Sample records for generation safeguards initiative

  1. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either are experts in international safeguards, or understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. The 44 participants represented eight national laboratories, four universities, three government organizations, two international organizations, two professional organizations, and three small companies. The goal of the ERIS workshop was to improve efforts to engage U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. At the workshop's conclusion, participants presented their findings to the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243). The report's major findings are summarized.

  2. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  3. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper S. E.

    2014-10-10T23:59:59.000Z

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  4. Next Generations Safeguards Initiative: The Life of a Cylinder

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Morgan, James B [ORNL; White-Horton, Jessica L [ORNL

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has begun a program based on a five-year plan to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders and their locations throughout the life cycle. A key initial activity in the NGSI program is to understand and document the 'life of a UF6 cylinder' from cradle to grave. This document describes the life of a UF6 cylinder and includes cylinder manufacture and procurement processes as well as cylinder-handling and operational practices at conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and depleted UF6 conversion facilities. The NGSI multiple-laboratory team is using this document as a building block for subsequent tasks in the five-year plan, including development of the functional requirements for cylinder-tagging and tracking devices.

  5. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17T23:59:59.000Z

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. Other university/organizations represented: University of California in LA, Stanford University, and the IAEA. Four of the students that completed this intensive course participated in a 2-month internship at LLNL. The conclusions of the two pilot courses and internships was a NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The Poster sessions were designed to provide a forum for sharing the results of their summer projects and providing experience in presenting their work to a varied audience of students, faculty and laboratory staff. The success of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of their two pilot efforts in the coming years.

  6. Next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI) program plan for safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lockwood, Dunbar [DOE/NA-243

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is defined as the incorporation of safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign the facility at a later date, or retrofit the completed facility. Not only can SBD avoid the need for redesign or retrofit, but consideration of safeguards features early in the facility design effort can provide for a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A program has been initiated by the United States Department of Energy during the past several years to develop, demonstrate and institutionalization SBD. This plan has been developed in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA while taking into account their achievements and future plans. The United States SBD program is focused on (1) identification of best practices that satisfy existing safeguards requirements, (2) identification of advanced concepts where best practices can be improved, and (3) institutionalizing SBD by gaining its acceptance as a global norm for the design of new nuclear facilities. SBD guidance documents are being prepared as an aid to industry for their design activities, to describe the relationship between requirements, best practices, and advanced concepts. SBD 'lessons learned' studies have been conducted to help identify the existing best practices and potential areas for improvement. Finally, acceptance as a global norm is being pursued by way of international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example by way of its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States.

  7. Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barefield Ii, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Clegg, Samuel M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Veirs, Douglas K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Browne, Mike [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lopez, Leon [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Martinez, Ron [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Le, Loan [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lamontagne, Stephen A [DOE/NNSA/NA241; Veal, Kevin [NN/ADTR

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as outlined in the NGSI will be discussed.

  8. INL Human Resource Development and the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gouveia, Fernando; Metcalf, Richard Royce Madison

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    It is the stated goal of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to promote the development of a strengthened nuclear safeguards base, one with the potential to advance the secure and peaceful implementation of nuclear energy world-wide. To meet this goal, the initiative, among other things, has sought to develop a revitalized effort to ensure the continued availability of next generation safeguards professionals. Accordingly, this paper serves to outline the human capital building strategies taken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in line with the NGSI. Various components are presented in detail, including INL’s efforts directed at university outreach, in particular the laboratory’s summer internship program, along with the development of various innovative training programs and long-term oriented strategies for student professional development. Special highlights include a video training series, developed by INL in cooperation with LLNL and other laboratories, which sought to expose students and entry-level professionals to the concept and practice of international nuclear safeguards.

  9. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA): A Nondestructive Assay Technique for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Plutonium Assay Challenge

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. W. Sterbentz; D. L. Chichester

    2010-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This is an end-of-year report for a project funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241). The goal of this project is to investigate the feasibility of using Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) to assay plutonium in commercial light-water-reactor spent fuel. This project is part of a larger research effort within the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to evaluate methods for assaying plutonium in spent fuel, the Plutonium Assay Challenge. The first-year goals for this project were modest and included: 1) developing a zero-order MCNP model for the NRTA technique, simulating data results presented in the literature, 2) completing a preliminary set of studies investigating important design and performance characteristics for the NRTA measurement technique, and 3) documentation of this work in an end of the year report (this report). Research teams at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and at several universities are also working to investigate plutonium assay methods for spent-fuel safeguards. While the NRTA technique is well proven in the scientific literature for assaying individual spent fuel pins, it is a newcomer to the current NGSI efforts studying Pu assay method techniques having just started in March 2010; several analytical techniques have been under investigation within this program for two to three years or more. This report summarizes a nine month period of work.

  10. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Overview and Policy Context of UF6 Cylinder Tracking Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Whitaker, J. Michael [ORNL; White-Horton, Jessica L. [ORNL; Durbin, Karyn R. [NNSA

    2012-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

    Thousands of cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) move around the world from conversion plants to enrichment plants to fuel fabrication plants, and their contents could be very useful to a country intent on diverting uranium for clandestine use. Each of these large cylinders can contain close to a significant quantity of natural uranium (48Y cylinder) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) (30B cylinder) defined as 75 kg {sup 235}U which can be further clandestinely enriched to produce 1.5 to 2 significant quantities of high enriched uranium (HEU) within weeks or months depending on the scale of the clandestine facility. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) kicked off a 5-year plan in April 2011 to investigate the concept of a unique identification system for UF{sub 6} cylinders and potentially to develop a cylinder tracking system that could be used by facility operators and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The goal is to design an integrated solution beneficial to both industry and inspectorates that would improve cylinder operations at the facilities and provide enhanced capabilities to deter and detect both diversion of low-enriched uranium and undeclared enriched uranium production. The 5-year plan consists of six separate incremental tasks: (1) define the problem and establish the requirements for a unique identification (UID) and monitoring system; (2) develop a concept of operations for the identification and monitoring system; (3) determine cylinder monitoring devices and technology; (4) develop a registry database to support proof-of-concept demonstration; (5) integrate that system for the demonstration; and (6) demonstrate proof-of-concept. Throughout NNSA's performance of the tasks outlined in this program, the multi-laboratory team emphasizes that extensive engagement with industry stakeholders, regulatory authorities and inspectorates is essential to its success.

  11. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gilligan, Kimberly [ORNL

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined • trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; • the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and • the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007).1 The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

  12. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hase, Kevin R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hawkins Erpenbeck, Heather [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

    Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.

  13. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Long, Jon D. [Y-12 National Security Complex] [Y-12 National Security Complex; McGinnis, Brent R [ORNL] [ORNL; Morgan, James B [ORNL] [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL] [ORNL; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA] [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA; Shipwash, Jacqueline L [ORNL] [ORNL

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working Group. The working group participants were tasked with providing recommendations for facility operators and designers, while promoting the IAEA's objectives of: (1) avoiding costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear facilities and (2) providing for more effective and efficient implementation of international safeguards.

  14. Initial Evaluation of a New Electromechanical Cooler for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coleman, RL

    2002-10-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The use of liquid nitrogen (LN{sub 2}) constitutes the current state of the art in cryogenic cooling for high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, which are widely used for {gamma}-ray and characteristic X-ray spectroscopy because of their excellent energy discrimination. Use of LN{sub 2} requires a liquid nitrogen supply, cumbersome storage tanks and plumbing, and the frequent attention of personnel to be sure that nitrogen levels are sufficient to maintain the detectors at a sufficiently low operating temperature. Safety hazards also are associated with the use of LN{sub 2}, both because of the potential for severe frostbite on exposure to skin and because it displaces ambient oxygen when it evaporates in closed spaces. Existing electromechanical coolers have, until now, been more expensive to procure and maintain than LN{sub 2} systems. Performance and reliability have also been serious issues because of microphonic degradation of photon energy peak resolution and cooler failures due to compressor oil becoming entrained in the refrigerant. This report describes the results of tests of a new HPGe detector cooling technology, the PerkinElmer ORTEC{reg_sign} Products X-Cooler{trademark} that, according to the manufacturer, significantly reduces the lifetime cost of the cooling system without degradation of the output signal. The manufacturer claims to have overcome cost, performance and reliability problems of older-generation electromechanical coolers, but the product has no significant history of use, and this project is the first independent evaluation of its performance for Total cost savings for the DOE and other agencies that use HPGe systems extensively for safeguards monitoring is expected to be quite significant if the new electromechanical cooler technology is shown to be reliable and if performance characteristics indicate its usefulness for this application. The technology also promises to make HPGe monitoring, characterization and detection available for unattended or covert operation and in remote or inaccessible locations where the unavailability of LN{sub 2} and signal degradation from existing mechanical coolers prevent its use at the present time.

  15. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  16. Developing the Next Generation of International Safeguards and Nonproliferation Experts: Highlights of Select Activities at the National Laboratories

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reed, J; Mathews, C; Kirk, B; Lynch, P; Doyle, J; Meek, E; Pepper, S; Metcalf, R

    2010-03-31T23:59:59.000Z

    With many safeguards experts in the United States at or near retirement age, and with the growing and evolving mission of international safeguards, attracting and educating a new generation of safeguards experts is an important element of maintaining a credible and capable international safeguards system. The United States National Laboratories, with their rich experience in addressing the technical and policy challenges of international safeguards, are an important resource for attracting, educating, and training future safeguards experts. This presentation highlights some of the safeguards education and professional development activities underway at the National Laboratories. These include university outreach, summer courses, internships, mid-career transition, knowledge retention, and other projects. The presentation concludes with thoughts on the challenge of interdisciplinary education and the recruitment of individuals with the right balance of skills and backgrounds are recruited to meet tomorrow's needs.

  17. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  18. Integrated safeguards testing laboratories in support of the advanced fuel cycle initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Santi, Peter A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Klasky, Kristen L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lee, Haeok [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sprinkle, James K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Williams, Bradley [DOE, NE

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A key enabler for advanced fuel cycle safeguards research and technology development for programs such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is access to facilities and nuclear materials. This access is necessary in many cases in order to ensure that advanced safeguards techniques and technologies meet the measurement needs for which they were designed. One such crucial facility is a hot cell based laboratory which would allow developers from universities, national laboratories, and commercial companies to perform iterative research and development of advanced safeguards instrumentation under realistic operating conditions but not be subject to production schedule limitations. The need for such a facility arises from the requirement to accurately measure minor actinide and/or fission product bearing nuclear materials that cannot be adequately shielded in glove boxes. With the contraction of the DOE nuclear complex following the end of the cold war, many suitable facilities at DOE sites are increasingly costly to operate and are being evaluated for closure. A hot cell based laboratory that allowed developers to install and remove instrumentation from the hot cell would allow for both risk mitigation and performance optimization of the instrumentation prior to fielding equipment in facilities where maintenance and repair of the instrumentation is difficult or impossible. These benefits are accomplished by providing developers the opportunity to iterate between testing the performance of the instrumentation by measuring realistic types and amounts of nuclear material, and adjusting and refining the instrumentation based on the results of these measurements. In this paper, we review the requirements for such a facility using the Wing 9 hot cells in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility as a model for such a facility and describe recent use of these hot cells in support of AFCI.

  19. BN-350 unattended safeguards system current status and initial fuel movement data

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, Richard Brady [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Browne, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Parker, Robert F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ingegneri, Maurizio [IAEA

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor facility in Aktau, Kazakhstan continues to provide safeguards monitoring data as the spent fuel disposition project transitions from wet fuel storage to dry storage casks. Qualitative data from the initial cask loading procedures has been released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is presented here for the first time. The BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, operated as a plutonium-producing facility from 1973 W1til 1999. Kazakhstan signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1994, and shortly afterwards the IAEA began safeguarding the reactor facility and its nuclear material. Slnce the cessation of reactor operations ten years ago, the chief proliferation concern has been the spent fuel assemblies stored in the pond on-site. By 2002, all fuel assemblies in wet storage had been repackaged into proliferation-resistant canisters. From the beginning, the IAEA's safeguards campaign at the BN-350 included a constant unattended sensor presence in the form of UNARM which monitors nuclear material activities at the facility in the absence of inspector presence. The UNARM equipment at the BN-350 was designed to be modular and extensible, allowing the system to adapt as the safeguards requirements change. This has been particularly important at the BN-350 due to the prolonged wet storage phase of the project. The primary function of the BN-350 UNARM system is to provide the IAEA with an independent, radiation-centric Containment and Surveillance (C&S) layer in addition to the standard seals and video systems. The UNARM system has provided continuous Continuity of Knowledge (COK) data for the BN-350's nuclear material storage areas in order to ensure the validity of the attended measurements during the lifetime of the project. The first of these attended measurements was characterization of the spent fuel assemblies. This characterization utilized the Spent Fuel Coincidence Counter (SFCC) instrument [ref] to measure neutron multiplicity and calculate Pu mass. These calculated masses were then compared to modeling simulation of the assemblies as well as declarations from the facility in order to baseline the amount of material under IAEA safeguards [ref]. Once the baseline was established, bundles of four or six assemblies were repackaged into proliferati n-resistant canisters. This provided an additional physical barrier to material diversion and provided further protection by choosing assemblies for each canister so that the overall dose rate met self-protection requirements. Each of the canisters were then characterized using a similar technique to the SFCC, but with the Spent Fuel Attribute Monitor (SPAM) instnunent (ref). The data from these measurements were then used to calculate an attribute proportional to the total Pu mass in each canister. This attribute was then compared to the know Pu mass of each assembly in order to verify the accuracy of SPAM. In the event that COK is lost, the SPAM detector remains positioned to reverify Pu content of individual canisters without requiring the canister to be opened.

  20. NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative | National Nuclear Security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

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  1. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Inaugural Conference | Department of

    Energy Savers [EERE]

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  2. Next Generation Safeguards Initiatives at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

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  3. Active Interrogation Using Electronic Neutron Generators for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    David L. Chichester; Edward H. Seabury

    2008-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. The most commonly used technique for performing active interrogation is to use an electronic neutron generator as the probe radiation source. Exploiting the unique operating characteristics of these devices, including their monoenergetic neutron emissions and their ability to operate in pulsed modes, presents a number of options for performing prompt and delayed signature analyses using both photon and neutron sensors. A review of literature in this area shows multiple applications of the active neutron interrogation technique for performing nuclear nonproliferation measurements. Some examples include measuring the plutonium content of spent fuel, assaying plutonium residue in spent fuel hull claddings, assaying plutonium in aqueous fuel reprocessing process streams, and assaying nuclear fuel reprocessing facility waste streams to detect and quantify fissile material. This paper discusses the historical use of this technique and examines its context within the scope and challenges of next-generation nuclear fuel cycles and advanced concept nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

  4. Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  5. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  6. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  7. The safeguards options study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  8. Safeguards Professional Development Opportunities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V [ORNL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Across the international field of safeguards there has been a rising awareness of the need for development of the next generation of safeguards professionals. The 2010 International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Symposium includes a suggested topic of 'developing safeguards professionals.' This can first be addressed by making university students and young professionals aware of safeguards and the unique career opportunities it encompasses. Then, once someone decides to go into safeguards he/she needs to be offered professional development opportunities in order to become a more effective member of the international safeguards community. This paper begins to do that by reviewing opportunities currently available. There are not many opportunities that are well advertised and this paper will serve to raise awareness of what does already exist and therefore benefit the international safeguards community. The current opportunities that will be discussed include training programs, graduate degrees, organizational outreach, professional networks, and intensive topic specific programs. The paper will also identify current needs and holes in the current offerings of professional development opportunities and suggest ways they can be filled. In the conclusion the paper addresses what types of programs are still needed.

  9. Evaluating alternative responses to safeguards alarms

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1982-04-15T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alarms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to have stolen special nuclear material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error - and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms.

  10. Process Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ehinger, Michael H [ORNL] [ORNL; Pomeroy, George D [ORNL] [ORNL; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W [ORNL] [ORNL

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Process Monitoring has long been used to evaluate industrial processes and operating conditions in nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In nuclear applications there is a recognized need to demonstrate the safeguards benefits from using advanced process monitoring on spent fuel reprocessing technologies and associated facilities, as a complement to nuclear materials accounting. This can be accomplished by: defining credible diversion pathway scenarios as a sample problem; using advanced sensor and data analysis techniques to illustrate detection capabilities; and formulating 'event detection' methodologies as a means to quantify performance of the safeguards system. Over the past 30 years there have been rapid advances and improvement in the technology associated with monitoring and control of industrial processes. In the context of bulk handling facilities that process nuclear materials, modern technology can provide more timely information on the location and movement of nuclear material to help develop more effective safeguards. For international safeguards, inspection means verification of material balance data as reported by the operator through the State to the international inspectorate agency. This verification recognizes that the State may be in collusion with the operator to hide clandestine activities, potentially during abnormal process conditions with falsification of data to mask the removal. Records provided may show material is accounted for even though a removal occurred. Process monitoring can offer additional fidelity during a wide variety of operating conditions to help verify the declaration or identify possible diversions. The challenge is how to use modern technology for process monitoring and control in a proprietary operating environment subject to safeguards inspectorate or other regulatory oversight. Under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a range of potential safeguards applications for process monitoring are under conceptual development and evaluation. This paper reports on a study of process monitoring for a sample problem involving spent fuel reprocessing with aqueous reprocessing technologies. This includes modeling the processes in the context of a nuclear material diversion scenario and measuring the associated process chemistry. A systems-centric model is applied using actual and simulated plant data, advanced sensors, anomaly detection methods, statistical analysis and data authentication methods, to help illustrate the benefits of process monitoring applications.

  11. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  12. Training in Environmental Analyses for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, R W; Gaffney, A M; Hutcheon, N A; Kersting, A B

    2009-05-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Responding to recommendations of the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a new course, Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards, is being offered as a summer internship opportunity at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first students completed the 8 week program during the summer of 2008. Interns are given training in the analysis of bulk environmental samples for safeguards through hands-on experience working in a clean laboratory, purifying U and Pu from bulk environmental samples, and measuring U and Pu isotope ratios by multi-collector ICP mass spectrometry. A series of lectures by invited safeguards and non-proliferation experts gives the students a broad picture of the safeguards work of the IAEA. At the end of the course, the students prepare a poster of their work to showcase at LLNL's summer student poster symposium. Both undergraduate and graduate students are recruited and hired as paid interns under the aegis of the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute in the Physical and Life Sciences Directorate at LLNL. This training course seeks to introduce students to analytical and interpretive skill-sets that are not generally taught at universities, and to encourage them to pursue careers with the IAEA.

  13. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19T23:59:59.000Z

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  14. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mullen, Mark [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-10-05T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  15. Next GeNeratioN SafeGuardS iNitiative

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

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  16. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duc Cao; Richard Metcalf

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguards optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

  17. Safeguards-by-Design: An Element of 3S Integration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    R. S. Bean; T. A. Bjornard; D. J. Hebdich

    2009-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2008, the “20/20 Vision for the Future” background report by the IAEA Director General identified the possibility of integrating certain activities related to safeguards, safety, and security. Later in the year, the independent Commission report prepared at the request of the IAEA Director General noted that the Agency’s roles in nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (3S) complement and can mutually reinforce each other. Safeguards-by-design (SBD) is a practical measure that strengthens 3S integration, especially for the stage of nuclear facility design and construction, but also with ramifications for other stages of the facility life-cycle. This paper describes the SBD concept, with examples for diverse regulatory environments, being developed in the U.S under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. This is compared with related international SBD work performed in the recent IAEA workshop on “Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards”. Potential future directions for further development of SBD and its integration within 3S are identified.

  18. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stevens, Rebecca S [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mc Clelland - Kerr, John [NNSA-NA-242; Senzaki, Masao [JAEA; Hori, Masato [JAEA

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  19. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper S. E.; .; Worrall, L.; Pickett, C.; Bachner, K.; Queirolo, A.

    2014-08-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, the U.S. Department of State, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a a workshop on the subject of ”Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation.” The workshop was held at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. The workshop participants included software and hardware experts from national laboratories, industry, government, and IAEA member states who were specially selected by the workshop organizers based on their experience with software that is developed for the control and operation of safeguards instrumentation. The workshop included presentations, to orient the participants to the IAEA Department of Safeguards software activities related to instrumentation data collection and processing, and case studies that were designed to inspire discussion of software development, use, maintenance, and upgrades in breakout sessions and to result in recommendations for effective software practices and management. This report summarizes the results of the workshop.

  20. Evaluation of a Business Case for Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Power Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wood, Thomas W.; Seward, Amy M.; Lewis, Valerie A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards by Design (SbD) is a well-known paradigm for consideration and incorporation of safeguards approaches and associated design features early in the nuclear facility development process. This paradigm has been developed as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and has been accepted as beneficial in many discussions and papers on NGSI or specific technologies under development within NGSI. The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine the business case justification of SbD for nuclear power reactors. Ultimately, the implementation of SbD will rely on the designers of nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is important to assess the incentives which will lead designers to adopt SbD as a standard practice for nuclear facility design. This report details the extent to which designers will have compelling economic incentives to adopt SbD.

  1. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been underappreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured. This paper argues that safeguards culture as an indicator of a country’s nonproliferation posture can be a useful tool.

  2. International Safeguards Technology and Policy Education and Training Pilot Programs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G A; Essner, J T; Dougan, A D; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokava, E; Wehling, F; Martin, J; Charlton, W

    2009-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

    A major focus of the National Nuclear Security Administration-led Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. NNSA launched two pilot programs in 2008 to develop university level courses and internships in association with James, Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU). These pilot efforts involved 44 students in total and were closely linked to hands-on internships at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between TAMU, LANL, and LLNL. The LANL-based coursework was shared with the students undertaking internships at LLNL via video teleconferencing. A weeklong hands-on exercise was also conducted at LANL. A second pilot effort, the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at MIIS in cooperation with LLNL. Speakers from MIIS, LLNL, and other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. The two pilots programs concluded with an NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The value of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of the two programs in the coming years.

  3. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future. Consequently, the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) sponsored a team of U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory nuclear safeguards experts and technologists to conduct a workshop on methods and technologies for improving this activity, under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Approaches Project. The workshop focused on reviewing and discussing the fundamental safeguards needs, and presented technology and/or methods that could potentially address those needs more effectively and efficiently. Conclusions and Recommendations for technology to enhance the performance of DIV inspections are presented by the workshop team.

  4. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC.

  5. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. • Life-cycle cost analysis can be a useful tool in safeguards design. • An important obstacle to straight forward application of life-cycle cost analysis is that there is no single organization responsible for the entire life-cycle cost of the facility. • The Safeguards Effectiveness Report (SGER) is proposed as a focus for the safeguards design activities, and is intended to be a living document that contains increasing safeguards relevant scope and content as the facility design emerges. Further work is required in a number of areas. The authors note that other studies supported by NGSI are addressing the development of requirements and performance criteria, as well as contributing to the design toolkit through the development of technology, methodology, and safeguards guidelines for designers. With respect to further development of the SBD design process, the authors recommend: • In the short term, conduct a workshop with interested industry representatives, to ensure that their perspectives and needs are factored into further development. • In the short term, provide NGSI SBD project documents to IAEA, and support them in the conduct of an ‘SBD Workshop II.” • In the medium term, continue to support the SBD demonstration work started with the Next Generation Nuclear Plant project. • In the longer term, conduct further studies to examine the integration of SBD into projects with concurrent consideration of physical security and safety.

  6. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04T23:59:59.000Z

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment was performed in September 2009 to test and demonstrate the applicability of the method to the quantitative measurement of an isotope of interest embedded in a thick target. The experiment, data analysis, and results are described in Section 4. The broad goal of our NRF studies is to assess the potential of the technique in safeguards applications. Three examples are analyzed in Section 5: the isotopic assay of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), the measurement of {sup 235}U enrichment in UF{sub 6} cylinders, and the determination of {sup 239}Pu in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The study of NRF for the assay of SNF assemblies was supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of the U.S. Department of Energy as part of a large multi-lab/university effort to quantify the plutonium (Pu) mass in spent nuclear fuel assemblies and to detect the diversion of pins with non-destructive assay (NDA) methods. NRF is one of 14 NDA techniques being researched. The methodology for performing and analyzing quantitative NRF measurements was developed for determining Pu mass in SNF and is extensively discussed in this report. The same methodology was applied to the assessment of NRF for the measurement of {sup 235}U enrichment and the determination of {sup 239}Pu in MOX fuel. The analysis centers on determining suitable NRF measurement methods, measurement capabilities that could be realized with currently available instrumentation, and photon source and detector requirements for achieving useful NDA capabilities.

  7. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  8. Eastern Renewable Generation Integration Study: Initial Results (Poster)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bloom, A.; Townsend, A.; Hummon, M.; Weekley, A.; Clark, K.; King, J.

    2013-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This poster presents an overview of the Eastern Renewable Generation Integration Study, which aims to answer critical questions about the future of the Eastern Interconnection under high levels of solar and wind generation penetration.

  9. International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zack, N.R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Safeguards Systems Group; Crawford, D.W. [USDOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Washington, DC (United States)

    1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies.

  10. Sustaining International CBRN Centers of Excellence with a Focus on Nuclear Security and Safeguards: Initial Scoping Session London, 23-24 September 2013 SUMMARY REPORT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anderson, Roger G.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-12T23:59:59.000Z

    This report provides a summary-level description of the key information, observations, ideas, and recommendations expressed during the subject meeting. The report is organized to correspond to the meeting agenda provided in Appendix 1 and includes references to several of the participants listed in Appendix 2 .The meeting venue was Lloyd’s Register in the City of London. Lloyd’s Register graciously accommodated the request of The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) with whom it works on various safeguards activities commissioned by NNSA. PNNL and NNSA also shared the goal of the meeting/study with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change with whom they coordinated the participant list.

  11. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  12. Development of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy instrumentatin for safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barefield Il, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Clegg, Samuel M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Le, Loan A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lopez, Leon N [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In September 2006, a Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards was held at IAEA headquarters (HQ). One of the principal recommendations from this meeting was the need to 'pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials.' Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications. This meeting was held at IAEA HQ from July 7-11,2008 and hosted by the Novel Technologies Unit (NTU). The meeting was attended by 12 LIBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. After a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts were in agreement that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. The needs of the IAEA inspectors were grouped in the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activity in a Hot Cell; (3) Verifying status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. Under the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Los Alamos National Laboratory is exploring three potential applications of LIBS for international safeguards. As part of this work, we are developing: (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements like plutonium and uranium; (2) a LIBS system that can be deployed in harsh environments such as gloveboxes and hot cells providing relative compositional analysis of process streams for example ratios like Cm/Pu and Cm/U; and (3) an inspector field deployable system that can be used to analyze the elemental composition of microscopic quantities of samples containing plutonium and uranium. In this paper we will describe our current development and performance testing results both in a fixed lab and measurements in field deployable configurations using LIBS instrumentation developed for applications to international safeguards.

  13. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-05-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order establishes roles and responsibilities for the Department of Energy Safeguards and Security Program. Cancels DOE O 470.4. Canceled by DOE O 470.4B

  14. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1988-01-22T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish the policy and responsibilities for the Department of Energy safeguards and security program. Does not cancel another directive. Canceled by DOE O 5630.11A dated 12-7-92.

  15. Safeguards Envelope Methodology 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Metcalf, Richard

    2012-02-14T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear safeguards are intrinsic and extrinsic features of a facility which reduce probability of the successful acquisition of special nuclear material (SNM) by hostile actors. Future bulk handling facilities in the United States will include both...

  16. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  17. Technology transfer significance of the International Safeguards Project Office

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Marcuse, W.; Waligura, A.J.

    1988-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are of major importance to the non-proliferation objectives of the United States of America and other nations of the world. Assurance of safeguards effectiveness is mandatory to continued peaceful use of nuclear power. To enhance the ability of the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively, and to ensure that the IAEA does not lack technical assistance in critical areas, the US Congress has made available a special authorization for a Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). This substantial program of technology transfer was initiated in 1976. The United States Departments of State and Energy, the Arms control and Disarmament Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have each accepted responsibility for parts of the Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards. Funding is provided by state through the Foreign Assistance Act. This report provides a discussion of this program.

  18. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.

  19. Feasibility of x ray fluorescence for spent fuel safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Freeman, Corey Ross [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mozin, Vladimir [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fensin, Michael L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; White, Julia M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croft, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stafford, Alissa [TAMU; Charlton, William [TAMU

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Quantifying the Pu content in spent nuclear fuel is necessary for many reasons, in particular to verify that diversion or other illicit activities have not occurred. Therefore, safeguarding the world's nuclear fuel is paramount to responsible nuclear regulation and public acceptance, but achieving this goal presents many difficulties from both a technical and economic perspective. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of NA-24 is funding a large collaborative effort between multiple laboratories and universities to improve spent nuclear fuel safeguards methods and equipment. This effort involves the current work of modeling several different nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. Several are being researched, because no single NDA technique, in isolation, has the potential to properly characterize fuel assemblies and offer a robust safeguards measure. The insights gained from this research, will be used to down-select from the original set a few of the most promising techniques that complement each other. The goal is to integrate the selected instruments to create an accurate measurement system for fuel verification that is also robust enough to detect diversions. These instruments will be fabricated and tested under realistic conditions. This work examines one of the NDA techniques; the feasibility of using x ray emission peaks from Pu and U to gather information about their relative quantities in the spent fuel. X Ray Fluorescence (XRF), is unique compared to the investigated techniques in that it is the only one able to give the elemental ratio of Pu to U, allowing the possibility of a Pu gram quantity for the assembly to be calculated. XRF also presents many challenges, mainly its low penetration, since the low energy x rays of interest are effectively shielded by the first few millimeters of a fuel pin. This paper will explore the results of Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) transport code calculations of spent fuel x ray peaks. The MCNPX simulations will be benchmarked against measurements taken at Oak Ridge. Analysis of the feasibility of XRFs role in spent nuclear fuel safeguards efforts, particularly in the context of the overall NGSI effort will be discussed.

  20. Safeguards and Security Program References

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes definitions for terms related to the Department of Energy Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program and includes lists of references and acronyms/abbreviations applicable to S&S Program directives. Cancels the Safeguards and Security Glossary of Terms, dated 12-18-95. Current Safeguards and Security Program References can also be found at Safeguards and Security Policy Information Resource (http://pir.pnl.gov/)

  1. Safeguard Security and Awareness Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2002-10-02T23:59:59.000Z

    Provides detailed requirements and procedures to supplement DOE O 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program, Chapter IV.

  2. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation methodology can be adapted for evaluating and assessing the safeguardability of nuclear facilities – both existing, as well as those still on the drawing board. The advantages of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis is that it would not only give the facility designer an analytical method for evaluating and assessing the safeguards measures and approaches for the prospective facility, but also the ability to optimize the design of the facility process for enhancing facility safeguardability. The following report explains the need for Facility Safeguardability Analysis and explains how it could be used in the Safeguards-by-Design, in support of the design and construction of nuclear facilities.

  3. Enhanced safeguards via solution monitoring

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burr, T.; Wangen, L.

    1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Solution monitoring is defined as the essentially continuous monitoring of solution level, density, and temperature in all tanks in the process that contain, or could contain, safeguards-significant quantities of nuclear material. This report describes some of the enhancements that solution monitoring could make to international safeguards. The focus is on the quantifiable benefits of solution monitoring, but qualitatively, solution monitoring can be viewed as a form of surveillance. Quantitatively, solution monitoring can in some cases improve diversion detection probability. For example, the authors show that under certain assumptions, solution monitoring can be used to reduce the standard deviation of the annual material balance, {sigma}{sub MB}, from approximately 17 kg to approximately 4 kg. Such reduction in {sigma}{sub MB} will not always be possible, as they discuss. However, in all cases, solution monitoring would provide assurance that the measurement error models are adequate so that one has confidence in his estimate of {sigma}{sub MB}. Some of the results in this report were generated using data that were simulated with prototype solution monitoring software that they are developing. An accompanying document describes that software.

  4. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  5. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish responsibilities for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program, and to establish program planning and management requirements for the S&S Program. Cancels DOE O 470.4A, DOE M 470.4-1, Chg. 2, and DOE O 142.1.

  6. and Pollutant Safeguarding Buildings

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    commercial buildings, these flows are driven primarily by the building's ventilation system, but natural2004 Airflow and Pollutant Transport Group Safeguarding Buildings Against Chemical and Biological research since 1998 to protect buildings and building occupants from threats posed by airborne chemical

  7. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes roles and responsibilities for the Department of Energy Safeguards and Security Program. Cancels: DOE O 470.1, DOE O 471.2A, DOE O 471.4, DOE O 472.1C, DOE O 473.1, DOE O 473.2, DOE O 474.1A. Canceled by DOE O 470.4A.

  8. NEAMS safeguards and separations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sadasivan, Pratap [Los Alamos National Laboratory; De Paoli, David W [ORNL

    2011-01-25T23:59:59.000Z

    This presentation provides a program management update on the Safeguards and Separations Integrated Performance and Safety Code (IPSC) program in the DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS). It provides an overview of FY11 work packages at multiple DOE Labs and includes material on challenge problem definitions for the IPSC effort.

  9. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-12-29T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards and Security Program ensures that the Department of Energy efficiently and effectively meets all its obligations to protect Special Nuclear Material, other nuclear materials, classified matter, sensitive information, government property, and the safety and security of employees, contractors, and the general public. Cancels DOE P 470.1.

  10. Nuclear Safeguards Considerations For The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Phillip Casey Durst; David Beddingfield; Brian Boyer; Robert Bean; Michael Collins; Michael Ehinger; David Hanks; David L. Moses; Lee Refalo

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    High temperature reactors (HTRs) have been considered since the 1940s, and have been constructed and demonstrated in the United Kingdom (Dragon), United States (Peach Bottom and Fort Saint Vrain), Japan (HTTR), Germany (AVR and THTR-300), and have been the subject of conceptual studies in Russia (VGM). The attraction to these reactors is that they can use a variety of reactor fuels, including abundant thorium, which upon reprocessing of the spent fuel can produce fissile U-233. Hence, they could extend the stocks of available uranium, provided the fuel is reprocessed. Another attractive attribute is that HTRs typically operate at a much higher temperature than conventional light water reactors (LWRs), because of the use of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide coated (TRISO) fuel particles embedded in ceramic graphite. Rather than simply discharge most of the unused heat from the working fluid in the power plant to the environment, engineers have been designing reactors for 40 years to recover this heat and make it available for district heating or chemical conversion plants. Demonstrating high-temperature nuclear energy conversion was the purpose behind Fort Saint Vrain in the United States, THTR-300 in Germany, HTTR in Japan, and HTR-10 and HTR-PM, being built in China. This resulted in nuclear reactors at least 30% or more thermodynamically efficient than conventional LWRs, especially if the waste heat can be effectively utilized in chemical processing plants. A modern variant of high temperature reactors is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). Originally developed in the United States and Germany, it is now being redesigned and marketed by the Republic of South Africa and China. The team examined historical high temperature and high temperature gas reactors (HTR and HTGR) and reviewed safeguards considerations for this reactor. The following is a preliminary report on this topic prepared under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Project in support of the NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI).

