Sample records for facility disposition safety

  1. Facility Disposition Safety Strategy RM

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

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  2. Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Volume One of this Standard has been revised to provide a Department of Energy (DOE) approved methodology for preparing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, as well as environmental restoration activities that involve work not done within a permanent structure. Methodologies provided in this Standard are intended to be compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements. Volume Two contains the appendices that provide additional environment, safety and health (ES&H) information to complement Volume 1 of this Standard. Volume 2 of the Standard is much broader in scope than Volume 1 and satisfies several purposes. Integrated safety management expectations are provided in accordance with facility disposition requirements contained in DOE O 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management.

  3. DOE standard: Integration of environment, safety, and health into facility disposition activities. Volume 2: Appendices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This volume contains the appendices that provide additional environment, safety, and health (ES and H) information to complement Volume 1 of this Standard. Appendix A provides a set of candidate DOE ES and H directives and external regulations, organized by hazard types that may be used to identify potentially applicable directives to a specific facility disposition activity. Appendix B offers examples and lessons learned that illustrate implementation of ES and H approaches discussed in Section 3 of Volume 1. Appendix C contains ISMS performance expectations to guide a project team in developing and implementing an effective ISMS and in developing specific performance criteria for use in facility disposition. Appendix D provides guidance for identifying potential Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs) when decommissioning facilities fall under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability Act (CERCLA) process. Appendix E discusses ES and H considerations for dispositioning facilities by privatization. Appendix F is an overview of the WSS process. Appendix G provides a copy of two DOE Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Standards memoranda that form the bases for some of the guidance discussed within the Standard. Appendix H gives information on available hazard analysis techniques and references. Appendix I provides a supplemental discussion to Sections 3.3.4, Hazard Baseline Documentation, and 3.3.6, Environmental Permits. Appendix J presents a sample readiness evaluation checklist.

  4. DOE standard: Integration of environment, safety, and health into facility disposition activities. Volume 1: Technical standard

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This Department of Energy (DOE) technical standard (referred to as the Standard) provides guidance for integrating and enhancing worker, public, and environmental protection during facility disposition activities. It provides environment, safety, and health (ES and H) guidance to supplement the project management requirements and associated guidelines contained within DOE O 430.1A, Life-Cycle Asset Management (LCAM), and amplified within the corresponding implementation guides. In addition, the Standard is designed to support an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS), consistent with the guiding principles and core functions contained in DOE P 450.4, Safety Management System Policy, and discussed in DOE G 450.4-1, Integrated Safety Management System Guide. The ISMS guiding principles represent the fundamental policies that guide the safe accomplishment of work and include: (1) line management responsibility for safety; (2) clear roles and responsibilities; (3) competence commensurate with responsibilities; (4) balanced priorities; (5) identification of safety standards and requirements; (6) hazard controls tailored to work being performed; and (7) operations authorization. This Standard specifically addresses the implementation of the above ISMS principles four through seven, as applied to facility disposition activities.

  5. Cost-effective facility disposition planning with safety and health lessons learned and good practices from the Oak Ridge Decontamination and Decommissioning Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An emphasis on transition and safe disposition of DOE excess facilities has brought about significant challenges to managing worker, public, and environmental risks. The transition and disposition activities involve a diverse range of hazardous facilities that are old, poorly maintained, and contain radioactive and hazardous substances, the extent of which may be unknown. In addition, many excess facilities do not have historical facility documents such as operating records, plant and instrumentation diagrams, and incident records. The purpose of this report is to present an overview of the Oak Ridge Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) Program, its safety performance, and associated safety and health lessons learned and good practices. Illustrative examples of these lessons learned and good practices are also provided. The primary focus of this report is on the safety and health activities and implications associated with the planning phase of Oak Ridge facility disposition projects. Section 1.0 of this report provides the background and purpose of the report. Section 2.0 presents an overview of the facility disposition activities from which the lessons learned and good practices discussed in Section 3.0 were derived.

  6. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1996-10-24T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  7. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-11-16T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  8. Facility Disposition Projects

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

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  9. Integrated Facilities Disposition Program

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

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  10. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-11-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this Order is to establish facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. The Order has Change 1 dated 11-16-95, Change 2 dated 10-24-96, and the latest Change 3 dated 11-22-00 incorporated. The latest change satisfies a commitment made to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in response to DNFSB recommendation 97-2, Criticality Safety.

  11. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22T23:59:59.000Z

    This Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for Department of Energy facilities, which includes nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards mitigation, and the System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1A. DOE O 420.1B Chg 1 issued 4-19-10.

  12. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22T23:59:59.000Z

    The order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and the System Engineer Program.Chg 1 incorporates the use of DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, mandatory for Hazard Category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities. Cancels DOE O 420.1A.

  13. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-10-13T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. Cancels DOE 5480.7A, DOE 5480.24, DOE 5480.28 and Division 13 of DOE 6430.1A. Canceled by DOE O 420.1A.

  14. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1B, DOE G 420.1-2 and DOE G 420.1-3.

  15. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2002-05-20T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish facility safety requirements for the Department of Energy, including National Nuclear Security Administration. Cancels DOE O 420.1. Canceled by DOE O 420.1B.

  16. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-06-21T23:59:59.000Z

    DOE-STD-1104 contains the Department's method and criteria for reviewing and approving nuclear facility's documented safety analysis (DSA). This review and approval formally document the basis for DOE, concluding that a facility can be operated safely in a manner that adequately protects workers, the public, and the environment. Therefore, it is appropriate to formally require implementation of the review methodology and criteria contained in DOE-STD-1104.

  17. Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility Documented Safety Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DODD, E.N.

    2003-10-08T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides the documented safety analysis (DSA) and Central Plateau Remediation Project (CP) requirements that apply to surveillance and maintenance (S&M) activities at the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) facility. This DSA was developed in accordance with DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities''. Upon approval and implementation of this document, the current safety basis documents will be retired.

  18. Documented safety analysis for 209-E Facility critical mass laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DODD, E.

    2003-04-23T23:59:59.000Z

    This documented safety analysis (DSA) addresses the 209-E facility and associated requirements that apply to 200 Area Facility Deactivation (AFD) activities. The DSA was developed in accordance with DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities''.

  19. CRAD, Facility Safety- Nuclear Facility Safety Basis

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Nuclear Facility Safety Basis.

  20. Preliminary siting characterization Salt Disposition Facility - Site B

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wyatt, D.

    2000-01-04T23:59:59.000Z

    A siting and reconnaissance geotechnical program has been completed in S-Area at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. This program investigated the subsurface conditions for the area known as ``Salt Disposition Facility (SDF), Site B'' located northeast of H-Area and within the S-Area. Data acquired from the Site B investigation includes both field exploration and laboratory test data.

  1. Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs establishes nuclear safety requirements related to safety management programs that are essential to the safety of DOE nuclear facilities.

  2. Site selection for the Salt Disposition Facility at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowers, J.A.

    2000-01-03T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this report is to identify, assess, and rank potential sites for the proposed Salt Disposition Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site.

  3. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wike, L.D.

    2000-12-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this study is to identify, assess, and rank potential sites for the proposed Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities complex at the Savannah River Site.

  4. Implementation Guide for Surveillance and Maintenance during Facility Transition and Disposition

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1999-09-29T23:59:59.000Z

    As DOE facilities complete mission operations and are declared excess, they pass into a transition phase that ultimately prepares them for disposition. The disposition phase of a facility's life cycle usually includes deactivation, decommissioning, and surveillance and maintenance (S&M) activities.

  5. Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Change, Safety, The order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety,...

  6. Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-07-23T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish accelerator-specific safety requirements which, when supplemented by other applicable safety and health requirements, will serve to prevent injuries and illnesses associated with Department of Energy (DOE) or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) accelerator operations. Cancels DOE O 420.2A. Certified 5-13-08. Canceled by DOE O 420.2C.

  7. Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The order defines accelerators and establishes accelerator specific safety requirements and approval authorities which, when supplemented by other applicable safety and health requirements, promote safe operations to ensure protection of workers, the public, and the environment. Cancels DOE O 420.2B.

  8. Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-01-08T23:59:59.000Z

    To establish accelerator-specific safety requirements which, when supplemented by other applicable safety and health requirements, will serve to prevent injuries and illnesses associated with Department of Energy (DOE) or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) accelerator operations. Cancels DOE O 420.2. Canceled by DOE O 420.2B.

  9. CRAD, Facility Safety- Technical Safety Requirements

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Technical Safety Requirments (TSA).

  10. Supplement Analysis for the Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    N /A

    2005-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

    In October 2002, DOE issued the Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement (Final EIS) (DOE 2002) that provided an analysis of the potential environmental consequences of alternatives/options for the management and disposition of Sodium Bearing Waste (SBW), High-Level Waste (HL W) calcine, and HLW facilities at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), now known as the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and referred to hereafter as the Idaho Site. Subsequent to the issuance of the Final EIS, DOE included the requirement for treatment of SBW in the Request for Proposals for Environmental Management activities on the Idaho Site. The new Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) Contractor identified Steam Reforming as their proposed method to treat SBW; a method analyzed in the Final EIS as an option to treat SBW. The proposed Steam Reforming process for SBW is the same as in the Final EIS for retrieval, treatment process, waste form and transportation for disposal. In addition, DOE has updated the characterization data for both the HLW Calcine (BBWI 2005a) and SBW (BBWI 2004 and BBWI 2005b) and identified two areas where new calculation methods are being used to determine health and safety impacts. Because of those changes, DOE has prepared this supplement analysis to determine whether there are ''substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns'' or ''significant new circumstances or information'' within the meaning of the Council of Environmental Quality and DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Regulations (40 CFR 1502.9 (c) and 10 CFR 1021.314) that would require preparation of a Supplemental EIS. Specifically, this analysis is intended to determine if: (1) the Steam Reforming Option identified in the Final EIS adequately bounds impacts from the Steam Reforming Process proposed by the new ICP Contractor using the new characterization data, (2) the new characterization data is significantly different than the data presented in the Final EIS, (3) the new calculation methods present a significant change to the impacts described in the Final EIS, and (4) would the updated characterization data cause significant changes in the environmental impacts for the action alternatives/options presented in the Final EIS. There are no other aspects of the Final EIS that require additional review because DOE has not identified any additional new significant circumstances or information that would warrant such a review.

  11. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This Standard identifies safety requirements for magnetic fusion facilities. Safety functions are used to define outcomes that must be achieved to ensure that exposures to radiation, hazardous materials, or other hazards are maintained within acceptable limits. Requirements applicable to magnetic fusion facilities have been derived from Federal law, policy, and other documents. In addition to specific safety requirements, broad direction is given in the form of safety principles that are to be implemented and within which safety can be achieved.

  12. Disposition of PUREX facility tanks D5 and E6 uranium and plutonium solutions. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Harty, D.P.

    1993-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Approximately 9 kilograms of plutonium and 5 metric tons of uranium in a 1 molar nitric acid solution are being stored in two PUREX facility vessels, tanks D5 and E6. The plutonium was accumulated during cleanup activities of the plutonium product area of the PUREX facility. Personnel at PUREX recently completed a formal presentation to the Surplus Materials Peer Panel (SMPP) regarding disposition of the material currently in these tanks. The peer panel is a group of complex-wide experts who have been chartered by EM-64 (Office of Site and Facility Transfer) to provide a third party independent review of disposition decisions. The information presented to the peer panel is provided in the first section of this report. The panel was generally receptive to the information provided at that time and the recommendations which were identified.

  13. Facility Safety Plan CMS Complexes CMS410

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cooper, G

    2007-06-14T23:59:59.000Z

    Laboratory management requires that the controls specified in this Facility Safety Plan (FSP) be applied to efficiently and safely perform operations within these facilities. Any operation conducted in these facilities that involves activities not commonly performed by the public, requires an Integrated Work Sheet to determine the appropriate level of safety documentation.

  14. Superfund Policy Statements and Guidance Regarding Disposition of Radioactive Waste in Non-NRC Licensed Disposal Facilities - 13407

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Walker, Stuart [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (United States)] [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This talk will discuss EPA congressional testimony and follow-up letters, as well as letters to other stakeholders on EPA's perspectives on the disposition of radioactive waste outside of the NRC licensed disposal facility system. This will also look at Superfund's historical practices, and emerging trends in the NRC and agreement states on waste disposition. (author)

  15. Nano Research Facility Lab Safety Manual Nano Research Facility

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Subramanian, Venkat

    1 Nano Research Facility Lab Safety Manual Nano Research Facility: Weining Wang Office: Brauer---chemical, biological, or radiological. Notify the lab manager, Dr. Yujie Xiong at 5-4530. Eye Contact: Promptly flush

  16. Facility Safety (9-23-10)--Withdrawn

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-09-23T23:59:59.000Z

    Withdrawn, 5-19-2014--This approval includes revision of the three implementing Guides: DOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide for Use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety; DOE G 420.1-2, Guide for the Mitigation of Natural Phenomena Hazards for DOE Nuclear Facilities and NonNuclear Facilities; and DOE G 420.1-3, Implementation Guide for DOE Fire Protection and Emergency Services Programs for Use with DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety

  17. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wike, L.D.

