National Library of Energy BETA

Sample records for include plant safety

  1. Preventive techniques of pollution control, the reliability and safety in core sectors including thermal power plant installations and economic evaluation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tewari, J.K.

    1997-12-31

    This paper reports on a study of pollution control techniques, thermal power plant reliability and safety, and economics. Included are some illustrative examples dealing with pollution control. Topics include environmental planning, prevention strategy, pesticide use, food pollution, soil pollution, water pollution, thermal power plant emissions, and pollution control equipment.

  2. Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE`s independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91.

  3. Property:Number of Plants included in Capacity Estimate | Open...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    Plants included in Capacity Estimate Jump to: navigation, search Property Name Number of Plants included in Capacity Estimate Property Type Number Retrieved from "http:...

  4. Property:Number of Plants Included in Planned Estimate | Open...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    Number of Plants Included in Planned Estimate Jump to: navigation, search Property Name Number of Plants Included in Planned Estimate Property Type String Description Number of...

  5. Kansas City Plant Celebrates Safety Milestone

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    None

    2010-09-01

    A gang of motorcycle riders arrived at the NNSA's Kansas City Plant on July 1 to help celebrate a significant safety achievement - working nearly five million hours, covering a one-year period without a lost-time injury. The bikers -- some of whom are plant employees -- represent Bikers Against Child Abuse, the local nonprofit selected to receive a $5,000 donation as part of the plant's safety achievement celebration. The organization was selected because it aligns with the plant's community outreach focus on Family Safety & Security and partnership with the plant's union members.

  6. Improving the safety of LWR power plants. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-04-01

    This report documents the results of the Study to identify current, potential research issues and efforts for improving the safety of Light Water Reactor (LWR) power plants. This final report describes the work accomplished, the results obtained, the problem areas, and the recommended solutions. Specifically, for each of the issues identified in this report for improving the safety of LWR power plants, a description is provided in detail of the safety significance, the current status (including information sources, status of technical knowledge, problem solution and current activities), and the suggestions for further research and development. Further, the issues are ranked for action into high, medium, and low priority with respect to primarily (a) improved safety (e.g. potential reduction in public risk and occupational exposure), and secondly (b) reduction in safety-related costs (improving or maintaining level of safety with simpler systems or in a more cost-effective manner).

  7. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-11-01

    The following provides a summary of the specific issues addressed in this FY-95 Annual Update as they relate to the CH TRU safety bases: Executive Summary; Site Characteristics; Principal Design and Safety Criteria; Facility Design and Operation; Hazards and Accident Analysis; Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements; Radiological and Hazardous Material Protection; Institutional Programs; Quality Assurance; and Decontamination and Decommissioning. The System Design Descriptions`` (SDDS) for the WIPP were reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 3, Principal Design and Safety Criteria and Chapter 4, Facility Design and Operation. This provides the most currently available final engineering design information on waste emplacement operations throughout the disposal phase up to the point of permanent closure. Also, the criteria which define the TRU waste to be accepted for disposal at the WIPP facility were summarized in Chapter 3 based on the WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.`` This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety analyses that develop and evaluate the adequacy of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Transuranic Wastes (WIPP CH TRU) safety bases necessary to ensure the safety of workers, the public and the environment from the hazards posed by WIPP waste handling and emplacement operations during the disposal phase and hazards associated with the decommissioning and decontamination phase. The analyses of the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) disposal of TRU and TRU mixed waste, and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 191, Subpart B and 40 CFR 268.6 will be addressed in detail in the WIPP Final Certification Application scheduled for submittal in October 1996 (40 CFR 191) and the No-Migration Variance Petition (40 CFR 268.6) scheduled for submittal in June 1996. Section 5.4, Long-Term Waste Isolation Assessment summarizes the current status of the assessment.

  8. Innovation that Improves Safety, Efficiency of Energy Plant Operations...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Innovation that Improves Safety, Efficiency of Energy Plant Operations Nets R&D 100 Award ... a clearer vision of conditions inside plant equipment while in operation so that ...

  9. South Ukraine NPP: Safety improvements through Plant Computer upgrade

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brenman, O.; Chernyshov, M. A.; Denning, R. S.; Kolesov, S. A.; Balakan, H. H.; Bilyk, B. I.; Kuznetsov, V. I.; Trosman, G.

    2006-07-01

    This paper summarizes some results of the Plant Computer upgrade at the Units 2 and 3 of South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). A Plant Computer, which is also called the Computer Information System (CIS), is one of the key safety-related systems at VVER-1000 nuclear plants. The main function of the CIS is information support for the plant operators during normal and emergency operational modes. Before this upgrade, South Ukraine NPP operated out-of-date and obsolete systems. This upgrade project wax founded by the U.S. DOE in the framework of the International Nuclear Safety Program (INSP). The most efficient way to improve the quality and reliability of information provided to the plant operator is to upgrade the Human-System Interface (HSI), which is the Upper Level (UL) CIS. The upgrade of the CIS data-acquisition system (DAS), which is the Lower Level (LL) CIS, would have less effect on the unit safety. Generally speaking, the lifetime of the LL CIS is much higher than one of the UL CIS. Unlike Plant Computers at the Western-designed plants, the functionality of the WER-1000 CISs includes a control function (Centralized Protection Testing) and a number of the plant equipment monitoring functions, for example, Protection and Interlock Monitoring and Turbo-Generator Temperature Monitoring. The new system is consistent with a historical migration of the format by which information is presented to the operator away from the traditional graphic displays, for example, Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P and ID's), toward Integral Data displays. The cognitive approach to information presentation is currently limited by some licensing issues, but is adapted to a greater degree with each new system. The paper provides some lessons learned on the management of the international team. (authors)

  10. Technical Safety Appraisal of the Rocky Flats Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brown, Blake P.

    1989-01-01

    This report provides the results of a Technical Safety Appraisal (TSA) of the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) conducted November 14 to 18 and November 28 to December 9, 1988. This appraisal covered the effectiveness and improvements in the RFP safety program across the site, evaluating progress to date against standards of accepted practice. The appraisal included coverage of the timeliness and effectiveness of actions taken in response to the recommendations/concerns in three previous Technical Safety Appraisals (TSAs) of RFP Bldg. 707 conducted in July 1986, Bldgs. 771/774 conducted in October/November 1986, and Bldgs. 776/777 conducted in January/February 1988. Results of this appraisal are given in Section IV for each of 14 technical safety areas at RFP. These results include a discussion, conclusions and any new safety concerns for each technical safety area. Appendix A contains a description of the system for categorizing concerns, and the concerns are tabulated in Appendix B. Appendix C reports on the evaluation of the contractor's actions and the current status of each of the 230 recommendations and concerns contained in the three previous TSA reports.

  11. Safety aspects of gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hansen, A.H.

    1987-01-01

    Uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge is a commercially proven, viable technology. Gas centrifuge enrichment plant operations pose hazards that are also found in other industries as well as unique hazards as a result of processing and handling uranium hexafluoride and the handling of enriched uranium. Hazards also found in other industries included those posed by the use of high-speed rotating equipment and equipment handling by use of heavy-duty cranes. Hazards from high-speed rotating equipment are associated with the operation of the gas centrifuges themselves and with the operation of the uranium hexafluoride compressors in the tail withdrawal system. These and related hazards are discussed. It is included that commercial gas centrifuge enrichment plants have been designed to operate safely.

  12. Using Process Safety Management to improve plant operability

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutton, I.S.

    1995-12-31

    The Process Safety Management (PSM) standard, 29 CFR 1910.119, was published in draft from in July 1990 and has been in force since May 1992. The standard requires that all companies that handle hazardous materials must have in place a management program to minimize the chance of accidents, and to reduce the consequences of such accidents should they occur. The purpose of this paper is to provide some preliminary guidance as to how PSM activities can be managed so that, as the compliance part of the work is completed, the best return on the investment can be achieved. One final point should be made about safety and operability. The two are closely linked, but they are not identical. In other words, a safety improvement program will almost certainly lead to reduced economic losses, similarly a reliability improvement program will almost certainly reduce injuries, but there are some differences that need to be taken account. These include: (1) Additional safety equipment may reduce reliability. (2) A reliable plant does not undergo many shutdowns. Therefore, operators have less practice with the implementation of shutdown and startup procedures than they would otherwise. (3) Unsafe engineering practices, such as the use of temporary bypasses and jumper lines, may increase operability, but they reduce safety.

  13. Integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis for safety assessment of nuclear power plants

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Di Maio, Francesco; Zio, Enrico; Smith, Curtis; Rychkov, Valentin

    2015-07-06

    The present special issue contains an overview of the research in the field of Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (IDPSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Traditionally, safety regulation for NPPs design and operation has been based on Deterministic Safety Assessment (DSA) methods to verify criteria that assure plant safety in a number of postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) scenarios. Referring to such criteria, it is also possible to identify those plant Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) and activities that are most important for safety within those postulated scenarios. Then, the design, operation, and maintenance of these “safety-related” SSCs andmore » activities are controlled through regulatory requirements and supported by Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA).« less

  14. Integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis for safety assessment of nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Di Maio, Francesco; Zio, Enrico; Smith, Curtis; Rychkov, Valentin

    2015-07-06

    The present special issue contains an overview of the research in the field of Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (IDPSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Traditionally, safety regulation for NPPs design and operation has been based on Deterministic Safety Assessment (DSA) methods to verify criteria that assure plant safety in a number of postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) scenarios. Referring to such criteria, it is also possible to identify those plant Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) and activities that are most important for safety within those postulated scenarios. Then, the design, operation, and maintenance of these “safety-related” SSCs and activities are controlled through regulatory requirements and supported by Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA).

  15. Innovation that Improves Safety, Efficiency of Energy Plant Operations Nets

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    R&D 100 Award for NETL, WVU and Schneider Electric Researchers | Department of Energy Innovation that Improves Safety, Efficiency of Energy Plant Operations Nets R&D 100 Award for NETL, WVU and Schneider Electric Researchers Innovation that Improves Safety, Efficiency of Energy Plant Operations Nets R&D 100 Award for NETL, WVU and Schneider Electric Researchers November 20, 2015 - 8:28am Addthis Innovation that Improves Safety, Efficiency of Energy Plant Operations Nets R&D

  16. Review of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Integrated Safety...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    ... Independent Oversight noted that the FBP ISMS description includes the three key safety culture focus areas - leadership, employeeworker engagement, and organizational learning - ...

  17. Safety and Nonsafety Communications and Interactions in International Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kisner, Roger A; Mullens, James Allen; Wilson, Thomas L; Wood, Richard Thomas; Korsah, Kofi; Qualls, A L; Muhlheim, Michael David; Holcomb, David Eugene; Loebl, Andy

    2007-08-01

    Current industry and NRC guidance documents such as IEEE 7-4.3.2, Reg. Guide 1.152, and IEEE 603 do not sufficiently define a level of detail for evaluating interdivisional communications independence. The NRC seeks to establish criteria for safety systems communications that can be uniformly applied in evaluation of a variety of safety system designs. This report focuses strictly on communication issues related to data sent between safety systems and between safety and nonsafety systems. Further, the report does not provide design guidance for communication systems nor present detailed failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) results for existing designs. This letter report describes communications between safety and nonsafety systems in nuclear power plants outside the United States. A limited study of international nuclear power plants was conducted to ascertain important communication implementations that might have bearing on systems proposed for licensing in the United States. This report provides that following information: 1.communications types and structures used in a representative set of international nuclear power reactors, and 2.communications issues derived from standards and other source documents relevant to safety and nonsafety communications. Topics that are discussed include the following: communication among redundant safety divisions, communications between safety divisions and nonsafety systems, control of safety equipment from a nonsafety workstation, and connection of nonsafety programming, maintenance, and test equipment to redundant safety divisions during operation. Information for this report was obtained through publicly available sources such as published papers and presentations. No proprietary information is represented.

  18. Safety Culture at the WTP White Paper: Potential Attachment for Advice on Waste Treatment Plant Safety Culture

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    29/2011 Page 1 of 6 Safety Culture at the WTP White Paper: Potential Attachment for Advice on Waste Treatment Plant Safety Culture Introduction This white paper provides context for the Hanford Advisory Board's (HAB) concerns regarding safety culture at the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP). This document is intended to clarify terminology associated with "safety culture" and to provide background about its conception, application, and development. The HAB has advised that a rigorous safety

  19. Quality + safety = productivity: The implosion of Plant 7

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Alhadeff, N.; Abernathy, L.

    1995-05-22

    At the Fernald Environmental Restoration Management Corporation (FERMCO), our product is a clean site. We measure productivity by our progress in taking down buildings and dispositioning hazardous waste. To those ends, Quality and Safety work together to ensure that productivity is gained in the safest way possible. The Plant 7 deconstruction is an example of how this teamwork has increased productivity at the site.

  20. Personnel Safety for Future Magnetic Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lee Cadwallader

    2009-07-01

    The safety of personnel at existing fusion experiments is an important concern that requires diligence. Looking to the future, fusion experiments will continue to increase in power and operating time until steady state power plants are achieved; this causes increased concern for personnel safety. This paper addresses four important aspects of personnel safety in the present and extrapolates these aspects to future power plants. The four aspects are personnel exposure to ionizing radiation, chemicals, magnetic fields, and radiofrequency (RF) energy. Ionizing radiation safety is treated well for present and near-term experiments by the use of proven techniques from other nuclear endeavors. There is documentation that suggests decreasing the annual ionizing radiation exposure limits that have remained constant for several decades. Many chemicals are used in fusion research, for parts cleaning, as use as coolants, cooling water cleanliness control, lubrication, and other needs. In present fusion experiments, a typical chemical laboratory safety program, such as those instituted in most industrialized countries, is effective in protecting personnel from chemical exposures. As fusion facilities grow in complexity, the chemical safety program must transition from a laboratory scale to an industrial scale program that addresses chemical use in larger quantity. It is also noted that allowable chemical exposure concentrations for workers have decreased over time and, in some cases, now pose more stringent exposure limits than those for ionizing radiation. Allowable chemical exposure concentrations have been the fastest changing occupational exposure values in the last thirty years. The trend of more restrictive chemical exposure regulations is expected to continue into the future. Other issues of safety importance are magnetic field exposure and RF energy exposure. Magnetic field exposure limits are consensus values adopted as best practices for worker safety; a typical

  1. Safety Evaluation for Packaging (onsite) T Plant Canyon Items

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    OBRIEN, J.H.

    2000-07-14

    This safety evaluation for packaging (SEP) evaluates and documents the ability to safely ship mostly unique inventories of miscellaneous T Plant canyon waste items (T-P Items) encountered during the canyon deck clean off campaign. In addition, this SEP addresses contaminated items and material that may be shipped in a strong tight package (STP). The shipments meet the criteria for onsite shipments as specified by Fluor Hanford in HNF-PRO-154, Responsibilities and Procedures for all Hazardous Material Shipments.

  2. Preliminary Safety Information Document for the Standard MHTGR. Volume 1, (includes latest Amendments)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1986-12-01

    With NRC concurrence, the Licensing Plan for the Standard HTGR describes an application program consistent with 10CFR50, Appendix O to support a US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review and design certification of an advanced Standard modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MHTGR) design. Consistent with the NRC's Advanced Reactor Policy, the Plan also outlines a series of preapplication activities which have as an objective the early issuance of an NRC Licensability Statement on the Standard MHTGR conceptual design. This Preliminary Safety Information Document (PSID) has been prepared as one of the submittals to the NRC by the US Department of Energy in support of preapplication activities on the Standard MHTGR. Other submittals to be provided include a Probabilistic Risk Assessment, a Regulatory Technology Development Plan, and an Emergency Planning Bases Report.

  3. Floating LNG plant will stress reliability and safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kinney, C.D.; Schulz, H.R.; Spring, W.

    1997-07-01

    Mobil has developed a unique floating LNG plant design after extensive studies that set safety as the highest priority. The result is a production, storage and offloading platform designed to produce 6 million tons per year of LNG and up to 55,000 bpd of condensate from 1 Bcfd of feed gas. All production and off-loading equipment is supported by a square donut-shaped concrete hull, which is spread-moored. The hull contains storage tanks for 250,000 m{sup 3} of LNG, 6540,000 bbl of condensate and ballast water. Both LNG and condensate can be directly offloaded to shuttle tankers. Since the plant may be moved to produce from several different gas fields during its life, the plant and barge were designed to be generic. It can be used at any location in the Pacific Rim, with up to 15% CO{sub 2}, 100 ppm H{sub 2}S, 55 bbl/MMcf condensate and 650 ft water depth. It can be modified to handle other water depths, depending upon the environment. In addition, it is much more economical than an onshore grassroots LNG plant, with potential capital savings of 25% or more. The paper describes the machinery, meteorology and oceanography, and safety engineering.

  4. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements; unresolved safety issues; generic safety issues; other multiplant action issues. Supplement 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. This third annual NUREG report, Supplement 3, presents updated information as of September 30, 1993. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ``A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,`` which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees.

  5. Documentation of Hanford Site independent review of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Herborn, D.I.

    1992-10-01

    This manual describes the overall WHC safety analysis process in terms of requirements for safety analyses, responsibilities of the various contributing organizations, and required reviews and approvals for the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant.

  6. Handbook of nuclear power plant seismic fragilities, Seismic Safety Margins Research Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cover, L.E.; Bohn, M.P.; Campbell, R.D.; Wesley, D.A.

    1983-12-01

    The Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) has a gola to develop a complete fully coupled analysis procedure (including methods and computer codes) for estimating the risk of an earthquake-induced radioactive release from a commercial nuclear power plant. As part of this program, calculations of the seismic risk from a typical commercial nuclear reactor were made. These calculations required a knowledge of the probability of failure (fragility) of safety-related components in the reactor system which actively participate in the hypothesized accident scenarios. This report describes the development of the required fragility relations and the data sources and data reduction techniques upon which they are based. Both building and component fragilities are covered. The building fragilities are for the Zion Unit 1 reactor which was the specific plant used for development of methodology in the program. Some of the component fragilities are site-specific also, but most would be usable for other sites as well.

  7. (Safety and reliability of nuclear power plant technology)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dickson, T.L.

    1990-10-22

    The traveler attended the 16th MPA Seminar on the Safety and Reliability of Plant Technology with Special Emphasis on Nuclear Technology. The objective of the trip was to gather information and data that could prove useful to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) sponsored Heavy-Section Steel Irradiation (HSSI) and Heavy-Section Steel Technology (HSST) Programs and to present a paper entitled, Effects of Irradiation on Initiation and Crack-Arrest Toughness of Two High-Copper Welds and on Stainless Steel Cladding. This paper summarizes results from the 5th, 6th, and 7th Irradiation Series of experiments performed within the HSSI Program by the Metals and Ceramics Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).

  8. On-shift training of plant personnel on environmental, safety and health regulations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, D.

    1996-08-01

    As one of the standing committees under the American Petroleum Institute (API) General Committee of Refining, the Central Committee on Training and Development has several goals. These include improving plant operations and maintenance, reducing occupational injuries and illnesses, reducing the incidence of fires, maintaining effective environmental controls, and improving plant security. An additional responsibility is to develop cost and resource effective training materials. One of the activities the committee uses to achieve its goal is by sponsoring a series of biannual regional training conferences that attract participants from a variety of refineries and petrochemical plants. During the 1995 Spring Conferences, conference attendees were asked if on-shift training of plant personnel on environmental, safety and health was being utilized to assist compliance efforts and to achieve cost and resource effective training. In general, use of on-shift training is increasingly finding acceptance among the sites. One west coast refiner reported that their refinery had implemented a program of on-shift training for plant personnel on all environmental, safety and health regulations, and had achieved nearly one-hundred percent compliance through the first quarter of the effort.

