRAPHY AT LOS ALAMOS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    PEREYRA, RAMIRO A.; LOVATO, DARRYL

    2007-01-08

    From early days of the Manhattan program to today, scientists and engineers have continued to investigate the metallurgical properties of plutonium (Pu). Although issues like aging was not a concern to the early pioneers, today the reliability of our aging stockpile is of major focus. And as the country moves toward a new generation of weapons similar problems that the early pioneers faced such as compatibility, homogeneity and malleability have come to the forefront. And metallography will continue to be a principle tool for the resolution of old and new issues. Standard metallographic techniques are used for the preparation of plutonium samples. The samples are first cut with a slow speed idamond saw. After mounting in Epon 815 epoxy resin, the samples are ground through 600 grit silicon carbide paper. PF 5070 (a Freon substitute) is used as a coolant, lubricant, and solvent for most operations. Rough mechanical polished is done with 9-{mu} diamond using a nap less cloth, for example nylon or cotton. Final polish is done with 1-{mu} diamond on a nappy cloth such as sylvet. Ethyl alcohol is then used ultrasonically to clean the samples before electro polishing. The sample is then electro-polished and etched in an electrolyte containing 10% nitric acid, and 90% dimethyleneformalmide. Ethyl alcohol is used as a final cleaning agent. Although standard metallographic preparation techniques are used, there are several reasons why metallography of Pu is difficult and challenging. Firstly, because of the health hazards associated with its radioactive properties, sample preparation is conducted in glove boxes. Figure 1 shows the metallography line, in an R and D facility. Since they are designed to be negative in pressure to the laboratory, cross-contamination of abrasives is a major problem. In addition, because of safety concerns and waste issues, there is a limit to the amount of solvent that can be used. Secondly, Pu will readily hydride or oxidize when in contact with metallographic polishing lubricants, solvents, or chemicals. And water being one of the most reactive solutions, is not used in the preparation. Figure 2 shows an example of a plutonium sample in which an oxide film has formed on the surface due to overexposure to solutions. it has been noted that nucleation of the hydride/oxide begins around inclusions and samples with a higher concentration of impurities seem to be more susceptible to this reaction. Figure 3 shows examples of small oxide rings, forming around inclusions. Lastly, during the cutting, grinding, or polishing process there is enough stress induced in the sample that the surface can transform from the soft face-centered-cubic delta phase (30 HV) to the strain-induced monoclinic alpha{prime} phase (300 HV). Figure 4 and 5 shows cross-sectional views of samples in which one was cut using a diamond saw and the other was processed through 600 grit. The white layers on the edges is the strain induced alpha{prime} phase. The 'V' shape indentation in Figure 5 was caused by a coarser abrasive which resulted in transformations to a depth of approximately 20 {micro}m. Another example of the transformation sensitivity of plutonium can be seen in Figure 6, in which the delta phase has partly transformed to alpha{prime} during micro hardness indentation.

  14. PLUTONIUM-238 PRODUCTION TARGET DESIGN STUDIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hurt, Christopher J [ORNL; Wham, Robert M [ORNL; Hobbs, Randall W [ORNL; Owens, R Steven [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Maldonado, G Ivan [ORNL

    2014-01-01

    A new supply chain is planned for plutonium-238 using existing reactors at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and existing chemical recovery facilities at ORNL. Validation and testing activities for new irradiation target designs have been conducted in three phases over a 2 year period to provide data for scale-up to production. Target design, qualification, target fabrication, and irradiation of fully-loaded targets have been accomplished. Data from post-irradiation examination (PIE) supports safety analysis and irradiation of future target designs.

  15. Overview of Modeling and Simulations of Plutonium Aging

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schwartz, A J; Wolfer, W G

    2007-04-24

    Computer-aided materials research is now an integral part of science and technology. It becomes particularly valuable when comprehensive experimental investigations and materials testing are too costly, hazardous, or of excessive duration; then, theoretical and computational studies can supplement and enhance the information gained from limited experimental data. Such is the case for improving our fundamental understanding of the properties of aging plutonium in the nuclear weapons stockpile. The question of the effects of plutonium aging on the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile emerged after the United States closed its plutonium manufacturing facility in 1989 and decided to suspend any further underground testing of nuclear weapons in 1992. To address this, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiated a research program to investigate plutonium aging, i.e., the changes with time of properties of Pu-Ga alloys employed in the nuclear weapons and to develop models describing these changes sufficiently reliable to forecast them for several decades. The November 26, 2006 press release by the NNSA summarizes the conclusions of the investigation, '...there appear to be no serious or sudden changes occurring, or expected to occur, in plutonium that would affect performance of pits beyond the well-understood, gradual degradation of plutonium materials'. Furthermore, 'These studies show that the degradation of plutonium in our nuclear weapons will not affect warhead reliability for decades', then NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks said. 'It is now clear that although plutonium aging contributes, other factors control the overall life expectancy of nuclear weapons systems'. The origin of plutonium aging is the natural decay of certain plutonium isotopes. Specifically, it is the process of alpha decay in which a plutonium atom spontaneously splits into a 5 MeV alpha particle and an 85keV uranium recoil. The alpha particle traverses the lattice, slowly loosing energy through electronic excitations, acquiring two electrons to become a helium atom, then finally coming to rest approximately 10 microns away with the generation of a few-hundred Frenkel pairs. The uranium recoil immediately displaces a couple-thousand Pu atoms from their original lattice sites. This process, which occurs at a rate of approximately 41 parts-per-million per year, is the source of potential property changes in aging plutonium. Plutonium aging encompasses many areas of research: radiation damage and radiation effects, diffusion of point defects, impurities and alloying elements, solid state phase transformations, dislocation dynamics and mechanical properties, equations of state under extreme pressures, as well as surface oxidation and corrosion. Theory, modeling, and computer simulations are involved to various degrees in many of these areas. The joint research program carried out at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory encompassed experimental measurements of numerous properties of newly fabricated reference alloys, archival material that have accumulated the effects of several decades of radioactive decay, and accelerated aging alloys in which the isotropic composition was adjusted to increase the rate of self-irradiation damage. In particular, the physical and chemical processes of nuclear materials degradation were to be studied individually and in great depth. Closely coupled to the experimental efforts are theory, modeling, and simulations. These efforts, validated by the experiments, aim to develop predictive models to evaluate the effects of age on the properties of plutonium. The need to obtain a scientific understanding of plutonium aging has revitalized fundamental research on actinides and plutonium in particular. For example, the experimental discovery of superconductivity in Pu-based compounds, the observation of helium bubbles in naturally aged material, and the measurement of phonon dispersion properties in gallium-stabilized delta plu

  16. Neutrons find "missing" magnetism of plutonium

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    numbers of electrons in plutonium's outer valence shell-an observation that also explains abnormal changes in plutonium's volume in its different phases. Neutrons are uniquely...

  17. AMF ARM Mobile FAcility

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach HomeA Better Anode Design to Improve4AJ01) (See Energy Level79AJ01)19^560AMERICA'S NATIONAL LABS by 50 50

  18. Stabilizing plutonium materials at Hanford: systems engineering for PFP transition project effort on DNFSB 94-1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Huber, T.E., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-07-02

    This report discusses the basic objectives of the stabilization and packaging activities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant that satisfy the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 94-1 by transforming the plutonium materials at hanford into forms or conditions which are suitable for safe storage to appropriate storage criteria; or discard that meets appropriate waste acceptance criteria.

  19. Photochemical preparation of plutonium pentafluoride

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Rabideau, Sherman W. (Los Alamos, NM); Campbell, George M. (Los Alamos, NM)

    1987-01-01

    The novel compound plutonium pentafluoride may be prepared by the photodissociation of gaseous plutonium hexafluoride. It is a white solid of low vapor pressure, which consists predominantly of a face-centered cubic structure with a.sub.o =4.2709.+-.0.0005 .ANG..

  20. Plutonium and americium behavior in coral atoll environments

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Noshkin, V.E.; Wong, K.M.; Jokela, T.A.; Brunk, J.L.; Eagle, R.J.

    1984-02-01

    Inventories of /sup 239 +240/Pu and /sup 241/Am greatly in excess of global fallout levels persist in the benthic environments of Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. Quantities of /sup 239 +240/Pu and lesser amounts of /sup 241/Am are continuously mobilizing from these sedimentary reservoirs. The amount of /sup 239 +240/Pu mobilized to solution at any time represents 0.08 to 0.09% of the sediment inventories to a depth of 16 cm. The mobilized /sup 239 +240/Pu has solute-like characteristics and different valence states coexist in solution - the largest fraction of the soluble plutonium is in an oxidized form (+V,VI). The adsorption of plutonium to sediments is not completely reversible because of changes that occur in the relative amounts of the mixed oxidation states in solution with time. Further, any characteristics of /sup 239 +240/Pu described at one location may not necessarily be relevant in describing its behavior elsewhere following mobilization and migration. The relative amounts of /sup 241/Am to /sup 239 +240/Pu in the sedimentary deposits at Enewetak and Bikini may be altered in future years because of mobilization and radiological decay. Mobilization of /sup 239 +240/Pu is not a process unique to these atolls, and quantities in solution derived from sedimentary deposits can be found at other global sites. These studies in the equatorial Pacific have significance in assessing the long-term behavior of the transuranics in any marine environment. 22 references, 1 figure, 13 tables.

  1. Complexation of Plutonium (IV) with Fluoride at Variable Tempeartures

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Moore, Dean A.

    2011-01-01

    of Neptunium and Plutonium. Edited by OECD Nuclear EnergyComplexation of Plutonium(IV) with Fluoride at Variablehigher temperatures. Key Words: Plutonium (IV) / Fluoride /

  2. Airborne release fractions/rates and respirable fractions for nonreactor nuclear facilities. Volume 2, Appendices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-12-01

    This document contains compiled data from the DOE Handbook on Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear facilities. Source data and example facilities utilized, such as the Plutonium Recovery Facility, are included.

  3. Neutron Scattering Facilities | U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC...

    Office of Science (SC) Website

    user facility as well as the world's leading source of elements heavier than plutonium for research, medicine, and industrial applications. Last modified: 1192015 8:57:27...

  4. LITERATURE REVIEW FOR OXALATE OXIDATION PROCESSES AND PLUTONIUM OXALATE SOLUBILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nash, C.

    2012-02-03

    A literature review of oxalate oxidation processes finds that manganese(II)-catalyzed nitric acid oxidation of oxalate in precipitate filtrate is a viable and well-documented process. The process has been operated on the large scale at Savannah River in the past, including oxidation of 20 tons of oxalic acid in F-Canyon. Research data under a variety of conditions show the process to be robust. This process is recommended for oxalate destruction in H-Canyon in the upcoming program to produce feed for the MOX facility. Prevention of plutonium oxalate precipitation in filtrate can be achieved by concentrated nitric acid/ferric nitrate sequestration of oxalate. Organic complexants do not appear practical to sequester plutonium. Testing is proposed to confirm the literature and calculation findings of this review at projected operating conditions for the upcoming campaign. H Canyon plans to commence conversion of plutonium metal to low-fired plutonium oxide in 2012 for eventual use in the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Facility. The flowsheet includes sequential operations of metal dissolution, ion exchange, elution, oxalate precipitation, filtration, and calcination. All processes beyond dissolution will occur in HB-Line. The filtration step produces an aqueous filtrate that may have as much as 4 M nitric acid and 0.15 M oxalate. The oxalate needs to be removed from the stream to prevent possible downstream precipitation of residual plutonium when the solution is processed in H Canyon. In addition, sending the oxalate to the waste tank farm is undesirable. This report addresses the processing options for destroying the oxalate in existing H Canyon equipment.

  5. Management of disused plutonium sealed sources

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Whitworth, Julia Rose [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Pearson, Michael W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Abeyta, Cristy [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01

    The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) has been recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources since 1999, including more than 2,400 Plutonium (Pu)-238 sealed sources and 653 Pu-239-bearing sources that represent more than 10% of the total sources recovered by GTRI/OSRP to date. These sources have been recovered from hundreds of sites within the United States (US) and around the world. OSRP grew out of early efforts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover and disposition excess Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) sealed sources that were distributed in the 1960s and 1970s under the Atoms for Peace Program, a loan-lease program that serviced 31 countries, as well as domestic users. In the conduct of these recovery operations, GTRI/OSRP has been required to solve problems related to knowledge-of-inventory, packaging and transportation of fissile and heat-source materials, transfer of ownership, storage of special nuclear material (SNM) both at US Department of Energy (DOE) facilities and commercially, and disposal. Unique issues associated with repatriation from foreign countries, including end user agreements required by some European countries and denials of shipment, will also be discussed.

  6. Certification of Plutonium Standards for KAMS Neutron Multiplicity Counter

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Salaymeh, S.R.

    2002-05-31

    As part of the implementation of the PEIS record of decision in January of 1997, DOE will pursue two technologies to disposition fifty metric tons of its stockpile of plutonium. As a result of this and in order to expedite the closure of Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in Colorado, DOE decided to use existing facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) for storing all material containing plutonium at KAMS. A neutron multiplicity counter was designed and built to carry out receipt verification measurement at the facility. Since the material covers a wide range and different levels of impurities, it is essential that we obtain a set of working standards. An agreement was drafted to select the first drums to be these standards. A plan was developed for the certification of these standards using Rocky Flat's existing nondestructive assay equipment. This paper will discuss the types of materials to be shipped to SRS, number of standards to certify for each type of material, and the certification plan. It will also discuss the activities necessary to determine the nuclear content of these working standards to be used at SRS facilities in support of shipment and receipt of the Pu containing materials. Definition of instrument qualifications, measurement control processes, measurement methodologies, and calculations necessary to report the gram quantities and their uncertainties for plutonium, americium-241, uranium-235 (if present) and neptunium-237 (if present) will also be presented.

  7. Standard practice for removal of uranium or plutonium, or both, for impurity assay in uranium or plutonium materials

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2006-01-01

    Standard practice for removal of uranium or plutonium, or both, for impurity assay in uranium or plutonium materials

  8. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    Following President Clinton`s Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.

  9. Plutonium distribution: Summary of public and governmental support issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pasternak, A.

    1995-03-31

    Obtaining strong public and governmental support for the plutonium disposition program and for the projects comprising the selected disposition options will be essential to the success of the program in meeting non-proliferation goals established as national policy. This paper summarizes issues related to public and governmental support for plutonium disposition. Recommendations are offered which rest on two fundamental assumptions: (1) public and political support derive from public trust and confidence, and (2) despite widespread support for U.S. non-proliferation goals, establishing and operating facilities to carry out the program will entail controversy. Documentation for the Administration`s policy on non-proliferation as it relates to plutonium disposition is cited and summarized as background for ongoing planning efforts by the Department of Energy (DOE). Consensus is a reasonable goal for efforts to secure public and governmental support for the plutonium disposition program and its elements; unanimity is very unlikely. The program will be aided by the popular recognition of the importance of the nation`s non-proliferation goals, the potential for an energy dividend if an energy production option is selected ({open_quotes}Swords to Plowshares{close_quotes} metaphor), the possibility of influencing disposition decisions in other countries, and the clear need to do something with the excess material ({open_quotes}the no action alternative{close_quotes} will not suffice).

  10. Plutonium focus area

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-08-01

    To ensure research and development programs focus on the most pressing environmental restoration and waste management problems at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environmental Management (EM) established a working group in August 1993 to implement a new approach to research and technology development. As part of this new approach, EM developed a management structure and principles that led to the creation of specific Focus Areas. These organizations were designed to focus the scientific and technical talent throughout DOE and the national scientific community on the major environmental restoration and waste management problems facing DOE. The Focus Area approach provides the framework for intersite cooperation and leveraging of resources on common problems. After the original establishment of five major Focus Areas within the Office of Technology Development (EM-50, now called the Office of Science and Technology), the Nuclear Materials Stabilization Task Group (EM-66) followed the structure already in place in EM-50 and chartered the Plutonium Focus Area (PFA). The following information outlines the scope and mission of the EM, EM-60, and EM-66 organizations as related to the PFA organizational structure.

  11. Selecting a plutonium vitrification process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jouan, A. [Centre d`Etudes de la Vallee du Rhone, Bagnols sur Ceze (France)

    1996-05-01

    Vitrification of plutonium is one means of mitigating its potential danger. This option is technically feasible, even if it is not the solution advocated in France. Two situations are possible, depending on whether or not the glass matrix also contains fission products; concentrations of up to 15% should be achievable for plutonium alone, whereas the upper limit is 3% in the presence of fission products. The French continuous vitrification process appears to be particularly suitable for plutonium vitrification: its capacity is compatible with the required throughout, and the compact dimensions of the process equipment prevent a criticality hazard. Preprocessing of plutonium metal, to convert it to PuO{sub 2} or to a nitric acid solution, may prove advantageous or even necessary depending on whether a dry or wet process is adopted. The process may involve a single step (vitrification of Pu or PuO{sub 2} mixed with glass frit) or may include a prior calcination step - notably if the plutonium is to be incorporated into a fission product glass. It is important to weigh the advantages and drawbacks of all the possible options in terms of feasibility, safety and cost-effectiveness.

  12. An improved, computer-based, on-line gamma monitor for plutonium anion exchange process control

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pope, N.G.; Marsh, S.F.

    1987-06-01

    An improved, low-cost, computer-based system has replaced a previously developed on-line gamma monitor. Both instruments continuously profile uranium, plutonium, and americium in the nitrate anion exchange process used to recover and purify plutonium at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility. The latest system incorporates a personal computer that provides full-feature multichannel analyzer (MCA) capabilities by means of a single-slot, plug-in integrated circuit board. In addition to controlling all MCA functions, the computer program continuously corrects for gain shift and performs all other data processing functions. This Plutonium Recovery Operations Gamma Ray Energy Spectrometer System (PROGRESS) provides on-line process operational data essential for efficient operation. By identifying abnormal conditions in real time, it allows operators to take corrective actions promptly. The decision-making capability of the computer will be of increasing value as we implement automated process-control functions in the future. 4 refs., 6 figs.

  13. PRTR/309 building nuclear facility preliminary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cornwell, B.C.

    1994-12-08

    The hazard classification of the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR)/309 building as a ``Radiological Facility`` and the office portions as ``Other Industrial Facility`` are documented by this report. This report provides: a synopsis of the history and facility it`s uses; describes major area of the facility; and assesses the radiological conditions for the facility segments. The assessment is conducted using the hazard category threshold values, segmentation methodology, and graded approach guidance of DOE-STD-1027-92.

  14. APPENDIX G Partition Coefficients For Plutonium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    and not adsorption reactions. C Adsorption data show that the presence of ligands influence plutonium adsorption onto soils. Increasing concentrations of ligands decrease plutonium adsorption. C If no complexing ligandsAPPENDIX G Partition Coefficients For Plutonium #12;Appendix G Partition Coefficients

  15. Plutonium Oxide Process Capability Work Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meier, David E.; Tingey, Joel M.

    2014-02-28

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been tasked to develop a Pilot-scale Plutonium-oxide Processing Unit (P3U) providing a flexible capability to produce 200g (Pu basis) samples of plutonium oxide using different chemical processes for use in identifying and validating nuclear forensics signatures associated with plutonium production. Materials produced can also be used as exercise and reference materials.

  16. Plutonium-the element of surprise

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Short, Daniel

    Plutonium-the element of surprise G.R.ChoppinandB.E.Stout This year marked the soth annivrsary ol the original isolation o{ plutonium, making ita relativenewcomerto the PeriodicTable.Ovrthe past 50 years plutonium has become more familiar to tho generslpublic than manyothor,olderelem6nts

  17. The occurrence of plutonium in nature

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Levine, Charles A.; Seaborg, Glenn T.

    1950-01-01

    Nuclear Energy S e r i e s , Plutonium P r o j e c t Record,Nuclear Energy S e r i e s , Plutonium P r o j e c t Record,Laboratory THE OCCURRENCE OF PLUTONIUM IN NATUIRE Charles A.

  18. Method of separating thorium from plutonium

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Clifton, David G. (Los Alamos, NM); Blum, Thomas W. (Los Alamos, NM)

    1984-01-01

    A method of chemically separating plutonium from thorium. Plutonium and thorium to be separated are dissolved in an aqueous feed solution, preferably as the nitrate salts. The feed solution is acidified and sodium nitrite is added to the solution to adjust the valence of the plutonium to the +4 state. A chloride salt, preferably sodium chloride, is then added to the solution to induce formation of an anionic plutonium chloride complex. The anionic plutonium chloride complex and the thorium in solution are then separated by ion exchange on a strong base anion exchange column.

  19. Method of separating thorium from plutonium

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Clifton, D.G.; Blum, T.W.

    1984-07-10

    A method is described for chemically separating plutonium from thorium. Plutonium and thorium to be separated are dissolved in an aqueous feed solution, preferably as the nitrate salts. The feed solution is acidified and sodium nitrite is added to the solution to adjust the valence of the plutonium to the +4 state. A chloride salt, preferably sodium chloride, is then added to the solution to induce formation of an anionic plutonium chloride complex. The anionic plutonium chloride complex and the thorium in solution are then separated by ion exchange on a strong base anion exchange column.

  20. Comparative behavior of plutonium and americium in the equatorial Pacific

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Noshkin, V.E.; Wong, K.M.; Jokela, T.A.; Brunk, J.L.; Eagle, R.J.

    1983-01-01

    Inventories of /sup 239 +240/Pu and /sup 241/Am greatly in excess of global fallout levels persist in the benthic environments of Bikini and Enewetak Atolls. The amount of /sup 239 +240/Pu mobilized to solution at the atolls can be predicted from a distribution coefficient K/sub d/ of 2.3 x 10/sup 5/ and the mean sediment concentrations. The mobilized /sup 239 +240/Pu has solute-like characteristics and different valence states coexist in solution - the largest fraction of the soluble plutonium is in an oxidized form (+V,VI). The adsorption of plutonium to sediments is not completely reversible because of changes that occur in the relative amounts of the mixed oxidation states in solution with time. Characteristics of /sup 239 +240/Pu described at one location may not necessarily describe its behavior elsewhere. The relative amounts of /sup 241/Am to /sup 239 +240/Pu may be altered in future years because of mobilization and radiological decay.

  1. PLUTONIUM LOADING CAPACITY OF REILLEX HPQ ANION EXCHANGE COLUMN - AFS-2 PLUTONIUM FLOWSHEET FOR MOX

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kyser, E.; King, W.; O'Rourke, P.

    2012-07-26

    Radioactive plutonium (Pu) anion exchange column experiments using scaled HB-Line designs were performed to investigate the dependence of column loading performance on the feed composition in the H-Canyon dissolution process for plutonium oxide (PuO{sub 2}) product shipped to the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). These loading experiments show that a representative feed solution containing {approx}5 g Pu/L can be loaded onto Reillex{trademark} HPQ resin from solutions containing 8 M total nitrate and 0.1 M KF provided that the F is complexed with Al to an [Al]/[F] molar ratio range of 1.5-2.0. Lower concentrations of total nitrate and [Al]/[F] molar ratios may still have acceptable performance but were not tested in this study. Loading and washing Pu losses should be relatively low (<1%) for resin loading of up to 60 g Pu/L. Loading above 60 g Pu/L resin is possible, but Pu wash losses will increase such that 10-20% of the additional Pu fed may not be retained by the resin as the resin loading approaches 80 g Pu/L resin.

  2. Global plutonium management: A security option

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sylvester, K.W.B.

    1998-12-31

    The US surplus plutonium disposition program was created to reduce the proliferation risk posed by the fissile material from thousands of retired nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy has decided to process its Put into a form as secure as Pu in civilian spent fuel. While implementation issues have been considered, a major one (Russian reciprocity) remains unresolved. Russia has made disposition action conditional on extracting the fuel value of its Pu but lacks the infrastructure to do so. Assistance in the construction of the required facilities would conflict with official US policy opposing the development of a Pu fuel cycle. The resulting stagnation provides impetus for a reevaluation of US nonproliferation objectives and Pu disposition options. A strategy for satisfying Russian fuel value concerns and reducing the proliferation risk posed by surplus weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) is proposed. The effectiveness of material alteration (e.g., isotopic, chemical, etc.{hor_ellipsis}) at reducing the desire, ability and opportunity for proliferation is assessed. Virtually all the security benefits attainable by material processing can be obtained by immobilizing Pu in large unit size/mass monoliths without a radiation barrier. Russia would be allowed to extract the Pu at a future date for use as fuel in a verifiable manner. Remote tracking capability, if proven feasible, would further improve safeguarding capability. As an alternate approach, the US could compensate Russia for its Pu, allowing it to be disposed of or processed elsewhere. A market based method for pricing Pu is proposed. Surplus Pu could represent access to nuclear fuel at a fixed price at a future date. This position can be replicated in the uranium market and priced using derivative theory. The proposed strategy attempts to meet nonproliferation objectives by recognizing technical limitations and satisfying political constraints.

  3. ARRAYS OF BOTTLES OF PLUTONIUM NITRATE SOLUTION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Margaret A. Marshall

    2012-09-01

    In October and November of 1981 thirteen approaches-to-critical were performed on a remote split table machine (RSTM) in the Critical Mass Laboratory of Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) in Richland, Washington using planar arrays of polyethylene bottles filled with plutonium (Pu) nitrate solution. Arrays of up to sixteen bottles were used to measure the critical number of bottles and critical array spacing with a tight fitting Plexiglas® reflector on all sides of the arrays except the top. Some experiments used Plexiglas shells fitted around each bottles to determine the effect of moderation on criticality. Each bottle contained approximately 2.4 L of Pu(NO3)4 solution with a Pu content of 105 g Pu/L and a free acid molarity H+ of 5.1. The plutonium was of low 240Pu (2.9 wt.%) content. These experiments were sponsored by Rockwell Hanford Operations because of the lack of experimental data on the criticality of arrays of bottles of Pu solution such as might be found in storage and handling at the Purex Facility at Hanford. The results of these experiments were used “to provide benchmark data to validate calculational codes used in criticality safety assessments of [the] plant configurations” (Ref. 1). Data for this evaluation were collected from the published report (Ref. 1), the approach to critical logbook, the experimenter’s logbook, and communication with the primary experimenter, B. Michael Durst. Of the 13 experiments preformed 10 were evaluated. One of the experiments was not evaluated because it had been thrown out by the experimenter, one was not evaluated because it was a repeat of another experiment and the third was not evaluated because it reported the critical number of bottles as being greater than 25. Seven of the thirteen evaluated experiments were determined to be acceptable benchmark experiments. A similar experiment using uranyl nitrate was benchmarked as U233-SOL-THERM-014.

  4. SUPPORTING SAFE STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM-BEARING MATERIALS THROUGH SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND SURVEILLANCE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dunn, K.; Chandler, G.; Gardner, C.; Louthan, M.; Mcclard, J.

    2009-11-10

    Reductions in the size of the U. S. nuclear weapons arsenal resulted in the need to store large quantities of plutonium-bearing metals and oxides for prolonged periods of time. To assure that the excess plutonium from the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites was stored in a safe and environmentally friendly manner the plutonium-bearing materials are stabilized and packaged according to well developed criteria published as a DOE Standard. The packaged materials are stored in secure facilities and regular surveillance activities are conducted to assure continuing package integrity. The stabilization, packaging, storage and surveillance requirements were developed through extensive science and engineering activities including those related to: plutonium-environment interactions and container pressurization, corrosion and stress corrosion cracking, plutonium-container material interactions, loss of sealing capability and changes in heat transfer characteristics. This paper summarizes some of those activities and outlines ongoing science and engineering programs that assure continued safe and secure storage of the plutonium-bearing metals and oxides.

  5. Plutonium assay for safeguards purposes: material heterogeneity and the application of calorimetry

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Welsh, T.I., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-07-01

    A variety of nuclear materials measurement techniques have been employed by the facility operator (WHC) and the IAEA during the two physical inventory verifications (PIVs) and at other items to determine and verify the quantities of plutonium present in the safeguarded inventory. Results of these analyses were statistically evaluated and are presented in this report.

  6. NNSA B-Roll: MOX Facility

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2010-09-01

    In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

  7. NNSA B-Roll: MOX Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2010-05-21

    In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

  8. Self-irradiation damage to the local structure of plutonium and plutonium intermetallics

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Booth, C. H.

    2014-01-01

    Self-irradiation damage to the local structure of plutoniumand plutonium intermetallics C. H. Booth, 1 Yu Jiang, 1 S.espe- cially in elemental plutonium. For instance, although

  9. Air transport of plutonium metal: content expansion initiative for the plutonium air transportable (PAT01) packaging

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Caviness, Michael L; Mann, Paul T

    2010-01-01

    The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has submitted an application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the air shipment of plutonium metal within the Plutonium Air Transportable (PAT-1) packaging. The PAT-1 packaging is currently authorized for the air transport of plutonium oxide in solid form only. The INMM presentation will provide a limited overview of the scope of the plutonium metal initiative and provide a status of the NNSA application to the NRC.

  10. Multi-generational stewardship of plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Nuclear Materials Technology Div.

    1997-10-01

    The post-cold war era has greatly enhanced the interest in the long-term stewardship of plutonium. The management of excess plutonium from proposed nuclear weapons dismantlement has been the subject of numerous intellectual discussions during the past several years. In this context, issues relevant to long-term management of all plutonium as a valuable energy resource are also being examined. While there are differing views about the future role of plutonium in the economy, there is a recognition of the environmental and health related problems and proliferation potentials of weapons-grade plutonium. The long-term management of plutonium as an energy resource will require a new strategy to maintain stewardship for many generations to come.

  11. Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Tobin, S. J.

    2010-01-01

    LBNL- Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent Fuel withSwinhoe. “Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent FuelS. Tobin, “Measurement of Plutonium in Spent Nuclear Fuel by

  12. US Releases Updated Plutonium Inventory Report | National Nuclear...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    details the current plutonium inventory of the U.S. Titled The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944-2009, the document serves as an update to Plutonium: the First 50 Years, which...

  13. New Gas Gun Helping Scientists Better Understand Plutonium Behavior

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hazi, A

    2005-09-20

    One of the most daunting scientific and engineering challenges today is ensuring the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear arsenal. To effectively meet that challenge, scientists need better data showing how plutonium, a key component of nuclear warheads, behaves under extreme pressures and temperatures. On July 8, 2003, Lawrence Livermore researchers performed the inaugural experiment of a 30-meter-long, two-stage gas gun designed to obtain those data. The results from a continuing stream of successful experiments on the gas gun are strengthening scientists' ability to ensure that the nation's nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable. The JASPER (Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research) Facility at the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Nevada Test Site (NTS) is home to the two-stage gas gun. In the gun's first test, an unqualified success, Livermore scientists fired a projectile weighing 28.6 grams and traveling about 5.21 kilometers per second when it impacted an extremely small (about 30-gram) plutonium target. This experiment marked the culmination of years of effort in facility construction, gun installation, system integration, design reviews, and federal authorizations required to bring the experimental facility online. Ongoing experiments have drawn enthusiastic praise from throughout DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the scientific community. NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks said, ''Our national laboratories now have at their disposal a valuable asset that enhances our due diligence to certify the nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear weapons testing.''

  14. Calculating Plutonium and Praseodymium Structural Transformations...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    transition of praseodymium. As plutonium is heated it undergoes six complex crystalline phase transitions-the most of any element at ambient pressure. Explaining these six...

  15. EA-0841: Import of Russian Plutonium-238

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of a proposal to purchase plutonium-238 from the Russian Federation (Russia) for use in the Nation's space program.

  16. Plutonium Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administrati...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    irradiating it in fast reactors operating under certain nonproliferation conditions. Irradiation in fast reactors is a technically credible approach for Russian plutonium...

  17. TECHNIQUES FOR MONITORING PLUTONIUM IN THE ENVIRONMENT

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nero Jr., A.V.

    2011-01-01

    NTIS). "Proceedings of the Rocky Flats Symposium on SafetyTotal Inventories from Rocky Flats," Health Physics 30, 209-Fraction of Plutonium at Rocky Flats," Health Physics ~,

  18. Independent Activity Report, Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    May 2012 Criticality Safety Information Meeting for the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant HIAR-RL-2012-05-14 This Independent Activity Report documents an oversight activity...

  19. Comparative repository performance of plutonium forms - initial...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    IL (United States) Country of Publication: United States Language: English Subject: 05 NUCLEAR FUELS; HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES; RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL; PLUTONIUM; WASTE...

  20. Hanford Site Workers Meet Challenging Performance Goal at Plutonium...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    at the Hanford site's Plutonium Finishing Plant are surpassing goals for removing hazardous tanks once used in the plutonium production process. EM's Richland Operations Office...

  1. Supplement Analysis For Disposal of Certain Rocky Flats Plutonium...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    discuss the potential impacts from different proposed alternatives for the storage and disposition of surplus plutonium and waste containing surplus plutonium. These EISs...

  2. Pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from an electrolyte salt

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Mullins, L.J.; Christensen, D.C.

    1982-09-20

    A pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from a plutonium-bearing salt is disclosed. The process is particularly useful in the recovery of plutonium for electrolyte salts which are left over from the electrorefining of plutonium. In accordance with the process, the plutonium-bearing salt is melted and mixed with metallic calcium. The calcium reduces ionized plutonium in the salt to plutonium metal, and also causes metallic plutonium in the salt, which is typically present as finely dispersed metallic shot, to coalesce. The reduced and coalesced plutonium separates out on the bottom of the reaction vessel as a separate metallic phase which is readily separable from the overlying salt upon cooling of the mixture. Yields of plutonium are typically on the order of 95%. The stripped salt is virtually free of plutonium and may be discarded to low-level waste storage.

  3. Pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from an electrolyte salt

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Mullins, Lawrence J. (Los Alamos, NM); Christensen, Dana C. (Los Alamos, NM)

    1984-01-01

    A pyrochemical process for extracting plutonium from a plutonium-bearing salt is disclosed. The process is particularly useful in the recovery of plutonium from electrolyte salts which are left over from the electrorefining of plutonium. In accordance with the process, the plutonium-bearing salt is melted and mixed with metallic calcium. The calcium reduces ionized plutonium in the salt to plutonium metal, and also causes metallic plutonium in the salt, which is typically present as finely dispersed metallic shot, to coalesce. The reduced and coalesced plutonium separates out on the bottom of the reaction vessel as a separate metallic phase which is readily separable from the overlying salt upon cooling of the mixture. Yields of plutonium are typically on the order of 95%. The stripped salt is virtually free of plutonium and may be discarded to low-level waste storage.

  4. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    N /A

    1999-11-19

    In December 1996, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Storage and Disposition PEIS)'' (DOE 1996a). That PEIS analyzes the potential environmental consequences of alternative strategies for the long-term storage of weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the disposition of weapons-usable plutonium that has been or may be declared surplus to national security needs. The Record of Decision (ROD) for the ''Storage and Disposition PEIS'', issued on January 14, 1997 (DOE 1997a), outlines DOE's decision to pursue an approach to plutonium disposition that would make surplus weapons-usable plutonium inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use. DOE's disposition strategy, consistent with the Preferred Alternative analyzed in the ''Storage and Disposition PEIS'', allows for both the immobilization of some (and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium and use of some of the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of both the immobilized plutonium and the MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a potential geologic repository.