    2000-08-17T23:59:59.000Z

    A site selection study was conducted to evaluate locations for the proposed Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities. Facilities to be located include the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), and the Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) facility. Objectives of the study include: (1) Confirm that the Department of Energy (DOE) selected locations for the MOX and PDCF were suitable based on selected siting criteria, (2) Recommend a site in the vicinity of F Area that is suitable for the PIP, and (3) Identify alternative suitable sites for one or more of these facilities in the event that further geotechnical characterization or other considerations result in disqualification of a currently proposed site.

  18. Implementation of safeguards and security for fissile materials disposition reactor alternative facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1995-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered and include facilities which provide for long-ten-n and interim storage, convert and stabilize fissile materials for other disposition alternatives, immobilize fissile material in glass and/or ceramic material, fabricate fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and dispose of fissile material using a number of geologic alternatives. Particular attention will be given to the reactor alternatives which include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary LWRs and CANDU reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include processing which converts Pu to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility located in either the US or in Europe, US LWRs or the CANDU reactors and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository. This paper focuses on how the objectives of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction and nonproliferation will be accomplished and the possible impacts of meeting these objectives on facility operations and design. Some of the areas in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threat, and (4) potential proliferation risks, the impacts on the facilities, and safeguards and security issues unique to the presence of Category 1 or strategic special nuclear material.

  19. Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MITCHELL,GERRY W.; LONGLEY,SUSAN W.; PHILBIN,JEFFREY S.; MAHN,JEFFREY A.; BERRY,DONALD T.; SCHWERS,NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK,THOMAS E.; NAEGELI,ROBERT E.

    2000-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.

  20. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Update - Dale...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Update - Dale Govan, Departmental Representative to the DNFSB Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Update - Dale Govan,...

  1. Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars...

  2. SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT KOP DISPOSITION - THERMAL AND GAS ANALYSIS FOR THE COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    SWENSON JA; CROWE RD; APTHORPE R; PLYS MG

    2010-03-09T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this document is to present conceptual design phase thermal process calculations that support the process design and process safety basis for the cold vacuum drying of K Basin KOP material. This document is intended to demonstrate that the conceptual approach: (1) Represents a workable process design that is suitable for development in preliminary design; and (2) Will support formal safety documentation to be prepared during the definitive design phase to establish an acceptable safety basis. The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) is responsible for the disposition of Knock Out Pot (KOP) sludge within the 105-K West (KW) Basin. KOP sludge consists of size segregated material (primarily canister particulate) from the fuel and scrap cleaning process used in the Spent Nuclear Fuel process at K Basin. The KOP sludge will be pre-treated to remove fines and some of the constituents containing chemically bound water, after which it is referred to as KOP material. The KOP material will then be loaded into a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO), dried at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and stored in the Canister Storage Building (CSB). This process is patterned after the successful drying of 2100 metric tons of spent fuel, and uses the same facilities and much of the same equipment that was used for drying fuel and scrap. Table ES-l present similarities and differences between KOP material and fuel and between MCOs loaded with these materials. The potential content of bound water bearing constituents limits the mass ofKOP material in an MCO load to a fraction of that in an MCO containing fuel and scrap; however, the small particle size of the KOP material causes the surface area to be significantly higher. This relatively large reactive surface area represents an input to the KOP thermal calculations that is significantly different from the calculations for fuel MCOs. The conceptual design provides for a copper insert block that limits the volume available to receive KOP material, enhances heat conduction, and functions as a heat source and sink during drying operations. This use of the copper insert represents a significant change to the thermal model compared to that used for the fuel calculations. A number of cases were run representing a spectrum of normal and upset conditions for the drying process. Dozens of cases have been run on cold vacuum drying of fuel MCOs. Analysis of these previous calculations identified four cases that provide a solid basis for judgments on the behavior of MCO in drying operations. These four cases are: (1) Normal Process; (2) Degraded vacuum pumping; (3) Open MCO with loss of annulus water; and (4) Cool down after vacuum drying. The four cases were run for two sets of input parameters for KOP MCOs: (1) a set of parameters drawn from safety basis values from the technical data book and (2) a sensitivity set using parameters selected to evaluate the impact of lower void volume and smaller particle size on MCO behavior. Results of the calculations for the drying phase cases are shown in Table ES-2. Cases using data book safety basis values showed dry out in 9.7 hours and heat rejection sufficient to hold temperature rise to less than 25 C. Sensitivity cases which included unrealistically small particle sizes and corresponding high reactive surface area showed higher temperature increases that were limited by water consumption. In this document and in the attachment (Apthorpe, R. and M.G. Plys, 2010) cases using Technical Databook safety basis values are referred to as nominal cases. In future calculations such cases will be called safety basis cases. Also in these documents cases using parameters that are less favorable to acceptable performance than databook safety values are referred to as safety cases. In future calculations such cases will be called sensitivity cases or sensitivity evaluations Calculations to be performed in support of the detailed design and formal safety basis documentation will expand the calculations presented in this document to include: additional features of th

  3. Occupational Safety Review of High Technology Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lee Cadwallader

    2005-01-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators. These data are useful to form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known sets of safety rules and regulations. Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other industrial hazards. Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for comparison.

  4. Site Selection for the Salt Disposition Facility at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gladden, J.B.; Rueter, K.J.; Morin, J.P.

    2000-11-15T23:59:59.000Z

    A site selection study was conducted to identify a suitable location for the construction and operation of a new Salt Disposition Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The facility to be sited is a single processing facility and support buildings that could house either of three technology alternatives being developed by the High Level Waste Systems Engineering Team: Small Tank Tetraphenylborate Precipitation, Crystalline Silicotitanate Non-Elutable Ion Exchange or Caustic Side Solvent Extraction. A fourth alternative, Direct Disposal in grout, is not part of the site selection study because a location has been identified that is unique to this technology (i.e., Z-Area). Facility site selection at SRS is a formal, documented process that seeks to optimize siting of new facilities with respect to facility-specific engineering requirements, sensitive environmental resources, and applicable regulatory requirements. In this manner, the prime objectives of cost minimization, environmental protection, and regulatory compliance are achieved. The results from this geotechnical characterization indicated that continued consideration be given to Site B for the proposed SDF. Suitable topography, the lack of surface hydrology and floodplain issues, no significant groundwater contamination, the presence of minor soft zones along the northeast portion of footprint, and no apparent geological structure in the Gordon Aquitard support this recommendation.

  5. Facility Disposition Safety Strategy RM | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742Energy Chinaof EnergyImpactOnSTATEMENT OF DAVID GEISEREnergy1 of 3 PPG Score MaturityThe

  6. Idaho High-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition, Final Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    N /A

    2002-10-11T23:59:59.000Z

    This EIS analyzes the potential environmental consequences of alternatives for managing high-level waste (HLW) calcine, mixed transuranic waste/sodium bearing waste (SBW) and newly generated liquid waste at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) in liquid and solid forms. This EIS also analyzes alternatives for the final disposition of HLW management facilities at the INEEL after their missions are completed. After considering comments on the Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0287D), as well as information on available treatment technologies, DOE and the State of Idaho have identified separate preferred alternatives for waste treatment. DOE's preferred alternative for waste treatment is performance based with the focus on placing the wastes in forms suitable for disposal. Technologies available to meet the performance objectives may be chosen from the action alternatives analyzed in this EIS. The State of Idaho's Preferred Alternative for treating mixed transuranic waste/SBW and calcine is vitrification, with or without calcine separations. Under both the DOE and State of Idaho preferred alternatives, newly generated liquid waste would be segregated after 2005, stored or treated directly and disposed of as low-level, mixed low-level, or transuranic waste depending on its characteristics. The objective of each preferred alternative is to enable compliance with the legal requirement to have INEEL HLW road ready by a target date of 2035. Both DOE and the State of Idaho have identified the same preferred alternative for facilities disposition, which is to use performance-based closure methods for existing facilities and to design new facilities consistent with clean closure methods.

  7. Office of Nuclear Safety Basis and Facility Design

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Nuclear Safety Basis & Facility Design establishes safety basis and facility design requirements and expectations related to analysis and design of nuclear facilities to ensure protection of workers and the public from the hazards associated with nuclear operations.

  8. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Guidance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in DOE-STD-6002-96, Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities: Requirements. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While the requirements in DOE-STD-6002-96 are generally applicable to a wide range of fusion facilities, this Standard, DOE-STD-6003-96, is concerned mainly with the implementation of those requirements in large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This Standard is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment as opposed to regulation by other regulatory agencies. As the need for guidance involving other types of fusion facilities or other regulatory environments emerges, additional guidance volumes should be prepared. The concepts, processes, and recommendations set forth here are for guidance only. They will contribute to safety at magnetic fusion facilities.

  9. Facility Safety | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently20,000 Russian NuclearandJunetrackEllen|JulyR--FOIA SupportDOE's FY3FacilityFacilityIn

  10. Safety of Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Batandjieva, B.; Warnecke, E.; Coates, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

    2008-01-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Full text of publication follows: ensuring safety during all stages of facility life cycle is a widely recognised responsibility of the operators, implemented under the supervision of the regulatory body and other competent authorities. As the majority of the facilities worldwide are still in operation or shutdown, there is no substantial experience in decommissioning and evaluation of safety during decommissioning in majority of Member States. The need for cooperation and exchange of experience and good practices on ensuring and evaluating safety of decommissioning was one of the outcomes of the Berlin conference in 2002. On this basis during the last three years IAEA initiated a number of international projects that can assist countries, in particular small countries with limited resources. The main IAEA international projects addressing safety during decommissioning are: (i) DeSa Project on Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety during Decommissioning; (ii) R{sup 2}D{sup 2}P project on Research Reactors Decommissioning Demonstration Project; and (iii) Project on Evaluation and Decommissioning of Former Facilities that used Radioactive Material in Iraq. This paper focuses on the DeSa Project activities on (i) development of a harmonised methodology for safety assessment for decommissioning; (ii) development of a procedure for review of safety assessments; (iii) development of recommendations on application of the graded approach to the performance and review of safety assessments; and (iv) application of the methodology and procedure to the selected real facilities with different complexities and hazard potentials (a nuclear power plant, a research reactor and a nuclear laboratory). The paper also outlines the DeSa Project outcomes and planned follow-up activities. It also summarises the main objectives and activities of the Iraq Project and introduces the R{sup 2}D{sup 2} Project, which is a subject of a complementary paper.

  11. Enhancing the safety of tailings management facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meggyes, T.; Niederleithinger, E.; Witt, K.J.; Csovari, M.; Kreft-Burman, K.; Engels, J.; McDonald, C.; Roehl, K.E. [BAM, Berlin (Germany). Federal Institute for Material Research & Testing

    2008-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Unsafe tailings management facilities (TMFs) have caused serious accidents in Europe threatening human health/life and the environment. While advanced design, construction and management procedures are available, their implementation requires greater emphasis. An integrated research project funded by the European Union was carried out between 2002 and 2005 with the overall goal of improving the safety of TMFs (Sustainable Improvement in Safety of Tailings Facilities - TAILSAFE, http://www.tailsafe.com/). The objective of TAILSAFE was to develop and apply methods of parameter evaluation and measurement for the assessment and improvement of the safety state of tailings facilities, with particular attention to the stability of tailings dams and slurries, the special risks inherent when such materials include toxic or hazardous wastes, and authorization and management procedures for tailings facilities. Aspects of tailings facilities design, water management and slurry transport, non-destructive and minimally intrusive testing methods, monitoring and the application of sensors, intervention and remediation options were considered in TAILSAFE. A risk reduction framework (the TAILSAFE Parameter Framework) was established to contribute to the avoidance of catastrophic accidents and hazards from tailings facilities. Tailings from the mining and primary processing of metals, minerals and coal were included within the scope of TAILSAFE. The project focused on the avoidance of hazards by developing procedures and methods for investigating and improving the stability of tailings dams and tailings bodies.