  11. International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolai I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Sokova, Elena K.; Ford, David G.

    2010-04-20T23:59:59.000Z

    All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

  12. Statistics applied to safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Picard, R.R.

    1993-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Statistical methods are central to safeguards work. Measurements forming the basis of much materials accountancy are not perfect - ``perfect`` in the sense of being error free. Other sessions in this course address the destructive and nondestructive measurement of nuclear material, together with the inherent limitations in those measurements. The bottom line is that measurement errors are a fact of life and, since we can`t eliminate them, we have to find a rational way to deal with them. Which leads to the world of statistics. Beyond dealing with measurement errors, another area of statistical application involves the sampling of items for verification. Inspectors from the IAEA and domestic regulatory agencies periodically visit operating facilities and make measurements of selected items. By comparing their own measured values to those declared by the facilities, increased confidence is obtained. If verification measurements were not expensive, time consuming, and disruptive to operations, perhaps verification of 100% of the inventories would be desirable. In reality, many constraints lead to inspection of only a portion of those inventories. Drawing inferences about a larger ``population`` of declared items in a facility based on verification information obtained from a sample of those items is a statistical problem. There are few texts on statistics in safeguards. The lengthy exposition ``IAEA Safeguards: Statistical Concepts and Techniques`` and the US NRC book edited by Bowen and Bennet are two good sources of general information. In the next section, the subject of measurement quality is addressed. The third section covers the evaluation of MUFs, and discusses the related subjects of error propagation and sequential analysis. The final section covers verification, inspection sample size calculations, and the D statistic. The text is written at an elementary level, with references to the safeguards literature for more detailed treatment.

  13. Statistics applied to safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Picard, R.R.

    1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Statistical methods are central to safeguards work. Measurements forming the basis of much materials accountancy are not perfect - perfect'' in the sense of being error free. Other sessions in this course address the destructive and nondestructive measurement of nuclear material, together with the inherent limitations in those measurements. The bottom line is that measurement errors are a fact of life and, since we can't eliminate them, we have to find a rational way to deal with them. Which leads to the world of statistics. Beyond dealing with measurement errors, another area of statistical application involves the sampling of items for verification. Inspectors from the IAEA and domestic regulatory agencies periodically visit operating facilities and make measurements of selected items. By comparing their own measured values to those declared by the facilities, increased confidence is obtained. If verification measurements were not expensive, time consuming, and disruptive to operations, perhaps verification of 100% of the inventories would be desirable. In reality, many constraints lead to inspection of only a portion of those inventories. Drawing inferences about a larger population'' of declared items in a facility based on verification information obtained from a sample of those items is a statistical problem. There are few texts on statistics in safeguards. The lengthy exposition IAEA Safeguards: Statistical Concepts and Techniques'' and the US NRC book edited by Bowen and Bennet are two good sources of general information. In the next section, the subject of measurement quality is addressed. The third section covers the evaluation of MUFs, and discusses the related subjects of error propagation and sequential analysis. The final section covers verification, inspection sample size calculations, and the D statistic. The text is written at an elementary level, with references to the safeguards literature for more detailed treatment.

  14. Full spectrum optical safeguard

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Ackerman, Mark R. (Albuquerque, NM)

    2008-12-02T23:59:59.000Z

    An optical safeguard device with two linear variable Fabry-Perot filters aligned relative to a light source with at least one of the filters having a nonlinear dielectric constant material such that, when a light source produces a sufficiently high intensity light, the light alters the characteristics of the nonlinear dielectric constant material to reduce the intensity of light impacting a connected optical sensor. The device can be incorporated into an imaging system on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or satellite.

  15. Safeguards Laboratory (SL) | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's PossibleRadiation Protection245C Unlimited ReleaseWelcome ton n uSTEM-ASafeguards &Safeguards

  16. Us-Japan cooperation on safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hori, Masato [JAEA; Kawakubo, Yoko [JAEA; Mcclelland - Kerr, J [NNSA

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    There is a long history of collaborative safeguards development between the United States and Japan. Japan has built, and continues to expand, the largest civil nuclear fuel cycle under full-scope IAEA safeguards in world. This development has posed unique challenges to the international safeguards system. Safeguards developments made through the US-Japan cooperation to address these unique challenges have significantly impacted the technologies deployed for international safeguards applications around the world.

  17. Master Safeguards and Security Agreements

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1988-02-03T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish the Department of Energy policy, requirements, responsibilities, and authorities for the development and implementation of Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSA's). Does not cancel another directive. Canceled by DOE O 5630.13A

  18. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Ensures appropriate levels of protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components; espionage; loss or theft of classified matter or Government property; and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security or on the health and safety of Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor employees, the public, or the environment. DOE O 470.1 Extended until 5-11-06 by DOE N 251.63, dated 5-11-05. Chg 1, Safeguards and Security Program, dated 9/28/95, extended by DOE N 251.57, dated 4/28/2004. Change 1, 5/21/96, revises Chapter IV. Cancels: DOE 5630.11B, DOE 5630.13A, DOE 5630.14A, DOE 5630.15, DOE 5630.16A, DOE 5630.17, DOE 5631.1C, DOE 5631.4A, DOE 5634.1B, DOE 5634.3, DOE 5639.3, DOE M 5632.1C-1 in part.

  19. A framework for nuclear facility safeguard evaluation using probabilistic methods and expert elicitation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Iamsumang, Chonlagarn

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the advancement of the next generation of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, concerns of the effectiveness of nuclear facility safeguards have been increasing due to the inclusion of highly enriched material and reprocessing ...

  20. Safeguards and Security Program, acronyms and abbereviations...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Program, acronyms and abbereviations - DOE M 470.4-7 Safeguards and Security Program, acronyms and abbereviations - DOE M 470.4-7 August 26, 2005 Canceled Safeguards and Security...

  1. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards...

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    UNCLASSIFIED Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System CONTACT INFORMATION UPDATE REPORTING IDENTIFICATION SYMBOL (RIS) RIS: Address: Facility Name: CONTACTS Name Email:...

  2. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  3. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  4. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  5. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  6. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  7. Nuclear material safeguards for enrichments plants: Part 4, Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant: Diversion scenarios and IAEA safeguards activities: Safeguards training course

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1988-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This publication is Part 4 of a safeguards training course in Nuclear Material Safeguards for enrichment plants. This part of the course deals with diversion scenarios and safeguards activities at gas centrifuge enrichment plants.

  8. Automatic Generation of Initial Weights and Estimation of Hidden Units for Pattern Classifcation Using Neural Networks 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Keeni, Kanad; Nakayama, Kenji; Shimodaira, Hiroshi

    This study high lights on the subject of weight initialization in back-propagation feed-forward networks. Training data is analyzed and the notion of critical points is introduced for determining the initial weights and ...

  9. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and participation in facility design options analysis in the conceptual design phase to enhance intrinsic features, among others. The SBD process is unlikely to be broadly applied in the absence of formal requirements to do so, or compelling evidence of its value. Neither exists today. A formal instrument to require the application of SBD is needed and would vary according to both the national and regulatory environment. Several possible approaches to implementation of the requirements within the DOE framework are explored in this report. Finally, there are numerous barriers to the implementation of SBD, including the lack of a strong safeguards culture, intellectual property concerns, the sensitive nature of safeguards information, and the potentially divergent or conflicting interests of participants in the process. In terms of SBD implementation in the United States, there are no commercial nuclear facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Efforts to institutionalize SBD must address these issues. Specific work in FY09 could focus on the following: finalizing the proposed SBD process for use by DOE and performing a pilot application on a DOE project in the planning phase; developing regulatory options for mandating SBD; further development of safeguards-related design guidance, principles and requirements; development of a specific SBD process tailored to the NRC environment; and development of an engagement strategy for the IAEA and other international partners.

  10. Methodology for predicting torsional fatigue life of turbine generator shafts using crack initiation plus propagation. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anderson, A.F.; Williams, R.A.; Wilkening, W.W.; LeFort, P.N.

    1985-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An overall methodology now exists that addresses both crack initiation and propagation in predicting the fatigue life of large turbine generator shafts. It can estimate previous torsional transient damage and predict residual life. In short, this improved methodology allows utilities to determine the availability of turbogenerators with greater confidence.

  11. Trinity College launches Computer Science Initiative for the 21st Century -Google supports next generation of technology leaders

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    O'Mahony, Donal E.

    Trinity College launches Computer Science Initiative for the 21st Century Classroom - Google supports next generation of technology leaders Friday, 31 May 2013: Trinity College Dublin today announcedst Century Computer Science Teaching Skills, developed by the Trinity Access 21 network in Trinity

  12. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  13. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed.

  14. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Challenge:

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's Possible for Renewable Energy:Nanowire3627 Federal Register /76Safeguards and Security Challenge:

  15. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  16. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Swinhoe, Martyn T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  17. Safeguards for Uranium Extraction (UREX) +1a Process 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Feener, Jessica S.

    2011-08-08T23:59:59.000Z

    safeguards approach is needed to show that a commercially sized UREX+ facility can be safeguarded to current international standards. A detailed safeguards approach for a UREX+1a reprocessing facility has been developed. The approach includes the use...

  18. PIA - Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Electronic Safeguards...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    System (E3S) PIA - Savannah River Nuclear Solutions Electronic Safeguards Security System (E3S) More Documents & Publications PIA - 10th International Nuclear Graphite...

  19. Safeguards and Security Program - DOE Directives, Delegations...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    ARCHIVED DOE O 470.1 Chg 1, Safeguards and Security Program by Website Administrator Functional areas: Environment, Safety, and Health, Hazardous Materials, Radiation Protection,...

  20. ORO Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System and Visitor Control System PIA, Oak Ridge Operations Office ORO Office Safeguards and Security Clearance Tracking System...

  1. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Elayat, H A; O'Connell, W J; Boyer, B D

    2006-06-05T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems used in enrichment facilities. This research focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of the safeguards in protecting against the range of safeguards concerns for enrichment plants, including diversion of attractive material and unauthorized modes of use. We developed an Extend simulation model for a generic medium-sized centrifuge enrichment plant. We modeled the material flow in normal operation, plant operational upset modes, and selected diversion scenarios, for selected safeguards systems. Simulation modeling is used to analyze both authorized and unauthorized use of a plant and the flow of safeguards information. Simulation tracks the movement of materials and isotopes, identifies the signatures of unauthorized use, tracks the flow and compilation of safeguards data, and evaluates the effectiveness of the safeguards system in detecting misuse signatures. The simulation model developed could be of use to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, enabling the IAEA to observe and draw conclusions that uranium enrichment facilities are being used only within authorized limits for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will evaluate improved approaches to nonproliferation concerns, facilitating deployment of enhanced and cost-effective safeguards systems for an important part of the nuclear power fuel cycle.

  2. Safeguards and Security Independent Oversight Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-12-23T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes the DOE Safeguards and Security Independent Oversight Program that provides DOE and contractor managers, Congress, and other stakeholders with an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of DOE safeguards and security policy and programs, and the implementation of those policies and programs. Cancels DOE 5630.12A.

  3. Safeguards and security issues during facility transition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, M.R. [USDOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Washington, DC (United States); Zack, N.R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). Safeguards Systems Group

    1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The transition of Department of Energy (DOE) production facilities to those destined for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) must consider traditional safeguards and security requirements governing nuclear materials. Current DOE safeguards and security policy establishes specific requirements for the removal of facilities and waste from safeguards. However, the current physical security policy does not differentiate the protection of waste from usable materials. Other transition issues include: access of uncleared individuals, positioning security zones, nuclear material holdup, accounting for difficult-to-measure materials, inventory difference and resolution, and radiological/toxicological sabotage. Safeguards and security goals for facility transitioning must provide a workable, efficient and cost-effective system for accounting and protecting nuclear material. In depth protection strategies utilizing combinations of safeguards and security systems should be developed to meet these goals.

  4. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY09

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters which nuclear facilities may operate within to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). As a result of the U.S. having no operating nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, there has been a strong interest in obtaining process monitoring data from the ICPP. The ICPP was shut down in 1996 and a recent effort has been made to retrieve the PM data from storage in a data mining effort. In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z- testing7.

  5. Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) into the design of small modular reactors : a handbook.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Middleton, Bobby D.; Mendez, Carmen Margarita [Sociotecnia Solutions] [Sociotecnia Solutions

    2013-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The existing regulatory environment for nuclear reactors impacts both the facility design and the cost of operations once the facility is built. Delaying the consideration of regulatory requirements until late in the facility design - or worse, until after construction has begun - can result in costly retrofitting as well as increased operational costs to fulfill safety, security, safeguards, and emergency readiness requirements. Considering the scale and scope, as well as the latest design trends in the next generation of nuclear facilities, there is an opportunity to evaluate the regulatory requirements and optimize the design process for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), as compared to current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). To this end, Sandia has embarked on an initiative to evaluate the interactions of regulations and operations as an approach to optimizing the design of SMR facilities, supporting operational efficiencies, as well as regulatory requirements. The early stages of this initiative consider two focus areas. The first focus area, reported by LaChance, et al. (2007), identifies the regulatory requirements established for the current fleet of LWR facilities regarding Safety, Security, Operations, Safeguards, and Emergency Planning, and evaluates the technical bases for these requirements. The second focus area, developed in this report, documents the foundations for an innovative approach that supports a design framework for SMR facilities that incorporates the regulatory environment, as well as the continued operation of the facility, into the early design stages, eliminating the need for costly retrofitting and additional operating personnel to fulfill regulatory requirements. The work considers a technique known as Integrated Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (ISOSS) (Darby, et al., 2007). In coordination with the best practices of industrial operations, the goal of this effort is to develop a design framework that outlines how ISOSS requirements can be incorporated into the pre-conceptual through early facility design stages, seeking a cost-effective design that meets both operational efficiencies and the regulatory environment. The larger scope of the project, i.e., in future stages, includes the identification of potentially conflicting requirements identified by the ISOSS framework, including an analysis of how regulatory requirements may be changed to account for the intrinsic features of SMRs.

  6. safeguards

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysisDarby Dietrich57/%2A0/%2A en4/%2A2/%2A/%2A en

  7. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  8. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Santi, Peter A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hypes, Philip A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-14T23:59:59.000Z

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  9. Remote monitoring for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dupree, S.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sonnier, C.S. [Jupiter Corp., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1997-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the US Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these field trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology. Fortunately, modern technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime.

  10. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    R. Wigeland; T Bjornard; B. Castle

    2009-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization’s purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations’ approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  11. Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes program planning and management requirements for the Departments Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program. Cancels: DOE N 473.9 and DOE M 470.1-1

  12. Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes program planning and management requirements for the Departments Safeguards and Security. Chg 1, dated 3-7-06 Cancels DOE N 473.9, DOE M 470.1-1 Chg 2.

  13. Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Policy

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-05-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this Policy is to formalize an Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) framework. Safeguards and security management systems provide a formal, organized process for planning, performing, assessing, and improving the secure conduct of work in accordance with risk-based protection strategies. These systems are institutionalized through Department of Energy (DOE) directives and contracts. Does not cancel other directives. Canceled by DOE P 470.1A.

  14. Safeguards and Security Program and Project Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-04-18T23:59:59.000Z

    The proposed revision to this Department of Energy Guide focuses on alignment of guidance for implementing key safeguard and security components to the DOE capital asset acquisition process with the revised DOE O 413.3B, Program and Project Management for Acquisition of Capital Assets, the revised DOE O 470.4B, Safeguard and Security Program, and the new series of DOE Orders replacing the DOE M 470.4 series of manuals.

  15. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24T23:59:59.000Z

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  16. Safeguards by design - industry engagement for new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Grice, Thomas [NRC; Lockwood, Dunbar [DOE/NA-243

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) has initiated a Safeguards by Design (SBD) effort to encourage the incorporation of international (IAEA) safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign or retrofit the facility at a later date. The main goals of Safeguards by Design are to (1) make the implementation of international safeguards at new civil nuclear facilities more effective and efficient, (2) avoid costly and time-consuming re-design work or retrofits at such facilities and (3) design such facilities in a way that makes proliferation as technically difficult, as time-consuming, and as detectable as possible. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently hosted efforts to facilitate the use of Safeguards by Design for new uranium enrichment facilities currently being planned for construction in the U.S. While SBD is not a NRC requirement, the NRC is aiding the implementation of SBD by coordinating discussions between DOE's NA-24 and industry's facility design teams. More specifically, during their normal course of licensing discussions the NRC has offered industry the opportunity to engage with NA-24 regarding SBD.

  17. Coupling a transient solvent extraction module with the separations and safeguards performance model.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DePaoli, David W. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Birdwell, Joseph F. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Gauld, Ian C. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); Cipiti, Benjamin B.; de Almeida, Valmor F. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN)

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A number of codes have been developed in the past for safeguards analysis, but many are dated, and no single code is able to cover all aspects of materials accountancy, process monitoring, and diversion scenario analysis. The purpose of this work was to integrate a transient solvent extraction simulation module developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The SSPM was designed for materials accountancy and process monitoring analyses, but previous versions of the code have included limited detail on the chemical processes, including chemical separations. The transient solvent extraction model is based on the ORNL SEPHIS code approach to consider solute build up in a bank of contactors in the PUREX process. Combined, these capabilities yield a more robust transient separations and safeguards model for evaluating safeguards system design. This coupling and initial results are presented. In addition, some observations toward further enhancement of separations and safeguards modeling based on this effort are provided, including: items to be addressed in integrating legacy codes, additional improvements needed for a fully functional solvent extraction module, and recommendations for future integration of other chemical process modules.

  18. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, James W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  19. IMPACT OF THE U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM SAFEGUARDS INTERNSHIP PROGRAM.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    PEPPER, S.; OSIECKI, C.

    2006-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Support Program began funding an internship program in the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 2002. Since that time, 39 U.S. citizens and permanent residents have been placed in one-year, paid internships with the IAEA. The management of the internship program was originally the responsibility of the International Safeguards Project Office but was transferred to the Office of Educational Programs at Brookhaven National Laboratory in 2004. Feedback on the internship program from the U.S. government and the IAEA has been positive. The interns have completed basic yet essential work for the Department of Safeguards and freed IAEA staff members to perform more complex tasks. The cost of an intern is low relative to other forms of human resources support. After the conclusion of their assignments, many of the interns go on to work for the U.S. government, the national laboratories, or companies in international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will discuss the work done by the interns for the IAEA, factors influencing the success of the internship program, and the effects the program has had on the careers of interns, in preparing the next generation to work in the nuclear industry, participation in INMM activities, and recruitment for U.S. citizens for safeguards positions.

  20. Safeguards Envelope: The First Steps

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Jean Ragusa; Robert Bean

    2008-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The possibility exists for real time accountancy and assay of nuclear materials as they move through a reprocessing facility. This project aims to establish working parameters and local figures of merit to identify possible diversion in real time with minimal operational impact. Factors such as pH, NOX gas concentration, flow speeds and radiation fields are rarely taken into account in safeguards methodologies and will be included to increase the confidence of location and assay of nuclear materials. An adaptable, real data model is being created of the contactors of the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility and will be analyzed using the appropriate modeling codes. This model will then be subjected to three, diversion scenarios and a figure of merit methodology will be utilized to create the operational parameters under which these diversion scenarios would be detected. This analysis for figure of merit methodology will include statistical fluctuations, operator error, and a rudimentary analysis of transient conditions. The long term goal of the project includes expansion universally over the plant, methods of detection without requiring access to proprietary information, and an evaluation of the requirements for future figure of merit methodologies.

  1. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill; William Charlton; Robert Bean

    2008-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of “non-traditional” operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes.

  2. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  3. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

    1981-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility.

  4. The evolution of information-driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Budlong-sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-10-14T23:59:59.000Z

    From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

  5. Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-08-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual establishes program planning and management requirements for the Department’s Safeguards and Security (S&S) Program. Change 2 is a revision to Section M of both the Manual and the CRD to realign the process for establishing deviations from DOE directives containing safeguards and security requirements to reflect established Departmental policy as set forth in DOE O 251.1C. Original publication, 8-26-05; Chg 1, 3-7-06. Canceled by DOE O 470.4B

  6. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    N. S. Bowden

    2008-09-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore offer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several efforts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  7. Personal views on integrated safeguards and the status of safeguards R&D in the united states.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J. W. (James W.)

    2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nearly one year ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards .' This important document, which was the product of extensive efforts by the Secretariat, the Director General's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), and outside experts over a number of years, provides a basis for discussions of proposed approaches to integrated safeguards . I will refer to this framework paper to share with you my personal views of integrated safeguards .

  8. The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sonnier, C.S. [Jupiter Corp., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1998-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data.

  9. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Whitaker, Jr., James [ORNL; Garner, James R [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL; Lockwood, Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA; Gilligan, Kimberly V [ORNL; Younkin, James R [ORNL; Hooper, David A [ORNL; Henkel, James J [ORNL; Krichinsky, Alan M [ORNL

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    As Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) increase in separative work unit (SWU) capacity, the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model safeguards approach needs to be strengthened. New measures to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approach are being investigated that will be mutually beneficial to the facility operators and the IAEA. One of the key concepts being studied for application at future GCEPs is embracing joint use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. A mock F/W system was built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to generate and collect F/W data from an analogous system. The ORNL system has been used to collect data representing several realistic normal process and off-normal (including diversion) scenarios. Emphasis is placed on the novelty of the analysis of data from the sensors as well as the ability to build information out of raw data, which facilitates a more effective and efficient verification process. This paper will provide a progress report on recent accomplishments and next steps.

  10. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  11. Evaluating safeguard effectiveness against violent insiders

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Fortney, D.S.

    1990-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The threat posed by a violent insiders presents a major challenge to safeguards managers. These insiders, in addition to their ability to exploit their special authorities, access, and knowledge of facility operations and safeguards, could use violence to defeat safeguards components and personnel. In protecting against theft of special nuclear material, facilities have emphasized the use of perimeter protection and physical barriers to protect against attacks by an outsider adversary group. Recently emphasis has begun to shift toward the implementation of hardware and procedural measures to protect against nonviolent insiders. Approaches are also needed to help assess the effectiveness of protection against those insiders who are willing to use violence. In this paper we describe an approach we're developing for dealing with violent insiders. We begin by categorizing insiders according to whether they are active or passive, rational or irrational, and whether they are willing to use force against safeguards components or coworkers. We define characteristics of each category, and describe the extent to which each category is adequately modelled by existing evaluation tools. We also discuss several modelling issues posed by active insiders, including: entry of contraband; reluctance to use violence; neutralization of insiders; and the ability to switch modes of attack between force, stealth, and deceit. 5 refs., 2 figs.

  12. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  13. IBM Software Solution Brief Safeguarding the cloud

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    IBM Software Solution Brief Safeguarding the cloud with IBM Security solutions Maintain visibility and control with proven security solutions for public, private and hybrid clouds Highlights Address cloud internal and external users, data, applications and workloads as they move to and from the cloud Regain

  14. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  15. Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR&PP case study results

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design should have such features in it if it is seen to have intrinsic proliferation resistance. The technical difficulty in diverting material from the ESFR is at least as strongly impacted by the adversaries overall technical capabilities as it is by the effort required to overcome those barriers intrinsic to the nuclear fuel cycle. The intrinsic proliferation resistance of the ESFR will affect how extrinsic measures in the safeguards approach for the ESFR will provide overall proliferation resistance.

  16. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10T23:59:59.000Z

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied to facility modifications or new designs • Modifications of the design that could mitigate a potential safeguards issue or facilitate a more efficient application of the safeguards approach • Possible innovative ideas for more efficient application of safeguards • The potential for changes in elements of the safeguard approach that may be required by IAEA as a result of facility design features and characteristics • Other potential concerns These issues will then be presented to the IAEA and the state regulator to be resolved in a timely manner, ensuring that the planned safeguards approach is acceptable and compatible with the facility design. The proposed approach should be validated by application to suitable facilities to assess its utility, comprehensiveness, and cost-effectiveness. The approach and example application should also be reviewed by industry to confirm the conclusions reached in the DOE review.

  17. Education in Safeguards and Security Technology Meeting Challenges with Technology and Experience

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Paschal, Linda J [ORNL; Chapman, Jeffrey Allen [ORNL; Rowe, Nathan C [ORNL; Stinson, Brad J [ORNL

    2011-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Education and hands-on experience are crucial to ensuring a workforce of safeguards and security professionals who can meet the challenges currently faced in global nuclear safeguards and security. Global demand for nuclear energy and technology, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the cleanup of Cold War facilities have resulted in an increased need for trained safeguards and security personnel. At the same time, the global community is facing a growing shortage of experienced workers with hands-on knowledge of nuclear material processing. Limited access to operating facilities has dramatically reduced the opportunities for next-generation practitioners to obtain hands-on training experience. To address these needs, the Safeguards Technology Integration Center (STIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was created as a Department of Energy User Facility to provide access both to the latest technology and to field-experienced professionals. The STIC provides real-world conditions, process equipment mock-ups, and controlled access to encapsulated radioactive materials (including highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for training and technology evaluation encompassing various techniques and skills, such as Radiation Inspection Systems, Containment and Surveillance Systems, Nondestructive Assay, Security System Performance Testing, and System Design and Analysis. The STIC facilities, laboratories, test beds, and training facilities are described along with the more notable aspects of the training program, which has included more than 1000 participants in the last four years.

  18. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  19. Generated using version 3.2 of the official AMS LATEX template Mesoscale Predictability and Initial-Condition Error Growth in1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Generated using version 3.2 of the official AMS LATEX template Mesoscale Predictability and Initial;ABSTRACT5 Early investigations suggested that mesoscale atmospheric motions would have very limited6 cascade. In contrast, subsequent studies proposed that many mesoscale cir-8 culations inherit

  20. A Monte Carlo based spent fuel analysis safeguards strategy assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fensin, Michael L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Nathan P [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for quantifying plutonium mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, creating diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here the generalized assessment process, the techniques employed to automate the coupled facets of the assessment process, and the standard burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library. We also clearly define the diversion scenarios that will be analyzed during the standardized assessments. Though this study is currently limited to generic PWR assemblies, it is expected that the results of the assessment will yield an adequate spent fuel analysis strategy knowledge that will help the down-select process for other reactor types.

  1. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  2. SRS delayed neutron instruments for safeguards measurements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Studley, R.V. [Westinghouse SRC, Aiken, SC (United States)

    1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Six analytical systems measuring delayed neutrons have been used for safeguards measurements at the Savannah River Site (SRS). A predecessor, the 252Cf Activation Analysis Facility installed at the Savannah River Technology Center (formally SR Laboratory) has been used since 1974 to analyze small samples, measuring both delayed neutrons and gammas. The six shufflers, plus one currently being fabricated, were developed, designed and fabricated by the LANL N-1 group. These shufflers have provided safeguards measurements of product (2 each), in-process scrap (2 each plus a conceptual replacement) and process waste (2 each plus one being fabricated). One shuffler for scrap assay was the first shuffler to be installed (1978) in a process. Another (waste) was the first installed in a process capable of assaying barrels. A third (waste) is the first pass-through model and a fourth (product) is the most precise ({+-}.12%) and accurate NDA instrument yet produced.

  3. Science and Technology Challenges for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mark Schanfein

    2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The science and technology challenges for international safeguards range from cutting edge physics needs to practical technology solutions for high volume data handling and analysis issues. This paper will take a narrow look at some of the predominant challenges, which include those at high throughput commercial facilities and those in the detection of undeclared facilities. It is hoped that by highlighting these areas it can encourage a concerted effort by scientific institutions and industry to provide robust cost-effective solutions.

  4. Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert J. Goldston and Alexander Glaser

    2012-08-10T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

  5. Advances toward a transportable antineutrino detector system for reactor monitoring and safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reyna, D. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bernstein, A. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Lund, J.; Kiff, S.; Cabrera-Palmer, B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States); Bowden, N. S.; Dazeley, S.; Keefer, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94550 (United States)

    2011-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear reactors have served as the neutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Our SNL/LLNL collaboration has demonstrated that such antineutrino based monitoring is feasible using a relatively small cubic meter scale liquid scintillator detector at tens of meters standoff from a commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). With little or no burden on the plant operator we have been able to remotely and automatically monitor the reactor operational status (on/off), power level, and fuel burnup. The initial detector was deployed in an underground gallery that lies directly under the containment dome of an operating PWR. The gallery is 25 meters from the reactor core center, is rarely accessed by plant personnel, and provides a muon-screening effect of some 20-30 meters of water equivalent earth and concrete overburden. Unfortunately, many reactor facilities do not contain an equivalent underground location. We have therefore attempted to construct a complete detector system which would be capable of operating in an aboveground location and could be transported to a reactor facility with relative ease. A standard 6-meter shipping container was used as our transportable laboratory - containing active and passive shielding components, the antineutrino detector and all electronics, as well as climate control systems. This aboveground system was deployed and tested at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in southern California in 2010 and early 2011. We will first present an overview of the initial demonstrations of our below ground detector. Then we will describe the aboveground system and the technological developments of the two antineutrino detectors that were deployed. Finally, some preliminary results of our aboveground test will be shown. (authors)

  6. Innovative cement helps DOE safeguard nuclear facilities | Argonne...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Innovative cement helps DOE safeguard nuclear facilities By Jared Sagoff * April 25, 2008 Tweet EmailPrint ARGONNE, Ill. - When Argonne materials scientists Arun Wagh and Dileep...

  7. Safeguards and Security for Program and Project Management

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-08-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Guide provides a methodology for implementing the safeguards and security requirements of DOE O 413.3B. Cancels DOE G 413.3-3.

  8. FAQS Reference Guide – Safeguards and Security General Technical Base

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This reference guide addresses the competency statements in the July 2009 edition of DOE-STD-1123-2009, Safeguards and Security General Technical Base Qualification Standard.

  9. Safeguards and Security Oversight and Assessments Implementation Guide

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-12-21T23:59:59.000Z

    This Guide identifies acceptable methods for implementing the safeguards and security provisions of DOE O 226.1A. Canceled by DOE N 251.80.

  10. Plutonium finishing plant safeguards and security systems replacement study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Klear, P.F.; Humphrys, K.L.

    1994-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides the preferred alternatives for the replacement of the Safeguards and Security systems located at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant.

  11. FAQS Job Task Analyses - Safeguards and Security General Technical...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Base More Documents & Publications FAQS Qualification Card - Safeguards and Security General Technical Base FAQS Job Task Analyses - General Technical Base FAQS Qualification Card...

  12. Master safeguards and security agreements and protection program planning orders and guide

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hensley, B.

    1988-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper discusses the Master Safeguards and Security Agreement (MSSA) and Protection Program Planning (PPP) orders of the Department of Energy (DOE). Both orders establish DOE policy, requirements, responsibilities, and authorities for the development and implementation of MSSA's and associated planning documents. The MSSA subcommittee to the Policy Development Task Force was responsible for the development of the MSSA order. Unlike other subcommittees that were involved in updating existing orders, the AMSSA subcommittee produced the initial version of the MSSA order. The subcommittee included representation from DOE outlay program offices with Headquarters and field office safeguards and security expertise. The PPP order was developed by a separate subcommittee and included representation mainly from the Task Force itself. It was completed much later than the other orders and remains under review within the Department.

  13. Safeguard By Design Lessons Learned from DOE Experience Integrating Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hockert, John; Burbank, Roberta L.

    2010-04-13T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper identifies the lessons to be learned for the institutionalization of Safeguards by Design (SBD) from the Department of Energy (DOE) experience developing and implementing DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process. The experience is valuable because of the similarity of the challenges of integrating safety and safeguards into the design process. The paper reviews the content and development of DOE-STD-1189-2008 from its initial concept in January 2006 to its issuance in March 2008. Lessons learned are identified in the areas of the development and structure of requirements for the SBD process; the target audience for SBD requirements and guidance, the need for a graded approach to SBD, and a possible strategy for development and implementation of SBD within DOE.

  14. The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schanfein, Mark J; Gouveia, Fernando S

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls.

  15. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a legal document. As such, it is written in a legalese that is understood by specialists in international law and treaties, but not by most outside of this field, including designers of nuclear facilities. For this reason, many of the requirements have been simplified and restated. However, in all cases, the relevant source document and passage is noted so that readers may trace the requirement to the source. This is a helpful living guide, since some of these requirements are subject to revision over time. More importantly, the practices by which the requirements are met are continuously modernized by the IAEA and nuclear facility operators to improve not only the effectiveness of international nuclear safeguards, but also the efficiency. As these improvements are made, the following guidelines should be updated and revised accordingly.

  16. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D. [Sandia National Laboratories, PO Box 5800 MS 0747, Albuquerque, NM 87185 (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

  17. Secret Objective Standoff: International Safeguards Educational Exercise

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Okowita, Samantha L [ORNL

    2014-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The International Safeguards Regime, being so multi-faceted, can be overwhelming to those first introduced to its many components. The organizers and lecturers of workshops and courses on nonproliferation often provide a series of independent lectures and must somehow demonstrate the cohesive and effective nature of the system. An exercise titled The Secret Objective Standoff was developed to complement lectures with hands-on learning to assist participants in bringing all the many components (IAEA agreements, export controls, treaty obligations, international diplomacy, etc.) of the International Safeguards Regime together. This exercise divides participants into teams that are assigned the role of either a country or the IAEA and asks that they fully immerse themselves in their roles. The teams are then randomly assigned three unique and secret objectives that are intended to represent realistic and current geopolitical scenarios. Through construction, trading, or hoarding of four resources (experts, technology, money, and uranium), the teams have a finite number of turns to accomplish their objectives. Each turn has three phases random dispersal of resources, a timed discussion where teams can coordinate and strategize with others, and an action phase. During the action phase, teams inform the moderator individually and secretly what they will be doing that turn. The exercise has been tested twice with Oak Ridge National Laboratory personnel, and has been conducted with outside participants twice, in each case the experience was well received by both participants and instructors. This exercise provides instructors the ability to modify the exercise before or during game play to best fit their educational goals. By offering a range of experiences, from an in-depth look at specific components to a generalized overview, this exercise is an effective tool in helping participants achieve a full understanding the International Safeguards Regime.

  18. Safeguarding Truck-Shipped Wholesale and Retail Fuels (STSWRF)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Safeguarding Truck-Shipped Wholesale and Retail Fuels (STSWRF) Oak Ridge National Laboratory at the wholesaler/distributor level or below. This presents additional challenges in tracking untaxed fuel after approved ORNL's plan to conduct a Phase II Pilot Test titled Safeguarding Truck-Shipped Wholesale

  19. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shipley, J.P. (comp.)