  5. Characterization of past and present solid waste streams from the plutonium finishing plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duncan, D.R.; Mayancsik, B.A. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)] [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); Pottmeyer, J.A.; Vejvoda, E.J.; Reddick, J.A.; Sheldon, K.M.; Weyns, M.I. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, Kennewick, WA (United States)] [Los Alamos Technical Associates, Kennewick, WA (United States)

    1993-02-01

    During the next two decades the transuranic (TRU) wastes now stored in the burial trenches and storage facilities at the Hanford Site are to be retrieved, processed at the Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility, and shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal. Over 50% of the TRU waste to be retrieved for shipment to the WIPP has been generated at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), also known as the Plutonium Processing and Storage Facility and Z Plant. The purpose of this report is to characterize the radioactive solid wastes generated by the PFP since its construction in 1947 using process knowledge, existing records, and history-obtained from interviews. The PFP is currently operated by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for the US Department of Energy (DOE).

  6. REMOVAL OF LEGACY PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FROM SWEDEN

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dunn, Kerry A.; Bellamy, J. Steve; Chandler, Greg T.; Iyer, Natraj C.; Koenig, Rich E.; Leduc, D.; Hackney, B.; Leduc, Dan R.

    2013-08-18

    U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) recently removed legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in collaboration with AB SVAFO, Sweden. This paper details the activities undertaken through the U.S. receiving site (Savannah River Site (SRS)) to support the characterization, stabilization, packaging and removal of legacy plutonium materials from Sweden in 2012. This effort was undertaken as part of GTRI’s Gap Materials Program and culminated with the successful removal of plutonium from Sweden as announced at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. The removal and shipment of plutonium materials to the United States was the first of its kind under NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The Environmental Assessment for the U.S. receipt of gap plutonium material was approved in May 2010. Since then, the multi-year process yielded many first time accomplishments associated with plutonium packaging and transport activities including the application of the of DOE-STD-3013 stabilization requirements to treat plutonium materials outside the U.S., the development of an acceptance criteria for receipt of plutonium from a foreign country, the development and application of a versatile process flow sheet for the packaging of legacy plutonium materials, the identification of a plutonium container configuration, the first international certificate validation of the 9975 shipping package and the first intercontinental shipment using the 9975 shipping package. This paper will detail the technical considerations in developing the packaging process flow sheet, defining the key elements of the flow sheet and its implementation, determining the criteria used in the selection of the transport package, developing the technical basis for the package certificate amendment and the reviews with multiple licensing authorities and most importantly integrating the technical activities with the Swedish partners.

  7. Survey of Worldwide Light Water Reactor Experience with Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fisher, S.E.

    1999-02-01

    The US and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have recently declared quantities of weapons materials, including weapons-grade (WG) plutonium, excess to strategic requirements. One of the leading candidates for the disposition of excess WG plutonium is irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) as mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. A description of the MOX fuel fabrication techniques in worldwide use is presented. A comprehensive examination of the domestic MOX experience in US reactors obtained during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s is also presented. This experience is described by manufacturer and is also categorized by the reactor facility that irradiated the MOX fuel. A limited summary of the international experience with MOX fuels is also presented. A review of MOX fuel and its performance is conducted in view of the special considerations associated with the disposition of WG plutonium. Based on the available information, it appears that adoption of foreign commercial MOX technology from one of the successful MOX fuel vendors will minimize the technical risks to the overall mission. The conclusion is made that the existing MOX fuel experience base suggests that disposition of excess weapons plutonium through irradiation in LWRs is a technically attractive option.

  8. A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lu, M.S.; Allentuck, J.

    1998-08-01

    It is the announced policy of the United States to make fissile material removed from its nuclear weapons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of this material is plutonium in the form of pits. The application of traditional IAEA safeguards would reveal Restricted Data to unauthorized persons which is prohibited by US law and international treaties. Prior to the availability of a facility for the conversion of the plutonium in the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term solution to the problem is foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to applying IAEA safeguards while preserving the necessary degree of confidentiality is required. This paper identifies such an approach. It presents in detail the form of the US declaration; the safeguards objectives which are met; inspection techniques which are utilized and the conclusion which the IAEA could reach concerning the contents of each item and the aggregate of all items. The approach would reveal the number of containers and the aggregate mass of plutonium in a set of n containers presented to the IAEA for verification while protecting data of the isotopic composition and plutonium mass of individual components. The suggested approach provides for traceability from the time the containers are sealed until the conversion of the plutonium to a non-sensitive form.

  9. Characterization of plutonium-bearing wastes by chemical analysis and analytical electron microscopy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Behrens, R.G.; Buck, E.C.; Dietz, N.L.; Bates, J.K.; Van Deventer, E.; Chaiko, D.J.

    1995-09-01

    This report summarizes the results of characterization studies of plutonium-bearing wastes produced at the US Department of Energy weapons production facilities. Several different solid wastes were characterized, including incinerator ash and ash heels from Rocky Flats Plant and Los Alamos National Laboratory; sand, stag, and crucible waste from Hanford; and LECO crucibles from the Savannah River Site. These materials were characterized by chemical analysis and analytical electron microscopy. The results showed the presence of discrete PuO{sub 2}PuO{sub 2{minus}x}, and Pu{sub 4}O{sub 7} phases, of about 1{mu}m or less in size, in all of the samples examined. In addition, a number of amorphous phases were present that contained plutonium. In all the ash and ash heel samples examined, plutonium phases were found that were completely surrounded by silicate matrices. Consequently, to achieve optimum plutonium recovery in any chemical extraction process, extraction would have to be coupled with ultrafine grinding to average particle sizes of less than 1 {mu}m to liberate the plutonium from the surrounding inert matrix.

  10. Health physics manual of good practices for the prompt detection of airborne plutonium in the workplace

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1988-07-01

    This manual provides guidance to US Department of Energy (DOE) facilities on the prompt detection of airborne plutonium in the workplace. Information is first given to aid in detection systems that will function effectively in various workplaces. Steps in designing a system are covered: its general requirements, the plotting of workplace sources of plutonium, and methods of determining workplace airflow patterns. Guidance is provided on the proper numbers and locations of probe sites, the orientation of probes for representative sampling, and the mixture of stationary and portable probes. Recommendations for delivery in sampling systems include examination of particle loss and self-absorption problems, methods of eliminating air leakage in the system, and optimization of decontamination capabilities. System flow rate, requirements in a collection medium, burial loss and pressure drop, and prudent frequency of renewing the collection medium are among air sampling considerations covered. After a discussion of controlling airflow and of vacuum sources and system backups, the checkpoints to ensure system reliability are listed. The manual then discusses instrument specifications that provide correct airborne plutonium concentrations and reliably activate alarms. Focusing on the interrelationship of all components, essential factors in instrument reliability are addressed: the regulatory lower limit of detection and performance specifications of detectors and filters, maintenance and calibration requirements, and features of commonly used plutonium air-sampling instruments. Finally, the manual advises on establishing a documentation program to archive and evaluate the performance of a plutonium air-sampling program.

  11. Plutonium metal exchange program : current status and statistical analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tandon, L.; Eglin, J. L.; Michalak, S. E.; Picard, R. R.; Temer, D. J.

    2004-01-01

    The Rocky Flats Plutonium (Pu) Metal Sample Exchange program was conducted to insure the quality and intercomparability of measurements such as Pu assay, Pu isotopics, and impurity analyses. The Rocky Flats program was discontinued in 1989 after more than 30 years. In 2001, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) reestablished the Pu Metal Exchange program. In addition to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, six Department of Energy (DOE) facilities Argonne East, Argonne West, Livermore, Los Alamos, New Brunswick Laboratory, and Savannah River are currently participating in the program. Plutonium metal samples are prepared and distributed to the sites for destructive measurements to determine elemental concentration, isotopic abundance, and both metallic and nonmetallic impurity levels. The program provides independent verification of analytical measurement capabilies for each participating facility and allows problems in analytical methods to be identified. The current status of the program will be discussed with emphasis on the unique statistical analysis and modeling of the data developed for the program. The discussion includes the definition of the consensus values for each analyte (in the presence and absence of anomalous values and/or censored values), and interesting features of the data and the results.

  12. EIS-0283: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium.

  13. Laboratory-scale evaluations of alternative plutonium precipitation methods

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Martella, L.L.; Saba, M.T.; Campbell, G.K.

    1984-02-08

    Plutonium(III), (IV), and (VI) carbonate; plutonium(III) fluoride; plutonium(III) and (IV) oxalate; and plutonium(IV) and (VI) hydroxide precipitation methods were evaluated for conversion of plutonium nitrate anion-exchange eluate to a solid, and compared with the current plutonium peroxide precipitation method used at Rocky Flats. Plutonium(III) and (IV) oxalate, plutonium(III) fluoride, and plutonium(IV) hydroxide precipitations were the most effective of the alternative conversion methods tested because of the larger particle-size formation, faster filtration rates, and the low plutonium loss to the filtrate. These were found to be as efficient as, and in some cases more efficient than, the peroxide method. 18 references, 14 figures, 3 tables.

  14. Structural Characterization of and Plutonium Sorption on Mesoporous and Nanoparticulate Ferrihydrite

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brogan, Luna Kestrel Schwaiger

    2012-01-01

    2.2.1 Plutonium Redox Chemistry . . . . . . . . .2.5 Plutonium Measurement with Liquid Scintillation CountingChemistry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9.4 Plutonium Uptake

  15. Quantifying structural damage from self-irradiation in a plutonium superconductor

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    2006-01-01

    was presented as part of Plutonium Futures - The Science: Atopical Confer- ence on Plutonium and Actinide, Asilomar,in loading one of the plutonium samples. This work was

  16. Interstitial incorporation of plutonium into a low-dimensional potassium borate

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wang, Shuao

    2014-01-01

    the disposal of weapons plutonium. J. Mat. Res. 1995, 10,C. ; Scheinost, A. Plutonium incorporation in phosphate andfor the immobilization of plutonium and “minor” actinides.

  17. From Yellow to Black: Dramatic Changes between Cerium(IV) and Plutonium(IV) Molybdates

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cross, Justin N.

    2014-01-01

    molybdate • cerium • plutonium • optical energy spectrum •is particularly common with plutonium where Ce(IV) has beenand the formation of plutonium molybdates has been suggested

  18. Reaction of Plutonium(VI) with the Manganese-Substituted Iron Oxide Mineral Goethite

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hu, Yung-Jin Hu

    2011-01-01

    Plutonium(VI) Sorption on Manganese-SubstitutedX-ray Beam-Induced Chemistry on Plutonium Sorbed on Variousof Plutonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159 v E Anion

  19. Molecular Interactions of Plutonium(VI) with Synthetic Manganese-Substituted Goethite

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hu, Yung-Jin

    2011-01-01

    E. , Thesis, Reactions of Plutonium(VI) with the Iron Oxideof Uranium, Neptunium, Plutonium, Americium and Technetium;Molecular Interactions of Plutonium(VI) with Synthetic

  20. Excess Plutonium: Weapons Legacy or National Asset?

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Klipa, G.; Boeke, S.; Hottel, R.

    2002-02-27

    The Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative was established in January, 2000, to accelerate the work of achieving integration and cutting long-term costs associated with the management of nuclear materials. As part of that initiative, the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (EM), has established Nuclear Material Management Groups for the management of excess nuclear materials. As one of these groups, the Plutonium Material Management Group (PMMG) has been chartered to serve as DOE's complex wide resource and point of contact for technical coordination and program planning support in the safe and efficient disposition of the nations excess Plutonium 239. This paper will explain the mission, goals, and objectives of the PMMG. In addition, the paper will provide a broad overview of the status of the plutonium inventories throughout the DOE complex. The DOE currently manages approximately 99.5 MT of plutonium isotopes. Details of the various categories of plutonium, from material designated for national security needs through material that has been declared excess, will be explained. For the plutonium that has been declared excess, the various pathways to disposition (including reuse, recycling, sale, transfer, treatment, consumption, and disposal) will be discussed. At this time 52.5 MT of plutonium has been declared excess and the method of disposition for that material is the subject of study and evaluation within DOE. The role of the PMMG in those evaluations will be outlined.

  1. PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT: UNITED STATES PLUTONIUM CONSOLIDATION AND DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Koenig, R.; Davies, S.

    2009-06-01

    Following the end of the Cold War, the United States identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium and larger quantities of enriched uranium that are permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) also began shutting down, stabilizing, and removing inventories from production facilities that were no longer needed to support weapons programs and non-weapons activities. The storage of 'Category I' nuclear materials at Rocky Flats, Sandia National Laboratories, and several smaller sites has been terminated to reduce costs and safeguards risks. De-inventory continues at the Hanford site and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Consolidation of inventories works in concert with the permanent disposition of excess inventories, including several tonnes of plutonium that have already been disposed to waste repositories and the preparation for transfers to the planned Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (for the bulk of the excess plutonium) and alternative disposition methods for material that cannot be used readily in the MOX fuel cycle. This report describes status of plutonium consolidation and disposition activities and their impacts on continuing operations, particularly at the Savannah River Site.

  2. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 4. Plutonium dispositioning in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sterbentz, J.W.; Olsen, C.S.; Sinha, U.P.

    1993-06-01

    This study is in response to a request by the Reactor Panel Subcommittee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to evaluate the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing conventional or advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs and in low temperature/pressure LWR designs that might be developed for plutonium disposal. Three plutonium-based fuel forms (oxides, aluminum metallics, and carbides) are evaluated for neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and material and compatibility issues. For the carbides, only the fabrication technologies are addressed. Viable plutonium oxide fuels for conventional or advanced LWRs include plutonium-zirconium-calcium oxide (PuO{sub 2}-ZrO{sub 2}-CaO) with the addition of thorium oxide (ThO{sub 2}) or a burnable poison such as erbium oxide (Er{sub 2}O{sub 3}) or europium oxide (Eu{sub 2}O{sub 3}) to achieve acceptable neutronic performance. Thorium will breed fissile uranium that may be unacceptable from a proliferation standpoint. Fabrication of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuels is well established; however, fabrication of plutonium-based oxide fuels will require further development. Viable aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels for a low temperature/pressure LWR include plutonium aluminide in an aluminum matrix (PuAl{sub 4}-Al) with the addition of a burnable poison such as erbium (Er) or europium (Eu). Fabrication of low-enriched plutonium in aluminum-plutonium metallic fuel rods was initially established 30 years ago and will require development to recapture and adapt the technology to meet current environmental and safety regulations. Fabrication of high-enriched uranium plate fuel by the picture-frame process is a well established process, but the use of plutonium would require the process to be upgraded in the United States to conform with current regulations and minimize the waste streams.

  3. Direct vitrification of plutonium-containing materials (PCM`s) with the glass material oxidation and dissolution system (GMODS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Forsberg, C.W. Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Rudolph, J.C.; Haas, P.A.; Malling, G.F.; Elam, K.; Ott, L.

    1995-10-30

    The end of the cold war has resulted in excess PCMs from nuclear weapons and associated production facilities. Consequently, the US government has undertaken studies to determine how best to manage and dispose of this excess material. The issues include (a) ensurance of domestic health, environment, and safety in handling, storage, and disposition, (b) international arms control agreements with Russia and other countries, and (c) economics. One major set of options is to convert the PCMs into glass for storage or disposal. The chemically inert characteristics of glasses make them a desirable chemical form for storage or disposal of radioactive materials. A glass may contain only plutonium, or it may contain plutonium along with other radioactive materials and nonradioactive materials. GMODS is a new process for the direct conversion of PCMs (i.e., plutonium metal, scrap, and residues) to glass. The plutonium content of these materials varies from a fraction of a percent to pure plutonium. GMODS has the capability to also convert other metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass, destroy organics, and convert chloride-containing materials into a low-chloride glass and a secondary clean chloride salt strewn. This report is the initial study of GMODS for vitrification of PCMs as input to ongoing studies of plutonium management options. Several tasks were completed: initial analysis of process thermodynamics, initial flowsheet analysis, identification of equipment options, proof-of-principle experiments, and identification of uncertainties.

  4. Plutonium

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4)9 Federal Register / Vol. 76,EXAMPLE 4 ***

  5. Mobility Apps

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Weissman, Dana; Villalobos, Monica

    2012-01-01

    third conference, “Sustainable Mobility & Cities: MarryingSUSTAINABLE CITIES CONFERENCE SERIES: URBAN HOUSING, ECONOMY, AND TRANSIT Mobility

  6. TECHNIQUES FOR MONITORING PLUTONIUM IN THE ENVIRONMENT

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nero Jr., A.V.

    2011-01-01

    150 day decay time, except for LMFBR, which assumes 30 days.> N") Plutonium from an LMFBR C'J II I I N") CD C".J c:'-l

  7. Guidelines for international plutonium management: Overview and implications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bryson, M.C. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Fitzgerald, C.P.; Kincaid, C. [Dept. of Energy, Washington, DC (United States)

    1998-12-31

    In September, 1997, nine of the world`s plutonium-using countries agreed to a set of guidelines for international plutonium management, with acceptances to be submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency on December 1. Following three years of discussion, the guidelines provide a unified package of accepted rules for the storage, handling, and transportation of civil plutonium as well as military plutonium that has been declared as no longer required for defense purposes. New requirements include a formal declaration of national plutonium strategies, which will recognize the environmental, economic, and proliferation concerns and the consequent importance of balancing plutonium supply and demand. Nations will also make annual declaration of their non-military stockpiles of unirradiated plutonium, together with estimates of the plutonium content in spent reactor fuel. These guidelines represent the first formally accepted recognition of the need for plutonium management of this scope and could thus provide a partial basis for future monitoring and policy regimes.

  8. Development of plutonium aerosol fractionation system 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mekala, Malla R.

    1993-01-01

    DEVELOPMENT OF A PLUTONIUM AEROSOL FRACTIONATION SYSTEM A Thesis by MALLA R. MEKALA Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE August... 1993 Major Subject: Mechanical Engineering DEVELOPMENT OP A PLUTONIUM AEROSOL FRACTIONATION SYSTEM A Thesis by MALLA R. MEKALA Approved as to style and content by: A. R. McFarland (Chair of Committee) N. K. Anand (Mer toer) (', & C. B...

  9. Plutonium: The first 50 years. United States plutonium production, acquisition, and utilization from 1944 through 1994

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    1996-02-01

    The report contains important newly declassified information regarding the US production, acquisition, and removals of plutonium. This new information, when combined with previously declassified data, has allowed the DOE to issue, for the first time, a truly comprehensive report on the total DOE plutonium inventory. At the December 7, 1993, Openness Press Conference, the DOE declassified the plutonium inventories at eight locations totaling 33.5 metric tons (MT). This report declassifies the remainder of the DOE plutonium inventory. Newly declassified in this report is the quantity of plutonium at the Pantex Site, near Amarillo, Texas, and in the US nuclear weapons stockpile of 66.1 MT, which, when added to the previously released inventory of 33.5 MT, yields a total plutonium inventory of 99.5 MT. This report will document the sources which built up the plutonium inventory as well as the transactions which have removed plutonium from that inventory. This report identifies four sources that add plutonium to the DOE/DoD inventory, and seven types of transactions which remove plutonium from the DOE/DoD inventory. This report also discusses the nuclear material control and accountability system which records all nuclear material transactions, compares records with inventory and calculates material balances, and analyzes differences to verify that nuclear materials are in quantities as reported. The DOE believes that this report will aid in discussions in plutonium storage, safety, and security with stakeholders as well as encourage other nations to declassify and release similar data. These data will also be available for formulating policies with respect to disposition of excess nuclear materials. The information in this report is based on the evaluation of available records. The information contained in this report may be updated or revised in the future should additional or more detailed data become available.

  10. Multiconfigurational nature of 5f orbitals in uranium and plutonium intermetallics

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Booth, C. H.

    2014-01-01

    Orbitals in Uranium and Plutonium Intermetallics C. H. BoothAbstract: Uranium and plutonium’s 5f electrons are tenuouslyanomalous properties of ?-plutonium. Nature 446(7135):513.

  11. Benchmark Evaluation of Plutonium Hemispheres Reflected by Steel and Oil

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    John Darrell Bess

    2008-06-01

    During the period from June 1967 through September 1969 a series of critical experiments was performed at the Rocky Flats Critical Mass Laboratory with spherical and hemispherical plutonium assemblies as nested hemishells as part of a Nuclear Safety Facility Experimental Program to evaluate operational safety margins for the Rocky Flats Plant. These assemblies were both bare and fully or partially oil-reflected. Many of these experiments were subcritical with an extrapolation to critical configurations or critical at a particular oil height. Existing records reveal that 167 experiments were performed over the course of 28 months. Unfortunately, much of the data was not recorded. A reevaluation of the experiments had been summarized in a report for future experimental and computational analyses. This report examines only fifteen partially oil-reflected hemispherical assemblies. Fourteen of these assemblies also had close-fitting stainless-steel hemishell reflectors, used to determine the effective critical reflector height of oil with varying steel-reflector thickness. The experiments and their uncertainty in keff values were evaluated to determine their potential as valid criticality benchmark experiments of plutonium.

  12. Options for the Immobilisation of UK Civil Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Scales, C.R.; Maddrell, E.R.; Harrison, M.T. [Nexia Solutions Ltd., Cumbria, CA (United Kingdom)

    2007-07-01

    As a result of the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel the UK expects to accumulate in excess of 100 tonnes of separated plutonium. There is currently no long term strategy for the management of this material. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) has commissioned a programme with Nexia Solutions to examine the alternatives for the disposition of this material and subsequently present the NDA with technically underpinned option(s) for plutonium disposition. The overall programme comprises two main options, re-use as fuel in reactors and immobilisation in the event of being declared surplus to requirements and is targeted specifically at the requirements of the UK. The disposition programme will take account of the UK reactor portfolio, and the quantity that may require immobilisation will depend on future UK nuclear strategy. Immobilisation options are being reviewed in the light that a proportion of the stockpile could be declared waste. The options for immobilisation are being assessed in the expectation that any immobilised product would be destined for an as yet undefined repository, preceded by a period of storage in secure facilities. Potential products are being developed to be compatible with a wide range of disposal scenarios. (authors)

  13. Life cycle costs for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition option

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, K.A.

    1999-10-01

    Projected constant dollar life cycle cost (LCC) estimates are presented for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition program being managed by the US Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD). The scope of the LCC estimate includes: design, construction, licensing, operation, and deactivation of a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility (FFF) that will be used to purify and convert weapons-derived plutonium oxides to MOX fuel pellets and fabricate MOX fuel bundles for use in commercial pressurized-water reactors (PWRs); fuel qualification activities and modification of facilities required for manufacture of lead assemblies that will be used to qualify and license this MOX fuel; and modification, licensing, and operation of commercial PWRs to allow irradiation of a partial core of MOX fuel in combination with low-enriched uranium fuel. The baseline cost elements used for this document are the same as those used for examination of the preferred sites described in the site-specific final environmental impact statement and in the DOE Record of Decision that will follow in late 1999. Cost data are separated by facilities, government accounting categories, contract phases, and expenditures anticipated by the various organizations who will participate in the program over a 20-year period. Total LCCs to DOE/MD are projected at approximately $1.4 billion for a 33-MT plutonium disposition mission.

  14. U.S. Plutonium "Pit" Production: Additional Facilities, Production

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Research should address key practical concerns in order to retain high confidence, lower costs where possible, and increase overall technical quality in the program, morale,...

  15. Good Practices for Ocupational Radiological Protection in Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum12,Executive CompensationEnergyGet Current:5 Department of Energy

  16. Fire Protection in Plutonium Facilities | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum12, 2015Executive Order14,EnergyFinancing andfor the StorageRelatedProtection

  17. Hanford, WA Selected as Plutonium Production Facility | National Nuclear

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration would likeUniverse (Journalvivo Low-Dose Lowï‚—34OctoberK West60 Revision 12.iB -Department

  18. Evaluation of Possible Surrogates for Validation of the Oxidation Furnace for the Plutonium Disposition Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duncan, A.

    2007-12-31

    The Plutonium Disposition project (PuD) is considering an alternative furnace design for direct metal oxidation (DMO) of plutonium metal to use as a feed for potential disposition routes. The proposed design will use a retort to oxidize the feed at temperatures up to 500 C. The atmosphere will be controlled using a metered mixture of oxygen, helium and argon to control the oxidation at approximately 400 torr. Since plutonium melts at 664 C, and may potentially react with retort material to form a lower melting point eutectic, the oxidation process will be controlled by metering the flow of oxygen to ensure that the bulk temperature of the material does not exceed this temperature. A batch processing time of <24 hours is desirable to meet anticipated furnace throughput requirements. The design project includes demonstration of concept in a small-scale demonstration test (i.e., small scale) and validation of design in a full-scale test. These tests are recommended to be performed using Pu surrogates due to challenges in consideration of the nature of plutonium and operational constraints required when handling large quantities of accountable material. The potential for spreading contamination and exposing workers to harmful levels of cumulative radioactive dose are motivation to utilize non-radioactive surrogates. Once the design is demonstrated and optimized, implementation would take place in a facility designed to accommodate these constraints. Until then, the use of surrogates would be a safer, less expensive option for the validation phase of the project. This report examines the potential for use of surrogates in the demonstration and validation of the DMO furnace for PuD. This report provides a compilation of the technical information and process requirements for the conversion of plutonium metal to oxide by burning in dry environments. Several potential surrogates were evaluated by various criteria in order to select a suitable candidate for large scale demonstration. First, the structure of the plutonium metal/oxide interface was compared to potential surrogates. Second the data for plutonium oxidation kinetics were reviewed and rates for oxidation were compared with surrogates. The criteria used as a basis for recommendation was selected in order to provide a reasonable oxidation rate during the validation phase. Several reference documents were reviewed and used to compile the information in this report. Since oxidation of large monolithic pieces of plutonium in 75% oxygen is the preferable oxidizing atmosphere for the intended process, this report does not focus on the oxidation of powders, but focuses instead on larger samples in flowing gas.

  19. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States). Fission Energy and Systems Safety Program

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient.

  20. Stabilization of Plutonium in Subsurface Environments via Microbial Reduction and Biofilm Formation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hakim Boukhalfa; Gary A. Icopini; Sean D. Reilly; Mary P. Neu

    2007-04-19

    Plutonium has a long half-life (2.4 x 104 years) and is of concern because of its chemical and radiological toxicity, high-energy alpha radioactive decay. A full understanding of its speciation and interactions with environmental processes is required in order to predict, contain, or remediate contaminated sites. Under aerobic conditions Pu is sparingly soluble, existing primarily in its tetravalent oxidation state. To the extent that pentavalent and hexavalent complexes and small colloidal species form they will increase the solubility and resultant mobility from contamination sources. There is evidence that in both marine environments and brines substantial fractions of the plutonium in solution is present as hexavalent plutonyl, PuO2 2+.

  1. The design and evaluation of an international plutonium storage system

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Bae, Eugene

    2001-01-01

    To address the proliferation risk of separated plutonium, a technical and institutional design of an international plutonium storage system (IPSS) is presented. The IPSS is evaluated from two perspectives: its ability to ...

  2. Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    N /A

    1999-05-14

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering & Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone & Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested services. The procurement process included the environmental review specified in DOE's NEPA regulations in 10 CFR 1021.216. The six reactors selected are Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in South Carolina McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in North Carolina, and North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 in Virginia. The Supplement describes the potential environmental impacts of using MOX fuel in these six specific reactors named in the DCS proposal as well as other program changes made since the SPD Draft EIS was published.

  3. Elastic and Mechanical Properties of Plutonium and Plutonium Alloys Tarik A. Saleh, Adam M. Farrow, Franz J. Friebert, Albert Migliori, Jeremy N. Mitchell, Michael E. Bange

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Elastic and Mechanical Properties of Plutonium and Plutonium Alloys Tarik A. Saleh, Adam M. Farrow and reactivity of plutonium on mechanical properties is of paramount importance to plutonium research of plutonium and its alloys, focusing on changing properties as a function of homogenization and age

  4. U.S. and Russia Sign Plutonium Disposition Agreement | National...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Plutonium Disposition Agreement | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation...

  5. Characterization of past and present solid waste streams from the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pottmeyer, J.A.; Weyns, M.I.; Lorenzo, D.S.; Vejvoda, E.J. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc., NM (US); Duncan, D.R. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (US)

    1993-04-01

    During the next two decades the transuranic wastes, now stored in the burial trenches and storage facilities at the Hanford Site, are to be retrieved, processed at the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility, and shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal. Over 7% of the transuranic waste to be retrieved for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant has been generated at the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant. The purpose of this report is to characterize the radioactive solid wastes generated by PUREX using process knowledge, existing records, and oral history interviews. The PUREX Plant is currently operated by the Westinghouse Hanford Company for the US Department of Energy and is now in standby status while being prepared for permanent shutdown. The PUREX Plant is a collection of facilities that has been used primarily to separate plutonium for nuclear weapons from spent fuel that had been irradiated in the Hanford Site`s defense reactors. Originally designed to reprocess aluminum-clad uranium fuel, the plant was modified to reprocess zirconium alloy clad fuel elements from the Hanford Site`s N Reactor. PUREX has provided plutonium for research reactor development, safety programs, and defense. In addition, the PUREX was used to recover slightly enriched uranium for recycling into fuel for use in reactors that generate electricity and plutonium. Section 2.0 provides further details of the PUREX`s physical plant and its operations. The PUREX Plant functions that generate solid waste are as follows: processing operations, laboratory analyses and supporting activities. The types and estimated quantities of waste resulting from these activities are discussed in detail.

  6. Standard test method for plutonium assay by plutonium (III) diode array spectrophotometry

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2002-01-01

    1.1 This test method describes the determination of total plutonium as plutonium(III) in nitrate and chloride solutions. The technique is applicable to solutions of plutonium dioxide powders and pellets (Test Methods C 697), nuclear grade mixed oxides (Test Methods C 698), plutonium metal (Test Methods C 758), and plutonium nitrate solutions (Test Methods C 759). Solid samples are dissolved using the appropriate dissolution techniques described in Practice C 1168. The use of this technique for other plutonium-bearing materials has been reported (1-5), but final determination of applicability must be made by the user. The applicable concentration range for plutonium sample solutions is 10–200 g Pu/L. 1.2 The values stated in SI units are to be regarded as standard. No other units of measurement are included in this standard. 1.3 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropria...

  7. Decontamination and decommissioning assessment for the Waste Incineration Facility (Building 232-Z) Hanford Site, [Hanford], WA

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dean, L.N. [Advanced Sciences, Inc., (United States)

    1994-02-01

    Building 232-Z is an element of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site. From 1961 until 1972, plutonium-bearing combustible materials were incinerated in the building. Between 1972 and 1983, following shutdown of the incinerator, the facility was used for waste segregation activities. The facility was placed in retired inactive status in 1984 and classified as a Limited Control Facility pursuant to DOE Order 5480.5, Safety of Nuclear Facilities, and 6430.1A, General Design Criteria. The current plutonium inventory within the building is estimated to be approximately 848 grams, the majority of which is retained within the process hood ventilation system. As a contaminated retired facility, Building 232-Z is included in the DOE Surplus Facility Management Program. The objective of this Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) assessment is to remove Building 232-Z, thereby elmininating the radiological and environmental hazards associated with the plutonium inventory within the structure. The steps to accomplish the plan objectives are: (1) identifying the locations of the most significant amounts of plutonium, (2) removing residual plutonium, (3) removing and decontaminating remaining building equipment, (4) dismantling the remaining structure, and (5) closing out the project.

  8. Calculated Phonon Spectra of Plutonium at High Temperatures

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Savrasov, Sergej Y.

    Calculated Phonon Spectra of Plutonium at High Temperatures X. Dai,1 S. Y. Savrasov,2 * G. Kotliar dynamical proper- ties of plutonium using an electronic structure method, which incorporates correlation anharmonic and can be stabilized at high temperatures by its phonon entropy. Plutonium (Pu) is a material

  9. Atomic Scale Mechanism of Plutonium Corrosion Steven D. Conradson,1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Atomic Scale Mechanism of Plutonium Corrosion Steven D. Conradson,1 Alison L. Costello,1 Francisco Estudios Superiores, Merida, Yucatan, Mexico conradson@lanl.gov INTRODUCTION The reaction of plutonium (Pu chemistry, nuclear forensics, and other areas of plutonium science and technology. The current model

  10. Excess plutonium disposition using ALWR technology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Phillips, A.; Buckner, M.R.; Radder, J.A.; Angelos, J.G.; Inhaber, H.

    1993-02-01

    The Office of Nuclear Energy of the Department of Energy chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force in August 1992. The Task Force was created to assess the range of practicable means of disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. Within the Task Force, working groups were formed to consider: (1) storage, (2) disposal,and(3) fission options for this disposition,and a separate group to evaluate nonproliferation concerns of each of the alternatives. As a member of the Fission Working Group, the Savannah River Technology Center acted as a sponsor for light water reactor (LWR) technology. The information contained in this report details the submittal that was made to the Fission Working Group of the technical assessment of LWR technology for plutonium disposition. The following aspects were considered: (1) proliferation issues, (2) technical feasibility, (3) technical availability, (4) economics, (5) regulatory issues, and (6) political acceptance.

  11. Method for dissolving delta-phase plutonium

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Karraker, David G. (1600 Sherwood Pl., SE., Aiken, SC 29801)

    1992-01-01

    A process for dissolving plutonium, and in particular, delta-phase plutonium. The process includes heating a mixture of nitric acid, hydroxylammonium nitrate (HAN) and potassium fluoride to a temperature between 40.degree. and 70.degree. C., then immersing the metal in the mixture. Preferably, the nitric acid has a concentration of not more than 2M, the HAN approximately 0.66M, and the potassium fluoride 0.1M. Additionally, a small amount of sulfamic acid, such as 0.1M can be added to assure stability of the HAN in the presence of nitric acid. The oxide layer that forms on plutonium metal may be removed with a non-oxidizing acid as a pre-treatment step.

  12. The United States Plutonium Balance, 1944 - 2009

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2012-06-01

    This report updates the report -Plutonium: The first 50 years- which was released by the U.S.Department of Energy (DOE) in 1996. The topic of both reports is plutonium, sometimes referred to as Pu-239, which is capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction and is used in nuclear weapons and for nuclear power production. This report updates 1994 data through 2009. The four most significant changes since 1994 include: (a) the completion of cleanup activities at the Rocky Flats Plant in 2005; (b) material consolidation and disposition activities, especially shipments from Hanford to the Savannah River Site; (c) the 2007 declaration of an additional 9.0 MT of weapons grade plutonium to be surplus to defense needs in the coming decades; and (d) the opening of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico in 1999.