  12. Mechanistic facility safety and source term analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    PLYS, M.G.

    1999-06-09T23:59:59.000Z

    A PC-based computer program was created for facility safety and source term analysis at Hanford The program has been successfully applied to mechanistic prediction of source terms from chemical reactions in underground storage tanks, hydrogen combustion in double contained receiver tanks, and proccss evaluation including the potential for runaway reactions in spent nuclear fuel processing. Model features include user-defined facility room, flow path geometry, and heat conductors, user-defined non-ideal vapor and aerosol species, pressure- and density-driven gas flows, aerosol transport and deposition, and structure to accommodate facility-specific source terms. Example applications are presented here.

  13. Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide for Use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-03-28T23:59:59.000Z

    This Guide provides guidance on the application of requirements for nonreactor nuclear facilities and explosives facilities of Department of Energy (DOE) O 420.1, Facility Safety, Section 4.1, Nuclear and Explosives Safety Design Criteria. No cancellation.

  14. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-04-07T23:59:59.000Z

    This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the CHF and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility. However, it is anticipated that design changes to the facility layout will have little or no impact on the criticality results and/or conclusions presented in this document. This calculation is subject to the ''Quality Assurance Requirements and Description'' (DOE 2004 [DIRS 171539]) because the CHF is included in the Q-List (BSC 2005 [DIRS 171190], p. A-3) as an item important to safety. This calculation is prepared in accordance with AP-3.12Q, ''Design Calculations and Analyses'' [DIRS 168413].

  15. NEW - DOE O 420.1 Chg 1, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. This Page Change is limited in scope to changes necessary to invoke DOE-STD-1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Document, and revised DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis as required methods. DOE O 420.1C Chg 1, dated 2-27-15, cancels DOE O 420.1C, dated 12-4-12.

  16. Compressed Gas Safety for Experimental Fusion Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lee C. Cadwallader

    2004-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Experimental fusion facilities present a variety of hazards to the operators and staff. There are unique or specialized hazards, including magnetic fields, cryogens, radio frequency emissions, and vacuum reservoirs. There are also more general industrial hazards, such as a wide variety of electrical power, pressurized air, and cooling water systems in use, there are crane and hoist loads, working at height, and handling compressed gas cylinders. This paper outlines the projectile hazard assoicated with compressed gas cylinders and mthods of treatment to provide for compressed gas safety. This information should be of interest to personnel at both magnetic and inertial fusion experiments.

  17. Compressed Gas Safety for Experimental Fusion Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cadwallader, L.C. [Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (United States)

    2005-05-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Experimental fusion facilities present a variety of hazards to the operators and staff. There are unique or specialized hazards, including magnetic fields, cryogens, radio frequency emissions, and vacuum reservoirs. There are also more general industrial hazards, such as a wide variety of electrical power, pressurized air and cooling water systems in use, there are crane and hoist loads, working at height, and handling compressed gas cylinders. This paper outlines the projectile hazard associated with compressed gas cylinders and methods of treatment to provide for compressed gas safety. This information should be of interest to personnel at both magnetic and inertial fusion experiments.

  18. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE O 420.2B, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document is an aid to understanding and meeting the requirements of DOE O 420.2B, Safety of Accelerator Facilities, dated 7/23/04. It does not impose requirements beyond those stated in that Order or any other DOE Order. No cancellation.

  19. Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide ...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Oak Ridge Operations Office Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide Fulfills ORO Safety Basis Competency 1, 2 (Part 1), or 7 (Part 1) November 2002 Nuclear...

  20. Safety Culture And Best Practices At Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rule, K. [Princeton Plasma Physics Lab., Princeton, NJ (United States); King, M. [General Atomics, San Diego, CA (United States); Takase, Y. [Univ. of Tokyo (Japan); Oshima, Y. [Univ. of Tokyo (Japan); Nishimura, K. [National Institute for Fusion Science, Toki (Japan); Sukegawa, A. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Naka (Japan)

    2014-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

  1. Safety Culture and Best Practices at Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rule, Keith [PPPL

    2014-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

  2. Safety analysis report for the Waste Storage Facility. Revision 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bengston, S.J.

    1994-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Storage Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Storage Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume.

  3. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Technical Safety Requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    1999-12-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included.

  4. THE NGA-DOE GRANT TO EXAMINE CRITICAL ISSUES RELATED TO RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND MATERIALS DISPOSITION INVOLVING DOE FACILITIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ann M. Beauchesne

    2000-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Through the National Governors Association (NGA) project ``Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials; Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities; Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect on individual sites in the complex; Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in the Department's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure plan and contractor integration analysis; Interstate waste and materials shipments; and Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the period from October 1, 1999 through January 31, 2000, under the NGA grant. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past three months can be categorized as follows: maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; convened and facilitated the October 6--8 NGA FFCA Task Force Meeting in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, external regulation of DOE; and continued to facilitate interactions between the states and DOE to develop a foundation for an ongoing substantive relationship between the Governors of key states and the Department.

  5. THE NGA-DOE GRANT TO EXAMINE CRITICAL ISSUES RELATED TO RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND MATERIALS DISPOSITION INVOLVING DOE FACILITIES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Through the National Governors' Association (NGA) project ''Critical Issues Related to Radioactive Waste and Materials Disposition Involving DOE Facilities'' NGA brings together Governors' policy advisors, state regulators, and DOE officials to examine critical issues related to the cleanup and operation of DOE nuclear weapons and research facilities. Topics explored through this project include: Decisions involving disposal of mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and disposition of nuclear materials. Decisions involving DOE budget requests and their effect on environmental cleanup and compliance at DOE facilities. Strategies to treat mixed, low-level, and transuranic (TRU) waste and their effect on individual sites in the complex. Changes to the FFCA site treatment plans as a result of proposals in DOE's Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure strategy and contractor integration analysis. Interstate waste and materials shipments. Reforms to existing RCRA and CERCLA regulations/guidance to address regulatory overlap and risks posed by DOE wastes. The overarching theme of this project is to help the Department improve coordination of its major program decisions with Governors' offices and state regulators and to ensure such decisions reflect input from these key state officials and stakeholders. This report summarizes activities conducted during the quarter from April 30, 1998 through June 30, 1998 under the NGA project. The work accomplished by the NGA project team during the past four months can be categorized as follows: maintained open communication with DOE on a variety of activities and issues within the DOE environmental management complex; and provided ongoing support to state-DOE interactions. maintained communication with NGA Federal Facilities Compliance Task Force members regarding DOE efforts to formulate a configuration for mixed low-level waste and low-level treatment and disposal, DOE's Environmental Management Budget, and DOE's proposed Intersite Discussions.

  6. Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Health, Safety and Security (HSS) observed the public hearing of the DNFSB review of the UPF project status for integrating safety into design. The meeting was broken into three...

  7. SAVANNAH RIVER SITE'S H-CANYON FACILITY: IMPACTS OF FOREIGN OBLIGATIONS ON SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Magoulas, V.

    2013-06-03T23:59:59.000Z

    The US has a non-proliferation policy to receive foreign and domestic research reactor returns of spent fuel materials of US origin. These spent fuel materials are returned to the Department of Energy (DOE) and placed in storage in the L-area spent fuel basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The foreign research reactor returns fall subject to the 123 agreements for peaceful cooperation. These ď123 agreementsĒ are named after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and govern the conditions of nuclear cooperation with foreign partners. The SRS management of these foreign obligations while planning material disposition paths can be a challenge.

  8. CRAD, New Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis and Technical...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Technical Safety Requirements - December 2, 2014 (EA CRAD 31-07, Rev. 0) More Documents & Publications CRAD, Nuclear Reactor Facility Operations - December 4, 2014 (EA CRAD 31-08...

  9. Preparation Of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-11-12T23:59:59.000Z

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD), DOE-STD-3009-2014, describes a method for preparing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) that is acceptable to DOE for nonreactor nuclear facilities.

  10. Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1996-12-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The manual defines the process DOE will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and its staff. Canceled by DOE M 140.1-1A. Does not cancel other directives.

  11. Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1999-01-26T23:59:59.000Z

    This Manual presents the process the Department of Energy will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) and its staff. Cancels DOE M 140.1-1.

  12. Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-03-30T23:59:59.000Z

    This Manual presents the process the Department of Energy will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) and its staff. Cancels DOE M 140.1-1A.

  13. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility.

  14. CUNY EXPORT CONTROL PROCEDURES 10. Facilities Management / Public Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rosen, Jay

    CUNY EXPORT CONTROL PROCEDURES 10. Facilities Management / Public Safety This Section addresses Export Control Administrator, with assistance from the College's Public Safety staff, will ensure adequate resources are in place to implement the TCP, when applicable. For assistance with export control

  15. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Volume 2, Guidance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in Vol. 1 of this Standard. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While Vol. 1 is generally applicable in that requirements there apply to a wide range of fusion facilities, this volume is concerned mainly with large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This volume is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment.

  16. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Idaho MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a February 2006 Commencement of Operations assessment of the Occupational Safety and Industrial Hygiene programs at the MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project.

  17. Technical safety requirements for the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF).

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Seylar, Roland F.

    2004-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    These Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) identify the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories, in compliance with 10 CFR 830, 'Nuclear Safety Management.' The bases for the TSRs are established in the AHCF Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), which was issued in compliance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements.' The AHCF Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) apply only to the ventilation system, the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and the inventory. Surveillance Requirements (SRs) apply to the ventilation system, HEPA filters, and associated monitoring equipment; to certain passive design features; and to the inventory. No Safety Limits are necessary, because the AHCF is a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility.

  18. Facilities Services and Environmental Health and Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    systems and implement and track hood decommissioning Trends in energy consumption of laboratory buildings and facility maintenance, mechanical support and operational budget management. The Energy Management Office energy conservation opportunities in campus laboratories. It provides continuous laboratory systems

  19. Legacy sample disposition project. Volume 2: Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gurley, R.N.; Shifty, K.L.

    1998-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the legacy sample disposition project at the Idaho Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), which assessed Site-wide facilities/areas to locate legacy samples and owner organizations and then characterized and dispositioned these samples. This project resulted from an Idaho Department of Environmental Quality inspection of selected areas of the INEEL in January 1996, which identified some samples at the Test Reactor Area and Idaho Chemical Processing Plant that had not been characterized and dispositioned according to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements. The objective of the project was to manage legacy samples in accordance with all applicable environmental and safety requirements. A systems engineering approach was used throughout the project, which included collecting the legacy sample information and developing a system for amending and retrieving the information. All legacy samples were dispositioned by the end of 1997. Closure of the legacy sample issue was achieved through these actions.

  20. Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Guide for use with DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04T23:59:59.000Z

    This Guide provides an acceptable approach for safety design of DOE hazard category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities for satisfying the requirements of DOE O 420.1C. Cancels DOE G 420.1-1.

  1. Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power AdministrationField8,Dist. Category UC-lFederalFY 2008Facility EngineeringFacility Ops

  2. Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC) Environmental Assessments (EA)Budget ¬Ľ FY 2014Facilities FusionFacility

  3. Fuel Storage Facility Final Safety Analysis Report. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Linderoth, C.E.

    1984-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Fuel Storage Facility (FSF) is an integral part of the Fast Flux Test Facility. Its purpose is to provide long-term storage (20-year design life) for spent fuel core elements used to provide the fast flux environment in FFTF, and for test fuel pins, components and subassemblies that have been irradiated in the fast flux environment. This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and its supporting documentation provides a complete description and safety evaluation of the site, the plant design, operations, and potential accidents.

  4. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Technical Safety Requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-08-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt of multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel. removal of free water from the MCOs using the cold vacuum drying process, and inerting and testing of the MCOs before transport to the Canister Storage Building. Controls required for public safety, significant defense in depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included.

  5. Expectations on Documented Safety Analysis for Deactivated Inactive Nuclear Facilities in a State of Long Term Surveillance & Maintenance or Decommissioning

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    JACKSON, M.W.

    2002-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    DOE promulgated 10 CFR 830 ''Nuclear Safety Management'' on October 10, 2000. Section 204 of the Rule requires that contractors at DOE hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities develop a ''Documented Safety Analysis'' (DSA) that summarizes the work to be performed, the associated hazards, and hazard controls necessary to protect workers, the public, and the environment. Table 2 of Appendix A to the rule has been provided to ensure that DSAs are prepared in accordance with one of the available predetermined ''safe harbor'' approaches. The table presents various acceptable safe harbor DSAs for different nuclear facility operations ranging from nuclear reactors to decommissioning activities. The safe harbor permitted for decommissioning of a nuclear facility encompasses methods described in DOE-STD-1 120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety and Health into Facility Disposition Activities,'' and provisions in 29 CFR 1910.120 or 29 CFR 1926.65 (HAZWOPER). Additionally, an evaluation of public safety impacts and development of necessary controls is required when the facility being decommissioned contains radiological inventory or contamination exceeding the Rule's definition for low-level residual fixed radioactivity. This document discusses a cost-effective DSA approach that is based on the concepts of DOE-STD-I 120 and meets the 10 CFR 830 safe harbor requirements for both transition surveillance and maintenance as well as decommissioning. This DSA approach provides continuity for inactive Hanford nuclear facilities that will eventually transition into decommissioning. It also uses a graded approach that meets the expectations of DOE-STD-3011 and addresses HAZWOPER requirements to provide a sound basis for worker protection, particularly where intrusive work is being conducted.

