National Library of Energy BETA

Sample records for generation safeguards initiative

  1. Next generation safeguards initiative university outreach: the...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Next generation safeguards initiative university outreach: the unique Los Alamos and the ... Title: Next generation safeguards initiative university outreach: the unique Los Alamos ...

  2. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Summer Internship Program | Argonne

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves over the next 25 years. Learn More Center for Strategic Security Argonne's Center for Strategic Security (CSS) develops and implements practical

  3. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative at Los Alamos National...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Initiative at Los Alamos National Laboratory - student perspective Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Next Generation Safeguards Initiative at Los Alamos National ...

  4. NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative | National Nuclear Security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Administration | (NNSA) NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative January 02, 2009 International safeguards are a central pillar of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), international safeguards serve to monitor nuclear activities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with peaceful use and nuclear nonproliferation undertakings. The Department of Energy's National Nuclear

  5. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue; Eipeldauer, Mary D; Whitaker, J Michael

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together with several DOE laboratories such as Pacific

  6. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either

  7. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper S. E.

    2014-10-10

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  8. Next Generations Safeguards Initiative: The Life of a Cylinder

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Morgan, James B; White-Horton, Jessica L

    2012-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has begun a program based on a five-year plan to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders and their locations throughout the life cycle. A key initial activity in the NGSI program is to understand and document the 'life of a UF6 cylinder' from cradle to grave. This document describes the life of a UF6 cylinder and includes cylinder manufacture and procurement processes as well as cylinder-handling and operational practices at conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and depleted UF6 conversion facilities. The NGSI multiple-laboratory team is using this document as a building block for subsequent tasks in the five-year plan, including development of the functional requirements for cylinder-tagging and tracking devices.

  9. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  10. NNSA Kicks Off Next Generation Safeguards Initiative | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation Powering the Nuclear Navy ... safeguards, which protect against proliferation. "Effective nuclear safeguards are the ...

  11. NNSA Kicks Off Next Generation Safeguards Initiative | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    safeguards, which protect against proliferation. "Effective nuclear safeguards are the ... system can grow to meet new proliferation challenges as we prepare for global ...

  12. Next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI) program plan for safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is defined as the incorporation of safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign the facility at a later date, or retrofit the completed facility. Not only can SBD avoid the need for redesign or retrofit, but consideration of safeguards features early in the facility design effort can provide for a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A program has been initiated by the United States Department of Energy during the past several years to develop, demonstrate and institutionalization SBD. This plan has been developed in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA while taking into account their achievements and future plans. The United States SBD program is focused on (1) identification of best practices that satisfy existing safeguards requirements, (2) identification of advanced concepts where best practices can be improved, and (3) institutionalizing SBD by gaining its acceptance as a global norm for the design of new nuclear facilities. SBD guidance documents are being prepared as an aid to industry for their design activities, to describe the relationship between requirements, best practices, and advanced concepts. SBD 'lessons learned' studies have been conducted to help identify the existing best practices and potential areas for improvement. Finally, acceptance as a global norm is being pursued by way of international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example by way of its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States.

  13. Technical Cross-Cutting Issues for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Spent Fuel Nondestructive Assay Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tobin, S. J.; Menlove, H. O.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Blanc, P.; Burr, T.; Evans, L. G.; Favalli, A.; Fensin, M. L.; Freeman, C. R.; Galloway, J.; Gerhart, J.; Rajasingam, A.; Rauch, E.; Sandoval, N. P.; Trellue, H.; Ulrich, T. J.; Conlin, J. L.; Croft, S.; Hendricks, John; Henzl, V.; Henzlova, D.; Eigenbrodt, J. M.; Koehler, W. E.; Lee, D. W.; Lee, T. H.; Lafleur, A. M.; Schear, M. A.; Humphrey, M. A.; Smith, Leon E.; Anderson, Kevin K.; Campbell, Luke W.; Casella, Andrew M.; Gesh, Christopher J.; Shaver, Mark W.; Misner, Alex C.; Amber, S. D.; Ludewigt, Bernhard A.; Quiter, B.; Solodov, Alexander; Charlton, W.; Stafford, A.; Romano, C.; Cheatham, J.; Ehinger, Michael; Thompson, S. J.; Chichester, David; Sterbentz, James; Hu, Jianwei; Hunt, A.; Mozin, Vladimir V.; Richard, J. G.

    2012-03-01

    Ever since there has been spent fuel (SF), researchers have made nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements of that fuel to learn about its content. In general these measurements have focused on the simplest signatures (passive photon and total neutron emission) and the analysis has often focused on diversion detection and on determining properties such as burnup (BU) and cooling time (CT). Because of shortcomings in current analysis methods, inspectorates and policy makers are interested in improving the state-of-the-art in SF NDA. For this reason the U.S. Department of Energy, through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), targeted the determination of elemental Pu mass in SF as a technical goal. As part of this research effort, 14 nondestructive assay techniques were studied . This wide range of techniques was selected to allow flexibility for the various needs of the safeguards inspectorates and to prepare for the likely integration of one or more techniques having complementary features. In the course of researching this broad range of NDA techniques, several cross-cutting issues were. This paper will describe some common issues and insights. In particular we will describe the following: (1) the role of neutron absorbers with emphasis on how these absorbers vary in SF as a function of initial enrichment, BU and CT; (2) the need to partition the measured signal among different isotopic sources; and (3) the importance of the “first generation” concept which indicates the spatial location from which the signal originates as well as the isotopic origins.

  14. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative s High-Purity Uranium-233 Preservation Effort

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Krichinsky, Alan M; Bostick, Debra A; Giaquinto, Joseph; Bayne, Charles; Goldberg, Dr. Steven A.; Humphrey, Dr. Marc; Hutcheon, Dr. Ian D.; Sobolev, Taissa

    2012-01-01

    High-purity 233U serves as a crucial reference material for accurately quantifying and characterizing uranium. The most accurate analytical results which can be obtained only with high-purity 233U certified reference material (CRM) are required when used to confirm compliance with international safeguards obligations and international nonproliferation agreements. The U.S. supply of 233U CRM is almost depleted, and existing domestic stocks of this synthetic isotope are scheduled to be down-blended for disposition with depleted uranium beginning in 2015. Down blending batches of high-purity 233U will permanently eliminate the value of this material as a CRM. Furthermore, no replacement 233U stocks are expected to be produced in the future due to a lack of operating production capability and the high cost of replacing such capability. Therefore, preserving select batches of high-purity 233U is of great value and will assist in retaining current analytical capabilities for uranium-bearing samples. Any organization placing a priority on accurate results of uranium analyses, or on the confirmation of trace uranium in environmental samples, has a vested interest in preserving this material. This paper describes the need for high-purity 233U, the consequences organizations and agencies face if this material is not preserved, and the progress and future plans for preserving select batches of the purest 233U materials from disposition. This work is supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration.

  15. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory: Developing Our Human Capital FY2015

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; Hawkins Erpenbeck, Heather

    2015-10-13

    This report documents the accomplishments of the Safeguards HCD Fiscal Year 2015 (FY15) Project Work Plan, highlighting LANL’s work as well as the accomplishments of our NGSI-sponsored students, graduate and postdoctoral fellows, and mid-career professionals during this past year. While fiscal year 2015 has been a year of transition in the Human Capital Development area for LANL, we are working to revitalize our efforts to promote and develop Human Capital in Safeguards and Non-proliferation and are looking forward to implementing new initiatives in the coming fiscal year and continuing to transition the knowledge of staff who have been on assignment at IAEA and Headquarters to improve our support to HCD.

  16. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Overview and Policy Context of UF6 Cylinder Tracking Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D; Whitaker, J. Michael; White-Horton, Jessica L.; Durbin, Karyn R.

    2012-07-12

    Thousands of cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) move around the world from conversion plants to enrichment plants to fuel fabrication plants, and their contents could be very useful to a country intent on diverting uranium for clandestine use. Each of these large cylinders can contain close to a significant quantity of natural uranium (48Y cylinder) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) (30B cylinder) defined as 75 kg {sup 235}U which can be further clandestinely enriched to produce 1.5 to 2 significant quantities of high enriched uranium (HEU) within weeks or months depending on the scale of the clandestine facility. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) kicked off a 5-year plan in April 2011 to investigate the concept of a unique identification system for UF{sub 6} cylinders and potentially to develop a cylinder tracking system that could be used by facility operators and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The goal is to design an integrated solution beneficial to both industry and inspectorates that would improve cylinder operations at the facilities and provide enhanced capabilities to deter and detect both diversion of low-enriched uranium and undeclared enriched uranium production. The 5-year plan consists of six separate incremental tasks: (1) define the problem and establish the requirements for a unique identification (UID) and monitoring system; (2) develop a concept of operations for the identification and monitoring system; (3) determine cylinder monitoring devices and technology; (4) develop a registry database to support proof-of-concept demonstration; (5) integrate that system for the demonstration; and (6) demonstrate proof-of-concept. Throughout NNSA's performance of the tasks outlined in this program, the multi-laboratory team emphasizes that extensive engagement with industry stakeholders, regulatory authorities and inspectorates is essential to its success.

  17. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gilligan, Kimberly

    2014-01-01

    In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined: trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and, the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007). The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

  18. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hase, Kevin R.; Hawkins Erpenbeck, Heather; Boyer, Brian D.

    2012-07-10

    Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.

  19. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burbank, Roberta L.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Shergur, Jason M.; Scholz, Melissa A.; Undem, Halvor A.

    2014-03-28

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI’s ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI’s long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  20. THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zhernosek, Alena V; Lynch, Patrick D; Scholz, Melissa A

    2011-01-01

    President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.

  1. Potential nuclear safeguards applications for neutron generators

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lindquist, L.O.

    1980-01-01

    Many nuclear safeguards inspection instruments use neutron sources to interrogate the fissile material (commonly /sup 235/U and /sup 239/Pu) to be measured. The neutron sources currently used in these instruments are isotopics such as Californium-252, Americium-Lithium, etc. It is becoming increasingly more difficult to transport isotopic sources from one measurement location to another. This represents a significant problem for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspectors because they must take their safeguards instruments with them to each nuclear installation to make an independent measurement. Purpose of this paper is to review the possibility of replacing isotopic neutron sources now used in IAEA safeguards instruments with electric neutron sources such as deuterium-tritium (D-T, 14-MeV neutrons) or deuterium-deuterium (D-D, 2-MeV neutrons). The potential for neutron generators to interrogate spent-light water reactor fuel assemblies in storage pools is also reviewed.

  2. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R; Morgan, James B; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  3. nuclear safeguards

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    The design projects were supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) program, which works to recruit, train and retain qualified...

  4. safeguards

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    %2A en NGSI Safeguards by Design http:www.nnsa.energy.govaboutusourprogramsdnnnissafeguardssbd

  5. safeguards

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    %2A en NGSI Safeguards by Design http:nnsa.energy.govaboutusourprogramsdnnnissafeguardssbd

  6. NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative | National Nuclear...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    This Site Budget IG Web Policy Privacy No Fear Act Accessibility FOIA Sitemap Federal Government The White House DOE.gov USA.gov Jobs Apply for Our Jobs Our Jobs Working at NNSA...

  7. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Inaugural Conference |...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    ... And we know that the political will and the resiliency of the nonproliferation regime are ... So I commend you for your work, for attendance and attention and for your participation ...