    1982-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  20. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  1. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  2. Safeguards and Security Systems | ornl.gov

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's PossibleRadiation Protection245C Unlimited ReleaseWelcome ton nSafeguards and Security Systems

  3. International Nuclear Safeguards | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated Codes | National NuclearInterlibrary LoanSafeguards | National Nuclear

  4. Organizational Culture, 3S, and Safeguards by Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-01-31T23:59:59.000Z

    While Safety and Security Culture are well socialized among nuclear facility designers, the concept of safeguards culture is less well defined. One area where safeguards culture may play a helpful role is in the area of Safeguards by Design. This paper will include a theoretical discussion of organizational culture, leading with safety culture and security culture that are well known, and positing that there may be room to think about safeguards culture along with the others. It will also examine the utility of the 3S concept and how this concept has been used in training for newcomer states. These will lead into a discussion of how the addition of safeguards to the mix of safety by design and security by design can be valuable, particularly as it is socialized to newcomer states.

  5. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1987-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  6. Sustainable Forest Bioenergy Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Breger, Dwayne; Rizzo, Rob

    2011-09-20T23:59:59.000Z

    In the state’s Electricity Restructuring Act of 1998, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts recognized the opportunity and strategic benefits to diversifying its electric generation capacity with renewable energy. Through this legislation, the Commonwealth established one of the nation’s first Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS) programs, mandating the increasing use of renewable resources in its energy mix. Bioenergy, meeting low emissions and advanced technology standards, was recognized as an eligible renewable energy technology. Stimulated by the state’s RPS program, several project development groups have been looking seriously at building large woody biomass generation units in western Massachusetts to utilize the woody biomass resource. As a direct result of this development, numerous stakeholders have raised concerns and have prompted the state to take a leadership position in pursuing a science based analysis of biomass impacts on forest and carbon emissions, and proceed through a rulemaking process to establish prudent policy to support biomass development which can contribute to the state’s carbon reduction commitments and maintain safeguards for forest sustainability. The Massachusetts Sustainable Forest Bioenergy Initiative (SFBI) was funded by the Department of Energy and started by the Department of Energy Resources before these contentious biomass issues were fully raised in the state, and continued throughout the substantive periods of this policy development. Thereby, while SFBI maintained its focus on the initially proposed Scope of Work, some aspects of this scope were expanded or realigned to meet the needs for groundbreaking research and policy development being advanced by DOER. SFBI provided DOER and the Commonwealth with a foundation of state specific information on biomass technology and the biomass industry and markets, the most comprehensive biomass fuel supply assessment for the region, the economic development impact associated with biomass usage, an understanding of forest management trends including harvesting and fuel processing methods, and the carbon profile of utilizing forest based woody biomass for the emerging biomass markets. Each of the tasks and subtasks have provided an increased level of understanding to support new directives, policies and adaptation of existing regulations within Massachusetts. The project has provided the essential information to allow state policymakers and regulators to address emerging markets, while ensuring forest sustainability and understanding the complex science on CO2 accounting and impacts as a result of biomass harvesting for power generation. The public at large and electricity ratepayers in Massachusetts will all benefit from the information garnered through this project. This is a result of the state’s interest to provide financial incentives to only biomass projects that demonstrate an acceptable carbon profile, an efficient use of the constrained supply of fuel, and the harvest of biomass to ensure forest sustainability. The goals of the Massachusetts Sustainable Forest Bioenergy Initiative as proposed in 2006 were identified as: increase the diversity of the Massachusetts energy mix through biomass; promote economic development in the rural economy through forest industry job creation; help fulfill the state’s energy and climate commitments under the Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard and Climate Protection Plan; assist the development of a biomass fuel supply infrastructure to support energy project demands; provide education and outreach to the public on the benefits and impacts of bioenergy; improve the theory and practice of sustainable forestry in the Commonwealth. Completed project activities summarized below will demonstrate the effectiveness of the project in meeting the above goals. In addition, as discussed above, Massachusetts DOER needed to make some modifications to its work plan and objectives during the term of this project due to changing public policy demands brought forth in the course of the public discours

  7. Electrochemically Modulated Separation for Plutonium Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pratt, Sandra H.; Breshears, Andrew T.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Accurate and timely analysis of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is critical in nuclear safeguards for detection of both protracted and rapid plutonium diversions. Gamma spectroscopy is a viable method for accurate and timely measurements of plutonium provided that the plutonium is well separated from the interfering fission and activation products present in spent nuclear fuel. Electrochemically modulated separation (EMS) is a method that has been used successfully to isolate picogram amounts of Pu from nitric acid matrices. With EMS, Pu adsorption may be turned "on" and "off" depending on the applied voltage, allowing for collection and stripping of Pu without the addition of chemical reagents. In this work, we have scaled up the EMS process to isolate microgram quantities of Pu from matrices encountered in spent nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Several challenges have been addressed including surface area limitations, radiolysis effects, electrochemical cell performance stability, and chemical interferences. After these challenges were resolved, 6 µg Pu was deposited in the electrochemical cell with approximately an 800-fold reduction of fission and activation product levels from a spent nuclear fuel sample. Modeling showed that these levels of Pu collection and interference reduction may not be sufficient for Pu detection by gamma spectroscopy. The main remaining challenges are to achieve a more complete Pu isolation and to deposit larger quantities of Pu for successful gamma analysis of Pu. If gamma analyses of Pu are successful, EMS will allow for accurate and timely on-site analysis for enhanced Pu safeguards.

  8. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  9. Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear meterial (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. The method is used to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards in both timely detection (in time to prevent theft) and late detection (after-the-fact). The method considers the various types of potential insider adversaries working alone or in collusion with other insiders. The approach can be used for a wide variety of facilities with various quantities and forms of SNM. An Evaluation Workbook provides documentation of the baseline assessment; this simplifies subsequent on-site appraisals. Quantitative evaluation is facilitated by an accompanying computer program. The method significantly increases an evaluation team's on-site analytical capabilities, thereby producing a more thorough and accurate safeguards evaluation.

  10. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad range of subjects, including nuclear material accountancy principles, legal definitions and the regulatory base and inspection tools and techniques. This 60% core part is given by representatives from regulatory bodies (The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, Directorate General for Nuclear Energy and Transport), industry (AREVA, British Nuclear Group), and research (Stockholm University, Hamburg University, Joint Research Centre-Institute of Transuranic Elements, and Joint Research Centre-Institute for the Protection of the Citizen). The remaining part is completed with topical lectures addressed by invited lecturers, such as from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the IAEA addressing topics of physical protection, illicit trafficking, the Iraq case study, exercises, including satellite imagery interpretation etc. With this structure of a stable core plus a variable set of invited lectures, the course will remain sustainable and up-to-date. A syllabus provides the students a homogeneous set of information material in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation matters at the European and international level. In this way, the ESARDA TKMWG aims to contribute to a two-fold scientific-technical and political-juridical education and training.

  11. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  12. Safeguards Approaches for Black Box Processes or Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Diaz-Marcano, Helly; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Miller, Erin; Wylie, Joann

    2013-09-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this study is to determine whether a safeguards approach can be developed for “black box” processes or facilities. These are facilities where a State or operator may limit IAEA access to specific processes or portions of a facility; in other cases, the IAEA may be prohibited access to the entire facility. The determination of whether a black box process or facility is safeguardable is dependent upon the details of the process type, design, and layout; the specific limitations on inspector access; and the restrictions placed upon the design information that can be provided to the IAEA. This analysis identified the necessary conditions for safeguardability of black box processes and facilities.

  13. Process monitoring in international safeguards for reprocessing plants: A demonstration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In the period 1985--1987, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory investigated the possible role of process monitoring for international safeguards applications in fuel reprocessing plants. This activity was conducted under Task C.59, ''Review of Process Monitoring Safeguards Technology for Reprocessing Facilities'' of the US program of Technical Assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards program. The final phase was a demonstration of process monitoring applied in a prototypical reprocessing plant test facility at ORNL. This report documents the demonstration and test results. 35 figs.

  14. Panel on protection and management of plutonium: Subpanel on safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear materials safeguards and security systems are described in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Materials of interest to safeguards, threats, proposals to strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, evolving safeguards issues and requirements, system effectiveness, and elements of a global nuclear materials management regime are discussed. Safeguards are seen as an essential element of nuclear materials management, but not a driver for decisions regarding nuclear power or the disposal of excess weapon nuclear materials.

  15. A Hubble Astrometry Initiative: Laying the Foundation for the Next-Generation Proper-Motion Survey of the Local Group

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kallivayalil, Nitya; Simon, Joshua D; Boylan-Kolchin, Michael; Deason, Alis J; Fritz, Tobias K; Geha, Marla; Sohn, Sangmo Tony; Weisz, Daniel R

    2015-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    High-precision astrometry throughout the Local Group is a unique capability of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), with potential for transformative science, including constraining the nature of dark matter, probing the epoch of reionization, and understanding key physics of galaxy evolution. While Gaia will provide unparalleled astrometric precision for bright stars in the inner halo of the Milky Way, HST is the only current mission capable of measuring accurate proper motions for systems at greater distances (> 80 kpc), which represents the vast majority of galaxies in the Local Group. The next generation of proper-motion measurements will require long time baselines, spanning many years to decades and possibly multiple telescopes, combining HST with the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) or the Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope (WFIRST). However, the current HST allocation process is not conducive to such multi-cycle/multi-mission science, which will bear fruit primarily over many years. We propose an HST ...

  16. Apparatus for safeguarding a radiological source

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Bzorgi, Fariborz M

    2014-10-07T23:59:59.000Z

    A tamper detector is provided for safeguarding a radiological source that is moved into and out of a storage location through an access porthole for storage and use. The radiological source is presumed to have an associated shipping container approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transporting the radiological source. The tamper detector typically includes a network of sealed tubing that spans at least a portion of the access porthole. There is an opening in the network of sealed tubing that is large enough for passage therethrough of the radiological source and small enough to prevent passage therethrough of the associated shipping cask. Generally a gas source connector is provided for establishing a gas pressure in the network of sealed tubing, and a pressure drop sensor is provided for detecting a drop in the gas pressure below a preset value.

  17. Environmental monitoring for nuclear safeguards. Background paper

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    To assure that states are not violating their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must verify that states do not possess convert nuclear facilities-a mission that prior to the 1991 Gulf War, it had neither the political backing nor the resources to conduct. The IAEA recognizes the importance of this new mission and is in the process of assuming it. One of the tools it is exploring to provide some indication of the presence of secret, or undeclared, nuclear activities and facilities is environmental monitoring. Modern sampling and analysis technologies provide powerful tools to detect the presence of characteristic substances that are likely to be emitted by such illicit activities. This background paper examines the prospects for such technologies to improve nuclear safeguards. It concludes that environmental monitoring can greatly increase the ability to detect undeclared activity at declared, or known, sites, and it can significantly increase the chances of detecting and locating undeclared sites.

  18. Safeguards for Uranium Extraction (UREX) +1a Process

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Feener, Jessica S.

    2011-08-08T23:59:59.000Z

    of nuclear material accountancy (MA), containment and surveillance (C/S) and solution monitoring (SM). Facility information was developed for a hypothesized UREX+1a plant with a throughput of 1000 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM) per year. Safeguard goals...

  19. Advanced integrated safeguards using front-end-triggering devices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Howell, J.A.; Whitty, W.J.

    1995-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report addresses potential uses of front-end-triggering devices for enhanced safeguards. Such systems incorporate video surveillance as well as radiation and other sensors. Also covered in the report are integration issues and analysis techniques.

  20. advanced safeguards approaches: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    to the international community as a possible means to shorten that state?s nuclear latency. If a safeguards approach could be developed for a fuel cycle featuring one of...

  1. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burr, Thomas L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hamada, Michael S. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-24T23:59:59.000Z

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  2. Review of selected dynamic material control functions for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lowry, L.L.

    1980-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the development of Dynamic Special Nuclear Material Accounting and Control systems used in nuclear manufacturing and reprocessing plants, there arises the question as to how these systems affect the IAEA inspection capabilities. The systems in being and under development provide information and control for a variety of purposes important to the plant operator, the safeguards purpose being one of them. This report attempts to judge the usefulness of these dynamic systems to the IAEA and have defined 12 functions that provide essential information to it. If the information acquired by these dynamic systems is to be useful to the IAEA, the inspectors must be able to independently verify it. Some suggestions are made as to how this might be done. But, even if it should not be possible to verify all the data, the availability to the IAEA of detailed, simultaneous, and plant-wide information would tend to inhibit a plant operator from attempting to generate a floating or fictitious inventory. Suggestions are made that might be helpful in the design of future software systems, an area which has proved to be fatally deficient in some systems and difficult in all.

  3. Influence of safeguards and fire protection on criticality safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Six, D E

    1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    There are several positive influences of safeguards and fire protection on criticality safety. Experts in each discipline must be aware of regulations and requirements of the others and work together to ensure a fault-tree design. EG and G Idaho, Inc., routinely uses an Occupancy-Use Readiness Manual to consider all aspects of criticality safety, fire protection, and safeguards. The use of the analytical tree is described.

  4. Termination of Safeguards on ULWBR Material

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ivan R. Thomas; Ernest L. Laible

    2008-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, has approved the disposition of 31 metric tons of Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (ULWBR) material in canisters stored within dry wells of the Underground Fuel Storage Facility at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). This unirradiated material consists primarily of ceramic pellets of thorium oxide in stainless steel cladding, but it also contains 300 kilograms of uranium that is 98 wt% U-233. The ULWBR material was not processed at the INTEC because it was incompatible with prior chemical separation schemes. Other economical recovery options have not been identified, and expressions of interest for consolidating the material with existing projects at other DOE sites have not been received. The U-233 could be used for producing the medical isotope Actinium-225, but the proof-of-principle demonstration and follow-on pilot program have not been developed to the point of requiring production quantities of U-233. Consequently, the selected disposition of the ULWBR material was burial as Low Level Waste at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which required terminating safeguards controls for the contained Category II quantity of Attractiveness Level D special nuclear material (SNM). The requested termination followed the twelve point evaluation criteria of the Historical Defense Program Discard Guidance and included a security analysis for evaluating the risks of theft, diversion, and radiological sabotage associated with the material. Continuity of knowledge in the book inventory was assured by documenting that the original shipper’s measurements accurately reflected the quantities of materials received and that the ULWBR materials had remained under adequate physical protection and had been subject to periodic physical inventories. The method selected for substantiating the book values as the basis for terminating safeguards was the nondestructive assay used during physical inventories. Shipping arrangements included refurbishing a licensed cask to be reused over the duration of the termination process. An accompanying batching plan and shipping schedule were developed to accommodate multiple commercial shipments of Category III quantities of SNM in the selected cask, such that all canisters would be received at NTS prior to the expiration of the nonrenewable cask license.

  5. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTEGRATION WITH SAFETY ANALYSIS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hearn, J; James Lightner, J

    2007-04-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this paper is to share the Savannah River Site lessons learned on Safeguards and Security (S&S) program integration with K-Area Complex (KAC) safety basis. The KAC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), is managed by the Washington Savannah River Company (WSRC), and the S&S program, managed by Wackenhut Services, Incorporated--Savannah River Site (WSI-SRS). WSRC and WSI-SRS developed a contractual arrangement to recognize WSI-SRS requirements in the KAC safety analysis. Design Basis Threat 2003 (DBT03) security upgrades required physical modifications and operational changes which included the availability of weapons which could potentially impact the facility safety analysis. The KAC DSA did not previously require explicit linkage to the S&S program to satisfy the safety analysis. WSI-SRS have contractual requirements with the Department of Energy (DOE) which are separate from WSRC contract requirements. The lessons learned will include a discussion on planning, analysis, approval of the controls and implementation issues.

  6. Research Initiative Will Demonstrate Low Temperature Geothermal...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Research Initiative Will Demonstrate Low Temperature Geothermal Electrical Power Generation Systems Using Oilfield Fluids Research Initiative Will Demonstrate Low Temperature...

  7. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ehinger, Michael H [ORNL; Johnson, Shirley [Tucker Creek Consulting

    2010-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  8. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Durst, Philip C.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Boyer, Brian; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

    This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line. The most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, referred to as “MOX”. However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and transmuted through irradiation in the ABR. A third and final report in this series will evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of reference. The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF.

  9. Task team approach to safeguards and security designs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zack, N.R. (Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)); Wilkey, D.D. (USDOE Idaho Operations Office, Idaho Falls, ID (United States))

    1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 1987, a US Department of Energy (DOE) supported task team was organized at the request of the DOE Idaho Field Office (DOE-ID) to provide support for safeguards and security (S S) designs of the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) facility. Prior to deferral of the project, the SIS facility was to be constructed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to produce weapons grade plutonium from DOE owned fuel grade plutonium. The task team was assembled to provide the resources necessary to assure that safeguards and security considerations were included as an integral part of the design of the facility, and that SIS designs would take advantage of available technology in the areas of physical security, measurements, accountability, and material and personnel tracking. The task team included personnel from DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE-OSS), DOE-ID, DOE contractors, and the national laboratories providing a wide range of expertise and experience. The team reviewed proposed designs and provided recommendations for safeguards and security features in each stage of the design process. The value of this approach to safeguards and security designs will be discussed with respect to benefits, lessons learned, and recommendations for future applications. 5 refs.

  10. Safeguards and security research and development progress report, October 1993--September 1994

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. [comp.

    1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R&D) program from October 1993 through September 1994. The activities presented in the first part of the report were directed primarily to domestic US safeguards applications and were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy`s Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS, NN-50). The activities described in Part 2, International Safeguards, were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/OACN, NN-40). Part 3 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have other sponsors. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R&D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published or presented in 1994.

  11. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  12. High-resolution microcalorimeter detectors as a tool in the future of nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hoteling, Nathan J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hoover, Andrew S [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    New measurements are presented from the LANL-NIST microcalorimeter array for two standard plutonium sources. The results demonstrate substantially smaller error bars obtained from the spectral analysis program FRAM. Some areas of improvement to the analysis technique have been identified, indicating that the micro calorimeter results can be improved upon. These results support the viability of a device for performing real nuclear safeguards measurements in the near future. The challenge of providing reliably accurate and precise data is a critical component of any safeguards initiative. In the realm of nuclear safeguards, this is an especially daunting task since inaccurate and/or imprecise data could have very serious international consequences. As such, there is a constant drive within the community to establish better measurement and analysis techniques in order to further reduce the associated errors and uncertainties. Even with todays state of the art equipment, measurement uncertainties can extend to several significant quantities worth of material over a relatively modest period of time. Furthermore, there is a strong desire for improved nondestructive analysis techniques in order to reduce both the cost, turnover rate, and inconvenience of destructive analyses. One promising new technology that may help to realize these goals is that of gamma-ray microcalorimeter detectors. The hallmark quality of this new technique is the ability to achieve energy resolution nearly an order of magnitude better than typical planar high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors. Such an improvement may help reduce uncertainties associated with, for instance, plutonium isotopics or uranium enrichment measurements. This may, in turn, help to reduce uncertainties in total plutonium and/or uranium content in a given sample without the need for destructive analysis. In this paper, we will describe this new detector technology as well as some recent measurements carried out with the LANL-NIST gamma-ray microcalorimeter ({micro}cal) array. Discussion will focus on the capabilities of this technology as well as the progress toward a practical measurement device.

  13. Considerations for Possible Light Impact of Spent Nuclear Fuel for Safeguards Measurements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brian K. Castle; Kelly D. Ellis

    2012-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This effort is designed to be a preliminary study to determine the appropriateness of lightly contacting SNF with zirconium-based cladding, in wet storage, for the purpose of taking safeguards measurements. Contact will likely consist of an initial impact followed by a light tensile load on the exterior surface of the SNF cladding. In the past, concerns have been raised that contacting SNF cladding could result in a loss of long-term mechanical integrity due to crack initiation, uncontrolled crack propagation, and a mechanical exfoliation of the protective oxide layer. The mechanical integrity concerns are addressed with an analytic model that evaluates the threshold impact limits for degraded, but undamaged SNF cladding. Aqueous corrosion concerns, associated with exfoliation of the protective oxide layer, are addressed with a qualitative argument, focusing on the possible corrosion mechanisms of zirconium-based cladding.

  14. An Inspector's Assessment of the New Model Safeguards Approach for Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Curtis, Michael M.

    2007-07-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This conference paper assesses the changes that are being made to the Model Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants.

  15. Export Controls and International Safeguards: Strengthening Nonproliferation through Interdisciplinary Integration

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peterson, Danielle J.; Goorevich, Richard; Hooper, Rich; Scheinman, Lawrence; Tape, James W.

    2008-11-03T23:59:59.000Z

    International safeguards and export controls are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of international safeguards and export controls rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.

  16. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Badalamente, R. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Anzelon, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Deland, S. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whiteson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  17. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  18. Integrated safeguards & security for material protection, accounting, and control.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Traditional safeguards and security design for fuel cycle facilities is done separately and after the facility design is near completion. This can result in higher costs due to retrofits and redundant use of data. Future facilities will incorporate safeguards and security early in the design process and integrate the systems to make better use of plant data and strengthen both systems. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integration of materials control and accounting (MC&A) measurements with physical security design for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Locations throughout the plant where data overlap occurs or where MC&A data could be a benefit were identified. This mapping is presented along with the methodology for including the additional data in existing probabilistic assessments to evaluate safeguards and security systems designs.

  19. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-10-02T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. {open_quotes}Military{close_quotes} refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. {open_quotes}Excess{close_quotes} refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. {open_quotes}Monitoring{close_quotes} is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

  20. Application of the sources code in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beddingfield, D. H. (David H.)

    2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Sources Code System provides a greatly expanded calculational capacity in the field of nuclear safeguards. It is becoming more common that we are called upon to perform assays on materials for which no standards exist. These materials tend to be mixtures of nuclear materials and low-Z compounds (spent fuels in a variety of matrices, in-process compounds such as UF6, MOX with varying water content). We will present soma applications of the Sources Code and discuss the application calculated (a,n) source terms in neutron coincidence counting for nuclear safeguards.

  1. AUTHENTICATED SENSOR INTERFACE DEVICE FOR JOINT USE SAFEGUARDS APPLICATIONS - CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Poland, R.; Drayer, R.; Wilson, J.

    2013-08-12T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper will discuss the key features of the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device that collectively provide the ability to share data among a number of parties while ensuring the authentication of data and protecting both the operator’s and the IAEA’s interests. The paper will also discuss the development of the prototype, the initial testing with an accountancy scale, and future plans and challenges to implementation into the joint use and remote monitoring applications. As nuclear fuel cycle technology becomes more prevalent throughout the world and the capacity of plants increases, limited resources of the IAEA are being stretched near a breaking point. A strategy is to increase efficiency in safeguards monitoring using “joint use” equipment that will provide the facility operator process data while also providing the IAEA key safeguards data. The data, however, must be authenticated and validated to ensure the data have not been tampered with. The Authenticated Sensor Interface Device provides the capability to share data and can be a valuable component in the IAEA’s ability to collect accountancy data from scales in Uranium conversion and enrichment plants, as well as nuclear fuel fabrication plants. Likewise, the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device can be configured to accept a diverse array of input signals, ranging from analog voltage, to current, to digital interfaces and more. These modular capabilities provide the ability to collect authenticated, joint-use, data streams from various process monitoring sensors.

  2. Report on the September 2011 Meeting of the Next Generation Safegaurds Professional Network

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gitau, Ernest TN; Benz, Jacob M.

    2011-12-19T23:59:59.000Z

    The Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN) was established in 2009 by Oak Ridge National Laboratory targeted towards the engagement of young professionals employed in safeguards across the many national laboratories. NGSPN focuses on providing a mechanism for young safeguards professionals to connect and foster professional relationships, facilitating knowledge transfer between current safeguards experts and the next generation of experts, and acting as an entity to represent the interests of the international community of young and mid-career safeguards professionals. This is accomplished in part with a yearly meeting held at a national laboratory site. In 2011, this meeting was held at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This report documents the events and results of that meeting.

  3. The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - How It Works

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nock,C.; Hoffheins,B.

    2008-07-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Support Program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to transfer US technology and expertise to assist the IAEA Department of Safeguards because its limited budget and scope would not allow for R&D activities and the procurement of specialized or customized equipment. Over the years, the USSP and the Department of Safeguards have worked together continuously to develop and improve processes for requesting, selecting, and managing projects that support the Safeguards verification mission. This paper will discuss the main USSP processes for accepting and processing Safeguards requests, and managing and reporting task progress.

  4. The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Containment and Surveillance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Diaz,R.A.

    2008-06-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States Support Program (USSP) priority for containment and surveillance (US) focuses on maintaining or improving the reliability and cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for IAEA safeguards, expanding the number of systems that are unattended and remotely monitored, and developing verification methods that help streamline the on-site inspection process. Existing IAEA C/S systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems, which may include active seals, nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. These systems operate autonomously. They send analytical data to IAEA headquarters where it can be reviewed. These systems present challenges to the goals of improved system performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness. One critical lesson from past experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer, and the facility operator, to create a successful, cost effective system. Recent USSP C/S activities include Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant safeguard systems, production of a new shift register, numerous vulnerability assessments of C/S systems, a conduit monitoring system which identifies tampering of IAEA conduit deployed in the field, fiber optic seal upgrades, unattended monitoring system software upgrades, next generation surveillance system which will upgrade existing camera systems, and support of the IAEA's development of the universal nondestructive assay data acquisition platform.

  5. The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pepper,S.

    2008-06-09T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.

  6. advanced safeguards technology: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    advanced safeguards technology First Page Previous Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Next Page Last Page Topic Index 1 February 2000 Advanced...

  7. Evaluation of three new technolgies for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stanbro, W.D.; Rodriguez, C.A.; Olinger, C.T.; Cremers, T.L.

    1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Los Alamos National Laboratory is examining a number of promising technologies that could increase the effectiveness and efficiency of international nuclear safeguards. The techniques described in this paper include video image processing, infrared imaging, and acoustic resonance spectroscopy. Each of these techniques offers unique advantages in the implementation of an inspection regime.

  8. Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards: Common technologies and challenges

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards have much in common, including the basic physical phenomena and technologies involved as well as the commitments and challenges posed by expanding nuclear programs in many countries around the world. The unique characteristics of the fission process -- such as prompt and delayed neutron and gamma ray emission -- not only provide the means of sustaining and controlling the fission chain reaction, but also provide unique ''signatures'' that are essential to quantitative measurement and effective safeguarding of key nuclear materials (notably /sup 239/Pu and /sup 235/U) against theft, loss, or diversion. In this paper, we trace briefly the historical emergence of safeguards as an essential component of the expansion of the nuclear enterprise worldwide. We then survey the major categories of passive and active nondestructive assay techniques that are currently in use or under development for rapid, accurate measurement and verification of safe-guarded nuclear materials in the many forms in which they occur throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. 23 refs., 14 figs.

  9. Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System Reporting and Data Submission

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-02-10T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual provides clear and detailed instructions and procedures for documenting and reporting data submissions for nuclear materials transactions, inventories, and material balances to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Cancels DOE 5633.3B. Canceled by DOE M 474.1-2A.

  10. Process monitoring in support of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.; Kerr, H.T.

    1987-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts touched on various concepts and a few specific applications, but none was comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report develops prototypical process monitoring concepts that can be incorporated into the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) general safeguards approach for fuel reprocessing plants. This effort considers existing approaches, recognizing limitations and needed improvements. Prototypical process monitoring applications are developed and proposed for implementation and demonstration in the Integrated Equipment Test facility, which is located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The specific information needed to accomplish the process monitoring objectives are defined, and the mechanics for obtaining that information are described. Effort is given to the identification and assessment of potential impacts and benefits associated with process monitoring concepts, with particular attention to IAEA, state, and plant operator interests. The historical development of process monitoring is described and the implications of using process monitoring in international safeguards are discussed. Specific process process monitoring applications for demonstration in the IET facility are developed in Sects. 6 through 14. 1 fig.

  11. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  12. Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert Bean

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

  13. A Cost Effective, Integrated and Smart Radioactive Safeguard System 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Singh, Harneet

    2012-02-14T23:59:59.000Z

    consequences. In order to protect this precious resource and ensure its use for the good of mankind, safeguard systems are more important than ever. Current Market solutions are wide ranged but have a large number of disadvantages, some of which include high...

  14. Progress Towards Deployable Antineutrino Detectors for Reactor Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowden, N; Bernstein, A; Dazeley, S; Keefer, G; Reyna, D; Cabrera-Palmer, B; Kiff, S

    2010-04-05T23:59:59.000Z

    Fission reactors emit large numbers of antineutrinos and this flux may be useful for the measurement of two quantities of interest for reactor safeguards: the reactor's power and plutonium inventory throughout its cycle. The high antineutrino flux and relatively low background rates means that simple cubic meter scale detectors at tens of meters standoff can record hundreds or thousands of antineutrino events per day. Such antineutrino detectors would add online, quasi-real-time bulk material accountancy to the set of reactor monitoring tools available to the IAEA and other safeguards agencies with minimal impact on reactor operations. Between 2003 and 2008, our LLNL/SNL collaboration successfully deployed several prototype safeguards detectors at a commercial reactor in order to test both the method and the practicality of its implementation in the field. Partially on the strength of the results obtained from these deployments, an Experts Meeting was convened by the IAEA Novel Technologies Group in 2008 to assess current antineutrino detection technology and examine how it might be incorporated into the safeguards regime. Here we present a summary of our previous deployments and discuss current work that seeks to provide expanded capabilities suggested by the Experts Panel, in particular aboveground detector operation.

  15. Nuclear reactor safeguards and monitoring with antineutrino detectors A. Bernsteina)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gratta, Giorgio

    Nuclear reactor safeguards and monitoring with antineutrino detectors A. Bernsteina) Sandia of nuclear reactor types, including power reactors, research reactors, and plutonium production reactors-understood principles that govern the core's evolution in time, can be used to determine whether the reactor is being

  16. Safeguards Agreement and Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-01-07T23:59:59.000Z

    To ensure that DOE complies with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, the Protocol to the Agreement, and the subsidiary arrangements to the Agreement. Canceled by DOE O 142.2A. Cancels DOE 1270.2B.

  17. China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Paris-Sud XI, Université de

    China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards Patrick A. Messerlin China finds of antidumping measures, but (so far) one of the smallest users of such measures. China's World Trade China's recent antidumping enforcement; how China could minimize its exposure to foreign antidumping

  18. Integrated Safeguards and Security Management Self-Assessment 2004

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lunford, Dan; Ramsey, Dwayne

    2005-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2002 Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory deployed the first Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Self-Assessment process, designed to measure the effect of the Laboratory's ISSM efforts. This process was recognized by DOE as a best practice and model program for self-assessment and training. In 2004, the second Self-Assessment was launched. The cornerstone of this process was an employee survey that was designed to meet several objectives: (1) Ensure that Laboratory assets are protected. (2) Provide a measurement of the Laboratory's current security status that can be compared against the 2002 Self-Assessment baseline. (3) Educate all Laboratory staff about security responsibilities, tools, and practices. (4) Provide security staff with feedback on the effectiveness of security programs. (5) Provide line management with the information they need to make informed decisions about security. This 2004 Self Assessment process began in July 2004 with every employee receiving an information packet and instructions for completing the ISSM survey. The Laboratory-wide survey contained questions designed to measure awareness and conformance to policy and best practices. The survey response was excellent--90% of Berkeley Lab employees completed the questionnaire. ISSM liaisons from each division followed up on the initial survey results with individual employees to improve awareness and resolve ambiguities uncovered by the questionnaire. As with the 2002 survey, the Self-Assessment produced immediate positive results for the ISSM program and revealed opportunities for longer-term corrective actions. Results of the questionnaire provided information for organizational profiles and an institutional summary. The overall level of security protection and awareness was very high--often above 90%. Post-survey work by the ISSM liaisons and line management consistently led to improved awareness and metrics, as shown by a comparison of profiles at the end of phase one (August 6, 2004) and phase two (November 1, 2004). The Self-Assessment confirmed that classified information is not held or processed at Berkeley Lab. The survey results also identified areas where increased employee knowledge and awareness of Laboratory policy would be beneficial, the two most prominent being password usage and wireless network service. Line management will be able to determine additional corrective actions based on the results of the Self-Assessment. Future assessments will raise the ratings bar for some existing program elements and add new elements to stimulate further improvements in Laboratory security.

  19. The ESA's Climate Change Initiative is reprocessing and reassessing over 40 years of multi-sensor satellite records to generate consistent, traceable, long-term datasets of

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Boyer, Edmond

    The ESA's Climate Change Initiative is reprocessing and reassessing over 40 years of multi" for the climate modeling and research communities. THE ESA CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE Satellite Data Records to our understanding of Earth's climate and how it is changing--one of the major challenges of the twenty

  20. Probabilistic risk analysis toward cost-effective 3S (safety, safeguards, security) implementation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Mochiji, Toshiro [Department of Science and Technology for Nuclear Material Management, Japan Atomic Energy Agency, 2-4 Shirane, Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Naka-gun, Ibaraki 319-1193 (Japan)

    2014-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) has been introduced for several decades in safety and nuclear advanced countries have already used this methodology in their own regulatory systems. However, PRA has not been developed in safeguards and security so far because of inherent difficulties in intentional and malicious acts. In this paper, probabilistic proliferation and risk analysis based on random process is applied to hypothetical reprocessing process and physical protection system in nuclear reactor with the Markov model that was originally developed by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) in Generation IV International Framework (GIF). Through the challenge to quantify the security risk with a frequency in this model, integrated risk notion among 3S to pursue the cost-effective installation of those countermeasures is discussed in a heroic manner.

  1. INL Active Interrogation Testing In Support of the GNEP Safeguards Campaign

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    David L. Chichester

    2008-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. Work at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in the area of active interrogation, using neutron and photon sources, has been under way for many years to develop methods for detecting and quantifying nuclear material for national and homeland security research areas. This research knowledge base is now being extended to address nuclear safeguards and process monitoring issues related to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). As a first step in this area preliminary scoping studies have been performed to investigate the usefulness of using active neutron interrogation, with a low-power electronic neutron generator, to assay Department of Transportation 6M shipping drums containing uranium oxide fuel rodlets from INL’s zero power physics reactor. Using the paired-counting technique during the die-away time period of interrogation, a lower detection limit of approximately 4.2 grams of enriched uranium (40% 235U) was calculated for a 40 minute measurement using a field portable 2.5 MeV neutron source and an array of 16 moderated helium-3 neutron tubes. Future work in this area, including the use of a more powerful neutron source and a better tailored detector array, would likely improve this limit to a much lower level. Further development work at INL will explore the applicability of active interrogation in association with the nuclear safeguards and process monitoring needs of the advanced GNEP facilities under consideration. This work, which will include both analyses and field demonstrations, will be performed in collaboration with colleagues at INL and elsewhere that have expertise in nuclear fuel reprocessing as well as active interrogation and its use for nuclear material analyses.