  13. Alternating layers of plutonium and lead or indium as surrogate for plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rudin, Sven Peter

    2009-01-01

    Elemental plutonium (Pu) assumes more crystal structures than other elements, plausibly due to bonding f electrons becoming non-bonding. Complex geometries hamper understanding of the transition in Pu, but calculations predict this transition in a system with simpler geometry: alternating layers either of plutonium and lead or of plutonium and indium. Here the transition occurs via a pairing-up of atoms within Pu layers. Calculations stepping through this pairing-up reveal valuable details of the transition, for example that the transition from bonding to non-bonding proceeds smoothly.

  14. REVIEW OF PLUTONIUM OXIDATION LITERATURE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Korinko, P.

    2009-11-12

    A brief review of plutonium oxidation literature was conducted. The purpose of the review was to ascertain the effect of oxidation conditions on oxide morphology to support the design and operation of the PDCF direct metal oxidation (DMO) furnace. The interest in the review was due to a new furnace design that resulted in oxide characteristics that are different than those of the original furnace. Very little of the published literature is directly relevant to the DMO furnace operation, which makes assimilation of the literature data with operating conditions and data a convoluted task. The oxidation behavior can be distilled into three regimes, a low temperature regime (RT to 350 C) with a relatively slow oxidation rate that is influenced by moisture, a moderate temperature regime (350-450 C) that is temperature dependent and relies on more or less conventional oxidation growth of a partially protective oxide scale, and high temperature oxidation (> 500 C) where the metal autocatalytically combusts and oxidizes. The particle sizes obtained from these three regimes vary with the finest being from the lowest temperature. It is surmised that the slow growth rate permits significant stress levels to be achieved that help break up the oxides. The intermediate temperatures result in a fairly compact scale that is partially protective and that grows to critical thickness prior to fracturing. The growth rate in this regime may be parabolic or paralinear, depending on the oxidation time and consequently the oxide thickness. The high temperature oxidation is invariant in quiescent or nearly quiescent conditions due to gas blanketing while it accelerates with temperature under flowing conditions. The oxide morphology will generally consist of fine particles (<15 {micro}m), moderately sized particles (15 < x < 250 {micro}m) and large particles (> 250 {micro}m). The particle size ratio is expected to be < 5%, 25%, and 70% for fine, medium and large particles, respectively, for metal temperatures in the 500-600 C range.

  15. PUREX facility hazards assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutton, L.N.

    1994-09-23

    This report documents the hazards assessment for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (PUREX) located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site. Operation of PUREX is the responsibility of Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC). This hazards assessment was conducted to provide the emergency planning technical basis for PUREX. DOE Order 5500.3A requires an emergency planning hazards assessment for each facility that has the potential to reach or exceed the lowest level emergency classification. In October of 1990, WHC was directed to place PUREX in standby. In December of 1992 the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management authorized the termination of PUREX and directed DOE-RL to proceed with shutdown planning and terminal clean out activities. Prior to this action, its mission was to reprocess irradiated fuels for the recovery of uranium and plutonium. The present mission is to establish a passively safe and environmentally secure configuration at the PUREX facility and to preserve that condition for 10 years. The ten year time frame represents the typical duration expended to define, authorize and initiate follow-on decommissioning and decontamination activities.

  16. Dehydration of plutonium or neptunium trichloride hydrate

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Foropoulos, J. Jr.; Avens, L.R.; Trujillo, E.A.

    1992-03-24

    A process is described for preparing anhydrous actinide metal trichlorides of plutonium or neptunium by reacting an aqueous solution of an actinide metal trichloride selected from the group consisting of plutonium trichloride or neptunium trichloride with a reducing agent capable of converting the actinide metal from an oxidation state of +4 to +3 in a resultant solution, evaporating essentially all the solvent from the resultant solution to yield an actinide trichloride hydrate material, dehydrating the actinide trichloride hydrate material by heating the material in admixture with excess thionyl chloride, and recovering anhydrous actinide trichloride.

  17. Dehydration of plutonium or neptunium trichloride hydrate

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Foropoulos, Jr., Jerry (Los Alamos, NM); Avens, Larry R. (Los Alamos, NM); Trujillo, Eddie A. (Espanola, NM)

    1992-01-01

    A process of preparing anhydrous actinide metal trichlorides of plutonium or neptunium by reacting an aqueous solution of an actinide metal trichloride selected from the group consisting of plutonium trichloride or neptunium trichloride with a reducing agent capable of converting the actinide metal from an oxidation state of +4 to +3 in a resultant solution, evaporating essentially all the solvent from the resultant solution to yield an actinide trichloride hydrate material, dehydrating the actinide trichloride hydrate material by heating the material in admixture with excess thionyl chloride, and recovering anhydrous actinide trichloride is provided.

  18. Using magnetization measurements to detect small amounts of plutonium hydride formation in plutonium metal

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kim, Jae Wook [Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, NJ (United States); Mielke, Charles H. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Zapf, Vivien [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Baiardo, Joseph P. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Mitchell, Jeremy N. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Richmond, Scott [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Schwartz, Daniel S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Mun, Eun D. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Smith, Alice Iulia [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-10-20

    We report the formation of plutonium hydride in 2 at % Ga-stabilized ?-Pu, with 1 atomic % H charging. We show that magnetization measurements are a sensitive, quantitative measure of ferromagnetic plutonium hydride against the nonmagnetic background of plutonium. It was previously shown that at low hydrogen concentrations, hydrogen forms super-abundant vacancy complexes with plutonium, resulting in a bulk lattice contraction. Here we use magnetization, X-ray and neutron diffraction measurements to show that in addition to forming vacancy complexes, at least 30% of the H atoms bond with Pu to precipitate PuHx, largely on the surface of the sample with x ~ 1.9. We observe magnetic hysteresis loops below 40 K with magnetic remanence, consistent with precipitates of ferromagnetic PuH1.9.

  19. Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition: Plutonium Packaging, Storage and Transportation and Waste Treatment, Storage and Disposal Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L J; Borisov, G B

    2004-07-21

    A fifth annual Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition meeting organized by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was held February 16-18, 2004, at the State Education Center (SEC), 4 Aerodromnya Drive, St. Petersburg, Russia. The meeting discussed Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition topics for which LLNL has the US Technical Lead Organization responsibilities. The technical areas discussed included Radioactive Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal, Plutonium Oxide and Plutonium Metal Packaging, Storage and Transportation and Spent Fuel Packaging, Storage and Transportation. The meeting was conducted with a conference format using technical presentations of papers with simultaneous translation into English and Russian. There were 46 Russian attendees from 14 different Russian organizations and six non-Russian attendees, four from the US and two from France. Forty technical presentations were made. The meeting agenda is given in Appendix B and the attendance list is in Appendix C.

  20. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S. [and others

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition.

  1. Development of a fresh MOX fuel transport package for disposition of weapons plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ludwig, S.B.; Pope, R.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Michelhaugh, R.D.; Chae, S.M.

    1998-11-01

    The US Department of Energy announced its Record of Decision on January 14, 1997, to embark on a dual-track approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium using immobilization in glass or ceramics and burning plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in reactors. In support of the MOX fuel alternative, Oak Ridge National Laboratory initiated development of conceptual designs for a new package for transporting fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel assemblies between the MOX fabrication facility and existing commercial light-water reactors in the US. This paper summarizes progress made in development of new MOX transport package conceptual designs. The development effort has included documentation of programmatic and technical requirements for the new package and development and analysis of conceptual designs that satisfy these requirements.

  2. Low-level detection and quantification of Plutonium(III, IV, V, and VI) using a liquid core waveguide

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wilson, Richard E.; Hu, Yung-Jin; Nitsche, Heino

    2003-01-01

    R. , Determination of Plutonium Oxidation States at TraceThe Absorption Spectra of Plutonium Ions in Perchloric Acidor company? Yes/No Plutonium Futures – The Science

  3. Determining Plutonium Mass in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay Techniques -- Preliminary Modeling Results Emphasizing Integration among Techniques

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Tobin, S. J.

    2010-01-01

    LBNL- Determining Plutonium Mass in Spent Fuel withSwinhoe. “Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent FuelS. Tobin, “Measurement of Plutonium in Spent Nuclear Fuel by

  4. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1997-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement.

  5. Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Preliminary Specifications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kriikku, E.

    1998-11-25

    This report discusses the Plutonium Immobilization can loading preliminary equipment specifications and includes a process block diagram, process description, equipment list, preliminary equipment specifications, plan and elevation sketches, and some commercial catalogs. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas.

  6. NNSS Soils Monitoring: Plutonium Valley (CAU366)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, Julianne J.; Mizell, Steve A.; Nikolich, George; Campbell, Scott

    2012-02-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nevada Site Office (NSO), Environmental Restoration Soils Activity has authorized the Desert Research Institute (DRI) to conduct field assessments of potential sediment transport of contaminated soil from Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites Contamination Area (CA) during precipitation runoff events.

  7. PLUTONIUM SOLUBILITY IN HIGH-LEVEL WASTE ALKALI BOROSILICATE GLASS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Marra, J.; Crawford, C.; Fox, K.; Bibler, N.

    2011-01-04

    The solubility of plutonium in a Sludge Batch 6 (SB6) reference glass and the effect of incorporation of Pu in the glass on specific glass properties were evaluated. A Pu loading of 1 wt % in glass was studied. Prior to actual plutonium glass testing, surrogate testing (using Hf as a surrogate for Pu) was conducted to evaluate the homogeneity of significant quantities of Hf (Pu) in the glass, determine the most appropriate methods to evaluate homogeneity for Pu glass testing, and to evaluate the impact of Hf loading in the glass on select glass properties. Surrogate testing was conducted using Hf to represent between 0 and 1 wt % Pu in glass on an equivalent molar basis. A Pu loading of 1 wt % in glass translated to {approx}18 kg Pu per Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister, or about 10X the current allowed limit per the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (2500 g/m{sup 3} of glass or about 1700 g/canister) and about 30X the current allowable concentration based on the fissile material concentration limit referenced in the Yucca Mountain Project License Application (897 g/m{sup 3}3 of glass or about 600 g Pu/canister). Based on historical process throughput data, this level was considered to represent a reasonable upper bound for Pu loading based on the ability to provide Pu containing feed to the DWPF. The task elements included evaluating the distribution of Pu in the glass (e.g. homogeneity), evaluating crystallization within the glass, evaluating select glass properties (with surrogates), and evaluating durability using the Product Consistency Test -- Method A (PCT-A). The behavior of Pu in the melter was evaluated using paper studies and corresponding analyses of DWPF melter pour samples.The results of the testing indicated that at 1 wt % Pu in the glass, the Pu was homogeneously distributed and did not result in any formation of plutonium-containing crystalline phases as long as the glass was prepared under 'well-mixed' conditions. The incorporation of 1 wt % Pu in the glass did not adversely impact glass viscosity (as assessed using Hf surrogate) or glass durability. Finally, evaluation of DWPF glass pour samples that had Pu concentrations below the 897 g/m{sup 3} limit showed that Pu concentrations in the glass pour stream were close to targeted compositions in the melter feed indicating that Pu neither volatilized from the melt nor stratified in the melter when processed in the DWPF melter.

  8. VALIDATION OF HANFORD PERSONNEL AND EXTREMITY DOSIMETERS IN PLUTONIUM ENVIRONMENTS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Scherpelz, Robert I.; Fix, John J.; Rathbone, Bruce A.

    2000-02-10

    A study was performed in the Plutonium Finishing Plant to assess the performance of Hanford personnel neutron dosimetry. The study was assessed whole body dosimetry and extremity dosimetry performance. For both parts of the study, the TEPC was used as the principle instrument for characterizing workplace neutron fields. In the whole body study, 12.7-cm-diameter TEPCs were used in ten different locations in the facility. TLD and TED personnel dosimeters were exposed on a water-filled phantom to enable a comparison of TEPC and dosimeter response. In the extremity study, 1.27-cm-diameter TEPCs were exposed inside the fingers of a gloveboxe glove. Extremity dosimeters were wrapped around the TEPCs. The glove was then exposed to six different cans of plutonium, simulating the exposure that a worker's fingers would receive in a glovebox. The comparison of TEPC-measured neutron dose equivalent to TLD-measured gamma dose equivalent provided neutron-to-gamma ratios that can be used to estimate the neutron dose equivalent received by a worker's finger based on the gamma readings of an extremity dosimeter. The study also utilized a Snoopy and detectors based on bubble technology for assessing neutron exposures, providing a comparison of the effectiveness of these instruments for workplace monitoring. The study concludes that the TLD component of the HCND performs adequately overall, with a positive bias of 30%, but exhibits excessive variability in individual results due to instabilities in the algorithm. The TED response was less variable but only 20% of the TEPC reference dose on average because of the low neutron energies involved. The neutron response of the HSD was more variable than the TLD component of the HCND and biased high by a factor of 8 overall due to its calibration to unmoderated 252Cf. The study recommends further work to correct instabilities in the HCND algorithm and to explore the potential shown by the bubble-based dosimeters.

  9. A Note on the Reaction of Hydrogen and Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-15

    Plutonium hydride has many practical and experimental purposes. The reaction of plutonium and hydrogen has interesting characteristics, which will be explored in the following analysis. Plutonium is a radioactive actinide metal that emits alpha particles. When plutonium metal is exposed to air, the plutonium oxides and hydrides, and the volume increases. PuH{sub 2} and Pu{sub 2}O{sub 3} are the products. Hydrogen is a catalyst for plutonium's corrosion in air. The reaction can take place at room temperature because it is fairly insensitive to temperature. Plutonium hydride, or PuH{sub 2}, is black and metallic. After PuH{sub 2} is formed, it quickly flakes off and burns. The reaction of hydrogen and plutonium is described as pyrophoric because the product will spontaneously ignite when oxygen is present. This tendency must be considered in the storage of metal plutonium. The reaction is characterized as reversible and nonstoichiometric. The reaction goes as such: Pu + H{sub 2} {yields} PuH{sub 2}. When PuH{sub 2} is formed, the hydrogen/plutonium ratio is between 2 and 2.75 (approximately). As more hydrogen is added to the system, the ratio increases. When the ratio exceeds 2.75, PuH{sub 3} begins to form along with PuH{sub 2}. Once the ratio surpasses 2.9, only PuH{sub 3} remains. The volume of the plutonium sample increases because of the added hydrogen and the change in crystal structure which the sample undergoes. As more hydrogen is added to a system of metal plutonium, the crystal structure evolves. Plutonium has a crystal structure classified as monoclinic. A monoclinic crystal structure appears to be a rectangular prism. When plutonium reacts with hydrogen, the product PuH{sub 2}, becomes a fluorite structure. It can also be described as a face centered cubic structure. PuH{sub 3} forms a hexagonal crystal structure. As plutonium evolves from metal plutonium to plutonium hydride to plutonium trihydride, the crystal structure evolves from monoclinic to fluorite to hexagonal. This change in crystal structure as a result of adding hydrogen is a shared characteristic with other actinide elements. Americium is isostructural with plutonium because they both form cubic dihyrides and hexagonal trihydrides. Reacting hydrogen with plutonium has the practical application of separating plutonium from other materials that don't react as well with hydrogen. When plutonium is placed in a chamber where there is very little oxygen, it can react with hydrogen without igniting. The hydrogen plutonium reaction can then be reversed, thus regaining the separated plutonium. Another application of this reaction is that it can be used to predict how plutonium reacts with other substances. Deuterium and tritium are two isotopes of hydrogen that are of interest. They are known to react likewise to hydrogen because they have similar properties. The reaction of plutonium and isotopes of hydrogen can prove to be very informative.

  10. Resource book: Decommissioning of contaminated facilities at Hanford

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1991-09-01

    In 1942 Hanford was commissioned as a site for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. The years since have seen the construction and operation of several generations of plutonium-producing reactors, plants for the chemical processing of irradiated fuel elements, plutonium and uranium processing and fabrication plants, and other facilities. There has also been a diversification of the Hanford site with the building of new laboratories, a fission product encapsulation plant, improved high-level waste management facilities, the Fast Flux test facility, commercial power reactors and commercial solid waste disposal facilities. Obsolescence and changing requirements will result in the deactivation or retirement of buildings, waste storage tanks, waste burial grounds and liquid waste disposal sites which have become contaminated with varying levels of radionuclides. This manual was established as a written repository of information pertinent to decommissioning planning and operations at Hanford. The Resource Book contains, in several volumes, descriptive information of the Hanford Site and general discussions of several classes of contaminated facilities found at Hanford. Supplementing these discussions are appendices containing data sheets on individual contaminated facilities and sites at Hanford. Twelve appendices are provided, corresponding to the twelve classes into which the contaminated facilities at Hanford have been organized. Within each appendix are individual data sheets containing administrative, geographical, physical, radiological, functional and decommissioning information on each facility within the class. 68 refs., 54 figs., 18 tabs.

  11. Plutonium disposition via immobilization in ceramic or glass

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, A.

    1997-03-05

    The management of surplus weapons plutonium is an important and urgent task with profound environmental, national, and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Policy Directive 13, and various analyses by renown scientific, technical, and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths for the long term disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The central goal of this effort is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in spent fuel from civilian reactors. One disposition option being considered for surplus plutonium is immobilization, in which the plutonium would be incorporated into a glass or ceramic material that would ultimately be entombed permanently in a geologic repository for high-level waste.

  12. Chemical Disposition of Plutonium in Hanford Site Tank Wastes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Delegard, Calvin H.; Jones, Susan A.

    2015-05-07

    This report examines the chemical disposition of plutonium (Pu) in Hanford Site tank wastes, by itself and in its observed and potential interactions with the neutron absorbers aluminum (Al), cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn), nickel (Ni), and sodium (Na). Consideration also is given to the interactions of plutonium with uranium (U). No consideration of the disposition of uranium itself as an element with fissile isotopes is considered except tangentially with respect to its interaction as an absorber for plutonium. The report begins with a brief review of Hanford Site plutonium processes, examining the various means used to recover plutonium from irradiated fuel and from scrap, and also examines the intermediate processing of plutonium to prepare useful chemical forms. The paper provides an overview of Hanford tank defined-waste–type compositions and some calculations of the ratios of plutonium to absorber elements in these waste types and in individual waste analyses. These assessments are based on Hanford tank waste inventory data derived from separately published, expert assessments of tank disposal records, process flowsheets, and chemical/radiochemical analyses. This work also investigates the distribution and expected speciation of plutonium in tank waste solution and solid phases. For the solid phases, both pure plutonium compounds and plutonium interactions with absorber elements are considered. These assessments of plutonium chemistry are based largely on analyses of idealized or simulated tank waste or strongly alkaline systems. The very limited information available on plutonium behavior, disposition, and speciation in genuine tank waste also is discussed. The assessments show that plutonium coprecipitates strongly with chromium, iron, manganese and uranium absorbers. Plutonium’s chemical interactions with aluminum, nickel, and sodium are minimal to non-existent. Credit for neutronic interaction of plutonium with these absorbers occurs only if they are physically proximal in solution or the plutonium present in the solid phase is intimately mixed with compounds or solutions of these absorbers. No information on the potential chemical interaction of plutonium with cadmium was found in the technical literature. Definitive evidence of sorption or adsorption of plutonium onto various solid phases from strongly alkaline media is less clear-cut, perhaps owing to fewer studies and to some well-attributed tests run under conditions exceeding the very low solubility of plutonium. The several studies that are well-founded show that only about half of the plutonium is adsorbed from waste solutions onto sludge solid phases. The organic complexants found in many Hanford tank waste solutions seem to decrease plutonium uptake onto solids. A number of studies show plutonium sorbs effectively onto sodium titanate. Finally, this report presents findings describing the behavior of plutonium vis-à-vis other elements during sludge dissolution in nitric acid based on Hanford tank waste experience gained by lab-scale tests, chemical and radiochemical sample characterization, and full-scale processing in preparation for strontium-90 recovery from PUREX sludges.

  13. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence to Measure Plutonium Mass in Spent Nuclear Fuel

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A

    2011-01-01

    and S.J. Thompson,“Determining Plutonium in Spent Fuel withTobin, “Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent FuelFluorescence to Measure Plutonium Mass in Spent Nuclear Fuel

  14. STUDIES IN THE NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY OF PLUTONIUM, AMERICIUM, AND CURIUM AND MASSES OF THE HEAVIEST ELEMENTS

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Glass, Richard Alois

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear Energy Series, Plutonium Project Record, Vol. 14B,Nuclear Energy Series, Plutonium Project Record, Vol. 9, p.Nuclear Energy Series, Plutonium Project Record, Vol. l4B,

  15. Complexation and redox interactions between aqueous plutonium and manganese oxide interfaces

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    2001-01-01

    The Chemistry of Plutonium (American Nuclear Society,XAS studies with sorbed plutonium on tuff,” J. Synch. Rad.state determination of plutonium aquo ions using x-ray

  16. Plutonium stabilization and handling (PuSH)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Weiss, E.V.

    1997-01-23

    This Functional Design Criteria (FDC) addresses construction of a Stabilization and Packaging System (SPS) to oxidize and package for long term storage remaining plutonium-bearing special nuclear materials currently in inventory at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), and modification of vault equipment to allow storage of resulting packages of stabilized SNM for up to fifty years. The major sections of the project are: site preparation; SPS Procurement, Installation, and Testing; storage vault modification; and characterization equipment additions. The SPS will be procured as part of a Department of Energy nationwide common procurement. Specific design crit1460eria for the SPS have been extracted from that contract and are contained in an appendix to this document.

  17. New way to predict plutonium Finding could lead to

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Savrasov, Sergej Y.

    New way to predict plutonium safety Finding could lead to improved storage of nuclear weapons of 2Science Front Page 2:14 PM ET Thursday, April 12, 2001 9/5/2003file://E:\\Homepages\\SavrasovHome\\Projects\\Research\\Plutonium, and Privacy Page 2 of 2Science Front Page 2:14 PM ET Thursday, April 12, 2001 9/5/2003file://E:\\Homepages\\SavrasovHome\\Projects\\Research\\Plutonium

  18. LANL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.; Ludwig, S.B. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. LANL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within both Category 1 and 2 areas. Technical Area (TA) 55/Plutonium Facility 4 will be used to store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, assemble rods, and store fuel bundles. Bundles will be assembled at a separate facility, several of which have been identified as suitable for that activity. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (at TA-3) will be used for analytical chemistry support. Waste operations will be conducted in TA-50 and TA-54. Only very minor modifications will be needed to accommodate the LA program. These modifications consist mostly of minor equipment upgrades. A commercial reactor operator has not been identified for the LA irradiation. Postirradiation examination (PIE) of the irradiated fuel will take place at either Oak Ridge National Laboratory or ANL-W. The only modifications required at either PIE site would be to accommodate full-length irradiated fuel rods. Results from this program are critical to the overall plutonium distribution schedule.

  19. Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Plutonium Sustainment Monthly Program Report September 2012

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McLaughlin, Anastasia Dawn [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Storey, Bradford G. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bowidowicz, Martin [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Robertson, William G. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hobson, Beverly F. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-10-22

    In March of 2012 the Plutonium Sustainment program at LANL completed or addressed the following high-level activities: (1) Delivered Revision 2 of the Plutonium Sustainment Manufacturing Study, which incorporated changes needed due to the release of the FY2013 President's Budget and the delay in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRRNF). (2) W87 pit type development activities completed a detailed process capability review for the flowsheet in preparation for the Engineering Development Unit Build. (3) Completed revising the Laser Beam Welding schedule to address scope and resource changes. (4) Completed machining and inspecting the first set of high-fidelity cold parts on Precitech 2 for Gemini. (5) The Power Supply Assembly Area started floor cutting with a concrete saw and continued legacy equipment decommissioning. There are currently no major issues associated with achieving MRT L2 Milestones 4195-4198 or the relevant PBIs associated with Plutonium Sustainment. There are no budget issues associated with FY12 final budget guidance. Table 1 identifies all Baseline Change Requests (BCRs) that were initiated, in process, or completed during the month. The earned value metrics overall for LANL are within acceptable thresholds, so no high-level recovery plan is required. Each of the 5 major LANL WBS elements is discussed in detail.

  20. Dresden 1 plutonium recycle program. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bresnick, S.D.

    1980-01-01

    This is the final report on the Dresden 1 Plutonium Recycle Demonstration Program. It covers the work performed from July 1, 1978 to completion, which includes in-pool inspection of two fuel assemblies, removal of two fuel rods, and post-irradiation examination (PIE) of six fuel rods. Appendix A describes the inspection and rod removal operations, and Appendix B describes the PIE work.

  1. Plutonium utilisation in future UK PWRs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, G. M.; Worrall, A. [Nexia Solutions Ltd. (Part of the BNFL Group of Companies), Springfield's Works, Preston, Lancashire (United Kingdom)

    2006-07-01

    Plutonium recycling in the form of Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuels is already a reality in over 30 reactors in Europe (in Belgium, Switzerland, Germany and France). Japan also plans to use MOX in approximately 30% of its reactors in the near future[1]. This paper describes potential near to mid-term disposition strategies for the United Kingdom's stockpile of plutonium. In order to be confident that MOX fuel can be utilised effectively in Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) in the UK, details are given of studies carried out recently at Nexia Solutions on PWR cores loaded with MOX containing typical UK plutonium isotopic compositions. Three dimensional steady state neutronic models of a standard Westinghouse four loop PWR design are constructed using state of the art tools (Studsvik of America's Core Management System[2, 3, 4]). Initially, a standard 18-month equilibrium UO{sub 2} fuel cycle is generated, followed by safety analyses and fuel performance calculations to demonstrate its feasibility. This equilibrium UO{sub 2} core is then gradually transitioned through loading patterns containing increasing MOX core loading fractions. Finally, an equilibrium MOX core loading pattern is determined. Technical safety analyses are also carried out on the transition cores and the final equilibrium scenario to ensure that all of the MOX cores are robust from a technical and safety viewpoint. Once these studies are completed the annual fuel throughputs for each scenario can be determined and used to produce options for managing the UK's plutonium stockpile. This work is part of a wider exercise currently being carried out by Nexia Solutions to explore the options for the safe disposition of the UK civil stockpile of separated PUO{sub 2}. (authors)

  2. Hanford Site Near-Facility Environmental Monitoring Data Report for Calendar Year 2008

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Perkins, Craig J.; Dorsey, Michael C.; Mckinney, Stephen M.; Wilde, Justin W.; Poston, Ted M.

    2009-09-15

    Near-facility environmental monitoring is defined as monitoring near facilities that have the potential to discharge or have discharged, stored, or disposed of radioactive or hazardous materials. Monitoring locations are associated with nuclear facilities such as the Plutonium Finishing Plant, Canister Storage Building, and the K Basins; inactive nuclear facilities such as N Reactor and the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility; and waste storage or disposal facilities such as burial grounds, cribs, ditches, ponds, tank farms, and trenches. Much of the monitoring consists of collecting and analyzing environmental samples and methodically surveying areas near facilities. The program is also designed to evaluate acquired analytical data, determine the effectiveness of facility effluent monitoring and controls, assess the adequacy of containment at waste disposal units, and detect and monitor unusual conditions.

  3. Hanford Site Near-Facility Environmental Monitoring Data Report for Calendar Year 2007- Appendix 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Perkins, Craig J.; Dorsey, Michael; Mckinney, Stephen M.; Wilde, Justin W.; Duncan, Joanne P.

    2008-10-13

    Near-facility environmental monitoring is defined as monitoring near facilities that have the potential to discharge or have discharged, stored, or disposed of radioactive or hazardous materials. Monitoring locations are associated with nuclear facilities such as the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), Canister Storage Building (CSB), and the K Basins; inactive nuclear facilities such as N Reactor and the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility; and waste storage or disposal facilities such as burial grounds, cribs, ditches, ponds, tank farms, and trenches. Much of the monitoring consists of collecting and analyzing environmental samples and methodically surveying areas near facilities. The program is also designed to evaluate acquired analytical data, determine the effectiveness of facility effluent monitoring and controls, assess the adequacy of containment at waste disposal units, and detect and monitor unusual conditions.

  4. Equation of State of Uranium and Plutonium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dalton Ellery Girão Barroso

    2015-07-13

    The objective of this work is to define the parameters of the three-term equation of state for uranium and plutonium, appropriate for conditions in which these materials are subjected to strong shock compressions, as in cylindrical and spherical implosions. The three-term equation of state takes into account the three components of the pressure that resist to compression in the solid: the elastic or "cold" pressure (coulombian repulsion between atoms), the thermal pressure due to vibratory motion of atoms in the lattice of the solid and the thermal pressure of electrons thermally excited. The equation of state defined here permits also to take into account the variation of the specific heat with the transition of the solid to the liquid or gaseous state due to continued growth of temperature in strong shock compressions. In the definition of uranium equation of state, experimental data on the uranium compression, available in the open scientific literature, are used. In the plutonium case, this element was considered initially in the alpha-phase or stabilized in the delta-phase. In the last case, an abrupt and instantaneous transition to the alpha-phase was considered when the delta-phase plutonium is submitted to strong compressions.

  5. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  6. Amended Record of Decision: Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Notices 1 A container that complies with DOE-STD-3013, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium- Bearing Materials. 2 The use of FFTF and the unirradiated fuel...

  7. Additional public meeting on plutonium disposition on September...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    period for the Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). September 1, 2012 dummy image Read our archives Contacts Editor Linda...

  8. LLNL Conducts First Plutonium Shot Using the JASPER Gas Gun ...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Conducts First Plutonium Shot Using the JASPER Gas Gun | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile...

  9. Predicted Radiation Output from Several Kilograms of Plutonium...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Cycle & Fuel Materials(11); Nuclear Physics & Radiation Physics(73) radiation output, passive signature, plutonium oxide Word Cloud More Like This Full Text File size NAView Full...

  10. Neutrons find "missing" magnetism of plutonium | ornl.gov

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Los Alamos National Laboratory 505-667-0471 Neutrons find "missing" magnetism of plutonium Doug Abernathy, left, ARCS instrument scientist at Oak Ridge National Laboratory,...

  11. Plutonium finishing plant safeguards and security systems replacement study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Klear, P.F.; Humphrys, K.L.

    1994-12-01

    This document provides the preferred alternatives for the replacement of the Safeguards and Security systems located at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant.

  12. PLUTONIUM-238 RECOVERY FROM IRRADIATED NEPTUNIUM TARGETS USING...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    proposes to re-establish a domestic capability for producing plutonium-238 (238Pu) to fuel radioisotope power systems primarily in support of future space missions. A...

  13. EIS-0276: Rocky Flats Plutonium Storage, Golden, Colorado

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS analyzes DOE's proposed action to provide safe interim storage of approximately 10 metric tons of plutonium at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS).

  14. President Truman Increases Production of Uranium and Plutonium...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Increases Production of Uranium and Plutonium | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing...

  15. EIS-0283-S2: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    program, including changes to the inventory of surplus plutonium and proposed new alternatives. The Final SEIS does not identify a preferred alternative. Once a preferred...

  16. Estimation and characterization of decontamination and decommissioning solid waste expected from the Plutonium Finishing Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Millar, J.S.; Pottmeyer, J.A.; Stratton, T.J. [and others

    1995-01-01

    Purpose of the study was to estimate the amounts of equipment and other materials that are candidates for removal and subsequent processing in a solid waste facility when the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant is decontaminated and decommissioned. (Building structure and soil are not covered.) Results indicate that {approximately}5,500 m{sup 3} of solid waste is expected to result from the decontamination and decommissioning of the Pu Finishing Plant. The breakdown of the volumes and percentages of waste by category is 1% dangerous solid waste, 71% low-level waste, 21% transuranic waste, 7% transuranic mixed waste.

  17. Supplementary data for "Relativistic density functional theory modeling of plutonium and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Titov, Anatoly

    Supplementary data for "Relativistic density functional theory modeling of plutonium and americium equilibrium geometries of plutonium and americium oxide molecules (standard .xyz files separated by empty

  18. ACCOUNTING FOR A VITRIFIED PLUTONIUM WASTE FORM IN THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT (TSPA)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Marra, J

    2007-02-12

    A vitrification technology utilizing a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass appears to be a viable option for dispositioning excess weapons-useable plutonium that is not suitable for processing into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. A significant effort to develop a glass formulation and vitrification process to immobilize plutonium was completed in the mid-1990s to support the Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP). Further refinement of the vitrification process was accomplished as part of the Am/Cm solution vitrification project. The LaBS glass formulation was found to be capable of immobilizing in excess of 10 wt% Pu and to be very tolerant of the impurities accompanying the plutonium material streams. Thus, this waste form would be suitable for dispositioning plutonium owned by the Department of Energy-Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) that may not be well characterized and may contain high levels of impurities. The can-in-canister technology demonstrated in the PIP could be utilized to dispose of the vitrified plutonium in the federal radioactive waste repository. The can-in-canister technology involves placing small cans of the immobilized Pu form into a high level waste (HLW) glass canister fitted with a rack to hold the cans and then filling the canister with HLW glass. Testing was completed to demonstrate that this technology could be successfully employed with little or no impact to current Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) operation and that the resulting canisters were essentially equivalent to the present HLW glass canisters to be dispositioned in the federal repository. The performance of wastes in the repository and, moreover, the performance of the entire repository system is being evaluated by the Department of Energy-Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (DOE-RW) using a Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) methodology. Technical bases documents (e.g., Analysis/Modeling Reports (AMR)) that address specific issues regarding waste form performance are being used to develop process models as input to the TSPA analyses. In this report, models developed in five AMRs for waste forms currently slated for disposition in the repository are evaluated for their applicability to waste forms with plutonium immobilized in LaBS glass using the can-in-canister technology. Those AMRs address: high-level waste glass degradation; radionuclide inventory; in-package chemistry; dissolved concentration limits of radioactive elements; and colloid-associated radionuclide concentrations. Based on evaluation of how the models treated HLW glass and similarities in the corrosion behaviors of borosilicate HLW glasses and LaBS glass, the models in the AMRs were deemed to be directly applicable to the disposition of excess weapons-useable plutonium. The evaluations are summarized.

  19. Response of TLD-albedo and nuclear track dosimeters exposed to plutonium sources

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brackenbush, L.W.; Baumgartner, W.V.; Fix, J.J.

    1991-12-01

    Neutron dosimetry has been extensively studied at Hanford since the mid-1940s. At the present time, Hanford contractors use thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD)-albedo dosimeters to record the neutron dose equivalent received by workers. The energy dependence of the TLD-albedo dosimeter has been recognized and documented since introduced at Hanford in 1964 and numerous studies have helped assure the accuracy of dosimeters. With the recent change in Hanford's mission, there has been a significant decrease in the handling of plutonium tetrafluoride, and an increase in the handling of plutonium metal and plutonium oxide sources. This study was initiated to document the performance of the current Hanford TLD-albedo dosimeter under the low scatter conditions of the calibration laboratory and under the high scatter conditions in the work place under carefully controlled conditions at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The neutron fields at the PFP facility were measured using a variety of instruments, including a multisphere spectrometer, tissue equivalent proportional counters, and specially calibrated rem meters. Various algorithms were used to evaluate the TLD-albedo dosimeters, and the results are given in this report. Using current algorithms, the dose equivalents evaluated for bare sources and sources with less than 2.5 cm (1 in.) of acrylic plastic shielding in high scatter conditions typical of glove box operations are reasonably accurate. Recently developed CR-39 track etch dosimeters (TEDs) were also exposed in the calibration laboratory and at the PFP. The results indicate that the TED dosimeters are quite accurate for both bare and moderated neutron sources. Until personnel dosimeter is available that incorporates a direct measure of the neutron dose to a person, technical uncertainties in the accuracy of the recorded data will continue.