  6. Office of Emergency Management UCF Facilities and Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wu, Shin-Tson

    Office of Emergency Management UCF Facilities and Safety Page 1 of 3 Departments within equipment, vital records, and data. When UCF suspends normal operations, prepare to close office: ∑ Planning how to ensure the protection of files, vital records, and valuable equipment in advance

  7. CRAD, Safety Basis- Idaho MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a May 2007 readiness assessment of the Safety Basis at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project.

  8. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Larson, H L

    2007-09-07T23:59:59.000Z

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.6. This Introduction to the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES TSRs is not part of the TSR limits or conditions and contains no requirements related to WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES operations or to the safety analyses of the DSA.

  9. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laycak, D

    2008-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  10. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laycak, D T

    2010-03-05T23:59:59.000Z

    This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  11. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laycak, D T

    2008-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.6.

  12. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laycak, D T

    2010-03-05T23:59:59.000Z

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.4.

  13. TRANSPORTATION CASK RECEIPT/RETURN FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY EVALUATIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-04-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this design calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of transportation casks performed in the Transportation Cask Receipt and Return Facility (TCRRF) and Buffer Area meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirement described in the ''Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170217], Section 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of the following items: (1) Evaluate criticality effects for both dry and fully flooded conditions pertaining to TCRRF and Buffer Area operations for defense in depth. (2) Evaluate Category 1 and 2 event sequences for the TCRRF as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). This evaluation includes credible fuel reconfiguration conditions. In addition to the scope of work listed above, an evaluation was also performed of modeling assumptions for commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) regarding inclusion of plenum and end regions of the active fuel. This calculation is limited to CSNF and US Department of Energy (DOE) SNF. it should be mentioned that the latter waste form is evaluated more in depth in the ''Canister Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167614]). Further, the design and safety analyses of the naval SNF canisters are the responsibility of the US Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the TCRRF and Buffer Area and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility. However, it is anticipated that design changes to the facility layout will have little or no impact on the criticality results and/or conclusions presented in this document. This calculation is subject to the ''Quality Assurance Requirements and Description'' (DOE 2004 [DIRS 171539]) because the TCRRF is included in the Q-List (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168361], p. A-3) as an item important to safety. This calculation is prepared in accordance with AP-3.12Q, ''Design Calculations and Analyses'' [DIRS 168413].

  14. Process Guide for the Identification and Disposition of S/CI...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Process Guide for the Identification and Disposition of SCI or Defective Items at Department of Energy Facilities Process Guide for the Identification and Disposition of SCI or...

  15. 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) based pyroprocessing facility safety evaluation plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ku, J.H.; Choung, W.M.; You, G.S.; Moon, S.I.; Park, S.H.; Kim, H.D. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute - KAERI, 989-111 Daeduk-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, 305-353 (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The big advantage of pyroprocessing for the management of spent fuels against the conventional reprocessing technologies lies in its proliferation resistance since the pure plutonium cannot be separated from the spent fuel. The extracted materials can be directly used as metal fuel in a fast reactor, and pyroprocessing reduces drastically the volume and heat load of the spent fuel. KAERI has implemented the SBD (Safeguards-By-Design) concept in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The goal of SBD is to integrate international safeguards into the entire facility design process since the very beginning of the design phase. This paper presents a safety evaluation plan using a conceptual design of a reference pyroprocessing facility, in which 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety)-By-Design (3SBD) concept is integrated from early conceptual design phase. The purpose of this paper is to establish an advanced pyroprocessing hot cell facility design concept based on 3SBD for the successful realization of pyroprocessing technology with enhanced safety and proliferation resistance.

  16. DOE-STD-1120-2005; Integration of Environment Safety and Health into Facility Disposition Activities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny:Revised Finding of No Significant Impact610-9464-94 June2Master1-98 December20-2005

  17. DOE-STD-1120-2005; Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't Your Destiny:Revised Finding of No Significant Impact610-9464-94 June2Master1-98

  18. Fast Flux Test Facility final safety analysis report. Amendment 73

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gantt, D.A.

    1993-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report provides Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 73 for incorporation into the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTR) FSAR set. This page change incorporates Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) issued subsequent to Amendment 72 and approved for incorparoration before May 6, 1993. These changes include: Chapter 3, design criteria structures, equipment, and systems; chapter 5B, reactor coolant system; chapter 7, instrumentation and control systems; chapter 9, auxiliary systems; chapter 11, reactor refueling system; chapter 12, radiation protection and waste management; chapter 13, conduct of operations; chapter 17, technical specifications; chapter 20, FFTF criticality specifications; appendix C, local fuel failure events; and appendix Fl, operation at 680{degrees}F inlet temperature.

  19. Nuclear and Facility Safety Directives | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYouTube YouTube Note: Since the.pdfBreaking ofOilNEWResponse to Time-Based Rates fromNuclear Securityand Facility Safety

  20. Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-02-07T23:59:59.000Z

    This standard provides a framework for generating Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) supporting fissionable material operations at Department of Energy (DOE) nonreactor nuclear facilities. This standard imposes no new criticality safety analysis requirements.

  1. Mixed Waste Management Facility Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Chapters 1 to 20

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides information on waste management practices, occupational safety, and a site characterization of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A facility description, safety engineering analysis, mixed waste processing techniques, and auxiliary support systems are included.

  2. Mission Need Statement: Calcine Disposition Project Major Systems Acquisition Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. T. Beck

    2007-04-26T23:59:59.000Z

    This document identifies the need to establish the Calcine Disposition Project to determine and implement the final disposition of calcine including characterization, retrieval, treatment (if necessary), packaging, loading, onsite interim storage pending shipment to a repository or interim storage facility, and disposition of related facilities.

  3. Superconducting Magnet Safety Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) facilities present unique hazards not found in most

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Maroncelli, Mark

    Superconducting Magnet Safety Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) facilities present unique hazards not found in most laboratory environments. The NMR facilities maintain superconducting magnets which have the units. Facility design and installation: Design and installation of a new NMR facility requires a number

  4. The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility: Status-2004*

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    R. A. Anderl; G. R. Longhurst; R. J. Pawelko; J. P. Sharpe; S. T. Schuetz; D. A. Petti

    2004-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this paper is to present the current status of the development of the Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Designated a National User Facility by the US DOE, the primary mission of STAR is to provide laboratory infrastructure to study tritium science and technology issues associated with the development of safe and environmentally friendly fusion energy. Both tritium and non-tritium fusion safety research is pursued along three key thrust areas: (1) plasma-material interactions of plasma-facing component (PFC) materials exposed to energetic tritium and deuterium ions, (2) fusion safety concerns related to PFC material chemical reactivity and dust/debris generation, activation product mobilization, and tritium behavior in fusion systems, and (3) molten salts and fusion liquids for tritium breeder and coolant applications. STAR comprises a multi-room complex with operations segregated to permit both tritium and non-tritium activities in separately ventilated rooms. Tritium inventory in STAR is limited to 15,000 Ci to maintain its classification as a Radiological Facility. Experiments with tritium are typically conducted in glovebox environments. Key components of the tritium infrastructure have been installed and tested. This includes the following subsystems: (1) a tritium Storage and Assay System (SAS) that uses two 50-g depleted uranium beds for tritium storage and PVT/beta-scintillation analyses for tritium accountability measurements, (2) a Tritium Cleanup System (TCS) that uses catalytic oxidation and molecular sieve water absorption to remove tritiated species from glovebox atmosphere gases and gaseous effluents from experiment and process systems, and (3) tritium monitoring instrumentation for room air, glovebox atmosphere and stack effluent tritium concentration measurements. Integration of the tritium infrastructure subsystems with the experimental and laboratory process systems is planned for early in 2004. Following an operational readiness review, tritium operations will be initiated in the summer of 2004. Summary results of the performance testing of the tritium infrastructure subsystems and their integration into the laboratory operations will be presented at this conference. Current research activity includes plasma-material interaction studies with the Tritium Plasma Experiment (TPE) and tritium/chemistry interactions in the molten salt designated as Flibe (2∑LiF-BeF2). The implementation of these capabilities in STAR will be described.

  5. Nuclear space power safety and facility guidelines study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mehlman, W.F.

    1995-09-11T23:59:59.000Z

    This report addresses safety guidelines for space nuclear reactor power missions and was prepared by The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) under a Department of Energy grant, DE-FG01-94NE32180 dated 27 September 1994. This grant was based on a proposal submitted by the JHU/APL in response to an {open_quotes}Invitation for Proposals Designed to Support Federal Agencies and Commercial Interests in Meeting Special Power and Propulsion Needs for Future Space Missions{close_quotes}. The United States has not launched a nuclear reactor since SNAP 10A in April 1965 although many Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) have been launched. An RTG powered system is planned for launch as part of the Cassini mission to Saturn in 1997. Recently the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) sponsored the Nuclear Electric Propulsion Space Test Program (NEPSTP) which was to demonstrate and evaluate the Russian-built TOPAZ II nuclear reactor as a power source in space. As of late 1993 the flight portion of this program was canceled but work to investigate the attributes of the reactor were continued but at a reduced level. While the future of space nuclear power systems is uncertain there are potential space missions which would require space nuclear power systems. The differences between space nuclear power systems and RTG devices are sufficient that safety and facility requirements warrant a review in the context of the unique features of a space nuclear reactor power system.

  6. Development of an auditable safety analysis in support of a radiological facility classification

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kinney, M.D. [Roy F. Weston, Inc., Rockville, MD (United States); Young, B. [Dept. of Energy, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1995-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In recent years, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities commonly have been classified as reactor, non-reactor nuclear, or nuclear facilities. Safety analysis documentation was prepared for these facilities, with few exceptions, using the requirements in either DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System; or DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Traditionally, this has been accomplished by development of an extensive Safety Analysis Report (SAR), which identifies hazards, assesses risks of facility operation, describes and analyzes adequacy of measures taken to control hazards, and evaluates potential accidents and their associated risks. This process is complicated by analysis of secondary hazards and adequacy of backup (redundant) systems. The traditional SAR process is advantageous for DOE facilities with appreciable hazards or operational risks. SAR preparation for a low-risk facility or process can be cost-prohibitive and quite challenging because conventional safety analysis protocols may not readily be applied to a low-risk facility. The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management recognized this potential disadvantage and issued an EM limited technical standard, No. 5502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation. This standard can be used for developing documentation for a facility classified as radiological, including preparation of an auditable (defensible) safety analysis. In support of the radiological facility classification process, the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project has developed an auditable safety analysis document based upon the postulation criteria and hazards analysis techniques defined in DOE Order 5480.23.

  7. Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report: Appendices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE`s nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation.

  8. Guidelines for preparing criticality safety evaluations at Department of Energy non-reactor nuclear facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document contains guidelines that should be followed when preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations that will be used to demonstrate the safety of operations performed at DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities. Adherence to these guidelines will provide consistency and uniformity in criticality safety evaluations (CSEs) across the complex and will document compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.24.

  9. Style, content and format guide for writing safety analysis documents. Volume 1, Safety analysis reports for DOE nuclear facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of Volume 1 of this 4-volume style guide is to furnish guidelines on writing and publishing Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) for DOE nuclear facilities at Sandia National Laboratories. The scope of Volume 1 encompasses not only the general guidelines for writing and publishing, but also the prescribed topics/appendices contents along with examples from typical SARs for DOE nuclear facilities.

  10. DOE's Approach to Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis and Management

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presenter: Dr. James O'Brien, Director, Office of Nuclear Safety, Office of Health, Safety and Security, US Department of Energy

  11. On-Line Educational Means on Radiological Protection and Accelerator General Safety Policy in Radiotherapy and Industrial Sterilization Facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Spyropoulos, B

    1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    On-Line Educational Means on Radiological Protection and Accelerator General Safety Policy in Radiotherapy and Industrial Sterilization Facilities

  12. Records Disposition

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1988-09-13T23:59:59.000Z

    To assign responsibilities and authorities and to prescribe policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines for the orderly disposition of records of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its management and operating contractors. Cancels DOE O 1324.2 dated 5-28-80. Chg 1 dated 4-9-92. Canceled by DOE O 1324.2B dated 1-12-95.