  8. Initial Evaluation of a New Electromechanical Cooler for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coleman, RL

    2002-10-21

    The use of liquid nitrogen (LN{sub 2}) constitutes the current state of the art in cryogenic cooling for high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, which are widely used for {gamma}-ray and characteristic X-ray spectroscopy because of their excellent energy discrimination. Use of LN{sub 2} requires a liquid nitrogen supply, cumbersome storage tanks and plumbing, and the frequent attention of personnel to be sure that nitrogen levels are sufficient to maintain the detectors at a sufficiently low operating temperature. Safety hazards also are associated with the use of LN{sub 2}, both because of the potential for severe frostbite on exposure to skin and because it displaces ambient oxygen when it evaporates in closed spaces. Existing electromechanical coolers have, until now, been more expensive to procure and maintain than LN{sub 2} systems. Performance and reliability have also been serious issues because of microphonic degradation of photon energy peak resolution and cooler failures due to compressor oil becoming entrained in the refrigerant. This report describes the results of tests of a new HPGe detector cooling technology, the PerkinElmer ORTEC{reg_sign} Products X-Cooler{trademark} that, according to the manufacturer, significantly reduces the lifetime cost of the cooling system without degradation of the output signal. The manufacturer claims to have overcome cost, performance and reliability problems of older-generation electromechanical coolers, but the product has no significant history of use, and this project is the first independent evaluation of its performance for Total cost savings for the DOE and other agencies that use HPGe systems extensively for safeguards monitoring is expected to be quite significant if the new electromechanical cooler technology is shown to be reliable and if performance characteristics indicate its usefulness for this application. The technology also promises to make HPGe monitoring, characterization and detection available for

  9. PROCESS MONITORING FOR SAFEGUARDS VIA EVENT GENERATION, INTEGRATION, AND INTERPRETATION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Humberto E. Garcia; Wen-Chiao Lin; Tae-Sic Yoo

    2010-07-01

    There is a recognized safeguards benefit from using process monitoring (PM) on nuclear facilities to complement nuclear materials accountancy. We introduce a model-based approach for PM in which the assessment regarding the state of the monitored system is conducted at a system-centric level. The proposed architecture integrates both time-driven and event-driven data integration and analysis for decision-making. While the time-driven layers of the proposed architecture encompass more traditional PM methods based on time series data and analysis, the event-driven layers encompass operation monitoring methods based on discrete event data integration and analysis. By integrating process- and operation-related information and methodologies within an unified modeling and monitoring framework that includes not only current but also past plant behaviors, the task of anomaly detection is greatly improved because this decision-making approach can benefit from not only known time-series relationships among measured signals but also from known event sequence relationships among generated events. Building from the proposed system-centric PM architecture, we briefly introduce methods that can be used to implement its different components. The application of the proposed approach is then demonstrated via simulation experiments.

  10. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  11. NGSI Safeguards by Design | National Nuclear Security Administration |

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    (NNSA) Nonproliferation and Arms Control / International Nuclear Safeguards NGSI Safeguards by Design NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) sponsors a project promoting international Safeguards by Design (SBD). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA ) has described the SBD concept as an approach in which "international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation,

  12. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  13. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA): A Nondestructive Assay Technique for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Plutonium Assay Challenge

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. W. Sterbentz; D. L. Chichester

    2010-12-01

    This is an end-of-year report for a project funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241). The goal of this project is to investigate the feasibility of using Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) to assay plutonium in commercial light-water-reactor spent fuel. This project is part of a larger research effort within the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to evaluate methods for assaying plutonium in spent fuel, the Plutonium Assay Challenge. The first-year goals for this project were modest and included: 1) developing a zero-order MCNP model for the NRTA technique, simulating data results presented in the literature, 2) completing a preliminary set of studies investigating important design and performance characteristics for the NRTA measurement technique, and 3) documentation of this work in an end of the year report (this report). Research teams at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and at several universities are also working to investigate plutonium assay methods for spent-fuel safeguards. While the NRTA technique is well proven in the scientific literature for assaying individual spent fuel pins, it is a newcomer to the current NGSI efforts studying Pu assay method techniques having just started in March 2010; several analytical techniques have been under investigation within this program for two to three years or more. This report summarizes a nine month period of work.

  14. Integrated safeguards testing laboratories in support of the advanced fuel cycle initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Santi, Peter A; Demuth, Scott F; Klasky, Kristen L; Lee, Haeok; Miller, Michael C; Sprinkle, James K; Tobin, Stephen J; Williams, Bradley

    2009-01-01

    A key enabler for advanced fuel cycle safeguards research and technology development for programs such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is access to facilities and nuclear materials. This access is necessary in many cases in order to ensure that advanced safeguards techniques and technologies meet the measurement needs for which they were designed. One such crucial facility is a hot cell based laboratory which would allow developers from universities, national laboratories, and commercial companies to perform iterative research and development of advanced safeguards instrumentation under realistic operating conditions but not be subject to production schedule limitations. The need for such a facility arises from the requirement to accurately measure minor actinide and/or fission product bearing nuclear materials that cannot be adequately shielded in glove boxes. With the contraction of the DOE nuclear complex following the end of the cold war, many suitable facilities at DOE sites are increasingly costly to operate and are being evaluated for closure. A hot cell based laboratory that allowed developers to install and remove instrumentation from the hot cell would allow for both risk mitigation and performance optimization of the instrumentation prior to fielding equipment in facilities where maintenance and repair of the instrumentation is difficult or impossible. These benefits are accomplished by providing developers the opportunity to iterate between testing the performance of the instrumentation by measuring realistic types and amounts of nuclear material, and adjusting and refining the instrumentation based on the results of these measurements. In this paper, we review the requirements for such a facility using the Wing 9 hot cells in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility as a model for such a facility and describe recent use of these hot cells in support of AFCI.

  15. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative s High-Purity Uranium...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Authors: Krichinsky, Alan M 1 ; Bostick, Debra A 1 ; Giaquinto, Joseph 1 ; Bayne, Charles 2 ; Goldberg, Dr. Steven A. 3 ; Humphrey, Dr. Marc 4 ; Hutcheon, Dr. Ian D. ...

  16. Next Generation Safeguards Initiatives at Los Alamos National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    ... for careers in government, industry, and at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ... While at LANL, she assists with projects in x-ray fluorescence to measure plutonium ...

  17. BN-350 unattended safeguards system current status and initial fuel movement data

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, Richard Brady; Browne, Michael C; Parker, Robert F; Ingegneri, Maurizio

    2009-01-01

    The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor facility in Aktau, Kazakhstan continues to provide safeguards monitoring data as the spent fuel disposition project transitions from wet fuel storage to dry storage casks. Qualitative data from the initial cask loading procedures has been released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is presented here for the first time. The BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, operated as a plutonium-producing facility from 1973 W1til 1999. Kazakhstan signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1994, and shortly afterwards the IAEA began safeguarding the reactor facility and its nuclear material. Slnce the cessation of reactor operations ten years ago, the chief proliferation concern has been the spent fuel assemblies stored in the pond on-site. By 2002, all fuel assemblies in wet storage had been repackaged into proliferation-resistant canisters. From the beginning, the IAEA's safeguards campaign at the BN-350 included a constant unattended sensor presence in the form of UNARM which monitors nuclear material activities at the facility in the absence of inspector presence. The UNARM equipment at the BN-350 was designed to be modular and extensible, allowing the system to adapt as the safeguards requirements change. This has been particularly important at the BN-350 due to the prolonged wet storage phase of the project. The primary function of the BN-350 UNARM system is to provide the IAEA with an independent, radiation-centric Containment and Surveillance (C&S) layer in addition to the standard seals and video systems. The UNARM system has provided continuous Continuity of Knowledge (COK) data for the BN-350's nuclear material storage areas in order to ensure the validity of the attended measurements during the lifetime of the project. The first of these attended measurements was characterization of the spent fuel assemblies. This characterization utilized

  18. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Challenge:

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Safeguards and Security Challenge: The international safeguards and security system is being challenged by evolving proliferation and terrorism threats, expanding International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responsibilities, a retiring safeguards workforce, and the need for better technologies to detect and deter proliferation, theft, and sabotage. Response: Revitalize, strengthen, and sustain U.S. and international safeguards and security capabilities through the Next Generation Safeguards

  19. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Kirk, Bernadette Lugue

    2015-01-01

    The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

  20. The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for Next Generation Safeguards Specialists--Maximizing Potential and Minimizing the Risks

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eipeldauer, Mary D

    2009-01-01

    This document is intended to provide an overview of the workshop entitled 'The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for the Next Generation Safeguards Experts-Maximizing Benefits While Minimizing Proliferation Risks', conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in partnership with the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This document presents workshop objectives; lists the numerous participant universities and individuals, the nuclear nonproliferation lecture topics covered, and the facilities tours taken as part of the workshop; and discusses the university partnership sessions and proposed areas for collaboration between the universities and ORNL for 2009. Appendix A contains the agenda for the workshop; Appendix B lists the workshop attendees and presenters with contact information; Appendix C contains graphics of the evaluation form results and survey areas; and Appendix D summarizes the responses to the workshop evaluation form. The workshop was an opportunity for ORNL, Y-12, and SRNL staff with more than 30 years combined experience in nuclear nonproliferation to provide a comprehensive overview of their expertise for the university professors and their students. The overall goal of the workshop was to emphasize nonproliferation aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and to identify specific areas where the universities and experts from operations and national laboratories could collaborate.

  1. Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  2. land art generator initiative | OpenEI Community

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    land art generator initiative Home Dc's picture Submitted by Dc(266) Contributor 20 March, 2015 - 11:22 Public Art Generates Renewable Energy Beautifully biofuel art clean energy...

  3. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  4. Status of the United States-Russian Federation safeguards, transparency and irreversibility (STI) initiative for nuclear arms reductions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Czajkowski, A.F.; Bieniawski, A.J.; Percival, C.M.

    1996-12-31

    The US-Russian Federation initiative to provide safeguards, transparency, and irreversibility (STI) of nuclear arms reductions has been emphasized by several Presidential Joint Summit Statements as well as various agreements between the two parties. Beginning with the US and Russian Federation agreement in March, 1994, to host reciprocal inspections to confirm the stockpiles of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons, the US and Russia have been negotiating an STI regime to increase the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction. In December, 1994, the US presented a paper to the Russian Federation proposing a regime of specific transparency measures to provide broader transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions. Presently the US considers STI to consist of the following measures: (1) agreement for cooperation (AFC); (2) stockpile data exchange agreement (SDEA); (3) mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI); (4) spot checks to confirm data exchanges (SC); and (5) limited Chain of Custody of Warheads Being Dismantled (LCC). The US and Russian have begun negotiations, which are in various stages of progress, on the first three of these measures. This paper will present a brief historical background of STI and discuss the transparency measures including the status of negotiation for each of the measures.

  5. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  6. NNSA Completes Fourth International Meeting on Next Generation Nuclear

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safeguards | National Nuclear Security Administration | (NNSA) NNSA Completes Fourth International Meeting on Next Generation Nuclear Safeguards July 12, 2012 HANOI, VIETNAM - The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), together with the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, announced today the successful completion of the Fourth International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards. Organized by NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

  7. The safeguards options study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  8. Process Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ehinger, Michael H [ORNL] [ORNL; Pomeroy, George D [ORNL] [ORNL; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W [ORNL] [ORNL

    2009-01-01

    Process Monitoring has long been used to evaluate industrial processes and operating conditions in nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In nuclear applications there is a recognized need to demonstrate the safeguards benefits from using advanced process monitoring on spent fuel reprocessing technologies and associated facilities, as a complement to nuclear materials accounting. This can be accomplished by: defining credible diversion pathway scenarios as a sample problem; using advanced sensor and data analysis techniques to illustrate detection capabilities; and formulating 'event detection' methodologies as a means to quantify performance of the safeguards system. Over the past 30 years there have been rapid advances and improvement in the technology associated with monitoring and control of industrial processes. In the context of bulk handling facilities that process nuclear materials, modern technology can provide more timely information on the location and movement of nuclear material to help develop more effective safeguards. For international safeguards, inspection means verification of material balance data as reported by the operator through the State to the international inspectorate agency. This verification recognizes that the State may be in collusion with the operator to hide clandestine activities, potentially during abnormal process conditions with falsification of data to mask the removal. Records provided may show material is accounted for even though a removal occurred. Process monitoring can offer additional fidelity during a wide variety of operating conditions to help verify the declaration or identify possible diversions. The challenge is how to use modern technology for process monitoring and control in a proprietary operating environment subject to safeguards inspectorate or other regulatory oversight. Under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a range of potential safeguards applications

  9. Training in Environmental Analyses for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, R W; Gaffney, A M; Hutcheon, N A; Kersting, A B

    2009-05-28

    Responding to recommendations of the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a new course, Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards, is being offered as a summer internship opportunity at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first students completed the 8 week program during the summer of 2008. Interns are given training in the analysis of bulk environmental samples for safeguards through hands-on experience working in a clean laboratory, purifying U and Pu from bulk environmental samples, and measuring U and Pu isotope ratios by multi-collector ICP mass spectrometry. A series of lectures by invited safeguards and non-proliferation experts gives the students a broad picture of the safeguards work of the IAEA. At the end of the course, the students prepare a poster of their work to showcase at LLNL's summer student poster symposium. Both undergraduate and graduate students are recruited and hired as paid interns under the aegis of the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute in the Physical and Life Sciences Directorate at LLNL. This training course seeks to introduce students to analytical and interpretive skill-sets that are not generally taught at universities, and to encourage them to pursue careers with the IAEA.