  20. Response of TLD-albedo and nuclear track dosimeters exposed to plutonium sources

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brackenbush, L.W.; Baumgartner, W.V.; Fix, J.J.

    1991-12-01

    Neutron dosimetry has been extensively studied at Hanford since the mid-1940s. At the present time, Hanford contractors use thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD)-albedo dosimeters to record the neutron dose equivalent received by workers. The energy dependence of the TLD-albedo dosimeter has been recognized and documented since introduced at Hanford in 1964 and numerous studies have helped assure the accuracy of dosimeters. With the recent change in Hanford`s mission, there has been a significant decrease in the handling of plutonium tetrafluoride, and an increase in the handling of plutonium metal and plutonium oxide sources. This study was initiated to document the performance of the current Hanford TLD-albedo dosimeter under the low scatter conditions of the calibration laboratory and under the high scatter conditions in the work place under carefully controlled conditions at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The neutron fields at the PFP facility were measured using a variety of instruments, including a multisphere spectrometer, tissue equivalent proportional counters, and specially calibrated rem meters. Various algorithms were used to evaluate the TLD-albedo dosimeters, and the results are given in this report. Using current algorithms, the dose equivalents evaluated for bare sources and sources with less than 2.5 cm (1 in.) of acrylic plastic shielding in high scatter conditions typical of glove box operations are reasonably accurate. Recently developed CR-39 track etch dosimeters (TEDs) were also exposed in the calibration laboratory and at the PFP. The results indicate that the TED dosimeters are quite accurate for both bare and moderated neutron sources. Until personnel dosimeter is available that incorporates a direct measure of the neutron dose to a person, technical uncertainties in the accuracy of the recorded data will continue.

  1. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required.

  2. Characterization of Representative Materials in Support of Safe, Long Term Storage of Surplus Plutonium in DOE-STD-3013 Containers

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Narlesky, Joshua E.; Stroud, Mary Ann; Smith, Paul Herrick; Wayne, David M.; Mason, Richard E.; Worl, Laura A.

    2013-02-15

    The Surveillance and Monitoring Program is a joint Los Alamos National Laboratory/Savannah River Site effort funded by the Department of Energy-Environmental Management to provide the technical basis for the safe, long-term storage (up to 50 years) of over 6 metric tons of plutonium stored in over 5,000 DOE-STD-3013 containers at various facilities around the DOE complex. The majority of this material is plutonium that is surplus to the nuclear weapons program, and much of it is destined for conversion to mixed oxide fuel for use in US nuclear power plants. The form of the plutonium ranges from relatively pure metal and oxide to very impure oxide. The performance of the 3013 containers has been shown to depend on moisture content and on the levels, types and chemical forms of the impurities. The oxide materials that present the greatest challenge to the storage container are those that contain chloride salts. Other common impurities include oxides and other compounds of calcium, magnesium, iron, and nickel. Over the past 15 years the program has collected a large body of experimental data on 54 samples of plutonium, with 53 chosen to represent the broader population of materials in storage. This paper summarizes the characterization data, moisture analysis, particle size, surface area, density, wattage, actinide composition, trace element impurity analysis, and shelf life surveillance data and includes origin and process history information. Limited characterization data on fourteen nonrepresentative samples is also presented.

  3. Cleaning up the Legacy of the Cold War: Plutonium Oxides and the Role of Synchrotron Radiation Research

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Clark, David Lewis

    2015-01-21

    The deceptively simple binary formula of AnO2 belies an incredibly complex structural nature, and propensity to form mixed-valent, nonstoichiometric phases of composition AnO2±x. For plutonium, the very formation of PuO2+x has challenged a long-established dogma, and raised fundamental questions for long-term storage and environmental migration. This presentation covers two aspects of Los Alamos synchrotron radiation studies of plutonium oxides: (1) the structural chemistry of laboratory-prepared AnO2+x systems (An = U, Pu; 0 ? x ? 0.25) determined through a combination of x-ray absorption fine structure spectroscopy (XAFS) and x-ray scattering of laboratory prepared samples; and (2) the application of synchrotron radiation towards the decontamination and decommissioning of the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. Making the case for particle transport mechanisms as the basis of plutonium and americium mobility, rather than aqueous sorption-desorption processes, established a successful scientific basis for the dominance of physical transport processes by wind and water. The scientific basis was successful because it was in agreement with general theory on insolubility of PuO2 in oxidation state IV, results of ultrafiltration analyses of field water/sediment samples, XAFS analyses of soil, sediment, and concrete samples, and was also in general agreement with on-site monitoring data. This understanding allowed Site contractors to rapidly move to application of soil erosion and sediment transport models as the means of predicting plutonium and americium transport, which led to design and application of site-wide soil erosion control technology to help control downstream concentrations of plutonium and americium in streamflow.

  4. Plutonium Oxidation and Subsequent Reduction by Mn (IV) Minerals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    KAPLAN, DANIEL

    2005-09-13

    Plutonium sorbed to rock tuff was preferentially associated with manganese oxides. On tuff and synthetic pyrolusite (Mn{sup IV}O{sub 2}), Pu(IV) or Pu(V) was initially oxidized, but over time Pu(IV) became the predominant oxidation state of sorbed Pu. Reduction of Pu(V/VI), even on non-oxidizing surfaces, is proposed to result from a lower Gibbs free energy of the hydrolyzed Pu(IV) surface species versus that of the Pu(V) or Pu(VI) surface species. This work suggests that despite initial oxidation of sorbed Pu by oxidizing surfaces to more soluble forms, the less mobile form of Pu, Pu(IV), will dominate Pu solid phase speciation during long term geologic storage. The safe design of a radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel geologic repository requires a risk assessment of radionuclides that may potentially be released into the surrounding environment. Geochemical knowledge of the radionuclide and the surrounding environment is required for predicting subsurface fate and transport. Although difficult even in simple systems, this task grows increasingly complicated for constituents, like Pu, that exhibit complex environmental chemistries. The environmental behavior of Pu can be influenced by complexation, precipitation, adsorption, colloid formation, and oxidation/reduction (redox) reactions (1-3). To predict the environmental mobility of Pu, the most important of these factors is Pu oxidation state. This is because Pu(IV) is generally 2 to 3 orders of magnitude less mobile than Pu(V) in most environments (4). Further complicating matters, Pu commonly exists simultaneously in several oxidation states (5, 6). Choppin (7) reported Pu may exist as Pu(IV), Pu(V), or Pu(VI) oxic natural groundwaters. It is generally accepted that plutonium associated with suspended particulate matter is predominantly Pu(IV) (8-10), whereas Pu in the aqueous phase is predominantly Pu(V) (2, 11-13). The influence of the character of Mn-containing minerals expected to be found in subsurface repository environments on Pu oxidation state distributions has been the subject of much recent research. Kenney-Kennicutt and Morse (14), Duff et al. (15), and Morgenstern and Choppin (16) observed oxidation of Pu facilitated by Mn(IV)-bearing minerals. Conversely, Shaughnessy et al. (17) used X-ray Absorption near-edge spectroscopy (XANES) to show reduction of Pu(VI) by hausmannite (Mn{sup II}Mn{sub 2}{sup III}O{sub 4}) and manganite ({gamma}-Mn{sup III}OOH) and Kersting et al., (18) observed reduction of Pu(VI) by pyrolusite (Mn{sup IV}O{sub 2}). In this paper, we attempt to reconcile the apparently conflicting datasets by showing that Mn-bearing minerals can indeed oxidize Pu, however, if the oxidized species remains on the solid phase, the oxidation step competes with the formation of Pu(IV) that becomes the predominant solid phase Pu species with time. The experimental approach we took was to conduct longer term (approximately two years later) oxidation state analyses on the Pu sorbed to Yucca Mountain tuff (initial analysis reported by Duff et al., (15)) and measure the time-dependant changes in the oxidation state distribution of Pu in the presence of the Mn mineral pyrolusite.

  5. Requirements for mobile photoware

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ames, Morgan; Eckles, Dean; Naaman, Mor; Spasojevic, Mirjana; House, Nancy

    2010-01-01

    and makers of mobile devices, mobile imaging and sharingmedia captured with a mobile device and shared via Zonetagare beginning to use mobile devices. In this article, we use

  6. Procedure for plutonium determination using Pu(VI) spectra

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Walker, L.F.; Temer, D.J.; Jackson, D.D.

    1996-09-01

    This document describes a simple spectrophotometric method for determining total plutonium in nitric acid solutions based on the spectrum of Pu(VI). Plutonium samples in nitric acid are oxidized to Pu(VI) with Ce(IV) and the net absorbance at the 830 nm peak is measured.

  7. Fuel bundle design for enhanced usage of plutonium fuel

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Reese, Anthony P. (San Jose, CA); Stachowski, Russell E. (Fremont, CA)

    1995-01-01

    A nuclear fuel bundle includes a square array of fuel rods each having a concentration of enriched uranium and plutonium. Each rod of an interior array of the rods also has a concentration of gadolinium. The interior array of rods is surrounded by an exterior array of rods void of gadolinium. By this design, usage of plutonium in the nuclear reactor is enhanced.

  8. The Human Plutonium Injection Experiments William Moss and Roger Eckhardt

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Massey, Thomas N.

    that was pertinent to those and LouisHempelmann #12;similar radiation experi- ments with humans. This article177 The Human Plutonium Injection Experiments William Moss and Roger Eckhardt T he human plutonium injection experiments carried out during and after the Manhattan Project have received tremendous noto

  9. PLUTONIUM ISOTOPES I N THE NORTH ATLANTIC KEN 0. BUESSELER

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Buesseler, Ken

    PLUTONIUM ISOTOPES I N THE NORTH ATLANTIC by KEN 0. BUESSELER B.A., University of California The a r t i f i c i a l radionuclide Plutonium (Pu) has been introduced i n t o the environment p r i m

  10. Recommended plutonium release fractions from postulated fires. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kogan, V.; Schumacher, P.M.

    1993-12-01

    This report was written at the request of EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc. in support of joint emergency planning for the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) by EG&G and the State of Colorado. The intent of the report is to provide the State of Colorado with an independent assessment of any respirable plutonium releases that might occur in the event of a severe fire at the plant. Fire releases of plutonium are of interest because they have been used by EG&G to determine the RFP emergency planning zones. These zones are based on the maximum credible accident (MCA) described in the RFP Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) of 1980, that MCA is assumed to be a large airplane crashing into a RFP plutonium building.The objective of this report was first, to perform a worldwide literature review of relevant release experiments from 1960 to the present and to summarize those findings, and second, to provide recommendations for application of the experimental data to fire release analyses at Rocky Flats. The latter step requires translation between experimental and expected RFP accident parameters, or ``scaling.`` The parameters of particular concern are: quantities of material, environmental parameters such as the intensity of a fire, and the physico-chemical forms of the plutonium. The latter include plutonium metal, bulk plutonium oxide powder, combustible and noncombustible wastes contaminated with plutonium oxide powder, and residues from plutonium extraction processes.

  11. Processing of Non-PFP Plutonium Oxide in Hanford Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jones, Susan A.; Delegard, Calvin H.

    2011-03-10

    Processing of non-irradiated plutonium oxide, PuO2, scrap for recovery of plutonium values occurred routinely at Hanford’s Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) in glovebox line operations. Plutonium oxide is difficult to dissolve, particularly if it has been high-fired; i.e., calcined to temperatures above about 400°C and much of it was. Dissolution of the PuO2 in the scrap typically was performed in PFP’s Miscellaneous Treatment line using nitric acid (HNO3) containing some source of fluoride ion, F-, such as hydrofluoric acid (HF), sodium fluoride (NaF), or calcium fluoride (CaF2). The HNO3 concentration generally was 6 M or higher whereas the fluoride concentration was ~0.5 M or lower. At higher fluoride concentrations, plutonium fluoride (PuF4) would precipitate, thus limiting the plutonium dissolution. Some plutonium-bearing scrap also contained PuF4 and thus required no added fluoride. Once the plutonium scrap was dissolved, the excess fluoride was complexed with aluminum ion, Al3+, added as aluminum nitrate, Al(NO3)3•9H2O, to limit collateral damage to the process equipment by the corrosive fluoride. Aluminum nitrate also was added in low quantities in processing PuF4.

  12. Thermal Stability Studies of Candidate Decontamination Agents for Hanford’s Plutonium Finishing Plant Plutonium-Contaminated Gloveboxes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Scheele, Randall D.; Cooper, Thurman D.; Jones, Susan A.; Ewalt, John R.; Compton, James A.; Trent, Donald S.; Edwards, Matthew K.; Kozelisky, Anne E.; Scott, Paul A.; Minette, Michael J.

    2005-09-29

    This report provides the results of PNNL's and Fluor's studies of the thermal stabilities of potential wastes arising from decontamination of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant's plutonium contaminated gloveboxes. The candidate wastes arising from the decontamination technologies ceric nitrate/nitric acid, RadPro, Glygel, and Aspigel.

  13. Standard test method for nondestructive assay of plutonium, tritium and 241 Am by calorimetric assay

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2009-01-01

    Standard test method for nondestructive assay of plutonium, tritium and 241 Am by calorimetric assay

  14. Standard practice for the ion exchange separation of uranium and plutonium prior to isotopic analysis

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2008-01-01

    Standard practice for the ion exchange separation of uranium and plutonium prior to isotopic analysis

  15. Estimate of the Sources of Plutonium-Containing Wastes Generated from MOX Fuel Production in Russia

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kudinov, K. G.; Tretyakov, A. A.; Sorokin, Yu. P.; Bondin, V. V.; Manakova, L. F.; Jardine, L. J.

    2002-02-26

    In Russia, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel is produced in a pilot facility ''Paket'' at ''MAYAK'' Production Association. The Mining-Chemical Combine (MCC) has developed plans to design and build a dedicated industrial-scale plant to produce MOX fuel and fuel assemblies (FA) for VVER-1000 water reactors and the BN-600 fast-breeder reactor, which is pending an official Russian Federation (RF) site-selection decision. The design output of the plant is based on a production capacity of 2.75 tons of weapons plutonium per year to produce the resulting fuel assemblies: 1.25 tons for the BN-600 reactor FAs and the remaining 1.5 tons for VVER-1000 FAs. It is likely the quantity of BN-600 FAs will be reduced in actual practice. The process of nuclear disarmament frees a significant amount of weapons plutonium for other uses, which, if unutilized, represents a constant general threat. In France, Great Britain, Belgium, Russia, and Japan, reactor-grade plutonium is used in MOX-fuel production. Making MOX-fuel for CANDU (Canada) and pressurized water reactors (PWR) (Europe) is under consideration in Russia. If this latter production is added, as many as 5 tons of Pu per year might be processed into new FAs in Russia. Many years of work and experience are represented in the estimates of MOX fuel production wastes derived in this report. Prior engineering studies and sludge treatment investigations and comparisons have determined how best to treat Pu sludges and MOX fuel wastes. Based upon analyses of the production processes established by these efforts, we can estimate that there will be approximately 1200 kg of residual wastes subject to immobilization per MT of plutonium processed, of which approximately 6 to 7 kg is Pu in the residuals per MT of Pu processed. The wastes are various and complicated in composition. Because organic wastes constitute both the major portion of total waste and of the Pu to be immobilized, the recommended treatment of MOX-fuel production waste is incineration or calcination, alkali sintering, and dissolution of sintered products in nitric acid. Insoluble residues are then mixed with vitrifying components and Pu sludges, vitrified, and sent for storage and disposal. Implementation of the intergovernmental agreement between Russia and the United States (US) regarding the utilization of 34 tons of weapons plutonium will also require treatment of Pu containing MOX fabrication wastes at the MCC radiochemical production plant.

  16. Co-Design: Fabrication of Unalloyed Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Korzekwa, Deniece R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Knapp, Cameron M. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Korzekwa, David A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Gibbs, John W [Northwestern University

    2012-07-25

    The successful induction casting of plutonium is a challenge which requires technical expertise in areas including physical metallurgy, surface and corrosion chemistry, materials science, electromagnetic engineering and a host of other technologies all which must be applied in concert. Here at LANL, we are employing a combined experimental and computational approach to design molds and develop process parameters needed to produce desired temperature profiles and improved castings. Computer simulations are performed using the commercial code FLOW-3D and the LANL ASC computer code TRUCHAS to reproduce the entire casting process starting with electromagnetic or radiative heating of the mold and metal and continuing through pouring with coupled fluid flow, heat transfer and non-isothermal solidification. This approach greatly reduces the time required to develop a new casting designs and also increases our understanding of the casting process, leading to a more homogeneous, consistent product and better process control. We will discuss recent casting development results in support of unalloyed plutonium rods for mechanical testing.

  17. Plutonium Detection with Straw Neutron Detectors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mukhopadhyay, Sanjoy; Maurer, Richard; Guss, Paul

    2014-03-27

    A kilogram of weapons grade plutonium gives off about 56,000 neutrons per second of which 55,000 neutrons come from spontaneous fission of 240Pu (~6% by weight of the total plutonium). Actually, all even numbered isotopes (238Pu, 240Pu, and 242Pu) produce copious spontaneous fission neutrons. These neutrons induce fission in the surrounding fissile 239Pu with an approximate multiplication of a factor of ~1.9. This multiplication depends on the shape of the fissile materials and the surrounding material. These neutrons (typically of energy 2 MeV and air scattering mean free path >100 meters) can be detected 100 meters away from the source by vehicle-portable neutron detectors. [1] In our current studies on neutron detection techniques, without using 3He gas proportional counters, we designed and developed a portable high-efficiency neutron multiplicity counter using 10B-coated thin tubes called straws. The detector was designed to perform like commercially available fission meters (manufactured by Ortec Corp.) except instead of using 3He gas as a neutron conversion material, we used a thin coating of 10B.

  18. Equation of State of Uranium and Plutonium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Barroso, Dalton Ellery Girão

    2015-01-01

    The objective of this work is to define the parameters of the three-term equation of state for uranium and plutonium, appropriate for conditions in which these materials are subjected to strong shock compressions, as in cylindrical and spherical implosions. The three-term equation of state takes into account the three components of the pressure that resist to compression in the solid: the elastic or "cold" pressure (coulombian repulsion between atoms), the thermal pressure due to vibratory motion of atoms in the lattice of the solid and the thermal pressure of electrons thermally excited. The equation of state defined here permits also to take into account the variation of the specific heat with the transition of the solid to the liquid or gaseous state due to continued growth of temperature in strong shock compressions. In the definition of uranium equation of state, experimental data on the uranium compression, available in the open scientific literature, are used. In the plutonium case, this element was co...

  19. SHIELDING AND DETECTOR RESPONSE CALCULATIONS PERTAINING TO CATEGORY 1 QUANTITIES OF PLUTONIUM AND HAND-HELD PLASTIC SCINTILLATORS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Couture, A.

    2013-06-07

    Nuclear facilities sometimes use hand-held plastic scintillator detectors to detect attempts to divert special nuclear material in situations where portal monitors are impractical. MCNP calculations have been performed to determine the neutron and gamma radiation field arising from a Category I quantity of weapons-grade plutonium in various shielding configurations. The shields considered were composed of combinations of lead and high-density polyethylene such that the mass of the plutonium plus shield was 22.7 kilograms. Monte-Carlo techniques were also used to determine the detector response to each of the shielding configurations. The detector response calculations were verified using field measurements of high-, medium-, and low- energy gamma-ray sources as well as a Cf-252 neutron source.

  20. Description and procedures for synchrotron radiation, small molecule, single crystal crystallography of plutonium complexes at ALS beamline 11.3.1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gorden, A.E.V.; Raymond, K.N.; Shuh, D.K.

    2008-01-01

    Crystallography of Plutonium Complexes at ALS Beamlineof the Structural Parameters of Plutonium Complexes by Smallpreparation and growth of the plutonium complexes (crystals)

  1. Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ackerman, J.P.

    1992-03-17

    A process is described for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished.

  2. The mysterious world of plutonium metallurgy: Past and future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hecker, S.S.; Hammel, E.F. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1998-12-31

    The first atomic bomb detonated at the Trinity Site in New Mexico on July 16, 1945, used plutonium, a man-made element discovered < 5 yr earlier. The story of how Manhattan Project scientists and engineers tackled the mysteries of this element and fabricated it into the first atomic bomb is one of the most fascinating in the history of metallurgy and materials. The authors are currently trying to generate renewed interest in plutonium metallurgy because of the challenge posed by President Clinton, i.e., to keep the nuclear stockpile of weapons safe and reliable without nuclear testing. The stockpile stewardship challenge requires either a lifetime extension of the plutonium components or a remanufacture--neither of which can be verified by testing. In turn, this requires that one achieve a better fundamental understanding of plutonium. Of special interest is the effect of self-irradiation on the properties and on the long-term stability of plutonium and its alloys. Additional challenges arise from long-term concerns about disposing of plutonium and dealing with its environmental legacy. It is imperative to interest the next generation of students in these plutonium challenges.

  3. Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ackerman, John P. (Downers Grove, IL)

    1992-01-01

    A process for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished.

  4. Challenges using a {sup 252}Cf shuffler instrument in a plant environment to measure mixtures of uranium and plutonium transuranic waste

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hurd, J.R.

    1999-08-29

    An active-passive {sup 252}Cf shuffler instrument, installed and certified several years ago at Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium facility, has now been calibrated for different matrices to measure Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)-destined transuranic (TRU) waste. Little or no data currently exist for these types of measurements in plant environments where sudden large changes in the neutron background radiation can significantly distort the results. Measurements and analyses of twenty-two 55-gallon drums, consisting of mixtures of varying quantities of uranium and plutonium in mostly noncombustible matrices, have been recently completed at the plutonium facility. The calibration and measurement techniques, including the method used to separate out the plutonium component, will be presented and discussed. Calculations used to adjust for differences in uranium enrichment from that of the calibration standards will be shown. Methods used to determine various sources of both random and systematic error will be indicated. Particular attention will be directed to those problems identified as arising from the plant environment. The results of studies to quantify the aforementioned distortion effects in the data will be presented. Various solution scenarios will be outlined, along with those adopted here.

  5. Development of NDA instruments for the Los Alamos SIS (Special Isotope Separation) Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Li, T.K.; Rinard, P.M.; Schneider, C.M.; Atencio, J.D.; Hyman, D.H.; Kroncke, K.E.; Painter, J.; Siebelist, R.; Holbrooks, O.; Halbig, J.K.

    1989-01-01

    The Los Alamos Special Isotope Separation Facility produces special plutonium isotopes and converts plutonium scrap by using the molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) process in a gaseous plutonium hexafluoride (PuF/sub 6/) phase. To provide important process-development and accountability information, we have developed and installed four nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments for that facility. These instruments are (1) an in-line plutonium isotopic analysis system to measure plutonium isotopes in gaseous, solid, and liquid phases, (2) an in-line sodium iodide (NaI) monitoring system consisting of six 2-in. by 2-in., two 2-in. by 24-in., and one 2-in. by 22-in. NaI detectors at specified components (a feed bottle, a feed-transfer cold trap, a compressor, a heat exchanger, a collector, a nozzle prefilter, and a tails cold trap) in the flow loop, (3) a portable high-resolution germanium gamma-ray system for plutonium isotopic analysis, and (4) a portable NaI gamma-ray holdup monitor. This paper discusses the measurement principles, hardware and software designs, and performance associated with these NDA instruments. 2 refs, 11 figs., 2 tabs.

  6. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

  7. Theory of Antineutrino Monitoring of Burning MOX Plutonium Fuels

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    A. C. Hayes; H. R. Trellue; Michael Martin Nieto; W. B. WIlson

    2011-10-03

    This letter presents the physics and feasibility of reactor antineutrino monitoring to verify the burnup of plutonium loaded in the reactor as a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel. It examines the magnitude and temporal variation in the antineutrino signals expected for different MOX fuels, for the purposes of nuclear accountability and safeguards. The antineutrino signals from reactor-grade and weapons-grade MOX are shown to be distinct from those from burning low enriched uranium. Thus, antineutrino monitoring could be used to verify the destruction of plutonium in reactors, though verifying the grade of the plutonium being burned is found to be more challenging.

  8. Theory of Antineutrino Monitoring of Burning MOX Plutonium Fuels

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hayes, A C; Nieto, Michael Martin; WIlson, W B

    2011-01-01

    This letter presents the physics and feasibility of reactor antineutrino monitoring to verify the burnup of plutonium loaded in the reactor as a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel. It examines the magnitude and temporal variation in the antineutrino signals expected for different MOX fuels, for the purposes of nuclear accountability and safeguards. The antineutrino signals from reactor-grade and weapons-grade MOX are shown to be distinct from those from burning low enriched uranium. Thus, antineutrino monitoring could be used to verify the destruction of plutonium in reactors, though verifying the grade of the plutonium being burned is found to be more challenging.

  9. Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium 1999 plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1999-01-30

    The purpose of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium is to serve the Texas Panhandle, the State of Texas and the US Department of Energy by: conducting scientific and technical research; advising decision makers; and providing information on nuclear weapons materials and related environment, safety, health, and nonproliferation issues while building academic excellence in science and technology. This paper describes the electronic resource library which provides the national archives of technical, policy, historical, and educational information on plutonium. Research projects related to the following topics are described: Environmental restoration and protection; Safety and health; Waste management; Education; Training; Instrumentation development; Materials science; Plutonium processing and handling; and Storage.

  10. ISIS Facility: Facility Design Challenges

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McDonald, Kirk

    ISIS Facility: Facility Design Challenges Matt Fletcher Head, Design Division ISIS Department, FNAL #12;ISIS -- neutrons Diamond -- X-rays #12;#12;· Lifetime · Reliable Operation · Flexibility

  11. Mobile cinema

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pan, Pengkai, 1972-

    2004-01-01

    This thesis develops techniques and methods that extend the art and craft of storytelling, and in particular enable the creation of mobile cinema. Stories are always constrained by the medium in which they are told and the ...

  12. Risk assessment of soil-based exposures to plutonium at experimental sites located on the Nevada Test Site and adjoining areas

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Layton, D.W.; Anspaugh, L.R.; Bogen, K.T.; Straume, T.

    1993-06-01

    In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a series of tests was conducted at or near the Nevada Test Site to study issues involving plutonium-bearing devices. These tests resulted in the dispersal of about 5 TBq of {sup 239,240}Pu on the surficial soils at the test locations. Access to the sites is strictly controlled; therefore, it does not constitute a threat to human health at the present time. However, because the residual {sup 239} Pu decays slowly (half-life of 24,110 y), the sites could indeed represent a long-term hazard if they are not remediated and if institutional controls are lost. To investigate the magnitude of the potential health risks for this no-remediation case, we defined three basic exposure scenarios that could bring individuals in contact with {sup 239,240}Pu at the sites: (1) a resident living in a subdivision located at a test site, (2) a resident farmer, and (3) a worker at a commercial facility. Our screening analyses indicated that doses to organs are dominated by the intemal deposition of Pu via the inhalation pathway, and thus our risk assessment focused on those factors that affect inhalation exposures and associated doses, including inhalation rates, activity patterns, tenure at a residence or occupation, indoor/outdoor air relationships, and resuspension outdoors. Cancer risks were calculated as a function of lifetime cumulative doses to the key target organs (i.e., bone surface, liver, and lungs) and risk factors for those organs. Uncertainties in the predicted cancer risks were analyzed using Monte-Carlo simulations of the probability distributions used to represent assessment parameters. The principal sources of uncertainty in the estimated risks were population mobility, the relationship between indoor and outdoor contaminant levels, and the dose and risk factors for bone, liver, and lung.

  13. ARM - ARM Mobile Facility 1 Article

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach HomeA Better Anode Design to Improve4AJ01) (See EnergyCurrent : 0.0 Waiting for0govFieldCampaignsARM

  14. Mobile Agent Software Applied in Maintenance Scheduling X. Xu M. Kezunovic

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mobile Agent Software Applied in Maintenance Scheduling X. Xu M. Kezunovic Department of Electrical different entities is required. In this paper, the mobile agent software is applied in the facility consuming and error-prone. The Concordia mobile agent software provides a flexible framework for mobile

  15. Plutonium and Americium Geochemistry at Hanford: A Site Wide Review

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cantrell, Kirk J.; Felmy, Andrew R.

    2012-08-23

    This report was produced to provide a systematic review of the state-of-knowledge of plutonium and americium geochemistry at the Hanford Site. The report integrates existing knowledge of the subsurface migration behavior of plutonium and americium at the Hanford Site with available information in the scientific literature regarding the geochemistry of plutonium and americium in systems that are environmentally relevant to the Hanford Site. As a part of the report, key research needs are identified and prioritized, with the ultimate goal of developing a science-based capability to quantitatively assess risk at sites contaminated with plutonium and americium at the Hanford Site and the impact of remediation technologies and closure strategies.

  16. Worker Involvement Improves Safety at Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Employees at the Hanford site are working together to find new and innovative ways to stay safe at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, one of the site’s most complex decommissioning projects.

  17. Development of the Direct Fabrication Process for Plutonium Immobilization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Congdon, J.W.

    2001-07-10

    The current baseline process for fabricating pucks for the Plutonium Immobilization Program includes granulation of the milled feed prior to compaction. A direct fabrication process was demonstrated that eliminates the need for granulation.

  18. Crystalline ceramics: Waste forms for the disposal of weapons plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W. [New Mexico Univ., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Weber, W.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

    1995-05-01

    At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (i) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (ii) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass ``logs``; (iii) deep borehole disposal (National Academy of Sciences Report, 1994). The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramics apatite, pyrochlore, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium.

  19. Plutonium Isotopes in the Terrestrial Environment at the Savannah...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    a mixture of weapons-grade, higher burn-up, and fallout material. This study provides a blue print for long term low level monitoring of plutonium in the environment. Authors:...

  20. Process for immobilizing plutonium into vitreous ceramic waste forms

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Feng, X.; Einziger, R.E.

    1997-01-28

    Disclosed is a method for converting spent nuclear fuel and surplus plutonium into a vitreous ceramic final waste form wherein spent nuclear fuel is bound in a crystalline matrix which is in turn bound within glass.

  1. Process for immobilizing plutonium into vitreous ceramic waste forms

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Feng, X.; Einziger, R.E.

    1997-08-12

    Disclosed is a method for converting spent nuclear fuel and surplus plutonium into a vitreous ceramic final waste form wherein spent nuclear fuel is bound in a crystalline matrix which is in turn bound within glass.

  2. Process for immobilizing plutonium into vitreous ceramic waste forms

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Feng, Xiangdong (Richland, WA); Einziger, Robert E. (Richland, WA)

    1997-01-01

    Disclosed is a method for converting spent nuclear fuel and surplus plutonium into a vitreous ceramic final waste form wherein spent nuclear fuel is bound in a crystalline matrix which is in turn bound within glass.

  3. Neutronic analysis of a proposed plutonium recycle assembly

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Solan, George Michael

    1975-01-01

    A method for the neutronic analysis of plutonium recycle assemblies has been developed with emphasis on relative power distribution prediction in the boundary area of vastly different spectral regions. Such regions are ...

  4. Interactions of Plutonium and Lanthanides with Ordered Mesoporous Materials

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Parsons-Moss, Tashi

    2014-01-01

    59 vii Figure 3.15. Pourbaix diagram for plutonium in aThere are several published Pourbaix diagrams that describeis also worth noting that Pourbaix diagrams describe systems

  5. Evolving Metallurgical Behaviors in Plutonium from Self-Irradiation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chung, B W; Lema, K E; Hiromoto, D S

    2009-05-05

    The plutonium alpha-decay leads to the age-related changes in physical properties. We review our experimental approaches including analytical techniques to assess the effects of extended aging on plutonium alloys, together with our recent results on age-related changes in physical and static mechanical properties. The ultimate goal of this work is to develop capabilities to predict metallurgical evolution driven by aging effects.

  6. Fuel bundle design for enhanced usage of plutonium fuel

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Reese, A.P.; Stachowski, R.E.

    1995-08-08

    A nuclear fuel bundle includes a square array of fuel rods each having a concentration of enriched uranium and plutonium. Each rod of an interior array of the rods also has a concentration of gadolinium. The interior array of rods is surrounded by an exterior array of rods void of gadolinium. By this design, usage of plutonium in the nuclear reactor is enhanced. 10 figs.

  7. Assessment of plutonium exposure in the Enewetak population by urinalysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sun, L.C.; Meinhold, C.B.; Moorthy, A.R.

    1997-07-01

    Since 1980, the inhabitants of Enewetak Atoll have been monitored periodically by scientists from Brookhaven National Laboratory for internally deposited radioactive material. In 1989, the establishment of fission track analysis and of a protocol for shipboard collection of 24-h urine samples significantly improved our ability to assess the internal uptake of plutonium. The purpose of this report is to show the distribution of plutonium concentrations in urine collected in 1989 and 1991, and to assess the associated committed effective doses for the Enewetak population based on a long-term chronic uptake of low-level plutonium. To estimate dose, we derived the plutonium dose-per-unit-uptake coefficients based on the dosimetric system of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. Assuming a continuous uptake, an integrated Jones`s plutonium urine excretion function was developed to interpret the Enewetak urine data. The Appendix shows how these values were derived. The committed effective doses were 0.2 mSv, calculated from the 1991 average plutonium content in 69 urine samples. 29 refs., 3 tabs.

  8. Program of Study Research Facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Thomas, Andrew

    of mobile, spatial, and context-aware technologies, the building of interoperable coordinated information live and communicate. The information technology sector will continue to grow and evolve over the yearsProgram of Study Research Facilities Financial Aid Spatial technologies are changing relations

  9. Determining Plutonium Mass in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay Techniques NGSI Research Overview and Update on NDA Techniques

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    A., V. Mozin, S.J. Tobin, L.W. Cambell, J.R. Cheatham, C.R. Freeman, C.J. Gesh,

    2012-01-01

    Determining Plutonium Mass in Spent Fuel with Non-CN-184/137 Determining Plutonium Mass in Spent Fuel withthe Direct Measurement of Plutonium in Spent LWR Fuels by

  10. Disposition of excess plutonium using ``off-spec`` MOX pellets as a sintered ceramic waste form

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Jardine, L.J.

    1996-02-01

    The authors describe a potential strategy for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium in a way that minimizes (1) technological risks, (2) implementation costs and completion schedules, and (3) requirements for constructing and operating new or duplicative Pu disposition facilities. This is accomplished by an optimized combination of (1) using existing nuclear power reactors to ``burn`` relatively pure excess Pu inventories as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and (2) using the same MOX fuel fabrication facilities to fabricate contaminated or impure excess Pu inventories into an ``off-spec`` MOX solid ceramic waste form for geologic disposition. Diversion protection for the SCWF to meet the ``spent fuel standard`` introduced by the National Academy of Sciences can be achieved in at least three ways. (1) One can utilize the radiation field from defense high-level nuclear waste by first packaging the SCWF pellets in 2- to 4-L cans that are subsequently encapsulated in radioactive glass in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) glass canisters (a ``can-in-canister`` approach). (2) One can add {sup 137}Cs (recovered from defense wastes at Hanford and currently stored as CsCl in capsules) to an encapsulating matrix such as cement for the SCWF pellets in a small hot-cell facility and thus fabricate large monolithic forms. (3) The SCWF can be fabricated into reactor fuel-like pellets and placed in tubes similar to fuel assemblies, which can then be mixed in sealed repository containers with irradiated spent nuclear fuel for geologic disposition.