  9. Supplemnental Volume - Independent Oversight Assessment of the Nuclear Safety Culture and Management of Nuclear Safety Concerns at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, January 2012

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Supplemental Volume Independent Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture and Management of Nuclear Safety Concerns at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant January 2012 Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety and Security HSS i Independent Oversight Assessment of Safety Culture and Management of Nuclear Safety Concerns at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant

  10. Plant perspective on electronic document management systems for process safety management programs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mannan, M.; Lee, W.S. [RMT/Jones and Neuse, Inc., Austin, TX (United States)

    1996-08-01

    As mandated by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) promulgated on February 24, 1992 the Process Management (PSM) rule: 29 CFR 1910.119. Compliance with the PSM requirements is causing a significant impact on both financial resources and manpower for the covered facilities. A major portion of the efforts have been concentrated on developing and compiling a vast amount of data in various formats (i.e., autocad, word processing, and numeric databases). Because of the need to access and revise these data on a continuous basis, many facilities have started to implement computer-based document management systems to store, manage, and maintain these data. This paper provides a plant perspective of the necessary features and characteristics of a computer-based document management system. An electronic document management system can also form the basis for a plant workflow system. Once, all the information related to a plant`s PSM program are inputted into the system, it is possible to control the plant workflow using the management of change system and maintenance work requests. Other key issues that must be included in a computer-based system are redlining capabilities, execution of management of change authorization, and interfacing with existing computer programs (many plants are already using different kinds of software for a variety of objectives). This paper provides a roadmap for the development and implementation of an electronic document management system.

  11. Nuclear criticality safety evaluation of Spray Booth Operations in X-705, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sheaffer, M.K.; Keeton, S.C.

    1993-09-20

    This report evaluates nuclear criticality safety for Spray Booth Operations in the Decontamination and Recovery Facility, X-705, at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. A general description of current procedures and related hardware/equipment is presented. Control parameters relevant to nuclear criticality safety are explained, and a consolidated listing of administrative controls and safety systems is developed. Based on compliance with DOE Orders and MMES practices, the overall operation is evaluated, and recommendations for enhanced safety are suggested.

  12. Pinellas Plant: Child Care/Partnership School safety assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1989-11-01

    The Albuquerque Operations Office through the Pinellas Plant Area Office is involved in a joint venture to establish a Partnership School and a Day Care Facility at the Plant. The venture is unique in that it is based on a partnership with the local county school system. The county school system will provide the teachers, supplies and classroom furnishings for the operation of the school for pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, first and second grade during regular school hours. The Government will provide the facility and its normal operating and maintenance costs. A Day Care Facility will also be available for children from infancy through the second grade for outside school hours. The day care will be operated as a non-profit corporation. Fees paid by parents with children in the day care center will cove the cost of staff, food, supplies and liability insurance. Again, the government will provide the facility and its normal operating and maintenance costs. Between 75 and 90 children are expected in the first year of operation. The Partnership School will consist of one class each for pre-kindergarten, kindergarten and first grade. Second grade will be added in 1990. The total estimated number of children for both the Child Care and Partnership School should not exceed 200 children. Expected benefits include reduced absenteeism, tardiness and turnover and thus increased productivity. The program will be an asset in recruiting and retaining the best workforce. Other benefits include improved education for the children.

  13. Pantex Plant Achieves Key Safety Milestone Ahead of Schedule...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Achieves Key Safety Milestone Ahead of Schedule | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing...

  14. Individual plant examination program: Perspectives on reactor safety and plant performance. Parts 2--5: Final report; Volume 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-12-01

    This report provides perspectives gained by reviewing 75 Individual Plant Examination (IPE) submittals pertaining to 108 nuclear power plant units. IPEs are probabilistic analyses that estimate the core damage frequency (CDF) and containment performance for accidents initiated by internal events. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviewed the IPE submittals with the objective of gaining perspectives in three major areas: (1) improvements made to individual plants as a result of their IPEs and the collective results of the IPE program, (2) plant-specific design and operational features and modeling assumptions that significantly affect the estimates of CDF and containment performance, and (3) strengths and weaknesses of the models and methods used in the IPEs. These perspectives are gained by assessing the core damage and containment performance results, including overall CDF, accident sequences, dominant contributions to component failure and human error, and containment failure modes. Methods, data, boundary conditions, and assumptions used in the IPEs are considered in understanding the differences and similarities observed among the various types of plants. This report is divided into three volumes containing six parts. Part 1 is a summary report of the key perspectives gained in each of the areas identified above, with a discussion of the NRC`s overall conclusions and observations. Part 2 discusses key perspectives regarding the impact of the IPE Program on reactor safety. Part 3 discusses perspectives gained from the IPE results regarding CDF, containment performance, and human actions. Part 4 discusses perspectives regarding the IPE models and methods. Part 5 discusses additional IPE perspectives. Part 6 contains Appendices A, B and C which provide the references of the information from the IPEs, updated PRA results, and public comments on draft NUREG-1560 respectively.

  15. Criteria Document for B-plant Surveillance and Maintenance Phase Safety Basis Document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    SCHWEHR, B.A.

    1999-08-31

    This document is required by the Project Hanford Managing Contractor (PHMC) procedure, HNF-PRO-705, Safety Basis Planning, Documentation, Review, and Approval. This document specifies the criteria that shall be in the B Plant surveillance and maintenance phase safety basis in order to obtain approval of the DOE-RL. This CD describes the criteria to be addressed in the S&M Phase safety basis for the deactivated Waste Fractionization Facility (B Plant) on the Hanford Site in Washington state. This criteria document describes: the document type and format that will be used for the S&M Phase safety basis, the requirements documents that will be invoked for the document development, the deactivated condition of the B Plant facility, and the scope of issues to be addressed in the S&M Phase safety basis document.

  16. Implementation of Recommendations from the One System Comparative Evaluation of the Hanford Tank Farms and Waste Treatment Plant Safety Bases

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garrett, Richard L.; Niemi, Belinda J.; Paik, Ingle K.; Buczek, Jeffrey A.; Lietzow, J.; McCoy, F.; Beranek, F.; Gupta, M.

    2013-11-07

    A Comparative Evaluation was conducted for One System Integrated Project Team to compare the safety bases for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project (WTP) and Tank Operations Contract (TOC) (i.e., Tank Farms) by an Expert Review Team. The evaluation had an overarching purpose to facilitate effective integration between WTP and TOC safety bases. It was to provide One System management with an objective evaluation of identified differences in safety basis process requirements, guidance, direction, procedures, and products (including safety controls, key safety basis inputs and assumptions, and consequence calculation methodologies) between WTP and TOC. The evaluation identified 25 recommendations (Opportunities for Integration). The resolution of these recommendations resulted in 16 implementation plans. The completion of these implementation plans will help ensure consistent safety bases for WTP and TOC along with consistent safety basis processes. procedures, and analyses. and should increase the likelihood of a successful startup of the WTP. This early integration will result in long-term cost savings and significant operational improvements. In addition, the implementation plans lead to the development of eight new safety analysis methodologies that can be used at other U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) complex sites where URS Corporation is involved.

  17. Technical safety appraisal: Buildings 776/777 Rocky Flats Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Field, H C

    1988-03-01

    Buildings 776/777 at the Rocky Flats Plant are major components of the production complex at the plant site. They have been in operation since 1957. The operations taking place in the buildings are nuclear weapons production support, processing of weapons assemblies returned from Pantex, waste processing, research and development in support of production, special projects, and those generated by support groups, such as maintenance. The appraisal team identified nine deficiencies that it believed required prompt attention. DOE management for EH, the program office (Defense Programs), and the field office analyzed the information provided by the appraisal team and instituted compensatory measures for closer monitoring of contractor activities by knowledgeable DOE staff and staff from other sites. Concurrently, the contractor was requested to address both short-term and long-term remedial measures to correct the identified issues as well as the underlying problems. The contractor has provided his action plan, which is included. This plan was under evaluation by EH and the DOE program office at the time this report was prepared. In addressing the major areas of concern identified above, a well as the specific deficiencies identified by the appraisal team, the contractor and the field office are cautioned to search for the root causes for the problems and to direct corrective actions to those root causes rather than solely to the symptoms to assure the sustainability of the improvements being made. The results of prior TSAs led DOE to conclude that previous corrective actions were not sufficient in that a large number of the individual findings are recurrent. Pending completion of remedial actions over the next few months, enhanced DOE oversight of the contractor is warranted.

  18. Independent Oversight Assessment of the Nuclear Safety Culture and Management of Nuclear Safety Concerns at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, January 2012

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    of Health, Safety and Security HSS Independent Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture and Management of Nuclear Safety Concerns at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant January 2012 Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy Enforcement and Oversight Abbreviations Used in this Report i Executive Summary iii Recommendations xi 1.0 Introduction 1 1.1 Background 2 1.2 Scope and Methodology 6 2.0 Current Safety

  19. Concentration of Actinides in Plant Mounds at Safety Test Nuclear Sites in Nevada

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    David S. Shafer; Jenna Gommes

    2008-09-15

    Plant mounds or blow-sand mounds are accumulations of soil particles and plant debris around large shrubs and are common features in deserts in the southwestern United States. Believed to be an important factor in their formation, the shrubs create surface roughness that causes wind-suspended particles to be deposited and resist further suspension. Shrub mounds occur in some plant communities on the Nevada Test Site, the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), and Tonopah Test Range (TTR), including areas of surface soil contamination from past nuclear testing. In the 1970s as part of early studies to understand properties of actinides in the environment, the Nevada Applied Ecology Group (NAEG) examined the accumulation of isotopes of Pu, {sup 241}Am, and U in plant mounds at safety test sites. The NAEG studies found concentrations of these contaminants to be greater in shrub mounds than in the surrounding areas of desert pavement. For example, at Project 57 on the NTTR, it was estimated that 15 percent of the radionuclide inventory of the site was associated with shrub mounds, which accounted for 17 percent of the surface area of the site, a ratio of inventory to area of 0.85. At Clean Slate III at the TTR, 29 percent of the inventory was associated with approximately 32 percent of the site covered by shrub mounds, a ratio of 0.91. While the total inventory of radionuclides in intershrub areas was greater, the ratio of radionuclide inventory to area was 0.40 and 0.38, respectively, at the two sites. The comparison between the shrub mounds and adjacent desert pavement areas was made for only the top 5 cm since radionuclides at safety test sites are concentrated in the top 5 cm of intershrub areas. Not accounting for radionuclides associated with the shrub mounds would cause the inventory of contaminants and potential exposure to be underestimated. As part of its Environmental Restoration Soils Subproject, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear

  20. Safety Improvements, Project Progress at Hanford Site’s Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    RICHLAND, Wash. – Recent changes in how work crews are deployed at the Hanford Site’s Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) have yielded significant improvements in safety performance as EM’s Richland Operations Office and contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company continue to make steady progress toward demolition of the plant.

  1. Worker Involvement Improves Safety at Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Employees at the Hanford site are working together to find new and innovative ways to stay safe at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, one of the site’s most complex decommissioning projects.

  2. Safety provisions for UF{sub 6} handling in the design of a new UF{sub 6} conversion plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bannister, S.P.

    1991-12-31

    British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) Fuel Division is currently undertaking the final design and construction of a new UF{sub 6} conversion plant at its production site at Springfields near Preston in the north of England. The Company has gained much experience in the handling of UF{sub 6} during operation of plants on site since 1961. The major hazard occurs during the liquefication cycle and the basis of the maximum credible incident scenario adopted for safety assessment and design purposes is discussed. This paper considers the design features which have been incorporated in the new plant to counter the hazards presented by the presence of UF{sub 6} in gaseous and liquid form and explains current thinking on operational procedures in areas of potential risk such as cylinder filling. The plant emergency response philosophy and systems are described and specific design provisions which have been included to satisfy the UK regulatory bodies are outlined in some detail.

  3. Documentation of Hanford Site independent review of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Revision 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Herborn, D.I.

    1992-10-01

    This manual describes the overall WHC safety analysis process in terms of requirements for safety analyses, responsibilities of the various contributing organizations, and required reviews and approvals for the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant.

  4. Technology, Safety and Costs of Decommissioning a Reference Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Elder, H. K.

    1981-10-01

    Safety and cost information is developed for the conceptual decommissioning of a commercial uranium hexafluoride conversion (UF{sub 6}) plant. Two basic decommissioning alternatives are studied to obtain comparisons between cost and safety impacts: DECON, and passive SAFSTOR. A third alternative, DECON of the plant and equipment with stabilization and long-term care of lagoon wastes. is also examined. DECON includes the immediate removal (following plant shutdown) of all radioactivity in excess of unrestricted release levels, with subsequent release of the site for public use. Passive SAFSTOR requires decontamination, preparation, maintenance, and surveillance for a period of time after shutdown, followed by deferred decontamination and unrestricted release. DECON with stabilization and long-term care of lagoon wastes (process wastes generated at the reference plant and stored onsite during plant operation} is also considered as a decommissioning method, although its acceptability has not yet been determined by the NRC. The decommissioning methods assumed for use in each decommissioning alternative are based on state-of-the-art technology. The elapsed time following plant shutdown required to perform the decommissioning work in each alternative is estimated to be: for DECON, 8 months; for passive SAFSTOR, 3 months to prepare the plant for safe storage and 8 months to accomplish deferred decontamination. Planning and preparation for decommissioning prior to plant shutdown is estimated to require about 6 months for either DECON or passive SAFSTOR. Planning and preparation prior to starting deferred decontamination is estimated to require an additional 6 months. OECON with lagoon waste stabilization is estimated to take 6 months for planning and about 8 months to perform the decommissioning work. Decommissioning cost, in 1981 dollars, is estimated to be $5.91 million for OECON. For passive SAFSTOR, preparing the facility for safe storage is estimated to cost $0

  5. Nuclear criticality safety evaluation of large cylinder cleaning operations in X-705, Portsmouth Gaseous diffusion Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sheaffer, M.K.; Keeton, S.C.; Lutz, H.F.

    1995-06-01

    This report evaluates nuclear criticality safety for large cylinder cleaning operations in the Decontamination and Recovery Facility, X-705, at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. A general description of current cleaning procedures and required hardware/equipment is presented, and documentation for large cylinder cleaning operations is identified and described. Control parameters, design features, administrative controls, and safety systems relevant to nuclear criticality are discussed individually, followed by an overall assessment based on the Double Contingency Principle. Recommendations for enhanced safety are suggested, and issues for increased efficiency are presented.

  6. Independent Oversight Follow-up Assessment of Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant - June 2014

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    December 2001 | Department of Energy Review, Kansas City Plant, Summary Report - December 2001 Independent Oversight Focused Review, Kansas City Plant, Summary Report - December 2001 December 2001 Focused Review of Environment, Safety and Health and Emergency Management at the Kansas City Plant This report provides a summary of the results of a focused review of the environment, safety, and health and emergency management programs at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Kansas City Plant. The

  7. Next Generation Nuclear Plant Structures, Systems, and Components Safety Classification White Paper

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pete Jordan

    2010-09-01

    This white paper outlines the relevant regulatory policy and guidance for a risk-informed approach for establishing the safety classification of Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant and sets forth certain facts for review and discussion in order facilitate an effective submittal leading to an NGNP Combined Operating License application under 10 CFR 52.

  8. Chemical Safety Management Program for Lockheed Martin Energy Systems operations at the Y-12 Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C.W. McMahon

    2000-03-24

    Operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Systems (Energy Systems), the Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant is a manufacturing facility that plays an integral role in the DOE nuclear weapons complex. Fulfilling the national security mission at the Y-12 Plant, continuing to be the cornerstone of uranium and lithium technologies for DOE, and providing customers with solutions for challenging manufacturing needs requires usage of a variety of chemicals and chemical processes. Performing this work safely while protecting workers, the public, and the environment is their commitment. The purpose of this document is to provide a description of the essential components of chemical safety, the integration of these components into the Y-12 Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS), and the functional integration of chemical safety issues across Y-12 organizations and programs managed by Energy Systems.

  9. AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gorgemans, J.; Mulhollem, L.; Glavin, J.; Pfister, A.; Conway, L.; Schulz, T.; Oriani, L.; Cummins, E.; Winters, J. [Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (United States)

    2012-07-01

    The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe class pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and costs. The AP1000 design uses passive features to mitigate design basis accidents. The passive safety systems are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as AC power, component cooling water, service water or HVAC. Furthermore, these passive features 'fail safe' during a non-LOCA event such that DC power and instrumentation are not required. The AP1000 also has simple, active, defense-in-depth systems to support normal plant operations. These active systems provide the first level of defense against more probable events and they provide investment protection, reduce the demands on the passive features and support the probabilistic risk assessment. The AP1000 passive safety approach allows the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of an accident for 72 hours without operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the U.S. Utility Requirement Document and the European Utility Requirements for passive plants. Limited operator actions are required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool via passive means. In line with the AP1000 approach to safety described above, the AP1000 plant design features multiple, diverse lines of defense to ensure spent fuel cooling can be maintained for design-basis events and beyond design-basis accidents. During normal and abnormal conditions, defense-in-depth and other systems provide highly reliable spent fuel pool cooling. They rely on off-site AC power or the on-site standby diesel generators. For unlikely design basis events with an extended loss of AC power (i.e., station blackout) or loss of heat sink or both, spent fuel cooling can still be provided indefinitely: - Passive systems, requiring minimal or no operator actions, are sufficient for at least 72 hours under all possible pool

  10. An assessment of criticality safety at the Department of Energy Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, July--September 1989

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mattson, Roger J.

    1989-09-01

    This is a report on the 1989 independent Criticality Safety Assessment of the Rocky Flats Plant, primarily in response to public concerns that nuclear criticality accidents involving plutonium may have occurred at this nuclear weapon component fabrication and processing plant. The report evaluates environmental issues, fissile material storage practices, ventilation system problem areas, and criticality safety practices. While no evidence of a criticality accident was found, several recommendations are made for criticality safety improvements. 9 tabs.

  11. Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    safety Safety All JLF participants must comply fully with all LLNL safety regulations and procedures by becoming a Registered User of the facility. All JLF participants must complete available LLNL safety training: HS5200-W Laser Safety HS4258-W Beryllium Awareness HS4261-W Lead Awareness HS5220-W Electrical Safety Awareness HS6001-W General Employee Radiological HS4240-W Chemical Safety HS4680-W PPE To access these training modules link here [LTRAIN] from inside LLNL, or here from anywhere. All

  12. Energy Department Announces Advanced Fuel-Efficient Vehicle Technologies Funding Opportunity, Includes Alternative Fuels Workplace Safety Programs

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz announced more than $55 million in funding for vehicle technology advancements while touring the newest vehicle technologies at the Washington Auto Show last week. One specific topic is focused on the development of alternative fuel vehicle workplace safety programs.

  13. Worker Safety and Health Program for DOE (Including the National Nuclear Security Administration) Federal and Contractor Employees

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-10-20

    This document was developed to assist the Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) Federal and contractor employees in effectively developing, managing, and implementing a worker safety and health program. Supersedes DOE G 440.1-1A and DOE G 440.1-8.

  14. Worker Safety and Health Program for DOE (Including the National Nuclear Security Administration) Federal and Contractor Employees

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-10-20

    This document was developed to assist the Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) Federal and contractor employees in effectively developing, managing, and implementing a worker safety and health program. Cancels DOE G 440.1-1A and DOE G 440.1-8. Adm Chg 1, dated 3-22-13.

  15. PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONAL ACCIDENTS AT THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rucker, D.F.

    2000-09-01

    This report presents a probabilistic safety assessment of radioactive doses as consequences from accident scenarios to complement the deterministic assessment presented in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The International Council of Radiation Protection (ICRP) recommends both assessments be conducted to ensure that ''an adequate level of safety has been achieved and that no major contributors to risk are overlooked'' (ICRP 1993). To that end, the probabilistic assessment for the WIPP accident scenarios addresses the wide range of assumptions, e.g. the range of values representing the radioactive source of an accident, that could possibly have been overlooked by the SAR. Routine releases of radionuclides from the WIPP repository to the environment during the waste emplacement operations are expected to be essentially zero. In contrast, potential accidental releases from postulated accident scenarios during waste handling and emplacement could be substantial, which necessitates the need for radiological air monitoring and confinement barriers (DOE 1999). The WIPP Safety Analysis Report (SAR) calculated doses from accidental releases to the on-site (at 100 m from the source) and off-site (at the Exclusive Use Boundary and Site Boundary) public by a deterministic approach. This approach, as demonstrated in the SAR, uses single-point values of key parameters to assess the 50-year, whole-body committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). The basic assumptions used in the SAR to formulate the CEDE are retained for this report's probabilistic assessment. However, for the probabilistic assessment, single-point parameter values were replaced with probability density functions (PDF) and were sampled over an expected range. Monte Carlo simulations were run, in which 10,000 iterations were performed by randomly selecting one value for each parameter and calculating the dose. Statistical information was then derived from the 10,000 iteration

  16. The Integrated Safety Management System Verification Enhancement Review of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BRIGGS, C.R.