  13. FACILITY SAFETY PLAN Department of Chemical and Biological Engineering

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Glover Building SAFETY OFFICE: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE ROOM 100 GLOVER PHONE 491-5252 Emergency Numbers

  14. EA-1410: Proposed Disposition of the Omega West Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EA evaluates the environmental impacts for the proposal to remove the Omega West Facility and the remaining support structures from Los Alamos Canyon at the U.S. Department of Energy Los...

  15. Observation challenges in a glovebox environment : behavior based safety at a plutonium facility.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Montalvo, M. L. (Maryrose L.)

    2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is one of the Nation's leading scientific and defense laboratories, owned by the Department of Energy and managed by the University of California. LANL is one of the original weapons complex labs dating back to the days of the Manhattan Project during World War II. Since then, radioactive materials research has continued at LANLs Plutonium Facility, and remains a primary responsibility of the Laboratory. The Nuclear Materials Technology Division (NMT) is a multidisciplinary organization responsible for daily operations of the Plutonium Facility and the Chemistry Research Metallurgy Facility. NMT Division is responsible for the saence, engineering and technology of plutonium and other actinides in support of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear materials disposition, and nuclear energy programs. A wide amy of activities are performed within NMT Division, such as analytical chemistry, metallurgical operations, actinide processes, waste operations, radioactive materials research and related administrative tasks.

  16. Records Disposition

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1980-05-28T23:59:59.000Z

    To assign responsibilities and authorities and to prescribe policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines for the orderly disposition of records of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its operating and onsite service contractors. Cancels DOE O 1324.1 dated 7-10-78. Chg 1 dated 7-2-81. Chg 2 dated 11-9-82. Canceled by DOE O 1324.2A dated 9-13-88.

  17. Facility Siting and Layout Optimization Based on Process Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Jung, Seungho

    2012-02-14T23:59:59.000Z

    In this work, a new approach to optimize facility layout for toxic release, fire and explosion scenarios is presented. By integrating a risk analysis in the optimization formulation, safer assignments for facility layout ...

  18. 340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. J. Rodovsky

    2010-10-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3.

  19. Overview of the preliminary safety analysis of the National Ignition Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brereton, S.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)] [and others] [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); and others

    1997-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed U.S. Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 individual laser beams onto a tiny deuterium-tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF has been classified as a low hazard, radiological facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis report be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been approved, which documents and evaluates the safety issues associated with the construction, operation, and decommissioning of the NIF. 10 refs., 6 figs., 4 tabs.

  20. ESTIMATING IMPURITIES IN SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Moore, E.

    2013-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States holds at least 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Many of the items that require disposition are only partially characterized, and SRNL uses a variety of techniques to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that are important for processing through the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and alternative disposition paths. Recent advances in laboratory tools, including Prompt Gamma Analysis and Peroxide Fusion treatment, provide data on the existing inventories that will enable disposition without additional, costly sampling and destructive analysis.

  1. Waste sampling and characterization facility complex safety analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meloy, R.T., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-06-04T23:59:59.000Z

    The Waste Sampling and Characterization Facility is a `Non-Nuclear, Radiological Facility. This document demonstrates, by analysis, that WSCF can meet the chemical and radiological inventory limits for a radiological facility. It establishes control that ensures those inventories are maintained below threshold values to preserve the `Non- Nuclear, Radiological` classification.

  2. Secure Pesticide Storage: Security and Safety-promoting Features of Pesticide Storage Facilities1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Watson, Craig A.

    PI32 Secure Pesticide Storage: Security and Safety-promoting Features of Pesticide Storage pesticide storage facility security and safety. Introduction In actual practice, the fundamental goal of "security" is always the same: effective safeguard. Therefore, certain features of a pesticide storage

  3. Safety and environmental process for the design and construction of the National Ignition Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brereton, S.J., LLNL

    1998-05-27T23:59:59.000Z

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) laser fusion experimental facility currently under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). This paper describes the safety and environmental processes followed by NIF during the design and construction activities.

  4. CRAD, Criticality Safety- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Criticality Safety program at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Facility.

  5. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Occupational and Industrial Safety and Hygiene Program portion of an Operational Readiness Review at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility.

  6. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of Industrial Safety and Industrial Health programs at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

  7. CRAD, Criticality Safety- Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Criticality Safety program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, TA 55 SST Facility.

  8. CRAD, Safety Basis- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Safety Basis at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

  9. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility, Appendix A

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-06-26T23:59:59.000Z

    Topics covered in this appendix include: General Rules-Code of Safe Practices; 2. Personal Protective Equipment; Hazardous Material Control; Traffic Control; Fire Prevention; Sanitation and First Aid; Confined Space Safety Requirements; Ladders and Stairways; Scaffolding and Lift Safety; Machinery, Vehicles, and Heavy Equipment; Welding and Cutting-General; Arc Welding; Oxygen/Acetylene Welding and Cutting; Excavation, Trenching, and Shoring; Fall Protection; Steel Erection; Working With Asbestos; Radiation Safety; Hand Tools; Electrical Safety; Nonelectrical Work Performed Near Exposed High-Voltage Power-Distribution Equipment; Lockout/Tagout Requirements; Rigging; A-Cranes; Housekeeping; Material Handling and Storage; Lead; Concrete and Masonry Construction.

  10. Interim safety basis for fuel supply shutdown facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brehm, J.R.; Deobald, T.L.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-05-23T23:59:59.000Z

    This ISB in conjunction with the new TSRs, will provide the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the Facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements. It is concluded that the risk associated with the current operational mode of the Facility, uranium closure, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within Risk Acceptance Guidelines. The Facility is classified as a Moderate Hazard Facility because of the potential for an unmitigated fire associated with the uranium storage buildings.

  11. Safety Software Guide Perspectives for the Design of New Nuclear Facilities (U)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    VINCENT, Andrew

    2005-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

    In June of this year, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued directives DOE O 414.1C and DOE G 414.1-4 to improve quality assurance programs, processes, and procedures among its safety contractors. Specifically, guidance entitled, ''Safety Software Guide for use with 10 CFR 830 Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements, and DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance, DOE G 414.1-4'', provides information and acceptable methods to comply with safety software quality assurance (SQA) requirements. The guidance provides a roadmap for meeting DOE O 414.1C, ''Quality Assurance'', and the quality assurance program (QAP) requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart A, Quality Assurance, for DOE nuclear facilities and software application activities. [1, 2] The order and guide are part of a comprehensive implementation plan that addresses issues and concerns documented in Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2002-1. [3] Safety SQA requirements for DOE as well as National Nuclear Security Administration contractors are necessary to implement effective quality assurance (QA) processes and achieve safe nuclear facility operations. DOE G 414.1-4 was developed to provide guidance on establishing and implementing effective QA processes tied specifically to nuclear facility safety software applications. The Guide includes software application practices covered by appropriate national and international consensus standards and various processes currently in use at DOE facilities. While the safety software guidance is considered to be of sufficient rigor and depth to ensure acceptable reliability of safety software at all DOE nuclear facilities, new nuclear facilities are well suited to take advantage of the guide to ensure compliant programs and processes are implemented. Attributes such as the facility life-cycle stage and the hazardous nature of each facility operations are considered, along with the category and level of importance of the software. The discussion provided herein illustrates benefits of applying the Safety Software Guide to work activities dependent on software applications and directed toward the design of new nuclear facilities. In particular, the Guide-based systematic approach with software enables design processes to effectively proceed and reduce the likelihood of rework activities. Several application examples are provided for the new facility.

  12. An overview of FFTF (Fast Flux Test Facility) contributions to Liquid Metal Reactor Safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Waltar, A.E.; Padilla, A. Jr.

    1990-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Fast Flux Test Facility has provided a very useful framework for testing the advances in Liquid Metal Reactor Safety Technology. During the licensing phase, the switch from a nonmechanistic bounding technique to the mechanistic approach was developed and implemented. During the operational phase, the consideration of new tests and core configurations led to use of the anticipated-transients-without-scram approach for beyond design basis events and the move towards passive safety. The future role of the Fast Flux Test Facility may involve additional passive safety and waste transmutation tests. 26 refs.

  13. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility, Appendix B

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-06-26T23:59:59.000Z

    This Appendix contains material from the LLNL Health and Safety Manual as listed below. For sections not included in this list, please refer to the Manual itself. The areas covered are: asbestos, lead, fire prevention, lockout, and tag program confined space traffic safety.

  14. Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-12-19T23:59:59.000Z

    This Standard describes a framework and the criteria to be used for approval of (1) safety basis documents, as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulation (C.F.R.) 830, Nuclear Safety Management, and (2) safety design basis documents, as required by Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD)-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process.

  15. Reactor Accident Analysis Methodology for the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility Documented Safety Analysis Upgrade

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sharp, G.L.; McCracken, R.T.

    2003-05-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The regulatory requirement to develop an upgraded safety basis for a DOE Nuclear Facility was realized in January 2001 by issuance of a revision to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 830 (10 CFR 830). Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, ''Safety Basis Requirements,'' requires a contractor responsible for a DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility to either submit by April 9, 2001 the existing safety basis which already meets the requirements of Subpart B, or to submit by April 10, 2003 an upgraded facility safety basis that meets the revised requirements. 10 CFR 830 identifies Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 1.70, ''Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants'' as a safe harbor methodology for preparation of a DOE reactor documented safety analysis (DSA). The regulation also allows for use of a graded approach. This report presents the methodology that was developed for preparing the reactor accident analysis portion of the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility (ATRC) upgraded DSA. The methodology was approved by DOE for developing the ATRC safety basis as an appropriate application of a graded approach to the requirements of 10 CFR 830.

  16. Reactor Accident Analysis Methodology for the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility Documented Safety Analysis Upgrade

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gregg L. Sharp; R. T. McCracken

    2003-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The regulatory requirement to develop an upgraded safety basis for a DOE nuclear facility was realized in January 2001 by issuance of a revision to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 830 (10 CFR 830).1 Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, ďSafety Basis Requirements,Ē requires a contractor responsible for a DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility to either submit by April 9, 2001 the existing safety basis which already meets the requirements of Subpart B, or to submit by April 10, 2003 an upgraded facility safety basis that meets the revised requirements.1 10 CFR 830 identifies Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 1.70, ďStandard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power PlantsĒ2 as a safe harbor methodology for preparation of a DOE reactor documented safety analysis (DSA). The regulation also allows for use of a graded approach. This report presents the methodology that was developed for preparing the reactor accident analysis portion of the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility (ATRC) upgraded DSA. The methodology was approved by DOE for developing the ATRC safety basis as an appropriate application of a graded approach to the requirements of 10 CFR 830.

  17. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE Order (0) 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

    The revision will address implementation of roles and responsibilities, improve operational efficiency using operating experience, and clarify the use of program requirements such as the Unreviewed Safety Issue and Accelerator Readiness Review.

  18. Facility Safety Policy, Guidance & Reports | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently20,000 Russian NuclearandJunetrackEllen|JulyR--FOIA SupportDOE's FY3FacilityFacility

  19. Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and the Resin Regeneration Facility Safety Analysis Report, Executive Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shedrow, C.B.

    1999-11-29T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safety Analysis Report documents the safety authorization basis for the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF) and the Resin Regeneration Facility (RRF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The present mission of the RBOF and RRF is to continue in providing a facility for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel assemblies from power and research reactors in the United States, fuel from SRS and other Department of Energy (DOE) reactors, and foreign research reactors fuel, in support of the nonproliferation policy. The RBOF and RRF provide the capability to handle, separate, and transfer wastes generated from nuclear fuel element storage. The DOE and Westinghouse Savannah River Company, the prime operating contractor, are committed to managing these activities in such a manner that the health and safety of the offsite general public, the site worker, the facility worker, and the environment are protected.

  20. Los Alamos National Laboratory corregated metal pipe saw facility preliminary safety analysis report. Volume I

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1990-09-19T23:59:59.000Z

    This Preliminary Safety Analysis Report addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and design operation of the processing systems in the Corrugated Metal Pipe Saw Facility with respect to normal and abnormal conditions. Potential hazards are identified, credible accidents relative to the operation of the facility and the process systems are analyzed, and the consequences of postulated accidents are presented. The risk associated with normal operations, abnormal operations, and natural phenomena are analyzed. The accident analysis presented shows that the impact of the facility will be acceptable for all foreseeable normal and abnormal conditions of operation. Specifically, under normal conditions the facility will have impacts within the limits posted by applicable DOE guidelines, and in accident conditions the facility will similarly meet or exceed the requirements of all applicable standards. 16 figs., 6 tabs.