  2. Using Highly Interactive Virtual Environments for Safeguards Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Weil, Bradley S [ORNL] [ORNL; Alcala, Benjamin S [ORNL] [ORNL; Alcala, Scott [ORNL] [ORNL; Eipeldauer, Mary D [ORNL] [ORNL; Weil, Logan B [ORNL] [ORNL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Highly interactive virtual environment (HIVE) is a term that refers to interactive educational simulations, serious games and virtual worlds. Studies indicate that learning with the aid of interactive environments produces better retention and depth of knowledge by promoting improved trainee engagement and understanding. Virtual reality or three dimensional (3D) visualization is often used to promote the understanding of something when personal observation, photographs, drawings, and/or sketches are not possible or available. Subjects and situations, either real or hypothetical, can be developed using a 3D model. Models can be tailored to the audience allowing safeguards and security features to be demonstrated for educational purposes in addition to engineering evaluation and performance analysis. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has begun evaluating the feasibility of HIVEs for improving safeguards activities such as training, mission planning, and evaluating worker task performance. This paper will discuss the development workflow of HIVEs and present some recent examples.

  3. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog. Second edition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Auerbach, C.

    1985-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This catalog contains entries on new developments and on items listed in BNL 51450, which have either been carried over unchanged or been updated. More than 70 entries were deleted because of either obsolescence, insufficient interest in terms of safeguards, or lack of documentable development activities in recent years. Some old listings as well as new material was consolidated into more generic entries. As in the earlier document, the emphasis is on devices and instruments that are either in field use at this time or under active development. A few items such as NDA reference materials, instrument vans and certain shipping containers are included because they are important adjuncts to optimum utilization of safeguards instrumentation. This catalog does not include devices for physical protection. As was the case with its predecessor, most of the material in this catalog originated in the US and Canada; a few contributions came from member states of the European Community.

  4. Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1994-07-15T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish policy, responsibilities, and authorities for the protection and control of safeguards and security interests. Cancels DOE O 5632.1B, DOE O 5632.2A, DOE O 5632.5, DOE O 5632.6, DOE O 5632.9A, DOE O 5632.11, DOE O 5635.1A, DOE O 5635.2B, DOE O 5635.3. Canceled by DOE O 473.1

  5. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B. (comps.)

    1982-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  6. Safeguards and security issues for the disposition of fissile materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rutherford, D.; Fearey, B. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Moore, L. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy`s Office of Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials, preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), preparing for a record of decision (ROD) regarding this material and conducting other activities. The primary security objectives of this program are to reduce major security risks and strengthen arms reduction and nonproliferation (NP). To help achieve these objectives, a safeguards and security (S&S) team consisting of participants from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established. The S&S activity for this program is a cross-cutting task which addresses all of the FMD program options. It includes both domestic and international safeguards and includes areas such as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will discuss the activities of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) S&S team as well as some specific S&S issues associated with various FMDP options/facilities. Some of the items to be discussed include the threat, S&S requirements, S&S criteria for assessing risk, S&S issues concerning fissile material processing/facilities, and international and domestic safeguards.

  7. Neutron Generators for Spent Fuel Assay

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A

    2010-12-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of the U.S. DOE has initiated a multi-lab/university collaboration to quantify the plutonium (Pu) mass in, and detect the diversion of pins from, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies with non-destructive assay (NDA). The 14 NDA techniques being studied include several that require an external neutron source: Delayed Neutrons (DN), Differential Die-Away (DDA), Delayed Gammas (DG), and Lead Slowing-Down Spectroscopy (LSDS). This report provides a survey of currently available neutron sources and their underlying technology that may be suitable for NDA of SNF assemblies. The neutron sources considered here fall into two broad categories. The term 'neutron generator' is commonly used for sealed devices that operate at relatively low acceleration voltages of less than 150 kV. Systems that employ an acceleration structure to produce ion beam energies from hundreds of keV to several MeV, and that are pumped down to vacuum during operation, rather than being sealed units, are usually referred to as 'accelerator-driven neutron sources.' Currently available neutron sources and future options are evaluated within the parameter space of the neutron generator/source requirements as currently understood and summarized in section 2. Applicable neutron source technologies are described in section 3. Commercially available neutron generators and other source options that could be made available in the near future with some further development and customization are discussed in sections 4 and 5, respectively. The pros and cons of the various options and possible ways forward are discussed in section 6. Selection of the best approach must take a number of parameters into account including cost, size, lifetime, and power consumption, as well as neutron flux, neutron energy spectrum, and pulse structure that satisfy the requirements of the NDA instrument to be built.

  8. Clean Coal Power Initiative | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Clean Coal Power Initiative Clean Coal Power Initiative "Clean coal technology" describes a new generation of energy processes that sharply reduce air emissions and other...

  9. Advances in nuclear instrumentation for safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Prettyman, T.H.; Reilly, T.D.; Miller, M.C.; Hollas, C.L.; Pickrell, M.M.; Prommel, J.M.; Dreicer, J.S.

    1996-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper describes detectors, instrumentation, and analytical methods under development to address the above issues. The authors will describe work underway on room-temperature semiconductors including attempts to model the response of these detectors to improve spectrum analysis procedures and detector design. Computerized tomography is used in many medical and industrial applications; they are developing both gamma-ray and neutron tomography for improved measurements of waste and direct-use materials. Modern electronics and scintillation detectors should permit the development of fast neutron coincidence detectors with dramatically improved signal-to-noise ratios. For active measurements, they are studying several improved neutron sources, including a high-fluence, plasma-based, d-t generator. New analysis tools from information theory may permit one to better combine data from different measurement systems. This paper attempts to briefly describe a range of new sensors, electronics, and data analysis methods under study at Los Alamos and other laboratories to promote discussion of promising technology that they may bring to bear on these important global issues.

  10. A parameter study to optimizing scintillator characteristics for increased sensitivity in nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security based applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Daniel Shy

    2014-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A parameter study to optimizing scintillator characteristics for increased sensitivity in nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security based applications

  11. Advanced Process Monitoring Techniques for Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Orton, Christopher R.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Peper, Shane M.

    2010-11-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies, including both the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor and a spectroscopy-based monitoring system, to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The MIP Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. This paper will provide an overview of our methods and report our on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies.

  12. Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-04-05T23:59:59.000Z

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

  13. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W. [comp.

    1997-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  14. Extended Evaluations of the Commercial Spectrometer Systems for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duc T. Vo

    1999-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguards applications require the best of the spectrometer system with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be easy to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with five different germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscope y may become the way of future gamma-ray spectroscopy.

  15. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance. (DLC)

  16. NGSI Safeguards by Design | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTubahq.na.govSecurityMaintaining theSan Jose-San|NGSI Safeguards by Design |

  17. Safeguards and Security for Program and Project Management - DOE

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's PossibleRadiation Protection245C Unlimited ReleaseWelcome ton nSafeguards and Security

  18. FAQS Qualification Card - Safeguards and Security | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport in Representative Geologic MediaTreatment | Department ofMechanicalSafeguards and

  19. Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

    2009-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states’ (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

  20. Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI): On-Line Intelligent Self-Diagnostic Monitoring for Next Generation Nuclear Plants - Phase I Annual Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    L. J. Bond; S. R. Doctor; R. W. Gilbert; D. B. Jarrell; F. L. Greitzer; R. J. Meador

    2000-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    OAK-B135 This OSTI ID belongs to an IWO and is being released out of the system. The Program Manager Rebecca Richardson has confirmed that all reports have been received. The objective of this project is to design and demonstrate the operation of the real-time intelligent self-diagnostic and prognostic system for next generation nuclear power plant systems. This new self-diagnostic technology is titled, ''On-Line Intelligent Self-Diagnostic Monitoring System'' (SDMS). This project provides a proof-of-principle technology demonstration for SDMS on a pilot plant scale service water system, where a distributed array of sensors is integrated with active components and passive structures typical of next generation nuclear power reactor and plant systems. This project employs state-of-the-art sensors, instrumentation, and computer processing to improve the monitoring and assessment of the power reactor system and to provide diagnostic and automated prognostics capabilities.

  1. Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Ward, Rebecca; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Middleton, Bobby D.

    2011-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

  2. Application of safeguards technology in DOE's environmental restoration program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eccleston, G.W.; Baker, M.P.; Hansen, W.R.; Lucas, M.C.; Markin, J.T.; Phillips, J.R.

    1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    During the last two decades, the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has supported the research and development of safeguards systems analysis methodologies and nondestructive assay (NDS) technology for characterizing, monitoring, and accounting nuclear materials. This paper discusses methodologies and NDA instrumentation developed by the DOE/OSS program that could be applied in the Environmental Restoration Program. NDA instrumentation could be used for field measurements during site characterization and to monitor nuclear materials, heavy metals, and other hazardous materials during site remediation. Systems methodologies can minimize the expenditure of resources and help specify appropriate combinations of NDA instrumentation and chemical analyses to characterize a variety of materials quickly and reduce personnel exposure in hazardous environments. A training program is available to teach fundamental and advanced principles and approaches to characterize and quantify nuclear materials properly and to organize and analyze measurement information for decision making. The ability to characterize the overall volume and distribution of materials at a waste site is difficult because of the inhomogeneous distribution of materials, the requirement for extreme sensitivity, and the lack of resources to collect and chemically analyze a sufficient number of samples. Using a systems study approach based on statistical sampling, the resources necessary to characterize a site can be enhanced by appropriately combining in situ and field NDA measurements with laboratory analyses. 35 refs., 1 figs., 2 tabs.

  3. Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory. FY 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory is published annually by the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) of the US Department of Energy (DOE), and is Intended to inform recipients of the full scope of the OSS R&D program. It is distributed for use by DOE headquarters personnel, DOE program offices, DOE field offices, DOE operating contractors, national laboratories, other federal agencies, and foreign governments. Chapters 1 through 7 of the Directory provide general information regarding the Technology Development Program, including the mission, program description, organizational roles and responsibilities, technology development lifecycle, requirements analysis, program formulation, the task selection process, technology development infrastructure, technology transfer activities, and current research and development tasks. These chapters are followed by a series of appendices which contain more specific information on aspects of the Program. Appendix A is a summary of major technology development accomplishments made during FY 1992. Appendix B lists S&S technology development reports issued during FY 1992 which reflect work accomplished through the OSS Technology Development Program and other relevant activities outside the Program. Finally, Appendix C summarizes the individual task statements which comprise the FY 1993 Technology Development Program.

  4. Safeguards and Security Research and Development progress report, October 1992--September 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. [comps.

    1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development program. Part 1 covers the three project phases that are part of the development of the technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. Examples include advanced portal monitor technology, digital image analysis for materials control, neutron multiplicity counting techniques, and development of a tomographic gamma-ray scanner. It treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 2 covers international safeguards activities, including technology developed for direct application in the international community, support to the IAEA, and bilateral technical exchanges with many other States, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Japan, Russia, and the Ukraine. Part 3 highlights a variety of projects, including several in computer security R and D, direct support of the IAEA through the Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, and safeguards projects funded by the US Department of State, the DOE`s Office of Technology Development, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Japan, and Germany. A few examples of these projects are the support to the Westinghouse Hanford Company efforts in data acquisition and control for the hydrogen mitigation tests on high-level-waste Tank 101-SY, nondestructive assay development for Warhead Dismantlement, and instrumentation system development for the Siemans mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant in Germany. 75 refs.

  5. Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Michael Holzemer; Alan Carvo

    2012-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

  6. The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Training and Human Resources

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Queirolo,A.

    2008-06-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) priority of training and human resources is aimed at providing the Department of Safeguards with an appropriate mixture of regular staff and extrabudgetary experts who are qualified to meet the IAEA's technical needs and to provide personnel with appropriate instruction to improve the technical basis and specific skills needed to perform their job functions. The equipment and methods used in inspection activities are unique, complex, and evolving. New and experienced safeguards inspectors need timely and effective training to perform required tasks and to learn new skills prescribed by new safeguards policies or agreements. The role of the inspector has changed from that of strictly an accountant to include that of a detective. New safeguards procedures are being instituted, and therefore, experienced inspectors must be educated on these new procedures. The USSP also recognizes the need for training safeguards support staff, particularly those who maintain and service safeguards equipment (SGTS), and those who perform information collection and analysis (SGIM). The USSP is committed to supporting the IAEA with training to ensure the effectiveness of all staff members and will continue to offer its assistance in the development and delivery of basic, refresher, and advanced training courses. This paper will discuss the USSP ongoing support in the area of training and IAEA staffing.

  7. The uranium cylinder assay system for enrichment plant safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rael, Carlos D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Iwamoto, Tomonori [JNFL; Tamura, Takayuki [JNFL; Aiuchi, Syun [JNFL

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safeguarding sensitive fuel cycle technology such as uranium enrichment is a critical component in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. A useful tool for the nuclear materials accountancy of such a plant would be an instrument that measured the uranium content of UF{sub 6} cylinders. The Uranium Cylinder Assay System (UCAS) was designed for Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) for use in the Rokkasho Enrichment Plant in Japan for this purpose. It uses total neutron counting to determine uranium mass in UF{sub 6} cylinders given a known enrichment. This paper describes the design of UCAS, which includes features to allow for unattended operation. It can be used on 30B and 48Y cylinders to measure depleted, natural, and enriched uranium. It can also be used to assess the amount of uranium in decommissioned equipment and waste containers. Experimental measurements have been carried out in the laboratory and these are in good agreement with the Monte Carlo modeling results.

  8. Nuclear Reactor Safeguards and Monitoring with Antineutrino Detectors

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Adam Bernstein; Yifang Wang; Giorgio Gratta; Todd West

    2001-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Cubic-meter-sized antineutrino detectors can be used to non-intrusively, robustly and automatically monitor and safeguard a wide variety of nuclear reactor types, including power reactors, research reactors, and plutonium production reactors. Since the antineutrino spectra and relative yields of fissioning isotopes depend on the isotopic composition of the core, changes in composition can be observed without ever directly accessing the core itself. Information from a modest-sized antineutrino detector, coupled with the well-understood principles that govern the core's evolution in time, can be used to determine whether the reactor is being operated in an illegitimate way. A group at Sandia is currently constructing a one cubic meter antineutrino detector at the San Onofre reactor site in California to demonstrate these principles.

  9. The new geospatial tools: global transparency enhancing safeguards verification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pabian, Frank Vincent [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-09-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper focuses on the importance and potential role of the new, freely available, geospatial tools for enhancing IAEA safeguards and how, together with commercial satellite imagery, they can be used to promote 'all-source synergy'. As additional 'open sources', these new geospatial tools have heralded a new era of 'global transparency' and they can be used to substantially augment existing information-driven safeguards gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection of undeclared facilities, as well as support ongoing monitoring and verification of various treaty (e.g., NPT, FMCT) relevant activities and programs. As an illustration of how these new geospatial tools may be applied, an original exemplar case study provides how it is possible to derive value-added follow-up information on some recent public media reporting of a former clandestine underground plutonium production complex (now being converted to a 'Tourist Attraction' given the site's abandonment by China in the early 1980s). That open source media reporting, when combined with subsequent commentary found in various Internet-based Blogs and Wikis, led to independent verification of the reporting with additional ground truth via 'crowdsourcing' (tourist photos as found on 'social networking' venues like Google Earth's Panoramio layer and Twitter). Confirmation of the precise geospatial location of the site (along with a more complete facility characterization incorporating 3-D Modeling and visualization) was only made possible following the acquisition of higher resolution commercial satellite imagery that could be correlated with the reporting, ground photos, and an interior diagram, through original imagery analysis of the overhead imagery.

  10. Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI): Novel Concepts for Damage-Resistant Alloys in Next Generation Nuclear Power Systems - Technical Progress Report August 2000 - October 2000

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2000-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    OAK-B135 This ID belongs to an IWO and is being released out of the system. The Program manager Rebecca Richardson has confirmed that all reports have been received. The objective of the proposed research is to develop the scientific basis for a new class of radiation-resistant materials. Two approaches will be evaluated to develop damage resistant materials far superior to current stainless steels: (1) lattice perturbation to catalyze defect recombination within the early stages of cascade formation and defect migration and (2) controlled manipulation of the aggregate defect ensemble through the deliberate introduction of dynamic metastable microstructures. The intrinsic ability of the host matrix to resist displacement damage survival will be optimized in first concept. This approach (Task 1) explores baseline atomic displacement and recovery processes as affected by major and minor alloy constituents selected for the dual purpose of environmental cracking resistance as well as interactions with point defects. Inert oversized solutes known to improve corrosion behavior will be used to create vacancy/interstitial traps and promote defect recombination. Dynamic metastable microstructures tailored to resist damage accumulation will be investigated and optimized in the second concept (Task 2). Unique intermetallic second phases with inherent instabilities under irradiation will be used to create a dynamic microstructure resistant to radiation hardening, swelling and embrittlement. A key aspect of designing this dynamic microstructure will be to ensure the complex, radiation-induced changes do not promote environmental cracking. The underlying radiation materials science for these two approaches is being explored using charged particle irradiations. Radiation damage resistance will be established by isolating the effect of each approach on defect microstructure, grain boundary microchemistries and matrix hardening. The dose dependence of these radiation-induced material changes will be used to identify promising alloys and initial microstructure that effectively delay or eliminate detrimental microstructural and microchemical evolution. Environmental cracking response is being established on non-irradiated alloys with thermomechanical treatments to simulate radiation microstructures and by tests on proton-irradiated specimens. The ultimate goal for these alloys will be resistance to environmental cracking, swelling and embrittlement during the high radiation exposures (>150 dpa) planned for advanced reactors.

  11. Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Doehle, Joel R.; Toomey, Christopher M.

    2014-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

  12. Design of a Safeguards Instrument for Plutonium Quantification in an Electrochemical Refining System 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Le Coq, Annabelle G

    2013-06-25T23:59:59.000Z

    There has been a strong international interest in using pyroprocessing to close the fast nuclear reactor fuel cycle and reprocess spent fuel efficiently. To commercialize pyroprocessing, safeguards technologies are required to be developed...

  13. JOINT UNITED STATES/IAEA PROPOSED APPROACH FOR SAFEGUARDS DURING PLUTONIUM STABILIZATION, PACKAGING, AND SHIPMENT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    L. KWEI; B. SMITH; ET AL

    2001-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    For safety reasons, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing to stabilize and package plutonium oxide currently subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) beginning in the year 2001. The Hanford Site will also stabilize and package plutonium materials under IAEA safeguards. The U.S. and the IAEA began consultations in late 1996 to develop an approach to the application of safeguards during stabilization and packaging. With the plans to ship RFETS plutonium to Savannah River for interim storage prior to final disposition, this work has been extended to include safeguards during shipment. This paper will discuss the elements of a joint U.S./IAEA proposal for this task.

  14. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.; Anzelon, G.

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards at almost all of its meeting.

  15. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States). Fission Energy and Systems Safety Program

    1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient.

  16. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08T23:59:59.000Z

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  17. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Reimold, Benjamin A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ward, Steven L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Howell, John [GLASGOW UNIV.

    2010-09-13T23:59:59.000Z

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  18. SCB initiator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Bickes Jr., Robert W.; Renlund, Anita M.; Stanton, Philip L.

    1994-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A detonator for high explosives initiated by mechanical impact includes a cylindrical barrel, a layer of flyer material mechanically covering the barrel at one end, and a semiconductor bridge ignitor including a pair of electrically conductive pads connected by a semiconductor bridge. The bridge is in operational contact with the layer, whereby ignition of said bridge forces a portion of the layer through the barrel to detonate the explosive. Input means are provided for igniting the semiconductor bridge ignitor.

  19. SCB initiator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Bickes, Jr., Robert W. (Albuquerque, NM); Renlund, Anita M. (Albuquerque, NM); Stanton, Philip L. (Albuquerque, NM)

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A detonator for high explosives initiated by mechanical impact includes a cylindrical barrel, a layer of flyer material mechanically covering the barrel at one end, and a semiconductor bridge ignitor including a pair of electrically conductive pads connected by a semiconductor bridge. The bridge is in operational contact with the layer, whereby ignition of said bridge forces a portion of the layer through the barrel to detonate the explosive. Input means are provided for igniting the semiconductor bridge ignitor.

  20. FUTURE POWER GRID INITIATIVE Next Generation Network

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    designed by PNNL and currently being deployed in the AEP gridSMART Demonstration Project, and » developed that will position PNNL as the leader in modeling and planning power grid data communication networks. External users scenarios and testing of communication requirements with smart grid investments. November 2012 PNNL-SA-90012

  1. Authentication of reprocessing plant safeguards data through correlation analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burr, T.L.; Wangen, L.E.; Mullen, M.F.

    1995-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report investigates the feasibility and benefits of two new approaches to the analysis of safeguards data from reprocessing plants. Both approaches involve some level of plant modeling. All models involve some form of mass balance, either applied in the usual way that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at discrete times or applied by accounting for pipe flow rates that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at continuous times. In the first case, material balances are computed after each tank-to-tank transfer. In the second case, material balances can be computed at any desired time. The two approaches can be described as follows. The first approach considers the application of a new multivariate sequential test. The test statistic is a scalar, but the monitored residual is a vector. The second approach considers the application of recent nonlinear time series methods for the purpose of empirically building a model for the expected magnitude of a material balance or other scalar variable. Although the report restricts attention to monitoring scalar time series, the methodology can be extended to vector time series.

  2. EMCAS, an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.; Bichl, F.J.

    1987-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MCandA) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities.

  3. EMCAS: An evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.; Bichl, F.J.

    1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities. 3 figs., 5 tabs.

  4. Applications of a portable MCA in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Halbig, J.K.; Klosterbuer, F.; Cameron, R.A.

    1986-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 1981 a small, battery-operated multichannel analyzer (MCA) prototype developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory was delivered to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The intent was to produce an instrument for inspector (nonscientist) use. Automated measurement programs were built into the MCA. An enhanced, commercially produced MCA is now available, which was patterned after and is software compatible with the prototype. After an extensive review of the hardware and software of the available portable MCAs, the IAEA has chosen this MCA to be used by IAEA inspectors throughout the world. Inspectors from the EURATOM Directorate of Safeguards are also using these MCAs in inspections throughout Europe. While this MCA's portability and programmability make it ideally suited for infield applications, its powerful built-in intelligence and communications protocol make it a strong candidate for distributed data acquisition and control systems. The user-instrument interface philosophy is so easy to use that in domestic and international training schools, the operators manual is not used.

  5. Materials accounting and international safeguards for MOX facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.; Hafer, J.F.

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Our experience with mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facilities leads us to conclude that there is inadequate guidance available to plant and process designers to make materials accounting systems timely, efficient, and minimally intrusive. A well designed state system for accounting and control of nuclear materials would be beneficial to plant operations and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or state regulatory agencies. Among the difficult accounting problems that arise in a large-scale MOX facility are the following: (1) process steps (such as the blending and splitting of powders) that require the accounting system to track material flow, calculate quantities based on previous measurements, and propagate uncertainties as part of data analysis; (2) extensive buffer storage areas involving long residence times that necessitate frequent corrections for material loss from radioactive decay; and (3) facility accounting at one level (for example, fuel pins) that must be reconciled with verification measurements at another level (for example, pin trays or assemblies). Approaches to addressing these problems include designing a special facility, simulating material flow, developing software for near-real-time materials accounting, and establishing achievable verification goals. This paper elaborates on these problems and proposes approaches to a materials accounting system design that considers facility, state, and IAEA safeguards and verification objectives. 11 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab.

  6. Initial Proposal

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville PowerCherries 82981-1cnHigh SchoolIn Other News linkThermal PhenomenaInitial

  7. Uranium-233 waste definition: Disposal options, safeguards, criticality control, and arms control

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Storch, S.N. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Lewis, L.C. [Lockheed Martin Idaho Technology Co., Idaho Falls, ID (United States). Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Lab.

    1998-07-07T23:59:59.000Z

    The US investigated the use of {sup 233}U for weapons, reactors, and other purposes from the 1950s into the 1970s. Based on the results of these investigations, it was decided not to use {sup 233}U on a large scale. Most of the {sup 233}U-containing materials were placed in long-term storage. At the end of the cold war, the US initiated, as part of its arms control policies, a disposition program for excess fissile materials. Other programs were accelerated for disposal of radioactive wastes placed in storage during the cold war. Last, potential safety issues were identified related to the storage of some {sup 233}U-containing materials. Because of these changes, significant activities associated with {sup 233}U-containing materials are expected. This report is one of a series of reports to provide the technical bases for future decisions on how to manage this material. A basis for defining when {sup 233}U-containing materials can be managed as waste and when they must be managed as concentrated fissile materials has been developed. The requirements for storage, transport, and disposal of radioactive wastes are significantly different than those for fissile materials. Because of these differences, it is important to classify material in its appropriate category. The establishment of a definition of what is waste and what is fissile material will provide the guidance for appropriate management of these materials. Wastes are defined in this report as materials containing sufficiently small masses or low concentrations of fissile materials such that they can be managed as typical radioactive waste. Concentrated fissile materials are defined herein as materials containing sufficient fissile content such as to warrant special handling to address nuclear criticality, safeguards, and arms control concerns.

  8. Behavior of 241Am in fast reactor systems - a safeguards perspective

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lafleur, Adrienne M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Advanced fuel-cycle developments around the world currently under development are exploring the possibility of disposing of {sup 241}Am from spent fuel recycle processes by burning this material in fast reactors. For safeguards practitioners, this approach could potentially complicate both fresh- and spent-fuel safeguards measurements. The increased ({alpha},n) production in oxide fuels from the {sup 241}Am increases the uncertainty in coincidence assay of Pu in MOX assemblies and will require additional information to make use of totals-based neutron assay of these assemblies. We have studied the behavior of {sup 241}Am-bearing MOX fuel in the fast reactor system and the effect on neutron and gamma-ray source-terms for safeguards measurements. In this paper, we will present the results of simulations of the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a fast breeder reactor system. Because of the increased use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors and advances in fuel-cycle designs aimed at americium disposal in fast reactors, we have undertaken a brief study of the behavior of americium in these systems to better understand the safeguards impacts of these new approaches. In this paper we will examine the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a variety of nuclear systems to provide insight into the safeguards implications of proposed Am disposition schemes.

  9. ON-LINE MONITORING FOR CONTROL AND SAFEGUARDING OF RADIOCHEMICAL STREAMS AT SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING PLANT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Lines, Amanda M.; Billing, Justin M.; Casella, Amanda J.; Johnsen, Amanda M.; Peterson, James M.; Thomas, Elizabeth M.

    2009-11-10T23:59:59.000Z

    Advanced techniques that enhance safeguarding of spent fuel reprocessing plants are urgently needed. Our approach is based on the prerequisite that real-time monitoring of solvent extraction flowsheets at a spent fuel reprocessing plant provides the unique capability to quickly detect unwanted manipulations with fissile isotopes present in the radiochemical streams during reprocessing activities. The methods used to monitor these processes must be robust and capable of withstanding harsh radiation and chemical environments. A new on-line monitoring system satisfying these requirements and featuring Raman spectroscopy combined with a Coriolis and conductivity probes recently has been developed by our research team for tank waste retrieval. It provides immediate chemical data and flow parameters of high-level radioactive waste streams with high brine content generated during retrieval activities from nuclear waste storage tanks at the Hanford Site. The nature of the radiochemical streams at the spent fuel reprocessing plant calls for additional spectroscopic information that can be gained by using Vis-NIR capabilities augmenting Raman spectroscopy. A fiber optic Raman probe allows monitoring of high concentration species encountered in both aqueous and organic phases within the UREX suite of flowsheets, including metal oxide ions, such as uranyl, components of the organic solvent, inorganic oxo-anions, and water. Actinides and lanthanides are monitored remotely by Vis-NIR spectroscopy in aqueous and organic phases. In this report, we present our results on spectroscopic measurements of simulant flowsheet solutions and commercial fuels designed to demonstrate the applicability of Raman and Vis-NIR spectroscopic analysis for actual dissolver feed solutions.

  10. Development and Evaluation of a Safeguards System Concept for a Pebble-Fueled High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gitau, Ernest Travis Ngure

    2012-10-19T23:59:59.000Z

    the world, adequate methods for safeguarding the reactor must be developed. Current safeguards methods for the pebble-fueled HTGR focus on extensive, redundant containment and surveillance (C/S) measures or a combination of item-type and bulk-type material...

  11. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 4, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, rough December 31, 1995. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  12. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1996, Vol. 2, Rev. 5

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1997-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 5, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1996. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  13. Report on the NGS3 Working Group on Safeguards by Design For Aqueous Reprocessing Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael; Schanfein, Mark

    2011-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of the Working Group on SBD for Aqueous Reprocessing Facilities was to provide recommendations, for facility operators and designers, which would aid in the coordination and integration of nuclear material accountancy and the safeguards requirements of all concerned parties - operators, state/regional authorities, and the IAEA. The recommendations, which are to be provided to the IAEA, are intended to assist in optimizing facility design and operating parameters to ensure the safeguardability of the facility while minimizing impact on the operations. The one day Working Group session addressed a wide range of design and operating topics.

  14. DOE/NNSA perspective safeguard by design: GEN III/III+ light water reactors and beyond

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pan, Paul Y [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-12-10T23:59:59.000Z

    An overview of key issues relevant to safeguards by design (SBD) for GEN III/IV nuclear reactors is provided. Lessons learned from construction of typical GEN III+ water reactors with respect to SBD are highlighted. Details of SBD for safeguards guidance development for GEN III/III+ light water reactors are developed and reported. This paper also identifies technical challenges to extend SBD including proliferation resistance methodologies to other GEN III/III+ reactors (except HWRs) and GEN IV reactors because of their immaturity in designs.

  15. analysis safeguards strategy: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    navigation 13 91 Planning for future uncertainties in electric power generation : an analysis of transitional strategies for reduction of carbon and sulfur emissions MIT -...

  16. Next generation information systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Limback, Nathan P [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Medina, Melanie A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Silva, Michelle E [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Information Systems Analysis and Development (ISAD) Team of the Safeguards Systems Group at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been developing web based information and knowledge management systems for sixteen years. Our vision is to rapidly and cost effectively provide knowledge management solutions in the form of interactive information systems that help customers organize, archive, post and retrieve nonproliferation and safeguards knowledge and information vital to their success. The team has developed several comprehensive information systems that assist users in the betterment and growth of their organizations and programs. Through our information systems, users are able to streamline operations, increase productivity, and share and access information from diverse geographic locations. The ISAD team is also producing interactive visual models. Interactive visual models provide many benefits to customers beyond the scope of traditional full-scale modeling. We have the ability to simulate a vision that a customer may propose, without the time constraints of traditional engineering modeling tools. Our interactive visual models can be used to access specialized training areas, controlled areas, and highly radioactive areas, as well as review site-specific training for complex facilities, and asset management. Like the information systems that the ISAD team develops, these models can be shared and accessed from any location with access to the internet. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the capabilities of information systems and interactive visual models as well as consider the possibility of combining the two capabilities to provide the next generation of infonnation systems. The collection, processing, and integration of data in new ways can contribute to the security of the nation by providing indicators and information for timely action to decrease the traditional and new nuclear threats. Modeling and simulation tied to comprehensive databases are progressions of the tools that can be used in new ways and further developed to enhance the mission of nonproliferation and threat reduction.

  17. Explosive laser light initiation of propellants

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Piltch, M.S.

    1993-05-18T23:59:59.000Z

    A improved initiator for artillery shell using an explosively generated laser light to uniformly initiate the propellent. A small quantity of a high explosive, when detonated, creates a high pressure and temperature, causing the surrounding noble gas to fluoresce. This fluorescence is directed into a lasing material, which lases, and directs laser light into a cavity in the propellant, uniformly initiating the propellant.

  18. NNSA Signs Memorandum with Kuwait to Increase Cooperation on Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    ScienceCinema (OSTI)

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2010-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    On June 23, 2010, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation topics with the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC). NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino and KNNEC's Secretary General, Dr. Ahmad Bishara, signed the memorandum at a ceremony at U.S. Department of Energy headquarters in Washington.

  19. Manual for Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System Reporting and Data Submission

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-08-19T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual provides detailed instructions for documenting and reporting data submissions for nuclear materials transactions, inventories, and material balances to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Cancels DOE M 474.1-2. Canceled by DOE M 470.4-6.

  20. Reactor antineutrino monitoring with a plastic scintillator array as a new safeguards method

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    S. Oguri; Y. Kuroda; Y. Kato; R. Nakata; Y. Inoue; C. Ito; M. Minowa

    2014-05-23T23:59:59.000Z

    We developed a segmented reactor-antineutrino detector made of plastic scintillators for application as a tool in nuclear safeguards inspection and performed mostly unmanned field operations at a commercial power plant reactor. At a position outside the reactor building, we measured the difference in reactor antineutrino flux above the ground when the reactor was active and inactive.

  1. MINOR for Natural Resources Conservation Conserving Earth's biological diversity and safeguarding the benefits or "ecosystem services"

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Schweik, Charles M.

    . Environmental Resources NRC 390E Evolution and Conservation (3cr-sprg) NRC 575 Case Studies in Conservation NRC for Natural Resources Conservation Conserving Earth's biological diversity and safeguarding the benefits resources conservation. In this minor, students learn about the ecology of terrestrial and aquatic

  2. In-Born Radio Frequency Identification Devices for Safeguards Use at Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ward,R.; Rosenthal,M.

    2009-07-12T23:59:59.000Z

    Global expansion of nuclear power has made the need for improved safeguards measures at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) imperative. One technology under consideration for safeguards applications is Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). RFIDs have the potential to increase IAEA inspector"s efficiency and effectiveness either by reducing the number of inspection visits necessary or by reducing inspection effort at those visits. This study assesses the use of RFIDs as an integral component of the "Option 4" safeguards approach developed by Bruce Moran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for a model GCEP [1]. A previous analysis of RFIDs was conducted by Jae Jo, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), which evaluated the effectiveness of an RFID tag applied by the facility operator [2]. This paper presents a similar evaluation carried out in the framework of Jo’s paper, but it is predicated on the assumption that the RFID tag is applied by the manufacturer at the birth of the cylinder, rather than by the operator. Relevant diversion scenarios are examined to determine if RFIDs increase the effectiveness and/ or efficiency of safeguards in these scenarios. Conclusions on the benefits offered to inspectors by using in-born RFID tagging are presented.

  3. Analysis of the effectiveness of gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinjoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235U enrichment of declared UF6 containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive assay (DA) of samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements. These improvements could reduce the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also explore how a few advanced safeguards systems could be assembled for unattended operation. The analysis will focus on how unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections (IDS) can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear materials when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems.

  4. Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Small Graphite Moderated Reactor and Associated Fuel Cycle Facilities 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rauch, Eric B.

    2010-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

    this type of reactor desirable also make it suspicious to the international community as a possible means to shorten that state?s nuclear latency. If a safeguards approach could be developed for a fuel cycle featuring one of these reactors, it would ease...

  5. Applications of virtual reality to nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stansfield, S.

    1996-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper presents several applications of virtual reality relevant to the areas of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. Each of these applications was developed to the prototype stage at Sandia National Laboratories` Virtual Reality and Intelligent Simulation laboratory. These applications include the use of virtual reality for facility visualization, training of inspection personnel, and security and monitoring of nuclear facilities.