  10. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOEs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  11. Next GeNeratioN SafeGuardS iNitiative

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation...To ... power without increasing the risks of proliferation." iNterNatioNal CollaboratioN oN Next ...

  12. Improving the Safeguardability of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bari; D. Hebditch; P. Peterson; M. Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferation hazards while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significant expansion of nuclear energy use may occur. Correspondingly, the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives to contribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to apply SBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure. Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical protection, and safety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be applied usefully today within most national regulatory environments. Development of a mature approach to implementing SBD requires work in the areas of requirements definition, design processes, technology and methodology, and institutionalization. The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBD work for international safeguards that has recently been initiated by the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders including member States, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers, nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferation community.

  13. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  14. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F; Mullen, Mark

    2011-10-05

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  15. Reversing the Trend: Creating a Growing and Sustainable Cadre of Safeguards Experts in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lockwood, Dunbar; Mathews, Caroline E.; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-07-17

    In October 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a wide-ranging study on international safeguards issues that found, inter alia, that the human capital base in the United States must be revitalized and expanded to ensure a seamless succession from the current generation of safeguards experts. Many current safeguards experts will soon retire and a new generation of talent with capabilities that cover the full spectrum of safeguards-relevant disciplines is needed. The success of this effort will have direct bearing on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An effective international safeguards system that responds to current and future nonproliferation challenges requires a cadre of skilled safeguards specialists. However, a number of factors have converged in recent years that have challenged the IAEAs ability to effectively carry out its safeguards mission, e.g. flat funding, expanding responsibilities, and several ad hoc high profile investigations. In the near future, the Agency will require increased numbers of qualified staff to address the expansion and evolution of its mission and anticipated worldwide growth in nuclear energy production. Without a large-scale effort to address this requirement in the near future, the international community will have far less confidence that nuclear material in civil programs is not being diverted for nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase around the world. This paper will describe in detail NNSAs efforts, in coordination with other federal agencies, to address the safeguards human resources challenge, focusing on the recommendations of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).

  16. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Bean; John W. Hockert; David J. Hebditch

    2009-05-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  17. Evaluation of a Business Case for Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Power Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wood, Thomas W.; Seward, Amy M.; Lewis, Valerie A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-12-01

    Safeguards by Design (SbD) is a well-known paradigm for consideration and incorporation of safeguards approaches and associated design features early in the nuclear facility development process. This paradigm has been developed as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and has been accepted as beneficial in many discussions and papers on NGSI or specific technologies under development within NGSI. The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine the business case justification of SbD for nuclear power reactors. Ultimately, the implementation of SbD will rely on the designers of nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is important to assess the incentives which will lead designers to adopt SbD as a standard practice for nuclear facility design. This report details the extent to which designers will have compelling economic incentives to adopt SbD.

  18. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-06-01

    Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been underappreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured. This paper argues that safeguards culture as an indicator of a countrys nonproliferation posture can be a useful tool.

  19. Eastern Renewable Generation Integration Study: Initial Results (Poster)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bloom, A.; Townsend, A.; Hummon, M.; Weekley, A.; Clark, K.; King, J.

    2013-10-01

    This poster presents an overview of the Eastern Renewable Generation Integration Study, which aims to answer critical questions about the future of the Eastern Interconnection under high levels of solar and wind generation penetration.

  20. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEAs Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facilitys general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facilitys layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in

  1. SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kempf, C.R.

    1994-03-01

    A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report.

  2. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper, Susan E.; Pickett, Chris A.; Queirolo, Al; Bachner, Katherine M.; Worrall, Louise G.

    2015-04-07

    The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

  3. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

  4. Sustaining International CBRN Centers of Excellence with a Focus on Nuclear Security and Safeguards: Initial Scoping Session London, 23-24 September 2013 SUMMARY REPORT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anderson, Roger G.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-12

    This report provides a summary-level description of the key information, observations, ideas, and recommendations expressed during the subject meeting. The report is organized to correspond to the meeting agenda provided in Appendix 1 and includes references to several of the participants listed in Appendix 2 .The meeting venue was Lloyd’s Register in the City of London. Lloyd’s Register graciously accommodated the request of The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) with whom it works on various safeguards activities commissioned by NNSA. PNNL and NNSA also shared the goal of the meeting/study with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change with whom they coordinated the participant list.

  5. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    was performed in September 2009 to test and demonstrate the applicability of the method to the quantitative measurement of an isotope of interest embedded in a thick target. The experiment, data analysis, and results are described in Section 4. The broad goal of our NRF studies is to assess the potential of the technique in safeguards applications. Three examples are analyzed in Section 5: the isotopic assay of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), the measurement of {sup 235}U enrichment in UF{sub 6} cylinders, and the determination of {sup 239}Pu in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The study of NRF for the assay of SNF assemblies was supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of the U.S. Department of Energy as part of a large multi-lab/university effort to quantify the plutonium (Pu) mass in spent nuclear fuel assemblies and to detect the diversion of pins with non-destructive assay (NDA) methods. NRF is one of 14 NDA techniques being researched. The methodology for performing and analyzing quantitative NRF measurements was developed for determining Pu mass in SNF and is extensively discussed in this report. The same methodology was applied to the assessment of NRF for the measurement of {sup 235}U enrichment and the determination of {sup 239}Pu in MOX fuel. The analysis centers on determining suitable NRF measurement methods, measurement capabilities that could be realized with currently available instrumentation, and photon source and detector requirements for achieving useful NDA capabilities.

  6. safeguards and security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    0%2A en NGSI Safeguards by Design http:nnsa.energy.govaboutusourprogramsdnnnissafeguardssbd

  7. Safeguards by Design (SBD): Safeguards Guidance for Research...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Safeguards by Design (SBD): Safeguards Guidance for Research Reactors and Critical ... Language: English Subject: Energy Planning, Policy, & Economy(29); Nuclear Disarmament, ...

  8. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, Michael C; Menlove, Howard O

    2008-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  9. International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zack, N.R.; Crawford, D.W.

    1995-09-01

    The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies.

  10. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gallucci, N.

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  11. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  12. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1988-01-22

    To establish the policy and responsibilities for the Department of Energy safeguards and security program. Does not cancel another directive. Canceled by DOE O 5630.11A dated 12-7-92.

  13. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-05-25

    The Order establishes roles and responsibilities for the Department of Energy Safeguards and Security Program. Cancels DOE O 470.4. Canceled by DOE O 470.4B

  14. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21

    The order establishes responsibilities and program planning and management requirements for the Safeguards and Security Program. Admin Chg 1, dated 2-15-13, supersedes DOE O 470.4B.

  15. Strengthening regional safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  16. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2009-05-27

    Abstract: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges. That paper described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper builds on that theoretical discussion to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Paper: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop on Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges, in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges. That paper, coauthored by Karyn R. Durbin and Andrew Van Duzer, described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper updates that theoretical discussion, and seeks to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Implicit in this discussion is an understanding that improving a culture is not an end in itself, but is one method of improving the underlying discipline, that is safety, security, or safeguards. Culture can be defined as a way of life, or general customs and beliefs of a particular group of people at a particular time. There are internationally accepted definitions of safety culture and nuclear security culture. As yet, there is no official agreed upon definition of safeguards culture. At the end of the paper I will propose my definition. At the Santa Fe Workshop the summary by the Co-Chairs of Working Group 1, The Further Evolution of Safeguards, noted: It is clear that safeguards culture needs to be

  17. International safeguards data authentication

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  18. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  19. Safeguard Security and Awareness Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2002-10-02

    Provides detailed requirements and procedures to supplement DOE O 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program, Chapter IV.

  20. Safeguards and Security Program References

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26

    The manual establishes definitions for terms related to the Department of Energy Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program and includes lists of references and acronyms/abbreviations applicable to S&S Program directives. Cancels the Safeguards and Security Glossary of Terms, dated 12-18-95. Current Safeguards and Security Program References can also be found at Safeguards and Security Policy Information Resource (http://pir.pnl.gov/)

  1. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing

  2. Facility Safeguardability Assessment Report

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    PNNL-21698 Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830 Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process RA Bari SJ Johnson J Hockert R Wigeland EF Wonder MD Zentner August 2012 PNNL- 21698 Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process RA Bari 1 SJ Johnson 2 J Hockert 3 R Wigeland 4 EF Wonder 5 M.D. Zentner August 2012 Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830 1 Brookhaven National Laboratory 2

  3. Feasibility of x ray fluorescence for spent fuel safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Freeman, Corey Ross; Mozin, Vladimir; Tobin, Stephen J; Fensin, Michael L; White, Julia M; Croft, Stephen; Stafford, Alissa; Charlton, William

    2010-01-01

    Quantifying the Pu content in spent nuclear fuel is necessary for many reasons, in particular to verify that diversion or other illicit activities have not occurred. Therefore, safeguarding the world's nuclear fuel is paramount to responsible nuclear regulation and public acceptance, but achieving this goal presents many difficulties from both a technical and economic perspective. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of NA-24 is funding a large collaborative effort between multiple laboratories and universities to improve spent nuclear fuel safeguards methods and equipment. This effort involves the current work of modeling several different nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. Several are being researched, because no single NDA technique, in isolation, has the potential to properly characterize fuel assemblies and offer a robust safeguards measure. The insights gained from this research, will be used to down-select from the original set a few of the most promising techniques that complement each other. The goal is to integrate the selected instruments to create an accurate measurement system for fuel verification that is also robust enough to detect diversions. These instruments will be fabricated and tested under realistic conditions. This work examines one of the NDA techniques; the feasibility of using x ray emission peaks from Pu and U to gather information about their relative quantities in the spent fuel. X Ray Fluorescence (XRF), is unique compared to the investigated techniques in that it is the only one able to give the elemental ratio of Pu to U, allowing the possibility of a Pu gram quantity for the assembly to be calculated. XRF also presents many challenges, mainly its low penetration, since the low energy x rays of interest are effectively shielded by the first few millimeters of a fuel pin. This paper will explore the results of Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) transport code calculations of spent fuel x ray peaks. The MCNPX

  4. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper S. E.; .; Worrall, L.; Pickett, C.; Bachner, K.; Queirolo, A.

    2014-08-08

    The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, the U.S. Department of State, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a a workshop on the subject of ”Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation.” The workshop was held at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. The workshop participants included software and hardware experts from national laboratories, industry, government, and IAEA member states who were specially selected by the workshop organizers based on their experience with software that is developed for the control and operation of safeguards instrumentation. The workshop included presentations, to orient the participants to the IAEA Department of Safeguards software activities related to instrumentation data collection and processing, and case studies that were designed to inspire discussion of software development, use, maintenance, and upgrades in breakout sessions and to result in recommendations for effective software practices and management. This report summarizes the results of the workshop.

  5. safeguards | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    safeguards WSU Mechanical Engineering students unveil their solutions to help PNNL researchers with nonproliferation and international safeguards work Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has partnered with Washington State University students for the past seven years to develop new instruments, tools, and methods to support nonproliferation and international safeguards. The students unveiled their latest designs last month in Richland,... Nuclear Verification Challenge: Maintain the

  6. Initial

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    ... Initial operation of the first amplifier stage resulted in self-lasing due to an optical cavity between the polarizing beam-splitter cube and the 0 reflecting mirror a setup ...

  7. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-12-29

    The Safeguards and Security Program ensures that the Department of Energy efficiently and effectively meets all its obligations to protect Special Nuclear Material, other nuclear materials, classified matter, sensitive information, government property, and the safety and security of employees, contractors, and the general public. Supersedes DOE P 470.1.

  8. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26

    Establishes roles and responsibilities for the Department of Energy Safeguards and Security Program. Cancels: DOE O 470.1, DOE O 471.2A, DOE O 471.4, DOE O 472.1C, DOE O 473.1, DOE O 473.2, DOE O 474.1A. Canceled by DOE O 470.4A.

  9. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21

    To establish responsibilities for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program, and to establish program planning and management requirements for the S&S Program. Cancels DOE O 470.4A, DOE M 470.4-1, Chg. 2, and DOE O 142.1.

  10. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2016-02-10

    The Safeguards and Security Program ensures that the Department of Energy efficiently and effectively meets all its obligations to protect Special Nuclear Material, other nuclear materials, classified matter, sensitive information, government property and facilities, and the safety and security of employees, contractors, and the general public. Supersedes DOE P 470.1A.