    2000-02-09

    The primary purpose of the verification enhancement review was for the DOE Richland Operations Office (RL) to verify contractor readiness for the independent DOE Integrated Safety Management System Verification (ISMSV) on the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Secondary objectives included: (1) to reinforce the engagement of management and to gauge management commitment and accountability; (2) to evaluate the ''value added'' benefit of direct public involvement; (3) to evaluate the ''value added'' benefit of direct worker involvement; (4) to evaluate the ''value added'' benefit of the panel-to-panel review approach; and, (5) to evaluate the utility of the review's methodology/adaptability to periodic assessments of ISM status. The review was conducted on December 6-8, 1999, and involved the conduct of two-hour interviews with five separate panels of individuals with various management and operations responsibilities related to PFP. A semi-structured interview process was employed by a team of five ''reviewers'' who directed open-ended questions to the panels which focused on: (1) evidence of management commitment, accountability, and involvement; and, (2) consideration and demonstration of stakeholder (including worker) information and involvement opportunities. The purpose of a panel-to-panel dialogue approach was to better spotlight: (1) areas of mutual reinforcement and alignment that could serve as good examples of the management commitment and accountability aspects of ISMS implementation, and, (2) areas of potential discrepancy that could provide opportunities for improvement. In summary, the Review Team found major strengths to include: (1) the use of multi-disciplinary project work teams to plan and do work; (2) the availability and broad usage of multiple tools to help with planning and integrating work; (3) senior management presence and accessibility; (4) the institutionalization of worker involvement; (5) encouragement of self-reporting and self

  17. Nuclear Safety Risk Management in Refueling Outage of Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meijing Wu; Guozhang Shen

    2006-07-01

    The NPP is used to planning maintenance, in-service inspection, surveillance test, fuel handling and design modification in the refueling outage; the operator response capability will be reduced plus some of the plant systems out of service or loss of power at this time. Based on 8 times refueling outage experiences of the Qinshan NPP, this article provide some good practice and lesson learned for the nuclear safety risk management focus at four safety function areas of Residual Heat Removal Capability, Inventory Control, Power availability and Reactivity control. (authors)

  18. Evaluation of station blackout accidents at nuclear power plants: Technical findings related to unresolved safety issue A-44: Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1988-06-01

    ''Station Blackout,'' which is the complete loss of alternating current (AC) electrical power in a nuclear power plant, has been designated as Unresolved Safety Issue A-44. Because many safety systems required for reactor core decay heat removal and containment heat removal depend on AC power, the consequences of a station blackout could be severe. This report documents the findings of technical studies performed as part of the program to resolve this issue. The important factors analyzed include: the fequency of loss of offsite power; the probability that emergency or onsite AC power supplies would be unavailable; the capability and reliability of decay heat removal systems independent of AC power; and the likelihood that offsite power would be restored before systems that cannot operate for extended periods without AC power fail, thus resulting in core damage. This report also addresses effects of different designs, locations, and operational features on the estimated frequency of core damage resulting from station blackout events.

  19. Environment, safety and Health Progress Assessment of the Rocky Flats Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-05-01

    This report documents the result of the US Department of Energy`s (DOE) Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) Progress Assessment of the DOE Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) in Golden, Colorado. The assessment, which was conducted during the period of May 17 through May 28, 1993, included a selective review of the ES&H management systems and programs of the responsible DOE Headquarters Program Offices (Defense Programs (DP) and Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM)), the DOE Rocky Flats Office (RFO), and the site contractor, EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc. (EG&G). Despite the near constant state of flux under which RFP has been required to operate, the Progress Assessment Team has concluded that significant progress has been made in correcting the deficiencies identified in the 1989 Assessment and in responding responsibly to regulations, and DOE directives and guidance that have been issued since that time. The Team concluded that the improvements have been concentrated in the activities associated with plutonium facilities and in regulatory driven programs. Much remains to be done with respect to implementing on a sitewide basis those management systems that anchor an organization`s pursuit of continuous ES&H improvement. Furthermore the Team concluded that the pace of improvement has been constrained by a combination of factors that have limited the site`s ability to manage change in the pursuit of sitewide ES&H excellence.

  20. Assessment of enriched uranium storage safety issues at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-08-01

    This document is an assessment of the technical safety issues pertaining to the storage of EU at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. The purpose of the assessment is to serve as the basis for defining the technical standards for storage of EU at Y-12. A formal assessment of the Y-12 materials acceptance criteria for EU is currently being conducted by a task force cochaired by B. G. Eddy of DOE Oak Ridge Operations and S. 0. Cox of Y-12 Defense Programs. The mission of this technical assessment for storage is obviously dependent on results of the acceptance assessment. Clearly, the two efforts require coordination to avoid inconsistencies. In addition, both these Assessments must be consistent with the Environmental Assessment for EU storage at Y-12.1 Both the Storage Assessment and the Criteria for Acceptance must take cognizance of the fact that a portion of the EU to be submitted for storage in the future is expected to be derived from foreign sources and to include previously irradiated uranium containing significant levels of transuranics, radioactive daughter products, and unstable uranium isotopes that do not occur in the EU stream of the DOE weapons complex. National security considerations may dictate that these materials be accepted despite the fact that they fail to conform to the Acceptance Criteria. This document will attempt to address the complexities inherent in this situation.

  1. Protection of Operators and Environment - the Safety Concept of the Karlsruhe Vitrification Plant VEK

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fleisch, J.; Kuttruf, H.; Lumpp, W.; Pfeifer, W.; Roth, G.; Weisenburger, S.

    2002-02-26

    The Karlsruhe Vitrification Plant (VEK) plant is a milestone in decommissioning and complete dismantling of the former Karlsruhe Reprocessing Plant WAK, which is in an advanced stage of disassembly. The VEK is scheduled to vitrify approx. 70 m3 of the highly radioactive liquid waste (HLW) resulting from reprocessing. Site preparation, civil work and component manufacturing began in 1999. The building will be finalized by mid of 2002, hot vitrification operation is currently scheduled for 2004/2005. Provisions against damages arising from construction and operation of the VEK had to be made in accordance with the state of the art as laid down in the German Atomic Law and the Radiation Protection Regulations. For this purpose, the appropriate analysis of accidents and their external and internal impacts were investigated. During the detailed design phase, a failure effects analysis was carried out, in which single events were studied with respect to the objectives of protection and ensuring activity containment, limiting radioactive discharges to the environment and protecting of the staff. Parallel to the planning phase of the VEK plant a cold prototype test facility (PVA) covering the main process steps was constructed and operated at the Institut fuer Nukleare Entsorgung (INE) of FZK. This pilot operation served to demonstrate the process technique and its operation with a simulated waste solution, and to test the main items of equipment, but was conducted also to use the experimental data and experience to back the safety concept of the radioactive VEK plant. This paper describes the basis of the safety concept of the VEK plant and results of the failure effect analysis. The experimental simulation of the failure scenarios, their effect on the process behavior, and the controllability of these events as well as the effect of the results on the safety concept of VEK are discussed. Additionally, an overview of the actual status of civil work and manufacturing of

  2. A probabilistic safety analysis of UF{sub 6} handling at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyd, G.J.; Lewis, S.R.; Summitt, R.L.

    1991-12-31

    A probabilistic safety study of UF{sub 6} handling activities at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant has recently been completed. The analysis provides a unique perspective on the safety of UF{sub 6} handling activities. The estimated release frequencies provide an understanding of current risks, and the examination of individual contributors yields a ranking of important plant features and operations. Aside from the probabilistic results, however, there is an even more important benefit derived from a systematic modeling of all operations. The integrated approach employed in the analysis allows the interrelationships among the equipment and the required operations to be explored in depth. This paper summarizes the methods used in the study and provides an overview of some of the technical insights that were obtained. Specific areas of possible improvement in operations are described.

  3. Management of the aging of critical safety-related concrete structures in light-water reactor plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Naus, D.J.; Oland, C.B. ); Arndt, E.G. )

    1990-01-01

    The Structural Aging Program has the overall objective of providing the USNRC with an improved basis for evaluating nuclear power plant safety-related structures for continued service. The program consists of a management task and three technical tasks: materials property data base, structural component assessment/repair technology, and quantitative methodology for continued-service determinations. Objectives, accomplishments, and planned activities under each of these tasks are presented. Major program accomplishments include development of a materials property data base for structural materials as well as an aging assessment methodology for concrete structures in nuclear power plants. Furthermore, a review and assessment of inservice inspection techniques for concrete materials and structures has been complete, and work on development of a methodology which can be used for performing current as well as reliability-based future condition assessment of concrete structures is well under way. 43 refs., 3 tabs.

  4. Cognitive decision errors and organization vulnerabilities in nuclear power plant safety management: Modeling using the TOGA meta-theory framework

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cappelli, M.; Gadomski, A. M.; Sepiellis, M.; Wronikowska, M. W.

    2012-07-01

    In the field of nuclear power plant (NPP) safety modeling, the perception of the role of socio-cognitive engineering (SCE) is continuously increasing. Today, the focus is especially on the identification of human and organization decisional errors caused by operators and managers under high-risk conditions, as evident by analyzing reports on nuclear incidents occurred in the past. At present, the engineering and social safety requirements need to enlarge their domain of interest in such a way to include all possible losses generating events that could be the consequences of an abnormal state of a NPP. Socio-cognitive modeling of Integrated Nuclear Safety Management (INSM) using the TOGA meta-theory has been discussed during the ICCAP 2011 Conference. In this paper, more detailed aspects of the cognitive decision-making and its possible human errors and organizational vulnerability are presented. The formal TOGA-based network model for cognitive decision-making enables to indicate and analyze nodes and arcs in which plant operators and managers errors may appear. The TOGA's multi-level IPK (Information, Preferences, Knowledge) model of abstract intelligent agents (AIAs) is applied. In the NPP context, super-safety approach is also discussed, by taking under consideration unexpected events and managing them from a systemic perspective. As the nature of human errors depends on the specific properties of the decision-maker and the decisional context of operation, a classification of decision-making using IPK is suggested. Several types of initial situations of decision-making useful for the diagnosis of NPP operators and managers errors are considered. The developed models can be used as a basis for applications to NPP educational or engineering simulators to be used for training the NPP executive staff. (authors)

  5. safety

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    contractor at the Nevada National Security Site, has been recognized by the Department of Energy for excellence in occupational safety and health protection. National Nuclear...

  6. Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Solar Energy Wind Energy Water Power Supercritical CO2 Geothermal Natural Gas Safety, Security & Resilience of the Energy Infrastructure Energy Storage Nuclear Power & Engineering ...

  7. DISPOSAL OF TRU WASTE FROM THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT IN PIPE OVERPACK CONTAINERS TO WIPP INCLUDING NEW SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hopkins, A.M.; Sutter, C.; Hulse, G.; Teal, J.

    2003-02-27

    The Department of Energy is responsible for the safe management and cleanup of the DOE complex. As part of the cleanup and closure of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) located on the Hanford site, the nuclear material inventory was reviewed to determine the appropriate disposition path. Based on the nuclear material characteristics, the material was designated for stabilization and packaging for long term storage and transfer to the Savannah River Site or, a decision for discard was made. The discarded material was designated as waste material and slated for disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Prior to preparing any residue wastes for disposal at the WIPP, several major activities need to be completed. As detailed a processing history as possible of the material including origin of the waste must be researched and documented. A technical basis for termination of safeguards on the material must be prepared and approved. Utilizing process knowledge and processing history, the material must be characterized, sampling requirements determined, acceptable knowledge package and waste designation completed prior to disposal. All of these activities involve several organizations including the contractor, DOE, state representatives and other regulators such as EPA. At PFP, a process has been developed for meeting the many, varied requirements and successfully used to prepare several residue waste streams including Rocky Flats incinerator ash, Hanford incinerator ash and Sand, Slag and Crucible (SS&C) material for disposal. These waste residues are packed into Pipe Overpack Containers for shipment to the WIPP.

  8. Safety analysis -- 200 Area Savannah River Plant, F-Canyon Operations. Supplement 4

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beary, M.M.; Collier, C.D.; Fairobent, L.A.; Graham, R.F.; Mason, C.L.; McDuffee, W.T.; Owen, T.L.; Walker, D.H.

    1986-02-01

    The F-Canyon facility is located in the 200 Separations Area and uses the Purex process to recover plutonium from reactor-irradiated uranium. The irradiated uranium is normally in the form of solid or hollow cylinders called slugs. These slugs are encased in aluminum cladding and are sent to the F-Canyon from the Savannah River Plant (SRP) reactor areas or from the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF). This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents an analysis of the F-Canyon operations and is an update to a section of a previous SAR. The previous SAR documented an analysis of the entire 200 Separations Area operations. This SAR documents an analysis of the F-Canyon and is one of a series of documents for the Separations Area as specified in the Savannah River Implementation Plans. A substantial amount of the information supporting the conclusions of this SAR is found in the Systems Analysis. Some F-Canyon equipment has been updated during the time between the Systems Analysis and this SAR and a complete description of this equipment is included in this report. The primary purpose of the analysis was to demonstrate that the F-Canyon can be operated without undue risk to onsite or offsite populations and to the environment. In this report, risk is defined as the expected frequency of an accident, multiplied by the resulting radiological consequence in person-rem. The units of risk for radiological dose are person-rem/year. Maximum individual exposure values have also been calculated and reported.

  9. Review guidelines on software languages for use in nuclear power plant safety systems. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hecht, H.; Hecht, M.; Graff, S.; Green, W.; Lin, D.; Koch, S.; Tai, A.; Wendelboe, D.

    1996-06-01

    Guidelines for the programming and auditing of software written in high level languages for safety systems are presented. The guidelines are derived from a framework of issues significant to software safety which was gathered from relevant standards and research literature. Language-specific adaptations of these guidelines are provided for the following high level languages: Ada, C/C++, Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) Ladder Logic, International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standard 1131-3 Sequential Function Charts, Pascal, and PL/M. Appendices to the report include a tabular summary of the guidelines and additional information on selected languages.s

  10. Thermodynamic analysis of a possible CO{sub 2}-laser plant included in a heat engine cycle

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bisio, G.; Rubatto, G.

    1998-07-01

    In these last years, several plants have been realized in some industrialized countries to recover pressure exergy from various fluids. That has been done by means of suitable turbines in particular for blast-furnace top gas and natural gas. Various papers have examined the topic, considering pros and cons. High-power CO{sub 2}-lasers are being more and more widely used for welding, drilling and cutting in machine shops. In the near future different kinds of metal surface treatments will probably become routine practice with laser units. The industries benefiting most from high power lasers will be: the automotive industry, shipbuilding, the offshore industry, the aerospace industry, the nuclear and the chemical processing industries. Both degradation and cooling problems may be alleviated by allowing the gas to flow through the laser tube and by reducing its pressure outside this tube. Thus, a thermodynamic analysis on high-power CO{sub 2}-lasers with particular reference to a possible energy recovery is justified. In previous papers the critical examination of the concept of efficiency has led one of the present authors to the definition of an operational domain in which the process can be achieved. This domain is confined by regions of no entropy production (upper limit) and no useful effects (lower limit). On the basis of these concepts and of what has been done for pressure exergy recovery from other fluids, exergy investigations and an analysis of losses are performed for a cyclic process including a high performance CO2 laser. Thermodynamic analysis of flow processes in a CO{sub 2}-laser plant shows that the inclusion of a turbine in this plant allows us to recover the most part of the exergy necessary for the compressor; in addition, the water consumption for the refrigeration in the heat exchanger is reduced.

  11. Updating Human Factors Engineering Guidelines for Conducting Safety Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O, J.M.; Higgins, J.; Stephen Fleger - NRC

    2011-09-19

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) programs of applicants for nuclear power plant construction permits, operating licenses, standard design certifications, and combined operating licenses. The purpose of these safety reviews is to help ensure that personnel performance and reliability are appropriately supported. Detailed design review procedures and guidance for the evaluations is provided in three key documents: the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711), and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). These documents were last revised in 2007, 2004 and 2002, respectively. The NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of the guidance to ensure that it remains a state-of-the-art design evaluation tool. To this end, the NRC is updating its guidance to stay current with recent research on human performance, advances in HFE methods and tools, and new technology being employed in plant and control room design. This paper describes the role of HFE guidelines in the safety review process and the content of the key HFE guidelines used. Then we will present the methodology used to develop HFE guidance and update these documents, and describe the current status of the update program.

  12. Evaluation of operational safety at Babcock and Wilcox Plants: Volume 2, Thermal-hydraulic results

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wheatley, P.D.; Davis, C.B.; Callow, R.A.; Fletcher, C.D.; Dobbe, C.A.; Beelman, R.J.

    1987-11-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has initiated a research program to develop a methodology to assess the operational performance of Babcock and Wilcox plants and to apply this methodology on a trial basis. The methodology developed for analyzing Babcock and Wilcox plants integrated methods used in both thermal-hydraulics and human factors and compared results with information used in the assessment of risk. The integrated methodology involved an evaluation of a selected plant for each pressurized water reactor vendor during a limited number of transients. A plant was selected to represent each vendor, and three transients were identified for analysis. The plants were Oconee Unit 1 for Babcock and Wilcox, H.B. Robinson Unit 2 for Westinghouse, and Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 for Combustion Engineering. The three transients were a complete loss of all feedwater, a small-break loss-of-coolant accident, and a steam-generator overfill with auxiliary feedwater. Included in the integrated methodology was an assessment of the thermal-hydraulic behavior, including event timing, of the plants during the three transients. Thermal-hydraulic results are presented in this volume (Volume 2) of the report. 26 refs., 30 figs., 7 tabs.

  13. Inspection of Environment, Safety, and Health Management at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant- Volume I, August 2002

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Secretary of Energy’s Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) conducted an inspection of environment, safety, and health (ES&H) and emergency management programs at the Department of Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in July and August 2002. The inspection was performed as a joint effort by the OA Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations and the Office of Emergency Management Oversight. This volume discusses the results of the review of the WIPP ES&H programs. The results of the review of the WIPP emergency management program are discussed in Volume II of this report, and the combined results are discussed in a summary report. As discussed throughout this report, the ISM program at WIPP is generally effective. Although improvements are warranted in some areas, the current programs have contributed to overall effective ES&H performance and a good safety record at WIPP. Section 2 of this volume provides an overall discussion of the results of the review of the WIPP ES&H programs, including positive aspects and weaknesses. Section 3 provides OA’s conclusions regarding the overall effectiveness of CBFO and WTS management of the ES&H programs. Section 4 presents the ratings assigned as a result of this review. Appendix A provides supplemental information, including team composition. Appendix B identifies the specific finding that requires corrective action and follow-up. Appendix C presents the results of the review of selected guiding principles of ISM. Appendix D presents the results of the review of the CBFO and WTS feedback and continuous improvement processes. The results of the review of the application of the core functions of ISM for the selected WIPP activities are discussed in Appendix E.

  14. Pantex Plant final safety analysis report, Zone 4 magazines. Staging or interim storage for nuclear weapons and components: Issue D

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-04-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) contains a detailed description and evaluation of the significant environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) issues associated with the operations of the Pantex Plant modified-Richmond and steel arch construction (SAC) magazines in Zone 4. It provides (1) an overall description of the magazines, the Pantex Plant, and its surroundings; (2) a systematic evaluations of the hazards that could occur as a result of the operations performed in these magazines; (3) descriptions and analyses of the adequacy of the measures taken to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards; and (4) analyses of potential accidents and their associated risks.

  15. PRB coal safety design considerations for new greenfield plants: an EPCC's perspective

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brown, J.H.

    2007-11-15

    The article reviews the design and safety aspects to consider in a new greenfield Powder River Basin (PRB) coal-fired power plant such as the 200 MW TS Power Plant (TSPP) in Nevada that Fluor is working on as an engineering, procurement and construction contractor (EPCC). PRB coals can become fragmented and form coal dust that is highly volatile and easily self-ignited. Coal handling systems incorporate features to minimise dust, such as totally enclosed chute works, 'spoon drops' to reduce impact turbulence, and overflow hoods. Conveyors have extended skirtboards and tight clearances between the wear plates and the belts. Storage piles are designed to have high compaction to deprive oxygen and dust suppression monitor hydrants to minimise dust and assist in compaction. The coal silo filling bay is designed to minimise dust once the coal is crushed, and attention is paid to cleaning and lighting. The silos are designed to ensure mass flow to the feeder and incorporate a carbon monoxide monitor and an F-500 fire suppressant. 3 photos.