  1. Facility Siting and Layout Optimization Based on Process Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Jung, Seungho

    2012-02-14T23:59:59.000Z

    -computational fluid dynamics (CFD) was used to compare the difference between the initial layout and the final layout in order to see how obstacles and separation distances affect the dispersion or overpressures of affected facilities. One of the CFD programs, ANSYS...

  2. Proliferation resistance criteria for fissile material disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Close, D.A.; Fearey, B.L.; Markin, J.T.; Rutherford, D.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Mangan, D.L.; Moya, R.W.; Moore, L.R. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Strait, R.S. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1995-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The 1994 National Academy of Sciences study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} defined options for reducing the national and international proliferation risks of materials declared excess to the nuclear weapons program. This report proposes criteria for assessing the proliferation resistance of these options. The criteria are general, encompassing all stages of the disposition process from storage through intermediate processing to final disposition including the facilities, processing technologies and materials, the level of safeguards for these materials, and the national/subnational threat to the materials.

  3. Examining factors affecting the safety performance and design of exclusive truck facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Iragavarapu, Vichika

    2008-10-10T23:59:59.000Z

    , Yunlong Zhang Tom Wehrly Head of Department, David V. Rosowsky December 2007 Major Subject: Civil Engineering iii ABSTRACT Examining Potential Factors Affecting the Safety Performance and Design of Exclusive Truck Facilities. (December... was conducted on crash data obtained from a selected freeway segment of the New Jersey turnpike for 2002. This facility functions as a dual-dual freeway system, with inner lanes dedicated to passenger cars only and the outer lanes open to mixed traffic...

  4. Examining factors affecting the safety performance and design of exclusive truck facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Iragavarapu, Vichika

    2009-05-15T23:59:59.000Z

    , Yunlong Zhang Tom Wehrly Head of Department, David V. Rosowsky December 2007 Major Subject: Civil Engineering iii ABSTRACT Examining Potential Factors Affecting the Safety Performance and Design of Exclusive Truck Facilities. (December... was conducted on crash data obtained from a selected freeway segment of the New Jersey turnpike for 2002. This facility functions as a dual-dual freeway system, with inner lanes dedicated to passenger cars only and the outer lanes open to mixed traffic...

  5. Introduction to the nuclear criticality safety evaluation of facility X-705, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sheaffer, M.K.; Keeton, S.C.

    1993-08-16T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is the first in a series of documents that will evaluate nuclear criticality safety in the Decontamination and Recovery Facility, X-705, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. It provides an overview of the facility, categorizes its functions for future analysis, reviews existing NCS documentation, and explains the follow-on effort planned for X-705. A detailed breakdown of systems, subsystems, and operational areas is presented and cross-referenced to existing NCS documentation.

  6. Spent nuclear fuel project cold vacuum drying facility safety equipment list

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    IRWIN, J.J.

    1999-02-24T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides the safety equipment list (SEL) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF). The SEL was prepared in accordance with the procedure for safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in HNF-PRO-516, ''Safety Structures, Systems, and Components,'' Revision 0 and HNF-PRO-097, Engineering Design and Evaluation, Revision 0. The SEL was developed in conjunction with HNF-SO-SNF-SAR-O02, Safety Analysis Report for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility, Phase 2, Supporting Installation of Processing Systems (Garvin 1998). The SEL identifies the SSCs and their safety functions, the design basis accidents for which they are required to perform, the design criteria, codes and standards, and quality assurance requirements that are required for establishing the safety design basis of the SSCs. This SEL has been developed for the CVDF Phase 2 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and shall be updated, expanded, and revised in accordance with future phases of the CVDF SAR until the CVDF final SAR is approved.

  7. Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility safety analysis report five year currency review

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Napper, P.R.; Carpenter, W.R.; Garner, R.W.

    1991-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    By DOE-ID Order 5481.1A, a five year currency review is required of the Safety Analysis Reports of all ID or ID contractor operations having hazards of a type and magnitude not routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. In keeping with this order, a currency review has been performed of the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility (ADTRC) Safety Analysis Report (SAR), Issue 003, 1990. The objectives of this currency review were to: evaluate the content, completeness, clarity of presentation and compliance with NRC Regulatory Guides and DOE Orders, etc., and evaluate the technical content of the SAR, particularly the Technical Specifications, and to evaluate the safety of continued operation of the ATRC. The reviewers concluded that although improvements may be needed in the overall content, clarity, and demonstration of compliance with current orders and regulations, the safety of the ATRC is in no way compromised and no unreviewed safety questions were identified. 6 figs., 3 tabs.

  8. Evaluation of natural phenomena hazards as part of safety assessments for nuclear facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kot, C.A.; Hsieh, B.J.; Srinivasan, M.G.; Shin, Y.W.

    1995-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The continued operation of existing US Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities and laboratories requires a safety reassessment based on current criteria and guidelines. This also includes evaluations for the effects of Natural Phenomena Hazards (NPH), for which these facilities may not have been designed. The NPH evaluations follow the requirements of DOE Order 5480.28, Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation (1993) which establishes NPH Performance Categories (PCs) for DOE facilities and associated target probabilistic performance goals. These goals are expressed as the mean annual probability of exceedance of acceptable behavior for structures, systems and components (SSCs) subjected to NPH effects. The assignment of an NPH Performance Category is based on the overall hazard categorization (low, moderate, high) of a facility and on the function of an SSC under evaluation (DOE-STD-1021, 1992). Detailed guidance for the NPH analysis and evaluation criteria are also provided (DOE-STD-1020, 1994). These analyses can be very resource intensive, and may not be necessary for the evaluation of all SSCs in existing facilities, in particular for low hazard category facilities. An approach relying heavily on screening inspections, engineering judgment and use of NPH experience data (S. J. Eder et al., 1993), can minimize the analytical effort, give reasonable estimates of the NPH susceptibilities, and yield adequate information for an overall safety evaluation of the facility. In the following sections this approach is described in more detail and is illustrated by an application to a nuclear laboratory complex.

  9. Preliminary Safety Design Report for Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Timothy Solack; Carol Mason

    2012-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A new onsite, remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled low-level waste disposal for remote-handled low-level waste from the Idaho National Laboratory and for nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled low-level waste in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This preliminary safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by discussing site characteristics that impact accident analysis, by providing the facility and process information necessary to support the hazard analysis, by identifying and evaluating potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled low-level waste, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  10. Annual Report To Congress. Department of Energy Activities Relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Calendar Year 2003

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    none,

    2004-02-28T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy (Department) submits an Annual Report to Congress each year detailing the Departmentís activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), which provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) regarding public health and safety issues at the Departmentís defense nuclear facilities. In 2003, the Department continued ongoing activities to resolve issues identified by the Board in formal recommendations and correspondence, staff issue reports pertaining to Department facilities, and public meetings and briefings. Additionally, the Department is implementing several key safety initiatives to address and prevent safety issues: safety culture and review of the Columbia accident investigation; risk reduction through stabilization of excess nuclear materials; the Facility Representative Program; independent oversight and performance assurance; the Federal Technical Capability Program (FTCP); executive safety initiatives; and quality assurance activities. The following summarizes the key activities addressed in this Annual Report.

  11. Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyd D. Christensen

    2010-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  12. Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyd D. Christensen

    2010-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  13. Management of radioactive material safety programs at medical facilities. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Camper, L.W.; Schlueter, J.; Woods, S. [and others

    1997-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A Task Force, comprising eight US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and two Agreement State program staff members, developed the guidance contained in this report. This report describes a systematic approach for effectively managing radiation safety programs at medical facilities. This is accomplished by defining and emphasizing the roles of an institution`s executive management, radiation safety committee, and radiation safety officer. Various aspects of program management are discussed and guidance is offered on selecting the radiation safety officer, determining adequate resources for the program, using such contractual services as consultants and service companies, conducting audits, and establishing the roles of authorized users and supervised individuals; NRC`s reporting and notification requirements are discussed, and a general description is given of how NRC`s licensing, inspection and enforcement programs work.

  14. EIS-0229: Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The EIS will evaluate the†reasonable alternatives and potential environmental impacts for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three types of facilities for plutonium disposition.

  15. ACCELERATION OF LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY TRANSURANIC WASTE DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O'LEARY, GERALD A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2007-01-04T23:59:59.000Z

    One of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) most significant risks is the site's inventory of transuranic waste retrievably stored above and below-ground in Technical Area (TA) 54 Area G, particularly the dispersible high-activity waste stored above-ground in deteriorating facilities. The high activity waste represents approximately 50% (by activity) of the total 292,000 PE-Ci inventory remaining to be disposed. The transuramic waste inventory includes contact-handled and remote-handled waste packaged in drums, boxes, and oversized containers which are retrievably stored both above and below-ground. Although currently managed as transuranic waste, some of the inventory is low-level waste that can be disposed onsite or at approved offsite facilities. Dispositioning the transuranic waste inventory requires retrieval of the containers from above and below-ground storage, examination and repackaging or remediation as necessary, characterization, certification and loading for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad New Mexico, all in accordance with well-defined requirements and controls. Although operations are established to process and characterize the lower-activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers, LAN L does not currently have the capability to repack high activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers (> 56 PE-Ci) or to process oversized containers with activity levels over 0.52 PE-Ci. Operational issues and compliance requirements have resulted in less than optimal processing capabilities for lower activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers, limiting preparation and reducing dependability of shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Since becoming the Los Alamos National Laboratory contract in June 2006, Los Alamos National Security (LANS) L.L.C. has developed a comprehensive, integrated plan to effectively and efficiently disposition the transuranic waste inventory, working in concert with the Department of Energy Los Alamos Site Office, Carlsbad Field Office and the Department of Energy Headquaeters. Rather than simply processing containers as retrieved, the plan places priority on efficient curie disposition, a direct correlation to reducing risk. Key elements of the approch include balancing inventory and operational risks, tailoring methods to meet requirements, optimizing existing facilities, equipment and staff, and incorporating best practices from other Department of Energy sites. With sufficient funding this will enable LANL to ship the above-ground high activity contact-handled transuranic waste offsite by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 and to disposition the remaining above- and below-ground contact-handled and remote-handled transuranic waste inventory by December 2010. Nearly 70% of the contact-handled transuranic waste containers, including the high activity waste, require processing and repackaging before characterization and certification for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. LANL is employing a balanced risk approach that accomplishes significant long-term risk reduction by accepting short-term increased facility operations risk under well-developed and justified interim controls. Reviews of facility conditions and additional analyses show that the Waste Characterization, Reduction and Repackaging Facility and the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility are the most appropriate facilities to safetly remediate, repackage, and ship lower activity and the remaining high activity drums. Updated safety documentation supporting limited Hazard Category 2 operations in these facilities has been developed. Once approved, limited-term operations to process the high activity drums can begin in early 2007, building upon the experience base established performing Hazard Category 3 operations processing lower activity waste in these facilities. LANL is also implementing a series of actions to improve and sustain operations for processing contact-handled transuranic waste inventory. Building 412 Decontamination and Volume Facility and Dom

  16. The Greening of a Plutonium Facility through Personnel Safety, Operational Efficiency, and Infrastructure Improvements - 12108

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dodge, Robert L.; Cournoyer, Michael E. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1163, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other hazardous materials account for most activities performed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Plutonium Facility (TA-55). Engineered barriers provide the most effective protection from hazardous materials. These safety features serve to protect workers and provide defense in depth against the hazards associated with operations. Although not designed to specifically meet environmental requirements the safety-based design does meet or exceed the requirements of the environmental regulations enacted during and since its construction. TA-55's Waste Services Group supports this safety methodology by ensuring safe, efficient and compliant management of all radioactive and hazardous wastes generated at the TA-55. A key function of this group is the implementation of measures that lower the overall risk of radiological and hazardous material operations. Processes and procedures that reduce waste generation compared to current, prevalent processes or procedures used for the same purpose are identified. Some of these 'Best Practices' include implementation of a chemical control system, elimination of aerosol cans, reduction in hazardous waste, implementation of zero liquid discharge, and the re-cyclization of nitric acid. P2/WMin opportunities have been implemented in the areas of personnel and facility attributes, environmental compliance, energy conservation, and green focused infrastructure expansion with the overall objective of minimizing raw material and energy consumption and waste generation. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety. (authors)

  17. Documented Safety Analysis Addendum for the Neutron Radiography Reactor Facility Core Conversion

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyd D. Christensen

    2009-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Neutron Radiography Reactor Facility (NRAD) is a Training, Research, Isotope Production, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor which was installed in the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Hot Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) in the mid 1970s. The facility provides researchers the capability to examine both irradiated and non-irradiated materials in support of reactor fuel and components programs through non-destructive neutron radiography examination. The facility has been used in the past as one facet of a suite of reactor fuels and component examination facilities available to researchers at the INL and throughout the DOE complex. The facility has also served various commercial research activities in addition to the DOE research and development support. The reactor was initially constructed using Fuel Lifetime Improvement Program (FLIP)- type highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel obtained from the dismantled Puerto Rico Nuclear Center (PRNC) reactor. In accordance with international non-proliferation agreements, the NRAD core will be converted to a low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and will continue to utilize the PRNC control rods, control rod drives, startup source, and instrument console as was previously used with the HEU core. The existing NRAD Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was created and maintained in the preferred format of the day, combining sections of both DOE-STD-3009 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.70. An addendum was developed to cover the refueling and reactor operation with the LEU core. This addendum follows the existing SAR format combining required formats from both the DOE and NRC. This paper discusses the project to successfully write a compliant and approved addendum to the existing safety basis documents.