  11. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  12. Nuclear Safeguards Considerations For The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Phillip Casey Durst; David Beddingfield; Brian Boyer; Robert Bean; Michael Collins; Michael Ehinger; David Hanks; David L. Moses; Lee Refalo

    2009-10-01

    Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).

  13. An expanded safeguards role for the DOE safeguards analytical laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bingham, C.D.

    1986-01-01

    The New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is a Government-owned, Government-operated (GOGO) laboratory, with the mission to provide and maintain a nuclear material measurements and standards laboratory. The functional responsibilities of NBL serve as a technical response to the statutory responsibility of the Department of Energy (DOE) to assure the safeguarding of nuclear materials. In the execution of its mission, NBL carries out activities in six safeguards-related programs: measurement development, measurement evaluation, measurement services, safeguards assessment, reference and calibration materials and site-specific assistance. These program activities have been implemented by NBL for many years; their relative emphases, however, have been changed recently to address the priorities defined by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Defense Programs (OSS/DP). As a consequence, NBL operations are in the ''mainstream'' of domestic safeguards activities. This expanded safeguards role for NBL is discussed in this paper.

  14. International Nuclear Safeguards | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    | (NNSA) International Nuclear Safeguards Challenge: Detect/deter undeclared nuclear materials and activities. Solution: Build capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Member States to implement and meet safeguards obligations. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards develops and supports the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to

  15. The effect of initial conditions on the electromagnetic radiation generation in type III solar radio bursts

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schmitz, H.; Tsiklauri, D.

    2013-06-15

    Extensive particle-in-cell simulations of fast electron beams injected in a background magnetised plasma with a decreasing density profile were carried out. These simulations were intended to further shed light on a newly proposed mechanism for the generation of electromagnetic waves in type III solar radio bursts [D. Tsiklauri, Phys. Plasmas, 18, 052903 (2011)]. The numerical simulations were carried out using different density profiles and fast electron distribution functions. It is shown that electromagnetic L and R modes are excited by the transverse current, initially imposed on the system. In the course of the simulations, no further interaction of the electron beam with the background plasma could be observed.

  16. Safeguards & Security | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    The mission of the PPPO Safeguards and Security Program is to effectively implement the Office of Environmental Management ... Serves as the Federal liaison with the Nuclear Regulatory ...

  17. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Keepin, G.R. )

    1989-07-01

    The safeguards R and D program at Los Alamos will be outlined briefly, from its formal beginning in December 1966 to the present. From the start, an important factor in the success and ongoing achievements of the Los Alamos program has been a close technical liaison between safeguards researchers and the materials processing experts in the Laboratory's extensive nuclear material processing facilities. Some of the major contributions of the program to safeguards technology development and its effective implementation will be highlighted, together with a brief overview of the several ongoing safeguards training courses at Los Alamos for IAEA inspectors and safeguards professionals from the United States as well as many advanced and developing countries around the world.

  18. Full spectrum optical safeguard

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ackerman, Mark R.

    2008-12-02

    An optical safeguard device with two linear variable Fabry-Perot filters aligned relative to a light source with at least one of the filters having a nonlinear dielectric constant material such that, when a light source produces a sufficiently high intensity light, the light alters the characteristics of the nonlinear dielectric constant material to reduce the intensity of light impacting a connected optical sensor. The device can be incorporated into an imaging system on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or satellite.

  19. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards ...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards You are ...

  20. Safeguards and Security Program - DOE Directives, Delegations...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    4B Admin Chg 1, Safeguards and Security Program by Marc Brooks Functional areas: Administrative Change, Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Management, Safety, Safety and Security,...

  1. International safeguards recommendations for the Indian advanced...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    International safeguards recommendations for the Indian advanced heavy water reactor (AHWR) Citation Details In-Document Search Title: International safeguards recommendations for ...

  2. Generation and focusing of electron beams with initial transverse-longitudinal correlation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Harris, J. R.; Lewellen, J. W.; Poole, B. R.

    2014-10-07

    In charged particle beams, one of the roles played by space charge is to couple the transverse and longitudinal dynamics of the beam. This can lead to very complex phenomena which are generally studied using computer simulations. However, in some cases models based on phenomenological or analytic approximations can provide valuable insight into the system behavior. In this paper, we employ such approximations to investigate the conditions under which all the slices of a space charge dominated electron beam with slowly varying current could be focused to a waist with the same radius and at the same location, independent of slice current, and show that this can be accomplished approximately if the initial transverse-longitudinal correlation introduced onto the beam by the electron gun is chosen to compensate for the transverse-longitudinal correlation introduced onto the beam in the drift section. The validity of our approximations is assessed by use of progressively more realistic calculations. We also consider several design elements of electron guns that affect the initial correlations in the beams they generate.

  3. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

  4. Overview of enrichment plant safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Swindle, D.W. Jr.; Wheeler, L.E.

    1982-01-01

    The relationship of enrichment plant safeguards to US nonproliferation objectives and to the operation and management of enrichment facilities is reviewed. During the review, the major components of both domestic and international safeguards systems for enrichment plants are discussed. In discussing domestic safeguards systems, examples of the technology currently in use to support nuclear materials accountability are described including the measurement methods, procedures and equipment used for weighing, sampling, chemical and isotopic analyses and nondestructive assay techniques. Also discussed is how the information obtained as part of the nuclear material accountancy task is useful to enrichment plant operations. International material accountancy verification and containment/surveillance concepts for enrichment plants are discussed, and the technologies presently being developed for international safeguards in enrichment plants are identified and the current development status is reported.

  5. Master Safeguards and Security Agreements

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1988-02-03

    To establish the Department of Energy policy, requirements, responsibilities, and authorities for the development and implementation of Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSA's). Does not cancel another directive. Canceled by DOE O 5630.13A

  6. International safeguards: experience and prospects

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Keepin, G.R.; Menlove, H.O.

    1982-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have been applied to over 95% of the nuclear material and facilities outside of the nuclear weapon states. The present system of nonproliferation agreements implemented by IAEA safeguards likely will not be changed in the foreseeable future. Instruments used for nondestructive analysis are described: portable multichannel analyzer, high-level neutron coincidence counter, active well coincidence counter, and neutron coincidence collar. 7 figs. (DLC)

  7. Safeguarding wetland on Laboratory property

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safeguarding wetland on Laboratory property Community Connections: Your link to news and opportunities from Los Alamos National Laboratory Latest Issue: September 1, 2016 all issues All Issues » submit Safeguarding wetland on Laboratory property Protecting our environment August 1, 2013 The wetlands in Sandia Canyon on Lab property provide a home to a large amount of wildlife. Work is taking place to preserve the area and manage its water supply The wetlands in Sandia Canyon on Lab property

  8. Voluntary Protection Program Onsite Review, Safeguards and Security...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Safeguards and Security - August 2012 Voluntary Protection Program Onsite Review, Safeguards and Security - August 2012 August 2012 Evaluation to determine whether Safeguards and...

  9. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-09-28

    Ensures appropriate levels of protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components; espionage; loss or theft of classified matter or Government property; and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security or on the health and safety of Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor employees, the public, or the environment. DOE O 470.1 Extended until 5-11-06 by DOE N 251.63, dated 5-11-05. Chg 1, Safeguards and Security Program, dated 9/28/95, extended by DOE N 251.57, dated 4/28/2004. Change 1, 5/21/96, revises Chapter IV. Cancels: DOE 5630.11B, DOE 5630.13A, DOE 5630.14A, DOE 5630.15, DOE 5630.16A, DOE 5630.17, DOE 5631.1C, DOE 5631.4A, DOE 5634.1B, DOE 5634.3, DOE 5639.3, DOE M 5632.1C-1 in part.

  10. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE`s Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL.

  11. Safeguards training course: Nuclear material safeguards for enrichment plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-06-01

    The main objective of this course is to provide the course participants with the necessary skills to perform their inspection activities at enrichment plants. As background information, a variety of enrichment technologies will first be characterized and compared followed by a review of basic cascade, gas centrifuge, and gaseous diffusion theory. To focus on gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion technology, the major components and system of gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion enrichment plants including their function in routine LEU production will be identified. The objectives of safeguards at an enrichment plant, including those agreed to in the Hexapartite Safeguards Project, will then be described. Discussions will then focus on potential diversion scenarios at both a centrifuge and diffusion enrichment facility and applicable safeguards inspection activities for detecting these scenarios. This report presents a discussion on basic separation and cascade theory, uranium hexafluoride, and detailed separation theory, including gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion.

  12. Safeguards training course: Nuclear material safeguards for enrichment plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-06-01

    The main objective of this training course is to provide the course participants with the necessary skills to perform their inspection activities at enrichment plants. As background information, a variety of enrichment technologies will first be characterized and compared followed by a review of basic cascade, gas centrifuge, and gaseous diffusion theory. To focus on gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion technology, the major components and systems of gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion enrichment plants including their function in routine LEU production will be identified. The objectives of safeguards at an enrichment plant, including those agreed to in the Hexapartite Safeguards Project, will then be described. Discussion will then focus on potential diversion scenarios at both a centrifuge and diffusion enrichment facility and applicable safeguards inspection activities for detecting these scenarios.

  13. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System CONTACT INFORMATION UPDATE REPORTING IDENTIFICATION SYMBOL (RIS) RIS: Address: Facility Name: CONTACTS Name Email: ...

  14. Resource Allocation Optimization Program for Safeguards

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (OSTI)

    1994-03-11

    RAOPS uses dynamic programming to make the best use of physical and economic resources in safeguarding special nuclear material.

  15. Process: (international) safeguards interface at the Portsmouth GCEP from the safeguards technology developer's viewpoint

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J.W.; Strittmatter, R.B.; Baker, A.L.

    1983-01-01

    The design of a major portion of a safeguards system for possible use by IAEA at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant is described from the viewpoint of the safeguards technology developer. The process-safeguards interface is reviewed, including safeguards, process, and operational constraints on the safeguards system. The conflicting requirements of the IAEA and the plant operator are minimized through the use of advanced technology that allows safeguards data to be acquired, analyzed, and reported in an automated, unattended mode. The proposed safeguards system will reduce the impact of the inspections on both the operator and the IAEA.

  16. Safeguards Transporter | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Safeguards Transporter General Davis kicks the tires on a Safeguards Transporter Brigadier General Stephen L. Davis, NNSA's Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, gets a lesson on how to drive a Safeguards Transporter during a recent visit to the Office of Secure Transportation (OST) headquarters in Albuquerque, New Mexico. OST is responsible for transporting

  17. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  18. Global partnering related to nuclear materials safeguards and security - A pragmatic approach to international safeguards work

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stanford, Dennis

    2007-07-01

    This paper documents issues Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has addressed in the performance of international work to safeguards and security work. It begins with a description of the package we put together for a sample proposal for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, for which we were ranked number one for technical approach and cost, and concludes with a discussion of approaches that we have taken to performing this work, including issues related to performing the work as part of a team. The primary focus is on communication, workforce, equipment, and coordination issues. Finally, the paper documents the rules that we use to assure the work is performed safely and successfully. (author)

  19. Safeguards and Security Briefing

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Rail Shipment Via Inter-Modal Transfer IMT Cask Status 0 3 6 9 12 15 FMF YM En Route Generator Transportation Operations Center * IMT intermodal transfer facility * FMFfleet...

  20. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  1. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  2. Initial operating results of coal-fired steam generators converted to 100% refuse-derived fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barsin, J.A. ); Graika, P.K. ); Gonyeau, J.A. ); Bloomer, T.M. )

    1988-01-01

    The conversion of Northern States Power Company's (NSP) Red Wing and Wilmarth steam generators to fire refuse-derived fuel (RDF) is discussed. The use of the existing plant with the necessary modifications to the boilers has allowed NSP to effectively incinerate the fuel as required by Washington and Ramsey Counties. This paper covers the six-month start-up of Red Wing No. 1, commencing in May 1987, and the operating results since the plant went commercial in July 1987.