  16. Regulatory analysis for the resolution of Generic Safety Issue 29: Bolting degradation or failure in nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chang, T.Y.

    1991-09-01

    Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-29 deals with staff concerns about public risk due to degradation or failure of safety-related bolting in nuclear power plants. The issue was initiated in November 1982. Value-impact studies of a mandatory program on safety-related bolting for operating plants were inconclusive: therefore, additional regulatory requirements for operating plants could not be justified in accordance with provisions of 10 CFR 50.109. In addition, based on operating experience with bolting in both nuclear and conventional power plants, the actions already taken through bulletins, generic letters, and information notices, and the industry-proposed actions, the staff concluded that a sufficient technical basis exists for the resolution of GSI-29. The staff further concluded that leakage of bolted pressure joints is possible but catastrophic failure of a reactor coolant pressure boundary joint that will lead to significant accident sequences is highly unlikely. For future plants, it was concluded that a new Standard Review Plant section should be developed to codify existing bolting requirements and industry-developed initiatives. 9 refs., 1 tab.

  17. Documentation of Hanford Site independent review of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Revision 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Herborn, D.I.

    1993-11-01

    Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) is the Integrating Contractor for the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, and as such is responsible for preparation of the HWVP Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). The HWVP PSAR was prepared pursuant to the requirements for safety analyses contained in US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 4700.1, Project Management System (DOE 1987); 5480.5, Safety of Nuclear Facilities (DOE 1986a); 5481.lB, Safety Analysis and Review System (DOE 1986b) which was superseded by DOE order 5480-23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, for nuclear facilities effective April 30, 1992 (DOE 1992); and 6430.lA, General Design Criteria (DOE 1989). The WHC procedures that, in large part, implement these DOE requirements are contained in WHC-CM-4-46, Nonreactor Facility Safety Analysis Manual. This manual describes the overall WHC safety analysis process in terms of requirements for safety analyses, responsibilities of the various contributing organizations, and required reviews and approvals.

  18. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  19. Enterprise Assessments Targeted Assessment of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant High-Level Waste Facility Radioactive Liquid Waste Disposal System Safety Basis Change Package … May 2016

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Assessment of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant High-Level Waste Facility Radioactive Liquid Waste Disposal System Safety Basis Change Package May 2016 Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments Office of Enterprise Assessments U.S. Department of Energy i Table of Contents Acronyms

  20. Independent Oversight Inspection of Environment, Safety, and Health Programs at the Pantex Plant, Technical Appendices, Volume II, February 2005

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) conducted an inspection of environment, safety, and health (ES&H) programs at the DOE Pantex Plant during January and February 2005. The inspection was performed by the OA Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations. OA reports to the Director of the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, who reports directly to the Secretary of Energy. This volume of the report provides four technical appendices (C through F) containing detailed results of the OA review. Appendix C provides the results of the review of the application of the core functions of ISM for Pantex Plant work activities. Appendix D presents the results of the review of NNSA, PXSO, and BWXT feedback and continuous improvement processes and management systems. Appendix E presents the results of the review of essential safety system functionality, and Appendix F presents the results of the review of safety management of the selected focus areas.

  1. Internal Technical Report, Safety Analysis Report 5 MW(e) Raft River Research and Development Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brown, E.S.; Homer, G.B.; Shaber, C.R.; Thurow, T.L.

    1981-11-17

    The Raft River Geothermal Site is located in Southern Idaho's Raft River Valley, southwest of Malta, Idaho, in Cassia County. EG and G idaho, Inc., is the DOE's prime contractor for development of the Raft River geothermal field. Contract work has been progressing for several years towards creating a fully integrated utilization of geothermal water. Developmental progress has resulted in the drilling of seven major DOE wells. Four are producing geothermal water from reservoir temperatures measured to approximately 149 C (approximately 300 F). Closed-in well head pressures range from 69 to 102 kPa (100 to 175 psi). Two wells are scheduled for geothermal cold 60 C (140 F) water reinjection. The prime development effort is for a power plant designed to generate electricity using the heat from the geothermal hot water. The plant is designated as the ''5 MW(e) Raft River Research and Development Plant'' project. General site management assigned to EG and G has resulted in planning and development of many parts of the 5 MW program. Support and development activities have included: (1) engineering design, procurement, and construction support; (2) fluid supply and injection facilities, their study, and control; (3) development and installation of transfer piping systems for geothermal water collection and disposal by injection; and (4) heat exchanger fouling tests.

  2. Internal Technical Report, Safety Analysis Report 5 MW(e) Raft River Pilot Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brown, E.S.; Homer, G.B.; Spencer, S.G.; Shaber, C.R.

    1980-05-30

    The Raft River Geothermal Site is located in Southern Idaho's Raft River Valley, southwest of Malta, Idaho, in Cassia County. EG and G idaho, Inc., is the DOE's prime contractor for development of the Raft River geothermal field. Contract work has been progressing for several years towards creating a fully integrated utilization of geothermal water. Developmental progress has resulted in the drilling of seven major DOE wells. Four are producing geothermal water from reservoir temperatures measured to approximately 149 C (approximately 300 F). Closed-in well head pressures range from 69 to 102 kPa (100 to 175 psi). Two wells are scheduled for geothermal cold 60 C (140 F) water reinjection. The prime development effort is for a power plant designed to generate electricity using the heat from the geothermal hot water. The plant is designated as the ''5 MW(e) Raft River Research and Development Plant'' project. General site management assigned to EG and G has resulted in planning and development of many parts of the 5 MW program. Support and development activities have included: (1) engineering design, procurement, and construction support; (2) fluid supply and injection facilities, their study, and control; (3) development and installation of transfer piping systems for geothermal water collection and disposal by injection; and (4) heat exchanger fouling tests.

  3. Integrated Safety Management System Phase I Verification for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) [VOL 1 & 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    SETH, S.S.

    2000-01-10

    U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Policy 450.4, Safety Management System Policy commits to institutionalizing an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) throughout the DOE complex as a means of accomplishing its missions safely. DOE Acquisition Regulation 970.5204-2 requires that contractors manage and perform work in accordance with a documented safety management system.

  4. Seismic safety margins research program. Phase I. Final report: plant/site selection and data collection (Project I)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chuang, T. Y.

    1981-05-01

    Project I of Phase I of the Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) comprised two parts: the selection of a representative nuclear power plant/site for study in Phase I and the collection of data needed by the other SSMRP projects. Unit 1 of the Zion Nuclear Power Plant in Zion, Illinois, was selected for the SSMRP Phase I studies. The Zion plant and its site were found to be reasonably representative of operating and future plants with regard to its nuclear steam supply system; the type of containment structure (prestressed concrete); its electrical capacity (1100 MWe); its location (the Midwest); the peak seismic accelaration used for design (0.17g); and the properties of the underlying soil (the low-strain shear-wave velocity is 1650 ft/s in a 50- to 100-ft-thick layer of soil overlying sedimentary bedrock).

  5. What Does Self-Assessment of Safety Culture Look Like? Discussion from the Pantex Plant Perspective

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presenter: Dr. Suzanne Helfinstine, Staff Engineer High Reliability Operations B&W Pantex Pantex Plant

  6. Documentation of Hanford Site independent review of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant Preliminary Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Herborn, D.I.

    1991-10-01

    The requirements for Westinghouse Hanford independent review of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) are contained in Section 1.0, Subsection 4.3 of WCH-CM-4-46. Specifically, this manual requires the following: (1) Formal functional reviews of the HWVP PSAR by the future operating organization (HWVP Operations), and the independent review organizations (HWVP and Environmental Safety Assurance, Environmental Assurance, and Quality Assurance); and (2) Review and approval of the HWVP PSAR by the Tank Waste Disposal (TWD) Subcouncil of the Safety and Environmental Advisory Council (SEAC), which provides independent advice to the Westinghouse Hanford President and executives on matters of safety and environmental protection. 7 refs.

  7. Review of nuclear power plant safety cable aging studies with recommendations for improved approaches and for future work.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gillen, Kenneth Todd; Bernstein, Robert

    2010-11-01

    Many U. S. nuclear power plants are approaching 40 years of age and there is a desire to extend their life for up to 100 total years. Safety-related cables were originally qualified for nuclear power plant applications based on IEEE Standards that were published in 1974. The qualifications involved procedures to simulate 40 years of life under ambient power plant aging conditions followed by simulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Over the past 35 years or so, substantial efforts were devoted to determining whether the aging assumptions allowed by the original IEEE Standards could be improved upon. These studies led to better accelerated aging methods so that more confident 40-year lifetime predictions became available. Since there is now a desire to potentially extend the life of nuclear power plants way beyond the original 40 year life, there is an interest in reviewing and critiquing the current state-of-the-art in simulating cable aging. These are two of the goals of this report where the discussion is concentrated on the progress made over the past 15 years or so and highlights the most thorough and careful published studies. An additional goal of the report is to suggest work that might prove helpful in answering some of the questions and dealing with some of the issues that still remain with respect to simulating the aging and predicting the lifetimes of safety-related cable materials.

  8. Guidelines for nuclear power plant safety issue prioritization information development. Supplement 4

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tabatabai, A.S.; Fecht, B.A.; Powers, T.B.; Bickford, W.E.; Andrews, W.B.; Gallucci, R.H.V.; Bian, S.H.; Daling, P.M.; Eschbach, E.J.; Allen, C.H.

    1986-07-01

    This is the fifth in a series of reports to document the use of a methodology developed by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory to calculate, for prioritization purposes, the risk, dose and cost impacts of implementing resolutions to reactor safety issues (NUREG/CR-2800, Andrews et al. 1983). This report contains results of issue-specific analyses for 23 issues. Each issue was considered within the constraints of available information as of winter 1986, and two staff-weeks of labor. The results are referenced, as one consideration in setting priorities for reactor safety issues, in NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues.''

  9. Safety Criticality Standards Using the French CRISTAL Code Package: Application to the AREVA NP UO{sub 2} Fuel Fabrication Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Doucet, M.; Durant Terrasson, L.; Mouton, J.

    2006-07-01

    Criticality safety evaluations implement requirements to proof of sufficient sub critical margins outside of the reactor environment for example in fuel fabrication plants. Basic criticality data (i.e., criticality standards) are used in the determination of sub critical margins for all processes involving plutonium or enriched uranium. There are several criticality international standards, e.g., ARH-600, which is one the US nuclear industry relies on. The French Nuclear Safety Authority (DGSNR and its advising body IRSN) has requested AREVA NP to review the criticality standards used for the evaluation of its Low Enriched Uranium fuel fabrication plants with CRISTAL V0, the recently updated French criticality evaluation package. Criticality safety is a concern for every phase of the fabrication process including UF{sub 6} cylinder storage, UF{sub 6}-UO{sub 2} conversion, powder storage, pelletizing, rod loading, assembly fabrication, and assembly transportation. Until 2003, the accepted criticality standards were based on the French CEA work performed in the late seventies with the APOLLO1 cell/assembly computer code. APOLLO1 is a spectral code, used for evaluating the basic characteristics of fuel assemblies for reactor physics applications, which has been enhanced to perform criticality safety calculations. Throughout the years, CRISTAL, starting with APOLLO1 and MORET 3 (a 3D Monte Carlo code), has been improved to account for the growth of its qualification database and for increasing user requirements. Today, CRISTAL V0 is an up-to-date computational tool incorporating a modern basic microscopic cross section set based on JEF2.2 and the comprehensive APOLLO2 and MORET 4 codes. APOLLO2 is well suited for criticality standards calculations as it includes a sophisticated self shielding approach, a P{sub ij} flux determination, and a 1D transport (S{sub n}) process. CRISTAL V0 is the result of more than five years of development work focusing on theoretical

  10. Review guidelines for software languages for use in nuclear power plant safety systems: Final report. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hecht, M.; Decker, D.; Graff, S.; Green, W.; Lin, D.; Dinsmore, G.; Koch, S.

    1997-10-01

    Guidelines for the programming and auditing of software written in high level languages for safety systems are presented. The guidelines are derived from a framework of issues significant to software safety which was gathered from relevant standards and research literature. Language-specific adaptations of these guidelines are provided for the following high level languages: Ada83 and Ada95; C and C++; International Electrochemical Commission (IEC) Standard 1131-3 Ladder Logic, Sequential Function Charts, Structured Text, and Function Block Diagrams; Pascal; and PL/M. Appendices to the report include a tabular summary of the guidelines and additional information on selected languages.

  11. Guidelines for nuclear-power-plant safety-issue-prioritization information development

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Andrews, W.B.; Gallucci, R.H.V.; Heaberlin, S.W.; Bickford, W.E.; Konzek, G.J.; Strenge, D.L.; Smith, R.I.; Weakley, S.A.

    1983-02-01

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory has developed a methodology, with examples, to calculate - to an approximation serviceable for prioritization purposes - the risk, dose and cost impacts of implementing resolutions to reactor safety issues. This report is an applications guide to issue-specific calculations. A description of the approach, mathematical models, worksheets and step-by-step examples are provided. Analysis using this method is intended to provide comparable results for many issues at a cost of two staff-weeks per issue. Results will be used by the NRC to support decisions related to issue priorities in allocation of resources to complete safety issue resolutions.

  12. Guidelines for nuclear power plant safety issue prioritization information development. Supplement 5

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Daling, P.M.; Lavender, J.C.

    1996-07-01

    This is the sixth in a series of reports to document the development and use of a methodology developed by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to calculate, for prioritization purposes, the risk, dose, and cost impacts of implementing potential resolutions to reactor safety issues (see NUREG/CR-2800, Andrews, et al., 1983). This report contains the results of issue-specific analyses for 34 generic issues. Each issue was considered within the constraints of available information at the time the issues were examined and approximately 2 staff-weeks of labor. The results are referenced as one consideration in NUREG-0933, A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues (Emrit, et al., 1983).

  13. Evaluation of operational safety at Babcock and Wilcox Plants: Volume 1, Results overview

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hanson, D.J.; Meyer, O.R.; Blackman, H.S.; Nelson, W.R.; Hallbert, B.P.

    1987-10-01

    A methodology was developed to assess the operational performance of nuclear power plants through an integration of thermal-hydraulic and human factors analysis techniques together with inputs from information used in the assessment of risk. This methodology was applied to evaluate the extent to which plant systems and/or operator actions are effective in lessening the severity of selected transients for Babcock and Wilcox (B and W) plants. Comparisons were also performed to assess differences in operational performance capabilities and limitations between selected Combustion Engineering, Westinghouse, and B and W plants. Detailed results from the methodology application are presented in two volumes. This report Volume 1, presents an overview of the results with emphasis on the systems and operator performance. Volume 2 presents detailed results from thermal-hydraulic calculations. 22 refs., 9 figs., 16 tabs.

  14. Power plant including an exhaust gas recirculation system for injecting recirculated exhaust gases in the fuel and compressed air of a gas turbine engine

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Anand, Ashok Kumar; Nagarjuna Reddy, Thirumala Reddy; Shaffer, Jason Brian; York, William David

    2014-05-13

    A power plant is provided and includes a gas turbine engine having a combustor in which compressed gas and fuel are mixed and combusted, first and second supply lines respectively coupled to the combustor and respectively configured to supply the compressed gas and the fuel to the combustor and an exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) system to re-circulate exhaust gas produced by the gas turbine engine toward the combustor. The EGR system is coupled to the first and second supply lines and configured to combine first and second portions of the re-circulated exhaust gas with the compressed gas and the fuel at the first and second supply lines, respectively.

  15. Assessment of inservice conditions of safety-related nuclear plant structures

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ashar, H.; Bagchi, G.

    1995-06-01

    The report is a compilation from a number of sources of information related to the condition Of structures and civil engineering features at operating nuclear power plants in the United States. The most significant information came from the hands-on inspection of the six old plants (licensed prior to 1977) performed by the staff of the Civil Engineering and Geosciences Branch (ECGB) in the Division of Engineering of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. For the containment structures, most of the information related to the degraded conditions came from the licensees as part of the Licensing Event Report System (10 CFR 50.73), or as part of the requirement under limiting condition of operation of the plant-specific Technical Specifications. Most of the information related to the degradation of other Structures and civil engineering features was extracted from the industry survey, the reported incidents, and the plant visits. The report discusses the condition of the structures and civil engineering features at operating nuclear power plants and provides information that would help detect, alleviate, and correct the degraded conditions of the structures and civil engineering features.

  16. Activities in Support of Continuing the Service of Nuclear Power Plant Safety-Related Concrete Structures

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Naus, Dan J

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear power plant (NPP) concrete structures are described. In-service inspection and testing requirements in the U.S. are summarized. The license renewal process in the U.S. is outlined and its current status provided. Operating experience related to performance of the concrete structures is presented. Basic components of a program to manage aging of the concrete structures are identified and described: (1) Degradation mechanisms, damage models, and material performance; (2) Assessment and remediation: i.e., component selection, in- service inspection, non-destructive examinations, and remedial actions; and (3) Estimation of performance at present or some future point in time: i.e., application of structural reliability theory to the design and optimization of in-service inspection/maintenance strategies, and determination of the effects of degradation on plant risk. Finally, areas are noted where additional research would be of benefit to aging management of nuclear power plant concrete structures.

  17. A safety and regulatory assessment of generic BWR and PWR permanently shutdown nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Travis, R.J.; Davis, R.E.; Grove, E.J.; Azarm, M.A.

    1997-08-01

    The long-term availability of less expensive power and the increasing plant modification and maintenance costs have caused some utilities to re-examine the economics of nuclear power. As a result, several utilities have opted to permanently shutdown their plants. Each licensee of these permanently shutdown (PSD) plants has submitted plant-specific exemption requests for those regulations that they believe are no longer applicable to their facility. This report presents a regulatory assessment for generic BWR and PWR plants that have permanently ceased operation in support of NRC rulemaking activities in this area. After the reactor vessel is defueled, the traditional accident sequences that dominate the operating plant risk are no longer applicable. The remaining source of public risk is associated with the accidents that involve the spent fuel. Previous studies have indicated that complete spent fuel pool drainage is an accident of potential concern. Certain combinations of spent fuel storage configurations and decay times, could cause freshly discharged fuel assemblies to self heat to a temperature where the self sustained oxidation of the zircaloy fuel cladding may cause cladding failure. This study has defined four spent fuel configurations which encompass all of the anticipated spent fuel characteristics and storage modes following permanent shutdown. A representative accident sequence was chosen for each configuration. Consequence analyses were performed using these sequences to estimate onsite and boundary doses, population doses and economic costs. A list of candidate regulations was identified from a screening of 10 CFR Parts 0 to 199. The continued applicability of each regulation was assessed within the context of each spent fuel storage configuration and the results of the consequence analyses.

  18. Safety Management System Policy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    SAFETY MANAGEMENT POLICY PURPOSE AND SCOPE To establish the Department of Energy's (DOE) expectation for safety, 1 including integrated safety management that will enable ...

  19. Validation of criticality safety calculational methods for U-AVLIS plant project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lewis, K.D.

    1993-07-14

    The objectives of the Uranium Atomic Vapor Laser isotope Separation (U-AVLIS) are to develop, demonstrate, and deploy a laser-based process to enrich natural uranium in the U-235 isotope to levels useful as fuel in commercial light-water power reactors. Current U-AVLIS production plant criteria call for uranium product enriched in {sup 235}U up to 5 wt%. Development of the U-AVLIS technology is in an advanced stage, and demonstration of the integrated enrichment process is currently in progress using plant-scale equipment in the Uranium Demonstration System (UDS) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In this paper several existing experimental data which are applicable to the critical systems of importance to the safe design of the U-AVLIS plant are identified. These were used to benchmark a configuration-controlled, work station based version of one state-of-the-art computer code employed by the U-AVLIS program in UDS equipment design, and in U-AVLIS plant conceptual design NCS analyses.