  11. Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tobin, S. J.; Sandoval, N. P.; Fensin, M. L.; Lee, S. Y.; Ludewigt, Bernhard A.; Menlovea, H. O.; Quiter, B. J.; Rajasingume, A.; Schearf, M. A.; Smith, L. E.; Swinhoe, M. T.; Thompson, S. J.

    2009-06-30

    There are a variety of reasons for quantifying plutonium (Pu) in spent fuel such as independently verifying the Pu content declared by a regulated facility, making shipper/receiver mass declarations, and quantifying the input mass at a reprocessing facility. As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, NA-241 has recently funded a multilab/university collaboration to determine the elemental Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies. This research effort is anticipated to be a five year effort: the first part of which is a two years Monte Carlo modeling effort to integrate and down-select among 13 nondestructive assay (NDA) technologies, followed by one year for fabricating instruments and then two years for measuring spent fuel. This paper gives a brief overview of the approach being taken for the Monte Carlo research effort. In addition, preliminary results for the first NDA instrument studied in detail, delayed neutron detection, will be presented. In order to cost effectively and robustly model the performance of several NDA techniques, an"assembly library" was created that contains a diverse range of pressurized water reactor spent fuel assemblies (burnup, enrichment, cooling time) similar to that which exists in spent pools today and in the future, diversion scenarios that capture a range of possible rod removal options, spatial and isotopic detail needed to accurately quantify the capability of all the NDA techniques so as to enable integration. Integration is being designed into this study from the beginning since it is expected that the best performance will be obtained by combining a few NDA techniques. The performance of each instrument will be quantified for the full assembly library in three different media: air, water and borated water. In this paper the preliminary capability of delayed neutron detection will be quantified for the spent fuel library for all three media. The 13 NDA techniques being researched are the following: Delayed Gamma, Delayed Neutrons, Differential Die-Away, Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation, Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer, Neutron Multiplicity, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence, Passive Prompt Gamma, Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity, Self-integration Neutron Resonance Densitometry, Total Neutron (Gross Neutron), X-Ray Fluorescence, 252Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron Detection.

  12. LAB-SCALE DEMONSTRATION OF PLUTONIUM PURIFICATION BY ANION EXCHANGE, PLUTONIUM (IV) OXALATE PRECIPITATION, AND CALCINATION TO PLUTONIUM OXIDE TO SUPPORT THE MOX FEED MISSION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Crowder, M.; Pierce, R.

    2012-08-22

    H-Canyon and HB-Line are tasked with the production of PuO{sub 2} from a feed of plutonium metal. The PuO{sub 2} will provide feed material for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. After dissolution of the Pu metal in H-Canyon, the solution will be transferred to HB-Line for purification by anion exchange. Subsequent unit operations include Pu(IV) oxalate precipitation, filtration and calcination to form PuO{sub 2}. This report details the results from SRNL anion exchange, precipitation, filtration, calcination, and characterization tests, as requested by HB-Line1 and described in the task plan. This study involved an 80-g batch of Pu and employed test conditions prototypical of HB-Line conditions, wherever feasible. In addition, this study integrated lessons learned from earlier anion exchange and precipitation and calcination studies. H-Area Engineering selected direct strike Pu(IV) oxalate precipitation to produce a more dense PuO{sub 2} product than expected from Pu(III) oxalate precipitation. One benefit of the Pu(IV) approach is that it eliminates the need for reduction by ascorbic acid. The proposed HB-Line precipitation process involves a digestion time of 5 minutes after the time (44 min) required for oxalic acid addition. These were the conditions during HB-line production of neptunium oxide (NpO{sub 2}). In addition, a series of small Pu(IV) oxalate precipitation tests with different digestion times were conducted to better understand the effect of digestion time on particle size, filtration efficiency and other factors. To test the recommended process conditions, researchers performed two nearly-identical larger-scale precipitation and calcination tests. The calcined batches of PuO{sub 2} were characterized for density, specific surface area (SSA), particle size, moisture content, and impurities. Because the 3013 Standard requires that the calcination (or stabilization) process eliminate organics, characterization of PuO{sub 2} batches monitored the presence of oxalate by thermogravimetric analysis-mass spectrometry (TGA-MS). To use the TGA-MS for carbon or oxalate content, some method development will be required. However, the TGA-MS is already used for moisture measurements. Therefore, SRNL initiated method development for the TGA-MS to allow quantification of oxalate or total carbon. That work continues at this time and is not yet ready for use in this study. However, the collected test data can be reviewed later as those analysis tools are available.

  13. Estimate of the Sources of Plutonium-Containing Wastes Generated from MOX Fuel Production in Russia

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kudinov, K.G.; Tretyakov, A.A.; Sorokin, Y.P.; Bondin, V.V.; Manakova, L.F.; Jardine, L.J.

    2001-12-01

    In Russia, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel is produced in a pilot facility ''Paket'' at ''MAYAK'' Production Association. The Mining-Chemical Combine (MCC) has developed plans to design and build a dedicated industrial-scale plant to produce MOX fuel and fuel assemblies (FA) for VVER-1000 water reactors and the BN-600 fast-breeder reactor, which is pending an official Russian Federation (RF) site-selection decision. The design output of the plant is based on production capacity of 2.75 tons of weapons plutonium per year to produce the resulting fuel assemblies: 1.25 tons for the BN-600 reactor FAs and the remaining 1.5 tons for VVER-1000 FAs. It is likely the quantity of BN-600 FAs will be reduced in actual practice. The process of nuclear disarmament frees a significant amount of weapons plutonium for other uses, which, if unutilized, represents a constant general threat. In France, Great Britain, Belgium, Russia, and Japan, reactor-grade plutonium is used in MOX-fuel production. Making MOX-fuel for CANDU (Canada) and pressurized water reactors (PWR) (Europe) is under consideration Russia. If this latter production is added, as many as 5 tons of Pu per year might be processed into new FAs in Russia. Many years of work and experience are represented in the estimates of MOX fuel production wastes derived in this report. Prior engineering studies and sludge treatment investigations and comparisons have determined how best to treat Pu sludges and MOX fuel wastes. Based upon analyses of the production processes established by these efforts, we can estimate that there will be approximately 1200 kg of residual wastes subject to immobilization per MT of plutonium processed, of which approximately 6 to 7 kg is Pu in the residuals per MT of Pu processed. The wastes are various and complicated in composition. Because organic wastes constitute both the major portion of total waste and of the Pu to be immobilized, the recommended treatment of MOX-fuel production waste is incineration or calcination, alkali sintering, and dissolution of sintered products in nitric acid. Insoluble residues are then mixed with vitrifying components and Pu sludges, vitrified, and sent for storage and disposal.

  14. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 366: Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2013-12-31

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 366 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended).

  15. THE CREATIVE APPLICATION OF SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY & WORK FORCE INNOVATIONS TO THE D&D OF PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) AT THE HANFORD NUCLEAR RESERVATION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    CHARBONEAU, S.L.

    2006-02-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) consists of a number of process and support buildings for handling plutonium. Building construction began in the late 1940's to meet national priorities and became operational in 1950 producing refined plutonium salts and metal for the United States nuclear weapons program. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material for fabrication into a nuclear device for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race. PFP has now completed its mission and is fully engaged in deactivation, decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). At this time the PFP buildings are planned to be reduced to ground level (slab-on-grade) and the site remediated to satisfy national, Department of Energy (DOE) and Washington state requirements. The D&D of a highly contaminated plutonium processing facility presents a plethora of challenges. PFP personnel approached the D&D mission with a can-do attitude. They went into D&D knowing they were facing a lot of challenges and unknowns. There were concerns about the configuration control associated with drawings of these old process facilities. There were unknowns regarding the location of electrical lines and process piping containing chemical residues such as strong acids and caustics. The gloveboxes were highly contaminated with plutonium and chemical residues. Most of the glovebox windows were opaque with splashed process chemicals that coated the windows or etched them, reducing visibility to near zero. Visibility into the glovebox was a serious worker concern. Additionally, all the gloves in the gloveboxes were degraded and unusable. Replacing gloves in gloveboxes was necessary to even begin glovebox cleanout. The sheer volume of breathing air needed was also an issue. These and other challenges and PFP's approach to overcome these challengers are described. Many of the challenges to the D&D work at PFP were met with innovative approaches based on new science and/or technology and many were also based on the creativity and motivation of the work force personnel.

  16. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1996-10-24

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  17. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-11-16

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  18. Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium. Quarterly technical progress report, May 1, 1997--July 31, 1997

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-09-01

    Progress summaries are provided from the Amarillo National Center for Plutonium. Programs include the plutonium information resource center, environment, public health, and safety, education and training, nuclear and other material studies.

  19. Follow-up on the Management of Plutonium-239 Sealed Sources Recovery...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    on the Management of Plutonium-239 Sealed Sources Recovery Activities, OAS-M-06-09 Follow-up on the Management of Plutonium-239 Sealed Sources Recovery Activities, OAS-M-06-09 The...

  20. Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium. Quarterly technical progress report, February 1, 1998--April 30, 1998

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-06-01

    Activities from the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium are described. Areas of work include materials science of nuclear and explosive materials, plutonium processing and handling, robotics, and storage.

  1. The Effect of Sedimentation on Plutonium Transport in Fourmile Branch

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chen, K.F.

    2002-02-21

    The major mechanisms of radioactive material transport and fate in surface water are sources, dilution, advection and dispersion of radionuclides by flow and surface waves, radionuclide decay, and interaction between sediment and radionuclides. STREAM II, an aqueous transport module of the Savannah River Site emergency response WIND system, accounts for the source term, and the effects of dilution, advection and dispersion. Although the model has the capability to account for nuclear decay, due to the short time interval of interest for emergency response, the effect of nuclear decay is very small and so it is not employed. The interactions between the sediment and radionuclides are controlled by the flow conditions and physical and chemical characteristics of the radionuclides and the sediment constituents. The STREAM II version used in emergency response must provide results relatively quickly; it therefore does not model the effects of sediment deposition/resuspension. This study estimates the effects of sediment deposition/resuspension on aqueous plutonium transport in Fourmile Branch. There are no measured data on plutonium transport through surface water available for direct model calibration. Therefore, a literature search was conducted to find the range of plutonium partition coefficients based on laboratory experiments and field measurements. A sensitivity study of the calculated plutonium peak concentrations as a function of the input parameter of partition coefficient was then performed. Finally, an estimation of the plutonium partition coefficient was made for the Fourmile Branch.

  2. Chloride-catalyzed corrosion of plutonium in glovebox atmospheres

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burgess, M. [ed.; Haschke, J.M.; Allen, T.H.; Morales, L.A.; Jarboe, D.M.; Puglisi, C.V.

    1998-04-01

    Characterization of glovebox atmospheres and the black reaction product formed on plutonium surfaces shows that the abnormally rapid corrosion of components in the fabrication line is consistent with a complex salt-catalyzed reaction involving gaseous hydrogen chloride (HCl) and water. Analytical data verify that chlorocarbon and HCl vapors are presented in stagnant glovebox atmospheres. Hydrogen chloride concentrations approach 7 ppm at some locations in the glovebox line. The black corrosion product is identified as plutonium monoxide monohydride (PuOH), a product formed by hydrolysis of plutonium in liquid water and salt solutions at room temperature. Plutonium trichloride (PuCl{sub 3}) produced by reaction of HCl at the metal surface is deliquescent and apparently forms a highly concentrated salt solution by absorbing moisture from the glovebox atmosphere. Rapid corrosion is attributed to the ensuing salt-catalyzed reaction between plutonium and water. Experimental results are discussed, possible involvement of hydrogen fluoride (HF) is examined, and methods of corrective action are presented in this report.

  3. Plutonium disposition study phase 1b final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1993-09-15

    This report provides the results of the Westinghouse activities performed as part of the Plutonium Disposition Study Phase 1b. These activities, which took place from May 16, 1993 to September 15, 1993, build upon the work completed in Phase 1a, which concluded on May 15, 1993. In Phase 1a, three Plutonium Disposal Reactor (PDR) options were developed for the disposal of excess weapons grade plutonium from returned and dismantled nuclear weapons. This report documents the results of several tasks that were performed to further knowledge in specific areas leading up to Phase 2 of the PDR Study. The Westinghouse activities for Phase 1b are summarized as follows: (1) resolved technical issues concerning reactor physics including equilibrium cycle calculations, use of gadolinium, moderator temperature coefficient, and others as documented in Section 2.0; (2) analyzed large Westinghouse commercial plants for plutonium disposal; (3) reactor safety issues including the steam line break were resolved, and are included in Section 2.0; (4) several tasks related to the PDR Fuel Cycle were examined; (5) cost and deployment options were examined to determine optimal configuration for both plutonium disposal and tritium production; (6) response to questions from DOE and National Academy of Scientists (NAS) reviewers concerning the PDR Phase 1a report are included in Appendix A.

  4. PRESSURE DEVELOPMENT IN SEALED CONTAINERS WITH PLUTONIUM BEARING MATERIALS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duffey, J.; Livingston, R.

    2010-02-01

    Gas generation by plutonium-bearing materials in sealed containers has been studied. The gas composition and pressure are determined over periods from months to years. The Pu-bearing materials studied represent those produced by all of the major processes used by DOE in the processing of plutonium and include the maximum amount of water (0.5% by weight) allowed by DOE's 3013 Standard. Hydrogen generation is of high interest and the Pu-bearing materials can be classed according to how much hydrogen is generated. Hydrogen generation by high-purity plutonium oxides packaged under conditions typical for actual 3013 materials is minimal, with very low generation rates and low equilibrium pressures. Materials with chloride salt impurities have much higher hydrogen gas generation rates and result in the highest observed equilibrium hydrogen pressures. Other materials such as those with high metal oxide impurities generate hydrogen at rates in between these extremes. The fraction of water that is converted to hydrogen gas as equilibrium is approached ranges from 0% to 25% under conditions typical of materials packaged to the 3013 Standard. Generation of both hydrogen and oxygen occurs when liquid water is present. The material and moisture conditions that result in hydrogen and oxygen generation for high-purity plutonium oxide and chloride salt-bearing plutonium oxide materials have been characterized. Other gases that are observed include nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and methane.

  5. Project management plan, Waste Receiving and Processing Facility, Module 1, Project W-026

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Starkey, J.G.

    1993-05-01

    The Hanford Waste Receiving and Processing Facility Module 1 Project (WRAP 1) has been established to support the retrieval and final disposal of approximately 400K grams of plutonium and quantities of hazardous components currently stored in drums at the Hanford Site.

  6. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Chemistry and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    . Capabilities Supporting National Security The CMR houses key capabilities for analytical chemistry, uraniumCMR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building supports research and experimental activities for plutonium and uranium

  7. EIS-0089: PUREX Plant and Uranium Oxide Plant Facilities, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The U.S. Department of Energy developed this statement to evaluate the environmental impacts of resumption of operations of the PUREX/Uranium Oxide facilities at the Hanford Site to produce plutonium and other special nuclear materials for national defense needs.

  8. Plutonium-238 observations as a test of modeled transport and surface deposition of meteoric smoke particles

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chipperfield, Martyn

    Plutonium-238 observations as a test of modeled transport and surface deposition of meteoric smoke chemistry-climate model (CCM) to simulate the transport and deposition of plutonium- 238 oxide nanoparticles. P. Chipperfield, and J. M. C. Plane (2013), Plutonium-238 observations as a test of modeled

  9. Spallation-Fission Competition in Heaviest Elements; Helium Ion Induced Reactions in Plutonium Isotopes

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Glass, Richard A.; Carr, Robert J.; Cobble, James W.; Seaborg, Glenn T.

    1956-01-01

    Nuclear Energy Series, Plutonium Project Record, Vol. 1 4Nuclear Energy S e r i e s , Plutonium P r o j e c t RecordNuclear Energy S e r i e s , Plutonium P r o j e c t Record,

  10. Orientation Imaging Microscopy of Plutonium: Grain Structure and Oxidation David P. Moore1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Orientation Imaging Microscopy of Plutonium: Grain Structure and Oxidation David P. Moore1 , Amanda the microstructure and oxidation of plutonium (Pu) in recent years. Two of the more powerful techniques for studying widely used in many areas of materials science, their application to plutonium is still largely

  11. j . Phycol. 17, 346-352 (1981) SORPTION OF PLUTONIUM-237 BY TWO SPECIES OF

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yen, Jeannette

    1981-01-01

    j . Phycol. 17, 346-352 (1981) SORPTION OF PLUTONIUM-237 BY TWO SPECIES OF MARINE PHYTOPLANKTON factor; phytoplankton, ma- rine; radionuclide; plutonium-237; sorption kinetics, pas- sive mechanism in the biological control of radionuclide distribtuion in aquatic systems. Algae, when exposed to plutonium

  12. Acoustic Measurements of the Elastic Properties and Quality of Plutonium and Uranium Based Oxide Fuels

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Acoustic Measurements of the Elastic Properties and Quality of Plutonium and Uranium Based Oxide ranged from depleted uranium oxide to mixtures of plutonium and depleted uranium oxide (MOX) and mixed.8Pu0.2 92 121 152.6 63.3 281Plutonium Futures -- The Science 2010, September 19-23, 2010, Keystone, CO

  13. Standard practice for preparation and dissolution of plutonium materials for analysis

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2008-01-01

    1.1 This practice is a compilation of dissolution techniques for plutonium materials that are applicable to the test methods used for characterizing these materials. Dissolution treatments for the major plutonium materials assayed for plutonium or analyzed for other components are listed. Aliquants of the dissolved samples are dispensed on a weight basis when one of the analyses must be highly reliable, such as plutonium assay; otherwise they are dispensed on a volume basis. 1.2 The treatments, in order of presentation, are as follows: Procedure Title Section Dissolution of Plutonium Metal with Hydrochloric Acid 9.1 Dissolution of Plutonium Metal with Sulfuric Acid 9.2 Dissolution of Plutonium Oxide and Uranium-Plutonium Mixed Oxide by the Sealed-Reflux Technique 9.3 Dissolution of Plutonium Oxide and Uranium-Plutonium Mixed Oxides by Sodium Bisulfate Fusion 9.4 Dissolution of Uranium-Plutonium Mixed Oxides and Low-Fired Plutonium Oxide in Beakers 9.5 1.3 The values stated in SI units are to be re...

  14. Evidence for Hydrogen Induced Vacancies in Plutonium Metal Scott Richmond, Joseph Anderson, Jeff Abes

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Evidence for Hydrogen Induced Vacancies in Plutonium Metal Scott Richmond, Joseph Anderson, Jeff@lanl.gov INTRODUCTION The solubility of hydrogen in plutonium metal was recently measured [1]. Based on the solubility data, the properties of plutonium and helium release data, the authors will show that hydrogen induced

  15. Neutron and gamma-ray cross-correlation measurements of plutonium oxide powder

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Eustice, Ryan

    Neutron and gamma-ray cross-correlation measurements of plutonium oxide powder S.D. Clarke a,Ã, M: Cross-correlation Plutonium oxide Special nuclear material Liquid scintillator MCNP-PoliMi a b s t r a c t For the first time, measurements of the time-dependent cross-correlation distributions of plutonium oxide have

  16. Relativistic density functional theory modeling of plutonium and americium higher oxide molecules

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Titov, Anatoly

    Relativistic density functional theory modeling of plutonium and americium higher oxide molecules of plutonium and americium higher oxide molecules Andréi Zaitsevskii,1,2,a) Nikolai S. Mosyagin,2,3 Anatoly V of plutonium and americium higher oxide molecules (actinide oxidation states VI through VIII) by two

  17. Density and Tensile Properties Changed by Aging Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chung, B W; Choi, B W; Thompson, S R; Woods, C H; Hopkins, D J; Ebbinghaus, B B

    2005-03-14

    We present volume, density, and tensile property change observed from both naturally and accelerated aged plutonium alloys. Accelerated alloys are plutonium alloys with a fraction of Pu-238 to accelerate the aging process by approximately 18 times the rate of unaged weapons-grade plutonium. After thirty-five equivalent years of aging on accelerated alloys, the dilatometry shows the samples at 35 C have swelled in volume by 0.12 to 0.14% and now exhibit a near linear volume increase due to helium in-growth while showing possible surface effects on samples at 50 C and 65 C. The engineering stress of the accelerated alloy at 18 equivalent years increased significantly compared to at 4.5 equivalent years.

  18. Thermal Cycling on Fatigue Failure of the Plutonium Vitrification Melter

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jordan, Jeffrey; Gorczyca, Jennifer

    2009-02-11

    One method for disposition of excess plutonium is vitrification into cylindrical wasteforms. Due to the hazards of working with plutonium, the vitrification process must be carried out remotely in a shielded environment. Thus, the equipment must be easily maintained. With their simple design, induction melters satisfy this criterion, making them ideal candidates for plutonium vitrification. However, due to repeated heating and cooling cycles and differences in coefficients of thermal expansion of contacting materials fatigue failure of the induction melter is of concern. Due to the cost of the melter, the number of cycles to failure is critical. This paper presents a method for determining the cycles to failure for an induction melter by using the results from thermal and structural analyses as input to a fatigue failure model.

  19. Supercritical fluid carbon dioxide cleaning of plutonium parts

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hale, S.J.

    1991-12-31

    Supercritical fluid carbon dioxide is under investigation in this work for use as a cleaning solvent for the final cleaning of plutonium parts. These parts must be free of organic residue to avoid corrosion in the stockpile. Initial studies on stainless steel and full-scale mock-up parts indicate that the oils of interest are easily and adequately cleaned from the metal surfaces with supercritical fluid carbon dioxide. Results from compatibility studies show that undesirable oxidation or other surface reactions are not occurring during exposure of plutonium to the supercritical fluid. Cleaning studies indicate that the oils of interest are removed from the plutonium surface under relatively mild conditions. These studies indicate that supercritical fluid carbon dioxide is a very promising cleaning medium for this application.

  20. Mobile workstation for decontamination and decommissioning operations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Whittaker, W.L.; Osborn, J.F.; Thompson, B.R.

    1993-10-01

    This project is an interdisciplinary effort to develop effective mobile worksystems for decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of facilities within the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. These mobile worksystems will be configured to operate within the environmental and logistical constraints of such facilities and to perform a number of work tasks. Our program is designed to produce a mobile worksystem with capabilities and features that are matched to the particular needs of D&D work by evolving the design through a series of technological developments, performance tests and evaluations. The project has three phases. In this the first phase, an existing teleoperated worksystem, the Remote Work Vehicle (developed for use in the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Building basement), was enhanced for telerobotic performance of several D&D operations. Its ability to perform these operations was then assessed through a series of tests in a mockup facility that contained generic structures and equipment similar to those that D&D work machines will encounter in DOE facilities. Building upon the knowledge gained through those tests and evaluations, a next generation mobile worksystem, the RWV II, and a more advanced controller will be designed, integrated and tested in the second phase, which is scheduled for completion in January 1995. The third phase of the project will involve testing of the RWV II in the real DOE facility.

  1. Plutonium (III) and uranium (III) nitrile complexes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Enriquez, A. E.; Matonic, J. H.; Scott, B. L.; Neu, M. P.

    2002-01-01

    Iodine oxidation of uranium and plutonium metals in tetrahydrofuran and pyridine form AnI{sub 3}(THF){sub 4} and AnI{sub 3}(py){sub 4} (An = Pu, U). These compounds represent convenient entries Into solution An(III) chemistry in organic solvents. Extensions of the actinide metal oxidation methodology in nitrile solvents by I{sub 2}, AgPF{sub 6}, and TIPF{sub 6} are presented here. Treatment of Pu{sup 0} in acetonitrile with iodine yields a putative PuI{sub 3}(NCMe){sub x} intermediate which can be trapped with the tripodal nitrogen donor ligand tpza (tpza = (tris[(2-pyrazinyl)methyl]amine)) and forms the eight-coordinate complex (tpza)PuI{sub 3}(NCMe). Treatment of excess U{sup 0} metal by iodine in acetonitrile afforded a brown crystalline mixed valence complex, [U(NCMe){sub 9}][UI{sub 6}][I], instead of UI{sub 3}(NCMe){sub 4}. The analogous reaction in bezonitrile forms red crystalline UI{sub 4}(NCPh){sub 4}. In contrast, treatment of UI{sub 3}(THF){sub 4} with excess acetonitrile cleanly generates [U(NCMe){sub 9}][I]{sub 3}. Oxidation of Pu{sup 0} by either TI(I) or Ag(I) hexafluorophosphate salts generates a nine-coordinate homoleptic acetonitrile adduct [Pu(NCMe){sub 9}][PF{sub 6}]{sub 3}. Attempts to oxidize U{sub 0} with these salts were unsuccessful.

  2. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-10-02

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. {open_quotes}Military{close_quotes} refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. {open_quotes}Excess{close_quotes} refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. {open_quotes}Monitoring{close_quotes} is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

  3. A technical basis for proliferation-resistant plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laidler, J.; DeVolpi, A.

    1995-12-01

    Final disposition of fissile materials cannot be reached without intermediate stages. Major uncertainties now exist in the physical and chemical form suitable for ultimate disposition. Forecasts are heavily dependent on interim experience and on policy evolution. Meanwhile, technical options for disposition can be examined and tested. Two of these options -- pyrochemical conditioning and vitrification -- have been the subject of research and development at Argonne. Using these technologies, weapons plutonium could be demilitarized by being blended with spent fuel. End-products suitable for disposal of weapons plutonium are particularly controversial because of factors associated with alternative energy uses, potential recovery for weapons, nuclear safeguards, criticality safety, and changing standards.

  4. Minutes of the 28th Annual Plutonium Sample Exchange Meeting. Part II: metal sample exchange

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1984-01-01

    Contents of this publication include the following list of participating laboratories; agenda; attendees; minutes of October 25 and 26 meeting; and handout materials supplied by speakers. The handout materials cover the following: statistics and reporting; plutonium - chemical assay 100% minus impurities; americium neptunium, uranium, carbon and iron data; emission spectroscopy data; plutonium metal sample exchange; the calorimetry sample exchange; chlorine determination in plutonium metal using phyrohydrolysis; spectrophotometric determination of 238-plutonium in oxide; plutonium measurement capabilities at the Savannah River Plant; and robotics in radiochemical laboratory.

  5. Plutonium solution storage in plastic bottles: Operational experience and safety issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Conner, W.V.

    1995-03-15

    Computer spread sheet models were developed to gain a better understanding of the factors that lead to pressurization and failure of plastic bottles containing plutonium solutions. These models were developed using data obtained from the literature on gas generation rates for plutonium solutions. Leak rates from sealed plastic bottles were obtained from bottle leak tests conducted at Rocky Flats. Results from these bottle leak tests showed that narrow mouth four liter bottles will seal much better than wide mouth four liter bottles. The gas generation rate and leak rate data were used to develop models for predicting the rate of pressurization and maximum pressures expected in sealed bottles of plutonium solution containing various plutonium and acid concentrations. The computer models were used to develop proposed time limits for storing or transporting plutonium solutions in sealed plastic bottles. For plutonium solutions containing < 1.5 g/l, maximum safe storage times from 4 weeks to 12 months are proposed. The maximum safe storage times vary depending upon the plutonium concentration in the solution. Low concentration plutonium solutions can be stored safely for longer periods of time than high concentration plutonium solutions. For solutions containing > 1.5 g/l plutonium, storage in sealed bottles should not be allowed. However, transportation of higher concentration plutonium solution in sealed bottles is required, and safe transportation times of 1 shift to 6 days are proposed.

  6. Standard test method for plutonium by Iron (II)/Chromium (VI) amperometric titration

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2002-01-01

    1.1 This test method covers the determination of plutonium in unirradiated nuclear-grade plutonium dioxide, uranium-plutonium mixed oxides with uranium (U)/plutonium (Pu) ratios up to 21, plutonium metal, and plutonium nitrate solutions. Optimum quantities of plutonium to measure are 7 to 15 mg. 1.2 The values stated in SI units are to be regarded as standard. No other units of measurement are included in this standard. 1.3 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety and health practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.

  7. Mobile Resources

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformationJessework uses concrete7 AssessmentBusinessAlternative Fueling StationMobile

  8. Facility Representatives

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-04-06

    REPLACED BY DOE-STD-1063 | SUPERSEDING DOE-STD-1063-2000 (MARCH 2000) The purpose of the DOE Facility Representative Program is to ensure that competent DOE staff personnel are assigned to oversee the day-to-day contractor operations at DOE’s hazardous nuclear and non-nuclear facilities.

  9. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22

    This Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for Department of Energy facilities, which includes nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards mitigation, and the System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1A. DOE O 420.1B Chg 1 issued 4-19-10.

  10. PUREX/UO{sub 3} facilities deactivation lessons learned: History

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gerber, M.S.

    1997-11-25

    In May 1997, a historic deactivation project at the PUREX (Plutonium URanium EXtraction) facility at the Hanford Site in south-central Washington State concluded its activities (Figure ES-1). The project work was finished at $78 million under its original budget of $222.5 million, and 16 months ahead of schedule. Closely watched throughout the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex and by the US Department of Defense for the value of its lessons learned, the PUREX Deactivation Project has become the national model for the safe transition of contaminated facilities to shut down status.

  11. Future is new focus at energy department`s Rocky Flats facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lobsenz, G.

    1993-11-12

    After several years of intensive effort to address radioactive pollution threatening nearby communities, officials at the Energy Department`s Rocky Flats plant now are turning their attention to the site`s plutonium buildings and finding a cleanup challenge of equally daunting proportions. Containing and mopping up off-site soil and water contamination remains the first priority at the Colorado facility, but site environmental managers say the huge volumes of plutonium and associated radioactive waste stored in Rocky Flats` aging building pose increasingly urgent safety concerns.

  12. Evaluation of source-term data for plutonium aerosolization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Haschke, J.M.

    1992-07-01

    Relevant data are reviewed and evaluated in an effort to define the time dependence and maximum value of the source term for plutonium aerosolization during a fuel fire. The rate of plutonium oxidation at high temperatures is a major determinant of the time dependence. Analysis of temperature-time data for oxidation of plutonium shows that the rate is constant (0.2 g PUO{sub 2}/cm{sup 2} of metal surface per min) and independent of temperature above 500{degrees}C. Total mass and particle distributions are derived for oxide products formed by reactions of plutonium metal and hydride. The mass distributions for products of all metal-gas reactions are remarkably similar with approximately 0.07 mass% of the oxide particles having geometric diameters {le} 10 {mu}m. In comparison, 25 mass% of the oxide formed by the PuH{sub 2}+O{sub 2} reaction is in this range. Experimental values of mass fractions released during oxidation are evaluated and factors that alter the release fraction are discussed.

  13. Plutonium Focus Area research and development plan. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-11-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) committed to a research and development program to support the technology needs for converting and stabilizing its nuclear materials for safe storage. The R and D Plan addresses five of the six material categories from the 94-1 Implementation Plan: plutonium (Pu) solutions, plutonium metals and oxides, plutonium residues, highly enriched uranium, and special isotopes. R and D efforts related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stabilization were specifically excluded from this plan. This updated plan has narrowed the focus to more effectively target specific problem areas by incorporating results form trade studies. Specifically, the trade studies involved salt; ash; sand, slag, and crucible (SS and C); combustibles; and scrub alloy. The plan anticipates possible disposition paths for nuclear materials and identifies resulting research requirements. These requirements may change as disposition paths become more certain. Thus, this plan represents a snapshot of the current progress and will continue to be updated on a regular basis. The paper discusses progress in safeguards and security, plutonium stabilization, special isotopes stabilization, highly-enriched uranium stabilization--MSRE remediation project, storage technologies, engineered systems, core technology, and proposed DOE/Russian technology exchange projects.

  14. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Alsaed, Abdelhalim Ali

    1996-01-01

    We have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. We have designed three transition cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. We found that four...

  15. Dissolution Behavior of Plutonium Containing Zirconia-Magnesia Ceramics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kiel Holliday; Thomas Hartmann; Gary Cerefice; Ken Czerwinski

    2012-03-01

    This study explores the dissolution properties of zirconia-magnesia ceramics containing plutonium as the basis of an inert atrix nuclear fuel. The magnesium oxide phase remains pure MgO, while the zirconia incorporates a small amount of magnesium oxide along with all of the plutonium oxide and erbium oxide. The performance of the material under reactor and repository environments was examined. Reactor conditions are examined using a pressure vessel to expose the material to 300 degrees C water. To assess the performance of the material as a waste form it was submerged in 90 degrees C water for 1000 h. In both aqueous dissolution studies there was minimal release of less than 0.8 wt.% of plutonium from the material. To examine the potential for recycling, the dissolution behavior of the fuel matrix was examined in acidic solutions: pure nitric acid and a nitric acid-hydrofluoric acid-peroxide solution. Both acidic media exhibit potential for dissolving plutonium from the zirconia matrix. The experiments performed in this study are meant to lay a foundation for the chemical performance of zirconia-magnesia inert matrix fuel containing fissile material and burnable poison.

  16. Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-07-31

    DOE is investigating methods for long term dispositioning of weapons grade plutonium. One such method would be to utilize the plutonium in Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel assemblies in existing CANDU reactors. CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed, licensed, built, and supported by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and currently use natural uranium oxide as fuel. The MOX spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactor would be similar to the spent fuel currently produced using natural uranium fuel, thus rendering the plutonium as unattractive as that in the stockpiles of commercial spent fuel. This report presents the results of a study sponsored by the DOE for dispositioning the plutonium using CANDU technology. Ontario Hydro`s Bruce A was used as reference. The fuel design study defined the optimum parameters to disposition 50 tons of Pu in 25 years (or 100 tons). Two alternate fuel designs were studied. Safeguards, security, environment, safety, health, economics, etc. were considered. Options for complete destruction of the Pu were also studied briefly; CANDU has a superior ability for this. Alternative deployment options were explored and the potential impact on Pu dispositioning in the former Soviet Union was studied. An integrated system can be ready to begin Pu consumption in 4 years, with no changes required to the reactors other than for safe, secure storage of new fuel.

  17. Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition: Opportunities, Options, and Issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Greene, S.R.