  3. INITIAL EVALUATION OF A PULSED WHITE SPECTRUM NEUTRON GENERATOR FOR EXPLOSIVE DETECTION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    King, Michael J.; Miller, Gill T.; Reijonen, Jani; Ji, Qing; Andresen, Nord; Gicquel,, Frederic; Kavlas, Taneli; Leung, Ka-Ngo; Kwan, Joe

    2008-06-02

    Successful explosive material detection in luggage and similar sized containers is acritical issue in securing the safety of all airline passengers. Tensor Technology Inc. has recently developed a methodology that will detect explosive compounds with pulsed fast neutron transmission spectroscopy. In this scheme, tritium beams will be used to generate neutrons with a broad energy spectrum as governed by the T(t,2n)4He fission reaction that produces 0-9 MeV neutrons. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), in collaboration with Tensor Technology Inc., has designedand fabricated a pulsed white-spectrum neutron source for this application. The specifications of the neutron source are demanding and stringent due to the requirements of high yield and fast pulsing neutron emission, and sealed tube, tritium operation. In a unique co-axial geometry, the ion source uses ten parallel rf induction antennas to externally couple power into a toroidal discharge chamber. There are 20 ion beam extraction slits and 3 concentric electrode rings to shape and accelerate the ion beam into a titanium cone target. Fast neutron pulses are created by using a set ofparallel-plate deflectors switching between +-1500 volts and deflecting the ion beams across a narrow slit. The generator is expected to achieve 5 ns neutron pulses at tritium ion beam energies between 80 - 120 kV. First experiments demonstrated ion source operation and successful beam pulsing.

  4. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  5. Simulation enabled safeguards assessment methodology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bean, Robert; Bjornard, Trond; Larson, Tom

    2007-07-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wire-frame construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed. (authors)

  6. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and

  7. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-07-26

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  8. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  9. Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards: An Introduction to Safeguards for Emerging Nuclear States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod; Mathews, Caroline E.; Solodov, Alexander; Zhernosek, Alena; Raffo-Caiado, Ana; Baldwin, George; Horak, Karl; McClelland-Kerr, John; VanSickle, Matthew; Mininni, Margot; Kovacic, Donald

    2009-10-06

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hosted a workshop from May 4-22, 2009, on the fundamental elements of international safeguards. Entitled "A Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards," the workshop introduced post-graduate students from Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to the fundamental issues and best practices associated with international safeguards and encouraged them to explore potential career paths in safeguards. Workshops like these strengthen the international safeguards regime by promoting the development of a "safeguards culture" among young nuclear professionals within nascent nuclear countries. While this concept of safeguards culture is sometimes hard to define and even harder to measure, this paper will demonstrate that the promotion of safeguards cultures through workshops like these justifies the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

  10. a state department perspective on IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kessler, J.C. )

    1989-07-01

    The maintenance of effective international safeguards is a fundamental tenet of U.S. non-proliferation policy. The U.S. Department of State plays a substantial role not only in articulating U.S. non-proliferation policy, but in the implementation of that policy, including a substantial role in all aspects of U.S. support of IAEA safeguards. The State Department's role in supporting IAEA safeguards ranges from considerations related to bilateral agreements for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and export control to many rather technical aspects of safeguards such as the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) and negotiation of Facility Attachments for U.S. nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. TSO plays an important role in support of these efforts by providing technical advice on a broad range of matters where technical and policy issues are closely intertwined.

  11. UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System CHANGE OF PROJECT NUMBER UPDATE PROJECT Project Number: Title: Date Valid: Date Deactivated: Classification Codes: Project Number: ...

  12. FAQS Reference Guide – Safeguards and Security

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This reference guide addresses the competency statements in the May 2009 edition of DOE-STD-1171-2009, Safeguards and Security Functional Area Qualification Standard.

  13. Nuclear Nonproliferation, International Safeguards and Nuclear...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Conference: Nuclear Nonproliferation, International Safeguards and Nuclear Security in the Middle East Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Nuclear Nonproliferation, ...

  14. International safeguards recommendations for the Indian advanced...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    advanced heavy water reactor (AHWR) Citation Details In-Document Search Title: International safeguards recommendations for the Indian advanced heavy water reactor (AHWR) ...

  15. Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System | National Nuclear...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    About Our Programs Nuclear Security Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System NMMSS U.S. Department of Energy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Materials ...

  16. Safeguards & Security | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    programmatic input to assist the Assistant Manager for Contract Administration and Business Management with the formulation and execution oversight of the safeguards and...

  17. International safeguards recommendations for the Indian advanced...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    International safeguards recommendations for the Indian advanced heavy water reactor ... Visit OSTI to utilize additional information resources in energy science and technology. A ...

  18. Early AEC safeguards and TSO beginnings

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Higinbotham, W.A. )

    1989-07-01

    In 1967, a committee at Brookhaven National Laboratory suggested that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) should establish a safeguards technical support organization at a national laboratory. In February 1968, the AEC established the Technical Support Organization (TSO) at Brookhaven. The AEC 1968 safeguards R and D program and the first TSO task assignments are summarized. To illustrate the nature of the national safeguards activities of TSO during the following 20 years, some of the many field exercises, systems studies, special project, and technical assistance on implementing safeguards measures are described briefly.

  19. Safeguards and Security Program, acronyms and abbereviations...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    More Documents & Publications Safeguards and Security Glossary - DOE M 470.4-7 References, Canceled -7 Section B - April 16 2010 Briefing, Classification of Nuclear Weapons-Related ...

  20. Nuclear Nonproliferation, International Safeguards and Nuclear...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Nuclear Nonproliferation, International Safeguards and Nuclear Security in the Middle East Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Nuclear Nonproliferation, International ...

  1. US Department of Energy Central Training Academy safeguards and technical security training program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nessel, S. )

    1991-01-01

    In 1984 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) established the Central Training Academy (CTA). The academy's mission at that time was to provide state-of-the-art, standardized training to DOE and DOe contractor safeguards and security personnel. The CTA's primary mission still is to provide quality training of the safeguards and security personnel throughout the DOE who are, or may become, involved in the protection of vital national resources. Our major goals are to develop quality training instruction, use of an ongoing training evaluation program, establish and maintain a professional instructor cadre, and standardize training in the area of safeguards and security. This paper addresses current and future CTA training initiatives for safeguards and technical security programs. It also addresses specific courses, course content and objectives, and course prerequisites.

  2. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; Croft, Steven

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocolsmore » and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.« less

  3. Optical assay technology for safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Edelson, M.C.; Lipert, R.J.; Murray, G.M.; Schuler, R.A.; Vera, J.; Wang, Z.M.; Weeks, S.J.

    1990-10-01

    Research conducted in the Ames Laboratory Nuclear Safeguards and Security Program during the period July 1, 1990 to September 30, 1990 is reviewed; included are reprints and preprints of papers written during this quarter. The first demonstration of isotopic selectivity in Inductively Coupled Plasma -- Laser Excited Atomic Fluorescence Spectroscopy (ICP-LEAFS) is reported and the application of ICP-LEAFS to U isotopic analysis is discussed. Current work in applying optical spectroscopy to the analytical determination of gas phase metal atoms is reviewed. Program administration topics are included in a separately bound Management Supplement to this report.

  4. Safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: Why is Iran a...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: Why is Iran a Threat? Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: Why is Iran a ...

  5. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants ...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants Authors: Boyer, ...

  6. Proceedings of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Safety...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Proceedings of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Safety Culture Workshop Proceedings of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Safety Culture Workshop December 16, ...

  7. Safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: Why is Iran a...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Technical Report: Safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: Why is Iran a Threat? Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: ...

  8. Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support | U.S. DOE Office...

    Office of Science (SC) Website

    Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation Support NBL Program Office NBL PO Home About Programs Certified Reference Materials Program Measurement Evaluation Nuclear Safeguards and ...

  9. Success Through Safety, Security, and Safeguards by Design (3SBD...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Safeguards by Design (3SBD): From Concept to Application Workshop Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Success Through Safety, Security, and Safeguards by Design (3SBD): From ...

  10. Simulated process test bed for integrated safeguards operations...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    safeguards operations monitoring Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Simulated process test bed for integrated safeguards operations monitoring No abstract prepared. ...

  11. Using Rules-Based Event Processing For Safeguards Monitoring...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Processing For Safeguards Monitoring System Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Using Rules-Based Event Processing For Safeguards Monitoring System No abstract prepared. ...

  12. Working Toward Robust Process Monitoring for Safeguards Applications...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Working Toward Robust Process Monitoring for Safeguards Applications Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Working Toward Robust Process Monitoring for Safeguards Applications ...

  13. GNEP Element:Develop Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards | Department...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    A description of GNEP development of enhanced nuclear safeguards. GNEP Element:Develop Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards More Documents & Publications Global Nuclear Energy Partnership...

  14. Audit of the Department of Energy's Site Safeguards and Security...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Energy's Site Safeguards and Security Plans TO: The Secretary BACKGROUND: The Department's Safeguards and Security program is designed to provide appropriate, efficient, and...

  15. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants ...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants You are ...

  16. Application of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) instrumentation for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Lopez, Leon N; Le, Loan A; Veirs, D Kirk; Browne, Mike

    2010-01-01

    Advanced methodologies and improvements to current measurements techniques are needed to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of international safeguards. This need was recognized and discussed at a Technical Meeting on 'The Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards' held at IAEA headquarters (September 2006). One of the principal recommendations from that meeting was the need to pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (UBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials'. Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the 'Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications' also held at IAEA headquarters (July 2008). This meeting was attended by 12 LlBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of South Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. Following a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts agreed that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. Inspectors needs were grouped into the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activities in Hot Cells; (3) Verify status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. The primary tool employed by the IAEA to detect undeclared processes and activities at special nuclear material facilities and sites is environmental sampling. One of the objectives of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Program Plan calls for the development of advanced tools and methodologies to

  17. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Elayat, H A; O'Connell, W J; Boyer, B D

    2006-06-05

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems used in enrichment facilities. This research focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of the safeguards in protecting against the range of safeguards concerns for enrichment plants, including diversion of attractive material and unauthorized modes of use. We developed an Extend simulation model for a generic medium-sized centrifuge enrichment plant. We modeled the material flow in normal operation, plant operational upset modes, and selected diversion scenarios, for selected safeguards systems. Simulation modeling is used to analyze both authorized and unauthorized use of a plant and the flow of safeguards information. Simulation tracks the movement of materials and isotopes, identifies the signatures of unauthorized use, tracks the flow and compilation of safeguards data, and evaluates the effectiveness of the safeguards system in detecting misuse signatures. The simulation model developed could be of use to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, enabling the IAEA to observe and draw conclusions that uranium enrichment facilities are being used only within authorized limits for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will evaluate improved approaches to nonproliferation concerns, facilitating deployment of enhanced and cost-effective safeguards systems for an important part of the nuclear power fuel cycle.

  18. Improving the Transparency of IAEA Safeguards Reporting

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Toomey, Christopher; Hayman, Aaron M.; Wyse, Evan T.; Odlaug, Christopher S.

    2011-07-17

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data.

  19. Safeguards and Security Independent Oversight Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-12-23

    Establishes the DOE Safeguards and Security Independent Oversight Program that provides DOE and contractor managers, Congress, and other stakeholders with an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of DOE safeguards and security policy and programs, and the implementation of those policies and programs. Cancels DOE 5630.12A.

  20. NNSA and MEXT to Co-host Second International Meeting on Next Generation

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Safeguards | National Nuclear Security Administration | (NNSA) and MEXT to Co-host Second International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards October 20, 2009 NNSA and MEXT to Co-host Second International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards WASHINGTON - The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) will co-host the second international meeting on Next Generation Safeguards from Oct. 26 - 28, 2009

  1. Multimedia systems for safeguards training

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Guardini, S.; Loeschner, J.

    1995-12-31

    The Joint Research Center as part of its support program to Euratom safeguards, is developing a line of unattended systems for fresh fuel assemblies in fabrication plants (low enrichment and mixed oxide). These systems combine neutron coincidence counting in the form of a neutron collar and a vision system for identification of the fuel assembly. The system is unattended, i.e. it is integrated into the production flow of the facility, and there is no inspector presence during verification measurement. The facility operator loads the assembly into the unattended measurement station which then automatically starts its predefined measurement cycle without the intervention of the facility operator. The station positions the collar according to a programming strategy for each assembly type and loads/unloads its own AmLi source for active and passive measurements. This paper is a discussion of the training requirements for such a system and the development of multimedia training aids to meet these requirements.