  6. Role of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards in confidence building

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Augustson, R.H.

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In this paper, I will examine some attributes of confidence building and connect them with how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) interacts with its member states in carrying out its safeguards function. These interactions and the structure set up to define them help maintain and strengthen confidence between the IAEA and the member states and among these states. 3 refs.

  7. Abstract: The challenges in nuclear safeguards and in nuclear security have significantly changed over the last decades. On the one side nuclear safeguards evolved from the simple verifica9on of declared amounts of material to a more informa9on driven app

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Abstract: The challenges in nuclear safeguards and in nuclear security have significantly changed over the last decades. On the one side nuclear safeguards evolved-doctoral researcher where he analysed dissolu9on residues from reprocessing of nuclear fuels

  8. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL; Howell, John [University of Glasgow

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF{sub 6} feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load cell data; (8) hardware and software implementation for process load cell data collection; (9) costs associated with unattended monitoring of load cells (for both operator and inspector) weighed against the potential benefits of having access to such data; (10) results from field tests of load cell data collection systems in operating facilities; and (11) use of unattended load cell data to increase efficiency of on-site inspection schedules and activities.

  9. IAEA SAFEGUARDS DURING PLUTONIUM STABILIZATION AT HANFORDS PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MCRAE, L.P.

    2004-02-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The Vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) became subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards beginning in 1994 as part of the US excess fissile material program. The inventory needed to be stabilized and repackaged for long-term storage to comply with Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. In 1998, the United States began negotiations with IAEA to develop methods to maintain safeguards as this material was stabilized and repackaged. The Design Information Questionnaire was revised and submitted to the IAEA in 2002 describing how PFP would be modified to accommodate the stabilization process line. The operation plan for 2003 was submitted describing the proposed schedules for removing materials for stabilization. Stabilization and repackaging activities for the safeguarded plutonium began in January 2003 and were completed in December 2003. The safeguards approach implemented at the Hanford Site was a combination of the original baseline approach augmented by a series of five vault additions of stabilized materials followed by five removals of unstabilized materials. IAEA containment and surveillance measures were maintained until the unstabilized material was removed. Following placement of repackaged material (most from the original safeguarded stock) into the storage vault, the IAEA conducted inventory change verification measurements and then established containment and surveillance. As part of the stabilization campaign, the IAEA developed new measurement methods and calibration standards representative of the materials and packaging. The annual physical inventory verification was conducted on the normal IAEA schedule following the fourth additional/removal phase. Plant activities and the impacts on operations are described.

  10. Direct Measurement of Initial Enrichment and Burn-up of Spent Fuel Assembly with a Differential Die-Away Technique Based Instrument

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Henzl, Vladimir [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

    A key objective of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is to utilize non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques to determine the elemental plutonium (Pu) content in a commercial-grade nuclear spent fuel assembly (SFA). In the third year of the NGSI Spent Fuel NDA project, the research focus is on the integration of a few NDA techniques. One of the reoccurring challenges to the accurate determination of Pu content has been the explicit dependence of the measured signal on the presence of neutron absorbers which build up in the assembly in accordance with its operating and irradiation history. The history of any SFA is often summarized by the parameters of burn-up (BU), initial enrichment (IE) and cooling time (CT). While such parameters can typically be provided by the operator, the ability to directly measure and verify them would significantly enhance the autonomy of the IAEA inspectorate. Within this paper, we demonstrate that an instrument based on a Differential Die-Away technique is in principle capable of direct measurement of IE and, should the CT be known, also the BU.

  11. Boron-10 ABUNCL Prototype Models And Initial Active Testing

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kouzes, Richard T.; Ely, James H.; Lintereur, Azaree T.; Siciliano, Edward R.

    2013-04-23T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security (NA-241) is supporting the project Coincidence Counting With Boron-Based Alternative Neutron Detection Technology at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for the development of a 3He proportional counter alternative neutron coincidence counter. The goal of this project is to design, build and demonstrate a system based upon 10B-lined proportional tubes in a configuration typical for 3He-based coincidence counter applications. This report provides results from MCNPX model simulations and initial testing of the active mode variation of the Alternative Boron-Based Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (ABUNCL) design built by General Electric Reuter-Stokes. Initial experimental testing of the as-delivered passive ABUNCL was previously reported.

  12. Annual Report FY2013-- A Kinematically Complete, Interdisciplinary, and Co-Institutional Measurement of the 19F(?,n) Cross-section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peters, William A [ORNL; Smith, Michael Scott [ORNL; Clement, Ryan [INL; Tan, Wanpeng [University of Notre Dame; Stech, Ed [University of Notre Dame; Cizewski, J A [Rutgers University; Febbraro, Michael [University of Michigan; Madurga Flores, Miguel [ORNL

    2013-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The goal of this proposal is to enable neutron detection for precision Non-Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. Neutrons are continuously generated from a UFx matrix in a container or sample as a result of the interaction of alpha particles from uranium-decay ? particles with fluorine nuclei in the matrix. Neutrons from 19F(?,n)22Na were once considered a poorly characterized background for assays of UFx samples via 238U spontaneous fission neutron detection [SMI2010B]. However, the yield of decay-?-driven neutrons is critical for 234,235U LEU and HEU assays, as it can used to determine both the total amount of uranium and the enrichment [BER2010]. This approach can be extremely valuable in a variety of safeguard applications, such as cylinder monitoring in underground uranium storage facilities, nuclear criticality safety studies, nuclear materials accounting, and other nonproliferation applications. The success of neutron-based assays critically depends on an accurate knowledge of the cross section of the (?,n) reaction that generates the neutrons. The 40% uncertainty in the 19F(?,n)22Na cross section currently limits the precision of such assays, and has been identified as a key factor in preventing accurate enrichment determinations [CRO2003]. The need for higher quality cross section data for (?,n) reactions has been a recurring conclusion in reviews of the nuclear data needs to support safeguards. The overarching goal of this project is to enable neutron detection to be used for precision Non- Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. This will significantly advance safeguards verification at existing declared facilities, nuclear materials accounting, process control, nuclear criticality safety monitoring, and a variety of other nonproliferation applications. To reach this goal, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Rutgers University (RU), and the University of Notre Dame (UND), will focus on three specific items: (1) making a precision (better than 10 %) determination of the absolute cross section of the 19F(?,n)22Na reaction as a function of energy; (2) determining the spectrum of neutrons and ?-rays emitted from 19F(?,n)22Na over an energy range pertinent to NDA; and (3) performing simulations with this new cross section to extract the neutron yield (neutrons/gram/second) and resulting neutron- and gamma ray-spectra when ? particles interact with fluorine nuclei in actinide samples, to aid in the design and reduce uncertainty of future NDA measurements and simulations.

  13. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-03-04T23:59:59.000Z

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  14. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  15. The US Support Program Assistance to the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis 2008

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tackentien,J.

    2008-06-12T23:59:59.000Z

    One of the United States Support Program's (USSP) priorities for 2008 is to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) development of an integrated and efficient safeguards information infrastructure, including reliable and maintainable information systems, and effective tools and resources to collect and analyze safeguards-relevant information. The USSP has provided funding in support of this priority for the ISIS Re-engineering Project (IRP), and for human resources support to the design and definition of the enhanced information analysis architecture project (nVision). Assistance for several other information technology efforts is provided. This paper will report on the various ongoing support measures undertaken by the USSP to support the IAEA's information technology enhancements and will provide some insights into activities that the USSP may support in the future.

  16. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coles, Garill A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-11-09T23:59:59.000Z

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  17. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coles, Garill A.; Hockert, John; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2013-01-26T23:59:59.000Z

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  18. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  19. Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order defines requirements for Department of Energy (DOE) compliance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, the Protocol to the Agreement, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement, and the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement and Additional Protocol. Cancels DOE O 142.2. Admin Chg 1, 6-27-13.

  20. Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order defines requirements for Department of Energy (DOE) compliance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, the Protocol to the Agreement, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement, and the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement and Additional Protocol. Cancels DOE O 142.2. Admin Chg 1, dated 6-27-13, cancels DOE O 142.1A. Certified 12-3-14.

  1. Plutonium Measurements with a Fast-Neutron Multiplicity Counter for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jennifer L. Dolan; Marek Flaska; Alexis Poitrasson-Riviere; Andreas Enqvist; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2014-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Measurements were performed at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy to field test a fast-neutron multiplicity counter developed at the University of Michigan. The measurements allowed the illustration of the system’s photon discrimination abilities, efficiency when measuring neutron multiplicity, ability to characterize 240Pueff mass, and performance relative to a currently deployed neutron coincidence counter. This work is motivated by the need to replace and improve upon 3He neutron detection systems for nuclear safeguards applications.

  2. 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) based pyroprocessing facility safety evaluation plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ku, J.H.; Choung, W.M.; You, G.S.; Moon, S.I.; Park, S.H.; Kim, H.D. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute - KAERI, 989-111 Daeduk-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, 305-353 (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The big advantage of pyroprocessing for the management of spent fuels against the conventional reprocessing technologies lies in its proliferation resistance since the pure plutonium cannot be separated from the spent fuel. The extracted materials can be directly used as metal fuel in a fast reactor, and pyroprocessing reduces drastically the volume and heat load of the spent fuel. KAERI has implemented the SBD (Safeguards-By-Design) concept in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The goal of SBD is to integrate international safeguards into the entire facility design process since the very beginning of the design phase. This paper presents a safety evaluation plan using a conceptual design of a reference pyroprocessing facility, in which 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety)-By-Design (3SBD) concept is integrated from early conceptual design phase. The purpose of this paper is to establish an advanced pyroprocessing hot cell facility design concept based on 3SBD for the successful realization of pyroprocessing technology with enhanced safety and proliferation resistance.

  3. Under-sodium viewing technology for improvement of fast-reactor safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Gerhart, Jeremy J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Kawakubo, Yoko [JAEA

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The current safeguards approach for fast reactors relies exclusively on maintenance of continuity of knowledge to track the movement of fuel assemblies through these facilities. The remote handling of fuel assemblies, the visual opacity of the liquid metal coolant. and the chemical reactivity of sodium all combine and result in significant limitations on the available options to verify fuel assembly identification numbers or the integrity of these assemblies. These limitations also serve to frustrate attempts to restore the continuity-of-knowledge in instances where the information is under a variety of scenarios. The technology of ultrasonic under-sodium viewing offers new options to the safeguards community for recovering continuity-of-knowledge and applying more traditional item accountancy to fast reactor facilities. We have performed a literature review to investigate the development of under-sodium viewing technologies. In this paper we will summarize our findings and report the state of development of this technology and we will present possible applications to the fast reactor system to improve the existing safeguards approach at these reactors and in future fast reactors.

  4. ASSESS (Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security) update: Current status and future developments

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Al-Ayat, R.A. (Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)); Cousins, T.D. (USDOE, Washington, DC (USA)); Hoover, E.R. (Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA))

    1990-07-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) has been released for use by DOE field offices and their contractors. In October, 1989, we offered a prototype workshop to selected representatives of the DOE community. Based on the prototype results, we held the first training workshop at the Central Training Academy in January, 1990. Four additional workshops are scheduled for FY 1990. ASSESS is a state-of-the-art analytical tool for management to conduct integrated evaluation of safeguards systems at facilities handling facilities. Currently, ASSESS focuses on the threat of theft/diversion of special nuclear material by insiders, outsiders, and a special form of insider/outsider collusion. ASSESS also includes a neutralization module. Development of the tool is continuing. Plans are underway to expand the capabilities of ASSESS to evaluate against violent insiders, to validate the databases, to expand the neutralization module, and to assist in demonstrating compliance with DOE Material Control and Accountability (MC A) Order 5633.3. These new capabilities include the ability to: compute a weighted average for performance capability against a spectrum of insider adversaries; conduct defense-in-depth analyses; and analyze against protracted theft scenarios. As they become available, these capabilities will be incorporated in our training program. ASSESS is being developed jointly by Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories under the sponsorship of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security.

  5. Status of Safeguards and Separations Model Development at Plant and Molecular Levels

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    de Almeida, Valmor F [ORNL; Hay, Benjamin [ORNL; DePaoli, David W [ORNL

    2009-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A primary goal of the Safeguards and Separations IPSC effort is the development of process modeling tools that allow dynamic simulations of separations plant operations under various configurations and conditions, and integration of relevant safeguards analyses. A requirement of the effort is to develop codes on modern, expandable architectures, with flexibility to explore and evaluate a wide range of process options. During FY09, efforts at ORNL have been focused on two priority tasks toward achieving the IPSC goal: (1) a top-down exploration of architecture - Subtask 1: Explore framework for code development and integration for plant-level simulation; and (2) a bottom-up fundamental modeling effort - Subtask 2: Development of molecular-level agent design code. Subtask 1 is important because definition and development of architecture is a key issue for the overall effort, as selection of an overall approach and code/data requirements is a necessary first step in the organization, design and development of separations and safeguards codes that will be incorporated. The agent design effort of Subtask 2 is a molecular-level modeling effort that has a direct impact on a near-term issue of the Separations and Waste Forms Campaign. A current focus of experimental efforts is the development of robust agents and processes for separation of Am/Cm. Development of enhanced agent-design codes will greatly accelerate discovery and experimental testing.

  6. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS DURING STABILIZATION AT HANFORD PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MCRAE, L.P.

    2004-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The Vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) became subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards beginning in 1994 as part of the US excess fissile material program. The inventory needed to be stabilized and repackaged for long-term storage to comply with Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. In 1998, the United States began negotiations with IAEA to develop methods to maintain safeguards during stabilization and repackaging of this material. The Design Information Questionnaire was revised and submitted to the IAEA in 2002 describing modification to the facility to accommodate the stabilization process line. The operation plan for 2003 was submitted describing the proposed schedules for removing materials for stabilization. Stabilization and repackaging activities for the safeguarded plutonium began in January 2003 and were completed in December 2003. The stabilization was completed in five phases. IAEA containment and surveillance measures were maintained until the material was removed by phase for stabilization and repackaging. Following placement of the repackaged material into the storage vault, the IAEA conducted inventory change verification measurements, and re-established containment and surveillance. Plant activities and the impacts on operations are described.

  7. Knowledge Generation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BRABSON,JOHN M.; DELAND,SHARON M.

    2000-11-02T23:59:59.000Z

    Unattended monitoring systems are being studied as a means of reducing both the cost and intrusiveness of present nuclear safeguards approaches. Such systems present the classic information overload problem to anyone trying to interpret the resulting data not only because of the sheer quantity of data but also because of the problems inherent in trying to correlate information from more than one source. As a consequence, analysis efforts to date have mostly concentrated on checking thresholds or diagnosing failures. Clearly more sophisticated analysis techniques are required to enable automated verification of expected activities level concepts in order to make automated judgments about safety, sensor system integrity, sensor data quality, diversion, and accountancy.

  8. Safeguards and security concept for the Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) and Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) fuel cycle, SAF line technical support

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schaubert, V.J.; Remley, M.E.; Grantham, L.F.

    1986-02-21T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is a safeguards and security concept system review for the secure automated fabrication (SAF) and national liquid metal reactor (LMR) fuel programs.

  9. Feasibility Study of Economics and Performance of Biomass Power Generation at the Former Farmland Industries Site in Lawrence, Kansas. A Study Prepared in Partnership with the Environmental Protection Agency for the RE-Powering America's Land Initiative: Siting Renewable Energy on Potentially Contaminated Land and Mine Sites

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tomberlin, G.; Mosey, G.

    2013-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Under the RE-Powering America's Land initiative, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided funding to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to support a feasibility study of biomass renewable energy generation at the former Farmland Industries site in Lawrence, Kansas. Feasibility assessment team members conducted a site assessment to gather information integral to this feasibility study. Information such as biomass resources, transmission availability, on-site uses for heat and power, community acceptance, and ground conditions were considered.

  10. Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1981-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table. (AT)

  11. Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Humberto Garcia; Wen-Chiao Lin; Reed Carlson

    2014-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

  12. Passive Measurement of Organic-Scintillator Neutron Signatures for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jennfier L. Dolan; Eric C. Miller; Alexis C. Kaplan; Andreas Enqvist; Marek Flaska; Alice Tomanin; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2012-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    At nuclear facilities, domestically and internationally, most measurement systems used for nuclear materials’ control and accountability rely on He-3 detectors. Due to resource shortages, alternatives to He-3 systems are needed. This paper presents preliminary simulation and experimental efforts to develop a fast-neutron-multiplicity counter based on liquid organic scintillators. This mission also provides the opportunity to broaden the capabilities of such safeguards measurement systems to improve current neutron-multiplicity techniques and expand the scope to encompass advanced nuclear fuels.

  13. Decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, a Shift in Paradigm for Terminating Safeguards on Process Holdup

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ivan R. Thomas

    2010-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    INMM Abstract 51st Annual Meeting Decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, a Shift in Paradigm for Terminating Safeguards on Process Holdup The Fuel Process Building at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) is being decommissioned after nearly four decades of recovering high enriched uranium from various government owned spent nuclear fuels. The separations process began with fuel dissolution in one of multiple head-ends, followed by three cycles of uranium solvent extraction, and ending with denitration of uranyl nitrate product. The entire process was very complex, and the associated equipment formed an extensive maze of vessels, pumps, piping, and instrumentation within several layers of operating corridors and process cells. Despite formal flushing and cleanout procedures, an accurate accounting for the residual uranium held up in process equipment over extended years of operation, presented a daunting safeguards challenge. Upon cessation of domestic reprocessing, the holdup remained inaccessible and was exempt from measurement during ensuing physical inventories. In decommissioning the Fuel Process Building, the Idaho Cleanup Project, which operates the INTEC, deviated from the established requirements that all nuclear material holdup be measured and credited to the accountability books and that all nuclear materials, except attractiveness level E residual holdup, be transferred to another facility. Instead, the decommissioning involved grouting the process equipment in place, rather than measuring and removing the contained holdup for subsequent transfer. The grouting made the potentially attractiveness level C and D holdup even more inaccessible, thereby effectually converting the holdup to attractiveness level E and allowing for termination of safeguards controls. Prior to grouting the facility, the residual holdup was estimated by limited sampling and destructive analysis of solutions in process lines and by acceptable knowledge based upon the separations process, plant layout, and operating history. The use of engineering estimates, in lieu of approved measurement methods, was justified by the estimated small quantity of holdup remaining, the infeasibility of measuring the holdup in a highly radioactive background, and the perceived hazards to personnel. The alternate approach to quantifying and terminating safeguards on process holdup was approved by deviation.

  14. Safeguards & Security (S&S) Program | U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)

    Office of Science (SC) Website

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What'sis Taking Over OurThe Iron4(SC) Mapping the ImpactSC Correspondence Control CenterSafeguards

  15. Microsoft PowerPoint - IAEA Safeguards Reporting Requirements for U.S. Facilities_Peter Habighorst

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysis and Feedback onWorkingIAEA Safeguards

  16. Manual for Implementation of the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-06-12T23:59:59.000Z

    This Manual provides detailed information for implementing the requirements of DOE O 142.2A, dated 12-15-06; the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in the United States; the Original Protocol to the Agreement; the Additional Protocol to the Agreement signed by the United States and the IAEA on June 12, 1998; and the Interagency Procedures for the Implementation of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. No cancellation. Admin Chg 1, dated 6-27-13, cancels DOE M 142.2-1. Certified 12-3-14.

  17. Manual for Implementation of the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-06-12T23:59:59.000Z

    This Manual provides detailed information for implementing the requirements of DOE O 142.2A, dated 12-15-06; the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in the United States; the Original Protocol to the Agreement; the Additional Protocol to the Agreement signed by the United States and the IAEA on June 12, 1998; and the Interagency Procedures for the Implementation of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. No cancellation. Admin Chg 1, 6-27-13

  18. APEC Smart Grid Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bloyd, Cary N.

    2012-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This brief paper describes the activities of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Smart Grid Initiative (ASGI) which is being led by the U.S. and developed by the APEC Energy Working Group. In the paper, I describe the origin of the initiative and briefly mention the four major elements of the initiative along with existing APEC projects which support it.

  19. Demonstration of safeguards technology at the Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), Arzamas-16

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Yuferev, V.; Skripka, G.; Augustson, R.H. [and others

    1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    As part of the US-Russian Lab-to-Lab program for strengthening nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A), a testbed facility has been established in a laboratory of the VNIIEF to demonstrate safeguards technology to nuclear facility operators. The design of the testbed MPC&A system provides the functions of nondestructive measurements for plutonium and highly enriched uranium, item control, personnel access control, radiation portal monitoring, search equipment, and computerized on-line accounting. The system controls, monitors, and accounts for nuclear material and people as the material moves through three MBAs. It also assists with physical inventory taking. A total of 39 instruments and control systems are being demonstrated in the present version of the testbed. Of these, about half are of Russian design and fabrication, including the software for the item monitoring and the accounting systems. These two computer systems are on an ethernet network and connected in a client-server local area architecture. The item monitoring system is integrated with the accounting system, providing alarm and status information to a central dispatcher terminal. The operation of the MPC&A testbed has been demonstrated under routine and alarm conditions in collaboration with safeguards staff from the six participating US national labs. Workshops and training for Russian nuclear facility operators are in progress. As needs for additional MPC&A technology at specific plants are identified, these are incorporated into the testbed and used to certify the hardware and software for implementation at the plant.

  20. Implementation of safeguards and security for fissile materials disposition reactor alternative facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1995-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered and include facilities which provide for long-ten-n and interim storage, convert and stabilize fissile materials for other disposition alternatives, immobilize fissile material in glass and/or ceramic material, fabricate fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and dispose of fissile material using a number of geologic alternatives. Particular attention will be given to the reactor alternatives which include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary LWRs and CANDU reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include processing which converts Pu to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility located in either the US or in Europe, US LWRs or the CANDU reactors and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository. This paper focuses on how the objectives of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction and nonproliferation will be accomplished and the possible impacts of meeting these objectives on facility operations and design. Some of the areas in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threat, and (4) potential proliferation risks, the impacts on the facilities, and safeguards and security issues unique to the presence of Category 1 or strategic special nuclear material.

  1. LABORATORY DEMONSTRATION OF A MULTISENSOR UNATTENDED CYLINDER VERIFICATION STATION FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Goodman, David I [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Rowland, Kelly L [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States); Smith, Sheriden [Colorado State Univ., Fort Collins, CO (United States); Miller, Karen A. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Flynn, Eric B. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-01-10T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear materials, and safeguarding uranium enrichment plants is especially important in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s proposed Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS) for UF6 cylinder verification would combine the operator’s accountancy scale with a nondestructive assay system such as the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM) and cylinder identification and surveillance systems. In this project, we built a laboratory-scale UCVS and demonstrated its capabilities using mock UF6 cylinders. We developed a signal processing algorithm to automate the data collection and processing from four continuous, unattended sensors. The laboratory demonstration of the system showed that the software could successfully identify cylinders, snip sensor data at the appropriate points in time, determine the relevant characteristics of the cylinder contents, check for consistency among sensors, and output the cylinder data to a file. This paper describes the equipment, algorithm and software development, laboratory demonstration, and recommendations for a full-scale UCVS.

  2. Feasibility Study of Economics and Performance of Geothermal Power Generation at the Lakeview Uranium Mill Site in Lakeview, Oregon. A Study Prepared in Partnership with the Environmental Protection Agency for the RE-Powering America's Land Initiative: Siting Renewable Energy on Potentially Contaminated Land and Mine Sites

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hillesheim, M.; Mosey, G.

    2013-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in accordance with the RE-Powering America's Land initiative, selected the Lakeview Uranium Mill site in Lakeview, Oregon, for a feasibility study of renewable energy production. The EPA contracted with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to provide technical assistance for the project. The purpose of this report is to describe an assessment of the site for possible development of a geothermal power generation facility and to estimate the cost, performance, and site impacts for the facility. In addition, the report recommends development pathways that could assist in the implementation of a geothermal power system at the site.

  3. Energy Security Initiatives Update

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presentation—given at the Spring 2009 Federal Utility Partnership Working Group (FUPWG) meeting—lists Federal government energy security initiatives.

  4. Initiating Business with INL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Initiating Business with INL The INL Small Business Program Office (SBPO) serves as the advocate and point of contact for businesses seeking contracting opportunities. We ask you...

  5. Strategic Growth Initiative (Michigan)

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A joint venture between Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (MDARD) and the Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC), the Strategic Growth Initiative Grant Program was...

  6. Salt Waste Processing Initiatives

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    1 Patricia Suggs Salt Processing Team Lead Assistant Manager for Waste Disposition Project Office of Environmental Management Savannah River Site Salt Waste Processing Initiatives...

  7. Network support for system initiated checkpoints

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chen, Dong; Heidelberger, Philip

    2013-01-29T23:59:59.000Z

    A system, method and computer program product for supporting system initiated checkpoints in parallel computing systems. The system and method generates selective control signals to perform checkpointing of system related data in presence of messaging activity associated with a user application running at the node. The checkpointing is initiated by the system such that checkpoint data of a plurality of network nodes may be obtained even in the presence of user applications running on highly parallel computers that include ongoing user messaging activity.

  8. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA): Initial Studies of a Method for Assaying Plutonium in Spent Fuel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    David L. Chichester; James W. Sterbentz

    2011-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) is an analytical technique that uses neutrons to assay the isotopic content of bulk materials. The technique uses a pulsed accelerator to produce an intense, short pulse of neutrons in a time-of-flight configuration. These neutrons, traveling at different speeds according to their energy, can be used to interrogate a spent fuel (SF) assembly to determine its plutonium content. Neutron transmission through the assembly is monitored as a function of neutron energy (time after the pulse), similar to the way neutron cross-section data is often collected. The transmitted neutron intensity is recorded as a function of time, with faster (higher-energy) neutrons arriving first and slower (lower-energy) neutrons arriving later. The low-energy elastic scattering and absorption resonances of plutonium and other isotopes modulate the transmitted neutron spectrum. Plutonium content in SF can be determined by analyzing this attenuation. Work is currently underway at Idaho National Laboratory, as a part of United States Department of Energy's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to investigate the NRTA technique and to assess its feasibility for quantifying the plutonium content in SF and for determining the diversion of SF pins from assemblies. Preliminary results indicate that NRTA has great potential for being able to assay intact SF assemblies. Operating in the 1-40 eV range, it can identify four plutonium isotopes (239, 240, 241, & 242Pu), three uranium isotopes (235, 236, & 238U), and six resonant fission products (99Tc, 103Rh, 131Xe, 133Cs, 145Nd, and 152Sm). It can determine the areal density or mass of these isotopes in single- or multiple-pin integral transmission scans. Further, multiple observables exist to allow the detection of material diversion (pin defects) including fast-neutron and x-ray radiography, gross-transmission neutron counting, plutonium resonance absorption analysis, and fission-product resonance absorption analysis. Initial benchmark modeling has shown excellent agreement with previously published experimental data for measurements of individual SF pins where plutonium assays were experimentally demonstrated to have a precision of better than 3%.

  9. Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Humberto E. Garcia

    2014-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system-centric strategy that utilizes data collected from a system of sensors and that effectively exploits known characterizations of sensors and facility operations in order to significantly improve anomaly detection, reduce false alarm, and enhance assessment robustness under unreliable partial sensor information.

  10. A Materials Facilities Initiative -

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    A Materials Facilities Initiative - FMITS & MPEX D.L. Hillis and ORNL Team Fusion & Materials for Nuclear Systems Division July 10, 2014 #12;2 Materials Facilities Initiative JET ITER FNSF Fusion Reactor Challenges for materials: fluxes and fluence, temperatures 50 x divertor ion fluxes up to 100 x neutron

  11. Self-Generation Incentive Program

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Initiated in 2001, the Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP) offers incentives to customers who produce electricity with wind turbines, fuel cells, various forms of combined heat and power (CHP)...

  12. Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 2. Appendix

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Goldman, A J

    1984-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This appendix provides detailed information regarding game theory (strategic analysis) and its potential role in safeguards to supplement the main body of this report. In particualr, it includes an extensive, though not comprehensive review of literature on game theory and on other topics that relate to the formulation of a game-theoretic model (e.g. the payoff functions). The appendix describes the basic form and components of game theory models, and the solvability of various models. It then discusses three basic issues related to the use of strategic analysis in material accounting: (1) its understandability; (2) its viability in regulatory settings; and (3) difficulties in the use of mixed strategies. Each of the components of a game theoretic model are then discussed and related to the present context.

  13. Ultra-high-resolution alpha spectrometry for nuclear forensics and safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bacrania, Minesh K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croce, Mark [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bond, Evelyn [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Dry, Donald [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Moody, W. Allen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lamont, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rabin, Michael [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rim, Jung [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Audrey [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beall, James [NIST-BOULDER; Bennett, Douglas [NIST-BOULDER; Kotsubo, Vincent [NIST-BOULDER; Horansky, Robert [NIST-BOULDER; Hilton, Gene [NIST-BOULDER; Schmidt, Daniel [NIST-BOULDER; Ullom, Joel [NIST-BOULDER; Cantor, Robin [STAR CRYOELECTRONICS

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    We will present our work on the development of ultra-high-resolution detectors for alpha particle spectrometry. These detectors, based on superconducting transition-edge sensors, offer energy resolution that is five to ten times better than conventional silicon detectors. Using these microcalorimeter detectors, the isotopic composition of mixed-actinide samples can be determined rapidly without the need for actinide separation chemistry to isolate each element, or mass spectrometry to separate isotopic signatures that can not be resolved using traditional alpha spectrometry (e.g. Pu-239/Pu-240, or Pu-238/Am-241). This paper will cover the detector and measurement system, actinide source preparation, and the quantitative isotopic analysis of a number of forensics- and safeguards-relevant radioactive sources.

  14. The ASSESS (Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security) Outsider module with multiple analyses

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Snell, M.K.; Winblad, A.E. (Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA)); Bingham, B.; Key, B.; Walker, S. (Science and Engineering Associates, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (USA))

    1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) includes modules for analyzing vulnerabilities against outsider and insider adversaries. The ASSESS Outsider Analysis Module has been upgraded to allow for defining, analyzing, and displaying the results of multiple analyses. Once a set of threat definitions have been defined in one Outsider file, they can be readily copied to other Outsider files. This multiple analysis, or batch, mode of operation provides an efficient way of covering the standard DOE outsider threat spectrum. A new approach for coupling the probability of interruption, P(I), values and values calculated by the ASSESS Neutralization module has been implemented in Outsider and is described. An enhanced capability for printing results of these multiple analyses is also included in the upgraded Outside module. 7 refs., 7 figs., 1 tab.

  15. Safeguards and Security FY 1996 Program Plan: WBS 6.6

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lee, F.D.

    1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safeguards and Security (SAS) Program is based upon integrity, competence and innovation in the protection of the public and Hanford resources through: (1) outstanding assistance, oversight, education, and counsel to their customers to ensure the protection of the public, site personnel, assets, and information; (2) value-added and cost-effective solutions to Hanford issues; and (3) risk management techniques to ensure effective asset protection, site accessibility, and the flexibility to adapt to changing customer needs. This plan is divided into two parts: overview and SAS WBS (work breakdown structure) dictionary sheets. The overview is divided into vision and mission, goals and objectives, assumptions and priorities, milestones, and a summary. The SAS WBS dictionary sheets are divided into department overhead, general and administrative, sitewide support, Hanford patrol, traffic safety, and locksmith services.

  16. Precision Information Environment (PIE) for International Safeguards: Pre-Demonstration Development Use Cases

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.

    2013-11-13T23:59:59.000Z

    In FY2013, the PIE International Safeguards team demonstrated our development progress to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) staff from the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24, our client) and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22). Following the demonstration, the team was asked by our client to complete additional development prior to a planned demonstration at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), scheduled tentatively for January or spring of 2014. The team discussed four potential areas for development (in priority order), and will develop them as time and funding permit prior to an IAEA demonstration. The four capability areas are: 1. Addition of equipment manuals to PIE-accessible files 2. Optical character recognition (OCR) of photographed text 3. Barcode reader with information look-up from a database 4. Add Facilities to Data Model 5. Geospatial capabilities with information integration Each area will be described below in a use case.

  17. Safeguards design strategies: designing and constructing new uranium and plutonium processing facilities in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Scherer, Carolynn P [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Long, Jon D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

    In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) is transforming its outdated and oversized complex of aging nuclear material facilities into a smaller, safer, and more secure National Security Enterprise (NSE). Environmental concerns, worker health and safety risks, material security, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while maintaining the capability for an effective nuclear deterrence by the United States, are influencing this transformation. As part of the nation's Uranium Center of Excellence (UCE), the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will advance the U.S.'s capability to meet all concerns when processing uranium and is located adjacent to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF), designed for consolidated storage of enriched uranium. The HEUMF became operational in March 2010, and the UPF is currently entering its final design phase. The designs of both facilities are for meeting anticipated security challenges for the 21st century. For plutonium research, development, and manufacturing, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico is now under construction. The first phase of the CMRR Project is the design and construction of a Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building. The second phase consists of the design and construction of the Nuclear Facility (NF). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) selected these two sites as part of the national plan to consolidate nuclear materials, provide for nuclear deterrence, and nonproliferation mission requirements. This work examines these two projects independent approaches to design requirements, and objectives for safeguards, security, and safety (3S) systems as well as the subsequent construction of these modern processing facilities. Emphasis is on the use of Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), incorporating Systems Engineering (SE) principles for these two projects.

  18. Breckinridge Project, initial effort

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    none,

    1982-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The project cogeneration plant supplies electric power, process steam and treated boiler feedwater for use by the project plants. The plant consists of multiple turbine generators and steam generators connected to a common main steam header. The major plant systems which are required to produce steam, electrical power and treated feedwater are discussed individually. The systems are: steam, steam generator, steam generator fuel, condensate and feedwater deaeration, condensate and blowdown collection, cooling water, boiler feedwater treatment, coal handling, ash handling (fly ash and bottom ash), electrical, and control system. The plant description is based on the Phase Zero design basis established for Plant 31 in July of 1980 and the steam/condensate balance as presented on Drawing 31-E-B-1. Updating of steam requirements as more refined process information becomes available has generated some changes in the steam balance. Boiler operation with these updated requirements is reflected on Drawing 31-D-B-1A. The major impact of updating has been that less 600 psig steam generated within the process units requires more extraction steam from the turbine generators to close the 600 psig steam balance. Since the 900 psig steam generation from the boilers was fixed at 1,200,000 lb/hr, the additional extraction steam required to close the 600 psig steam balance decreased the quantity of electrical power available from the turbine generators. In the next phase of engineering work, the production of 600 psig steam will be augmented by increasing convection bank steam generation in the Plant 3 fired heaters by 140,000 to 150,000 lb/hr. This modification will allow full rated power generation from the turbine generators.