    1999-07-17

    The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in the United States (U.S.) and the former Soviet Union. These materials pose a danger to national and international security. During the past few years, the U.S. and Russia have engaged in an ongoing dialog concerning the safe storage and disposition of surplus fissile material stockpiles. In January 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced the U. S. would pursue a dual track approach to rendering approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons. One track involves immobilizing the plutonium by combining it with high-level radioactive waste in glass or ceramic ''logs''. The other method, referred to as reactor-based disposition, converts plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear reactors. The U.S. and Russia are moving ahead rapidly to develop and demonstrate the technology required to implement the MOX option in their respective countries. U.S. MOX fuel research and development activities were started in the 1950s, with irradiation of MOX fuel rods in commercial light water reactors (LWR) from the 1960s--1980s. In all, a few thousand MOX fuel rods were successfully irradiated. Though much of this work was performed with weapons-grade or ''near'' weapons-grade plutonium--and favorable fuel performance was observed--the applicability of this data for licensing and use of weapons-grade MOX fuel manufactured with modern fuel fabrication processes is somewhat limited. The U.S. and Russia are currently engaged in an intensive research, development, and demonstration program to support implementation of the MOX option in our two countries. This paper focuses on work performed in the U.S. and provides a brief summary of joint U.S./Russian work currently underway.

  18. Cooperating mobile robots

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Harrington, John J.; Eskridge, Steven E.; Hurtado, John E.; Byrne, Raymond H.

    2004-02-03

    A miniature mobile robot provides a relatively inexpensive mobile robot. A mobile robot for searching an area provides a way for multiple mobile robots in cooperating teams. A robotic system with a team of mobile robots communicating information among each other provides a way to locate a source in cooperation. A mobile robot with a sensor, a communication system, and a processor, provides a way to execute a strategy for searching an area.

  19. HB-LINE ANION EXCHANGE PURIFICATION OF AFS-2 PLUTONIUM FOR MOX

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kyser, E.; King, W.

    2012-04-25

    Non-radioactive cerium (Ce) and radioactive plutonium (Pu) anion exchange column experiments using scaled HB-Line designs were performed to investigate the feasibility of using either gadolinium nitrate (Gd) or boric acid (B as H{sub 3}BO{sub 3}) as a neutron poison in the H-Canyon dissolution process. Expected typical concentrations of probable impurities were tested and the removal of these impurities by a decontamination wash was measured. Impurity concentrations are compared to two specifications - designated as Column A or Column B (most restrictive) - proposed for plutonium oxide (PuO{sub 2}) product shipped to the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). Use of Gd as a neutron poison requires a larger volume of wash for the proposed Column A specification. Since boron (B) has a higher proposed specification and is more easily removed by washing, it appears to be the better candidate for use in the H-Canyon dissolution process. Some difficulty was observed in achieving the Column A specification due to the limited effectiveness that the wash step has in removing the residual B after {approx}4 BV's wash. However a combination of the experimental 10 BV's wash results and a calculated DF from the oxalate precipitation process yields an overall DF sufficient to meet the Column A specification. For those impurities (other than B) not removed by 10 BV's of wash, the impurity is either not expected to be present in the feedstock or process, or recommendations have been provided for improvement in the analytical detection/method or validation of calculated results. In summary, boron is recommended as the appropriate neutron poison for H-Canyon dissolution and impurities are expected to meet the Column A specification limits for oxide production in HB-Line.

  20. HB-LINE ANION EXCHANGE PURIFICATION OF AFS-2 PLUTONIUM FOR MOX

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kyser, E. A.; King, W. D.

    2012-07-31

    Non-radioactive cerium (Ce) and radioactive plutonium (Pu) anion exchange column experiments using scaled HB-Line designs were performed to investigate the feasibility of using either gadolinium nitrate (Gd) or boric acid (B as H{sub 3}BO{sub 3}) as a neutron poison in the H-Canyon dissolution process. Expected typical concentrations of probable impurities were tested and the removal of these impurities by a decontamination wash was measured. Impurity concentrations are compared to two specifications - designated as Column A or Column B (most restrictive) - proposed for plutonium oxide (PuO{sub 2}) product shipped to the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). Use of Gd as a neutron poison requires a larger volume of wash for the proposed Column A specification. Since boron (B) has a higher proposed specification and is more easily removed by washing, it appears to be the better candidate for use in the H-Canyon dissolution process. Some difficulty was observed in achieving the Column A specification due to the limited effectiveness that the wash step has in removing the residual B after ~4 BV's wash. However a combination of the experimental 10 BV's wash results and a calculated DF from the oxalate precipitation process yields an overall DF sufficient to meet the Column A specification. For those impurities (other than B) not removed by 10 BV's of wash, the impurity is either not expected to be present in the feedstock or process, or recommendations have been provided for improvement in the analytical detection/method or validation of calculated results. In summary, boron is recommended as the appropriate neutron poison for H-Canyon dissolution and impurities are expected to meet the Column A specification limits for oxide production in HB-Line.

  1. Facility Status

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Chinese Academy of Sciences, Hefei, Anhui, P.R. China The Engineering Design of ARC: A Compact, High Field, Fusion Nuclear Science Facility and Demonstration Power Plant B. N....

  2. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2002-05-20

    To establish facility safety requirements for the Department of Energy, including National Nuclear Security Administration. Cancels DOE O 420.1. Canceled by DOE O 420.1B.

  3. Facility Name Facility Name Facility FacilityType Owner Developer...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    FacilityStatus Coordinates D Metals D Metals D Metals Definition Small Scale Wind Valley City OH MW Northern Power Systems In Service AB Tehachapi Wind Farm AB Tehachapi...

  4. Status of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zygmunt, S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Peko, D. [Dept. of Energy, Washington, DC (United States). Office of Fissile Materials Disposition

    1998-12-31

    A planned new facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) will be used to disassemble the nation`s inventory of surplus nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium recovered from those pits into a form suitable for storage, international inspection, and final disposition. Sized to handle 35 metric tons of plutonium from pits and other sources over its 10-year operating life, the PDCF will apply the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) technology. ARIES process technology has been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and an integrated system is being demonstrated LANL. Four sites were considered for locating the PDCF: Pantex Plant, Savannah River Site (SRS), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), and Hanford Site. Each site offers a different opportunity for constructing the PDCF, ranging from a new building at Pantex Plant to using an existing building at Hanford Site or INEEL. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement was prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) to aid in site selection. This paper describes the initial scoping activities, preconceptual and conceptual design work, and the status of the PDCF.

  5. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-11-20

    The objective of this Order is to establish facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. The Order has Change 1 dated 11-16-95, Change 2 dated 10-24-96, and the latest Change 3 dated 11-22-00 incorporated. The latest change satisfies a commitment made to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in response to DNFSB recommendation 97-2, Criticality Safety.

  6. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22

    The order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and the System Engineer Program.Chg 1 incorporates the use of DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, mandatory for Hazard Category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities. Cancels DOE O 420.1A.

  7. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-06-21

    DOE-STD-1104 contains the Department's method and criteria for reviewing and approving nuclear facility's documented safety analysis (DSA). This review and approval formally document the basis for DOE, concluding that a facility can be operated safely in a manner that adequately protects workers, the public, and the environment. Therefore, it is appropriate to formally require implementation of the review methodology and criteria contained in DOE-STD-1104.

  8. Investigation of injury/illness data at a nuclear facility: Part II

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Garcia, Vincent E.; Sandoval, Arnold N.; George, Gerald L.; Gubernatis, David C.; Schreiber, Stephen B.

    2014-11-21

    At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), there are several nuclear facilities, accelerator facilities, radiological facilities, explosives sites, moderate- and high-hazard non-nuclear facilities, biosciences laboratory, etc. The Plutonium Science and Manufacturing Directorate (ADPSM) provides special nuclear material research, process development, technology demonstration, and manufacturing capabilities. ADPSM manages the LANL Plutonium Facility. Within the Radiological Control Area at TA-55 (PF-4), chemical and metallurgical operations with plutonium and other hazardous materials are performed. LANL Health and Safety Programs investigate injury and illness data. In this study, statistically significant trends have been identified and compared for LANL, ADPSM, and PF-4 injury/illness cases. A previously described output metric is used to measures LANL management progress towards meeting its operational safety objectives and goals. Timelines are used to determine trends in Injury/Illness types. Pareto Charts are used to prioritize causal factors. The data generated from analysis of Injury/Illness data have helped identify and reduce the number of corresponding causal factors.

  9. Investigation of injury/illness data at a nuclear facility. Part II

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Garcia, Vincent E.; Sandoval, Arnold N.; George, Gerald L.; Gubernatis, David C.; Schreiber, Stephen B.

    2015-07-01

    At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), there are several nuclear facilities, accelerator facilities, radiological facilities, explosives sites, moderate- and high-hazard non-nuclear facilities, biosciences laboratory, etc. The Plutonium Science and Manufacturing Directorate (ADPSM) provides special nuclear material research, process development, technology demonstration, and manufacturing capabilities. ADPSM manages the LANL Plutonium Facility. Within the Radiological Control Area at TA-55 (PF-4), chemical and metallurgical operations with plutonium and other hazardous materials are performed. LANL Health and Safety Programs investigate injury and illness data. In this study, statistically significant trends have been identified and compared for LANL, ADPSM, and PF-4 injury/illness cases. A previouslymore »described output metric is used to measures LANL management progress towards meeting its operational safety objectives and goals. Timelines are used to determine trends in Injury/Illness types. Pareto Charts are used to prioritize causal factors. The data generated from analysis of Injury/Illness data have helped identify and reduce the number of corresponding causal factors.« less

  10. The Optimum Plutonium Inert Matrix Fuel Form for Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tulenko, J.S.; Wang, J.; Acosta, C.

    2004-10-06

    The University of Florida has underway an ongoing research program to validate the economic, operational and performance benefits of developing an inert matrix fuel (IMF) for the disposition of the U.S. weapons plutonium (Pu) and for the recycle of reprocessed Pu. The current fuel form of choice for Pu disposition for the Department of Energy is as a mixed oxide (MOX) (PuO2/UO2). We will show analyses that demonstrate that a Silicon Carbide (SiC) IMF offers improved performance capabilities as a fuel form for Pu recycle and disposition. The reason that UF is reviewing various materials to serve as an inert matrix fuel is that an IMF fuel form can offer greatly reduced Pu and transuranic isotope (TRU) production and also improved thermal performance characteristics. Our studies showed that the Pu content is reduced by an order of magnitude while centerline fuel temperatures are reduced approximately 380 degrees centigrade compared to MOX. These reduced temperatures result in reduced stored heat and thermal stresses in the pellet. The reduced stored heat reduces the consequences of the loss of coolant accident, while the reduced temperatures and thermal stresses yield greatly improved fuel performance. Silicon Carbide is not new to the nuclear industry, being a basic fuel material in gas cooled reactors.

  11. The Optimum Plutonium Inert Matrix Fuel Form for Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tulenko, J.S.; Wang, J.; Acosta, C.

    2004-10-03

    The University of Florida has underway an ongoing research program to validate the economic, operational and performance benefits of developing an inert matrix fuel (IMF) for the disposition of the U.S. weapons plutonium (Pu) and for the recycle of reprocessed Pu. The current fuel form of choice for Pu disposition for the Department of Energy is as a mixed oxide (MOX) (PuO2/UO2). We will show analyses that demonstrate that a Silicon Carbide (SiC) IMF offers improved performance capabilities as a fuel form for Pu recycle and disposition. The reason that UF is reviewing various materials to serve as an inert matrix fuel is that an IMF fuel form can offer greatly reduced Pu and transuranic isotope (TRU) production and also improved thermal performance characteristics. Our studies showed that the Pu content is reduced by an order of magnitude while centerline fuel temperatures are reduced approximately 380 degrees centigrade compared to MOX. These reduced temperatures result in reduced stored heat and thermal stresses in the pellet. The reduced stored heat reduces the consequences of the loss of coolant accident, while the reduced temperatures and thermal stresses yield greatly improved fuel performance. Silicon Carbide is not new to the nuclear industry, being a basic fuel material in gas cooled reactors.

  12. PUREX/UO{sub 3} facilities deactivation lessons learned history

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hamrick, D.G.; Gerber, M.S.

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility operated from 1956-1972, from 1983-1988, and briefly during 1989-1990 to produce for national defense at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The Uranium Trioxide (UO{sub 3}) Facility operated at the Hanford Site from 1952-1972, 1984-1988, and briefly in 1993. Both plants were ordered to permanent shutdown by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in December 1992, thus initiating their deactivation phase. Deactivation is that portion of a facility`s life cycle that occurs between operations and final decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). This document details the history of events, and the lessons learned, from the time of the PUREX Stabilization Campaign in 1989-1990, through the end of the first full fiscal year (FY) of the deactivation project (September 30, 1994).

  13. Thermal and Physical Properties of Plutonium Dioxide Produced from the Oxidation of Metal: a Data Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wayne, David M.

    2014-01-13

    The ARIES Program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory removes plutonium metal from decommissioned nuclear weapons, and converts it to plutonium dioxide in a specially-designed Direct Metal Oxidation furnace. The plutonium dioxide is analyzed for specific surface area, particle size distribution, and moisture content. The purpose of these analyses is to certify that the plutonium dioxide powder meets or exceeds the specifications of the end-user, and the specifications for the packaging and transport of nuclear materials. Analytical results from plutonium dioxide from ARIES development activities, from ARIES production activities, from muffle furnace oxidation of metal, and from metal that was oxidized over a lengthy time interval in air at room temperature, are presented. The processes studied produce plutonium dioxide powder with distinct differences in measured properties, indicating the significant influence of oxidation conditions on physical properties.

  14. Dry sample storage system for an analytical laboratory supporting plutonium processing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Treibs, H.A.; Hartenstein, S.D.; Griebenow, B.L.; Wade, M.A.

    1990-07-25

    The Special Isotope Separation (SIS) plant is designed to provide removal of undesirable isotopes in fuel grade plutonium by the atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) process. The AVLIS process involves evaporation of plutonium metal, and passage of an intense beam of light from a laser through the plutonium vapor. The laser beam consists of several discrete wavelengths, tuned to the precise wavelength required to ionize the undesired isotopes. These ions are attracted to charged plates, leaving the bulk of the plutonium vapor enriched in the desired isotopes to be collected on a cold plate. Major portions of the process consist of pyrochemical processes, including direct reduction of the plutonium oxide feed material with calcium metal, and aqueous processes for purification of plutonium in residues. The analytical laboratory for the plant is called the Material and Process Control Laboratory (MPCL), and provides for the analysis of solid and liquid process samples.

  15. Determination of Plutonium Content in Spent Fuel with Nondestructive Assay

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Tobin, S. J.

    2010-01-01

    the input mass at a reprocessing facility. As part of theassembly selection at a reprocessing facility. Facilityoptimal compositions in reprocessing solutions. The blending

  16. Delocalization and occupancy effects of 5f orbitals in plutonium intermetallics using L3-edge resonant X-ray emission spectroscopy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Booth, C. H.

    2014-01-01

    5f orbitals in uranium and plutonium intermetallics, Proc.E. Colineau, G. H. Lander, Plutonium-based superconductivityproduced by self-damage in plutonium, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.

  17. Plutonium Transport Through Lysimeters Exposed to Natural Weather Conditions for Two to Twelve Years

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kaplan, D.I.

    2003-10-20

    One of the most important factors influencing the subsurface transport of plutonium (Pu) is its oxidation state. Under similar geochemical conditions (e.g., groundwater pH) the mobility of reduced Pu, Pu(IV), is two to three orders of magnitude lower than that of oxidized Pu, Pu(V) and Pu(VI). However, due to a poor understanding of Pu oxidation state transformations, transport models typically employ conservative assumptions which can lead to overly conservative and costly decisions. The objective of this study was to develop a conceptual geochemical transport model to describe Pu mobility through 52-L lysimeters established in 1980. The lysimeters contained E-Area sediment and various forms of well-characterized Pu sources of known oxidation state and were exposed to natural SRS weather conditions for up to 11 years. For this study, archived core sediments from the lysimeters were retrieved and Pu concentrations in depth-discrete samples were measured and then transport of Pu was modeled using a coupled reactive transport model. The geochemical conceptual model and input values included in the transport code were based on laboratory experiments. The single most important finding from this work was regardless of the Pu oxidation state added to SRS sediments, it quickly converted to the less mobile Pu(IV) form. In conclusion, it is expected that Pu will exist primarily in the SRS subsurface environment in the relatively less mobile Pu(IV) form, irrespective of the oxidation state that it first enters the ground. The lysimeter results provide important long-term data that support the removal of important overly conservative approaches presently used to calculate risk and performance assessment associated with groundwater Pu. These findings do not contradict previous Pu modeling efforts, including the E-Area Low-Level Waste Performance Assessment or the Special Analysis on Pu disposal in SRS trenches. Instead, the results from this work could be used in future calculations to improve accuracy and reduce uncertainty and conservatism.

  18. Title Plutonium Mobility in Soil and Uptake in Plants: A Review...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    or technical journals) Recipients Public ERC Index number 05.09.714 Box Number 1651-1 U . N . R . ILL DEPT. : THIS MATERIAL MAY HB CTED BY OOEXRIGHT LAH

  19. Hanford Site

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Maintence Facility Container Maintence Facility "Green" Containers "Green" Containers Plutonium Finishing Plant Visit Plutonium Finishing Plant Visit Plutonium Finishing Plant...

  20. SMALL-SCALE TESTING OF PLUTONIUM (IV) OXALATE PRECIPITATION AND CALCINATION TO PLUTONIUM OXIDE TO SUPPORT THE MOX FEED MISSION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Crowder, M.; Pierce, R.; Scogin, J.; Daniel, G.; King, W.

    2012-06-25

    The H-Canyon facility will be used to dissolve Pu metal for subsequent purification and conversion to plutonium dioxide (PuO{sub 2}) using Phase II of HB-Line. To support the new mission, SRNL conducted a series of experiments to produce calcined plutonium (Pu) oxide and measure the physical properties and water adsorption of that material. This data will help define the process operating conditions and material handling steps for HB-Line. An anion exchange column experiment produced 1.4 L of a purified 52.6 g/L Pu solution. Over the next nine weeks, seven Pu(IV) oxalate precipitations were performed using the same stock Pu solution, with precipitator feed acidities ranging from 0.77 M to 3.0 M nitric acid and digestion times ranging from 5 to 30 minutes. Analysis of precipitator filtrate solutions showed Pu losses below 1% for all precipitations. The four larger precipitation batches matched the target oxalic acid addition time of 44 minutes within 4 minutes. The three smaller precipitation batches focused on evaluation of digestion time and the oxalic acid addition step ranged from 25-34 minutes because of pump limitations in the low flow range. Following the precipitations, 22 calcinations were performed in the range of 610-690 C, with the largest number of samples calcined at either 650 or 635 C. Characterization of the resulting PuO{sub 2} batches showed specific surface areas in the range of 5-14 m{sup 2}/g, with 16 of the 22 samples in the range of 5-10 m2/g. For samples analyzed with typical handling (exposed to ambient air for 15-45 minutes with relative humidities of 20-55%), the moisture content as measured by Mass Spectrometry ranged from 0.15 to 0.45 wt % and the total mass loss at 1000 C, as measured by TGA, ranged from 0.21 to 0.58 wt %. For the samples calcined between 635 and 650 C, the moisture content without extended exposure ranged from 0.20 to 0.38 wt %, and the TGA mass loss ranged from 0.26 to 0.46 wt %. Of these latter samples, the samples calcined at 650 C generally had lower specific surface areas and lower moisture contents than the samples calcined at 635 C, which matches expectations from the literature. Taken together, the TGA-MS results for samples handled at nominally 20-50% RH, without extended exposure, indicate that the Pu(IV) oxalate precipitation process followed by calcination at 635-650 C appears capable of producing PuO{sub 2} with moisture content < 0.5 wt% as required by the 3013 Standard. Exposures of PuO{sub 2} samples to ambient air for 3 or more hours generally showed modest mass gains that were primarily gains in moisture content. These results point to the need for a better understanding of the moisture absorption of PuO{sub 2} and serve as a warning that extended exposure times, particularly above the 50% RH level observed in this study will make the production of PuO{sub 2} with less than 0.5 wt % moisture more challenging. Samples analyzed in this study generally contained approximately 2 monolayer equivalents of moisture. In this study, the bulk of the moisture released from samples below 300 C, as did a significant portion of the CO{sub 2}. Samples in this study consistently released a minor amount of NO in the 40-300 C range, but no samples released CO or SO{sub 2}. TGA-MS results also showed that MS moisture content accounted for 80 {+-} 8% of the total mass loss at 1000 C measured by the TGA. The PuO{sub 2} samples produced had particles sizes that typically ranged from 0.2-88 {micro}m, with the mean particle size ranging from 6.4-9.3 {micro}m. The carbon content of ten different calcination batches ranged from 190-480 {micro}g C/g Pu, with an average value of 290 {micro}g C/g Pu. A statistical review of the calcination conditions and resulting SSA values showed that in both cases tested, calcination temperature had a significant effect on SSA, as expected from literature data. The statistical review also showed that batch size had a significant effect on SSA, but the narrow range of batch sizes tested is a compelling reason to set aside that result until tests

  1. Anticipated Radiological Dose to Worker for Plutonium Stabilization and Handling at PFP Project W-460

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    WEISS, E.V.

    2000-03-06

    This report provides estimates of the expected whole body and extremity radiological dose, expressed as dose equivalent (DE), to workers conducting planned plutonium (Pu) stabilization processes at the Hanford Site Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The report is based on a time and motion dose study commissioned for Project W-460, Plutonium Stabilization and Handling, to provide personnel exposure estimates for construction work in the PFP storage vault area plus operation of stabilization and packaging equipment at PFP.

  2. MPC&A for plutonium disposition in the Russian federation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1995-08-08

    The issue of what to do with excess fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons has been discussed for a number of years. The options or alternatives commanding the most attention were identified by the American National Academy of Sciences. For plutonium these options are: (1) the fabrication and use of mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel followed by the disposal of the spent fuel, or (2) vitrification (immobilization) of plutonium combined with highly radioactive material followed by direct disposal. The Academy report also identified the alternative of disposal in a deep borehole as requiring further study before being eliminated or accepted. The report emphasized security of nuclear materials as a principal factor in considering management and disposition decisions. Security of materials is particularly important in the near term-now-long before ultimate disposition can be accomplished. The MOX option was the subject of a NATO workshop held at Obninsk, Russia in October 1994. Hence this paper does not deal with the MOX alternative in detail. It deals with the following: materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) for immobilization and disposal; the immobilization vs MOX alternatives; the security of disposed plutonium; the need to demonstrate MTC&A for plutonium disposition; and, finally, a recommended investment to quickly and inexpensively improve the protection of fissile materials in Russia. It is the author`s view that near-term management is of overriding importance. That is, with respect to the ultimate disposition of excess nuclear materials, how we get there is more important than where we are going.

  3. Hanford MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site (SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. Hanford has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 1 facility. In all, a total of three LA MOX fuel fabrication options were identified by Hanford that could accommodate the program. In every case, only minor modification would be required to ready any of the facilities to accept the equipment necessary to accomplish the LA program.

  4. Conceptual Design for the Pilot-Scale Plutonium Oxide Processing Unit in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lumetta, Gregg J.; Meier, David E.; Tingey, Joel M.; Casella, Amanda J.; Delegard, Calvin H.; Edwards, Matthew K.; Jones, Susan A.; Rapko, Brian M.

    2014-08-05

    This report describes a conceptual design for a pilot-scale capability to produce plutonium oxide for use as exercise and reference materials, and for use in identifying and validating nuclear forensics signatures associated with plutonium production. This capability is referred to as the Pilot-scale Plutonium oxide Processing Unit (P3U), and it will be located in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The key unit operations are described, including plutonium dioxide (PuO2) dissolution, purification of the Pu by ion exchange, precipitation, and conversion to oxide by calcination.

  5. Weapons and commercial plutonium ultimate disposition choices: Destroy ``completely`` or store forever

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowman, C.D.

    1994-07-01

    All of the options under consideration for weapons and commercial plutonium disposition ultimately boil down to the choices of either ``complete`` destruction or storage ``forever.`` None of the reactor-based plutonium burning systems demonstrated over the past 50 years of reactor development consume this material completely. Ultimately considerable unburned plutonium must be stored ``forever`` from those systems. Plutonium is considered to be dangerous both as a weapons material and as a health hazard. While properly stored plutonium might never make its way back by natural phenomena into the environment as a health hazard, stored plutonium is always accessible to recovery for malevolent purposes. It must be guarded wherever in the world it is stored for as long as it continues to exist. Complete destruction of the plutonium eliminates this material as a concern of future generations. Los Alamos National Laboratory accelerator-driven technology promises to allow safe and complete destruction of this material. Furthermore it appears that in the process of destruction the neutron rich features of the weapons plutonium provides benefits to society that place a value on weapons plutonium exceeding that of highly enriched uranium. A realistic time scale for development and deployment of burial technology either with or without partial burning in reactors is expected to be comparable with or to exceed the time for development and deployment of the accelerator-driven destruction method under study at Los Alamos.

  6. Voluntary Protection Program Onsite Review, Plutonium Finishing Plant Closure Project- May 2007

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Evaluation to determine whether Plutonium Finishing Plant Closure Project is continuing to perform at a level deserving DOE-VPP Star recognition.

  7. Use of Gadolinium as a Primary Criticality Control in Disposing Waste Containing Plutonium at SRS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Andrew, Vincent

    2005-01-04

    Use of gadolinium as a neutron poison has been proposed for disposing of several metric tons of excess plutonium at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The plutonium will first be dissolved in nitric acid in small batches. Gadolinium nitrate will then be added to the plutonium nitrate solution. The Gd-poisoned plutonium solution will be neutralized and transferred to large under-ground tanks. The pH of small batches of neutralized plutonium solution will be adjusted prior to addition of the glass frit for eventual production as glass logs. The use of gadolinium as the neutron poison would minimize the number of glass logs generated from this disposition. The primary criticality safety concerns regarding the disposal process are: (1) maintaining neutron moderation under all processing conditions since gadolinium has a very large absorption cross section for thermal neutrons, (2) characteristics of plutonium and gadolinium precipitation during the neutralization process, (3) mixing characteristics of the precipitate to ensure that plutonium would remain homogeneously mixed with gadolinium, and (4) potential separation of plutonium and gadolinium during nitric and formic acids addition. A number of experiments were conducted at the Savannah River National Laboratory to study the behavior of plutonium and gadolinium at various stages of the disposition process.

  8. Structural Characterization of and Plutonium Sorption on Mesoporous and Nanoparticulate Ferrihydrite

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brogan, Luna Kestrel Schwaiger

    2012-01-01

    cation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pourbaix diagram forPourbaix diagram for plutonium in an aqueous solutionoxidation state distribution. A Pourbaix diagram can also be

  9. DOE Will Dispose of 34 Metric Tons of Plutonium by Turning it...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Will Dispose of 34 Metric Tons of Plutonium by Turning it into Fuel for Civilian Reactors | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People...

  10. Characterization of decontamination and decommissioning wastes expected from the major processing facilities in the 200 Areas

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Amato, L.C.; Franklin, J.D.; Hyre, R.A.; Lowy, R.M.; Millar, J.S.; Pottmeyer, J.A. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, Kennewick, WA (United States); Duncan, D.R. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)

    1994-08-01

    This study was intended to characterize and estimate the amounts of equipment and other materials that are candidates for removal and subsequent processing in a solid waste facility when the major processing and handling facilities in the 200 Areas of the Hanford Site are decontaminated and decommissioned. The facilities in this study were selected based on processing history and on the magnitude of the estimated decommissioning cost cited in the Surplus Facilities Program Plan; Fiscal Year 1993 (Winship and Hughes 1992). The facilities chosen for this study include B Plant (221-B), T Plant (221-T), U Plant (221-U), the Uranium Trioxide (UO{sub 3}) Plant (224-U and 224-UA), the Reduction Oxidation (REDOX) or S Plant (202-S), the Plutonium Concentration Facility for B Plant (224-B), and the Concentration Facility for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) and REDOX (233-S). This information is required to support planning activities for current and future solid waste treatment, storage, and disposal operations and facilities.

  11. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-10-13

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. Cancels DOE 5480.7A, DOE 5480.24, DOE 5480.28 and Division 13 of DOE 6430.1A. Canceled by DOE O 420.1A.

  12. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1B, DOE G 420.1-2 and DOE G 420.1-3.

  13. Location Management for Mobile Devices

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wilde, Erik

    2008-01-01

    general, and wireless and mobile devices in particular. Thelocation-enabled mobile devices and location-based services.information from mobile devices and making it available to

  14. Facility Operations and Maintenance Facilities Management

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Capogna, Luca

    Facility Operations and Maintenance Facilities Management D101 Facilities Management R -575/affirmative action institution. 354 3 373 4 373A,B,C,D 4 Alm8/31/12 #12;Facility Operations and Maintenance, B 5 1409 5 1403 5 1403 A, B 4 1408 3 1408 A,B,C 3 1610 3 #12;Facility Operations and Maintenance

  15. Site Selection for Concrete Batch Plant to Support Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wike, L.D.

    2001-06-15

    WSRC conducted a site selection study to identify, assess, and rank candidate sites for an onsite concrete batch plant at the Savannah River Site in the vicinity of F-Area.

  16. U.S. Plutonium "Pit" Production: Additional Facilities, Production

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal GasAdministration Medal01 Sandia4) August 20123/%2A en4 SPONSORED3 DOE NNSAHEUPlutonium

  17. DOE-HDBK-1145-2001; Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum Based| Department8, 2015 GATEWAY6.1 DOE-HDBK-1141-2001 OverheadSENSITIVE

  18. Guide of Good Practices for Occupational Radiological Protection in Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum12,ExecutiveFinancing Programs | Department of Energyof2 December 2006 DOE

  19. Guide of Good Practices for Occupational Radiological Protection in Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum12,ExecutiveFinancing Programs | Department of Energyof2 December 2006

  20. Standard test method for nondestructive assay of plutonium in scrap and waste by passive neutron coincidence counting

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2010-01-01

    Standard test method for nondestructive assay of plutonium in scrap and waste by passive neutron coincidence counting

  1. A Plutonium Finishing Plant Model for the Cercla Removal Action and Decommissioning Construction Final Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hopkins, A. [Fluor Hanford, Inc, Richland, WA (United States)

    2008-07-01

    The joint policy between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for decommissioning buildings at DOE facilities documents an agreement between the agencies to perform decommissioning activities including demolition under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). The use of removal actions for decommissioning integrates EPA oversight authority, DOE lead agency responsibility, and state authority for decommissioning activities. Once removal actions have been performed under CERCLA, a construction completion report is required to document the completion of the required action. Additionally, a decommissioning report is required under DOE guidance. No direct guidance was found for documenting completion of decommissioning activities and preparing a final report that satisfies the CERCLA requirements and the DOE requirements for decommissioning. Additional guidance was needed for the documentation of construction completion under CERCLA for D and D projects undertaken under the joint policy that addresses the requirements of both agencies. A model for the construction completion report was developed to document construction completion for CERCLA D and D activities performed under the joint EPA/DOE policy at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The model documentation report developed at PFP integrates the DOE requirements for establishing decommissioning end-points, documenting end-point completion and preparing a final decommissioning report with the CERCLA requirements to document completion of the action identified in the Action Memorandum (AM). The model includes the required information on health and safety, data management, cost and schedule and end-points completion. (authors)

  2. INVESTIGATION OF PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM UPTAKE INTO MCU SOLVENT AND NEXT GENERATION SOLVENT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peters, T.; Fink, S.

    2012-01-06

    At the request of the Savannah River Remediation (SRR) customer, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) examined the plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) uptake into the Next Generation Solvent (NGS) that will be used at the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). SRNL examined archived samples of solvent used in Extraction-Scrub-Strip (ESS) tests, as well as samples from new tests designed explicitly to examine the Pu and U uptake. Direct radiocounting for Pu and U provided the best results. Using the radiocounting results, we found that in all cases there were <3.41E-12 g Pu/g of NGS and <1.17E-05 g U/g of NGS in multiple samples, even after extended contact times and high aqueous:organic volume phase ratios. These values are conservative as they do not allow for release or removal of the actinides by scrub, strip, or solvent wash processes. The values do not account for extended use or any increase that may occur due to radiolytic damage of the solvent.

  3. TOTAL MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY IN HOLDUP MEASUREMENTS AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    KEELE, B.D.

    2007-07-05

    An approach to determine the total measurement uncertainty (TMU) associated with Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) [1,2,3] measurements was developed and implemented in 2004 and 2005 [4]. This paper describes a condensed version of the TMU calculational model, including recent developments. Recent modifications to the TMU calculation model include a change in the attenuation uncertainty, clarifying the definition of the forward background uncertainty, reducing conservatism in the random uncertainty by selecting either a propagation of counting statistics or the standard deviation of the mean, and considering uncertainty in the width and height as a part of the self attenuation uncertainty. In addition, a detection limit is calculated for point sources using equations derived from summary equations contained in Chapter 20 of MARLAP [5]. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2007-1 to the Secretary of Energy identified a lack of requirements and a lack of standardization for performing measurements across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The DNFSB also recommended that guidance be developed for a consistent application of uncertainty values. As such, the recent modifications to the TMU calculational model described in this paper have not yet been implemented. The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is continuing to perform uncertainty calculations as per Reference 4. Publication at this time is so that these concepts can be considered in developing a consensus methodology across the complex.

  4. Ion mobility sensor system

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Xu, Jun; Watson, David B.; Whitten, William B.

    2013-01-22

    An ion mobility sensor system including an ion mobility spectrometer and a differential mobility spectrometer coupled to the ion mobility spectrometer. The ion mobility spectrometer has a first chamber having first end and a second end extending along a first direction, and a first electrode system that generates a constant electric field parallel to the first direction. The differential mobility spectrometer includes a second chamber having a third end and a fourth end configured such that a fluid may flow in a second direction from the third end to the fourth end, and a second electrode system that generates an asymmetric electric field within an interior of the second chamber. Additionally, the ion mobility spectrometer and the differential mobility spectrometer form an interface region. Also, the first end and the third end are positioned facing one another so that the constant electric field enters the third end and overlaps the fluid flowing in the second direction.

  5. Mobile Proactive secret sharing

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Schultz, David Andrew

    2007-01-01

    This thesis describes mobile proactive secret sharing (MPSS), an extension of proactive secret sharing. Mobile proactive secret sharing is much more flexible than proactive secret sharing in terms of group membership: ...

  6. Tandem mobile robot system

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Buttz, James H. (Albuquerque, NM); Shirey, David L. (Albuquerque, NM); Hayward, David R. (Albuquerque, NM)

    2003-01-01

    A robotic vehicle system for terrain navigation mobility provides a way to climb stairs, cross crevices, and navigate across difficult terrain by coupling two or more mobile robots with a coupling device and controlling the robots cooperatively in tandem.

  7. Keeping Mobile Robots Connected

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lynch, Nancy

    2009-06-17

    Designing robust algorithms for mobile agents with reliable communication is difficult due to the distributed nature of computation, in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) the matter is exacerbated by the need to ensure ...