  18. Acceleration of Los Alamos National Laboratory transuranic waste disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O'Leary, G.A.; Palmer, B.A.; Starke, T.P.; Phelps, A.K. [Los Alamos National Security, L.L.C., Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2007-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    One of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) most significant risks is the site's inventory of transuranic waste retrievably stored above and below-ground in Technical Area (TA) 54 Area G, particularly the dispersible high-activity waste stored above-ground in deteriorating facilities. The high activity waste represents approximately 50% (by activity) of the total 292,000 PE-Ci inventory remaining to be disposed. The transuranic waste inventory includes contact-handled and remote-handled waste packaged in drums, boxes, and oversized containers which are retrievably stored both above and below-ground. Although currently managed as transuranic waste, some of the inventory is low-level waste that can be disposed onsite or at approved offsite facilities. Dis-positioning the transuranic waste inventory requires retrieval of the containers from above and below- ground storage, examination and repackaging or remediation as necessary, characterization, certification and loading for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, all in accordance with well-defined requirements and controls. Although operations are established to process and characterize the lower-activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers, LANL does not currently have the capability to repack high activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers (> 56 PE-Ci) or to process oversized containers with activity levels over 0.52 PE-Ci. Operational issues and compliance requirements have resulted in less than optimal processing capabilities for lower activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers, limiting preparation and reducing dependability of shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Since becoming the Los Alamos National Laboratory contractor in June 2006, Los Alamos National Security (LANS) L.L.C. has developed a comprehensive, integrated plan to effectively and efficiently disposition the transuranic waste inventory, working in concert with the Department of Energy Los Alamos Site Office, Carlsbad Field Office and the Department of Energy Headquarters. Rather than simply processing containers as retrieved, the plan places priority on efficient curie disposition, a direct correlation to reducing risk. Key elements of the approach include balancing inventory and operational risks, tailoring methods to meet requirements, optimizing existing facilities, equipment and staff, and incorporating best practices from other Department of Energy sites. With sufficient funding this will enable LANL to ship the above-ground high activity contact-handled transuranic waste offsite by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 and to disposition the remaining above- and below-ground contact-handled and remote-handled transuranic waste inventory by December 2010. Nearly 70% of the contact-handled transuranic waste containers, including the high activity waste, require processing and repackaging before characterization and certification for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. LANL is employing a balanced risk approach that accomplishes significant long-term risk reduction by accepting short-term increased facility operations risk under well-developed and justified interim controls. Reviews of facility conditions and additional analyses show that the Waste Characterization, Reduction and Repackaging Facility and the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility are the most appropriate facilities to safely remediate, repackage, and ship lower activity and the remaining high activity drums. Updated safety documentation supporting limited Hazard Category 2 operations in these facilities has been developed. Once approved, limited-term operations to process the high activity drums can begin in early 2007, building upon the experience base established performing Hazard Category 3 operations processing lower activity waste in these facilities. LANL is also implementing a series of actions to improve and sustain operations for processing contact-handled transuranic waste inventory. Building 412 Decontamination and Volume Reduction Fa

  19. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-06-25T23:59:59.000Z

    Changes include invoking DOE-STD-3009 and DOE-STD-1104 as requirements documents. NOTE: The two standards are not final documents but can be found in Technical Standards RevCom at https://www.standards.doe.gov/login.jsp. Login as an SME using your email address.

  20. A HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR DISPOSITION OF LONG-LIVED RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eriksson, Leif G.; Dials, George E.; Parker, Frank L.

    2003-02-27T23:59:59.000Z

    During the past 45 years, one of the most challenging scientific, engineering, socio-economic, and political tasks and obligations of our time has been to site and develop technical, politically acceptable, solutions to the safe disposition of long-lived radioactive materials (LLRMs). However, at the end of the year 2002, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site in the United States of America (USA) hosts the world's only operating LLRM-disposal system, which (1) is based on the LLRM-disposal principles recommended by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 1957, i.e., deep geological disposal in a ''stable'' salt vault/repository, (2) complies with the nation's ''Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes'', and (3) may receive 175,584 cubic meters (m3) of transuranic radioactive waste (TRUW)a. Pending the scheduled opening of repositories for once-used nuclear fuel (OUNF) in the USA, Sweden, and Finland in the years 2010, 2015, and 2017, respectively, LLRM-disposal solutions remain the missing link in all national LLRM-disposition programs. Furthermore, for a variety of reasons, many nations with nuclear programs have chosen a ''spectator'' stance in terms of enhancing the global nuclear safety culture and the nuclear renaissance, and have either ''slow-tracked'' or deferred their LLRM-disposal programs to allow time for an informed national consensus to evolve based on LLRM-disposition experiences and solutions gained elsewhere. In the meantime, LLRMs will continue to amass in different types and levels of safeguarded storage facilities around the world. In an attempt to contribute to the enhancement of the global nuclear safety culture and the nuclear renaissance, the authors developed the sample holistic approach for synergistic disposition of LLRMs comprising LLRM-disposition components considered either ''proven'' or ''promising'' by the authors. The fundamental principles of the holistic approach are: (1) Risk minimization; (2) Minimization of the LLRM volume requiring deep geological disposal; and (3) LLRM-disposition flexibility. An integral element of these principles is to allow time for LLRM-disposition solutions to evolve/mature technically, financially, and politically. Furthermore, contingent upon the desired outcome(s), available financial, scientific, and technical resources, and political will, these components may be implemented separately or in combinations by one or a group of nations.

  1. Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Environmental Data Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fledderman, P.D.

    2000-08-24T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides an overview of existing environmental and ecological information at areas identified as potential locations of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) facilities. This information is required to document existing environmental and baseline conditions from which SPD construction and operation impacts can be defined. It will be used in developing the required preoperational monitoring plan to be used at specific SPD facilities construction sites.

  2. Preliminary safety analysis report for the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    OSCAR,DEBBY S.; WALKER,SHARON ANN; HUNTER,REGINA LEE; WALKER,CHERYL A.

    1999-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) will be a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility used to characterize, treat, and repackage radioactive and mixed material and waste for reuse, recycling, or ultimate disposal. A significant upgrade to a previous facility, the Temporary Hot Cell, will be implemented to perform this mission. The following major features will be added: a permanent shield wall; eight floor silos; new roof portals in the hot-cell roof; an upgraded ventilation system; and upgraded hot-cell jib crane; and video cameras to record operations and facilitate remote-handled operations. No safety-class systems, structures, and components will be present in the AHCF. There will be five safety-significant SSCs: hot cell structure, permanent shield wall, shield plugs, ventilation system, and HEPA filters. The type and quantity of radionuclides that could be located in the AHCF are defined primarily by SNL/NM's legacy materials, which include radioactive, transuranic, and mixed waste. The risk to the public or the environment presented by the AHCF is minor due to the inventory limitations of the Hazard Category 3 classification. Potential doses at the exclusion boundary are well below the evaluation guidelines of 25 rem. Potential for worker exposure is limited by the passive design features incorporated in the AHCF and by SNL's radiation protection program. There is no potential for exposure of the public to chemical hazards above the Emergency Response Protection Guidelines Level 2.

  3. "Defense-in-Depth" Laser Safety and the National Ignition Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    King, J J

    2010-12-02T23:59:59.000Z

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the largest and most energetic laser in the world contained in a complex the size of a football stadium. From the initial laser pulse, provided by telecommunication style infrared nanoJoule pulsed lasers, to the final 192 laser beams (1.8 Mega Joules total energy in the ultraviolet) converging on a target the size of a pencil eraser, laser safety is of paramount concern. In addition to this, there are numerous high-powered (Class 3B and 4) diagnostic lasers in use that can potentially send their laser radiation travelling throughout the facility. With individual beam paths of up to 1500 meters and a workforce of more than one thousand, the potential for exposure is significant. Simple laser safety practices utilized in typical laser labs just don't apply. To mitigate these hazards, NIF incorporates a multi layered approach to laser safety or 'Defense in Depth.' Most typical high-powered laser operations are contained and controlled within a single room using relatively simplistic controls to protect both the worker and the public. Laser workers are trained, use a standard operating procedure, and are required to wear Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as Laser Protective Eyewear (LPE) if the system is not fully enclosed. Non-workers are protected by means of posting the room with a warning sign and a flashing light. In the best of cases, a Safety Interlock System (SIS) will be employed which will 'safe' the laser in the case of unauthorized access. This type of laser operation is relatively easy to employ and manage. As the operation becomes more complex, higher levels of control are required to ensure personnel safety. Examples requiring enhanced controls are outdoor and multi-room laser operations. At the NIF there are 192 beam lines and numerous other Class 4 diagnostic lasers that can potentially deliver their hazardous energy to locations far from the laser source. This presents a serious and complex potential hazard to personnel. Because of this, a multilayered approach to safety is taken. This paper presents the philosophy and approach taken at the NIF in the multi-layered 'defense-in-depth' approach to laser safety.

  4. Safety and licensing issues that are being addressed by the Power Burst Facility test programs. [PWR; BWR

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McCardell, R.K.; MacDonald, P.E.

    1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper presents an overview of the results of the experimental program being conducted in the Power Burst Facility and the relationship of these results to certain safety and licensing issues. The safety issues that were addressed by the Power-Cooling-Mismatch, Reactivity Initiated Accident, and Loss of Coolant Accident tests, which comprised the original test program in the Power Burst Facility, are discussed. The resolution of these safety issues based on the results of the thirty-six tests performed to date, is presented. The future resolution of safety issues identified in the new Power Burst Facility test program which consists of tests which simulate BWR and PWR operational transients, anticipated transients without scram, and severe fuel damage accidents, is described.

  5. Mound facility physical characterization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tonne, W.R.; Alexander, B.M.; Cage, M.R.; Hase, E.H.; Schmidt, M.J.; Schneider, J.E.; Slusher, W.; Todd, J.E.

    1993-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this report is to provide a baseline physical characterization of Mound`s facilities as of September 1993. The baseline characterizations are to be used in the development of long-term future use strategy development for the Mound site. This document describes the current missions and alternative future use scenarios for each building. Current mission descriptions cover facility capabilities, physical resources required to support operations, current safety envelope and current status of facilities. Future use scenarios identify potential alternative future uses, facility modifications required for likely use, facility modifications of other uses, changes to safety envelope for the likely use, cleanup criteria for each future use scenario, and disposition of surplus equipment. This Introductory Chapter includes an Executive Summary that contains narrative on the Functional Unit Material Condition, Current Facility Status, Listing of Buildings, Space Plans, Summary of Maintenance Program and Repair Backlog, Environmental Restoration, and Decontamination and Decommissioning Programs. Under Section B, Site Description, is a brief listing of the Site PS Development, as well as Current Utility Sources. Section C contains Site Assumptions. A Maintenance Program Overview, as well as Current Deficiencies, is contained within the Maintenance Program Chapter.

  6. FAST FLUX TEST FACILITY (FFTF) A HISTORY OF SAFETY & OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NIELSEN, D L

    2004-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is a 400-megawatt (thermal) sodium-cooled, high temperature, fast neutron flux, loop-type test reactor. The facility was constructed to support development and testing of fuels, materials and equipment for the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program. FFTF began operation in 1980 and over the next 10 years demonstrated its versatility to perform experiments and missions far beyond the original intent of its designers. The reactor had several distinctive features including its size, flux, core design, extensive instrumentation, and test features that enabled it to simultaneously carry out a significant array of missions while demonstrating its features that contributed to a high level of plant safety and availability. FFTF is currently being deactivated for final closure.

  7. Excess plutonium disposition: The deep borehole option

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ferguson, K.L.