  20. Role of Passive Safety Systems in Severe Accidents Prevention for Advanced WWER-1000 Reactor Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bukin, N.V.; Fil, N.S.; Shumsky, A.M. [EDO 'Gidropress', 21 Ordzhonikidze str., Podolsk, Moscow Region, RU-142103 (Russian Federation)

    2004-07-01

    Role of new safety systems applied in advanced WWER-1000 (passive residual heat removal system, SPOT and passive core flooding system, HA-2) in severe accident prevention is considered in the paper. The following typical beyond-design accidents (BDBAs) that essentially determine the design basis of the above passive systems are considered in the paper: - station blackout; - LB LOCA (double-ended cold leg break 850 mm diameter) with station blackout. The domestic DINAMIKA-97 and TETCH-M-97 codes developed by EDO 'Gidropress' were used for the analyses. Besides, some supporting calculations have been performed by new Russian KORSAR code and western RELAP5/MOD3.2 and ATHLET 1.2A codes. The analysis of station blackout accident without operation of new passive systems have shown the exceeding of the maximum design limit of fuel rod damage already in 2-2,5 h after initiating event. Operation of SPOT system prevents any core damage during the BDBA under consideration. The analysis have also demonstrated that operation of new passive safety systems (SPOT and HA-2) ensures the effective core cooling within required period of time. This ensures essentially decreased probability of severe core degradation. (authors)

  1. Process safety management (OSHA) and process risk management (CAA) application. Application to a coke plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Graeser, W.C.; Mentzer, W.P.

    1995-12-01

    Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accidental Release Prevention is the name of the proposed rule for the RMP Risk Management Program. The RMP was written in response to several catastrophic releases of hazardous substances. The rule is applicable to facilities that store, process or use greater than threshold quantities of 62 listed flammable chemicals and another 100 listed toxic substances. Additionally, a Risk Management Plan is registered with the EPA, Chemical Safety and Hazardous Investigation Board, state governments and the local emergency planning commission. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (specifically Section 112r) required the EPA to develop a three phase Risk Management Plan for industry: prevention program; hazard assessment; and emergency response program. The Prevention Program closely follows the OSHA`s Process Safety Management Standard. The Hazard Assessment section requires facilities to develop plans for a worst case scenario. The Emergency Response section defines the steps the facility and each employee will take if a release occurs. This section also needs to be coordinated with the Local Emergency Planning Commission. These regulations are described using Clairton Works as an example of compliance.

  2. Aging and service wear of air-operated valves used in safety-related systems at nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cox, D.F.; McElhaney, K.L.; Staunton, R.H.

    1995-05-01

    Air-operated valves (AOVs) are used in a variety of safety-related applications at nuclear power plants. They are often used where rapid stroke times are required or precise control of the valve obturator is required. They can be designed to operate automatically upon loss of power, which is often desirable when selecting components for response to design basis conditions. The purpose of this report is to examine the reported failures of AOVs and determine whether there are identifiable trends in the failures related to predictable causes. This report examines the specific components that comprise a typical AOV, how those components fail, when they fail, and how such failures are discovered. It also examines whether current testing frequencies and methods are effective in predicting such failures.

  3. Owners of nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1982-11-01

    The list indicates percentage ownership of commercial nuclear power plants by utility companies as of September 1, 1982. The list includes all plants licensed to operate, under construction, docketed for NRC safety and environmental reviews, or under NRC antitrust review. Part I lists plants alphabetically with their associated applicants and percentage ownership. Part II lists applicants alphabetically with their associated plants and percentage ownership. Part I also indicates which plants have received operating licenses.

  4. Owners of nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wood, R.S.

    1991-07-01

    This report indicates percentage ownership of commercial nuclear power plants by utility companies. The report includes all plants operating, under construction, docketed for NRC safety and environmental reviews, or under NRC antitrust review, but does not include those plants announced but not yet under review or those plants formally cancelled. Part 1 of the report lists plants alphabetically with their associated applicants or licensees and percentage ownership. Part 2 lists applicants or licensees alphabetically with their associated plants and percentage ownership. Part 1 also indicates which plants have received operating licenses (OLS).

  5. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22

    This Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for Department of Energy facilities, which includes nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards mitigation, and the System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1A. DOE O 420.1B Chg 1 issued 4-19-10.

  6. Apple latent spherical virus vectors for reliable and effective virus-induced gene silencing among a broad range of plants including tobacco, tomato, Arabidopsis thaliana, cucurbits, and legumes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Igarashi, Aki; Yamagata, Kousuke; Sugai, Tomokazu; Takahashi, Yukari; Sugawara, Emiko; Tamura, Akihiro; Yaegashi, Hajime; Yamagishi, Noriko; Takahashi, Tsubasa; Isogai, Masamichi; Takahashi, Hideki; Yoshikawa, Nobuyuki

    2009-04-10

    Apple latent spherical virus (ALSV) vectors were evaluated for virus-induced gene silencing (VIGS) of endogenous genes among a broad range of plant species. ALSV vectors carrying partial sequences of a subunit of magnesium chelatase (SU) and phytoene desaturase (PDS) genes induced highly uniform knockout phenotypes typical of SU and PDS inhibition on model plants such as tobacco and Arabidopsis thaliana, and economically important crops such as tomato, legume, and cucurbit species. The silencing phenotypes persisted throughout plant growth in these plants. In addition, ALSV vectors could be successfully used to silence a meristem gene, proliferating cell nuclear antigen and disease resistant N gene in tobacco and RCY1 gene in A. thaliana. As ALSV infects most host plants symptomlessly and effectively induces stable VIGS for long periods, the ALSV vector is a valuable tool to determine the functions of interested genes among a broad range of plant species.

  7. PACKAGE INCLUDES:

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    PACKAGE INCLUDES: Airfare from Seattle, 4 & 5 Star Hotels, Transfers, Select Meals, Guided Tours and Excursions DAY 01: BANGKOK - ARRIVAL DAY 02: BANGKOK - SIGHTSEEING DAY 03: BANGKOK - FLOATING MARKET DAY 04: BANGKOK - AT LEISURE DAY 05: BANGKOK - CHIANG MAI BY AIR DAY 06: CHIANG MAI - SIGHTSEEING DAY 07: CHIANG MAI - ELEPHANT CAMP DAY 08: CHIANG MAI - PHUKET BY AIR DAY 09: PHUKET - PHI PHI ISLAND BY FERRY DAY 10: PHUKET - AT LEISURE DAY 11: PHUKET - CORAL ISLAND BY SPEEDBOAT DAY 12: PHUKET

  8. Occupational Safety Review of High Technology Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lee Cadwallader

    2005-01-31

    This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators. These data are useful to form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known sets of safety rules and regulations. Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other industrial hazards. Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for comparison.

  9. Safety system status monitoring

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lewis, J.R.; Morgenstern, M.H.; Rideout, T.H.; Cowley, P.J.

    1984-03-01

    The Pacific Northwest Laboratory has studied the safety aspects of monitoring the preoperational status of safety systems in nuclear power plants. The goals of the study were to assess for the NRC the effectiveness of current monitoring systems and procedures, to develop near-term guidelines for reducing human errors associated with monitoring safety system status, and to recommend a regulatory position on this issue. A review of safety system status monitoring practices indicated that current systems and procedures do not adequately aid control room operators in monitoring safety system status. This is true even of some systems and procedures installed to meet existing regulatory guidelines (Regulatory Guide 1.47). In consequence, this report suggests acceptance criteria for meeting the functional requirements of an adequate system for monitoring safety system status. Also suggested are near-term guidelines that could reduce the likelihood of human errors in specific, high-priority status monitoring tasks. It is recommended that (1) Regulatory Guide 1.47 be revised to address these acceptance criteria, and (2) the revised Regulatory Guide 1.47 be applied to all plants, including those built since the issuance of the original Regulatory Guide.

  10. Safety evaluation report related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391): Supplement No. 19

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-11-01

    Supplement No. 19 to the Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by the Tennessee Valley Authority for license to operate Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391, located in Rhea County Tennessee, has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The purpose of this supplement is to update the Safety Evaluation with (1) additional information submitted by the applicant since Supplement No. 18 was issued, and (2) matters that the staff had under review when Supplement No. 18 was issued.

  11. Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391). Supplement No. 12

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tam, P.S.

    1993-10-01

    Supplement No. 12 to the Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by the Tennessee Valley Authority for license to operate Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391, located in Rhea County, Tennessee, has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The purpose of this supplement is to update the Safety Evaluation of (1) additional information submitted by the applicant since Supplement No. 11 was issued, and (2) matters that the staff had under review when Supplement No. 11 was issued.

  12. Summary and bibliography of safety-related events at boiling-water nuclear power plants as reported in 1980

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McCormack, K.E.; Gallaher, R.B.

    1982-03-01

    This document presents a bibliography that contains 100-word abstracts of event reports submitted to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerning operational events that occurred at boiling-water-reactor nuclear power plants in 1980. The 1547 abstracts included on microfiche in this bibliography describe incidents, failures, and design or construction deficiencies that were experienced at the facilities. These abstracts are arranged alphabetically by reactor name and then chronologically for each reactor. Full-size keyword and permuted-title indexes to facilitate location of individual abstracts are provided following the text. Tables that summarize the information contained in the bibliography are also provided. The information in the tables includes a listing of the equipment items involved in the reported events and the associated number of reports for each item. Similar information is given for the various kinds of instrumentation and systems, causes of failures, deficiencies noted, and the time of occurrence (i.e., during refueling, operation, testing, or construction).

  13. EA-0970: Environmental Safety and Health Analytical Laboratory Project No. 94-AA-01 Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EA evaluates the environmental impacts of the proposal to construct and operate an Environmental Safety and Health Analytical Laboratory and subsequent demolition of the existing Analytical...

  14. Delivering safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Baldwin, N.D.; Spooner, K.G.; Walkden, P.

    2007-07-01

    In the United Kingdom there have been significant recent changes to the management of civil nuclear liabilities. With the formation in April 2005 of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), ownership of the civil nuclear licensed sites in the UK, including the Magnox Reactor Stations, passed to this new organisation. The NDAs mission is to seek acceleration of the nuclear clean up programme and deliver increased value for money and, consequently, are driving their contractors to seek more innovative ways of performing work. British Nuclear Group manages the UK Magnox stations under contract to the NDA. This paper summarises the approach being taken within its Reactor Sites business to work with suppliers to enhance working arrangements at sites, improve the delivery of decommissioning programmes and deliver improvements in safety and environmental performance. The UK Magnox stations are 1. generation gas-graphite reactors, constructed in the 1950's and 1960's. Two stations are currently still operating, three are shut-down undergoing defueling and the other five are being decommissioned. Despite the distractions of industry restructuring, an uncompromising policy of demanding improved performance in conjunction with improved safety and environmental standards has been adopted. Over the past 5 years, this policy has resulted in step-changes in performance at Reactor Sites, with increased electrical output and accelerated defueling and decommissioning. The improvements in performance have been mirrored by improvements in safety (DACR of 0 at 5 sites); environmental standards (reductions in energy and water consumption, increased waste recycling) and the overall health of the workforce (20% reduction in sickness absence). These achievements have, in turn, been recognised by external bodies, resulting in several awards, including: the world's first ISRS and IERS level 10 awards (Sizewell, 2006), the NUMEX plant maintenance award (Bradwell, 2006), numerous Ro

  15. A probabilistic evaluation of the safety of Babcock and Wilcox nuclear reactor power plants with emphasis on historically observed operational events

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hsu, C.J.; Youngblood, R.W.; Fitzpatrick, R.G.; Amico, P.J.

    1989-03-01

    This report summarizes a study performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Engineering and System Technology (A/D for Systems), US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This study was requested by the NRC to assist their staff in assessing the risk significance of features of the Babcock and Wilcox (B and W) reactor plant design in the light of recent operational events. This study focuses on a critical review of submissions from the B and W Owners Group (BWOG) and as an independent assessment of the risk significance of ''Category C'' events at each operating B and W reactor. Category C events are those in which system conditions reach limits which require significant safety system and timely operator response to mitigate. A precursor study for each of the major B and W historical Category C events also was carried out. In addition, selected PRAs for B and W reactor plants and plants with other pressurized water reactor (PWR) designs were reviewed to appraise their handling of Category C events, thereby establishing a comparison between the risk profiles of B and W reactor plants and those of other PWR designs. The effectiveness of BWOG recommendations set forth in Appendix J of the BWOG SPIP (Safety and Performance Improvement Program) report (BAW-1919) also was evaluated. 49 refs., 21 figs., 52 tabs.

  16. Safety of nuclear power reactors in the former Eastern European Countries

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chakraborty, S.

    1995-10-01

    This article discusses the safety of nuclear power plants in the former Eastern European countries (including the former Soviet Union). The current international design, fabrication, construction, operation, safety, regulatory standards and practices, and ways to resolve plant problems are addressed in light of experience with the Western nuclear power development programs.

  17. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2002-05-20

    To establish facility safety requirements for the Department of Energy, including National Nuclear Security Administration. Cancels DOE O 420.1. Canceled by DOE O 420.1B.

  18. OSHA safety regulation calls for step-by-step approach

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bellomo, P.J. (Arthur D. Little Inc., Houston, TX (US))

    1992-06-01

    The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's long-awaited process safety management (PSM) regulation mandates the implementation of a PSM program at facilities handling highly hazardous materials, including oil refineries and petrochemical plants. This article presents a step-by-step PSM program compliance strategy, delineated and explored through practical examples.

  19. Safety Improvements, Project Progress at Hanford Site's Plutonium...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Safety Improvements, Project Progress at Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant Safety Improvements, Project Progress at Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant May 16, 2016 - ...

  20. Enterprise Assessments Review of Explosives Safety Program Implementat...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Explosives Safety Program Implementation at the Pantex Plant - November 2015 Enterprise Assessments Review of Explosives Safety Program Implementation at the Pantex Plant - ...

  1. Proceedings of the international meeting on thermal nuclear reactor safety. Vol. 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1983-02-01

    Separate abstracts are included for each of the papers presented concerning current issues in nuclear power plant safety; national programs in nuclear power plant safety; radiological source terms; probabilistic risk assessment methods and techniques; non LOCA and small-break-LOCA transients; safety goals; pressurized thermal shocks; applications of reliability and risk methods to probabilistic risk assessment; human factors and man-machine interface; and data bases and special applications.

  2. Definition and means of maintaining the emergency notification and evacuation system portion of the Plutonium Finishing Plant safety envelope

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    White, W.F.

    1997-04-21

    The Emergency Evacuation and Notification System provides information to the PFP Building Emergency Director to assist in determining appropriate emergency response, notifies personnel of the required response, and assists in their response. The report identifies the equipment in the Safety Envelope (SE) for this System and the Administrative, Maintenance, and Surveillance Procedures used to maintain the SE Equipment.

  3. Tiger Team assessment of the Pinellas Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-05-01

    This Document contains findings identified during the Tiger Team Compliance Assessment of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Pinellas Plant, Pinellas County, Florida. The assessment wa directed by the Department's Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES H) from January 15 to February 2, 1990. The Pinellas Tiger Team Compliance Assessment is comprehensive in scope. It covers the Environment Safety and Health, and Management areas and determines the plant's compliance with applicable Federal (including DOE), State, and local regulations and requirements.

  4. safety | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    safety New Pantex Plant sensors provide ample warning to protect NNSA operations from lightning NNSA is charged with making sure the nation's nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, and effective. That mission includes protecting the Nuclear Security Enterprise from forces of nature. One natural threat, lightning, can damage electronics and even degrade concrete buildings and... NNSA Achieves Major Milestone in BUILDER Implementation WASHINGTON, D.C. - The Department of Energy's National Nuclear

  5. Fast reactor safety program. Progress report, January-March 1980

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-05-01

    The goal of the DOE LMFBR Safety Program is to provide a technology base fully responsive to safety considerations in the design, evaluation, licensing, and economic optimization of LMFBRs for electrical power generation. A strategy is presented that divides safety technology development into seven program elements, which have been used as the basis for the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) for the Program. These elements include four lines of assurance (LOAs) involving core-related safety considerations, an element supporting non-core-related plant safety considerations, a safety R and D integration element, and an element for the development of test facilities and equipment to be used in Program experiments: LOA-1 (prevent accidents); LOA-2 (limit core damage); LOA-3 (maintain containment integrity); LOA-4 (attenuate radiological consequences); plant considerations; R and D integration; and facility development.

  6. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1996-10-24

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  7. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-11-16

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  8. Reactor safety assessment system

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sebo, D.E.; Bray, M.A.; King, M.A.

    1987-01-01

    The Reactor Safety Assessment System (RSAS) is an expert system under development for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). RSA is designed for use at the USNRC Operations Center in the event of a serious incident at a licensed nuclear power plant. RSAS is a situation assessment expert system which uses plant parametric data to generate conclusions for use by the NRC Reactor Safety Team. RSAS uses multiple rule bases and plant specific setpoint files to be applicable to all licensed nuclear power plants in the United States. RSAS currently covers several generic reactor categories and multiple plants within each category.

  9. Summary of the contractor information exchange meeting for improving the safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, February 19, 1997

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-04-01

    This report summarizes a meeting held on February 19, 1997, in Washington, D.C. The meeting was held primarily to exchange information among the contractors involved in the U.S. Department of Energy`s efforts to improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power plants. Previous meetings have been held on December 5-6, 1995, and May 22, 1996. The meetings are sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and coordinated by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The U.S. Department of Energy works with countries to increase the level of safety at 63 Soviet-designed nuclear reactors operating in Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The work is implemented largely by commercial companies and individuals who provide technologies and services to the countries with Soviet-designed nuclear power plants. Attending the meeting were 71 representatives of commercial contractors, the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of State, national laboratories, and other federal agencies. The presentations and discussions that occurred during the exchange are summarized in this report. While this report captures the general presentation and discussion points covered at the meeting, it is not a verbatim, inclusive record. To make the report useful, information presented at the meeting has been expanded to clarify issues, respond to attendees` requests, or place discussion points in a broader programmatic context. Appendixes A through F contain the meeting agenda, list of attendees, copies of presentation visuals and handouts, the Strategy Document discussed at the meeting, and a summary of attendees` post-meeting evaluation comments. As with past information exchanges, the participants found this meeting valuable and useful. In response to the participant`s requests, a fourth information exchange will be held later in 1997.

  10. Construction Safety Advisory Committee - Membership Roster |...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Committee - Membership Roster Construction Safety Advisory Committee - Membership Roster ... job duties include program management or operational direction of construction safety. ...

  11. Radiation Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safety Home MSDS Search MSDS Help Safety Training and Tests Contact Links LSU Campus Safety Glossary Radiation Safety Manual Radiation Safety Test NOTE: All Training and Testing Material is for LSU CAMD Users ONLY! **Please allow two weeks for your badge to be processed.** Regulations and Hierarchy The CAMD Safety Officer reports to two separate individuals regarding safety. These are the Radiation Safety Officer for the University, and the Campus Safety Officer in all other matters. Thus safety

  12. Environmental, safety, and health engineering

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Woodside, G.; Kocurek, D.

    1997-12-31

    A complete guide to environmental, safety, and health engineering, including an overview of EPA and OSHA regulations; principles of environmental engineering, including pollution prevention, waste and wastewater treatment and disposal, environmental statistics, air emissions and abatement engineering, and hazardous waste storage and containment; principles of safety engineering, including safety management, equipment safety, fire and life safety, process and system safety, confined space safety, and construction safety; and principles of industrial hygiene/occupational health engineering including chemical hazard assessment, personal protective equipment, industrial ventilation, ionizing and nonionizing radiation, noise, and ergonomics.

  13. Tiger team assessment of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    none,

    1990-02-01

    This document contains findings identified during the Tiger Team Compliance Assessment of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The Y-12 Plant Tiger Team Compliance Assessment is comprehensive in scope. It covers the Environmental, Safety, and Health (including Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance), and Management areas and determines the plant's compliance with applicable federal (including DOE), state, and local regulations and requirements. 4 figs., 12 tabs.

  14. Hoffman Joins Safety Management Elite

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Hoffman Joins Safety Management Elite CARLSBAD, N.M., June 21, 2001 - Paul Hoffman of Westinghouse TRU Solutions LLC (WTS) has joined the ranks of the safety management elite in the United States by earning his Certificate in Safety Management. WTS is the management and operating contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The Certificate in Safety Management is awarded by the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) to recognize completion of

  15. Industrial Safety | The Ames Laboratory

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safety General Safety includes traditional safety disciplines such as machine guarding, personal protective equipment (PPE), electrical safety, accident prevention and investigation, building design and code review, fire safety, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulatory compliance. Safety's role is to protect the health and well-being of employees, visitors, and the public from hazards present at or created in the workplace. These factors may be present as a result of

  16. Thermal reactor safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-06-01

    Information is presented concerning new trends in licensing; seismic considerations and system structural behavior; TMI-2 risk assessment and thermal hydraulics; statistical assessment of potential accidents and verification of computational methods; issues with respect to improved safety; human factors in nuclear power plant operation; diagnostics and activities in support of recovery; LOCA transient analysis; unresolved safety issues and other safety considerations; and fission product transport.