  8. Measurement of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel by self-induced x-ray fluorescence

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hoover, Andrew S; Rudy, Cliff R; Tobin, Steve J; Charlton, William S; Stafford, A; Strohmeyer, D; Saavadra, S

    2009-01-01

    Direct measurement of the plutonium content in spent nuclear fuel is a challenging problem in non-destructive assay. The very high gamma-ray flux from fission product isotopes overwhelms the weaker gamma-ray emissions from plutonium and uranium, making passive gamma-ray measurements impossible. However, the intense fission product radiation is effective at exciting plutonium and uranium atoms, resulting in subsequent fluorescence X-ray emission. K-shell X-rays in the 100 keV energy range can escape the fuel and cladding, providing a direct signal from uranium and plutonium that can be measured with a standard germanium detector. The measured plutonium to uranium elemental ratio can be used to compute the plutonium content of the fuel. The technique can potentially provide a passive, non-destructive assay tool for determining plutonium content in spent fuel. In this paper, we discuss recent non-destructive measurements of plutonium X-ray fluorescence (XRF) signatures from pressurized water reactor spent fuel rods. We also discuss how emerging new technologies, like very high energy resolution microcalorimeter detectors, might be applied to XRF measurements.

  9. Ris-R-1321(EN) On Weapons Plutonium in the Arctic

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    and transfer of plutonium to benthic biota is low. Paper II, concludes that the resuspension of accident debris the catchment area to lakes than plutonium and radio lead. Paper III, is a method description of inventory.4 Resuspension on land 33 3.5 Biota 34 4 Concluding Remarks and Future Research 34 Paper I 43 Paper II 63 Paper

  10. Functional Design Criteria plutonium stabilization and handling (PUSH) project W-460

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NELSON, D.W.

    1999-09-02

    This Functional Design Criteria (FDC) contains information to guide the design of the Stabilization and Packaging Equipment necessary to oxidize and package the remaining plutonium-bearing Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) currently in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) inventory. The FDC also guides the design of vault modifications to allow storage of 3013 packages of stabilized SNM for up to 50 years.

  11. Implications of Plutonium isotopic separation on closed fuel cycles and repository design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Forsberg, C.

    2013-07-01

    Advances in laser enrichment may enable relatively low-cost plutonium isotopic separation. This would have large impacts on LWR closed fuel cycles and waste management. If Pu-240 is removed before recycling plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, it would dramatically reduce the buildup of higher plutonium isotopes, Americium, and Curium. Pu-240 is a fertile material and thus can be replaced by U-238. Eliminating the higher plutonium isotopes in MOX fuel increases the Doppler feedback, simplifies reactor control, and allows infinite recycle of MOX plutonium in LWRs. Eliminating fertile Pu-240 and Pu-242 reduces the plutonium content in MOX fuel and simplifies fabrication. Reducing production of Pu-241 reduces production of Am-241 - the primary heat generator in spent nuclear fuels after several decades. Reducing heat generating Am-241 would reduce repository cost and waste toxicity. Avoiding Am- 241 avoids its decay product Np-237, a nuclide that partly controls long-term oxidizing repository performance. Most of these benefits also apply to LWR plutonium recycled into fast reactors. There are benefits for plutonium isotopic separation in fast reactor fuel cycles (particularly removal of Pu-242) but the benefits are less. (author)

  12. History and stabilization of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) complex, Hanford Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gerber, M.S., Fluor Daniel Hanford

    1997-02-18

    The 231-Z Isolation Building or Plutonium Metallurgy Building is located in the Hanford Site`s 200 West Area, approximately 300 yards north of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) (234-5 Building). When the Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) built it in 1944 to contain the final step for processing plutonium, it was called the Isolation Building. At that time, HEW used a bismuth phosphate radiochemical separations process to make `AT solution,` which was then dried and shipped to Los Alamos, New Mexico. (AT solution is a code name used during World War II for the final HEW product.) The process was carried out first in T Plant and the 224-T Bulk Reduction Building and B Plant and the 224-B Bulk Reduction Building. The 224-T and -B processes produced a concentrated plutonium nitrate stream, which then was sent in 8-gallon batches to the 231-Z Building for final purification. In the 231-Z Building, the plutonium nitrate solution underwent peroxide `strikes` (additions of hydrogen peroxide to further separate the plutonium from its carrier solutions), to form the AT solution. The AT solution was dried and shipped to the Los Alamos Site, where it was made into metallic plutonium and then into weapons hemispheres.` The 231-Z Building began `hot` operations (operations using radioactive materials) with regular runs of plutonium nitrate on January 16, 1945.

  13. Symmetry and Stability of Plutonium: The Influence of Electronic Structure K. T. Moore,1,* P. Soderlind,1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Laughlin, David E.

    Symmetry and Stability of Plutonium: The Influence of Electronic Structure K. T. Moore,1,* P. So-functional theory, we calculate the bond strengths between the 12 nearest neighbors in plutonium for both pure Pu rather than face-centered cubic Fm3m, showing that the anomalously large anisotropy of plutonium

  14. Annealing of Aged Plutonium Jeremy N. Mitchell, Adam M. Farrow, Franz J. Freibert, and Daniel S. Schwartz

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Annealing of Aged Plutonium Jeremy N. Mitchell, Adam M. Farrow, Franz J. Freibert, and Daniel S Alamos, NM 87545 jeremy@lanl.gov INTRODUCTION Face-centered cubic -phase is stable in pure plutonium properties of plutonium, including solute content, thermal history, and processing history. The radioactive

  15. Plutonium in groundwater at the 100K-Area of the U.S. DOE Hanford Site

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Buesseler, Ken

    Plutonium in groundwater at the 100K-Area of the U.S. DOE Hanford Site Minhan Daia,b , Ken O distribution, redox state and isotopic composition of plutonium (Pu) in groundwater at the 100K-Area at the U distribution. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Plutonium; Isotopic composition; Size

  16. Recovery of Plutonium from Refractory Residues Using a Sodium Peroxide Pretreatment Process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rudisill, T.S.

    2003-10-23

    The recycle of plutonium from refractory residues is a necessary activity for the nuclear weapon production complex. Traditionally, high-fired plutonium oxide (PuO2) was leached from the residue matrix using a nitric acid/fluoride dissolving flowsheet. The recovery operations were time consuming and often required multiple contacts with fresh dissolving solution to reduce the plutonium concentration to levels where residual solids could be discarded. Due to these drawbacks, the development of an efficient process for the recovery of plutonium from refractory materials is desirable. To address this need, a pretreatment process was developed. The development program utilized a series of small-scale experiments to optimize processing conditions for the fusion process and demonstrate the plutonium recovery efficiency using ceramic materials developed as potential long-term storage forms for PuO2 and an incinerator ash from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats) as te st materials.

  17. Reaction kinetics relevant to the recycle hydride-dehydride process for plutonium recovery

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Haschke, J.M.; Allen, T.H.

    1997-10-01

    Objectives of this one-year, Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project were the expansion of fundamental knowledge of plutonium chemistry and the development of information for enhancing plutonium recovery methods and weapons safety. Results of kinetic studies demonstrate that the monoxide monohydride, PuO(H), formed during corrosion of plutonium by water in pyrophoric when dry and acts as an initiator for hydride-catalyzed reaction of the metal with air. The catalyzed corrosion rate of Pu is 10{sup 8} times faster than that in dry air and transforms plutonium into a readily aerosolized material. A potential application for the catalytic reaction is in the direct recovery of plutonium as oxide. Wet PuO(H) is non-pyrophoric and the safety hazard posed by its formation is reduced if the material is not allowed to dry.

  18. Mobile Technology Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-05-15

    The order establishes requirements, assigns responsibilities, and provides guidance for federal mobile technology management and employee use of both government furnished and personally-owned mobile devices within DOE and NNSA. Establishes requirements for use of User Agreements to govern mobile devices used for official duties. Does not cancel other directives.

  19. Investigation into the feasibility of alternative plutonium shipping forms

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mishima, J.; Lindsey, C.G.

    1983-06-01

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), operated for the Department of Energy by the Battelle Memorial Institute, is conducting a study for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the feasibility of altering current plutonium shipping forms to reduce or eliminate the airborne dispersibility of PuO/sub 2/ which might occur during a shipping accident. Plutonium used for fuel fabrication is currently shipped as a PuO/sub 2/ powder with a significant fraction in the respirable size range. If the high-strength container is breached due to stresses imposed during a transportation accident, the PuO/sub 2/ powder could be subject to airborne dispersion. The available information indicated that a potential accident involving fire accompanied by crush/impact forces would lead to failure of current surface shipping containers (no assumptions were made on the possibility of such a severe accident). Criteria were defined for an alternate shipping form to mitigate the effects of such an accident. Candidate techniques and materials were evaluated as alternate shipping forms by a task team consisting of personnel from PNL and Rockwell Hanford Operations (RHO). At this time, the most promising candidate for an alternate plutonium shipping form appears to be pressing PuO/sub 2/ into unsintered (green) pellets. These green pellets satisfy the criteria for a less dispersible form without requiring significant process changes. Discussions of all candidates considered are contained in a series of appendices. Recommendations for further investigations of the applicability of green pellets as an alternate shipping form are given, including the need for a cost-benefit study.

  20. Radiochemistry of uranium, neptunium and plutonium: an updating

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Roberts, R.A.; Choppin, G.R.; Wild, J.F.

    1986-02-01

    This report presents some procedures used in the radiochemical isolation, purification and/or analysis of uranium, neptunium, and plutonium. In this update of the procedures, we have not attempted to discuss the developments in the chemistry of U, Np, and Pu but have restricted the report to the newer procedures, most of which have resulted from the increased emphasis in environmental concern which requires analysis of extremely small amounts of the actinide element in quite complex matrices. The final section of this report describes several schemes for isolation of actinides by oxidation state.

  1. Post-accident inhalation exposure and experience with plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shinn, J

    1998-06-01

    This paper addresses the issue of inhalation exposure immediately afterward and for a long time following a nuclear accident. For the cases where either a nuclear weapon burns or explodes prior to nuclear fission, or at locations close to a nuclear reactor accident containing fission products, a major concern is the inhalation of aerosolized plutonium (Pu) particles producing alpha-radiation. We have conducted field studies of Pu- contaminated real and simulated accident sites at Bikini, Johnston Atoll, Tonopah (Nevada), Palomares (Spain), Chernobyl, and Maralinga (Australia).

  2. Science &Technology Facilities Council

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Science &Technology Facilities Council Science &Technology Facilities Council Science and Technology Facilities Council Annual Report and Accounts 2011-2012 Science and Technology Facilities Council Laboratory, Cheshire; UK Astronomy Technology Centre, Edinburgh; Chilbolton Observatory, Hampshire; Isaac

  3. Plutonium contamination in soils in open space and residential areas near Rocky Flats, Colorado

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Litaor, M.I.

    1999-02-01

    Spatial analysis of the {sup 240}Pu:{sup 239}Pu isotopic ratio of 42 soil samples collected around Rocky Flats Plant near Golden, Colorado, was conducted to assess the effect of Rocky Flats Plant activity on the soil environment. Two probability maps that quantified the uncertainty of the spatial distribution of plutonium isotopic ratios were constructed using the sequential Gaussian simulation technique (sGs). Assuming a plutonium isotopic ratio range of 0.152 {+-} 0.003 to 0.169 {+-} 0.009 is characteristic to global fallout in Colorado, and a mean value of 0.155 is representative for the Rocky Flats Plant area, the main findings of the current work were (1) the areas northwest and southwest of Rocky Flats Plant exhibited a plutonium ratio {ge}0.155, this were minimally impacted by the plant activity; (2) he study area east of Rocky Flats Plant exhibited a plutonium isotopic ratio {le}0.155, which is a definitive indicator of Rocky Flats Plant-derived plutonium; and (3) inventory calculations across the study area exhibited large standard error of estimates. These errors were originated from the high variability in plutonium activity over a small sampling scale and the uncertainty in the global fallout isotopic ratio. Using the mean simulated estimates of plutonium isotopic ratio, coupled with plutonium activity measured at 11 soil pits and additional plutonium information published elsewhere, the plutonium loading on the open space and residential areas amounted to 111.2 GBq, with a standard error of estimate of 50.8 GBq.

  4. SRS MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site(SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. SRS has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 2 or 3 facility with storage of bulk PuO{sub 2} and assembly, storage, and shipping of fuel bundles in an S and S Category 1 facility. The total Category 1 approach, which is the recommended option, would be done in the 221-H Canyon Building. A facility that was never in service will be removed from one area, and a hardened wall will be constructed in another area to accommodate execution of the LA fuel fabrication. The non-Category 1 approach would require removal of process equipment in the FB-Line metal production and packaging glove boxes, which requires work in a contamination area. The Immobilization Hot Demonstration Program equipment in the Savannah River Technology Center would need to be removed to accommodate pellet fabrication. This work would also be in a contaminated area.

  5. Plutonium destruction in a non-fertile, ZrO{sub 2}-based fuel: A reactor option for disposition of surplus plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Oversby, V.M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); McPheeters, C.C. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1996-02-01

    The United States and Russia are assessing options for disposition of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. This paper reviews the options under consideration by the US Department of Energy and suggests an additional option that fits within the framework of the environmental analysis provided in the draft PEIS (Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement). In addition to the burning of Pu in mixed U-Pu oxide fuel, we recommend consideration of a non-fertile fuel based on zirconia with inclusion of rare earth elements for phase stabilization and control of reactivity. The zirconia based fuel could also be used to burn plutonium generated in commercial reactor fuels, which represent a larger inventory of plutonium than the weapon-grade material. The increasing inventories of civilian plutonium potentially represent a larger threat with respect to diversion weapons usable material than the stocks of weapon-grade material considered for disposition by the US and Russia. We discuss the use of zirconia-based fuel and pyrochemical processing of spent commercial reactor fuels as a means of decreasing world-wide plutonium inventories. The experience gained in burning weapon-grade plutonium in the new non-fertile fuel would shorten the time required to gain acceptance of the fuel for commercial reactor use.

  6. An integrated approach for determining plutonium mass in spent fuel assemblies with nondestructive assay

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fensin, Mike L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    There are a variety of reasons for quantifying plutonium (Pu) in spent fuel. Below, five motivations are listed: (1) To verify the Pu content of spent fuel without depending on unverified information from the facility, as requested by the IAEA ('independent verification'). New spent fuel measurement techniques have the potential to allow the IAEA to recover continuity of knowledge and to better detect diversion. (2) To assure regulators that all of the nuclear material of interest leaving a nuclear facility actually arrives at another nuclear facility ('shipper/receiver'). Given the large stockpile of nuclear fuel at reactor sites around the world, it is clear that in the coming decades, spent fuel will need to be moved to either reprocessing facilities or storage sites. Safeguarding this transportation is of significant interest. (3) To quantify the Pu in spent fuel that is not considered 'self-protecting.' Fuel is considered self-protecting by some regulatory bodies when the dose that the fuel emits is above a given level. If the fuel is not self-protecting, then the Pu content of the fuel needs to be determined and the Pu mass recorded in the facility's accounting system. This subject area is of particular interest to facilities that have research-reactor spent fuel or old light-water reactor (LWR) fuel. It is also of interest to regulators considering changing the level at which fuel is considered self-protecting. (4) To determine the input accountability value at an electrochemical processing facility. It is not expected that an electrochemical reprocessing facility will have an input accountability tank, as is typical in an aqueous reprocessing facility. As such, one possible means of determining the input accountability value is to measure the Pu content in the spent fuel that arrives at the facility. (5) To fully understand the composition of the fuel in order to efficiently and safely pack spent fuel into a long-term repository. The NDA of spent fuel can be part of a system that cost-effectively meets the burnup credit needs of a repository. Behind each of these reasons is a regulatory structure with MC&A requirements. In the case of the IAEA, the accountable quantity is elemental plutonium. The material in spent fuel (fissile isotopes, fission products, etc.) emits signatures that provide information about the content and history of the fuel. A variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques are available to quantify these signatures. The effort presented in this paper is investigation of the capabilities of 12 NDA techniques. For these 12, none is conceptually capable of independently determining the Pu content in a spent fuel assembly while at the same time being able to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of rods. For this reason the authors are investigating the capability of 12 NDA techniques with the end goal of integrating a few techniques together into a system that is capable of measuring Pu mass in an assembly. The work described here is the beginning of what is anticipated to be a five year effort: (1) two years of modeling to select the best technologies, (2) one year fabricating instruments and (3) two years measuring spent fuel. This paper describes the first two years of this work. In order to cost effectively and robustly model the performance of the 12 NDA techniques, an 'assembly library' was created. The library contains the following: (a) A diverse range of PWR spent fuel assemblies (burnup, enrichment, cooling time) similar to that which exists in spent pools today and in the future. (b) Diversion scenarios that capture a range of possible rod removal options. (c) The spatial and isotopic detail needed to accurately quantify the capability of all the NDA techniques so as to enable integration. It is our intention to make this library available to other researchers in the field for inter-comparison purposes. The performance of each instrument will be quantified for the full assembly library for measurements in three different media: air, water and borated water. The 12 NDA te

  7. Science Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDidDevelopment Top LDRDUniversitySchedules PrintNIF About BlogFacilities

  8. A history of major Hanford facilities and processes involving radioactive material. [Contains glossary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ballinger, M.Y.; Hall, R.B.

    1991-03-01

    The Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction (HEDR) Project was established in 1987 to estimate radiation doses that people could have received from nuclear operations at the Hanford Site since 1944. Hanford Site operations began in 1944 to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. This effort included fabricating fuel elements, irradiating the fuel in nuclear reactors, and separating the resulting plutonium from uranium and fission byproducts. To build a foundation for the first step in estimating radiation doses, HEDR staff at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory compiled and summarized historical information that describes the processes and facilities in which radioactive material was generated or used at the Hanford Site. This document categorizes nuclear operations under six processes: fuel fabrication, reactor operations, fuel separations, plutonium finishing, research and development, and tank farms and waste recovery. Historical emission controls and effluent monitoring are discussed for each process. Because Hanford Site operations used the first large-scale nuclear facilities of their kind, process development and effluent control measures evolved as knowledge about the processes improved. Over the years, facilities were added or modified to improve processes, accelerate production, and better control emissions to the environment. 25 refs., 23 figs., 3 tabs.

  9. Experimental critical parameters of plutonium metal cylinders flooded with water

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-07-01

    Forty-nine critical configurations are reported for experiments involving arrays of 3 kg plutonium metal cylinders moderated and reflected by water. Thirty-four of these describe systems assembled in the laboratory, while 15 others are derived critical parameters inferred from 46 subcritical cases. The arrays included 2x2xN, N = 2, 3, 4, and 5, in one program and 3x3x3 configurations in a later study. All were three-dimensional, nearly square arrays with equal horizontal lattice spacings but a different vertical lattice spacing. Horizontal spacings ranged from units in contact to 180 mm center-to-center; and vertical spacings ranged from about 80 mm to almost 400 mm center-to-center. Several nearly-equilateral 3x3x3 arrays exhibit an extremely sensitive dependence upon horizontal separation for identical vertical spacings. A line array of unreflected and essentially unmoderated canned plutonium metal units appeared to be well subcritical based on measurements made to assure safety during the manual assembly operations. All experiments were performed at two widely separated times in the mid-1970s and early 1980s under two programs at the Rocky Flats Plant`s Critical Mass Laboratory.

  10. Treatment of plutonium process residues by molten salt oxidation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stimmel, J.; Wishau, R.; Ramsey, K.B.; Montoya, A.; Brock, J.; Heslop, M.; Wernly, K.

    1999-04-01

    Molten Salt Oxidation (MSO) is a thermal process that can remove more than 99.999% of the organic matrix from combustible {sup 238}Pu material. Plutonium processing residues are injected into a molten salt bed with an excess of air. The salt (sodium carbonate) functions as a catalyst for the conversion of the organic material to carbon dioxide and water. Reactive species such as fluorine, chlorine, bromine, iodine, sulfur, phosphorous and arsenic in the organic waste react with the molten salt to form the corresponding neutralized salts, NaF, NaCl, NaBr, NaI, Na{sub 2}SO{sub 4}, Na{sub 3}PO{sub 4} and NaAsO{sub 2} or Na{sub 3}AsO4. Plutonium and other metals react with the molten salt and air to form metal salts or oxides. Saturated salt will be recycled and aqueous chemical separation will be used to recover the {sup 238}Pu. The Los Alamos National Laboratory system, which is currently in the conceptual design stage, will be scaled down from current systems for use inside a glovebox.

  11. Research To Underpin The UK Plutonium Disposition Strategy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hanson, B.C.; Scales, C.R.; Worrall, A.; Thomas, M. [Nexia Solutions, Risley, Warrington, Cheshire, WA3 6AS (United Kingdom); Davies, P.; Gilchrist, P. [Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Pelham House, Calderbridge, Cumbria, CA20 1DB (United Kingdom)

    2006-07-01

    In April 2005, the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) took ownership of most of the civil nuclear liabilities and assets in the UK. These include separated civil plutonium stocks, which are expected to rise to over 100 tonnes. Future UK national policy for disposition remains to be finalised. The feasibility of management options needs to be determined in order to allow the NDA to advise government on the ultimate disposition of this material. Nexia Solutions has a contract with NDA to develop and carry out a research project which will result in a recommendation on the technical feasibility of a number of disposition options, focussing on re-use and immobilisation of plutonium as a waste for disposal. Initial work is already underway evaluating re-use with MOX and IMF fuels and immobilisation using ceramics, glasses and MOX for disposal. The programme is expected to result, circa 2010, in a recommendation of a preferred route for immobilisation and a preferred route for re-use for the UK's civil Pu stocks. (authors)

  12. Standard test methods for chemical, mass spectrometric, and spectrochemical analysis of nuclear-grade plutonium dioxide powders and pellets

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2010-01-01

    1.1 These test methods cover procedures for the chemical, mass spectrometric, and spectrochemical analysis of nuclear-grade plutonium dioxide powders and pellets to determine compliance with specifications. 1.2 The analytical procedures appear in the following order: Sections Plutonium Sample Handling 8 to 10 Plutonium by Controlled-Potential Coulometry Plutonium by Ceric Sulfate Titration Plutonium by Amperometric Titration with Iron(II) Plutonium by Diode Array Spectrophotometry Nitrogen by Distillation Spectrophotometry Using Nessler Reagent 11 to 18 Carbon (Total) by Direct Combustion–Thermal Conductivity 19 to 30 Total Chlorine and Fluorine by Pyrohydrolysis 31 to 38 Sulfur by Distillation Spectrophotometry 39 to 47 Plutonium Isotopic Analysis by Mass Spectrometry Rare Earth Elements by Spectroscopy 48 to 55 Trace Elements by Carrier–Distillation Spectroscopy 56 to 63 Impurities by ICP-AES Impurity Elements by Spark-Source Mass Spectrography 64 to 70 Moisture by the Coulomet...

  13. Study of plutonium disposition using existing GE advanced Boiling Water Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-06-01

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the US to dispose of 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in a safe and proliferation resistant manner. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing permanent conversion and long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study ``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium identified Light Water Reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a US disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a typical 1155 MWe GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. A companion study of the Advanced BWR has recently been submitted. The MOX core design work that was conducted for the ABWR enabled GE to apply comparable fuel design concepts and consequently achieve full MOX core loading which optimize plutonium throughput for existing BWRs.

  14. Survey of plutonium and uranium atom ratios and activity levels in Mortandad Canyon

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gallaher, B.M.; Benjamin, T.M.; Rokop, D.J.; Stoker, A.K.

    1997-09-22

    For more than three decades Mortandad Canyon has been the primary release area of treated liquid radioactive waste from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Laboratory). In this survey, six water samples and seven stream sediment samples collected in Mortandad Canyon were analyzed by thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) to determine the plutonium and uranium activity levels and atom ratios. Be measuring the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu atom ratios, the Laboratory plutonium component was evaluated relative to that from global fallout. Measurements of the relative abundance of {sup 235}U and {sup 236}U were also used to identify non-natural components. The survey results indicate the Laboratory plutonium and uranium concentrations in waters and sediments decrease relatively rapidly with distance downstream from the major industrial sources. Plutonium concentrations in shallow alluvial groundwater decrease by approximately 1000 fold along a 3000 ft distance. At the Laboratory downstream boundary, total plutonium and uranium concentrations were generally within regional background ranges previously reported. Laboratory derived plutonium is readily distinguished from global fallout in on-site waters and sediments. The isotopic ratio data indicates off-site migration of trace levels of Laboratory plutonium in stream sediments to distances approximately two miles downstream of the Laboratory boundary.

  15. Distributed Mobility Management for Target Tracking in Mobile Sensor Networks

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chakrabarty, Krishnendu

    --Wireless mobile sensor networks, mobility management, target tracking, Bayesian, distributed system. Ç 1 of scarce resources, such as energy and network bandwidth. Furthermore, the mobility management schemeDistributed Mobility Management for Target Tracking in Mobile Sensor Networks Yi Zou, Member, IEEE

  16. CALORIMETER-BASED ADJUSTMENT OF MULTIPLICITY DETERMINED 240PU EFF KNOWN-A ANALYSIS FOR THE ASSAY OF PLUTONIUM

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dubose, F.

    2012-02-21

    In nuclear material processing facilities, it is often necessary to balance the competing demands of accuracy and throughput. While passive neutron multiplicity counting is the preferred method for relatively fast assays of plutonium, the presence of low-Z impurities (fluorine, beryllium, etc.) rapidly erodes the assay precision of passive neutron counting techniques, frequently resulting in unacceptably large total measurement uncertainties. Conversely, while calorimeters are immune to these impurity effects, the long count times required for high accuracy can be a hindrance to efficiency. The higher uncertainties in passive neutron measurements of impure material are driven by the resulting large (>>2) {alpha}-values, defined as the ({alpha},n):spontaneous fission neutron emission ratio. To counter impurity impacts for high-{alpha} materials, a known-{alpha} approach may be adopted. In this method, {alpha} is determined for a single item using a combination of gamma-ray and calorimetric measurements. Because calorimetry is based on heat output, rather than a statistical distribution of emitted neutrons, an {alpha}-value determined in this way is far more accurate than one determined from passive neutron counts. This fixed {alpha} value can be used in conventional multiplicity analysis for any plutonium-bearing item having the same chemical composition and isotopic distribution as the original. With the results of single calorimeter/passive neutron/gamma-ray measurement, these subsequent items can then be assayed with high precision and accuracy in a relatively short time, despite the presence of impurities. A calorimeter-based known-{alpha} multiplicity analysis technique is especially useful when requiring rapid, high accuracy, high precision measurements of multiple plutonium bearing items having a common source. The technique has therefore found numerous applications at the Savannah River Site. In each case, a plutonium (or mixed U/Pu) bearing item is divided into multiple containers. A single item from that batch is then selected for both neutron and calorimetric measurements; all remaining items undergo a neutron measurement only. Using the technique mentioned above, the 'true' {alpha} value determined from the first (calorimeter and passive neutron measured) item is used in multiplicity analysis for all other items in the batch. The justification for using this {alpha} value in subsequent calculations is the assumption that the chemical composition and isotopic distribution of all batch items are the same, giving a constant ({alpha},n):spontaneous fission ratio. This analysis method has been successfully applied to the KIS Facility, significantly improving measurement uncertainties and reducing processing times for numerous items. Comprehensive plans were later developed to extend the use of this method to other applications, including the K-Area Shuffler and the H-Area Pu-Blending Project. While only the feasibility study for the Shuffler has been completed, implementation of the method in the H-Area Pu-Blending Project is currently in progress and has been successfully applied to multiple items. This report serves to document the details of this method in order to serve as a reference for future applications. Also contained herein are specific examples of the application of known-{alpha} multiplicity analysis.

  17. DOE plutonium disposition study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 2, Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-05-15

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document Volume 2, provides a discussion of: Plutonium Fuel Cycle; Technology Needs; Regulatory Considerations; Cost and Schedule Estimates; and Deployment Strategy.

  18. A preliminary analysis of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternative deployment schedules

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zurn, R.M.

    1997-09-01

    This paper discusses the preliminary analysis of the implementation schedules of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives. These schedule analyses are a part of a larger process to examine the nine decision criteria used to determine the most appropriate method of disposing of U.S. surplus weapons plutonium. The preliminary analysis indicates that the mission durations for the reactor-based alternatives range from eleven years to eighteen years and the initial mission fuel assemblies containing surplus weapons-usable plutonium could be loaded into the reactors between nine and fourteen years after the Record of Decision.

  19. NNSS Soils Monitoring: Plutonium Valley (CAU366) FY2012

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, Julianne J.; Mizell, Steve A.; Nikolich, George; McCurdy, Greg; Campbell, Scott

    2013-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nevada Site Office (NSO), Environmental Restoration Soils Activity has authorized the Desert Research Institute (DRI) to conduct field assessments of potential sediment transport of contaminated soil from Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites Contamination Area (CA) during precipitation runoff events. Field measurements at the T-4 Atmospheric Test Site (CAU 370) suggest that radionuclide-contaminated soils may have migrated along a shallow ephemeral drainage that traverses the site (NNSA/NSO, 2009). (It is not entirely clear how contaminated soils got into their present location at the T-4 Site, but flow to the channel has been redirected and the contamination does not appear to be migrating at present.) Aerial surveys in selected portions of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) also suggest that radionuclide-contaminated soils may be migrating along ephemeral channels in Areas 3, 8, 11, 18, and 25 (Colton, 1999). In Area 11, several low-level airborne surveys of the Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites (CAU 366) show plumes of Americium 241 (Am-241) extending along ephemeral channels (Figure 1, marker numbers 5 and 6) below Corrective Action Site (CAS) 11-23-03 (marker number 3) and CAS 11 23-04 (marker number 4) (Colton, 1999). Plutonium Valley in Area 11 of the NNSS was selected for the study because of the aerial survey evidence suggesting downstream transport of radionuclide-contaminated soil. The aerial survey (Figure 1) shows a well defined finger of elevated radioactivity (marker number 5) extending to the southwest from the southernmost detonation site (marker number 4). This finger of contamination overlies a drainage channel mapped on the topographic base map used for presentation of the survey data suggesting surface runoff as a likely cause of the contaminated area. Additionally, instrumenting sites strongly suspected of conveying soil from areas of surface contamination offers the most efficient means to confirm that surface runoff may transport radioactive contamination as a result of ambient precipitation/runoff events. Closure plans being developed for the CAUs on the NNSS may include post-closure monitoring for possible release of radioactive contaminants. Determining the potential for transport of radionuclide-contaminated soils under ambient meteorological conditions will facilitate an appropriate closure design and post-closure monitoring program.

  20. Mobile Technology Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-11-21

    The directive will ensure that federal organizations and employees within the Department can use mobile technology to support mission requirements in a safe and secure manner.

  1. Workers Remove Glove Boxes from Ventilation at Hanford's Plutonium...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    boxes inside the facility's former processing area. This work is performed inside plastic enclosures to limit the spread of contamination. Preparing the glove boxes for...

  2. Reversible expansion of gallium-stabilized (delta)-plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wolfer, W G; Oudot, B; Baclet, N

    2006-02-27

    It is shown that the transient expansion of plutonium-gallium alloys observed both in the lattice parameter as well as in the dimension of a sample held at ambient temperature can be explained by assuming incipient precipitation of Pu{sub 3}Ga. However, this ordered {zeta}-phase is also subject to radiation-induced disordering. As a result, the gallium-stabilized {delta}-phase, being metastable at ambient temperature, is driven towards thermodynamic equilibrium by radiation-enhanced diffusion of gallium and at the same time reverted back to its metastable state by radiation-induced disordering. A steady state is reached in which only a modest fraction of the gallium present is arranged in ordered {zeta}-phase regions.

  3. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) HVAC System Component Index

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DICK, J.D.

    2000-02-28

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) WAC System includes sub-systems 25A through 25K. Specific system boundaries and justifications are contained in HNF-SD-CP-SDD-005, ''Definition and Means of Maintaining the Ventilation System Confinement Portion of the PFP Safety Envelope.'' The procurement requirements associated with the system necessitates procurement of some system equipment as Commercial Grade Items in accordance with HNF-PRO-268, ''Control of Purchased Items and Services.'' This document lists safety class and safety significant components for the Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning and specifies the critical characteristics for Commercial Grade Items, as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to properly perform its safety function. There may be several manufacturers or models that meet the critical characteristics for any one item.

  4. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Durst, Philip C.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Boyer, Brian; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line. The most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, referred to as “MOX”. However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and transmuted through irradiation in the ABR. A third and final report in this series will evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of reference. The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF.

  5. Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium quarterly technical progress report, August 1--October 31, 1998

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-11-01

    This paper describes activities of the Center under the following topical sections: Electronic resource library; Environmental restoration and protection; Health and safety; Waste management; Communication program; Education program; Training; Analytical development; Materials science; Plutonium processing and handling; and Storage.

  6. DOE Plutonium Disposition Study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 1, Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-05-15

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document, Volume 1, presents a technical description of the various elements of the System 80 + Standard Plant Design upon which the Plutonium Disposition Study was based. The System 80 + Standard Design is fully developed and directly suited to meeting the mission objectives for plutonium disposal. The bass U0{sub 2} plant design is discussed here.

  7. An analysis of plutonium recycle fuel elements in San Onofre-1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Momsen, Bruce William Foster

    1974-01-01

    A method has been developed to allow independent assessment of the use of plutonium recycle assemblies in operating reactors. This method utilizes Generalized Mixed Number Density (GMND) cross sections (based on Breen's ...

  8. US weapons-useable plutonium disposition policy: implementation of the MOX fuel option 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gonzalez, Vanessa L

    1998-01-01

    A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of U.S. weapons-grade plutonium which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option...

  9. Dynamic shape factors for hydox-generated plutonium dioxide-type non-sperical objects 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lohaus, James Harold

    1999-01-01

    The dynamic shape factors of HYDOX-generated plutonium dioxide-type non-spherical objects were estimated with computational methods. Leith's empirical methods were used to modify classical Stokes's law for aerosol dynamics (1987). The dynamic shape...

  10. Analysis of conventional and plutonium recycle unit-assemblies for the Yankee (Rowe) PWR

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mertens, Paul Gustaaf

    1971-01-01

    An analysis and comparison of Unit Conventional UO2 Fuel-Assemblies and proposed Plutonium Recycle Fuel Assemblies for the Yankee (Rowe) Reactor has been made. The influence of spectral effects, at the watergaps -and ...

  11. Environmental behavior of hafnium : the impact on the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cerefice, Gary Steven

    1999-01-01

    Experimental and analytical studies were performed to examine the environmental behavior of hafnium and its utility as a neutron poison for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Yucca Mountain. The hydrolysis of ...

  12. Fertile free fuels for plutonium and minor actinides burning in LWRs

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Zhang, Yi, 1979-

    2003-01-01

    The feasibility of using various uranium-free fuels for plutonium incineration in present light water reactors is investigated. Two major categories of inert matrix fuels are studied: composite ceramic fuel particles ...

  13. Deactivation and decommissioning environmental strategy for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Complex Hanford Nuclear Reservation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    HOPKINS, A.M.

    2003-02-01

    The overall goal of this strategy is to comply with all applicable environmental laws and regulations and/or compliance agreements during Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) stabilization, deactivation, and eventual dismantlement.