  19. Initial data engineering

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Piotr T. Chrusciel; James Isenberg; Daniel Pollack

    2005-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

    We present a local gluing construction for general relativistic initial data sets. The method applies to generic initial data, in a sense which is made precise. In particular the trace of the extrinsic curvature is not assumed to be constant near the gluing points, which was the case for previous such constructions. No global conditions on the initial data sets such as compactness, completeness, or asymptotic conditions are imposed. As an application, we prove existence of spatially compact, maximal globally hyperbolic, vacuum space-times without any closed constant mean curvature spacelike hypersurface.

  20. LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROGRAM The purpose of the Lockout/Tagout program is to safeguard employees from unexpected start-up of

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROGRAM The purpose of the Lockout/Tagout program is to safeguard employees from the Lockout/Tagout Program, please contact the EH&S Occupational Health and Safety Program at 725-3209. #12;

  1. Safeguarding Health Information: Building Assurance through HIPAA Security Hosted by the HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    1 Safeguarding Health Information: Building Assurance through HIPAA Security Hosted by the HHS, Acting Chief, Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), NIST 9 Data Using Encryption Matthew Scholl, Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory

  2. The President's Biofuels Initiative

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Biofuels Initiative Neil Rossmeissl Office of the Biomass Program Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Why Can't We Regulate Our Way There? 25 20 15 10 5 0 1970 1980 1990 2000...

  3. Mississippi Clean Energy Initiative

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    In April 2010, the Mississippi Legislature enacted [http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2010/pdf/HB/1700-1799/HB1701S... HB 1701], establishing the Mississippi Clean Energy Initiative. This...

  4. President's Hydrogen Fuel Initiative

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Hydrogen Fuel Initiative Workshop on Manufacturing R&D for the Hydrogen Economy Washington, DC July 13, 2005 JoAnn Milliken DOE Hydrogen Program Planning U.S. Energy Dependence is...

  5. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

  6. Design and development of a 3He replacement safeguards neutron counter based on 10B-lined proportional detector technology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Henzlova, Daniela [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Evans, Louise [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rael, Carlos D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Martinez, Isaac P. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This presentation represents an overview of the experimental evaluation of a boron-lined proportional technology performed within an NA-241 sponsored project on testing of boron-lined proportional counters for the purpose of replacement of {sup 3}He technologies. The presented boron-lined technology will be utilized in a design of a full scale safeguards neutron coincidence counter. The design considerations and the Monte Carlo performance predictions for the counter are also presented.

  7. FEMO, A FLOW AND ENRICHMENT MONITOR FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS AT A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gunning, John E [ORNL; Laughter, Mark D [ORNL; March-Leuba, Jose A [ORNL

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A number of countries have received construction licenses or are contemplating the construction of large-capacity gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The capability to independently verify nuclear material flows is a key component of international safeguards approaches, and the IAEA does not currently have an approved method to continuously monitor the mass flow of 235U in uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas streams. Oak Ridge National Laboratory is investigating the development of a flow and enrichment monitor, or FEMO, based on an existing blend-down monitoring system (BDMS). The BDMS was designed to continuously monitor both 235U mass flow and enrichment of UF6 streams at the low pressures similar to those which exists at GCEPs. BDMSs have been installed at three sites-the first unit has operated successfully in an unattended environment for approximately 10 years. To be acceptable to GCEP operators, it is essential that the instrument be installed and maintained without interrupting operations. A means to continuously verify flow as is proposed by FEMO will likely be needed to monitor safeguards at large-capacity plants. This will enable the safeguards effectiveness that currently exists at smaller plants to be maintained at the larger facilities and also has the potential to reduce labor costs associated with inspections at current and future plants. This paper describes the FEMO design requirements, operating capabilities, and development work required before field demonstration.

  8. Technology diffusion of a different nature: Applications of nuclear safeguards technology to the chemical weapons verification regime

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kadner, S.P. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Reisman, A. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Turpen, E. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Cambridge, MA (United States)

    1996-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

  9. Clean Coal Power Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Doug Bartlett; Rob James; John McDermott; Neel Parikh; Sanjay Patnaik; Camilla Podowski

    2006-03-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is the fifth quarterly Technical Progress Report submitted by NeuCo, Incorporated, under Award Identification Number, DE-FC26-04NT41768. This award is part of the Clean Coal Power Initiative (''CCPI''), the ten-year, $2B initiative to demonstrate new clean coal technologies in the field. This report is one of the required reports listed in Attachment B Federal Assistance Reporting Checklist, part of the Cooperative Agreement. The report covers the award period January 1, 2006 - March 31, 2006 and NeuCo's efforts within design, development, and deployment of on-line optimization systems during that period.

  10. Initiatives | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613 122Commercial602 1,39732on Armed ServicesDepartmentInformationInitiatives Initiatives

  11. Generating Binary Black Hole Initial Data Gregory B. Cook

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cook, Greg

    vector : tµ = nµ + µ ds 2 = - 2 dt 2 + ij(dx i + i dt)(dx j + j dt) µ = gµ + nµn Kµ = -1 2 µ Lng + nµn Kµ = -1 2 µ Lng Constraint equations ŻR + K 2 - KijK ij = 16 Żj K ij - ij K = 8j i Sµ µ

  12. Generating Initial Data for Interacting Compact Binaries Gregory B. Cook

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cook, Greg

    Lng #12;The 3 + 1 Decomposition nµ nµ t µ µ t tµ t t t + t Lapse : Spatial metric : ij Shift vector dt) µ = gµ + nµn Kµ = -1 2 µ Lng Constraint equations ŻR + K 2 - KijK ij = 16 Żj K ij - ij K = 8

  13. land art generator initiative | OpenEI Community

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov YouKizildere IRaghuraji Agro IndustriesTownDells, Wisconsin: EnergyWyandanch,Eaga SolarZoloHomeimprove Homeland art

  14. Long-term need for new generating capacity

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bloomster, C.H.; Merrill, E.T.

    1987-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Electricity demand should continue to grow at about the same rate as GNP, creating a need for large amounts of new generating capacity by the year 2000. Only coal and nuclear at this time have the abundant domestic resources and assured technology to meet this need. However, large increase in both coal and nuclear usage will not be acceptable to society without solutions to many of the problems that now deter their increased usage. For coal, the problems center around the safety and environmental impacts of increased coal mining and coal combustion. For nuclear the problems center around reactor safety, radioactive waste disposal, financial risk, and nuclear materials safeguards. The fuel requirements and waste generation for coal plants are orders of magnitude greater than for nuclear. Technology improvements and waste management practices must be pursued to mitigate environmental and safety impacts from electricity generation. 26 refs., 14 figs., 23 tabs.

  15. GLOBAL TAXONOMY INITIATIVE

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Grant, Taran

    #12;THE GLOBAL TAXONOMY INITIATIVE: Using Systematic Inventories to Meet Country and Regional Needs International #12;Table of Contents Introduction 1 I. Using Inventories to Build Capacity and Advance the GTI 2 for systematic inventories. A major component of the workshop addressed how systematic inventories can serve

  16. BRAZIL RESEARCH INITIATIVES

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Liu, Taosheng

    BRAZIL RESEARCH INITIATIVES Michigan State University (MSU) identifies Brazil as a global priority and challenges become increasingly part of the U.S.-Brazil agenda, MSU desires partnerships aimed at producing in the U.S. and one in Brazil, to share research strategies and explore joint projects in several research

  17. ----------------IRI ---------------Initiative & Referendum Institute

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rohs, Remo

    results a conservative cast: · Marijuana rejected. Marijuana proponents went 0-4 on election night. California's Propo- sition 19 that would have legalized marijuana was one of the highest profile initiatives this year. In early polls, it led substantially but ended up failing 45-55. The silver lining for marijuana

  18. Staff Initials ______ Membership Application*

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    NOT include the basketball gym. #12;Staff Initials ______ Furman University Fitness Center Acknowledgement and Release Form I, the undersigned, acknowledge that I am at least 18 years of age and that I am voluntarily here) I acknowledge that I am aware of the possible risks, dangers, and hazards associated with my

  19. The Sustainability "Green Initiative"

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Harms, Kyle E.

    sustainability approach aimed at: ·Lowering energy use and cost ·Reducing greenhouse gases ·Water and waste waterThe Sustainability "Green Initiative" At LAPPA October, 2008 #12;Sustainability is the capacity ·Carbon Footprint ·Ozone Friendly ·Global Warming ·Renewable Energy ·Biodegradable What does this whole

  20. Safeguards Verification Measurements using Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anheier, Norman C.; Cannon, Bret D.; Kulkarni, Gourihar R.; Munley, John T.; Nelson, Danny A.; Qiao, Hong (Amy) [Amy; Phillips, Jon R.

    2012-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

    Laser Ablation Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) is a new verification measurement technology under development at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). LAARS uses three lasers to ablate and then measure the relative isotopic abundance of uranium compounds. An ablation laser is tightly focused on uranium-bearing solids, producing a small atomic uranium vapor plume. Two collinear wavelength-tuned spectrometry lasers transit through the plume and the absorbance of U-235 and U-238 isotopes are measured to determine U-235 enrichment. The measurement is independent of chemical form and degree of dilution with nuisance dust and other materials. LAARS has high relative precision and detection limits approaching the femtogram range for U-235. The sample is scanned and assayed point-by-point at rates reaching 1 million measurements/hour, enabling LAARS to detect and analyze uranium in trace samples. The spectrometer is assembled using primarily commercially available components and features a compact design and automated analysis.Two specific gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) applications of the spectrometer are currently under development: 1) LAARS-Environmental Sampling (ES), which collects and analyzes aerosol particles for GCEP misuse detection and 2) LAARS-Destructive Assay (DA), which enables onsite enrichment DA sample collection and analysis for protracted diversion detection. The two applications propose game-changing technological advances in GCEP safeguards verification.

  1. Spectroscopic Online Monitoring for Process Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Fuel Reprocessing Streams - 13553

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bryan, S.A.; Levitskaia, T.G.; Casella, Amanda; Peterson, James [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 902 Battelle Boulevard, PO Box 999,MSIN: P7-25, Richland, WA, 99352 (United States)] [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 902 Battelle Boulevard, PO Box 999,MSIN: P7-25, Richland, WA, 99352 (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    There is a renewed interest worldwide to promote the use of nuclear power and close the nuclear fuel cycle. The long term successful use of nuclear power is critically dependent upon adequate and safe processing and disposition of the used nuclear fuel. Liquid-liquid extraction is a separation technique commonly employed for the processing of the dissolved spent nuclear fuel. The instrumentation used to monitor these processes must be robust, require little or no maintenance, and be able to withstand harsh environments such as high radiation fields and aggressive chemical matrices. This paper discusses application of absorption and vibrational spectroscopic techniques supplemented by physicochemical measurements for radiochemical process monitoring. In this context, our team experimentally assessed the potential of Raman and spectrophotometric techniques for on-line real-time monitoring of the U(VI)/nitrate ion/nitric acid and Pu(IV)/Np(V)/Nd(III), respectively, in solutions relevant to spent fuel reprocessing. Both techniques demonstrated robust performance in the repetitive batch measurements of each analyte in a wide concentration range using simulant and commercial dissolved spent fuel solutions. Static spectroscopic measurements served as training sets for the multivariate data analysis to obtain partial least squares predictive models, which were validated using on-line centrifugal contactor extraction tests. Satisfactory prediction of the analytes concentrations in these preliminary experiments warrants further development of the spectroscopy-based methods for radiochemical safeguards and process control. (authors)

  2. Application of EMCAS timeliness model to the safeguards/facility interface

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.

    1987-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Hanford operating contractor has developed a timeliness model for periodic mass balance tests (MBTs) for loss of special nuclear material (SNM). The purpose of the model is to compute the probability that an adversary will be detected by a periodic MBT before he could escape from a facility with stolen SNM using stealth and deceit to avoid detection. The model considers (a) the loss detection sensitivity of the MBT, (b) the time between MBTs, and (c) the statistical distribution of the total time required to complete stealth and deceit strategies. The model shows whether or not it is cost-effective to conduct frequent MBTs for loss and where improvements should be made. The Evaluation Methods for Material Control and Accountability Safeguards Systems (EMCAS) timeliness model computes the loss detection capability of periodic materials control and accounting (MC A) tests in terms of (a) the ability of the test to detect the specified target quantity and (b) the probability that the MC A test will occur before the adversary can complete the sequence of stealth and deceit strategies required to avoid detection.

  3. Savannah River Site delayed neutron instruments for safeguards measurements. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Studley, R.V.

    1992-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) includes a variety of nuclear production facilities that, since 1953, have processed special nuclear materials (SNM) including highly-enriched uranium (>90% {sup 235}U), recycled enriched uranium ({approximately}50% {sup 235}U + 40% {sup 236}U), low burnup plutonium (> 90% {sup 239}Pu + < 6% {sup 240}Pu ) and several other nuclear materials such as heat source plutonium ({sup 238}Pu). DOE Orders, primarily 5633.3, require all nuclear materials to be safeguarded through accountability and material control. Accountability measurements determine the total amount of material in a facility, balancing inventory changes against receipts and shipments, to provide assurance (delayed) that all material was present. Material control immediately detects or deters theft or diversion by assuring materials remain in assigned locations or by impeding unplanned movement of materials within or from a material access area. Goals for accountability or material control, and, therefore, the design of measurement systems, are distinctly different. Accountability measurements are optimized for maximum precision and accuracy, usually for large amounts of special nuclear material. Material control measurements are oriented more toward security features and often must be optimized for sensitivity, to detect small amounts of materials where none should be.

  4. AUTOMATED PROCESS MONITORING: APPLYING PROVEN AUTOMATION TECHNIQUES TO INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS NEEDS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O'Hara, Matthew J.; Durst, Philip C.; Grate, Jay W.; Devol, Timothy A.; Egorov, Oleg; Clements, John P.

    2008-07-13T23:59:59.000Z

    Identification and quantification of specific alpha- and beta-emitting radionuclides in complex liquid matrices is highly challenging, and is typically accomplished through laborious wet chemical sample preparation and separations followed by analysis using a variety of detection methodologies (e.g., liquid scintillation, gas proportional counting, alpha energy analysis, mass spectrometry). Analytical results may take days or weeks to report. Chains of custody and sample security measures may also complicate or slow the analytical process. When an industrial process-scale plant requires the monitoring of specific radionuclides as an indication of the composition of its feed stream or of plant performance, radiochemical measurements must be fast, accurate, and reliable. Scientists at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have assembled a fully automated prototype Process Monitor instrument capable of a variety of tasks: automated sampling directly from a feed stream, sample digestion / analyte redox adjustment, chemical separations, radiochemical detection and data analysis / reporting. The system is compact, its components are fluidically inter-linked, and analytical results could be immediately transmitted to on- or off-site locations. The development of a rapid radiochemical Process Monitor for 99Tc in Hanford tank waste processing streams, capable of performing several measurements per hour, will be discussed in detail. More recently, the automated platform was modified to perform measurements of 90Sr in Hanford tank waste stimulant. The system exemplifies how automation could be integrated into reprocessing facilities to support international nuclear safeguards needs.

  5. The Feasibility of Cask "Fingerprinting" as a Spent-Fuel, Dry-Storage Cask Safeguards Technique

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ziock, K P; Vanier, P; Forman, L; Caffrey, G; Wharton, J; Lebrun, A

    2005-07-27T23:59:59.000Z

    This report documents a week-long measurement campaign conducted on six, dry-storage, spent-nuclear-fuel storage casks at the Idaho National Laboratory. A gamma-ray imager, a thermal-neutron imager and a germanium spectrometer were used to collect data on the casks. The campaign was conducted to examine the feasibility of using the cask radiation signatures as unique identifiers for individual casks as part of a safeguards regime. The results clearly show different morphologies for the various cask types although the signatures are deemed insufficient to uniquely identify individual casks of the same type. Based on results with the germanium spectrometer and differences between thermal neutron images and neutron-dose meters, this result is thought to be due to the limitations of the extant imagers used, rather than of the basic concept. Results indicate that measurements with improved imagers could contain significantly more information. Follow-on measurements with new imagers either currently available as laboratory prototypes or under development are recommended.

  6. Advances Towards Readily Deployable Antineutrino Detectors for Reactor Monitoring and Safeguards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowden, N S; Bernstein, A; Dazeley, S; Lund, J; Reyna, D; Sadler, L; Svoboda, R

    2008-06-05T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear reactors have served as the neutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Our LLNL/SNL collaboration has demonstrated that such antineutrino based monitoring is feasible using a relatively small cubic meter scale detector at tens of meters standoff from a commercial PWR. With little or no burden on the plant operator we have been able to remotely and automatically monitor the reactor operational status (on/off), power level, and fuel burnup. Recently, we have investigated several technology paths that could allow such devices to be more readily deployed in the field. In particular, we have developed and fielded two new detectors; a low cost, non- flammable water based design; and a robust solid-state design based upon plastic scintillator. Here we will describe the tradeoffs inherent in these designs, and present results from their field deployments.

  7. Spectroscopic online monitoring for process control and safeguarding of radiochemical streams

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bryan, S.A.; Levitskaia, T.G. [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 902 Battelle Boulevard, PO Box 999, MSIN: P7-25, Richland, WA 99352 (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper summarizes application of the absorption and vibrational spectroscopic techniques supplemented by physicochemical measurements for radiochemical process monitoring. In this context, our team experimentally assessed the potential of Raman and spectrophotometric techniques for online real-time monitoring of the U(VI)/nitrate ion/nitric acid and Pu(IV)/Np(V)/Nd(III), respectively, in solutions relevant to spent fuel reprocessing. These techniques demonstrate robust performance in the repetitive batch measurements of each analyte in a wide concentration range using simulant and commercial dissolved spent fuel solutions. Spectroscopic measurements served as training sets for the multivariate data analysis to obtain partial least squares predictive models, which were validated using on-line centrifugal contactor extraction tests. Satisfactory prediction of the analytes concentrations in these preliminary experiments warrants further development of the spectroscopy-based methods for radiochemical process control and safeguarding. Additionally, the ability to identify material intentionally diverted from a liquid-liquid extraction contactor system was successfully tested using on-line process monitoring as a means to detect the amount of material diverted. (authors)

  8. FUTURE POWER GRID INITIATIVE Real-time High-Performance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    FUTURE POWER GRID INITIATIVE Real-time High-Performance Computing Infrastructure for Next- Generation Power Grid Analysis OBJECTIVE » We are developing infrastructure, software, formal models for real Infrastructure Operations Center (EIOC), the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory's (PNNL) national electric

  9. Changes in the Economic Value of Variable Generation at High Penetration Levels: A Pilot Case Study of California

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mills, Andrew

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    and M. O’Malley. Wind generation, power system operation,9510. GE Energy. Analysis of Wind Generation Impact on ERCOTcarrying capability of wind generation: Initial results with

  10. Estimating Alarm Thresholds for Process Monitoring Data under Different Assumptions about the Data Generating Mechanism

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Burr, Tom; Hamada, Michael S.; Howell, John; Skurikhin, Misha; Ticknor, Larry; Weaver, Brian

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Process monitoring (PM) for nuclear safeguards sometimes requires estimation of thresholds corresponding to small false alarm rates. Threshold estimation dates to the 1920s with the Shewhart control chart; however, because possible new roles for PM are being evaluated in nuclear safeguards, it is timely to consider modern model selection options in the context of threshold estimation. One of the possible new PM roles involves PM residuals, where a residual is defined as residual = data ? prediction. This paper reviews alarm threshold estimation, introduces model selection options, and considers a range of assumptions regarding the data-generating mechanism for PM residuals.more »Two PM examples from nuclear safeguards are included to motivate the need for alarm threshold estimation. The first example involves mixtures of probability distributions that arise in solution monitoring, which is a common type of PM. The second example involves periodic partial cleanout of in-process inventory, leading to challenging structure in the time series of PM residuals.« less

  11. Hanford tanks initiative plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McKinney, K.E.

    1997-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Abstract: The Hanford Tanks Initiative (HTI) is a five-year project resulting from the technical and financial partnership of the U.S. Department of Energy`s Office of Waste Management (EM-30) and Office of Science and Technology Development (EM-50). The HTI project accelerates activities to gain key technical, cost performance, and regulatory information on two high-level waste tanks. The HTI will provide a basis for design and regulatory decisions affecting the remainder of the Tank Waste Remediation System`s tank waste retrieval Program.

  12. UNLV Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hechanova, Anthony E.; Johnson, Allen; O'Toole, Brendan; Trabia, Mohamed; Peterson, Per

    2012-10-25T23:59:59.000Z

    Evaluation of the Crack growth rate (CGR) of Alloy 617 and Alloy 276 under constant K at ambient temperature has been completed. Creep deformation of Alloy 230 at different temperature range and load level has been completed and heat to heat variation has been noticed. Creep deformation study of Alloy 276 has been completed under an applied initial stress level of 10% of yield stress at 950şC. The grain size evaluation of the tested creep specimens of Alloy 276 has been completed.

  13. World Consensus Initiative 2004

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of ScienceandMesa del SolStrengtheningWildfires may contribute more toConsensus Initiative 2004 Texas

  14. Thermoelectric Generators 1. Thermoelectric generator

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Ho Sung

    1 Thermoelectric Generators HoSung Lee 1. Thermoelectric generator 1.1 Basic Equations In 1821 effects are called the thermoelectric effects. The mechanisms of thermoelectricity were not understood. Cold Hot I - -- - - - - -- Figure 1 Electron concentration in a thermoelectric material. #12;2 A large

  15. Remote-Reading Safety and Safeguards Surveillance System for 3013 Containers

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lechelt, W. M.; Skorpik, J. R.; Silvers, K. L.; Szempruch, R. W.; Douglas, D. G.; Fein, K. O.

    2002-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

    At Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), plutonium oxide is being loaded into stainless steel containers for long-term storage on the Hanford Site. These containers consist of two weld-sealed stainless steel cylinders nested one within the other. A third container holds the plutonium within the inner cylinder. This design meets the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) storage standard, DOE-STD- 3013-2000, which anticipates a 50-year storage lifetime. The 3013 standard also requires a container surveillance program to continuously monitor pressure and to assure safeguards are adequate. However, the configuration of the container system makes using conventional measurement and monitoring methods difficult. To better meet the 3013 monitoring requirements, a team from Fluor Hanford (who manages the PFP), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and Vista Engineering Technologies, LLC, developed a safer, cost-efficient, remote PFP 3013 container surveillance system. This new surveillance system is a combination of two successfully deployed technologies: (1) a magnetically coupled pressure gauge developed by Vista Engineering and (2) a radio frequency (RF) tagging device developed by PNNL. This system provides continuous, 100% monitoring of critical parameters with the containers in place, as well as inventory controls. The 3013 container surveillance system consists of three main elements: (1) an internal magnetic pressure sensor package, (2) an instrument pod (external electronics package), and (3) a data acquisition storage and display computer. The surveillance system described in this paper has many benefits for PFP and DOE in terms of cost savings and reduced personnel exposure. In addition, continuous safety monitoring (i.e., internal container pressure and temperature) of every container is responsible nuclear material stewardship and fully meets and exceeds DOE's Integrated Surveillance Program requirements.

  16. Modeling of UF{sub 6} enrichment with gas centrifuges for nuclear safeguards activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mercurio, G.; Peerani, P.; Richir, P.; Janssens, W.; Eklund, G. [European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements Via Fermi, 2749-TP181,20127 Ispra (Italy)

    2012-09-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The physical modeling of uranium isotopes ({sup 235}U, {sup 238}U) separation process by centrifugation of is a key aspect for predicting the nuclear fuel enrichment plant performances under surveillance by the Nuclear Safeguards Authorities. In this paper are illustrated some aspects of the modeling of fast centrifuges for UF{sub 6} gas enrichment and of a typical cascade enrichment plant with the Theoretical Centrifuge and Cascade Simulator (TCCS). The background theory for reproducing the flow field characteristics of a centrifuge is derived from the work of Cohen where the separation parameters are calculated using the solution of a differential enrichment equation. In our case we chose to solve the hydrodynamic equations for the motion of a compressible fluid in a centrifugal field using the Berman - Olander vertical velocity radial distribution and the solution was obtained using the Matlab software tool. The importance of a correct estimation of the centrifuge separation parameters at different flow regimes, lies in the possibility to estimate in a reliable way the U enrichment plant performances, once the separation external parameters are set (feed flow rate and feed, product and tails assays). Using the separation parameters of a single centrifuge allow to determine the performances of an entire cascade and, for this purpose; the software Simulink was used. The outputs of the calculation are the concentrations (assays) and the flow rates of the enriched (product) and depleted (tails) gas mixture. These models represent a valid additional tool, in order to verify the compliance of the U enrichment plant operator declarations with the 'on site' inspectors' measurements.

  17. Precision flyer initiator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Frank, A.M.; Lee, R.S.

    1998-05-26T23:59:59.000Z

    A precision flyer initiator forms a substantially spherical detonation wave in a high explosive (HE) pellet. An explosive driver, such as a detonating cord, a wire bridge circuit or a small explosive, is detonated. A flyer material is sandwiched between the explosive driver and an end of a barrel that contains an inner channel. A projectile or ``flyer`` is sheared from the flyer material by the force of the explosive driver and projected through the inner channel. The flyer than strikes the HE pellet, which is supported above a second end of the barrel by a spacer ring. A gap or shock decoupling material delays the shock wave in the barrel from predetonating the HE pellet before the flyer. A spherical detonation wave is formed in the HE pellet. Thus, a shock wave traveling through the barrel fails to reach the HE pellet before the flyer strikes the HE pellet. The precision flyer initiator can be used in mining devices, well-drilling devices and anti-tank devices. 10 figs.

  18. Precision flyer initiator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Frank, Alan M. (Livermore, CA); Lee, Ronald S. (Livermore, CA)

    1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A precision flyer initiator forms a substantially spherical detonation wave in a high explosive (HE) pellet. An explosive driver, such as a detonating cord, a wire bridge circuit or a small explosive, is detonated. A flyer material is sandwiched between the explosive driver and an end of a barrel that contains an inner channel. A projectile or "flyer" is sheared from the flyer material by the force of the explosive driver and projected through the inner channel. The flyer than strikes the HE pellet, which is supported above a second end of the barrel by a spacer ring. A gap or shock decoupling material delays the shock wave in the barrel from predetonating the HE pellet before the flyer. A spherical detonation wave is formed in the HE pellet. Thus, a shock wave traveling through the barrel fails to reach the HE pellet before the flyer strikes the HE pellet. The precision flyer initiator can be used in mining devices, well-drilling devices and anti-tank devices.

  19. Implications of Export/Import Reporting Requirements in the United States - International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Additional Protocol

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Killinger, Mark H; Benjamin, Eugene L; McNair, Gary W

    2001-02-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The US has signed but not ratified the US/IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol. If ratified, the Additional Protocol will require the US to report to the IAEA certain nuclear-related exports and imports to the IAEA. This document identifies and assesses the issues associated with the US making those reports. For example, some regulatory changes appear to be necessary. The document also attempts to predict the impact on the DOE Complex by assessing the historical flow of exports and imports that would be reportable if the Additional Protocol were in force.

  20. Implications of Export/Import Reporting Requirements in the United States - International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Additional Protocol

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Killinger, Mark H.; Benjamin, Eugene L.; McNair, Gary W.

    2001-02-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States has signed but not ratified the US/IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol. If ratified, the Additional Protocol will require the US to report to the IAEA certain nuclear-related exports and imports to the IAEA. This document identifies and assesses the issues associated with the US making those reports. For example, some regulatory changes appear to be necessary. The document also attempts to predict the impact on the DOE Complex by assessing the historical flow of exports and imports that would be reportable if the Additional Protocol were in force.

  1. Instrumented Pipeline Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas Piro; Michael Ream

    2010-07-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This report summarizes technical progress achieved during the cooperative agreement between Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC) and U.S. Department of Energy to address the need for a for low-cost monitoring and inspection sensor system as identified in the Department of Energy (DOE) National Gas Infrastructure Research & Development (R&D) Delivery Reliability Program Roadmap.. The Instrumented Pipeline Initiative (IPI) achieved the objective by researching technologies for the monitoring of pipeline delivery integrity, through a ubiquitous network of sensors and controllers to detect and diagnose incipient defects, leaks, and failures. This report is organized by tasks as detailed in the Statement of Project Objectives (SOPO). The sections all state the objective and approach before detailing results of work.

  2. Waste Generated from LMR-AMTEC Reactor Concept

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hasan, Ahmed; Mohamed, Yasser, T.; Mohammaden, Tarek, F.

    2003-02-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The candidate Liquid Metal Reactor-Alkali Metal Thermal -to- Electric Converter (LMR-AMTEC) is considered to be the first reactor that would use pure liquid potassium as a secondary coolant, in which potassium vapor aids in the conversion of thermal energy to electric energy. As with all energy production, the thermal generation of electricity produces wastes. These wastes must be managed in ways which safeguard human health and minimize their impact on the environment. Nuclear power is the only energy industry, which takes full responsibility for all its wastes. Based on the candidate design of the LMR-AMTEC components and the coolant types, different wastes will be generated from LMR. These wastes must be classified and characterized according to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulation, CFR. This paper defines the waste generation and waste characterization from LMR-AMTEC and reviews the applicable U.S. regulations that govern waste transportation, treatment, storage and final disposition. The wastes generated from LMR-AMTEC are characterized as: (1) mixed waste which is generated from liquid sodium contaminated by fission products and activated corrosion products; (2) hazardous waste which is generated from liquid potassium contaminated by corrosion products; (3) spent nuclear fuel; and (4) low-level radioactive waste which is generated from the packing materials (e.g. activated carbon in cold trap and purification units). The regulations and management of these wastes are summarized in this paper.

  3. Effect of Initial Oil Saturation on In-Situ Combustion Performance of a Canadian Bitumen

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Aleksandrov, Denis

    2013-05-31T23:59:59.000Z

    generated from the chemical reactions between fuel formed during ISC and injected oxygen. Heat generation depends on the amount of fuel formed, which, in turn, is affected by initial oil saturation (IOS). Thus, in this study, ISC process dynamics were...

  4. Experimental Investigation of the Effect of Initial Conditions on Rayleigh-Taylor Instability

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kuchibhatla, Sarat Chandra

    2011-10-21T23:59:59.000Z

    generated using a controllable, highly reliable Servo motor. The uniqueness of the study is the system’s capability of generating the required initial conditions precisely as compared to the previous endeavors. Backlit photography was used for imaging...

  5. ORNL Sustainable Campus Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Halford, Christopher K [ORNL] [ORNL

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The research conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) spans many disciplines and has the potential for far-reaching impact in many areas of everyday life. ORNL researchers and operations staff work on projects in areas as diverse as nuclear power generation, transportation, materials science, computing, and building technologies. As the U.S. Department of Energy s (DOE) largest science and energy research facility, ORNL seeks to establish partnerships with industry in the development of innovative new technologies. The primary focus of this current research deals with developing technologies which improve or maintain the quality of life for humans while reducing the overall impact on the environment. In its interactions with industry, ORNL serves as both a facility for sustainable research, as well as a representative of DOE to the private sector. For these reasons it is important that the everyday operations of the Laboratory reflect a dedication to the concepts of stewardship and sustainability.

  6. MONTANA PALLADIUM RESEARCH INITIATIVE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peters, John

    2012-05-09T23:59:59.000Z

    Project Objective: The overarching objective of the Montana Palladium Research Initiative is to perform scientific research on the properties and uses of palladium in the context of the U.S. Department of Energy'Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?s Hydrogen, Fuel Cells and Infrastructure Technologies Program. The purpose of the research will be to explore possible palladium as an alternative to platinum in hydrogen-economy applications. To achieve this objective, the Initiatives activities will focus on several cutting-edge research approaches across a range of disciplines, including metallurgy, biomimetics, instrumentation development, and systems analysis. Background: Platinum-group elements (PGEs) play significant roles in processing hydrogen, an element that shows high potential to address this need in the U.S. and the world for inexpensive, reliable, clean energy. Platinum, however, is a very expensive component of current and planned systems, so less-expensive alternatives that have similar physical properties are being sought. To this end, several tasks have been defined under the rubric of the Montana Palladium Research Iniative. This broad swath of activities will allow progress on several fronts. The membrane-related activities of Task 1 employs state-of-the-art and leading-edge technologies to develop new, ceramic-substrate metallic membranes for the production of high-purity hydrogen, and develop techniques for the production of thin, defect-free platinum group element catalytic membranes for energy production and pollution control. The biomimetic work in Task 2 explores the use of substrate-attached hydrogen-producing enzymes and the encapsulation of palladium in virion-based protein coats to determine their utility for distributed hydrogen production. Task 3 work involves developing laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) as a real-time, in situ diagnostic technique to characterize PGEs nanoparticles for process monitoring and control. The systems engineering work in task 4 will determine how fuel cells Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?Ă?Â?taken as systems behave over periods of time that should show how their reformers and other subsystems deteriorate with time.

  7. Woodland Park Healthy Forest Initiative

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    March 2010 Woodland Park Healthy Forest Initiative Collaboration Case Study #12;Woodland Park Healthy Forest Initiative 1 1 Colorado Forest Restoration Institute Collaboration Case Study: Woodland at Colorado State University, to conduct case studies of two collaborative forest health efforts

  8. Digital Library Initiative Rice University

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Digital Library Initiative Rice University Project Management General guidelines for digital projects Contact: dli (at) rice (dot) edu October, 2007 #12;Digital Library Initiative, Rice University................................................................................................8 #12;Guidelines for managing digital projects Page 2 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE We recognized

  9. Toward a Fieldable Atomic Mass Spectrometer for Safeguards Applications: Sample Preparation and Ionization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barinaga, Charles J.; Hager, George J.; Hart, Garret L.; Koppenaal, David W.; Marcus, R. Kenneth; Jones, Sarah MH; Manard, Benjamin T.

    2014-10-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) long-term research and development plan calls for the development of new methods to detect misuse at nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as reprocessing and enrichment plants. At enrichment plants, for example, the IAEA’s contemporary safeguards approaches are based on a combination of routine and random inspections that include collection of UF6 samples from in-process material and selected cylinders for subsequent analyses. These analyses include destructive analysis (DA) in a laboratory (typically by mass spectrometry [MS]) for isotopic characterization, and environmental sampling (ES) for subsequent laboratory elemental and isotopic analysis (also both typically by MS). One area of new method development includes moving this kind of isotope ratio analytical capability for DA and ES activities into the field. Some of the reasons for these developments include timeliness of results, avoidance of hazardous material shipments, and guidance for additional sample collecting. However, this capability does not already exist for several reasons, such as that most lab-based chemical and instrumental methods rely on laboratory infrastructure (highly trained staff, power, space, hazardous material handling, etc.) and require significant amounts of consumables (power, compressed gases, etc.). In addition, there are no currently available, fieldable instruments for atomic or isotope ratio analysis. To address these issues, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and collaborator, Clemson University, are studying key areas that limit the fieldability of isotope ratio mass spectrometry for atomic ions: sample preparation and ionization, and reducing the physical size of a fieldable mass spectrometer. PNNL is seeking simple and robust techniques that could be effectively used by inspectors who may have no expertise in analytical MS. In this report, we present and describe the preliminary findings for three candidate techniques: matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization (MALDI) MS, liquid sampling-atmospheric pressure glow discharge (LS-APGD), and laser ablation/ionization (LAI) MS at atmospheric pressure. Potential performance metrics for these techniques will be presented, including detectability, response, isotope ratio accuracy and precision, and ease of use.