  17. WIPP Documents - Nuclear Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Nuclear Safety DOE/WIPP-07-3372, Revision 5b, WIPP Documented Safety Analysis Approved April 2016 The Documented Safety Analysis addresses all hazards (both radiological and nonradiological) and the controls necessary to provide adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. The WIPP DSA demonstrates the extent to which the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant can be operated safely with respect to workers, the public, and the environment. DOE/WIPP-07-3373, Revision 5b, WIPP Technical

  18. Multimegawatt Space Reactor Safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stanley, M.L. )

    1989-01-01

    The Multimegawatt (MMW) Space Reactor Project supports the Strategic Defense Initiative Office requirement to provide reliable, safe, cost-effective, electrical power in the MMW range. Specifically, power may be used for neutral particle beams, free electron lasers, electromagnetic launchers, and orbital transfer vehicles. This power plant technology may also apply to the electrical power required for other uses such as deep-space probes and planetary exploration. The Multimegawatt Space Reactor Project, the Thermionic Fuel Element Verification Program, and Centaurus Program all support the Multimegawatt Space Nuclear Power Program and form an important part of the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) space and defense power systems activities. A major objective of the MMW project is the development of a reference flight system design that provides the desired levels of public safety, health protection, and special nuclear material (SNM) protection when used during its designated missions. The safety requirements for the MMW project are a hierarchy of requirements that consist of safety requirements/regulations, a safety policy, general safety criteria, safety technical specifications, safety design specifications, and the system design. This paper describes the strategy and philosophy behind the development of the safety requirements imposed upon the MMW concept developers. The safety organization, safety policy, generic safety issues, general safety criteria, and the safety technical specifications are discussed.

  19. Job Safety

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Job Safety and Health It's the law EMPLOYEES: Must have access to: DOE safety and health publications; The worker safety and health program for their location; This ...

  20. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Plans and Reports WIPP Recovery Plan The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Recovery Plan outlines the necessary steps to resume limited waste disposal operations in the first quarter of calendar year 2016. WIPP operations were suspended following an underground truck fire and a radiological release in February 2014. The recovery plan was issued on Sept. 30, 2014. Key elements of the recovery plan include strengthening safety programs, regulatory compliance, decontamination of the underground,

  1. The Advanced BWR Nuclear Plant: Safe, economic nuclear energy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Redding, J.R.

    1994-12-31

    The safety and economics of Advanced BWR Nuclear Power Plants are outlined. The topics discussed include: ABWR Programs: status in US and Japan; ABWR competitiveness: safety and economics; SBWR status; combining ABWR and SBWR: the passive ABWR; and Korean/GE partnership.

  2. Results of an Analysis of Field Studies of the Intrinsic Dynamic Characteristics Important for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kaznovsky, A. P. Kasiyanov, K. G.; Ryasnyj, S. I.

    2015-01-15

    A classification of the equipment important for the safety of nuclear power plants is proposed in terms of its dynamic behavior under seismic loading. An extended bank of data from dynamic tests over the entire range of thermal and mechanical equipment in generating units with VVER-1000 and RBMK-1000 reactors is analyzed. Results are presented from a study of the statistical behavior of the distribution of vibrational frequencies and damping decrements with the “small perturbation” factor that affects the measured damping decrements taken into account. A need to adjust the regulatory specifications for choosing the values of the damping decrements with specified inertial loads on equipment owing to seismic effects during design calculations is identified. Minimum values of the decrements are determined and proposed for all types of equipment as functions of the directions and natural vibration frequencies of the dynamic interactions to be adopted as conservative standard values in the absence of actual experimental data in the course of design studies of seismic resistance.

  3. Managing a Process Safety Management inspection

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mulvey, N.P. [AcuTech Consulting, Inc., Princeton, NJ (United States)

    1995-12-31

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations (29 CFR {section} 1910.119) have been in effect for almost three years. State level risk management programs, in New Jersey, California, and Delaware have been in effect for over six years. More recently, Nevada and Louisiana have enacted process safety management programs. These regulations have had a significant impact on all phases of plant operations, including preliminary design, construction, startup, and operations. Through proper planning and the commitment of resources, many facilities are beginning to realize the benefits of well developed PSM programs. This paper will discuss in greater detail some of these benefits, and in particular, the subject of governmental inspections of facilities for process safety management programs.

  4. TWRS safety program plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Calderon, L.M., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-08-01

    Management of Nuclear Safety, Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene, and Fire Protection programs, functions, and field support resources for Tank Waste Remediation Systems (TWRS) has, until recently, been centralized in TWRS Safety, under the Emergency, Safety, and Quality organization. Industrial hygiene technician services were also provided to support operational needs related to safety basis compliance. Due to WHC decentralization of safety and reengineering efforts in West Tank Farms, staffing and safety responsibilities have been transferred to the facilities. Under the new structure, safety personnel for TWRS are assigned directly to East Tank Farms, West Tank Farms, and a core Safety Group in TWRS Engineering. The Characterization Project Operations (CPO) safety organization will remain in tact as it currently exists. Personnel assigned to East Tank Farms, West Tank Farms, and CPO will perform facility-specific or project-specific duties and provide field implementation of programs. Those assigned to the core group will focus on activities having a TWRS-wide or programmatic focus. Hanford-wide activities will be the responsibility of the Safety Center of Expertise. In order to ensure an effective and consistent safety program for TWRS under the new organization program functions, goals, organizational structure, roles, responsibilities, and path forward must be clearly established. The purpose of the TWRS Safety Program Plan is to define the overall safety program, responsibilities, relationships, and communication linkages for safety personnel under the new structure. In addition, issues associated with reorganization transition are addressed, including training, project ownership, records management, and dissemination of equipment. For the purpose of this document ``TWRS Safety`` refers to all safety professionals and technicians (Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene, Fire Protection, and Nuclear Safety) within the TWRS organization, regardless of their

  5. Centrifuge enrichment plants. (Latest citations from the NTIS bibliographic database). Published Search

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-03-01

    The bibliography contains citations concerning the design, control, monitoring, and safety of centrifuge enrichment plants. Power supplies, enrichment plant safeguards, facility design, cascade heater test loops to monitor the enrichment process, inspection strategies, and the socioeconomic effects of centrifuge enrichment plants are examined. Radioactive waste disposal problems are considered. (Contains a minimum of 172 citations and includes a subject term index and title list.)

  6. Centrifuge enrichment plants. (Latest citations from the NTIS bibliographic database). Published Search

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1993-09-01

    The bibliography contains citations concerning the design, control, monitoring, and safety of centrifuge enrichment plants. Power supplies, enrichment plant safeguards, facility design, cascade heater test loops to monitor the enrichment process, inspection strategies, and the socioeconomic effects of centrifuge enrichment plants are examined. Radioactive waste disposal problems are considered. (Contains a minimum of 171 citations and includes a subject term index and title list.)

  7. Fast reactor safety: proceedings of the international topical meeting. Volume 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1985-07-01

    The emphasis of this meeting was on the safety-related aspects of fast reactor design, analysis, licensing, construction, and operation. Relative to past meetings, there was less emphasis on the scientific and technological basis for accident assessment. Because of its broad scope, the meeting attracted 217 attendees from a wide cross section of the design, safety analysis, and safety technology communities. Eight countries and two international organizations were represented. A total of 126 papers were presented, with contributions from the United States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. Sessions covered in Volume 1 include: impact of safety and licensing considerations on fast reactor design; safety aspects of innovative designs; intra-subassembly behavior; operational safety; design accommodation of seismic and other external events; natural circulation; safety design concepts; safety implications derived from operational plant data; decay heat removal; and assessment of HCDA consequences.

  8. Independent Oversight Follow-up Assessment of Safety Culture...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Assessment of Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant - June 2014 Independent Oversight Follow-up Assessment of Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and...

  9. Enterprise Assessments Follow-up Assessment of Safety Culture...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Assessment of Safety Culture at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant - June 2015 Enterprise Assessments Follow-up Assessment of Safety Culture at the Hanford...

  10. Independent Oversight Follow-up Assessment of Safety Culture...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Independent Oversight Follow-up Assessment of Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and ... Assessment of Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Table ...

  11. Transportation Safety Excellence in Operations Through Improved Transportation Safety Document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; MAL

    2007-05-01

    A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC. This accomplishment supported excellence in operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport costs; and making facility operations more efficient. The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers. Previously, the TSD did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums. Previous practice was to package the waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations. This practice allowed operations to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations friendly. An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were used effectively to directly support excellence in operations. Several factors contributed to the success of MFCs effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities. 1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to better integrate nuclear safety

  12. Management of National Nuclear Power Programs for assured safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Connolly, T.J.

    1985-01-01

    Topics discussed in this report include: nuclear utility organization; before the Florida Public Service Commission in re: St. Lucie Unit No. 2 cost recovery; nuclear reliability improvement and safety operations; nuclear utility management; training of nuclear facility personnel; US experience in key areas of nuclear safety; the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission - function and process; regulatory considerations of the risk of nuclear power plants; overview of the processes of reliability and risk management; management significance of risk analysis; international and domestic institutional issues for peaceful nuclear uses; the role of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO); and nuclear safety activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

  13. Health & Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Health & Safety Health & Safety1354608000000Health & SafetySome of these resources are LANL-only and will require Remote Access.NoQuestions? 667-5809library@lanl.gov Health &...

  14. Safety, Security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safety, Security Safety, Security The Lab's mission is to develop and apply science and technology to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; reduce global threats; and solve other emerging national security and energy challenges. Contact Operator Los Alamos National Laboratory (505) 667-5061 We do not compromise safety for personal, programmatic, or operational reasons. Safety: we integrate safety, security, and environmental concerns into every step of our

  15. CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS AND THE SAFETY BASIS AT PFP

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kessler, S

    2009-04-21

    With the implementation of DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, and DOE-STD-3007-2007, 'Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities', a new requirement was imposed that all criticality safety controls be evaluated for inclusion in the facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and that the evaluation process be documented in the site Criticality Safety Program Description Document (CSPDD). At the Hanford site in Washington State the CSPDD, HNF-31695, 'General Description of the FH Criticality Safety Program', requires each facility develop a linking document called a Criticality Control Review (CCR) to document performance of these evaluations. Chapter 5, Appendix 5B of HNF-7098, Criticality Safety Program, provided an example of a format for a CCR that could be used in lieu of each facility developing its own CCR. Since the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is presently undergoing Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D), new procedures are being developed for cleanout of equipment and systems that have not been operated in years. Existing Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) are revised, or new ones written, to develop the controls required to support D&D activities. Other Hanford facilities, including PFP, had difficulty using the basic CCR out of HNF-7098 when first implemented. Interpretation of the new guidelines indicated that many of the controls needed to be elevated to TSR level controls. Criterion 2 of the standard, requiring that the consequence of a criticality be examined for establishing the classification of a control, was not addressed. Upon in-depth review by PFP Criticality Safety staff, it was not clear that the programmatic interpretation of criterion 8C could be applied at PFP. Therefore, the PFP Criticality Safety staff decided to write their own CCR. The PFP CCR provides additional guidance for the evaluation team to use by clarifying the evaluation criteria in DOE-STD-3007-2007. In

  16. PRELIMINARY ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT ON THE INTEGRATION OF A PROCESS UTILIZING LOW-ENERGY SOLVENTS FOR CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE ENABLED BY A COMBINATION OF ENZYMES AND VACUUM REGENERATION WITH A SUBCRITICAL PC POWER PLANT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fitzgerald, David; Vidal, Rafael; Russell, Tania; Babcock, Doosan; Freeman, Charles; Bearden, Mark; Whyatt, Greg; Liu, Kun; Frimpong, Reynolds; Lu, Kunlei; Salmon, Sonja; House, Alan; Yarborough, Erin

    2014-12-31

    The results of the preliminary environmental, health and safety (EH&S) risk assessment for an enzyme-activated potassium carbonate (K2CO3) solution post-combustion CO2 capture (PCC) plant, integrated with a subcritical pulverized coal (PC) power plant, are presented. The expected emissions during normal steady-state operation have been estimated utilizing models of the PCC plant developed in AspenTech’s AspenPlus® software, bench scale test results from the University of Kentucky, and industrial experience of emission results from a slipstream PCC plant utilizing amine based solvents. A review of all potential emission species and their sources was undertaken that identified two credible emission sources, the absorber off-gas that is vented to atmosphere via a stack and the waste removed from the PCC plant in the centrifuge used to reclaim enzyme and solvent. The conditions and compositions of the emissions were calculated and the potential EH&S effects were considered as well as legislative compliance requirements. Potential mitigation methods for emissions during normal operation have been proposed and solutions to mitigate uncontrolled releases of species have been considered. The potential emissions were found to pose no significant EH&S concerns and were compliant with the Federal legislation reviewed. The limitations in predicting full scale plant performance from bench scale tests have been noted and further work on a larger scale test unit is recommended to reduce the level of uncertainty.

  17. WIPP Receives Top Mine Safety Award

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Top Mine Safety Award CARLSBAD, N.M., September 18, 2013 - The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) received top safety honors from the New Mexico...

  18. Owners of nuclear power plants: Percentage ownership of commercial nuclear power plants by utility companies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wood, R.S.

    1987-08-01

    The following list indicates percentage ownership of commercial nuclear power plants by utility companies as of June 1, 1987. The list includes all plants licensed to operate, under construction, docked for NRC safety and environmental reviews, or under NRC antitrust review. It does not include those plants announced but not yet under review or those plants formally canceled. In many cases, ownership may be in the process of changing as a result of altered financial conditions, changed power needs, and other reasons. However, this list reflects only those ownership percentages of which the NRC has been formally notified. Part I lists plants alphabetically with their associated applicants/licensees and percentage ownership. Part II lists applicants/licensees alphabetically with their associated plants and percentage ownership. Part I also indicates which plants have received operating licenses (OL's). Footnotes for both parts appear at the end of this document.

  19. Pantex Plant | National Nuclear Security Administration | (NNSA)

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Pantex Plant The Pantex Plant, near Amarillo, Texas, is charged with maintaining the safety, security and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. It is managed and operated by Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC for the NNSA Production Office. Work performed at Pantex includes support of the nuclear weapons life extension programs; nuclear weapons dismantlement; the development, testing and fabrication of high explosive components; and interim storage and surveillance of

  20. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-11-20

    The objective of this Order is to establish facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. The Order has Change 1 dated 11-16-95, Change 2 dated 10-24-96, and the latest Change 3 dated 11-22-00 incorporated. The latest change satisfies a commitment made to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in response to DNFSB recommendation 97-2, Criticality Safety.

  1. TWRS safety management plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Popielarczyk, R.S., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-08-01

    The Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Safety Management Program Plan for development, implementation and maintenance of the tank farm authorization basis is described. The plan includes activities and procedures for: (a) Updating the current Interim Safety Basis, (b) Development,implementation and maintenance of a Basis for Interim Operations, (c) Development, implementation and maintenance of the Final Safety Analyses Report, (d) Development and implementation of a TWRS information Management System for monitoring the authorization basis.

  2. Centrifuge enrichment plants. January 1970-October 1988 (Citations from the NTIS data base). Report for January 1970-October 1988

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1988-11-01

    This bibliography contains citations concerning the design, control, monitoring, and safety of centrifuge enrichment plants. Power supplies, enrichment plant safeguards, facility design, cascade heater test loops to monitor the enrichment process, inspection strategies, and the socio-economic effects of centrifuge enrichment plants are examined. Radioactive waste disposal problems are briefly considered. (Contains 151 citations fully indexed and including a title list.)

  3. Pinellas Plant annual site environmental report for calendar year 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-05-01

    Lockheed Martin Specialty Components, Inc., and the US Department of Energy are committed to successfully administering a high-quality Environmental, Safety and Health Program at the Pinellas Plant in Pinellas County, Florida. Part of this commitment includes accurately documenting and communicating to the Pinellas Plant stakeholders the results of the Pinellas Plant`s environmental compliance and monitoring activities. The Annual Site Environmental Report presents a comprehensive summary of the results of the Environmental Monitoring, Waste Management, and Environmental Restoration Programs at the Pinellas Plant for 1995. This report also includes the plant`s performance in the areas of compliance with applicable regulatory requirements and standards and identifies major Environmental, Safety and Health Program initiatives and accomplishments for 1995. As a result of the end of the Department of Energy`s Defense Programs mission (weapons production) on September 30, 1994, considerable changes at the Pinellas Plant are occurring. The Department of Energy`s Environmental Management is now the landlord of the Pinellas Plant to facilitate the plant`s new mission of transition to alternate use in support of economic development and safe shutdown. The Department of Energy sold the Pinellas Plant to the Pinellas County Industry Council in March 1995, and it is leasing back a portion of the plant through September 1997, to complete the safe shutdown and transition activities.

  4. Enterprise Assessments Review of Explosives Safety Program Implementation

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    at the Pantex Plant - November 2015 | Department of Energy Explosives Safety Program Implementation at the Pantex Plant - November 2015 Enterprise Assessments Review of Explosives Safety Program Implementation at the Pantex Plant - November 2015 November 2015 Review of the Explosives Safety Program Implementation at the Pantex Plant The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA), Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments, conducted an independent review

  5. Electric power monthly, September 1990. [Glossary included

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-12-17

    The purpose of this report is to provide energy decision makers with accurate and timely information that may be used in forming various perspectives on electric issues. The power plants considered include coal, petroleum, natural gas, hydroelectric, and nuclear power plants. Data are presented for power generation, fuel consumption, fuel receipts and cost, sales of electricity, and unusual occurrences at power plants. Data are compared at the national, Census division, and state levels. 4 figs., 52 tabs. (CK)

  6. Pump apparatus including deconsolidator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Sonwane, Chandrashekhar; Saunders, Timothy; Fitzsimmons, Mark Andrew

    2014-10-07

    A pump apparatus includes a particulate pump that defines a passage that extends from an inlet to an outlet. A duct is in flow communication with the outlet. The duct includes a deconsolidator configured to fragment particle agglomerates received from the passage.

  7. WIPP Receives Top Safety Award

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    WIPP Receives Top Safety Award CARLSBAD, N.M., November 10, 2011 - The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) received top accolades from New...

  8. Nuclear Safety Policy, Guidance & Reports

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Nuclear Safety establishes and maintains nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidance including policy and requirements relating to hazard and accident analysis, facility design and operation, and Quality Assurance.

  9. Safety Analysis: Evaluation of Accident Risks in the Transporation of Hazardous Materials by Truck and Rail at the Savannah River Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blanchard, A.

    1999-04-15

    This report presents an analysis of the consequences and risks of accidents resulting from hazardous material transportation at the Savannah River Plant.

  10. Optical modulator including grapene

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Liu, Ming; Yin, Xiaobo; Zhang, Xiang

    2016-06-07

    The present invention provides for a one or more layer graphene optical modulator. In a first exemplary embodiment the optical modulator includes an optical waveguide, a nanoscale oxide spacer adjacent to a working region of the waveguide, and a monolayer graphene sheet adjacent to the spacer. In a second exemplary embodiment, the optical modulator includes at least one pair of active media, where the pair includes an oxide spacer, a first monolayer graphene sheet adjacent to a first side of the spacer, and a second monolayer graphene sheet adjacent to a second side of the spacer, and at least one optical waveguide adjacent to the pair.

  11. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. This Page Change is limited in scope to changes necessary to invoke DOE-STD-1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Document, and revised DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis as required methods. DOE O 420.1C Chg 1, dated 2-27-15, supersedes DOE O 420.1C.

  12. Integrated Safety Management Policy

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-04-25

    The policy establishes DOE's expectation for safety, including integrated safety management that will enable the Department’s mission goals to be accomplished efficiently while ensuring safe operations at all departmental facilities and activities. Supersedes DOE P 450.4, DOE P 411.1, DOE P 441.1, DOE P 450.2A, and DOE P 450.7

  13. Fire Safety Committee

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The purpose of the Department of Energy /National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE) Fire Safety Committee is to provide a forum to facilitate the interaction between the DOE, its program offices and contractor personnel with common interests regarding the identification and resolution of fire safety-related issues including the development of appropriate fire protection Orders, Guides, and Technical Standards.