  14. URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM LOADING ONTO MONOSODIUM TITANATE MST IN TANK 50H

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hobbs, D

    2006-08-31

    A possible disposition pathway for the residue from the abandoned In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) sends the material from Tank 48H in increments to Saltstone via aggregation in Tank 50H. After entering Tank 50H, the amount of fissile material sorbed on MST may increase as a result of contacting waste solutions with dissolved uranium and plutonium. SRNL recommends that nuclear criticality safety evaluations use uranium and plutonium loadings onto MST of 14.0 {+-} 1.04 weight percent (wt %) for uranium and 2.79 {+-} 0.197 wt % for plutonium given the assumed streams defined in this report. These values derive from recently measured for conditions relevant to the Actinide Removal Process (ARP) and serve as conservative upper bounds for uranium and plutonium loadings during the proposed transfers of MST from Tank 48H into Tank 50H.

  15. Benefits of Using Mobile Transformers and Mobile Substations...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Using Mobile Transformers and Mobile Substations for Rapidly Restoring Electrical Service: a Report to the United States Congress Pursuant to Section 1816 of the Energy Policy Act...

  16. Opportunities for mixed oxide fuel testing in the advanced test reactor to support plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Terry, W.K.; Ryskamp, J.M.; Sterbentz, J.W.

    1995-08-01

    Numerous technical issues must be resolved before LWR operating licenses can be amended to allow the use of MOX fuel. These issues include the following: (1) MOX fuel fabrication process verification; (2) Whether and how to use burnable poisons to depress MOX fuel initial reactivity, which is higher than that of urania; (3) The effects of WGPu isotopic composition; (4) The feasibility of loading MOX fuel with plutonia content up to 7% by weight; (5) The effects of americium and gallium in WGPu; (6) Fission gas release from MOX fuel pellets made from WGPu; (7) Fuel/cladding gap closure; (8) The effects of power cycling and off-normal events on fuel integrity; (9) Development of radial distributions of burnup and fission products; (10) Power spiking near the interfaces of MOX and urania fuel assemblies; and (11) Fuel performance code validation. The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory possesses many advantages for performing tests to resolve most of the issues identified above. We have performed calculations to show that the use of hafnium shrouds can produce spectrum adjustments that will bring the flux spectrum in ATR test loops into a good approximation to the spectrum anticipated in a commercial LWR containing MOX fuel while allowing operation of the test fuel assemblies near their optimum values of linear heat generation rate. The ATR would be a nearly ideal test bed for developing data needed to support applications to license LWRs for operation with MOX fuel made from weapons-grade plutonium. The requirements for planning and implementing a test program in the ATR have been identified. The facilities at Argonne National Laboratory-West can meet all potential needs for pre- and post-irradiation examination that might arise in a MOX fuel qualification program.

  17. Enhancing mobile browsing and reading

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Yu, Chen-Hsiang

    Although the web browser has become a standard interface for information access on the Web, the mobile web browser on the smartphone does not hold the same interest to mobile users. A survey with 11 mobile users shows that ...

  18. Mobile Malware Propagation and Defense

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Zyba, Gjergji

    Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices (SPSM), pages 3–directly by the mobile devices, and that this difference isMcA] McAfee. Securing Mobile Devices: Present and Future.

  19. Method of immobilizing weapons plutonium to provide a durable, disposable waste product

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ewing, Rodney C. (Albuquerque, NM); Lutze, Werner (Albuquerque, NM); Weber, William J. (Richland, WA)

    1996-01-01

    A method of atomic scale fixation and immobilization of plutonium to provide a durable waste product. Plutonium is provided in the form of either PuO.sub.2 or Pu(NO.sub.3).sub.4 and is mixed with and SiO.sub.2. The resulting mixture is cold pressed and then heated under pressure to form (Zr,Pu)SiO.sub.4 as the waste product.

  20. Comparison of bioturbation rates determined by lead-210 and plutonium in abyssal cores 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Stordal, Mary Christine

    1981-01-01

    COMPARISON OF BIOTURBATION RATES DETERMINED BY LEAD-210 AND PLUTONIUM IN ABYSSAI. CORES A Thesis by MARY CHRISTINE STORDAL Submitted to the Graduate College of Texas ASM University in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree... of MASTER OF SCIENCE December 1981 Major Subject: Oceanography COMPARISON OF BIOTURBATION RATES DETERMINED BY LEAD-210 AND PLUTONIUM IN ABYSSAL CORES A Thesis MARY CHRISTINE STORDAL Approved as t. o style and content by: (Chairman of Committee...

  1. Method for removal of plutonium impurity from americium oxides and fluorides

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    FitzPatrick, John R. (Los Alamos, NM); Dunn, Jerry G. (Los Alamos, NM); Avens, Larry R. (Los Alamos, NM)

    1987-01-01

    Method for removal of plutonium impurity from americium oxides and fluorides. AmF.sub.4 is not further oxidized to AmF.sub.6 by the application of O.sub.2 F at room temperature, while plutonium compounds present in the americium sample are fluorinated to volatile PuF.sub.6, which can readily be separated therefrom, leaving the purified americium oxides and/or fluorides as the solid tetrafluoride.

  2. Method for removal of plutonium impurity from americium oxides and fluorides

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    FitzPatrick, J.R.; Dunn, J.G.; Avens, L.R.

    1987-02-13

    Method for removal of plutonium impurity from americium oxides and fluorides. AmF/sub 4/ is not further oxidized to AmF/sub 6/ by the application of O/sub 2/F at room temperature thereto, while plutonium compounds present in the americium sample are fluorinated to volatile PuF/sub 6/, which can readily be separated therefrom, leaving the purified americium oxides and/or fluorides as the solid tetrafluoride thereof.

  3. Plutonium Immobilization Project Binder Burnout and Sintering Studies (Milestone 6.6a)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chandler, G.

    1999-10-28

    The Plutonium Immobilization Team has developed an integrated test program to understand and optimize the controlling variables for the sintering step of the plutonium immobilization process. Sintering is the key process step that controls the product minerology. It is expected that the sintering will be the limiting process step that controls the throughput of the production line. The goal of the current sintering test program is to better understand factors that affect the sintering process.

  4. Measurements of the oxidation state and concentration of plutonium in interstitial waters of the Irish Sea

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nelson, D.M.; Lovett, M.B.

    1980-01-01

    The question of plutonium movement in interstitial waters resulting from diffusion along concentration gradients or from advective flow is addressed. The results of measurements of both the concentration and the oxidation state of plutonium in interstitial water collected from sediments near the Windscale discharge, in the solid phases of these sediments and in seawater and suspended solids collected at the coring locations are discussed. (ACR)

  5. Risk analysis of shipping plutonium pits and mixed oxide fuel 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Caldwell, Amy Baker

    1997-01-01

    .89 resulting from traffic accidents. For the placement of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at Pantex, only the MOX fuel would need to be transported from one facility to another, in this case from Pantex to Palo Verde. The total fatalities for this scenario...

  6. Feasibility of Burning First- and Second-Generation Plutonium in Pebble Bed High-Temperature Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Haas, J.B.M. de; Kuijper, J.C

    2005-08-15

    The core physics investigations at the Nuclear Research Consultancy Group in the Netherlands, as part of the activities within the HTR-N project of the European Fifth Framework Program, are focused on the incineration of pure (first- and second-generation) Pu fuels in the reference pebble bed high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTR) HTR-MODUL with a continuous reload [MEDUL, (MEhrfach DUrchLauf, multipass)] fueling strategy in which the spherical fuel elements, or pebbles, pass through the core a number of times before being permanently discharged. For pebbles fueled with different loadings of plutonium, the feasibility of a sustained fuel cycle under nominal reactor conditions was investigated by means of the reactivity and temperature coefficients of the reactor. The HTR-MODUL was found to be a very effective reactor to reduce the stockpile of first-generation plutonium. It reduces the amount of plutonium to about one-sixth of the original and reduces the risk of proliferation by denaturing the plutonium vector. For second-generation plutonium the incineration is less favorable, as the amount of plutonium is only halved.

  7. Plutonium Recycling in Light Water Reactors at Framatome ANP: Status and Trends

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Porsch, Dieter [Framatome ANP GmbH (France); Stach, Walter [Framatome ANP GmbH (France); Charmensat, Pascal [Framatome ANP S.A.S. (France); Pasquet, Michel [Framatome ANP S.A.S. (France)

    2005-08-15

    The civil and military utilization of nuclear power results in continuously increasing stockpiles of spent fuel and separated plutonium. Since fast breeder reactors are at present not available, the majority of spent fuel discharged from commercial nuclear reactors is intended for direct final disposal or designated for interim storage. An effective form of intermediate plutonium storage is recycling in thermal reactors. Recycling of the recovered plutonium in commercial light water reactors (LWRs) is currently practiced in Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland. The number of mixed-oxide (MOX) assemblies reloaded each year in a large variety of reactors demonstrates that plutonium recycling in LWRs has reached industrial maturity. The status of experience gained today at Framatome ANP confirms the reliability of the design codes and the suitability of fuel assembly and core designs. The validation database for increasing exposures of MOX fuel is being continuously expanded. This provides the basis for further extending the discharge exposures of MOX assemblies and for licensing the use of higher plutonium concentrations. Options to support the weapons plutonium reduction programs and for the development of advanced MOX assembly designs are investigated.

  8. Mobility in Wireless Sensor Networks

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mehta, Ankur Mukesh

    2012-01-01

    rate communication in an empirical WSN installation . Motecommunication for mobile MANET- WSN scenarios”. In: IEEEof Nodes in Mobile WSN”. In: IEEE Inter- national Conference

  9. Resumption of thermal stabilization of plutonium oxide in Building 707, Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado. Environmental Assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-02-01

    The Department of Energy is proposing thermal stabilization to enhance the safe storage of plutonium at Rocky Flats Plant until decisions are made on long-term storage and disposition of the material. The proposed action is to resume thermal stabilization of pyrophoric plutonium in Building 707 at Rocky Flats Plant. Thermal stabilization would heat the pyrophoric plutonium under controlled conditions in a glovebox furnace to promote full oxidation and convert the material into stable plutonium oxide in the form of PuO{sub 2}. Other activities associated with thermal stabilization would include post-stabilization characterization of non-pyrophoric plutonium and on-site movement of pyrophoric and non-pyrophoric plutonium. This report covers; purpose and need; proposed action; alternatives to the proposed action; affected environment; environmental effects of proposed action and no action alternative; agencies and person consulted; and public participation.

  10. Guide to research facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-06-01

    This Guide provides information on facilities at US Department of Energy (DOE) and other government laboratories that focus on research and development of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. These laboratories have opened these facilities to outside users within the scientific community to encourage cooperation between the laboratories and the private sector. The Guide features two types of facilities: designated user facilities and other research facilities. Designated user facilities are one-of-a-kind DOE facilities that are staffed by personnel with unparalleled expertise and that contain sophisticated equipment. Other research facilities are facilities at DOE and other government laboratories that provide sophisticated equipment, testing areas, or processes that may not be available at private facilities. Each facility listing includes the name and phone number of someone you can call for more information.

  11. Decommissioning an Active Historical Reactor Facility at the Savannah River Site - 13453

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bergren, Christopher L.; Long, J. Tony; Blankenship, John K. [Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC, Bldg. 730-4B, Aiken, SC 29808 (United States)] [Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC, Bldg. 730-4B, Aiken, SC 29808 (United States); Adams, Karen M. [United States Department of Energy, Bldg. 730-B, Aiken, SC 29808 (United States)] [United States Department of Energy, Bldg. 730-B, Aiken, SC 29808 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina, where Management and Operations are performed by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). In 2004, DOE recognized SRS as structure within the Cold War Historic District of national, state and local significance composed of the first generation of facilities constructed and operated from 1950 through 1989 to produce plutonium and tritium for our nation's defense. DOE agreed to manage the SRS 105-C Reactor Facility as a potentially historic property due to its significance in supporting the U.S. Cold War Mission and for potential for future interpretation. This reactor has five primary areas within it, including a Disassembly Basin (DB) that received irradiated materials from the reactor, cooled them and prepared the components for loading and transport to a Separation Canyon for processing. The 6,317 square meter area was divided into numerous work/storage areas. The walls between the individual basin compartments have narrow vertical openings called 'slots' that permit the transfer of material from one section to another. Data indicated there was over 830 curies of radioactivity associated with the basin sediments and approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated water, not including a large quantity of activated reactor equipment, scrap metal, and debris on the basin floor. The need for an action was identified in 2010 to reduce risks to personnel in the facility and to eliminate the possible release of contaminants into the environment. The release of DB water could potentially migrate to the aquifer and contaminate groundwater. DOE, its regulators [U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)-Region 4 and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC)] and the SC Historical Preservation Office (SHPO) agreed/concurred to perform a non-time critical removal action for the In Situ Decommissioning (ISD) of the 105-C Disassembly Basin. ISD consisted of stabilization/isolation of remaining contaminated water, sediment, activated reactor equipment, and scrap metal by filling the DB with underwater non-structural grout to the appropriate (-4.877 meter) grade-level, thence with dry area non-structural grout to the final -10 centimeter level. The roof over the DB was preserved due to its potential historical significance and to prevent the infiltration of precipitation. Forced evaporation was the form of treatment implemented to remove the approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated basin water. Using specially formulated grouts, irradiated materials and sediment were treated by solidification/isolation thus reducing their mobility, reducing radiation exposure and creating an engineered barrier thereby preventing access to the contaminants. Grouting provided a low permeability barrier to minimize any potential transport of contaminants to the aquifer. Efforts were made to preserve the historical significance of the Reactor in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act. ISD provides a cost effective means to isolate and contain residual radioactivity from past nuclear operations allowing natural radioactive decay to reduce hazards to manageable levels. This method limits release of radiological contamination to the environment, minimizes radiation exposure to workers, prevents human/animal access to the hazardous substances, and allows for ongoing monitoring of the decommissioned facility. Field construction was initiated in August 2011; evaporator operations commenced January 2012 and ended July 2012 with over 9 M liters of water treated/removed. Over 8,525 cubic meters of grout were placed, completing in August 2012. The project completed with an excellent safety record, on schedule and under budget. (authors)

  12. Use of Air Modeling to Reduce Facility Demolition Costs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, Dennis; Sanford, Peter; Parsons, Duane A.

    2003-02-26

    DOE faces the problem of decommissioning facilities contaminated with plutonium, uranium, and beryllium. The standard process has been to remove the contaminated process equipment from a facility, and then decontaminate the residual radiological and hazardous contamination from the facility structure to an ''unconditional release'' level. The facility would then be taken down as a clean demolition. Several beryllium-contaminated facilities were identified that will be particularly difficult to decontaminate to these release levels. A number of alternative decommissioning approaches were investigated that would require less decontamination, and thus reduced cost and schedule. Initial alternative approaches proposed erection of barriers (i.e. building-size tent structures with ventilation controls) to minimize the release of contamination to the environment. More recently we have investigated methods to control contamination at the structure surfaces before and during demolition, and model the risk posed to the workers, public, and the environment by the small residual material actually dispersed. This approach promises to minimize decontamination by removing only the highest contamination levels, and eliminates the need for erecting large contamination control structures along with the attendant ventilation equipment and administrative controls. The modeling has demonstrated the regulatory acceptability of this approach, and the approach is ready to be discussed with the regulators and the public.

  13. MobilityFirst: A Robust and Trustworthy Mobility-Centric

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Garfunkel, Eric

    starting, ~5-10B units by 2020 INTERNET Wireless Edge Network INTERNET ~1B server/PC's, ~700M smart phones and opportunistic data delivery Mobile DTN Router Roadway Sensors Mobile DTN User/Router Ad-Hoc Network Opportunistic High-Speed Link (MB/s) Mobile P2P User Infostations Router MOBILE INTERNET Disconnection

  14. FORM AND AGING OF PLUTONIUM IN SAVANNAH RIVER SITE WASTE TANK 18

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hobbs, D.

    2012-02-24

    This report provides a summary of the effects of aging on and the expected forms of plutonium in Tank 18 waste residues. The findings are based on available information on the operational history of Tank 18, reported analytical results for samples taken from Tank 18, and the available scientific literature for plutonium under alkaline conditions. These findings should apply in general to residues in other waste tanks. However, the operational history of other waste tanks should be evaluated for specific conditions and unique operations (e.g., acid cleaning with oxalic acid) that could alter the form of plutonium in heel residues. Based on the operational history of other tanks, characterization of samples from the heel residues in those tanks would be appropriate to confirm the form of plutonium. During the operational period and continuing with the residual heel removal periods, Pu(IV) is the dominant oxidation state of the plutonium. Small fractions of Pu(V) and Pu(VI) could be present as the result of the presence of water and the result of reactions with oxygen in air and products from the radiolysis of water. However, the presence of Pu(V) would be transitory as it is not stable at the dilute alkaline conditions that currently exists in Tank 18. Most of the plutonium that enters Savannah River Site (SRS) high-level waste (HLW) tanks is freshly precipitated as amorphous plutonium hydroxide, Pu(OH){sub 4(am)} or hydrous plutonium oxide, PuO{sub 2(am,hyd)} and coprecipitated within a mixture of hydrous metal oxide phases containing metals such as iron, aluminum, manganese and uranium. The coprecipitated plutonium would include Pu{sup 4+} that has been substituted for other metal ions in crystal lattice sites, Pu{sup 4+} occluded within hydrous metal oxide particles and Pu{sup 4+} adsorbed onto the surface of hydrous metal oxide particles. The adsorbed plutonium could include both inner sphere coordination and outer sphere coordination of the plutonium. PuO{sub 2(am,hyd)} is also likely to be present in deposits and scales that have formed on the steel surfaces of the tank. Over the operational period and after closure of Tank 18, Ostwald ripening has and will continue to transform PuO{sub 2(am,hyd)} to a more crystalline form of plutonium dioxide, PuO{sub 2(c)}. After bulk waste removal and heel retrieval operations, the free hydroxide concentration decreased and the carbonate concentration in the free liquid and solids increased. Consequently, a portion of the PuO{sub 2(am,hyd)} has likely been converted to a hydroxy-carbonate complex such as Pu(OH){sub 2}(CO{sub 3}){sub (s)}. or PuO(CO{sub 3}) {center_dot} xH{sub 2}O{sub (am)}. Like PuO{sub 2(am,hyd)}, Ostwald ripening of Pu(OH){sub 2}(CO{sub 3}){sub (s)} or PuO(CO{sub 3}) {center_dot} xH{sub 2}O{sub (am)} would be expected to occur to produce a more crystalline form of the plutonium carbonate complex. Due to the high alkalinity and low carbonate concentration in the grout formulation, it is expected that upon interaction with the grout, the plutonium carbonate complexes will transform back into plutonium hydroxide. Although crystalline plutonium dioxide is the more stable thermodynamic state of Pu(IV), the low temperature and high water content of the waste during the operating and heel removal periods in Tank 18 have limited the transformation of the plutonium into crystalline plutonium dioxide. During the tank closure period of thousands of years, transformation of the plutonium into a more crystalline plutonium dioxide form would be expected. However, the continuing presence of water, reaction with water radiolysis products, and low temperatures will limit the transformation, and will likely maintain an amorphous Pu(OH){sub 4} or PuO{sub 2(am,hyd)} form on the surface of any crystalline plutonium dioxide produced after tank closure. X-ray Absorption Spectroscopic (XAS) measurements of Tank 18 residues are recommended to confirm coordination environments of the plutonium. If the presence of PuO(CO{sub 3}){sub (am,hyd)} is confirmed by XAS, it is recommended that e

  15. Progress Continues Toward Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    the facility. This work is performed in plastic enclosures to limit the spread of contamination. Employees cut a ventilation duct attached to the last glove box in the former...

  16. THE MOBILE WINDOW THERMAL TEST FACILITY (MoWiTT)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Klems, J. H.

    2011-01-01

    funding from the U, S, Department of Energy provided by the Assis- tant Secretary for Conservation and Solar

  17. Mobile Facility Records Annual Climate Cycle in Niger, Africa

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration wouldMass map shines light on77 PAGEMission Mission Missionof EnergyJennings= a n iof

  18. Mobile Climate Monitoring Facility to Sample Skies in Africa | Department

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirley Ann JacksonDepartment ofOffice| DepartmentGJPPGPracticesDraft.doc Moreof%of Energy

  19. Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1994-04-30

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.

  20. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 3: A new reactor concept without uranium or thorium for burning weapons-grade plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Schnitzler, B.G.; Fletcher, C.D. [and others

    1993-06-01

    The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) requested that the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) examine concepts that focus only on the destruction of 50,000 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. A concept has been developed by the INEL for a low-temperature, low-pressure, low-power density, low-coolant-flow-rate light water reactor that destroys plutonium quickly without using uranium or thorium. This concept is very safe and could be designed, constructed, and operated in a reasonable time frame. This concept does not produce electricity. Not considering other missions frees the design from the paradigms and constraints used by proponents of other dispositioning concepts. The plutonium destruction design goal is most easily achievable with a large, moderate power reactor that operates at a significantly lower thermal power density than is appropriate for reactors with multiple design goals. This volume presents the assumptions and requirements, a reactor concept overview, and a list of recommendations. The appendices contain detailed discussions on plutonium dispositioning, self-protection, fuel types, neutronics, thermal hydraulics, off-site radiation releases, and economics.

  1. Limits of social mobilization

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pentland, Alex Paul

    The Internet and social media have enabled the mobilization of large crowds to achieve time-critical feats, ranging from mapping crises in real time, to organizing mass rallies, to conducting search-and-rescue operations ...

  2. A Mobile Robot Project

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Brooks, Rodney A.

    We are building a mobile robot which will roam around the AI lab observing and later perhaps doing. Our approach to building the robot and its controlling software differs from that used in many other projects in a number ...

  3. Risk management considerations for seismic upgrading of an older facility for short-term residue stabilization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Additon, S.L.; Peregoy, W.L.; Foppe, T.L.

    1999-06-01

    Building 707 and its addition, Building 707A, were selected, after the production mission of Rocky Flats was terminated a few years ago, to stabilize many of the plutonium residues remaining at the site by 2002. The facility had undergone substantial safety improvements to its safety systems and conduct of operations for resumption of plutonium operations in the early 1990s and appeared ideally suited for this new mission to support accelerated Site closure. During development of a new authorization basis, a seismic evaluation was performed. This evaluation addressed an unanalyzed expansion joint and suspect connection details for the precast concrete tilt-up construction and concluded that the seismic capacity of the facility is less than half of that determined by previous analysis. Further, potential seismic interaction was identified between a collapsing Building 707 and the seismically upgraded Building 707A, possibly causing the partial collapse of the latter. Both the operating contractor and the Department of Energy sought a sound technical basis for deciding how to proceed. This paper addresses the risks of the as-is facility and possible benefits of upgrades to support a decision on whether to upgrade the seismic capacity of Building 707, accept the risk of the as-is facility for its short remaining mission, or relocate critical stabilization missions. The paper also addresses the Department of Energy`s policy on natural phenomena.

  4. DISSOLUTION OF PLUTONIUM METAL IN 8-10 M NITRIC ACID

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rudisill, T.; Pierce, R.

    2012-02-21

    The H-Canyon facility will be used to dissolve Pu metal for subsequent purification and conversion to plutonium dioxide (PuO{sub 2}) using Phase II of HB-Line. To support the new mission, the development of a Pu metal dissolution flowsheet which utilizes concentrated (8-10 M) nitric acid (HNO{sub 3}) solutions containing potassium fluoride (KF) is required. Dissolution of Pu metal in concentrated HNO{sub 3} is desired to eliminate the need to adjust the solution acidity prior to purification by anion exchange. The preferred flowsheet would use 8-10 M HNO{sub 3}, 0.015-0.07 M KF, and 0.5-1.0 g/L Gd to dissolve the Pu up to 6.75 g/L. An alternate flowsheet would use 8-10 M HNO{sub 3}, 0.1-0.2 M KF, and 1-2 g/L B to dissolve the Pu. The targeted average Pu metal dissolution rate is 20 mg/min-cm{sup 2}, which is sufficient to dissolve a 'standard' 2250-g Pu metal button in 24 h. Plutonium metal dissolution rate measurements showed that if Gd is used as the nuclear poison, the optimum dissolution conditions occur in 10 M HNO{sub 3}, 0.04-0.05 M KF, and 0.5-1.0 g/L Gd at 112 to 116 C (boiling). These conditions will result in an estimated Pu metal dissolution rate of {approx}11-15 mg/min-cm{sup 2} and will result in dissolution times of 36-48 h for standard buttons. The recommended minimum and maximum KF concentrations are 0.03 M and 0.07 M, respectively. The maximum KF concentration is dictated by a potential room-temperature Pu-Gd-F precipitation issue at low Pu concentrations. The purpose of the experimental work described in this report was two-fold. Initially a series of screening experiments was performed to measure the dissolution rate of Pu metal as functions of the HNO{sub 3}, KF, and Gd or B concentrations. The objective of the screening tests was to propose optimized conditions for subsequent flowsheet demonstration tests. Based on the rate measurements, this study found that optimal dissolution conditions in solutions containing 0.5-1.0 g/L Gd occurred in 8-10 M HNO{sub 3} with 0.04-0.05 M KF at 112 to 116 C (boiling). The testing also showed that solutions containing 8-10 M HNO{sub 3}, 0.1-0.2 M KF, and 1-2 g/L B achieved acceptable dissolution rates in the same temperature range. To confirm that conditions identified by the dissolution rate measurements for solutions containing Gd or B can be used to dissolve Pu metal up to 6.75 g/L in the presence of Fe, demonstration experiments were performed using concentrations in the optimal ranges. In two of the demonstration experiments using Gd and in one experiment using B, the offgas generation during the dissolution was measured and samples were analyzed for H{sub 2}. The experimental methods used to perform the dissolution rate measurements and flowsheet demonstrations and a discussion of the results are presented.

  5. Environmental assessment of the import of Russian plutonium-238

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-06-01

    The United States (U.S.) is proposing to purchase plutonium-238 (Pu-238) from the Russian Federation (Russia) for use in the Nations`s space program. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended, requires the assessment of environmental consequences of all major Federal actions that may significantly affect the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the US Department of Energy (DOE) prepared this Environmental Assessment (EA) to identify and evaluate the environmental consequences of importing Pu-238 fuel from Russia, and of the initial transport and processing of such fuel within the US., as necessary, to add the fuel to the existing US inventory. Since the proposed action involves ocean transport, DOE also considered the environmental consequences of this action on the global commons in accordance with Executive Order 12114 and DOE Guidelines for Compliance with Executive Order 12114. During the transportation sequence from point of origin in Russia to the US, and within the US from the port of entry to either SRS or LANL, various environments could be affected by the proposed action. These potentially affected environments include the Russian land and port environments, the marine environment, the US port locale, highway routes, LANL, and SRS. Each of these is discussed below the connection with the proposed action.

  6. Standard guide for design criteria for plutonium gloveboxes

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2009-01-01

    1.1 This guide defines criteria for the design of glovebox systems to be used for the handling of plutonium in any chemical or physical form or isotopic composition or when mixed with other elements or compounds. Not included in the criteria are systems auxiliary to the glovebox systems such as utilities, ventilation, alarm, and waste disposal. Also not addressed are hot cells or open-face hoods. The scope of this guide excludes specific license requirements relating to provisions for criticality prevention, hazards control, safeguards, packaging, and material handling. Observance of this guide does not relieve the user of the obligation to conform to all federal, state, and local regulations for design and construction of glovebox systems. 1.2 The values stated in SI units are to be regarded as the standard. The values given in parentheses are for information only. 1.3 This standard does not purport to address all of the safety problems, if any, associated with its use. It is the responsibility of the user...

  7. Radiation damage and 5f-electron localization of Plutonium compounds: -Pu, PuGa3, and PuAl2 , Corwin H. Booth1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Radiation damage and 5f-electron localization of Plutonium compounds: -Pu, PuGa3, and PuAl2 Yu and pure science, people have been studying various plutonium compounds for decades. Starting in the 1980's

  8. 5. Wick, O. J. (ed.) Plutonium Handbook: a Guide to the Technology 3357 (American Nuclear Society, LaGrange Park, IL, 1980).

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    5. Wick, O. J. (ed.) Plutonium Handbook: a Guide to the Technology 33­57 (American Nuclear Society superconductors. Phys. Rev. Lett. 8, 250­253 (1962). 11. Wolfer, W. G. Radiation effects in plutonium. Los Alamos

  9. Plutonium stabilization and disposition focus area, FY 1999 and FY 2000 multi-year program plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-03-01

    Consistent with the Environmental Management`s (EM`s) plan titled, ``Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure``, and ongoing efforts within the Executive Branch and Congress, this Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP) for the Plutonium Focus Area was written to ensure that technical gap projects are effectively managed and measured. The Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) defines and manages technology development programs that contribute to the effective stabilization of nuclear materials and their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of PFA activities includes the complete spectrum of plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA enables solutions to site-specific and complex-wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. The report describes the current technical activities, namely: Plutonium stabilization (9 studies); Highly enriched uranium stabilization (2 studies); Russian collaboration program (2 studies); Packaging and storage technologies (6 studies); and PFA management work package/product line (3 studies). Budget information for FY 1999 and FY 2000 is provided.

  10. Direct conversion of plutonium-containing materials to borosilicate glass for storage or disposal

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Beahm, E.C.

    1995-06-27

    A new process, the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS), has been invented for the direct conversion of plutonium metal, scrap, and residue into borosilicate glass. The glass should be acceptable for either the long-term storage or disposition of plutonium. Conversion of plutonium from complex chemical mixtures and variable geometries into homogeneous glass (1) simplifies safeguards and security; (2) creates a stable chemical form that meets health, safety, and environmental concerns; (3) provides an easy storage form; (4) may lower storage costs; and (5) allows for future disposition options. In the GMODS process, mixtures of metals, ceramics, organics, and amorphous solids containing plutonium are fed directly into a glass melter where they are directly converted to glass. Conventional glass melters can accept materials only in oxide form; thus, it is its ability to accept materials in multiple chemical forms that makes GMODS a unique glass making process. Initial proof-of-principle experiments have converted cerium (plutonium surrogate), uranium, stainless steel, aluminum, and other materials to glass. Significant technical uncertainties remain because of the early nature of process development.

  11. DEVELOPMENT OF GLASS AND CRYSTALLINE CERAMIC FORMS FOR DISPOSITION OF EXCESS PLUTONIUM

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Marra, James; Cozzi, A; Crawford, C.; Herman, C.; Marra, John; Peeler, D.

    2009-09-10

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) has identified up to 50 metric tons of excess plutonium that needs to be dispositioned. The bulk of the material is slated to be blended with uranium and fabricated into a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel for subsequent burning in commercial nuclear reactors. Excess plutonium-containing impurity materials making it unsuitable for fabrication into MOX fuel will need to be dispositioned via other means. Glass and crystalline ceramics have been developed and studied as candidate forms to immobilize these impure plutonium feeds. A titanate-based ceramic was identified as an excellent actinide material host. This composition was based on Synroc compositions previously developed for nuclear waste immobilization. These titanate ceramics were found to be able to accommodate extremely high quantities of fissile material and exhibit excellent aqueous durability. A lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass was developed to accommodate high concentrations of plutonium and to be very tolerant of impurities yet still maintain good aqueous durability. Recent testing of alkali borosilicate compositions showed promise of using these compositions to disposition lower concentrations of plutonium using existing high level waste vitrification processes. The developed waste forms all appear to be suitable for Pu disposition. Depending on the actual types and concentrations of the Pu residue streams slated for disposition, each waste form offers unique advantages.

  12. DEFINING A GLASS COMPOSITION ENVELOPE FOR AN IMPURITY VARIABILITY STUDY TO SUPPORT PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fox, K; Elizabeth Hoffman, E; Tommy Edwards, T; James Marra, J

    2007-08-21

    This study focuses on the development of a composition envelope that describes the solubility of various impurities in the lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass. A series of glass compositions was selected, fabricated and characterized in order to define this envelope. The selection of glass compositions, which is the focus of this report, was based on the projected types and concentrations of impurities expected in the plutonium feed stream. A limited amount of impurity data for the various plutonium sources is available and projections were made through analysis of the available information. These projections were used to define the glass compositions to be fabricated and tested. The results of this glass selection process provided an array of glass compositions to be fabricated and characterized in the laboratory in order to evaluate the solubility of various impurity elements and their effects on crystallization and durability as measured by the Product Consistency Test (PCT). The majority of the glasses will be formulated with hafnium as a surrogate for plutonium to simplify laboratory experiments. Plutonium glass testing will also be implemented for select compositions to validate the results of the surrogate testing. The results of this variability testing will be discussed in a separate report that will provide data to validate the acceptability of the compositional envelope defined here and/or provide additional compositional constraints for the plutonium feed materials.

  13. CRAD, Facility Safety- Nuclear Facility Design

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Nuclear Facility Design.

  14. CRAD, Facility Safety- Nuclear Facility Safety Basis

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Nuclear Facility Safety Basis.

  15. ver the past fifty years, thousands of workers in the United States have handled plutonium. Of those workers, only about

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Massey, Thomas N.

    was thus a stable source of radiation for hundreds of years The Human Plutonium Injection Experiments 224 of the risk of plutonium to humans and much of the public's perceptions about the dangers of radioactive "Ionizing Radiation--It's Everywhere!" pages 24-25, for a discussion of radioac- tive half-life). Radium

  16. Pulse-height distributions of neutron and gamma rays from plutonium-oxide S.A. Pozzi a,, S.D. Clarke a

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Eustice, Ryan

    Pulse-height distributions of neutron and gamma rays from plutonium-oxide samples S.A. Pozzi a,Ã, S Digital data processing Plutonium oxide 252 Cf a b s t r a c t We present new results on neutron and gamma-ray pulse-height distributions (PHDs) measured with liquid scintillators from five plutonium-oxide samples

  17. Controlled Mobility for Sustainable Wireless Networks

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kansal, Aman; Rahimi, Mohammed; Kaiser, W J; Srivastava, Mani B; Pottie, Gregory; Estrin, D

    2004-01-01

    fashion. Fourth, mobility must be sustainable and constantlyControlled Mobility for Sustainable Wireless Networks Amanthe controlled mobility methods required for sustainable

  18. Supplement: Thousands of human mobile element

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pratt, Vaughan

    Supplement: Thousands of human mobile element fragments undergo strong purifying selection near Supplemental material Supplemental text, tables, and figures. S1 pan-boreoeutherian mobile elements Mobile

  19. Update on mobile applications in dermatology

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Patel, Shivani; Eluri, Madhu; Boyers, Lindsay N; Karimkhani, Chante; Dellavalle, Robert

    2015-01-01

    Background: As the use of mobile devices surpasses that ofSuper Retina display, on mobile devices. Teledermatologyowned a smartphone, and mobile application devices surpassed

  20. Helping Developers Construct Secure Mobile Applications

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chin, Erika Michelle

    2013-01-01

    Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile devices (SPSM), 2011. [25]Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices (SPSM), 2011. [34]Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices (SPSM), 2012. [63