  2. Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) into the design of small modular reactors : a handbook.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Middleton, Bobby D.; Mendez, Carmen Margarita

    2013-10-01

    The existing regulatory environment for nuclear reactors impacts both the facility design and the cost of operations once the facility is built. Delaying the consideration of regulatory requirements until late in the facility design - or worse, until after construction has begun - can result in costly retrofitting as well as increased operational costs to fulfill safety, security, safeguards, and emergency readiness requirements. Considering the scale and scope, as well as the latest design trends in the next generation of nuclear facilities, there is an opportunity to evaluate the regulatory requirements and optimize the design process for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), as compared to current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). To this end, Sandia has embarked on an initiative to evaluate the interactions of regulations and operations as an approach to optimizing the design of SMR facilities, supporting operational efficiencies, as well as regulatory requirements. The early stages of this initiative consider two focus areas. The first focus area, reported by LaChance, et al. (2007), identifies the regulatory requirements established for the current fleet of LWR facilities regarding Safety, Security, Operations, Safeguards, and Emergency Planning, and evaluates the technical bases for these requirements. The second focus area, developed in this report, documents the foundations for an innovative approach that supports a design framework for SMR facilities that incorporates the regulatory environment, as well as the continued operation of the facility, into the early design stages, eliminating the need for costly retrofitting and additional operating personnel to fulfill regulatory requirements. The work considers a technique known as Integrated Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (ISOSS) (Darby, et al., 2007). In coordination with the best practices of industrial operations, the goal of this effort is to develop a design framework that outlines how ISOSS

  3. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Santi, Peter A.; Hypes, Philip A.

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  4. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  5. Safeguards and Security Program, acronyms and abbereviations - DOE M

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    470.4-7 | Department of Energy Program, acronyms and abbereviations - DOE M 470.4-7 Safeguards and Security Program, acronyms and abbereviations - DOE M 470.4-7 August 26, 2005 Canceled Safeguards and Security Program acronyms and abbereviations Canceled -7 Section C Safeguards and Security Program acronyms and abbereviations Safeguards and Security Program, acronyms and abbereviations - DOE M 470.4-7 (381.95 KB) More Documents & Publications Safeguards and Security Glossary - DOE M

  6. Safeguards and Security Program - DOE Directives, Delegations...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    O 470.4B, Safeguards and Security Program by Mary Gallion Functional areas: Safety, Safety and Security, Security, Work Processes, To establish responsibilities for the U.S....

  7. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    R. Wigeland; T Bjornard; B. Castle

    2009-02-01

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organizations purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  8. Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gallucci, Nicholas; Poe, Sarah

    2015-10-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

  9. Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26

    Establishes program planning and management requirements for the Departments Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program. Cancels: DOE N 473.9 and DOE M 470.1-1

  10. Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26

    The manual establishes program planning and management requirements for the Departments Safeguards and Security. Chg 1, dated 3-7-06 Cancels DOE N 473.9, DOE M 470.1-1 Chg 2.

  11. Safeguards and Security Program and Project Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-04-18

    The proposed revision to this Department of Energy Guide focuses on alignment of guidance for implementing key safeguard and security components to the DOE capital asset acquisition process with the revised DOE O 413.3B, Program and Project Management for Acquisition of Capital Assets, the revised DOE O 470.4B, Safeguard and Security Program, and the new series of DOE Orders replacing the DOE M 470.4 series of manuals.

  12. Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Policy

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-05-08

    The purpose of this Policy is to formalize an Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) framework. Safeguards and security management systems provide a formal, organized process for planning, performing, assessing, and improving the secure conduct of work in accordance with risk-based protection strategies. These systems are institutionalized through Department of Energy (DOE) directives and contracts. Does not cancel other directives. Canceled by DOE P 470.1A.

  13. Safeguards by design - industry engagement for new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F; Grice, Thomas; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) has initiated a Safeguards by Design (SBD) effort to encourage the incorporation of international (IAEA) safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign or retrofit the facility at a later date. The main goals of Safeguards by Design are to (1) make the implementation of international safeguards at new civil nuclear facilities more effective and efficient, (2) avoid costly and time-consuming re-design work or retrofits at such facilities and (3) design such facilities in a way that makes proliferation as technically difficult, as time-consuming, and as detectable as possible. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently hosted efforts to facilitate the use of Safeguards by Design for new uranium enrichment facilities currently being planned for construction in the U.S. While SBD is not a NRC requirement, the NRC is aiding the implementation of SBD by coordinating discussions between DOE's NA-24 and industry's facility design teams. More specifically, during their normal course of licensing discussions the NRC has offered industry the opportunity to engage with NA-24 regarding SBD.

  14. Coupling a transient solvent extraction module with the separations and safeguards performance model.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DePaoli, David W.; Birdwell, Joseph F.; Gauld, Ian C.; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; de Almeida, Valmor F.

    2009-10-01

    A number of codes have been developed in the past for safeguards analysis, but many are dated, and no single code is able to cover all aspects of materials accountancy, process monitoring, and diversion scenario analysis. The purpose of this work was to integrate a transient solvent extraction simulation module developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The SSPM was designed for materials accountancy and process monitoring analyses, but previous versions of the code have included limited detail on the chemical processes, including chemical separations. The transient solvent extraction model is based on the ORNL SEPHIS code approach to consider solute build up in a bank of contactors in the PUREX process. Combined, these capabilities yield a more robust transient separations and safeguards model for evaluating safeguards system design. This coupling and initial results are presented. In addition, some observations toward further enhancement of separations and safeguards modeling based on this effort are provided, including: items to be addressed in integrating legacy codes, additional improvements needed for a fully functional solvent extraction module, and recommendations for future integration of other chemical process modules.

  15. Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program nuclear materials measurement data: Phase 1: Final report, 1985 through 1986

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cacic, C.G.

    1988-08-01

    The New Brunswick Laboratory has been tasked by the US Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security to assess and evaluate the adequacy of measurement technology as applied to materials accounting in US Department of Energy nuclear facilities. The Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program was developed as a means to monitor and evaluate the quality and effectiveness of accounting measurements by site, material balance area, or unit process. Phase 1 of the Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program, initiated during 1985, involved evaluation of the primary accountability measurement methods at six US Department of Energy Defense Programs facilities. Resulting data are presented and evaluated as indicators of current state-of-the-practice accountability measurement methodology, deficiencies in materials accounting practices, and areas for possible assistance in upgrading measurement capabilities. 22 figs., 5 tabs.

  16. U. S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brenner, L.M.; McDowell, S.C.T. )

    1989-07-01

    In discussing the U.S. safeguards history and the evolution of safeguards research and development, five significant eras are identified. The period ending January 1, 1947, may be called the first era. Safeguards as known today did not exist and the classic military approach of security protection applied. The second era covers the period from 1947 to 1954 (when the Atomic Energy Act was completely rewritten to accommodate the then foreseen Civil uses Program and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the first steps were taken by the Atomic Energy Commission to establish material accounting records for all source and fissionable materials on inventory. The third era covers the period 1954 through 1968, which focused on nuclear safeguards in its domestic activities and made major policy changes in its approach to material control and accountability. The fourth era, 1968 to 1972 saw a quantum jump in the recognition and need for a significant safeguards research and development program, answered by the formation of a safeguards technical support organization at Brookhaven National Laboratory and a safeguards Laboratory at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for the development and application of non-destructive assay technology. The fifth era had its beginning in 1972 with the burgeoning of international terrorism. The corresponding need for a strong physical protection research and development support program was responded to by the Sandia National Laboratory.

  17. The evolution of information-driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Budlong-sylvester, Kory W; Pilat, Joseph F

    2010-10-14

    From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

  18. Safeguards and Security for Program and Project Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-08-15

    This Guide addresses the implementation steps for achieving safeguards and security systems that support the Department's projection objectives.

  19. ORO Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System and Visitor

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Control System PIA, Oak Ridge Operations Office | Department of Energy Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System and Visitor Control System PIA, Oak Ridge Operations Office ORO Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System and Visitor Control System PIA, Oak Ridge Operations Office ORO Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System and Visitor Control System PIA, Oak Ridge Operations Office ORO Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System and

  20. PIA - Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Electronic Safeguards Security

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    System (E3S) | Department of Energy Electronic Safeguards Security System (E3S) PIA - Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Electronic Safeguards Security System (E3S) PIA - Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Electronic Safeguards Security System (E3S) PIA - Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Electronic Safeguards Security System (E3S) (3.6 MB) More Documents & Publications PIA - 10th International Nuclear Graphite Specialists Meeting registration web site PIA - HSPD-12 Physical and Logical

  1. Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26

    The manual establishes program planning and management requirements for the Departments Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program. Change 2 is a revision to Section M of both the Manual and the CRD to realign the process for establishing deviations from DOE directives containing safeguards and security requirements to reflect established Departmental policy as set forth in DOE O 251.1C. Original publication, 8-26-05; Chg 1, 3-7-06. Canceled by DOE O 470.4B

  2. The New Brunswick Laboratory Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cacic, C.G.; Trahey, N.M.; Zook, A.C.

    1987-07-01

    The New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) has been tasked by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) to assess and evaluate the adequacy of measurement technology as applied to materials accounting in DOE nuclear facilities. The Safeguards Measurement Evaluation (SME) Program was developed as a means to monitor and evaluate the quality and effectiveness of accounting measurements by site, material balance area (MBA), or unit process. Phase I of the SME Program, initiated during 1985, involved evaluation of the primary accountability measurement methods at six DOE Defense Programs facilities: Savannah River Plant, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Y-12 Plant, Rocky Flats Plant, Rockwell Hanford Operations, and NBL. Samples of uranyl nitrate solution, dried plutonium nitrates, and plutonium oxides were shipped to the participants for assay and isotopic abundance measurements. Resulting data are presented and evaluated as indicators of current state-of-the-practice accountability measurement methodology, deficiencies in materials accounting practices, and areas for possible assistance in upgrading measurement capabilities. Continuing expansion of the SME Program to include materials which are representative of specific accountability measurement points within the DOE complex is discussed.

  3. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  4. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  5. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards after Iraq - some Austrailian perceptions

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bardsley, J.; Carlson, J.; Hill, J.

    1994-12-31

    Iraq`s nuclear weapons development program used facilities and nuclear material separate from its safeguarded activities. To detect such a strategy the IAEA`s safeguards inspectors need access to locations and information beyond that foreseen in NPT safeguards agreements. But the IAEA is short of money. And detecting undeclared activities could be expensive. If the IAEA can establish a capability to detect undeclared activities, then it might be able to save on regular safeguards. But it`s important not to put the cart before the horse - effective safeguards must come first, savings second.

  6. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Whitaker, Jr., James; Garner, James R; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Gilligan, Kimberly V; Younkin, James R; Hooper, David A; Henkel, James J; Krichinsky, Alan M

    2011-01-01

    As Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) increase in separative work unit (SWU) capacity, the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model safeguards approach needs to be strengthened. New measures to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approach are being investigated that will be mutually beneficial to the facility operators and the IAEA. One of the key concepts being studied for application at future GCEPs is embracing joint use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. A mock F/W system was built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to generate and collect F/W data from an analogous system. The ORNL system has been used to collect data representing several realistic normal process and off-normal (including diversion) scenarios. Emphasis is placed on the novelty of the analysis of data from the sensors as well as the ability to build information out of raw data, which facilitates a more effective and efficient verification process. This paper will provide a progress report on recent accomplishments and next steps.

  7. Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sanders, K.E. )

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program.

  8. Technical support organization efforts in support of IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gordon, D.M. )

    1989-07-01

    The Technical Support Organization (TSO) of the Brookhaven National Laboratory has been carrying out tasks in support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards since 1968, when TSO was founded. These tasks have been funded by both the Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security and by the United States Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). These tasks have included a variety of systems studies (e.g. the zone approach to IAEA safeguards, the Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment Methodology, and international safeguards for uranium enrichment plants), development of instruments (e.g., the automated electromanometer and the load-cell-based weighing system for UF/sub 6/ cylinders), preparation of guidance documents, training of inspectors, and the development and evaluation of safeguards seals. This paper reviews some of the highlights from this program of support.

  9. Microsoft Word - NETL-TRS-X-2015_Field-Generated Foamed Cement Initial Collection, Computed Tomography, and Analysis.final.2015

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Field-Generated Foamed Cement: Initial Collection, Computed Tomography, and Analysis 20 July 2015 Office of Fossil Energy NETL-TRS-5-2015 Disclaimer This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information,

  10. Select Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Plant Design for Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) per Used Fuel Campaign

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott Francis; Sprinkle, James K.

    2015-05-26

    As preparation to the year-end deliverable (Provide SSBD Best Practices for Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant) for the Work Package (FT-15LA040501–Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage), the initial step was to select a generic dry-storage pilot plant design for SSBD. To be consistent with other DOE-NE Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCR&D) activities, the Used Fuel Campaign was engaged for the selection of a design for this deliverable. For the work Package FT-15LA040501–“Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage”, SSBD will be initiated for the Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant described by the layout of Reference 2. SSBD will consider aspects of the design that are impacted by domestic material control and accounting (MC&A), domestic security, and international safeguards.