  14. Independent Oversight Assessment, Pantex Plant - November 2012...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Assessment, Pantex Plant - November 2012 November 2012 Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Pantex Plant This report provides the results of an independent assessment of...

  15. Independent Oversight Inspection, Pantex Plant, Summary Report...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Plant, Summary Report - November 2002 Independent Oversight Inspection, Pantex Plant, Summary Report - November 2002 November 2002 Inspection of Environment, Safety, and Health and ...

  16. Biological Safety

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    The DOE's Biological Safety Program provides a forum for the exchange of best practices, lessons learned, and guidance in the area of biological safety. This content is supported by the Biosurety Executive Team. The Biosurety Executive Team is a DOE-chartered group. The DOE Office of Worker Safety and Health Policy provides administrative support for this group. The group identifies biological safety-related issues of concern to the DOE and pursues solutions to issues identified.

  17. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22

    The order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and the System Engineer Program.Chg 1 incorporates the use of DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, mandatory for Hazard Category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities. Cancels DOE O 420.1A.

  18. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1B, DOE G 420.1-2 and DOE G 420.1-3.

  19. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-10-13

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. Cancels DOE 5480.7A, DOE 5480.24, DOE 5480.28 and Division 13 of DOE 6430.1A. Canceled by DOE O 420.1A.

  20. Packaging and Transportation Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-05-14

    The order establishes safety requirements for the proper packaging and transportation of DOE, including NNSA, offsite shipments and onsite transfers of radioactive and other hazardous materials and for modal transportation. Supersedes DOE O 460.1B.

  1. An Overview of the Safety Case for Small Modular Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ingersoll, Daniel T

    2011-01-01

    Several small modular reactor (SMR) designs emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to lessons learned from the many technical and operational challenges of the large Generation II light-water reactors. After the accident at the Three Mile Island plant in 1979, an ensuing reactor redesign effort spawned the term inherently safe designs, which later evolved into passively safe terminology. Several new designs were engineered to be deliberately small in order to fully exploit the benefits of passive safety. Today, new SMR designs are emerging with a similar philosophy of offering highly robust and resilient designs with increased safety margins. Additionally, because these contemporary designs are being developed subsequent to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, they incorporate a number of intrinsic design features to further strengthen their safety and security. Several SMR designs are being developed in the United States spanning the full spectrum of reactor technologies, including water-, gas-, and liquid-metal-cooled ones. Despite a number of design differences, most of these designs share a common set of design principles to enhance plant safety and robustness, such as eliminating plant design vulnerabilities where possible, reducing accident probabilities, and mitigating accident consequences. An important consequence of the added resilience provided by these design approaches is that the individual reactor units and the entire plant should be able to survive a broader range of extreme conditions. This will enable them to not only ensure the safety of the general public but also help protect the investment of the owner and continued availability of the power-generating asset. Examples of typical SMR design features and their implications for improved plant safety are given for specific SMR designs being developed in the United States.

  2. Fossil plant self assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bozgo, R.H.; Maguire, B.A.

    1996-07-01

    The increasingly competitive environment of the electric utility business is focusing utilities attention on reducing the cost of electricity generation. By using benchmark indicators, gains are being sought in plant material condition with corresponding improvements in operating efficiency and capacity factor as well as reductions in Operating and Maintenance (O&M) costs. In designing a process for improvement, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Edison) plant managers were asked to review and approve objectives and criteria for Fossil Plant Operations. The program methods included optimizing work processes (including material condition, maintenance programs, work control systems, and personnel performance); team building techniques to foster personnel buy-in of the process; and long term cultural change to insure an ongoing continuous improvement process with measurable results. The program begins with a self assessment of each plant based upon the approved Objectives and Criteria. The Criteria and Review Approaches (CRAs) are established by senior management and the review team. The criteria cover Management, Operations, Maintenance, and Support Functions including Technical Support, Training and Qualification, Environmental Compliance, Chemistry, and Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The Assessment is followed by a review of corrective action plans and an interim corrective action review. Annual Assessments are planned to ensure continuous improvement. Emphasis is placed on progress made in maintenance at the fossil stations.

  3. Recommended practice for fire protection for electric generating plants and high voltage direct current converter stations. 2005 ed.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2005-07-01

    The standard outlines fire safety recommendations for gas, oil, coal, and alternative fuel electric generating plants including high voltage direct current converter stations and combustion turbine units greater than 7500 hp used for electric generation. Provisions apply to both new and existing plants. The document provides fire prevention and fire protection recommendations for the: safety of construction and operating personnel; physical integrity of plant components; and continuity of plant operations. The 2005 edition includes revisions and new art that clarify existing provisions. 5 annexes.

  4. Radioisotope thermoelectric generator reliability and safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Campbell, R.; Klein, J.

    1989-01-01

    There are numerous occasions when a planetary mission requires energy in remote areas of the solar system. Anytime power is required much beyond Mars or the Asteroid Belts, solar power is not an option. The radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) was developed for such a mission requirement. It is a relatively small and lightweight power source that can produce power under adverse conditions. Just this type of source has become the backbone of the power system for far outer plant exploration. Voyagers I and II are utilizing RTGs, which will soon power the Galileo spacecraft to Jupiter and the Ulysses spacecraft to study the solar poles. The paper discusses RTG operation including thermoelectric design, converter design, general-purpose heat source; RTG reliability including design, testing, experience, and launch approval; and RTG safety issues and methods of ensuring safety.

  5. Five-megawatt geothermal-power pilot-plant project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-08-29

    This is a report on the Raft River Geothermal-Power Pilot-Plant Project (Geothermal Plant), located near Malta, Idaho; the review took place between July 20 and July 27, 1979. The Geothermal Plant is part of the Department of Energy's (DOE) overall effort to help commercialize the operation of electric power plants using geothermal energy sources. Numerous reasons were found to commend management for its achievements on the project. Some of these are highlighted, including: (a) a well-qualified and professional management team; (b) effective cost control, performance, and project scheduling; and (c) an effective and efficient quality-assurance program. Problem areas delineated, along with recommendations for solution, include: (1) project planning; (2) facility design; (3) facility construction costs; (4) geothermal resource; (5) drilling program; (6) two facility construction safety hazards; and (7) health and safety program. Appendices include comments from the Assistant Secretary for Resource Applications, the Controller, and the Acting Deputy Director, Procurement and Contracts Management.

  6. Safety Issues

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Site Safety Orientation April, 2015 Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Climate Research Facility/ North Slope of Alaska/Adjacent Arctic Ocean (ACRF/NSA/AAO) Site Safety Orientation Purpose This document provides an overview and summary of safety issues and safe work practices associated with operations at the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Climate Research Facility/North Slope of Alaska/Adjacent Arctic Ocean (ACRF/NSA/AAO) Sites. It is intended for site visitors as well as routine site

  7. Fermilab | Traffic Safety at Fermilab |

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Included progressive discipline for parking and moving violations as described in FESHM 10160. Set up an online training course titled Traffic Safety Awareness, which is required ...

  8. Explosives Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-06-27

    The Standard provides the basic technical requirements for an explosives safety program necessary for operations involving explosives, explosives assemblies, pyrotechnics and propellants, and assemblies containing these materials.

  9. Safety Engineer

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A successful candidate in this position will ensure DOE Federal personnel and contractors develop effective safety programs and continuously evaluates those activities to ensure compliance with DOE...

  10. Explosives Safety

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    ... Schnetzer, Kimball O. Merewether, and Roy E. Jorgenson; May 1993 (current version 06 August 2002) Life Safety Code: NFPA 101, National Fire Protection Association (current version) ...

  11. Microsoft PowerPoint - Fire Safety workshop NQA-1 CGD 4 29 15...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    v Nuclear and Facility Safety Programs Workshop Fire Safety Track May 5th, 2015 Overview ... of Replacement Items in Nuclear Power Plants" * EPRI 1016157, "Information for ...

  12. Preliminary design of the Carrisa Plains solar central receiver power plant. Volume III, Book 3. Appendices. Part 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lee, S. K.

    1983-12-31

    The auxiliary heat transport systems of the Carrisa Plains Solar Power Plant (CPSPP) comprise facilities which are used to support plant operation and provide plant safety and maintenance. The facilities are the sodium purification system, argon cover gas system, sodium receiving and filling system, sodium-water reaction product receiving system, and safety and maintenance equipment. The functions of the facilities of the auxiliary system are described. Design requirements are established based on plant operating parameters. Descriptions are given on the system which will be adequate to perform the function and satisfy the requirements. Valve and equipment lists are included in the appendix.

  13. Centrifuge enrichment plants. (Latest citations from the NTIS data base). Published Search

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-09-01

    The bibliography contains citations concerning the design, control, monitoring, and safety of centrifuge enrichment plants. Power supplies, enrichment plant safeguards, facility design, cascade heater test loops to monitor the enrichment process, inspection strategies, and the socioeconomic effects of centrifuge enrichment plants are examined. Radioactive waste disposal problems are briefly considered. (Contains a minimum of 169 citations and includes a subject term index and title list.)

  14. Introduction to Safety Culture Advice

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safety Culture Advice Thursday, June 7, 2012 As expressed in past advice, and in draft advice being proposed today, the safe and effective treatment of Hanford's tank waste through vitrification, is a priority for the Hanford Advisory Board. The cornerstone of vitrification is the Waste Treatment Plant. We all want the WTP to work safely and effectively. The Tank Waste Committee and the Health Safety and Environmental Protection Committee are bringing this advice forward today in response to

  15. Brain surgery breathes new life into aging plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Makansi, J.

    2006-04-15

    Unlike managing the human aging process, extending the life of a power plant often includes brain surgery, modernizing its control and automation system. Lately, such retrofits range from wholesale replacing of existing controls to the addition of specific control elements that help optimize performance. Pending revisions to safety codes and cybersecurity issues also need to be considered. 4 figs.

  16. Transportation Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safety - Sandia Energy Energy Search Icon Sandia Home Locations Contact Us Employee Locator Energy & Climate Secure & Sustainable Energy Future Stationary Power Energy Conversion Efficiency Solar Energy Wind Energy Water Power Supercritical CO2 Geothermal Natural Gas Safety, Security & Resilience of the Energy Infrastructure Energy Storage Nuclear Power & Engineering Grid Modernization Battery Testing Nuclear Energy Defense Waste Management Programs Advanced Nuclear Energy

  17. Independent Oversight Inspection, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Summary Report- August 2002

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Inspection of Environment, Safety, and Health and Emergency Management at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

  18. State-of-the-Art of Non-Destructive Testing Methods and Technologies for Application to Nuclear Power Plant Safety-Related Concrete Structures

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wiggenhauser, Dr. Herbert; Naus, Dan J

    2014-01-01

    The inspection of nuclear power plant concrete structures presents challenges different from conventional civil engineering structures. Wall thicknesses can be in excess of one meter and the structures often have increased steel reinforcement density with more complex detailing. The accessibility for any testing method may be limited due to the presence of liners and other components and there can be a number of penetrations or cast-in-place items present. The objective of the report is to present the state-of-the art of non-destructive testing methods and technologies for the inspection of thick, heavily-reinforced nuclear power plant concrete cross-sections with particular respect to: locating steel reinforcement and identification of its cover depth locating tendon ducts and identification of the condition of the grout materials detection of cracking, voids, delamination, and honeycombing in concrete structures detection of inclusions of different materials or voids adjacent to the concrete side of the containment liner methods capable of identification of corrosion occurrence on the concrete side of the containment liner

  19. State-of-the-art of non-destructive testing methods and technologies for application to nuclear power plant safety-related concrete structures

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wiggenhauser, Herbert; Naus, Dan J.

    2014-02-18

    The inspection of nuclear power plant concrete structures presents challenges different from conventional civil engineering structures. Wall thicknesses can be in excess of one meter and the structures often have increased steel reinforcement density with more complex detailing. The accessibility for any testing method may be limited due to the presence of liners and other components and there can be a number of penetrations or cast-in-place items present. The objective of the report is to present the state-of-the art of non-destructive testing methods and technologies for the inspection of thick, heavily-reinforced nuclear power plant concrete cross-sections with particular respect to: •locating steel reinforcement and identification of its cover depth •locating tendon ducts and identification of the condition of the grout materials •detection of cracking, voids, delamination, and honeycombing in concrete structures •detection of inclusions of different materials or voids adjacent to the concrete side of the containment liner •methods capable of identification of corrosion occurrence on the concrete side of the containment liner.

  20. Westinghouse Earns Safety Excellence Award

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    For Immediate Release Westinghouse Earns Safety Excellence Award CARLSBAD, N.M., December 17, 2001 - For the third time this year, Westinghouse TRU Solutions LLC (WTS) has been recognized for safety excellence by the New Mexico State Mine Inspector. WTS is the management and operating contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). On December 6, New Mexico Inspector of Mines Gilbert Miera presented WTS with the "Safety Excellence Award" in the

  1. Review of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project, October 2010 Review of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project, October 2010 October ...

  2. Basic TRUEX process for Rocky Flats Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Leonard, R.A.; Chamberlain, D.B.; Dow, J.A.; Farley, S.E.; Nunez, L.; Regalbuto, M.C.; Vandegrift, G.F.

    1994-08-01

    The Generic TRUEX Model was used to develop a TRUEX process flowsheet for recovering the transuranics (Pu, Am) from a nitrate waste stream at Rocky Flats Plant. The process was designed so that it is relatively insensitive to changes in process feed concentrations and flow rates. Related issues are considered, including solvent losses, feed analysis requirements, safety, and interaction with an evaporator system for nitric acid recycle.

  3. NRC - regulator of nuclear safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-05-01

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was formed in 1975 to regulate the various commercial and institutional uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear power plants. The agency succeeded the Atomic Energy Commission, which previously had responsibility for both developing and regulating nuclear activities. Federal research and development work for all energy sources, as well as nuclear weapons production, is now conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy. Under its responsibility to protect public health and safety, the NRC has three principal regulatory functions: (1) establish standards and regulations, (2) issue licenses for nuclear facilities and users of nuclear materials, and (3) inspect facilities and users of nuclear materials to ensure compliance with the requirements. These regulatory functions relate to both nuclear power plants and to other uses of nuclear materials - like nuclear medicine programs at hospitals, academic activities at educational institutions, research work, and such industrial applications as gauges and testing equipment. The NRC places a high priority on keeping the public informed of its work. The agency recognizes the interest of citizens in what it does through such activities as maintaining public document rooms across the country and holding public hearings, public meetings in local areas, and discussions with individuals and organizations.

  4. Safety is the First Priority

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    is the First Priority The project team completed a number of overlapping safety methods to assure the safety of individuals operating and in proximity to the hydrogen fuel cell including: ● Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) which identifies potential failure points and devises ways to mitigate them (engineered and administrative/operational controls). ● Independent review and approval of the design by the Hydrogen Safety Panel and the US Coast Guard, and informational review by the

  5. Path to development of quantitative safety goals

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Joksimovic, V.; Houghton, W.J.

    1980-04-01

    There is a growing interest in defining numerical safety goals for nuclear power plants as exemplified by an ACRS recommendation. This paper proposes a lower frequency limit of approximately 10/sup -4//reactor-year for design basis events. Below this frequency, down, to a small frequency such as 10/sup -5//reactor-year, safety margin can be provided by, say, site emergency plans. Accident sequences below 10/sup -5/ should not impact public safety, but it is prudent that safety research programs examine sequences with significant consequences. Once tentatively agreed upon, quantitative safety goals together with associated implementation tools would be factored into regulatory and design processes.

  6. Independent Activity Report, Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant- May 2012

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    Criticality Safety Information Meeting for the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant [HIAR-RL-2012-05-14

  7. Independent Oversight Review, Plutonium Finishing Plant- July 2014

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    Targeted Review of the Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System and Review of Federal Assurance Capability at the Plutonium Finishing Plant

  8. U.S. Representative Cleaver congratulates KCP employees for safety...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    praised employees for keeping safety and security a primary focus and reiterated the importance of the plant's national security mission. The massive relocation of the...

  9. CRAD, Documented Safety Analysis Development- April 23, 2013

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Review of Documented Safety Analysis Development for the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (LBL Facilities) (HSS CRAD 45-58, Rev. 0)

  10. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Safety Conscious Work Environmen...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) Self-Assessment Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) Self-Assessment The documents included in ...

  11. Chief of Nuclear Safety (CNS) Staff Assignments & Expertise ...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Chief of Nuclear Safety (CNS) Staff Assignments & Expertise CNS staff maintains adequate technical proficiency, including the timely completion of Senior Technical Safety Manager...

  12. Department of Energy Job Safety and Health Poster

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Job Safety & Health It's the law EMPLOYEES And their Representatives have a right to: * Participate in the worksite safety and health program, including inspections of the site; *...

  13. Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations Appraisal...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    processes. * Include oversight of worker safety and health requirements outlined in 10 CFR 851 Worker Safety and Health Program into existing processes. * Better reflect current ...

  14. 2012 Nuclear Safety Workshop | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Background In response to the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, Secretary Chu initiated a series of actions to review the safety of the Department...

  15. Fire Safety Committee Meeting Minutes- May 2014

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    DOE Fire Safety Committee Meeting Minutes, May, 2014 Topics included discussions on Fire modeling, revisions to DOE regulations and other important items relating to DOE and Fire Safety Community.

  16. RISMC advanced safety analysis working plan: FY2015 - FY2019. Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Szilard, Ronaldo H; Smith, Curtis L

    2014-09-01

    In this report, the Advanced Safety Analysis Program (ASAP) objectives and value proposition is described. ASAP focuses on modernization of nuclear power safety analysis (tools, methods and data); implementing state-of-the-art modeling techniques (which include, for example, enabling incorporation of more detailed physics as they become available); taking advantage of modern computing hardware; and combining probabilistic and mechanistic analyses to enable a risk informed safety analysis process. The modernized tools will maintain the current high level of safety in our nuclear power plant fleet, while providing an improved understanding of safety margins and the critical parameters that affect them. Thus, the set of tools will provide information to inform decisions on plant modifications, refurbishments, and surveillance programs, while improving economics. The set of tools will also benefit the design of new reactors, enhancing safety per unit cost of a nuclear plant. As part of the discussion, we have identified three sets of stakeholders, the nuclear industry, the Department of Energy (DOE), and associated oversight organizations. These three groups would benefit from ASAP in different ways. For example, within the DOE complex, the possible applications that are seen include the safety of experimental reactors, facility life extension, safety-by-design in future generation advanced reactors, and managing security for the storage of nuclear material. This report provides information in five areas: (1) A value proposition (“why is this important?”) that will make the case for stakeholder’s use of the ASAP research and development (R&D) products; (2) An identification of likely end users and pathway to adoption of enhanced tools by the end-users; (3) A proposed set of practical and achievable “use case” demonstrations; (4) A proposed plan to address ASAP verification and validation (V&V) needs; and (5) A proposed schedule for the multi-year ASAP.

  17. Pinellas Plant Annual Site Environmental Report for calendar year 1994

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-06-01

    This report presents a comprehensive summary of the results of the Environmental Monitoring, Waste Management, and Environmental Restoration Programs at the Pinellas Plant, in Pinellas County, Florida for 1994. This report also includes the plant`s performance in the areas of compliance with applicable regulatory requirements and standards and identifies major Environmental, Safety and Health Program initiatives and accomplishments for 1994. As a result of the end of Department of Energy Defense Programs mission production on September 30, 1994, considerable changes at the Pinellas Plant occurred. These changes, which included transitioning the plant toward alternate use in support of economic development and safe shutdown, both increased and heightened Environmental, Safety and Health responsibilities. In December 1994, the Department of Energy announced it had reached an agreement to sell the Pinellas Plant to the Pinellas County Industry Council in March 1995. The plant is being leased back by the Department of Energy through September 1997 to complete safe shutdown, reconfiguration, transfer of equipment to other Department of Energy production facilities, and transition to commercial ventures. Permit modifications and transfers will be completed during 1995 to reflect the new ownership by the Pinellas County Industry Council and to include new tenants as needed.