  10. Safeguards Verification Measurements using Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anheier, Norman C.; Cannon, Bret D.; Qiao, Hong (Amy) [Amy; Phillips, Jon R.

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Laser Ablation Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) is a new verification measurement technology under development at the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). LAARS uses three lasers to ablate and then measure the relative isotopic abundance of uranium compounds. An ablation laser is tightly focused on uranium-bearing solids producing a small plume containing uranium atoms. Two collinear wavelength-tuned spectrometry lasers transit through the plume and the absorbance of U-235 and U-238 isotopes are measured to determine U-235 enrichment. The measurement has high relative precision and detection limits approaching the femtogram range for uranium. It is independent of chemical form and degree of dilution with nuisance dust and other materials. High speed sample scanning and pinpoint characterization allow measurements on millions of particles/hour to detect and analyze the enrichment of trace uranium in samples. The spectrometer is assembled using commercially available components at comparatively low cost, and features a compact and low power design. Future designs can be engineered for reliable, autonomous deployment within an industrial plant environment. Two specific applications of the spectrometer are under development: 1) automated unattended aerosol sampling and analysis and 2) on-site small sample destructive assay measurement. The two applications propose game-changing technological advances in gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) safeguards verification. The aerosol measurement instrument, LAARS-environmental sampling (ES), collects aerosol particles from the plant environment in a purpose-built rotating drum impactor and then uses LAARS-ES to quickly scan the surface of the impactor to measure the enrichments of the captured particles. The current approach to plant misuse detection involves swipe sampling and offsite analysis. Though this approach is very robust it generally requires several months to obtain results from a given sample collection. The destructive assay instrument, LAARS-destructive assay (DA), uses a simple purpose-built fixture with a sampling planchet to collect adsorbed UF6 gas from a cylinder valve or from a process line tap or pigtail. A portable LAARS-DA instrument scans the microgram quantity of uranium collected on the planchet and the assay of the uranium is measured to ~0.15% relative precision. Currently, destructive assay samples for bias defect measurements are collected in small sample cylinders for offsite mass spectrometry measurement.

  11. Oklahoma GSHP Initiative Jim Bullington

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    10/1/2012 1 Oklahoma GSHP Initiative Jim Bullington Trade & Industrial Education Oklahoma the Oklahoma CareerTech GSHP Initiative Model · Provide my contact information for you to share with your and Technical Education · Encourage you to contact them to get an initiative rolling Who is Oklahoma Career

  12. Generation of energy

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Kalina, Alexander I. (12214 Clear Fork, Houston, TX 77077)

    1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A method of generating energy which comprises utilizing relatively lower temperature available heat to effect partial distillation of at least portion of a multicomponent working fluid stream at an intermediate pressure to generate working fluid fractions of differing compositions. The fractions are used to produce at least one main rich solution which is relatively enriched with respect to the lower boiling component, and to produce at least one lean solution which is relatively improverished with respect to the lower boiling component. The pressure of the main rich solution is increased whereafter it is evaporated to produce a charged gaseous main working fluid. The main working fluid is expanded to a low pressure level to release energy. The spent low pressure level working fluid is condensed in a main absorption stage by dissolving with cooling in the lean solution to regenerate an initial working fluid for reuse.

  13. Initial Cladding Condition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    E. Siegmann

    2000-08-22T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this analysis is to describe the condition of commercial Zircaloy clad fuel as it is received at the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site. Most commercial nuclear fuel is encased in Zircaloy cladding. This analysis is developed to describe cladding degradation from the expected failure modes. This includes reactor operation impacts including incipient failures, potential degradation after reactor operation during spent fuel storage in pool and dry storage and impacts due to transportation. Degradation modes include cladding creep, and delayed hydride cracking during dry storage and transportation. Mechanical stresses from fuel handling and transportation vibrations are also included. This Analysis and Model Report (AMR) does not address any potential damage to assemblies that might occur at the YMP surface facilities. Ranges and uncertainties have been defined. This analysis will be the initial boundary condition for the analysis of cladding degradation inside the repository. In accordance with AP-2.13Q, ''Technical Product Development Planning'', a work plan (CRWMS M&O 2000c) was developed, issued, and utilized in the preparation of this document. There are constraints, caveats and limitations to this analysis. This cladding degradation analysis is based on commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel with Zircaloy cladding but is applicable to Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) fuel. Reactor operating experience for both PWRs and BWRs is used to establish fuel reliability from reactor operation. It is limited to fuel exposed to normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences (i.e. events which are anticipated to occur within a reactor lifetime), and not to fuel that has been exposed to severe accidents. Fuel burnup projections have been limited to the current commercial reactor licensing environment with restrictions on fuel enrichment, oxide coating thickness and rod plenum pressures. The information provided in this analysis will be used in evaluating the post-closure performance of the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) in relation to waste form degradation.

  14. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the U.S. Department of Energy. Quarter ending December 31, 1996

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strauch, M.S.

    1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) carries out safeguards and security activities for the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), as well as other organizations, both within and outside the DOE. This document summarizes the activities conducted for the OSS during the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 1997 (October through December, 1996). The nature and scope of the activities carried out for OSS at LLNL require a broad base of technical expertise. To assure projects are staffed and executed effectively, projects are conducted by the organization at LLNL best able to supply the needed technical expertise. These projects are developed and managed by senior program managers. Institutional oversight and coordination is provided through the LLNL Deputy Director`s office. At present, the Laboratory is supporting OSS in four areas: (1) safeguards technology; (2) safeguards and material accountability; (3) computer security--distributed systems; and (4) physical and personnel security support. The remainder of this report describes the activities in each of these four areas. The information provided includes an introduction which briefly describes the activity, summary of major accomplishments, task descriptions with quarterly progress, summaries of milestones and deliverables and publications published this quarter.

  15. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy: Quarter ending December 31, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Steele, E.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) carries out safeguards and security activities for the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), as well as other organizations, both within and outside the DOE. This document summarizes the activities conducted for the OSS during the first quarter of fiscal year 1994 (October through December, 1993). The nature and scope of the activities carried out for OSS at LLNL require a broad base of technical expertise. To assure projects are staffed and executed effectively, projects are conducted by the organization at LLNL best able to supply the needed technical expertise. These projects are developed and managed by senior program managers. Institutional oversight and coordination is provided through the LLNL Deputy Director`s office. At present, the Laboratory is supporting OSS in five areas: (1) Safeguards Technology, (2) Safeguards and Decision Support, (3) Computer Security, (4) DOE Automated Physical Security, and (5) DOE Automated Visitor Access Control System. This report describes the activities in each of these five areas. The information provided includes an introduction which briefly describes the activity, summary of major accomplishments, task descriptions with quarterly progress, summaries of milestones and deliverables and publications published this quarter.

  16. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy: Quarter ending September 30, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.; Mansur, D.L.; Davis, G.

    1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) carries out safeguards and security activities for the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), as well as other organizations, both within and outside the DOE. This document summarizes the activities conducted for the OSS during the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1993 (July through September, 1993). The nature and scope of the activities carried out for OSS at LLNL require a broad base of technical expertise. To assure projects are staffed and executed effectively, projects are conducted by the organization at LLNL best able to supply the needed technical expertise. These projects are developed and managed by senior program managers. Institutional oversight and coordination is provided through the LLNL Deputy Director`s office. At present, the Laboratory is supporting OSS in five areas: Safeguards Technology, Safeguard System Studies, Computer Security, DOE Automated Physical Security and DOE Automated Visitor Access Control System. The remainder of this report describes the activities in each of these five areas. The information provided includes an introduction which briefly describes the activity, summary of major accomplishments, task descriptions with quarterly progress, summaries of milestones and deliverables and publications published this quarter.

  17. Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs | ORNL

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Initiatives Nonproliferation Technology Nonproliferation Systems Safeguards and Security Technology International Safeguards Nuclear Material Detection and Characterization For...

  18. Centralized and Distributed Generated Power Systems -A Comparison Approach

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    White Paper Power Systems Engineering Research Center Empowering Minds to Engineer the Future ElectricCentralized and Distributed Generated Power Systems - A Comparison Approach Future Grid Initiative Energy System #12;Centralized and Distributed Generated Power Systems - A Comparison Approach Prepared

  19. Centralized and Decentralized Generated Power Systems -A Comparison Approach

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Electric Energy System #12;Centralized and Distributed Generated Power Systems - A Comparison ApproachCentralized and Decentralized Generated Power Systems - A Comparison Approach Future Grid Initiative White Paper Power Systems Engineering Research Center Empowering Minds to Engineer the Future

  20. Modeling of leachate generation in municipal solid waste landfills

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Beck, James Bryan

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    and the inclusion of compaction effects and leachate generation and movement effects by Mehevec (1994) should provide the user with a tool for estimating leachate generation values and landfill capacity figures for a variety of initial design and operational...

  1. Education and Training in Radiochemistry – The NAMP Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Patricia Paviet-Hartmann; Mansour Akbarzadeh

    2012-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2009, the nuclear industry employed approximately 120,000 people. Nearly 38 percent of the nuclear industry force will be eligible to retire within the next five years. To maintain the current work force, the industry will need to hire approximately 25,000 more workers by 2015. Given that the current radiochemistry workforce is approaching the age for retirement and that a limited number of US universities provide experience with radiochemistry, the United States is faced with a growing demand for the education and training of scientists in the radiochemistry arena. Furthermore, it is critical that the US maintains global leadership in the next generation of safe nuclear energy technology from both a national security and environmental perspective. This will require a robust program that focuses entirely on educating and training the next generation of radiochemists in subjects such as 1- radioanalysis of actinides and radioelements not only in the environment but in medium pertinent to the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, 2- speciation of radionuclides, 3- detection methods, 4- safeguards etc… Therefore, the National Analytical Management Program (NAMP) has organized a subcommittee focusing on training and education in radiochemistry. Through the efforts of this subcommittee, NAMP has established collaborative associations to foster the exchange of scientific and technical information with professors in radiochemistry programs at different universities. This paper will present our accomplishments and the development of a curriculum for an intermediate radiochemistry course in cooperation with the EPA. These short (2-hour) webinar presentations on specific radiochemistry topics have been developed and will be presented. The webinars are recorded and will become a library or collection of information for on-line access from the NAMP website.

  2. Submersible Generator for Marine Hydrokinetics

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robert S. Cinq-Mars; Timothy Burke; Dr. James Irish; Brian Gustafson; Dr. James Kirtley; Dr. Aiman Alawa

    2011-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A submersible generator was designed as a distinct and critical subassembly of marine hydrokinetics systems, specifically tidal and stream energy conversion. The generator is designed to work with both vertical and horizontal axis turbines. The final product is a high-pole-count, radial-flux, permanent magnet, rim mounted generator, initially rated at twenty kilowatts in a two-meter-per-second flow, and designed to leverage established and simple manufacturing processes. The generator was designed to work with a 3 meter by 7 meter Gorlov Helical Turbine or a marine hydrokinetic version of the FloDesign wind turbine. The team consisted of experienced motor/generator design engineers with cooperation from major US component suppliers (magnetics, coil winding and electrical steel laminations). Support for this effort was provided by Lucid Energy Technologies and FloDesign, Inc. The following tasks were completed: � Identified the conditions and requirements for MHK generators. � Defined a methodology for sizing and rating MHK systems. � Selected an MHK generator topology and form factor. � Completed electromechanical design of submersible generator capable of coupling to multiple turbine styles. � Investigated MHK generator manufacturing requirements. � Reviewed cost implications and financial viability. � Completed final reporting and deliverables

  3. Florida Hydrogen Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Block, David L

    2013-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The Florida Hydrogen Initiative (FHI) was a research, development and demonstration hydrogen and fuel cell program. The FHI program objectives were to develop Florida?s hydrogen and fuel cell infrastructure and to assist DOE in its hydrogen and fuel cell activities The FHI program funded 12 RD&D projects as follows: Hydrogen Refueling Infrastructure and Rental Car Strategies -- L. Lines, Rollins College This project analyzes strategies for Florida's early stage adaptation of hydrogen-powered public transportation. In particular, the report investigates urban and statewide network of refueling stations and the feasibility of establishing a hydrogen rental-car fleet based in Orlando. Methanol Fuel Cell Vehicle Charging Station at Florida Atlantic University ? M. Fuchs, EnerFuel, Inc. The project objectives were to design, and demonstrate a 10 kWnet proton exchange membrane fuel cell stationary power plant operating on methanol, to achieve an electrical energy efficiency of 32% and to demonstrate transient response time of less than 3 milliseconds. Assessment of Public Understanding of the Hydrogen Economy Through Science Center Exhibits, J. Newman, Orlando Science Center The project objective was to design and build an interactive Science Center exhibit called: ?H2Now: the Great Hydrogen Xchange?. On-site Reformation of Diesel Fuel for Hydrogen Fueling Station Applications ? A. Raissi, Florida Solar Energy Center This project developed an on-demand forecourt hydrogen production technology by catalytically converting high-sulfur hydrocarbon fuels to an essentially sulfur-free gas. The removal of sulfur from reformate is critical since most catalysts used for the steam reformation have limited sulfur tolerance. Chemochromic Hydrogen Leak Detectors for Safety Monitoring ? N. Mohajeri and N. Muradov, Florida Solar Energy Center This project developed and demonstrated a cost-effective and highly selective chemochromic (visual) hydrogen leak detector for safety monitoring at any facility engaged in transport, handling and use of hydrogen. Development of High Efficiency Low Cost Electrocatalysts for Hydrogen Production and PEM Fuel Cell Applications ? M. Rodgers, Florida Solar Energy Center The objective of this project was to decrease platinum usage in fuel cells by conducting experiments to improve catalyst activity while lowering platinum loading through pulse electrodeposition. Optimum values of several variables during electrodeposition were selected to achieve the highest electrode performance, which was related to catalyst morphology. Understanding Mechanical and Chemical Durability of Fuel Cell Membrane Electrode Assemblies ? D. Slattery, Florida Solar Energy Center The objective of this project was to increase the knowledge base of the degradation mechanisms for membranes used in proton exchange membrane fuel cells. The results show the addition of ceria (cerium oxide) has given durability improvements by reducing fluoride emissions by an order of magnitude during an accelerated durability test. Production of Low-Cost Hydrogen from Biowaste (HyBrTec?) ? R. Parker, SRT Group, Inc., Miami, FL This project developed a hydrogen bromide (HyBrTec?) process which produces hydrogen bromide from wet-cellulosic waste and co-produces carbon dioxide. Eelectrolysis dissociates hydrogen bromide producing recyclable bromine and hydrogen. A demonstration reactor and electrolysis vessel was designed, built and operated. Development of a Low-Cost and High-Efficiency 500 W Portable PEMFC System ? J. Zheng, Florida State University, H. Chen, Bing Energy, Inc. The objectives of this project were to develop a new catalyst structures comprised of highly conductive buckypaper and Pt catalyst nanoparticles coated on its surface and to demonstrate fuel cell efficiency improvement and durability and cell cost reductions in the buckypaper based electrodes. Development of an Interdisciplinary Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Academic Program ? J. Politano, Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne, FL This project developed a hydrogen and fuel cel

  4. Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Dundee, University of

    Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1 Roger Fletcher \\Lambda with the optimisation of distillation column models by non­ linear programming are considered. The paper presents of the distillation column model. A certain limiting case of the column model is examined, that of infinite reflux

  5. Innovative Manufacturing Initiative Recognition Day

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Innovative Manufacturing Initiative (IMI) Recognition Day (held in Washington, DC on June 20, 2012) showcased IMI projects selected by the Energy Department to help American manufacturers...

  6. IR-laser initiated combustion -- A step toward complete combustion

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laghai, A.; Nabavi, S.H.; Servati, H.B.; Syed, F.

    1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The new global environmental regulations for reducing the engine emissions from both moving and stationary sources, as well as improvement in fuel economy are the major motifs to obtain a perfect combustion process and exhaust aftertreatment methods. Infrared (IR)-Laser initiated combustion provides a very high initial temperature, which produces propagation of a turbulent thermopressure pulse that results in a fast burning and improved combustion. The role of IR is to maximize the heat generation efficiency.

  7. GASIFICATION FOR DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ronald C. Timpe; Michael D. Mann; Darren D. Schmidt

    2000-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A recent emphasis in gasification technology development has been directed toward reduced-scale gasifier systems for distributed generation at remote sites. The domestic distributed power generation market over the next decade is expected to be 5-6 gigawatts per year. The global increase is expected at 20 gigawatts over the next decade. The economics of gasification for distributed power generation are significantly improved when fuel transport is minimized. Until recently, gasification technology has been synonymous with coal conversion. Presently, however, interest centers on providing clean-burning fuel to remote sites that are not necessarily near coal supplies but have sufficient alternative carbonaceous material to feed a small gasifier. Gasifiers up to 50 MW are of current interest, with emphasis on those of 5-MW generating capacity. Internal combustion engines offer a more robust system for utilizing the fuel gas, while fuel cells and microturbines offer higher electric conversion efficiencies. The initial focus of this multiyear effort was on internal combustion engines and microturbines as more realistic near-term options for distributed generation. In this project, we studied emerging gasification technologies that can provide gas from regionally available feedstock as fuel to power generators under 30 MW in a distributed generation setting. Larger-scale gasification, primarily coal-fed, has been used commercially for more than 50 years to produce clean synthesis gas for the refining, chemical, and power industries. Commercial-scale gasification activities are under way at 113 sites in 22 countries in North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia, according to the Gasification Technologies Council. Gasification studies were carried out on alfalfa, black liquor (a high-sodium waste from the pulp industry), cow manure, and willow on the laboratory scale and on alfalfa, black liquor, and willow on the bench scale. Initial parametric tests evaluated through reactivity and product composition were carried out on thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) equipment. These tests were evaluated and then followed by bench-scale studies at 1123 K using an integrated bench-scale fluidized-bed gasifier (IBG) which can be operated in the semicontinuous batch mode. Products from tests were solid (ash), liquid (tar), and gas. Tar was separated on an open chromatographic column. Analysis of the gas product was carried out using on-line Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FT-IR). For selected tests, gas was collected periodically and analyzed using a refinery gas analyzer GC (gas chromatograph). The solid product was not extensively analyzed. This report is a part of a search into emerging gasification technologies that can provide power under 30 MW in a distributed generation setting. Larger-scale gasification has been used commercially for more than 50 years to produce clean synthesis gas for the refining, chemical, and power industries, and it is probable that scaled-down applications for use in remote areas will become viable. The appendix to this report contains a list, description, and sources of currently available gasification technologies that could be or are being commercially applied for distributed generation. This list was gathered from current sources and provides information about the supplier, the relative size range, and the status of the technology.

  8. Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initiative

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    de Weck, Olivier L.

    Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initiative RESEARCH PORTFOLIO Fall 2008 About SEAri http://seari.mit.edu The Systems Engineering Advancement Research Initiative brings together a set of sponsored research projects and a consortium of systems engineering leaders from industry, government, and academia. SEAri is positioned within

  9. Generation Planning (pbl/generation)

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power AdministrationField8,Dist.Newof EnergyFundingGene ControlsCounselGeneral User Generation

  10. GE funds initiative to support STEM initiatives in Oklahoma ...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    STEM Empowers OK: Initiative to enrich STEM education in Oklahoma Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window) Share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Click to share...

  11. Thin-film optical initiator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Erickson, Kenneth L. (Albuquerque, NM)

    2001-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A thin-film optical initiator having an inert, transparent substrate, a reactive thin film, which can be either an explosive or a pyrotechnic, and a reflective thin film. The resultant thin-film optical initiator system also comprises a fiber-optic cable connected to a low-energy laser source, an output charge, and an initiator housing. The reactive thin film, which may contain very thin embedded layers or be a co-deposit of a light-absorbing material such as carbon, absorbs the incident laser light, is volumetrically heated, and explodes against the output charge, imparting about 5 to 20 times more energy than in the incident laser pulse.

  12. Energy Efficient Schools Initiative- Grants

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Energy Efficient Schools Initiative was created in May 2008 to provide grants and [http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=TN57F&re... loans] to Tennessee school...

  13. Georgia Power- Advanced Solar Initiative

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Note: According to Georgia Power's website, the Advanced Solar Initiative's final program guidelines are due to be published on June 25th and the bidding period for is expected to open on July 10,...

  14. Initial

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville PowerCherries 82981-1cnHigh SchoolIn Other News linkThermal Phenomena

  15. IST EPFL Joint doctoral Initiative Thesis Topic Proposal Form

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Instituto de Sistemas e Robotica

    IST ­ EPFL Joint doctoral Initiative Thesis Topic Proposal Form TITLE: Pump-turbines with variable of the use of turbines and pump-turbines with variable speed drives in pressurized water pipe systems (e speed drives for electricity generation in pressurised pipe systems FOCUS AREA: Environmental Hydraulics

  16. IST EPFL Joint doctoral Initiative Thesis Topic Proposal Form

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Instituto de Sistemas e Robotica

    IST ­ EPFL Joint doctoral Initiative Thesis Topic Proposal Form TITLE: Blocking probability. Keywords: Blocking probability; Dam safety; Discharge capacity; Driftwood; Spillway. SUPERVISORS IST: Jorge block and thereby reduce the open flow area for water passage. The blocking generated by woody debris

  17. Hanford Tanks Initiative requirements and document management process guide

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schaus, P.S.

    1998-05-22T23:59:59.000Z

    This revision of the guide provides updated references to project management level Program Management and Assessment Configuration Management activities, and provides working level directions for submitting requirements and project documentation related to the Hanford Tanks Initiative (HTI) project. This includes documents and information created by HTI, as well as non-HTI generated materials submitted to the project.

  18. Initial measurements of BN-350 spent fuel in dry storage casks using the dual slab verification detonator

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Santi, Peter Angelo [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Browne, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Freeman, Corey R [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Parker, Robert F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Williams, Richard B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Dual Slab Verification Detector (DSVD) has been developed, built, and characterized by Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as part of the dry storage safeguards system for the spent fuel from the BN-350 fast reactor. The detector consists of two rows of 3He tubes embedded in a slab of polyethylene which has been designed to be placed on the outer surface of the dry storage cask. By performing DSVD measurements at several different locations around the outer surface of the DUC, a signature 'fingerprint' can be established for each DUC based on the neutron flux emanating from inside the dry storage cask. The neutron fingerprint for each individual DUC will be dependent upon the spatial distribution of nuclear material within the cask, thus making it sensitive to the removal of a certain amount of material from the cask. An initial set of DSVD measurements have been performed on the first set of dry storage casks that have been loaded with canisters of spent fuel and moved onto the dry storage pad to both establish an initial fingerprint for these casks as well as to quantify systematic uncertainties associated with these measurements. The results from these measurements will be presented and compared with the expected results that were determined based on MCNPX simulations of the dry storage facility. The ability to safeguard spent nuclear fuel is strongly dependent on the technical capabilities of establishing and maintaining continuity of knowledge (COK) of the spent fuel as it is released from the reactor core and either reprocessed or packaged and stored at a storage facility. While the maintenance of COK is often done using continuous containment and surveillance (C/S) on the spent fuel, it is important that the measurement capabilities exist to re-establish the COK in the event of a significant gap in the continuous CIS by performing measurements that independently confirm the presence and content of Plutonium (Pu) in the spent fuel. The types of non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements that can be performed on the spent fuel are strongly dependent on the type of spent fuel that is being safeguarded as well as the location in which the spent fuel is being stored. The BN-350 Spent Fuel Disposition Project was initiated to improve the safeguards and security of the spent nuclear fuel from the BN-350 fast-breeder reactor and was developed cooperatively to meet the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as the terms of the 1993 CTR and MPC&A Implementing Agreements. The unique characteristics of fuel from the BN-350 fast-breeder reactor have allowed for the development of an integrated safeguards measurement program to inventory, monitor, and if necessary, re-verify Pu content of the spent fuel throughout the lifetime of the project. This approach includes the development of a safeguards measurement program to establish and maintain the COK on the spent fuel during the repackaging and eventual relocation of the spent-fuel assemblies to a long-term storage site. As part of the safeguards measurement program, the Pu content of every spent-fuel assembly from the BN-350 reactor was directly measured and characterized while the spent-fuel assemblies were being stored in the spent-fuel pond at the BN-350 facility using the Spent Fuel Coincidence Counter (SFCC). Upon completion of the initial inventory of the Pu content of the individual spent-fuel assemblies, the assemblies were repackaged into welded steel canisters that were filled with inert argon gas and held either four or six individual spent-fuel assemblies depending on the type of assembly that was being packaged. This repackaging of the spent-fuel assemblies was performed in order to improve the stability of the spent-fuel assemblies for long-term storage and increase the proliferation resistance of the spent fuel. To maintain the capability of verifying the presence of the spent-fuel assemblies inside the welded steel canisters, measurements were performed on the canis

  19. Jet initiation of PBX 9502

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McAfee, J.M.

    1987-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report details the progress of an effort to determine the quantitative aspects of the initiation of PBX 9502 (95% TATB, 5% Kel-F 800) by copper jets. The particular jet used was that produced by the LAW warhead (66-mm diameter, 42/sup 0/ angle cone, copper-lined, conical shaped charge). Fifteen experiments, in various configurations, have been fired to define the essential parameters for quantitatively measuring the jet performance and initiation of bare PBX 9502. 7 refs., 8 figs.

  20. Southface Energy Institute: Advanced Commercial Buildings Initiative...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Southface Energy Institute: Advanced Commercial Buildings Initiative - 2015 Peer Review Southface Energy Institute: Advanced Commercial Buildings Initiative - 2015 Peer Review...

  1. Clean Energy Manufacturing Initiative Midwest Regional Summit...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Clean Energy Manufacturing Initiative Midwest Regional Summit: Lightweighting Breakout Session Summary Clean Energy Manufacturing Initiative Midwest Regional Summit: Lightweighting...

  2. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy, quarter ending March 31, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.; Mansur, D.L.; Davis, G.

    1993-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This quarterly report discusses activities in the Safeguards Technology Program (STP) which is a program in LLNL`s Nuclear Chemistry Division that develop advanced, nondestructive-analysis (NDA) technology for measurement of special nuclear materials. The work focuses on R&D relating to x{minus} and gamma-ray spectrometry techniques and to the development of computer codes for interpreting the spectral data obtained by these techniques.

  3. Benchmark data for a large reprocessing plant for evaluation of advanced data analysis algorithms and safeguards system design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burr, T.L.; Coulter, C.A.; Wangen, L.E.

    1998-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the simulation and analysis of solution level and density (L,D) in all key main process tanks in a large reprocessing plant. In addition, initial provisions were made to include temperature (T) data in the analysis at a later time. FacSim, a simulation program developed at Los Alamos, was used to generate simulated process operating data for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) that is now under construction in Japan. Both normal facility operation and more than thirty abrupt diversion scenarios were modeled over 25-day periods of simulated operation beginning with clean startup of the facility. The simulation tracked uranium, plutonium (both +3 and +4 oxidation states), HNO{sub 3} diluent, and tributyl phosphate from the input accountability vessel to the plutonium output accountability vessel, with the status of each process vessel and many pipes recorded at intervals of approximately four minutes. These data were used to determine solution volume and density values in each process vessel as a function of time.

  4. AVAILABLE ONLINE AT: INITIATED BY:

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office511041cloth DocumentationProducts (VAP) VAP7-0973 1 Introduction In the design INITIATED BY: INITIATED

  5. Understanding and Managing Generation Y

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wallace, Kevin

    2007-12-14T23:59:59.000Z

    There are four generations in the workplace today; they consist of the Silent Generation, Baby Boom Generation, Generation X, and Generation Y. Generation Y, being the newest generation, is the least understood generation although marketers...

  6. Simulated Interdiction: Proliferation Security Initiative

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    ………………………………... Technical Capabilities to Support PSI ………………………………… Foreign Policy and External Relations ………………………............... Republic of Bevostan ………………………………………………………….. Geography ……………………………………………………………... iii 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 10... Security, Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) Texas A&M University May 6, 2009 Simulated Interdiction: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Acknowledgements The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department...

  7. Zentrum fr Nutzfahrzeugtechnologie Initial situation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Berns, Karsten

    with a vehicle model in the MKS software for the study of vehicle dynamic behavior. Schindler03_2012_03 Zentrum to calculate the tyre dynamic behavior when travelling through the soil surface. It can be fur- ther integratedZentrum fĂĽr Nutzfahrzeugtechnologie Initial situation: The study on the trafficability

  8. Managing Critical Management Improvement Initiatives

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Provides requirements and responsibilities for planning, executing and assessing critical management improvement initiatives within DOE. DOE N 251.59, dated 9/27/2004, extends this Notice until 10/01/2005. Archived 11-8-10. Does not cancel other directives.

  9. Initiation disruptor systems and methods of initiation disruption

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Baum, Dennis W

    2014-09-23T23:59:59.000Z

    A system that may be used as an initiation disruption system (IDS) according to one embodiment includes an explosive charge; a plurality of particles in a layer at least partially surrounding the explosive charge; and a fire suppressant adjacent the plurality of particles. A method for disabling an object according to one embodiment includes placing the system as recited above near an object; and causing the explosive charge to initiate, thereby applying mechanical loading to the object such that the object becomes disabled. Additional systems and methods are also presented. A device according to another embodiment includes a plurality of particles bound by a binder thereby defining a sidewall having an interior for receiving an explosive; and a fire suppressant adjacent the plurality of particles and binder. Additional systems and methods are also presented.

  10. Boston Architectural College Urban Sustainability Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Byers, Arthur C.

    2013-07-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The Boston Architectural College's Urban Sustainability initiative is a demonstration project as defined by the National Energy Technology Laboratory. BAC's proposed project with the U.S. Department of Energy - NETL, is a large part of that overall initiative. The BAC's Urban Sustainability Initiative is a multi-part project with several important goals and objectives that will have a significant impact on the surrounding neighborhood including: energy conservation, reduction of storm water runoff, generation of power through alternative energy sources, elimination/reduction of BAC carbon footprint, and to create a vehicle for ongoing public outreach and education. Education and outreach opportunities will serve to add to the already comprehensive Sustainability Design courses offered at BAC relative to energy savings, performance and conservation in building design. At the finish of these essential capital projects there will be technical materials created for the education of the design, sustainability, engineering, community development and historic preservation communities, to inform a new generation of environmentally-minded designers and practitioners, the city of Boston and the general public. The purpose of the initiative, through our green renovations program, is to develop our green alley projects and energy saving renovations to the BAC physical plant, to serve as a working model for energy efficient design in enclosed 19th century and 20th century urban sites and as an educational laboratory for teaching ecological and sustainable technologies to students and the public while creating jobs. The scope of our project as it relates to the BAC and the U.S. Department of Energy- NETL combined efforts includes: Task I of the project is Phase II (Green Alley). Task I encompasses various renovation activities that will demonstrate the effectiveness of permeable paving and ground water recharge systems. It will aid in the reduction of storm water runoff into the Charles River Basin in one of its most significantly polluted sections and, will provide a green renovation mechanism for the redirected storm water of a public alley way. This activity is designed to improve the quality of water recharging the ground water and protecting the vulnerable wood pilings under many of the historic masonry buildings in Boston's Back Bay. Sustainable design research and system monitoring opportunities will also be incorporated, providing ongoing tools for public outreach and education through innovative signage and "virtual tour" technology. The monitoring will include a "building performance dash board" that reflects real time operating conditions and improvements in environmental and economic performance to be prominently displayed on the face of our 320 Newbury Street building (approximately 1.5 million people walk by annually). The project site and demonstration area is located at the rear of 951 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02115 and the parking area adjacent to Public Alley #444 in Boston's historic Back Bay. Task II of the project is Geothermal Solution. This task involves the installation of approximately seven Geothermal wells which will tap into the earth's constant underground temperatures to provide air-conditioning and heating for BAC facilities. The environmentally friendly geothermal system uses no fossil fuel, produces no emissions and runs silently, providing a sustainable model for commercial and residential buildings throughout Boston. Ultimately the combination of this project and other projects will assist in making the BAC "carbon-neutral", and could generate enough additional energy to provide free power to the Engine 33 and Ladder 15 Firehouse located at 941 Boylston Street. The project is located at the rear of 951 Boylston Street, Boston, MA 02115 and the parking area adjacent to Public Alley #444 in Boston's historic Back Bay. Task III of the project is the Sustainability Design Curriculum at the BAC. The BAC is the nation’s largest independent, multi-disciplinary college of spatial design, and a leader in

  11. California Solar Initiative California Public Utilities Commission

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    California Solar Initiative California Public Utilities Commission Staff Progress Report January 2008 #12;California Solar Initiative, CPUC Staff Progress Report, January 2008 This page intentionally left blank. #12;California Solar Initiative, CPUC Staff Progress Report, January 2008 Table of Contents

  12. Green Button Initiative Growing | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Initiative Growing Green Button Initiative Growing May 17, 2013 - 1:17pm Addthis The Green Button initiative, which is the common-sense idea that electricity customers should...

  13. Accounting for and finance of generation investment

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Newbery, David

    , although peak demand growth was falling. Initially the capacity margin was below the comfort level of 20% (for a coal-fired system with high growth rates). The move to larger generation units and higher efficiencies designed for higher quality UK coal... , or the electricity company faces bankruptcy, common features of the Indian ESI (Newbery, 2007). One common feature of many ESIs, and notably of generation, is that the book value of assets is far below their modern equivalent asset (MEA) replacement cost...

  14. Guam Initial Technical Assessment Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Baring-Gould, I.; Conrad, M.; Haase, S.; Hotchkiss, E.; McNutt, P.

    2011-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Under an interagency agreement, funded by the Department of Interior's (DOI) Office of Insular Affairs (OIA), the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) was tasked to deliver technical assistance to the island of Guam by conducting an island initial technical assessment that would lay out energy consumption and production data and establish a baseline. This assessment will be used to conduct future analysis and studies by NREL that will estimate energy efficiency and renewable energy potential for the island of Guam.

  15. The President's Biofuels Initiative | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    The President's Biofuels Initiative The President's Biofuels Initiative Presentation by Neil Rossmeissl at the October 24, 2006 Bio-Derived Liquids to Hydrogen Distributed...

  16. Voluntary Initiative on Incentives: Toolkit Training Webinar...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Voluntary Initiative on Incentives: Toolkit Training Webinar Voluntary Initiative on Incentives: Toolkit Training Webinar March 26, 2015 12:30PM to 2:0...

  17. Innovative Corridors Initiative: Business Model Analysis

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Shaheen, Susan; Lingham, Viginia; Finson, Rachel S.