  11. Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR&PP case study results

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D

    2009-01-01

    The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design

  12. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Badwan, Faris M.; Demuth, Scott Francis; Miller, Michael Conrad; Pshakin, Gennady

    2015-02-23

    Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may

  13. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied

  14. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  15. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beyer, Brian David; Beddingfield, David H; Durst, Philip; Bean, Robert

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  16. A Monte Carlo based spent fuel analysis safeguards strategy assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fensin, Michael L; Tobin, Stephen J; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Menlove, Howard O; Sandoval, Nathan P

    2009-01-01

    Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for quantifying plutonium mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, creating diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here the generalized

  17. Education in Safeguards and Security Technology Meeting Challenges with Technology and Experience

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Paschal, Linda J; Chapman, Jeffrey Allen; Rowe, Nathan C; Stinson, Brad J

    2011-01-01

    Education and hands-on experience are crucial to ensuring a workforce of safeguards and security professionals who can meet the challenges currently faced in global nuclear safeguards and security. Global demand for nuclear energy and technology, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the cleanup of Cold War facilities have resulted in an increased need for trained safeguards and security personnel. At the same time, the global community is facing a growing shortage of experienced workers with hands-on knowledge of nuclear material processing. Limited access to operating facilities has dramatically reduced the opportunities for next-generation practitioners to obtain hands-on training experience. To address these needs, the Safeguards Technology Integration Center (STIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was created as a Department of Energy User Facility to provide access both to the latest technology and to field-experienced professionals. The STIC provides real-world conditions, process equipment mock-ups, and controlled access to encapsulated radioactive materials (including highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for training and technology evaluation encompassing various techniques and skills, such as Radiation Inspection Systems, Containment and Surveillance Systems, Nondestructive Assay, Security System Performance Testing, and System Design and Analysis. The STIC facilities, laboratories, test beds, and training facilities are described along with the more notable aspects of the training program, which has included more than 1000 participants in the last four years.

  18. SAFEGUARD AND SECURE CONTROL VERIFY POLICY

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Fall 2014 National Nuclear Security Administration ENERGY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF NIS Leads International Workshop to Strengthen Nuclear Safeguards Regime By Jessica WilBourne and sean dunlop T he National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)'s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) recently concluded a five-day workshop aimed at strengthening the ability of countries to ensure that civilian nuclear material is not being used for the illicit manufacture of nuclear weapons.

  19. safeguards and security | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    safeguards and security ProForce marks 65 years protecting Sandia resources, facilities, people Current and former members of the Lab's Protective Force gathered to reflect on and recognize the contributions ProForce has made to securing Sandia National Laboratory's resources, facilities, and people. Over the past 65 years, the force has changed in size and structure but its mission has... Nuclear Verification Challenge: Maintain the U.S. ability to monitor and verify nuclear reduction

  20. Implementation of Safeguards and Security Policy Panels

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    5,2008 MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION FROM URITY OFFICER AND SECURITY SUBJECT: Implementation of Safeguards and Security Policy Panels The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) recognizes the importance of well- conceived strategies and policies to support and communicate the security posture of the Department. In order for our security policies to properly reflect and enable Department of Energy corporate strategies, early and frequent communication between policy makers and end users is

  1. UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System CHANGE OF PROJECT NUMBER UPDATE PROJECT Project Number: Title: Date Valid: Date Deactivated: Classification Codes: Project Number: Project Title: Associated Materials: Programmatic RIS Previous Project Number(s) Status Code Allotment Code (S=Supplier, U=User) I authorize that the information listed above is for the NMMSS Program to use as part of the project number conversion process for this facility. Signature of Authorized Official Date

  2. Science and Technology Challenges for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mark Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The science and technology challenges for international safeguards range from cutting edge physics needs to practical technology solutions for high volume data handling and analysis issues. This paper will take a narrow look at some of the predominant challenges, which include those at high throughput commercial facilities and those in the detection of undeclared facilities. It is hoped that by highlighting these areas it can encourage a concerted effort by scientific institutions and industry to provide robust cost-effective solutions.

  3. Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert J. Goldston and Alexander Glaser

    2012-08-10

    Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

  4. Project planning at the Hanford Site for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards of excess fissile material

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, B.W.; McRae, L.P.; Walker, A.C.

    1995-06-01

    In his September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton proposed several initiatives to promote nuclear nonproliferation. One element is of these initiatives was that the United States offered to place excess fissile material under International Atomic Energy Agency @A) safeguards. Three Department of Energy (DOE) facilities were identified as part of a phased approach for initial implementation. This paper describes the planning process used to provide information to assist the DOE in making decisions for the initial offer, outlines tasks to be performed, and develops a budget request. The process consisted of: (1) Characterizing the Hanford Site from the perspective of IAEA safeguards; (2) identify key issues to be resolved; (3) developing budget estimates and schedules; (4) interfacing with other DOE components and the IAEA to clarify expected activities; and (5) initiating additional data collection and preparatory activities to reduce planning uncertainties.

  5. Memorandum, Safeguards & Security Policy Panels - February 15, 2008 |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Department of Energy Memorandum, Safeguards & Security Policy Panels - February 15, 2008 Memorandum, Safeguards & Security Policy Panels - February 15, 2008 February 15, 2008 As outlined in the attached HSS memo, dated December 3,2007, subject: Safeguards and Security Policy Panels, the HSS Office of Security Policy is establishing several new policy panels that will create new opportunities for communication and will include those current active groups that are now effectively

  6. Integrating Safeguards, Security, & Emergency Services at CNS | Y-12

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    National Security Complex Integrating Safeguards, ... Integrating Safeguards, Security, & Emergency Services at CNS Posted: October 14, 2015 - 5:34pm Lindy Pyatt, Y-12 S&S Performance Assurance Issues Management, assists Gannon Tucker, the CNS SS&ES change control administrator based at Pantex, with consolidating security's document control. Integrating organizations across two states (and two time zones) can be complex. The divisions within the Safeguards, Security, &

  7. Voluntary Protection Program Onsite Review, Safeguards and Security- August 2012

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Evaluation to determine whether Safeguards and Security at Hanford is continuing to perform at a level deserving DOE-VPP Star recognition.

  8. Summary of safeguards interactions between Los Alamos and Chinese scientists

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-04-20

    Los Alamos has been collaborating since 1984 with scientists from the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) to develop nuclear measurement instrumentation and safeguards systems technologies that will help China support implementation of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). To date, four Chinese scientists have visited Los Alamos, for periods of six months to two years, where they have studied nondestructive assay instrumentation and learned about safeguards systems and inspection techniques that are used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Part of this collaboration involves invitations from the CIAE to US personnel to visit China and interact with a larger number of Institute staff and to provide a series of presentations on safeguards to a wider audience. Typically, CIAE scientists, Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering (BINE) staff, and officials from the Government Safeguards Office attend the lectures. The BINE has an important role in developing the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle. BINE is designing a reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel from Chinese nuclear Power reactors. China signed the nonproliferation treaty in 1992 and is significantly expanding its safeguards expertise and activities. This paper describes the following: DOE support for US and Chinese interactions on safeguards; Chinese safeguards; impacts of US-China safeguards interactions; and possible future safeguards interactions.

  9. Safeguards and Security for Program and Project Management -...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Program Management, Property Management, Safety and Security The Guide provides a methodology for implementing the safeguards and security requirements of DOE O 413.3B....

  10. Parker, J.L. 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    for plutonium and americium-241 decay corrections Sampson, T.E.; Parker, J.L. 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; AMERICIUM 241; DECAY; PLUTONIUM;...

  11. Practical issues associated with implementing an advanced safeguards...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    at gas centrifuge enrichment facilities Citation Details In-Document Search Title: Practical issues associated with implementing an advanced safeguards approach at gas ...

  12. The IAEA and the International Safeguards System (Technical Report...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    The IAEA and the International Safeguards System Citation Details In-Document Search ... Sponsoring Org: DOELANL Country of Publication: United States Language: English Subject: ...

  13. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (Conference...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (FW) stations. ... CAPACITY; GAS CENTRIFUGES; IAEA; MONITORING; ORNL; SAFEGUARDS; SENSORS; ...

  14. Safeguards and Security for Program and Project Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-08-15

    The Guide provides a methodology for implementing the safeguards and security requirements of DOE O 413.3B. Supersedes DOE G 413.3-3.

  15. Voluntary Protection Program Onsite Review, Safeguards and Security...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Safeguards and Security - August 2012 Voluntary Protection Program Onsite Review, FLUOR HANFORD SAS - February 2008 Voluntary Protection Program Onsite Review, Hanford...

  16. Microsoft PowerPoint - Implementation of IAEA safeguards_Peter...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Subcommittee on International Safeguards and Monitoring (SISM) IAEA Steering Committee (IAEA-SC) National Security Council (NSC) Non-Proliferation IPC Sub-Interagency Policy ...

  17. PNNL hosts NNSA early-career safeguards professionals | National...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Participants saw the inner workings of nuclear production, ... the International Atomic Energy Agency. "Participants came ... aiming for-ensuring a sustainable safeguards capability ...

  18. FAQS Reference Guide – Safeguards and Security General Technical Base

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    This reference guide addresses the competency statements in the July 2009 edition of DOE-STD-1123-2009, Safeguards and Security General Technical Base Qualification Standard.

  19. A Brief History of International Safeguards (Technical Report...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Research Org: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Sponsoring Org: DOELANL Country of Publication: United States Language: English Subject: Nuclear Disarmament, Safeguards, & ...

  20. International Safeguards Regime (Technical Report) | SciTech...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Research Org: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Sponsoring Org: DOELANL Country of Publication: United States Language: English Subject: Nuclear Disarmament, Safeguards, & ...

  1. Safeguards and Security Oversight and Assessments Implementation Guide

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-12-21

    This Guide identifies acceptable methods for implementing the safeguards and security provisions of DOE O 226.1A. Canceled by DOE N 251.80.

  2. Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Arrigo, Leah M.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Christensen, Richard; Douglas, Matthew; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Liezers, Martin; Orton, Christopher R.; Peper, Shane M.; Schwantes, Jon M.

    2010-05-21

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. Currently, methods to verify that the facilities are operating under adequate safeguard-declared conditions require time consuming sampling and expensive, destructive analysis. The time delay between sampling and subsequent analysis provides a potential opportunity to divert the material out of the appropriate chemical stream. One way to avoid this problem is to use process monitoring equipment that is capable of on-line and in near-real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Three integrated systems for flowsheet monitoring are currently being developed at PNNL including: 1) Multi-Isotope Process Monitor (MIP), 2) a spectroscopy-based monitor utilizing UV-Vis-NIR (Ultra Violet-Visible-Near Infrared) and Raman spectrometers, and 3) Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). MIP uses gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The UV-Vis-NIR and Raman spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and preconcentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection via non-destructive assay by gamma spectroscopy or destructive analysis with mass spectrometry. PNNL previously reported some of its initial modeling work as proof of principle. Here we will provide a general overview of the technologies and the ongoing demonstrations that utilize actual spent fuel.

  3. Advances toward a transportable antineutrino detector system for reactor monitoring and safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reyna, D.; Bernstein, A.; Lund, J.; Kiff, S.; Cabrera-Palmer, B.; Bowden, N. S.; Dazeley, S.; Keefer, G.

    2011-07-01

    Nuclear reactors have served as the neutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Our SNL/LLNL collaboration has demonstrated that such antineutrino based monitoring is feasible using a relatively small cubic meter scale liquid scintillator detector at tens of meters standoff from a commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). With little or no burden on the plant operator we have been able to remotely and automatically monitor the reactor operational status (on/off), power level, and fuel burnup. The initial detector was deployed in an underground gallery that lies directly under the containment dome of an operating PWR. The gallery is 25 meters from the reactor core center, is rarely accessed by plant personnel, and provides a muon-screening effect of some 20-30 meters of water equivalent earth and concrete overburden. Unfortunately, many reactor facilities do not contain an equivalent underground location. We have therefore attempted to construct a complete detector system which would be capable of operating in an aboveground location and could be transported to a reactor facility with relative ease. A standard 6-meter shipping container was used as our transportable laboratory - containing active and passive shielding components, the antineutrino detector and all electronics, as well as climate control systems. This aboveground system was deployed and tested at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in southern California in 2010 and early 2011. We will first present an overview of the initial demonstrations of our below ground detector. Then we will describe the aboveground system and the technological developments of the two antineutrino

  4. A Simple Candle Filter Safeguard Device

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hurley, J.P.; Henderson, A.K.; Swanson, M.L.