  18. Hanford Advisory Board Advice: Testing Safety Culture in Practice,

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Hanford Advisory Board Advice: Testing Safety Culture in Practice, Draft 3, Feb 3, 2016 Lead Issue Managers: Dirk Dunning and Liz Mattson Background The Hanford Advisory Board (HAB, Board) has been focused on reviewing, discussing, and issuing advice on safety culture since the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued its Recommendation 2011-1: Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in June 2011. Safety culture terminology has created confusion in our discussions,

  19. Measuring Process Safety Management

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sweeney, J.C. (ARCO Chemical Co., Newtown Square, PA (United States))

    1992-04-01

    Many companies are developing and implementing Process Safety Management (PSM) systems. Various PSM models, including those by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) and OSHA have emerged to guide the design, development and installation of these systems. These models represent distillations of the practices, methods and procedures successfully used by those who believed that a strong correlation exists between sound PSM practices and achieving reductions in the frequency and severity of process incidents. This paper describes the progress of CCPS research toward developing a PSM performance measurement model. It also provides a vision for future CCPS research to define effectiveness indices.

  20. Safety study application guide. Safety Analysis Report Update Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-07-01

    Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., (Energy Systems) is committed to performing and documenting safety analyses for facilities it manages for the Department of Energy (DOE). Included are analyses of existing facilities done under the aegis of the Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program, and analyses of new and modified facilities. A graded approach is used wherein the level of analysis and documentation for each facility is commensurate with the magnitude of the hazard(s), the complexity of the facility and the stage of the facility life cycle. Safety analysis reports (SARs) for hazard Category 1 and 2 facilities are usually detailed and extensive because these categories are associated with public health and safety risk. SARs for Category 3 are normally much less extensive because the risk to public health and safety is slight. At Energy Systems, safety studies are the name given to SARs for Category 3 (formerly {open_quotes}low{close_quotes}) facilities. Safety studies are the appropriate instrument when on-site risks are limited to irreversible consequences to a few people, and off-site consequences are limited to reversible consequences to a few people. This application guide provides detailed instructions for performing safety studies that meet the requirements of DOE Orders 5480.22, {open_quotes}Technical Safety Requirements,{close_quotes} and 5480.23, {open_quotes}Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.{close_quotes} A seven-chapter format has been adopted for safety studies. This format allows for discussion of all the items required by DOE Order 5480.23 and for the discussions to be readily traceable to the listing in the order. The chapter titles are: (1) Introduction and Summary, (2) Site, (3) Facility Description, (4) Safety Basis, (5) Hazardous Material Management, (6) Management, Organization, and Institutional Safety Provisions, and (7) Accident Analysis.

  1. Nuclear explosive safety study process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear explosives by their design and intended use require collocation of high explosives and fissile material. The design agencies are responsible for designing safety into the nuclear explosive and processes involving the nuclear explosive. The methodology for ensuring safety consists of independent review processes that include the national laboratories, Operations Offices, Headquarters, and responsible Area Offices and operating contractors with expertise in nuclear explosive safety. A NES Study is an evaluation of the adequacy of positive measures to minimize the possibility of an inadvertent or deliberate unauthorized nuclear detonation, high explosive detonation or deflagration, fire, or fissile material dispersal from the pit. The Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group (NESSG) evaluates nuclear explosive operations against the Nuclear Explosive Safety Standards specified in DOE O 452.2 using systematic evaluation techniques. These Safety Standards must be satisfied for nuclear explosive operations.

  2. Workers Deliver Award-Winning Respiratory Safety | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Deliver Award-Winning Respiratory Safety Workers Deliver Award-Winning Respiratory Safety April 2, 2013 - 12:00pm Addthis Workers wear air purifying respirators in the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Workers wear air purifying respirators in the Plutonium Finishing Plant. A program developed by employees enhances use of respiratory equipment in the Plutonium Finishing Plant. A program developed by employees enhances use of respiratory equipment in the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Workers wear air

  3. Flibe Use in Fusion Reactors - An Initial Safety Assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cadwallader, Lee Charles; Longhurst, Glen Reed

    1999-04-01

    This report is an initial effort to identify and evaluate safety issues associated with the use of Flibe (LiF-BeF2) as a molten salt coolant for nuclear fusion power plant applications. Flibe experience in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment is briefly reviewed. Safety issues identified include chemical toxicity, radiological issues resulting from neutron activation, and the operational concerns of handling a high temperature coolant. Beryllium compounds and fluorine pose be toxicological concerns. Some controls to protect workers are discussed. Since Flibe has been handled safely in other applications, its hazards appear to be manageable. Some safety issues that require further study are pointed out. Flibe salt interaction with strong magnetic fields should be investigated. Evolution of Flibe constituents and activation products at high temperature (i.e., will Fluorine release as a gas or remain in the molten salt) is an issue. Aerosol and tritium release from a Flibe spill requires study, as does neutronics analysis to characterize radiological doses. Tritium migration from Flibe into the cooling system is also a safety concern. Investigation of these issues will help determine the extent to which Flibe shows promise as a fusion power plant coolant or plasma-facing material.

  4. Flibe use in fusion reactors -- An initial safety assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cadwallader, L.C.; Longhurst, G.R.

    1999-03-01

    This report is an initial effort to identify and evaluate safety issues associated with the use of Flibe (LiF-BeF{sub 2}) as a molten salt coolant for nuclear fusion power plant applications. Flibe experience in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment is briefly reviewed. Safety issues identified include chemical toxicity, radiological issues resulting from neutron activation, and the operational concerns of handling a high temperature coolant. Beryllium compounds and fluorine pose be toxicological concerns. Some controls to protect workers are discussed. Since Flibe has been handled safely in other applications, its hazards appear to be manageable. Some safety issues that require further study are pointed out. Flibe salt interaction with strong magnetic fields should be investigated. Evolution of Flibe constituents and activation products at high temperature (i.e., will Fluorine release as a gas or remain in the molten salt) is an issue. Aerosol and tritium release from a Flibe spill requires study, as does neutronics analysis to characterize radiological doses. Tritium migration from Flibe into the cooling system is also a safety concern. Investigation of these issues will help determine the extent to which Flibe shows promise as a fusion power plant coolant or plasma-facing material.

  5. Safety harness

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Gunter, Larry W.

    1993-01-01

    A safety harness to be worn by a worker, especially a worker wearing a plastic suit thereunder for protection in a radioactive or chemically hostile environment, which safety harness comprises a torso surrounding portion with at least one horizontal strap for adjustably securing the harness about the torso, two vertical shoulder straps with rings just forward of the of the peak of the shoulders for attaching a life-line and a pair of adjustable leg supporting straps releasibly attachable to the torso surrounding portion. In the event of a fall, the weight of the worker, when his fall is broken and he is suspended from the rings with his body angled slightly back and chest up, will be borne by the portion of the leg straps behind his buttocks rather than between his legs. Furthermore, the supporting straps do not restrict the air supplied through hoses into his suit when so suspended.

  6. Safety valve

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Bergman, Ulf C.

    1984-01-01

    The safety valve contains a resilient gland to be held between a valve seat and a valve member and is secured to the valve member by a sleeve surrounding the end of the valve member adjacent to the valve seat. The sleeve is movable relative to the valve member through a limited axial distance and a gap exists between said valve member and said sleeve.

  7. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-06-21

    DOE-STD-1104 contains the Department's method and criteria for reviewing and approving nuclear facility's documented safety analysis (DSA). This review and approval formally document the basis for DOE, concluding that a facility can be operated safely in a manner that adequately protects workers, the public, and the environment. Therefore, it is appropriate to formally require implementation of the review methodology and criteria contained in DOE-STD-1104.

  8. Safety equipment list

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lavender, J.C.; Roe, N.A.

    1995-04-13

    This analysis assigns preliminary safety class (SC) designations to major systems and structures associated with the Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility (MWTF) project in accordance with the Multi-Function QAPP, W-236A (Hall 1994). Also included are SC assignments for those subsystems and major components of the major systems discussed in this document (see Appendices A and B). Component safety classifications have been completed through inspection (using engineering judgement) for simple systems, and through use of logic models (i.e., fault trees) for complicated systems. This analysis is intended to augment the SC systems list supplied in Chapter 9 of the MWTF Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (WHC 1994). Whereas WHC (1994) only addresses select systems, this analysis addresses the SC ramifications of all MWTF systems and structures as identified in the Title 1 design media. This document provides additional analyses of the system safety classifications assignments, and classifies systems not addressed in WHC (1994). This analysis specifically describes the safety functions) that must be performed by each MWTF system.

  9. Safety evaluation for packaging CPC metal boxes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Romano, T.

    1995-05-15

    This Safety Evaluation for Packaging (SEP) provides authorization for the use of Container Products Corporation (CPC) metal boxes, as described in this document, for the interarea shipment of radioactive contaminated equipment and debris for storage in the Central Waste Complex (CWC) or T Plant located in the 200 West Area. Authorization is granted until November 30, 1995. The CPC boxes included in this SEP were originally procured as US Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 7A Type A boxes. A review of the documentation provided by the manufacturer revealed the documentation did not adequately demonstrate compliance to the 4 ft drop test requirement of 49 CFR 173.465(c). Preparation of a SEP is necessary to document the equivalent safety of the onsite shipment in lieu of meeting DOT packaging requirements until adequate documentation is received. The equivalent safety of the shipment is based on the fact that the radioactive contents consist of contaminated equipment and debris which are not dispersible. Each piece is wrapped in two layers of no less than 4 mil plastic prior to being placed in the box which has an additional 10 mil liner. Pointed objects and sharp edges are padded to prevent puncture of the plastic liner and wrapping.

  10. Nuclear Safety Regulatory Framework

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Authority and responsibility to regulate nuclear safety at DOE facilities 10 CFR 830 10 CFR 835 10 CFR 820 Regulatory Implementation Nuclear Safety Radiological Safety Procedural ...

  11. Enterprise Assessments Review, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant -...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    December 2014 Review of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Recovery Plan for Operating Diesel Equipment with Available Underground Airflows. The Office of Nuclear Safety and...

  12. DOE O 440.1 B, Worker Protection Program for DOE (Including the...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    29 CFR 1960. DOE O 440.1B also includes the Department's requirement for overseeing contractor safety and health programs required by 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program. ...

  13. Reactor operation safety information document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-01-01

    The report contains a reactor facility description which includes K, P, and L reactor sites, structures, operating systems, engineered safety systems, support systems, and process and effluent monitoring systems; an accident analysis section which includes cooling system anomalies, radioactive materials releases, and anticipated transients without scram; a summary of onsite doses from design basis accidents; severe accident analysis (reactor core disruption); a description of operating contractor organization and emergency planning; and a summary of reactor safety evolution. (MB)

  14. OTEC (Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion) stationkeeping subsystems (SKSS). Review of conceptual and preliminary designs of Pilot Plant SKSS. Appendix. Recommendations for OTEC commercial plant SKSS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-09-15

    The aim of the study is primarily an assessment of the adequacy, accuracy, and practicality of the proposed designs, in order to make comment on the feasibility of developing a viable station-keeping subsystems (SKSS) for the OTEC Pilot Plant. Included in this report is information on: design criteria and safety factors; environmental data and response analysis; materials and components; deployment concept; maintenance and replacement concepts; concept evaluation - risk/reliability/cost; and recommendations for OTEC commercial plant station-keeping subsystems.

  15. Nuclear Safety Research and Development Annual Report, December 2014

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    This document is the first annual report of DOE’s Nuclear Safety Research and Development (NSR&D) Program, managed by the Office of Nuclear Safety in the Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security. The report includes a description of the program and summaries of R&D projects related to DOE (including NNSA) nuclear facility and operational safety.

  16. Next Generation Nuclear Plant Defense-in-Depth Approach

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Edward G. Wallace; Karl N. Fleming; Edward M. Burns

    2009-12-01

    The purpose of this paper is to (1) document the definition of defense-in-depth and the pproach that will be used to assure that its principles are satisfied for the NGNP project and (2) identify the specific questions proposed for preapplication discussions with the NRC. Defense-in-depth is a safety philosophy in which multiple lines of defense and conservative design and evaluation methods are applied to assure the safety of the public. The philosophy is also intended to deliver a design that is tolerant to uncertainties in knowledge of plant behavior, component reliability or operator performance that might compromise safety. This paper includes a review of the regulatory foundation for defense-in-depth, a definition of defense-in-depth that is appropriate for advanced reactor designs based on High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) technology, and an explanation of how this safety philosophy is achieved in the NGNP.

  17. Next Generation Nuclear Plant GAP Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ball, Sydney J; Burchell, Timothy D; Corwin, William R; Fisher, Stephen Eugene; Forsberg, Charles W.; Morris, Robert Noel; Moses, David Lewis

    2008-12-01

    As a follow-up to the phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) studies conducted recently by NRC on next generation nuclear plant (NGNP) safety, a study was conducted to identify the significant 'gaps' between what is needed and what is already available to adequately assess NGNP safety characteristics. The PIRT studies focused on identifying important phenomena affecting NGNP plant behavior, while the gap study gives more attention to off-normal behavior, uncertainties, and event probabilities under both normal operation and postulated accident conditions. Hence, this process also involved incorporating more detailed evaluations of accident sequences and risk assessments. This study considers thermal-fluid and neutronic behavior under both normal and postulated accident conditions, fission product transport (FPT), high-temperature metals, and graphite behavior and their effects on safety. In addition, safety issues related to coupling process heat (hydrogen production) systems to the reactor are addressed, given the limited design information currently available. Recommendations for further study, including analytical methods development and experimental needs, are presented as appropriate in each of these areas.

  18. Safety Share from National Safety Council

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Slide Presentation by Joe Yanek, Fluor Government Group. National Safety Council Safety Share. The Campbell Institute is the “Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) Center of Excellence” at the National Safety Council and provides a Forum for Leaders in EHS to exchange ideas and collaborate across industry sectors and organizational types.

  19. U.S. assistance enhancing safety culture in countries operating Soviet-designed reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Guppy, J.G.; Horak, W.C.; Reisman, A.W.

    1995-05-01

    The United States Department of Energy (USDOE) is managing the International Nuclear Safety Program (INSP), which is aimed at providing assistance to enhance safety at commercial nuclear power plants (NPPS) in Russia and Ukraine, as well as Central European countries (CEC). The funding for this program has been provided by the US Agency for International Development (AID). Brookhaven National Laboratory has been assisting DOE in certain portions of this program. The enhancement of safety culture is one of the most important goals of the joint International Nuclear Safety Program. In terms of the INSP, safety culture is comprised of two major components; (1) an environment that is a function of regulations, management sensitivity and structure; and (2) an individual commitment to safety in the day to day execution of activities in terms of thought and accountability. The long term impact of the INSP activities can only be measured by the effectiveness of strengthening safety culture within our partner counties. The strengthening of this culture will manifest in reduced risk of a nuclear accident long after other evidence of the INSP activities has disappeared. One area within the INSP, which has already led to a number of successful specific projects, is under the plant safety upgrade activities. Here, the US and the partner countries jointly identify specific target areas for the INSP efforts. Each identified area has a major component involving safety culture enhancement. With any direct involvement in the particular assistance activities, areas are identified to include a need for training. As technical experts and management from the partner country are assisted in addressing the identified needs, the training programs are provided which will not only address the specific need at hand, but will also teach skills which can be applied to different, but related needs that may exist or develop.

  20. Safety Fest | Y-12 National Security Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safety Fest Safety Fest Posted: September 11, 2014 - 7:54pm CNS Y-12 Site Manager Bill Tindal addresses attendees of this year's Safety Fest TN. Tindal has 24 years of experience in highly hazardous nuclear facility operations, including 18 years of management at Y-12. CNS served as a sponsor and as the host site for the weeklong annual event presented by the Oak Ridge Business Safety Partnership

  1. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Documented Safety Analysis

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    WHB-01-001a involves more drums than CH-WHB-01-001a (i.e., 218 versus

  2. A literature review of safety culture.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cole, Kerstan Suzanne; Stevens-Adams, Susan Marie; Wenner, Caren A.

    2013-03-01

    Workplace safety has been historically neglected by organizations in order to enhance profitability. Over the past 30 years, safety concerns and attention to safety have increased due to a series of disastrous events occurring across many different industries (e.g., Chernobyl, Upper Big-Branch Mine, Davis-Besse etc.). Many organizations have focused on promoting a healthy safety culture as a way to understand past incidents, and to prevent future disasters. There is an extensive academic literature devoted to safety culture, and the Department of Energy has also published a significant number of documents related to safety culture. The purpose of the current endeavor was to conduct a review of the safety culture literature in order to understand definitions, methodologies, models, and successful interventions for improving safety culture. After reviewing the literature, we observed four emerging themes. First, it was apparent that although safety culture is a valuable construct, it has some inherent weaknesses. For example, there is no common definition of safety culture and no standard way for assessing the construct. Second, it is apparent that researchers know how to measure particular components of safety culture, with specific focus on individual and organizational factors. Such existing methodologies can be leveraged for future assessments. Third, based on the published literature, the relationship between safety culture and performance is tenuous at best. There are few empirical studies that examine the relationship between safety culture and safety performance metrics. Further, most of these studies do not include a description of the implementation of interventions to improve safety culture, or do not measure the effect of these interventions on safety culture or performance. Fourth, safety culture is best viewed as a dynamic, multi-faceted overall system composed of individual, engineered and organizational models. By addressing all three components of

  3. NREL: Environment, Health, and Safety - Construction Subcontractors...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    performed on NREL-owned property, including South Table Mountain and the National Wind Technology Center. The Construction Environment, Health & Safety Plan (CEHSP). Each...

  4. CRAD, Facility Safety - Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Department of Energy Facility Safety - Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements CRAD, Facility Safety - Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process.. CRADs provide a recommended approach and the types of information to

  5. Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) Advanced Test Reactor

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Demonstration Case Study | Department of Energy (RISMC) Advanced Test Reactor Demonstration Case Study Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) Advanced Test Reactor Demonstration Case Study Safety is central to the design, licensing, operation, and economics of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Consequently, the ability to better characterize and quantify safety margin holds the key to improved decision making about light water reactor design, operation, and plant life extension. A

  6. Effective safety communications | Y-12 National Security Complex

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Effective safety ... Effective safety communications Posted: September 11, 2014 - 7:44pm CNS Communications Specialist Kathryn King spoke on effective safety communications at Safety Fest TN held this week at Y-12's New Hope Center. King was joined by two safety and health experts from Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Dr. Jeff Miller and Dr. David Duncan. The presentation included a case study of the Uranium Processing Facility Project, where the effectiveness of safety communications has

  7. Office of Worker Safety and Health Enforcement | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Worker Safety and Health Enforcement Office of Worker Safety and Health Enforcement MISSION The Office of Worker Safety and Health Enforcement implements the Department's worker safety and health enforcement program in accordance with 10 CFR 851 as authorized by the Atomic Energy Act. FUNCTIONS * Implements a worker safety and health enforcement program that includes processes and incentives for contractors to promptly identify, report, and correct safety issues and noncompliances. *

  8. 2016 Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop 2016 Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop March 22, 2016 - 3:48pm Addthis 2016 Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop The Office of Environmental Health, Safety, and Security will sponsor the 2016 Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop which will be held May 2-6, 2016 at the Alexis Park in Las Vegas, Nevada. The Workshop will include meetings for the DOE Safety Culture Improvement Panel, Federal Technical Capability Panel, Facility

  9. Review of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Immobilization Plant Project, October 2010 | Department of Energy Review of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project, October 2010 Review of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project, October 2010 October 2010 Report for independent review of the nuclear safety culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) project at DOE's Hanford Site. This report provides the results of a

  10. Cal/OSHA process safety standard update

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pourmehraban, I.

    1995-12-31

    Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation applies mainly to chemical and oil companies, plus other industries such as food processing, and paper production. It covers plants that deal with any of about 130 toxic chemicals in quantities above thresholds limits in Appendix A of PSM standard or flammable liquids and gases in quantities greater than 10,000 pounds. The State Consultation PSM teams (North and South) use a detailed audit checklist featuring above elements for audit of facilities requesting PSM assistance. The audit focuses on three generic activities: records, onsite conditions, and interviews. Records include written programs that outline the requirements and documentation of completion. Onsite conditions are implementation of activities specified in written programs. Interviews are for evaluation of transferred information to the workers that are already developed in written programs and training programs.