    2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Wenger, Joyce. Business Models for Vehicle InfrastructureCorridors Initiative: Business Model Analysis Rachel S.Corridors Initiative: Business Model Analysis Task Order

  18. Advanced Manufacturing Initiative Improves Turbine Blade Productivity...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Advanced Manufacturing Initiative Improves Turbine Blade Productivity Advanced Manufacturing Initiative Improves Turbine Blade Productivity May 20, 2011 - 2:56pm Addthis This is an...

  19. Climate VISION: Private Sector Initiatives: Cement: Resources...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    The Cement Sustainability Initiative Coordinated by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI) helps the cement...

  20. California Low Carbon Fuels Infrastructure Investment Initiative...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Low Carbon Fuels Infrastructure Investment Initiative California Low Carbon Fuels Infrastructure Investment Initiative 2012 DOE Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Program and Vehicle...

  1. Energy Innovation: Green Button Initiative Empowering Americans...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Energy Innovation: Green Button Initiative Empowering Americans to Save Energy and Money Energy Innovation: Green Button Initiative Empowering Americans to Save Energy and Money...

  2. Energy Transition Initiative: Islands Playbook (Book) | OSTI...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    Energy Transition Initiative: Islands Playbook (Book) Re-direct Destination: The Island Energy Playbook (the Playbook) provides an action-oriented guide to successfully initiating,...

  3. Triangle geometry processing for surface modeling and cartesian grid generation

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Aftosmis, Michael J. (San Mateo, CA) [San Mateo, CA; Melton, John E. (Hollister, CA) [Hollister, CA; Berger, Marsha J. (New York, NY) [New York, NY

    2002-09-03T23:59:59.000Z

    Cartesian mesh generation is accomplished for component based geometries, by intersecting components subject to mesh generation to extract wetted surfaces with a geometry engine using adaptive precision arithmetic in a system which automatically breaks ties with respect to geometric degeneracies. During volume mesh generation, intersected surface triangulations are received to enable mesh generation with cell division of an initially coarse grid. The hexagonal cells are resolved, preserving the ability to directionally divide cells which are locally well aligned.

  4. Generation gaps in engineering?

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Kim, David J. (David Jinwoo)

    2008-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    There is much enthusiastic debate on the topic of generation gaps in the workplace today; what the generational differences are, how to address the apparent challenges, and if the generations themselves are even real. ...

  5. Small Generator Aggregation (Maine)

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This section establishes requirements for electricity providers to purchase electricity from small generators, with the goal of ensuring that small electricity generators (those with a nameplate...

  6. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Krichinsky, Alan M [ORNL; Bates, Bruce E [ORNL; Chesser, Joel B [ORNL; Koo, Sinsze [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2009-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F&W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F&W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F&W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF{sub 6} F&W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF{sub 6}. The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under plant operating conditions. The ultimate use of technologies tested on the engineering-scale test bed is to work with safeguards agencies to install them in operating plants (e.g., enrichment and fuel processing plants), thereby promoting new safeguards measures with minimal impact to operating plants. In addition, this system is useful in identifying features for new plants that can be incorporated as part of 'safeguards by design,' in which load cells and other monitoring technologies are specified to provide outputs for automated monitoring and inspector evaluation.

  7. Initial Decision and Risk Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Engel, David W.

    2012-02-29T23:59:59.000Z

    Decision and Risk Analysis capabilities will be developed for industry consideration and possible adoption within Year 1. These tools will provide a methodology for merging qualitative ranking of technology maturity and acknowledged risk contributors with quantitative metrics that drive investment decision processes. Methods and tools will be initially introduced as applications to the A650.1 case study, but modular spreadsheets and analysis routines will be offered to industry collaborators as soon as possible to stimulate user feedback and co-development opportunities.

  8. AVAILABLE ONLINE AT: INITIATED BY:

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTuba City,EnrichedSupplementalAdministrationAdministration INITIATED

  9. AVAILABLE ONLINE AT: INITIATED BY:

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA groupTuba City,EnrichedSupplementalAdministrationAdministration INITIATED

  10. Generation of Web Service Descriptions and Web Service

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Generation of Web Service Descriptions and Web Service Module Implementation for Concept University of Science and Technology Software Systems Institute (STS) #12;Abstract Nowadays web services in order to initiate the communication. A web services endpoint communication interface utilizes

  11. American Samoa Initial Technical Assessment Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Busche, S.; Conrad, M.; Funk, K.; Kandt, A.; McNutt, P.

    2011-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document is an initial energy assessment for American Samoa, the first of many steps in developing a comprehensive energy strategy. On March 1, 2010, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Tony Babauta invited governors and their staff from the Interior Insular Areas to meet with senior principals at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Meeting discussions focused on ways to improve energy efficiency and increase the deployment of renewable energy technologies in the U.S. Pacific Territories. In attendance were Governors Felix Camacho (Guam), Benigno Fitial (Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands), and Togiola Tulafono, (American Samoa). This meeting brought together major stakeholders to learn and understand the importance of developing a comprehensive strategic plan for implementing energy efficiency measures and renewable energy technologies. For several decades, dependence on fossil fuels and the burden of high oil prices have been a major concern but never more at the forefront as today. With unstable oil prices, the volatility of fuel supply and the economic instability in American Samoa, energy issues are a high priority. In short, energy security is critical to American Samoa's future economic development and sustainability. Under an interagency agreement, funded by the Department of Interior's Office of Insular Affairs, NREL was tasked to deliver technical assistance to the islands of American Samoa. Technical assistance included conducting an initial technical assessment to define energy consumption and production data, establish an energy consumption baseline, and assist with the development of a strategic plan. The assessment and strategic plan will be used to assist with the transition to a cleaner energy economy. NREL provided an interdisciplinary team to cover each relevant technical area for the initial energy assessments. Experts in the following disciplines traveled to American Samoa for on-island site assessments: (1) Energy Efficiency and Building Technologies; (2) Integrated Wind-Diesel Generation; (3) Transmission and Distribution; (4) Solar Technologies; and (5) Biomass and Waste-to-Energy. In addition to these core disciplines, team capabilities also included expertise in program analysis, project financing, energy policy and energy planning. The intent of the technical assessment was to provide American Samoa with a baseline energy assessment. From the baseline, various scenarios and approaches for deploying cost effective energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies could be created to meet American Samoa's objectives. The information provided in this energy assessment will be used as input in the development of a draft strategic plan and the development of scenarios and strategies for deploying cost-effective energy efficiency and renewable products.

  12. Generation to Generation: The Heart of Family Medicine

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Winter, Robin O

    2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Ageism in the Workplace. Generations Spring, 5. Westman,of caring for multiple generations simultaneously. StronglyGeneration to Generation: The Heart of Family Medicine

  13. Gamma ray generator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Firestone, Richard B; Reijonen, Jani

    2014-05-27T23:59:59.000Z

    An embodiment of a gamma ray generator includes a neutron generator and a moderator. The moderator is coupled to the neutron generator. The moderator includes a neutron capture material. In operation, the neutron generator produces neutrons and the neutron capture material captures at least some of the neutrons to produces gamma rays. An application of the gamma ray generator is as a source of gamma rays for calibration of gamma ray detectors.

  14. Plug-in Hybrid Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Goodman, Angie; Moore, Ray; Rowden, Tim

    2013-09-27T23:59:59.000Z

    Our main project objective was to implement Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEV) and charging infrastructure into our electric distribution service territory and help reduce barriers in the process. Our research demonstrated the desire for some to be early adopters of electric vehicles and the effects lack of education plays on others. The response of early adopters was tremendous: with the initial launch of our program we had nearly 60 residential customers interested in taking part in our program. However, our program only allowed for 15 residential participants. Our program provided assistance towards purchasing a PEV and installation of Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). The residential participants have all come to love their PEVs and are more than enthusiastic about promoting the many benefits of driving electric.

  15. Direct laser initiation of PETN

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Early, J. W. (James W.); Kennedy, J. E. (James E.)

    2001-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In the early 1970s Yang and Menichelli demonstrated that direct laser illumination of low-density secondary explosive prr:ssings through a transparent window could produce detonation. 'The energy requirement for threshold initiation of detonation was reduced when a thin metal coating of metal covered the side of the window against which the low-density explosive was pressed. We have obtained experimental results that are in general agreement with the results of Renllund, Stanton and Trott (1 989) and recent: work by Nagayama, hou and Nakahara (2001). We report exploration of the effects of laser beam diameter, PEiTN density and specific surface area, and thickness of a titanium coating on the window.

  16. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the U.S. Department of Energy. Quarter ending September 30, 1996

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Davis, G.; Johnson, D.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

    1996-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The paper describes tasks undertaken in each of the following areas: Safeguards technology program (STP); Safeguards and material accountability (SMA); Computer security, distributed systems; Complex-wide access control system (CWAC); and Standardization of security systems (SSS). The STP develops advanced, nondestructive analysis technology for measurement of special nuclear materials. Work focuses on R and D relating to X- and gamma-ray spectrometry and to development of computer codes for interpreting the spectral data obtained by these techniques. The SMA is concerned with four areas: insider protection; material accountability; planning and evaluation; and information security. The Computer Security Technology Center provides expertise and solutions to the many information security problems present in today`s computer systems and networks. Incidents of intrusions, computer viruses, the purposeful replacement of legitimate software for illegal purposes, and similar acts are being addressed by the creation of security software, the delivery of incident response expertise, and research and development into secure systems. The purpose of the CWAC is to develop an approach that will allow visitors to use their DOE standard badge in access control systems throughout the DOE complex. The purpose of the SSS project is to support the standardization of security systems to meet DOE orders and requirements, and to support the DOE in offering relevant security technology and capabilities to Federal standardization efforts.

  17. Initial Risk Analysis and Decision Making Framework

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Engel, David W.

    2012-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Commercialization of new carbon capture simulation initiative (CCSI) technology will include two key elements of risk management, namely, technical risk (will process and plant performance be effective, safe, and reliable) and enterprise risk (can project losses and costs be controlled within the constraints of market demand to maintain profitability and investor confidence). Both of these elements of risk are incorporated into the risk analysis subtask of Task 7. Thus far, this subtask has developed a prototype demonstration tool that quantifies risk based on the expected profitability of expenditures when retrofitting carbon capture technology on a stylized 650 MW pulverized coal electric power generator. The prototype is based on the selection of specific technical and financial factors believed to be important determinants of the expected profitability of carbon capture, subject to uncertainty. The uncertainty surrounding the technical performance and financial variables selected thus far is propagated in a model that calculates the expected profitability of investments in carbon capture and measures risk in terms of variability in expected net returns from these investments. Given the preliminary nature of the results of this prototype, additional work is required to expand the scope of the model to include additional risk factors, additional information on extant and proposed risk factors, the results of a qualitative risk factor elicitation process, and feedback from utilities and other interested parties involved in the carbon capture project. Additional information on proposed distributions of these risk factors will be integrated into a commercial implementation framework for the purpose of a comparative technology investment analysis.

  18. RELAP-7 and PRONGHORN Initial Integration Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. Ortensi; D. Andrs; A.A. Bingham; R.C. Martineau; J.W. Peterson

    2012-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Modern nuclear reactor safety codes require the ability to solve detailed coupled neutronicthermal fluids problems. For larger cores, this implies fully coupled 3-D spatial dynamics with appropriate feedback models that can provide enough resolution to accurately compute core heat generation and removal during steady and unsteady conditions. The reactor analyis code PRONGHORN is being coupled to RELAP-7 as a first step to extend RELAP's current capabilities. This report details the mathematical models, the type of coupling, and the testing that will be used to produce an integrated system. RELAP-7 is a MOOSE-based application that solves the continuity, momentum, and energy equations in 1-D for a compressible fluid. The pipe and joint capabilities enable it to model parts of the PCU system. The PRONGHORN application, also developed on the MOOSE infrastructure, solves the coupled equations that define the neutron diffusion, fluid flow, and heat transfer in a 3-D core model. Initially, the two systems will be loosely coupled to simplify the transition towards a more complex infrastructure. The integration will be tested with the OECD/NEA MHTGR-350 Coupled Neutronics-Thermal Fluids benchmark model.

  19. ATTRIBUTE VERIFICATION SYSTEMS WITH INFORMATION BARRIERS FOR CLASSIFIED FORMS OF PLUTONIUM IN THE TRILATERAL INITIATIVE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Langner, D. C. (Diana C.); Hsue, S.-T. (Sin-Tao); MacArthur, D. W. (Duncan W.); Nicholas, N. J. (Nancy J.); Whiteson, R. (Rena); Gosnell, T. B. (Thomas B.); Koening, Z. (Zachary); Wolford, J. K. (James K.); Aparo, Massimo; Kulikov, Iouri; Puckett, J. M. (John M.); Whichello, J. (Julian); Razinkov, S. (Sergei); Livke, A. (Alexander)

    2001-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A team of technical experts from the Russian Federation, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the United States has been working since December 1997 to develop a toolkit of instruments that could be used to verify plutonium-bearing items that have classified characteristics in nuclear weapons states. This suite of instruments is similar in many ways to standard safeguards equipment and includes high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers, neutron multiplicity counters, gross neutron counters, and gross gamma-ray detectors. In safeguards applications, this equipment is known to be robust and authentication methods are well understood. However, this equipment is very intrusive, and a traditional safeguards application of such equipment for verification of materials with classified characteristics would reveal classified information to the inspector. Several enabling technologies have been or are being developed to facilitate the use of these trusted, but intrusive safeguards technologies. In this paper, these new technologies will be described.

  20. Electrical initiation of an energetic nanolaminate film

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Tringe, Joseph W. (Walnut Creek, CA); Gash, Alexander E. (Brentwood, CA); Barbee, Jr., Troy W. (Palo Alto, CA)

    2010-03-30T23:59:59.000Z

    A heating apparatus comprising an energetic nanolaminate film that produces heat when initiated, a power source that provides an electric current, and a control that initiates the energetic nanolaminate film by directing the electric current to the energetic nanolaminate film and joule heating the energetic nanolaminate film to an initiation temperature. Also a method of heating comprising providing an energetic nanolaminate film that produces heat when initiated, and initiating the energetic nanolaminate film by directing an electric current to the energetic nanolaminate film and joule heating the energetic nanolaminate film to an initiation temperature.

  1. Cylindrical neutron generator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Leung, Ka-Ngo (Hercules, CA)

    2008-04-22T23:59:59.000Z

    A cylindrical neutron generator is formed with a coaxial RF-driven plasma ion source and target. A deuterium (or deuterium and tritium) plasma is produced by RF excitation in a cylindrical plasma ion generator using an RF antenna. A cylindrical neutron generating target is coaxial with the ion generator, separated by plasma and extraction electrodes which contain many slots. The plasma generator emanates ions radially over 360.degree. and the cylindrical target is thus irradiated by ions over its entire circumference. The plasma generator and target may be as long as desired. The plasma generator may be in the center and the neutron target on the outside, or the plasma generator may be on the outside and the target on the inside. In a nested configuration, several concentric targets and plasma generating regions are nested to increase the neutron flux.

  2. Cylindrical neutron generator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Leung, Ka-Ngo (Hercules, CA)

    2009-12-29T23:59:59.000Z

    A cylindrical neutron generator is formed with a coaxial RF-driven plasma ion source and target. A deuterium (or deuterium and tritium) plasma is produced by RF excitation in a cylindrical plasma ion generator using an RF antenna. A cylindrical neutron generating target is coaxial with the ion generator, separated by plasma and extraction electrodes which contain many slots. The plasma generator emanates ions radially over 360.degree. and the cylindrical target is thus irradiated by ions over its entire circumference. The plasma generator and target may be as long as desired. The plasma generator may be in the center and the neutron target on the outside, or the plasma generator may be on the outside and the target on the inside. In a nested configuration, several concentric targets and plasma generating regions are nested to increase the neutron flux.

  3. Cylindrical neutron generator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Leung, Ka-Ngo

    2005-06-14T23:59:59.000Z

    A cylindrical neutron generator is formed with a coaxial RF-driven plasma ion source and target. A deuterium (or deuterium and tritium) plasma is produced by RF excitation in a cylindrical plasma ion generator using an RF antenna. A cylindrical neutron generating target is coaxial with the ion generator, separated by plasma and extraction electrodes which contain many slots. The plasma generator emanates ions radially over 360.degree. and the cylindrical target is thus irradiated by ions over its entire circumference. The plasma generator and target may be as long as desired. The plasma generator may be in the center and the neutron target on the outside, or the plasma generator may be on the outside and the target on the inside. In a nested configuration, several concentric targets and plasma generating regions are nested to increase the neutron flux.

  4. New generation enrichment monitoring technology for gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Alexandrov, Boian S. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hill, Thomas R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Macarthur, Duncan W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marks, Thomas [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Moss, Calvin E. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sheppard, Gregory A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-06-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The continuous enrichment monitor, developed and fielded in the 1990s by the International Atomic Energy Agency, provided a go-no-go capability to distinguish between UF{sub 6} containing low enriched (approximately 4% {sup 235}U) and highly enriched (above 20% {sup 235}U) uranium. This instrument used the 22-keV line from a {sup 109}Cd source as a transmission source to achieve a high sensitivity to the UF{sub 6} gas absorption. The 1.27-yr half-life required that the source be periodically replaced and the instrument recalibrated. The instrument's functionality and accuracy were limited by the fact that measured gas density and gas pressure were treated as confidential facility information. The modern safeguarding of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant producing low-enriched UF{sub 6} product aims toward a more quantitative flow and enrichment monitoring concept that sets new standards for accuracy stability, and confidence. An instrument must be accurate enough to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of material, have virtually zero false alarms, and protect the operator's proprietary process information. We discuss a new concept for advanced gas enrichment assay measurement technology. This design concept eliminates the need for the periodic replacement of a radioactive source as well as the need for maintenance by experts. Some initial experimental results will be presented.

  5. Air, Health, Clean Energy, and Related Economic Impacts: Assessing the Many Benefits of State and Local Clean Energy Initiatives Multiple Benefits of Clean Energy Initiatives

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    unknown authors

    Reducing energy demand and/or increasing renewable energy generation from state and local clean energy initiatives—such as goals, standards, codes, funds, and programs—can generate many benefits, including: ••Security, diversity, and overall reliability improvements for the electric system. ••Improved environmental quality, human health, and quality of life. ••Positive economic gains through energy costs saved, avoided medical costs, higher disposable incomes, increased labor productivity, and more jobs. This brief is part of a series and focuses on environmental and human health benefits. State and local governments can analyze their clean energy initiatives using methods and tools described in EPA’s Assessing the

  6. CALIFORNIA SOLAR INITIATIVE-THERMAL PROGRAMHANDBOOK

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    CALIFORNIA SOLAR INITIATIVE-THERMAL PROGRAMHANDBOOK CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES California Solar Initiative Thermal Program Handbook i 1. Introduction to CSI-Thermal Program....................................................................................3 2.1.1 Host Customer

  7. Childhood Cancer Tracking Initiative in Massachusetts

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Childhood Cancer Tracking Initiative in Massachusetts: Developing a New Electronic Tool Presented (CEH) Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) #12;Childhood Cancer Tracking Initiative "Develop methods for linking environmental databases with childhood cancer incidence data to identify

  8. California Solar Initiative California Public Utilities Commission

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    California Solar Initiative California Public Utilities Commission Staff Progress Report July 2008 #12;California Solar Initiative, CPUC Staff Progress Report, July 2008 Cover Photo Credits: Photographer: Andrew McKinney Name of Installer: Marin Solar System owner

  9. aeolicus initiates primer: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Juan A. Valiente Kroon 2007-12-20 203 Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1 Mathematics Websites Summary: Column Initialization 1 Initializing...

  10. a549 cells initial: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Juan A. Valiente Kroon 2007-12-20 93 Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1 Mathematics Websites Summary: Column Initialization 1 Initializing...

  11. aspa initial results: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Juan A. Valiente Kroon 2007-12-20 192 Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1 Mathematics Websites Summary: Column Initialization 1 Initializing...

  12. areas initial results: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Juan A. Valiente Kroon 2007-12-20 269 Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1 Mathematics Websites Summary: Column Initialization 1 Initializing...

  13. aachen aspa initial: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    A. Valiente Kroon 2007-12-20 137 Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1 Mathematics Websites Summary: Column Initialization 1 Initializing...

  14. aav initiator protein: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Juan A. Valiente Kroon 2007-12-20 94 Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1 Mathematics Websites Summary: Column Initialization 1 Initializing...

  15. aquifex aeolicus initiates: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Juan A. Valiente Kroon 2007-12-20 44 Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1 Mathematics Websites Summary: Column Initialization 1 Initializing...

  16. adenocarcinomas initial clinical: Topics by E-print Network

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Juan A. Valiente Kroon 2007-12-20 98 Column Initialization 1 Initializing Distillation Column Models 1 Mathematics Websites Summary: Column Initialization 1 Initializing...

  17. Voluntary Initiative: Partnering to Enhance Program Capacity...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    to Enhance Program Capacity Better Buildings Residential Network Program Sustainability Peer Exchange Call Series: Voluntary Initiative: Partnering to Enhance Program...

  18. Clean Energy Manufacturing Initiative Industrial Efficiency and...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Industrial Efficiency and Energy Productivity Video Clean Energy Manufacturing Initiative Industrial Efficiency and Energy Productivity Video Addthis Description Industrial...

  19. California Solar Initiative California Public Utilities Commission

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    California Solar Initiative California Public Utilities Commission Staff Progress Report January 2009 #12;2 California Solar Initiative CPUC Staff Progress Report - January 2009 The California Public progress on the California Solar Initiative, the country's largest solar incentive program. In January 2007

  20. California Solar Initiative California Public Utilities Commission

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    California Solar Initiative California Public Utilities Commission Staff Progress Report October 2008 #12;2 California Solar Initiative CPUC Staff Progress Report - October 2008 The California Public progress on the California Solar Initiative, the country's largest solar incentive program. In January 2007

  1. New downhole steam generator tested

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bleakley, W.B.

    1981-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Completion of 2 field tests of a new-model down-hole steam generator paves the way for further evaluation and development of a system destined to increase California's heavy oil production. Current air pollution restrictions there prevent installation of conventional steam generators in several areas of interest to oil operators. The current series of tests, conducted by Chemical Oil Recovery Co. (CORCO) of Bakersfield, California, follows an earlier prototype operation conducted by Sandia National Laboratories in conjunction with the US Department of Energy. The CORCO tests were conducted on the surface with the generator's output going into Tenneco Oil Exploration and Production Co.'s overland-Riokern Well No. 80, located in the Kern River field 4 miles north of Bakersfield. The first test was concluded with just under 1000 bbl of steam injected, less than planned due to a higher-than-expected injection pressure. The unit operated at less than 25% capacity because of the air compressor limitation. Compressor output was only 285 psi, not enough to inject the desired volumes into the reservoir. Test data shows that injection amounted to 150 bpd of 90 to 95% quality steam at 225-psi wellhead pressure. After injection, the well was shut in for 3 days to allow soaking, then put on production. Initial production was 40 bopd at 175 F.

  2. New wave generation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Mercier, Matthieu J.

    We present the results of a combined experimental and numerical study of the generation of internal waves using the novel internal wave generator design of Gostiaux et al. (Exp. Fluids, vol. 42, 2007, pp. 123–130). This ...

  3. Safeguards and Security Program

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-09-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Ensures appropriate levels of protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components; espionage; loss or theft of classified matter or Government property; and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security or on the health and safety of Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor employees, the public, or the environment. DOE N 251.40, dated 5/3/01, extends this directive until 12/31/01. Cancels DOE 5630.11B, DOE 5630.13A, DOE 5630.14A, DOE 5630.15, DOE 5630.16A, DOE 5630.17, DOE 5631.1C, DOE 5631.4A, DOE 5634.1B, DOE 5634.3, DOE 5639.3, and Chapter IX of DOE M 5632.1C-1

  4. Safeguards Envelope Methodology

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Metcalf, Richard

    2012-02-14T23:59:59.000Z

    is the earliest known non- simulated data published and analyzed. An Integrated Equipment Test (IET) facility was constructed as an example pilot-scale facility, running synthetic plutonium in depleted uranium.4 A mass-tracking system, integrating a pair of dip...

  5. safeguards and security

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:AdministrationAnalysisDarby Dietrich57/%2A0/%2A en4/%2A2/%2A/%2A

  6. Facility Safeguardability Assessment Report

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn AprilA Approved:Administration Sandia CorporationNuclear Security21698 Prepared for

  7. Voltage controlled MESFET pulse shape generator

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Burkhart, S.C.

    1994-10-26T23:59:59.000Z

    A programmable pulse shape generator capable of producing pulse shapes for Nova and Beamlet has been designed and simulated using the circuit code SPICE. The design utilizes power MESFETS, which are commonly used in microwave amplifiers. The pulse shape is varied by setting a bias voltage on each in a chain of MESFETS with a 200 ps temporal resolution. The electrical pulse then drives an integrated electro-optic modulator similar to what is on Beamlet. Pulse shapes 22 and 25, used on Nova, have been generated by this design. There is no fundamental barrier to making such a pulse generator for use on the National Ignition Facility. In fact, the longer time scales on the NIF pulse will ease the high speed requirements of the pulse shape generator allowing the use of less expensive components. The next step will be to build a prototype circuit for initial testing on Beamlet and Nova.

  8. Coal Gasification for Power Generation, 3. edition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    2007-11-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The report provides a concise look at the challenges faced by coal-fired generation, the ability of coal gasification to address these challenges, and the current state of IGCC power generation. Topics covered include: an overview of Coal Generation including its history, the current market environment, and the status of coal gasification; a description of gasification technology including processes and systems; an analysis of the key business factors that are driving increased interest in coal gasification; an analysis of the barriers that are hindering the implementation of coal gasification projects; a discussion of Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) technology; an evaluation of IGCC versus other generation technologies; a discussion of IGCC project development options; a discussion of the key government initiatives supporting IGCC development; profiles of the key gasification technology companies participating in the IGCC market; and, a detailed description of existing and planned coal IGCC projects.

  9. Shock Initiation of Damaged Explosives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chidester, S K; Vandersall, K S; Tarver, C M

    2009-10-22T23:59:59.000Z

    Explosive and propellant charges are subjected to various mechanical and thermal insults that can increase their sensitivity over the course of their lifetimes. To quantify this effect, shock initiation experiments were performed on mechanically and thermally damaged LX-04 (85% HMX, 15% Viton by weight) and PBX 9502 (95% TATB, 5% Kel-F by weight) to obtain in-situ manganin pressure gauge data and run distances to detonation at various shock pressures. We report the behavior of the HMX-based explosive LX-04 that was damaged mechanically by applying a compressive load of 600 psi for 20,000 cycles, thus creating many small narrow cracks, or by cutting wedge shaped parts that were then loosely reassembled, thus creating a few large cracks. The thermally damaged LX-04 charges were heated to 190 C for long enough for the beta to delta solid - solid phase transition to occur, and then cooled to ambient temperature. Mechanically damaged LX-04 exhibited only slightly increased shock sensitivity, while thermally damaged LX-04 was much more shock sensitive. Similarly, the insensitive explosive PBX 9502 was mechanically damaged using the same two techniques. Since PBX 9502 does not undergo a solid - solid phase transition but does undergo irreversible or 'rachet' growth when thermally cycled, thermal damage to PBX 9502 was induced by this procedure. As for LX-04, the thermally damaged PBX 9502 demonstrated a greater shock sensitivity than mechanically damaged PBX 9502. The Ignition and Growth reactive flow model calculated the increased sensitivities by igniting more damaged LX-04 and PBX 9502 near the shock front based on the measured densities (porosities) of the damaged charges.

  10. New mechanism for lightning initiation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Roussel-Dupre, R.; Buchwald, M.; Gurevich, A. [Lebedev Institute of Physical Sciences, Moscow (Russian Federation)] [and others

    1996-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This is the final report of a three-year, Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). To distinguish radio-frequency (rf) signals generated by lightning from the electromagnetic pulse produced by a nuclear explosion, it is necessary to understand the fundamental nature of thunderstorm discharges. The recent debate surrounding the origin of transionospheric pulse pairs (TIPPs) detected by the BLACKBEARD experiment aboard the ALEXIS satellite illustrates this point. We have argued that TIPP events could originate from the upward propagating discharges recently identified by optical images taken from the ground, from airplanes, and from the space shuttle. In addition, the Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) measurements of x-ray bursts originating from thunderstorms are almost certainly associated with these upward propagating discharges. When taken together, these three measurements point directly to the runaway electron mechanism as the source of the upward discharges. The primary goal of this research effort was to identify the specific role played by the runaway-air-breakdown mechanism in the general area of thunderstorm electricity and in so doing develop lightning models that predict the optical, rf, and x-ray emissions that are observable from space.

  11. Motor/generator

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Hickam, Christopher Dale (Glasford, IL)

    2008-05-13T23:59:59.000Z

    A motor/generator is provided for connecting between a transmission input shaft and an output shaft of a prime mover. The motor/generator may include a motor/generator housing, a stator mounted to the motor/generator housing, a rotor mounted at least partially within the motor/generator housing and rotatable about a rotor rotation axis, and a transmission-shaft coupler drivingly coupled to the rotor. The transmission-shaft coupler may include a clamp, which may include a base attached to the rotor and a plurality of adjustable jaws.

  12. Summary Report of Summer 2009 NGSI Human Capital Development Efforts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dougan, A; Dreicer, M; Essner, J; Gaffney, A; Reed, J; Williams, R

    2009-11-16T23:59:59.000Z

    In 2009, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) engaged in several activities to support NA-24's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This report outlines LLNL's efforts to support Human Capital Development (HCD), one of five key components of NGSI managed by Dunbar Lockwood in the Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243). There were five main LLNL summer safeguards HCD efforts sponsored by NGSI: (1) A joint Monterey Institute of International Studies/Center for Nonproliferation Studies-LLNL International Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis Course; (2) A Summer Safeguards Policy Internship Program at LLNL; (3) A Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards Internship; (4) Safeguards Technology Internships; and (5) A joint LLNL-INL Summer Safeguards Lecture Series. In this report, we provide an overview of these five initiatives, an analysis of lessons learned, an update on the NGSI FY09 post-doc, and an update on students who participated in previous NGSI-sponsored LLNL safeguards HCD efforts.

  13. Creating a Cognitive Agent in a Virtual World: Planning, Navigation, and Natural Language Generation

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hewlett, William

    2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Language Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Language Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

  14. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  15. Energy Security, Innovation & Sustainability Initiative

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2010-04-30T23:59:59.000Z

    More than a dozen energy experts convened in Houston, Texas, on February 13, 2009, for the first in a series of four regionally-based energy summits being held by the Council on Competitiveness. The Southern Energy Summit was hosted by Marathon Oil Corporation, and participants explored the public policy, business and technological challenges to increasing the diversity and sustainability of U.S. energy supplies. There was strong consensus that no single form of energy can satisfy the projected doubling, if not tripling, of demand by the year 2050 while also meeting pressing environmental challenges, including climate change. Innovative technology such as carbon capture and storage, new mitigation techniques and alternative forms of energy must all be brought to bear. However, unlike breakthroughs in information technology, advancing broad-based energy innovation requires an enormous scale that must be factored into any equation that represents an energy solution. Further, the time frame for developing alternative forms of energy is much longer than many believe and is not understood by the general public, whose support for sustainability is critical. Some panelists estimated that it will take more than 50 years to achieve the vision of an energy system that is locally tailored and has tremendous diversity in generation. A long-term commitment to energy sustainability may also require some game-changing strategies that calm volatile energy markets and avoid political cycles. Taking a page from U.S. economic history, one panelist suggested the creation of an independent Federal Energy Reserve Board not unlike the Federal Reserve. The board would be independent and influence national decisions on energy supply, technology, infrastructure and the nation's carbon footprint to better calm the volatile energy market. Public-private efforts are critical. Energy sustainability will require partnerships with the federal government, such as the U.S. Department of Energy's National Laboratories, that can provide real-world improvements in both the short- and long-term. Indeed, the roles of government and the private sector in energy sustainability were brought into sharper focus by the pending American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, also known as the economic stimulus bill. There was cautious optimism that the bill was moving the nation in the right direction by way of focusing on greater energy efficiency, alternative forms of energy and improved infrastructure. Nevertheless, there was concern over Congress picking energy winners and losers. Instead, Congress should challenge industry to produce solutions that will create a clear path forward to energy sustainability that the American people can support.

  16. Potential growth of nuclear and coal electricity generation in the US

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bloomster, C.H.; Merrill, E.T.

    1989-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Electricity demand should continue to grow at about the same rate as GNP, creating a need for large amounts of new generating capacity over the next fifty years. Only coal and nuclear at this time have the abundant domestic resources and assured technology to meet this need. However, large increase in both coal and nuclear usage will require solutions to many of the problems that now deter their increased usage. For coal, the problems center around the safety and environmental impacts of increased coal mining and coal combustion. For nuclear, the problems center around reactor safety, radioactive waste disposal, financial risk, and nuclear materials safeguards. This report assesses the impacts associated with a range of projected growth rates in electricity demand over the next 50 years. The resource requirements and waste generation resulting from pursuing the coal and nuclear fuel options to meet the projected growth rates are estimated. The fuel requirements and waste generation for coal plants are orders of magnitude greater than for nuclear. Improvements in technology and waste management practices must be pursued to mitigate environmental and safety concerns about electricity generation from both options. 34 refs., 18 figs., 14 tabs.

  17. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Evans, Louise G [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croft, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, S. J. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, H. O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Schear, M. A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Worrall, Andrew [U.K. NNL

    2011-01-13T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/ or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  18. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Evans, Louise G [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croft, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, S. J. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, B. D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, H. O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Schear, M. A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Worrall, Andrew [U.K., NNL

    2010-11-24T23:59:59.000Z

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  19. Heat engine generator control system

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Rajashekara, Kaushik (Carmel, IN); Gorti, Bhanuprasad Venkata (Towson, MD); McMullen, Steven Robert (Anderson, IN); Raibert, Robert Joseph (Fishers, IN)

    1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An electrical power generation system includes a heat engine having an output member operatively coupled to the rotor of a dynamoelectric machine. System output power is controlled by varying an electrical parameter of the dynamoelectric machine. A power request signal is related to an engine speed and the electrical parameter is varied in accordance with a speed control loop. Initially, the sense of change in the electrical parameter in response to a change in the power request signal is opposite that required to effectuate a steady state output power consistent with the power request signal. Thereafter, the electrical parameter is varied to converge the output member speed to the speed known to be associated with the desired electrical output power.

  20. Heat engine generator control system

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Rajashekara, K.; Gorti, B.V.; McMullen, S.R.; Raibert, R.J.

    1998-05-12T23:59:59.000Z

    An electrical power generation system includes a heat engine having an output member operatively coupled to the rotor of a dynamoelectric machine. System output power is controlled by varying an electrical parameter of the dynamoelectric machine. A power request signal is related to an engine speed and the electrical parameter is varied in accordance with a speed control loop. Initially, the sense of change in the electrical parameter in response to a change in the power request signal is opposite that required to effectuate a steady state output power consistent with the power request signal. Thereafter, the electrical parameter is varied to converge the output member speed to the speed known to be associated with the desired electrical output power. 8 figs.