    2002-09-18

    In order to reach the highest possible efficiencies in a coal-fired turbine-based power system, the turbine should be directly fired with the products of coal utilization. Two main designs employ these turbines: those based on pressurized fluidized-bed combustors (PFBCs) and those based on integrated gasification combined cycles (IGCCs). In both designs, the suspended particulates, or dust, must be cleaned from the gas before it enters the turbine to prevent fouling and erosion of the blades. To produce the cleanest gas, barrier filters are being developed and are in commercial use. Barrier filters are composed of porous, high-temperature materials that allow the hot gas to pass but collect the dust on the surface. The three main configurations are candle, cross-flow, and tube. Both candle and tube filters have been tested extensively. They are primarily composed of coarsely porous ceramic that serves as a structural support, overlain with a thin, microporous ceramic layer o n the dirty gas side that serves as the primary filter surface. They are highly efficient at removing particulate matter from the gas stream and, because of their ceramic construction, are resistant to gas and ash corrosion. However, ceramics are brittle, and individual elements can fail, allowing the particulates to pass through the hole left by the filter element and erode the turbine. Because of the possibility of occasional filter breakage, safeguard devices (SGDs) must be employed to prevent the dust streaming through broken filters from reaching the turbine. The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC) safeguard device is composed of three main parts: the ceramic substrate, the adhesive coating, and the safeguard device housing. This report describes the development and laboratory testing of each of those parts as well as the bench-scale performance of both types of complete SGDs.

  5. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D.

    2013-07-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

  6. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for ... Title: A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and ...

  7. The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schanfein, Mark J; Gouveia, Fernando S

    2010-07-01

    The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls.

  8. Safeguard By Design Lessons Learned from DOE Experience Integrating Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hockert, John; Burbank, Roberta L.

    2010-04-13

    This paper identifies the lessons to be learned for the institutionalization of Safeguards by Design (SBD) from the Department of Energy (DOE) experience developing and implementing DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process. The experience is valuable because of the similarity of the challenges of integrating safety and safeguards into the design process. The paper reviews the content and development of DOE-STD-1189-2008 from its initial concept in January 2006 to its issuance in March 2008. Lessons learned are identified in the areas of the development and structure of requirements for the SBD process; the target audience for SBD requirements and guidance, the need for a graded approach to SBD, and a possible strategy for development and implementation of SBD within DOE.

  9. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  10. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  11. Electrochemically Modulated Separation for Plutonium Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pratt, Sandra H.; Breshears, Andrew T.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-12-31

    Accurate and timely analysis of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is critical in nuclear safeguards for detection of both protracted and rapid plutonium diversions. Gamma spectroscopy is a viable method for accurate and timely measurements of plutonium provided that the plutonium is well separated from the interfering fission and activation products present in spent nuclear fuel. Electrochemically modulated separation (EMS) is a method that has been used successfully to isolate picogram amounts of Pu from nitric acid matrices. With EMS, Pu adsorption may be turned "on" and "off" depending on the applied voltage, allowing for collection and stripping of Pu without the addition of chemical reagents. In this work, we have scaled up the EMS process to isolate microgram quantities of Pu from matrices encountered in spent nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Several challenges have been addressed including surface area limitations, radiolysis effects, electrochemical cell performance stability, and chemical interferences. After these challenges were resolved, 6 µg Pu was deposited in the electrochemical cell with approximately an 800-fold reduction of fission and activation product levels from a spent nuclear fuel sample. Modeling showed that these levels of Pu collection and interference reduction may not be sufficient for Pu detection by gamma spectroscopy. The main remaining challenges are to achieve a more complete Pu isolation and to deposit larger quantities of Pu for successful gamma analysis of Pu. If gamma analyses of Pu are successful, EMS will allow for accurate and timely on-site analysis for enhanced Pu safeguards.

  12. A colalborative environment for information driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Scott, Mark R; Michel, Kelly D

    2010-09-15

    For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

  13. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  14. Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hayes, Timothy; Nelson, Roger

    2012-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an over

  15. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  16. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  17. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  18. Apparatus for safeguarding a radiological source

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bzorgi, Fariborz M

    2014-10-07

    A tamper detector is provided for safeguarding a radiological source that is moved into and out of a storage location through an access porthole for storage and use. The radiological source is presumed to have an associated shipping container approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transporting the radiological source. The tamper detector typically includes a network of sealed tubing that spans at least a portion of the access porthole. There is an opening in the network of sealed tubing that is large enough for passage therethrough of the radiological source and small enough to prevent passage therethrough of the associated shipping cask. Generally a gas source connector is provided for establishing a gas pressure in the network of sealed tubing, and a pressure drop sensor is provided for detecting a drop in the gas pressure below a preset value.

  19. Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jacobsen, S.E.; Matthews, W.B. III; McKamy, E.D.; Pedigo, R.B. )

    1991-01-01

    This paper describes the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) which is sponsored by the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The system serves national security and program management interests, and international interests in the programs for the peaceful application of nuclear energy and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Within the scope of the NMMSS are found all nuclear materials applied and controlled under United States law and related international agreements, including U.S. nuclear materials production programs and U.S. private nuclear industrial activities. In addition, its national and international scope enables it to provide services to other organizations such as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of State, and the U.S. Congress.

  20. Analysis of the impact of safeguards criteria

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mullen, M.F.; Reardon, P.T.

    1981-01-01

    As part of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) was asked to assist in developing and demonstrating a model for assessing the impact of setting criteria for the application of IAEA safeguards. This report presents the results of PNL's work on the task. The report is in three parts. The first explains the technical approach and methodology. The second contains an example application of the methodology. The third presents the conclusions of the study. PNL used the model and computer programs developed as part of Task C.5 (Estimation of Inspection Efforts) of the Program of Technical Assistance. The example application of the methodology involves low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. The effects of variations in seven parameters are considered: false alarm probability, goal probability of detection, detection goal quantity, the plant operator's measurement capability, the inspector's variables measurement capability, the inspector's attributes measurement capability, and annual plant throughput. Among the key results and conclusions of the analysis are the following: the variables with the greatest impact on the probability of detection are the inspector's measurement capability, the goal quantity, and the throughput; the variables with the greatest impact on inspection costs are the throughput, the goal quantity, and the goal probability of detection; there are important interactions between variables. That is, the effects of a given variable often depends on the level or value of some other variable. With the methodology used in this study, these interactions can be quantitatively analyzed; reasonably good approximate prediction equations can be developed using the methodology described here.

  1. Safeguards optimization tool for the advanced fuel cycle facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DeMuth, Scott; Thomas, Kenneth; Dixon, Eleanor

    2007-07-01

    The planned Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF) is intended to support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) by demonstrating separation and fuel fabrication processes required to support an Advanced Burner Reactor. Advanced safeguards will be based on new world standards for the prevention of nuclear materials proliferation. Safeguarding nuclear facilities includes inventory accountancy, process monitoring, and containment and surveillance. An effort has been undertaken to optimize selection of technology for advanced safeguards accountancy, by way of using the Standard Error in the Inventory Difference (SEID) as a basis for cost/benefit analyses. (authors)

  2. Application of Telepresence Technologies to Nuclear Material Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wright, M.C.; Rome, J.A.

    1999-09-20

    Implementation of remote monitoring systems has become a priority area for the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international inspection regimes. For the past three years, DOE2000 has been the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) initiative to develop innovative applications to exploit the capabilities of broadband networks and media integration. The aim is to enhance scientific collaboration by merging computing and communications technologies. These Internet-based telepresence technologies could be easily extended to provide remote monitoring and control for confidence building and transparency systems at nuclear facilities around the world. One of the original DOE2000 projects, the Materials Microcharacterization Collaboratory is an interactive virtual laboratory, linking seven DOE user facilities located across the US. At these facilities, external collaborators have access to scientists, data, and instrumentation, all of which are available to varying degrees using the Internet. Remote operation of the instruments varies between passive (observational) to active (direct control), in many cases requiring no software at the remote site beyond a Web browser. Live video streams are continuously available on the Web so that participants can see what is happening at a particular location. An X.509 certificate system provides strong authentication, The hardware and software are commercially available and are easily adaptable to safeguards applications.

  3. Microsoft PowerPoint - Implementation of IAEA safeguards_Peter Habighorst [Compatibility Mode]

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in the U.S. Peter Habighorst, MC&A Branch Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Background 2 1957 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 1970 INFCIRC/66 Safeguards Model INFCIRC/153 Comprehensive Safeguards Model 1965 1972 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 1945 INFCIRC/540 Additional Protocol Model 1997 1953 Atoms for Peace The NPT requires NNWS to accept full-scope safeguards and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA Information

  4. U. S. department of energy safeguards research and development program and the brookhaven national laboratory technical support organization role

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hammond, G.A. )

    1989-07-01

    The Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) Technical Support Organization (TSO) has played a key role over the past 20 years in the evolution of much of the effective materials control and accountability systems implemented successfully at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. The safeguards research and development program of the U.S. DOE is summarized, noting the contributions of the BNL-TSO. During 1977-79, the non-proliferation features of many nuclear fuel cycles were studied in support of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. The Beirut bombings of 1982 led to increased emphasis on physical protection and to establishment of a Central Training Academy. High-level and all-DOE reviews of DOE safeguards and security led to major improvements in the management, operations, and assessment of DOE's safeguards and security programs during 1985-88. TSO is expected to continue to play a lead role in stimulating new research initiatives and in guiding the development that is necessary for future challenges in maintaining cost-effective and credible safeguards.

  5. Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnston, R. G.; Warner, Jon S.; Garcia, A. R. E.; Martinez, R. K.; Lopez, L. N.; Pacheco, A. N.; Trujillo, S. J.; Herrera, A. M.; Bitzer, E. G. , III

    2005-01-01

    There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

  6. Electrical Safety Investment Safeguards Employees at Large Idaho Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    IDAHO FALLS, Idaho – The Idaho Site’s main cleanup contractor is using a $1.8 million DOE investment to safeguard employees from the threat of second- and third-degree electrical arc flash burns.

  7. Microsoft PowerPoint - IAEA Safeguards Reporting Requirements...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards ... The reports are converted by NMMSS into the following IAEA data files: * MBR-288-1 ...

  8. Advanced integrated safeguards using front-end-triggering devices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Howell, J.A.; Whitty, W.J.

    1995-12-01

    This report addresses potential uses of front-end-triggering devices for enhanced safeguards. Such systems incorporate video surveillance as well as radiation and other sensors. Also covered in the report are integration issues and analysis techniques.

  9. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burr, Thomas L.; Hamada, Michael S.

    2012-08-24

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  10. FY09 Advanced Instrumentation and Active Interrogation Research for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    D. L. Chichester; S. A. Pozzi; E. H. Seabury; J. L. Dolan; M. Flaska; J. T. Johnson; S. M. Watson; J. Wharton

    2009-08-01

    Multiple small-scale projects have been undertaken to investigate advanced instrumentation solutions for safeguard measurement challenges associated with advanced fuel cycle facilities and next-generation fuel reprocessing installations. These activities are in support of the U.S. Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle Research and Development program and its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control for Transmutation (MPACT) campaign. 1) Work was performed in a collaboration with the University of Michigan (Prof. Sara Pozzi, co-PI) to investigate the use of liquid-scintillator radiation detectors for assaying mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, to characterize its composition and to develop advanced digital pulse-shape discrimination algorithms for performing time-correlation measurements in the MOX fuel environment. This work included both simulations and experiments and has shown that these techniques may provide a valuable approach for use within advanced safeguard measurement scenarios. 2) Work was conducted in a collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Dr. Paul Hausladen, co-PI) to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the fast-neutron coded-aperture imaging technique for locating and characterizing fissile material, and as a tool for performing hold-up measurements in fissile material handling facilities. This work involved experiments at Idaho National Laboratory, using MOX fuel and uranium metal, in both passive and active interrogation configurations. A complete analysis has not yet been completed but preliminary results suggest several potential uses for the fast neutron imaging technique. 3) Work was carried out to identify measurement approaches for determining nitric acid concentration in the range of 1 – 4 M and beyond. This work included laboratory measurements to investigate the suitability of prompt-gamma neutron activation analysis for this measurement and product reviews of other commercial solutions. Ultrasonic density analysis appears to be