    1994-08-09T23:59:59.000Z

    This report reviews the current status of technologies required for the disposition of plutonium in Very Deep Holes (VDH). It is in response to a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report which addressed the management of excess weapons plutonium and recommended three approaches to the ultimate disposition of excess plutonium: (1) fabrication and use as a fuel in existing or modified reactors in a once-through cycle, (2) vitrification with high-level radioactive waste for repository disposition, (3) burial in deep boreholes. As indicated in the NAS report, substantial effort would be required to address the broad range of issues related to deep bore-hole emplacement. Subjects reviewed in this report include geology and hydrology, design and engineering, safety and licensing, policy decisions that can impact the viability of the concept, and applicable international programs. Key technical areas that would require attention should decisions be made to further develop the borehole emplacement option are identified.

  8. Order Module--DOE O 420.1B, FACILITY SAFETY | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently Asked QuestionsDepartmentGas and Oil ResearchEnergyOnHSSOpti-MN1B, FACILITY SAFETY

  9. B PLANT DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DODD, E.N.; KERR, N.R.

    2003-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides the documented safety analysis (DSA) and Central Plateau Remediation Project (CP) requirements that apply to surveillance and maintenance (S&M) activities at the 221-B Canyon Building and ancillary support structures (B Plant). The document replaces BHI-010582, Documented Safety Analysis for the B-Plant Facility. The B Plant is non-operational, deactivated and undergoing long term S&M prior to decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). This DSA is compliant with 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' The DSA was developed in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) standard DOE-STD-1120-98, Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities (DOE 1998) per Table 2 of 10 CFR 830 Appendix A, DOE Richland Operation Office (RL) direction (02-ABD-0053, Fluor Hanford Nuclear Safety Basis Strategy and Criteria) for facilities in long term S&M, and RL Direction (02-ABD-0091, ''FHI Nuclear Safety Expectations for Nuclear Facilities in Surveillance and Maintenance''). A crosswalk was prepared to identify potential inconsistencies between the previous B Plant safety analysis and DOE-STD-1120-98 guidance. In general, the safety analysis met the criteria of DOE-STD-1120-98. Some format and content changes have been made, including incorporating recent facility modifications and updating the evaluation guidelines and control selection criteria in accordance with RL direction (02-ABD-0053). The facility fire hazard analysis (FHA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) are appended to this DSA as an aid to the users, to minimize editorial redundancy, and to provide an efficient basis for update.

  10. Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Flynn, N.C. Bechtel Jacobs

    2008-04-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) policy is to provide a safe and healthy workplace for all employees and subcontractors. The implementation of this policy requires that operations of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF), located one-half mile west of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex, be guided by an overall plan and consistent proactive approach to environment, safety and health (ES&H) issues. The BJC governing document for worker safety and health, BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', describes the key elements of the BJC Safety and Industrial Hygiene (IH) programs, which includes the requirement for development and implementation of a site-specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) where required by regulation (refer also to BJC-EH-1012, 'Development and Approval of Safety and Health Plans'). BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', implements the requirements for worker protection contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 851. The EMWMF site-specific HASP requirements identifies safe operating procedures, work controls, personal protective equipment, roles and responsibilities, potential site hazards and control measures, site access requirements, frequency and types of monitoring, site work areas, decontamination procedures, and outlines emergency response actions. This HASP will be available on site for use by all workers, management and supervisors, oversight personnel and visitors. All EMWMF assigned personnel will be briefed on the contents of this HASP and will be required to follow the procedures and protocols as specified. The policies and procedures referenced in this HASP apply to all EMWMF operations activities. In addition the HASP establishes ES&H criteria for the day-to-day activities to prevent or minimize any adverse effect on the environment and personnel safety and health and to meet standards that define acceptable waste management practices. The HASP is written to make use of past experience and best management practices to eliminate or minimize hazards to workers or the environment from events such as fires, falls, mechanical hazards, or any unplanned release to the environment.

  11. Safety Assessment for the Kozloduy National Disposal Facility in Bulgaria - 13507

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Biurrun, E.; Haverkamp, B. [DBE TECHNOLOGY GmbH, Eschenstr. 55, D-31224 Peine (Germany)] [DBE TECHNOLOGY GmbH, Eschenstr. 55, D-31224 Peine (Germany); Lazaro, A.; Miralles, A. [Westinghouse Electric Spain SAR, Padilla 17, E-28006 Madrid (Spain)] [Westinghouse Electric Spain SAR, Padilla 17, E-28006 Madrid (Spain); Stefanova, I. [SERAW, 52 A Dimitrov Blvd, 6 Fl., 1797 Sofia (Bulgaria)] [SERAW, 52 A Dimitrov Blvd, 6 Fl., 1797 Sofia (Bulgaria)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Due to the early decommissioning of four Water-Water Energy Reactors (WWER) 440-V230 reactors at the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near the city of Kozloduy in Bulgaria, large amounts of low and intermediate radioactive waste will arise much earlier than initially scheduled. In or-der to manage the radioactive waste from the early decommissioning, Bulgaria has intensified its efforts to provide a near surface disposal facility at Radiana with the required capacity. To this end, a project was launched and assigned in international competition to a German-Spanish consortium to provide the complete technical planning including the preparation of the Intermediate Safety Assessment Report. Preliminary results of operational and long-term safety show compliance with the Bulgarian regulatory requirements. The long-term calculations carried out for the Radiana site are also a good example of how analysis of safety assessment results can be used for iterative improvements of the assessment by pointing out uncertainties and areas of future investigations to reduce such uncertainties in regard to the potential radiological impact. The computer model used to estimate the long-term evolution of the future repository at Radiana predicted a maximum total annual dose for members of the critical group, which is carried to approximately 80 % by C-14 for a specific ingestion pathway. Based on this result and the outcome of the sensitivity analysis, existing uncertainties were evaluated and areas for reasonable future investigations to reduce these uncertainties were identified. (authors)

  12. Characterizing Surplus US Plutonium for Disposition - 13199

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, Jeffrey S. [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)] [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken SC 29808 (United States); Moore, Edwin N. [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC, Savannah River Site, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)] [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC, Savannah River Site, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems. (authors)

  13. Characterizing surplus US plutonium for disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, Jeffrey S.; Moore, Edwin N.

    2013-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems.

  14. Notice of Intent to Develop a Page Change for DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-06-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The Page Change will be strictly limited in scope to changes necessary to accomplish the following objectives: (1) to invoke revised DOE-STD- 1104-20xx, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Document, as a required method; (2) to invoke revised DOE-STD-3009-20xx, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis, as a required method for new nuclear facilities as discussed below; and (3) to make miscellaneous administrative corrections and clarifications based on the one-year implementation review required by DOE O 251.1C, Departmental Directives Program. This JM is an update to one approved June 21, 2013.

  15. SELECTION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FOR DISPOSITION TO WIPP

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Mcclard, J.; Christopher, J.

    2012-06-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing a Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). Included in the evaluation are up to 6 metric tons (MT) of plutonium in the form of impure oxides and metals for which a disposition plan has not been decided, among options that include preparation as feed for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility; disposing to high-level waste through the Savannah River Site (SRS) HB Line and H Canyon; can-in-canister disposal using the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility; and preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE and SRS have identified at least 0.5 MT of plutonium that, because of high levels of chemical and isotopic impurities, is impractical for disposition by methods other than the WIPP pathway. Characteristics of these items and the disposition strategy are discussed.

  16. Proliferation resistance criteria for fissile material disposition issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rutherford, D.A.; Fearey, B.L.; Markin, J.T.; Close, D.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Tolk, K.M.; Mangan, D.L. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Moore, L. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The 1994 National Acdaemy of Sciences study ``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium`` defined options for reducing the national and international proliferation risks of materials declared excess to the nuclear weapons program. This paper proposes criteria for assessing the proliferation resistance of these options as well defining the ``Standards`` from the report. The criteria are general, encompassing all stages of the disposition process from storage through intermediate processing to final disposition including the facilities, processing technologies and materials, the level of safeguards for these materials, and the national/subnational threat to the materials.

  17. Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 1998

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1999-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This is the ninth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy (Department) activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department`s defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department`s defense nuclear facilities. The locations of the major Department facilities are provided. During 1998, Departmental activities resulted in the proposed closure of one Board recommendation. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with four other Board recommendations. Two new Board recommendations were received and accepted by the Department in 1998, and two new implementation plans are being developed to address these recommendations. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, a renewed effort to increase the technical capabilities of the federal workforce, and a revised plan for stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  18. Safety requirements, facility user needs, and reactor concepts for a new Broad Application Test Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ryskamp, J.M. [ed.; Liebenthal, J.L.; Denison, A.B.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1992-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the EG&G Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program (LDRD) Broad Application Test Reactor (BATR) Project that was conducted in fiscal year 1991. The scope of this project was divided into three phases: a project process definition phase, a requirements development phase, and a preconceptual reactor design and evaluation phase. Multidisciplinary teams of experts conducted each phase. This report presents the need for a new test reactor, the project process definition, a set of current and projected regulatory compliance and safety requirements, a set of facility user needs for a broad range of projected testing missions, and descriptions of reactor concepts capable of meeting these requirements. This information can be applied to strategic planning to provide the Department of Energy with management options.

  19. Safety requirements, facility user needs, and reactor concepts for a new Broad Application Test Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ryskamp, J.M. (ed.); Liebenthal, J.L.; Denison, A.B.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1992-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the EG G Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program (LDRD) Broad Application Test Reactor (BATR) Project that was conducted in fiscal year 1991. The scope of this project was divided into three phases: a project process definition phase, a requirements development phase, and a preconceptual reactor design and evaluation phase. Multidisciplinary teams of experts conducted each phase. This report presents the need for a new test reactor, the project process definition, a set of current and projected regulatory compliance and safety requirements, a set of facility user needs for a broad range of projected testing missions, and descriptions of reactor concepts capable of meeting these requirements. This information can be applied to strategic planning to provide the Department of Energy with management options.

  20. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Larson, H L

    2007-09-07T23:59:59.000Z

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment of the DWTF. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment of the DWTF (LLNL 2004). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment of the DWTF is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment of the DWTF (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment of the DWTF are shown in the B695 Segment of the DWTF DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment of the DWTF include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating low-level waste (LLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained LLW. A permit modification for B696S was submitted to DTSC in January 2004 to store and treat hazardous and mixed waste. Upon approval of the permit modification, B696S rooms 1007, 1008, and 1009 will be able to store hazardous and mixed waste for up to 1 year. Furthermore, an additional drum crusher and a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., {sup 90}Sr, {sup 137}Cs, {sup 3}H. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for this facility. The DSA is applicable to the handling of radioactive waste stored and treated in the B695 Segment of the DWTF. Section 5 of the TSR, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the B695 Segment of the DWTF. A basis explanation follows each of the requirements described in Section 5.5, Specific Administrative Controls. The basis explanation does not constitute an additional requirement, but is intended as an expansion of the logic and reasoning behind development of the requirement. Programmatic Administrative Controls are addressed in Section 5.6.

  1. Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Preliminary Quality Assurance...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Preliminary Quality Assurance Implementation Plan Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Preliminary Quality Assurance Implementation Plan The primary...

  2. Criticality safety strategy for the Fuel Cycle Facility electrorefiner at Argonne National Laboratory, West

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mariani, R.D.; Benedict, R.W. [Argonne National Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Lell, R.M.; Turski, R.B.; Fujita, E.K. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Integral Fast Reactor being developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) combines the advantages of metal-fueled, liquid-metal-cooled reactors and a closed fuel cycle. Presently, the Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) at ANL-West in Idaho Falls, Idaho is being modified to recycle spent metallic fuel from Experimental Breeder Reactor II as part of a demonstration project sponsored by the Department of Energy. A key component of the FCF is the electrorefiner (ER) in which the actinides are separated from the fission products. In the electrorefining process, the metal fuel is anodically dissolved into a high-temperature molten salt and refined uranium or uranium/plutonium products are deposited at cathodes. In this report, the criticality safety strategy for the FCF ER is summarized. FCF ER operations and processes formed the basis for evaluating criticality safety and control during actinide metal fuel refining. In order to show criticality safety for the FCF ER, the reference operating conditions for the ER had to be defined. Normal operating envelopes (NOES) were then defined to bracket the important operating conditions. To keep the operating conditions within their NOES, process controls were identified that can be used to regulate the actinide forms and content within the ER. A series of operational checks were developed for each operation that wig verify the extent or success of an operation. The criticality analysis considered the ER operating conditions at their NOE values as the point of departure for credible and incredible failure modes. As a result of the analysis, FCF ER operations were found to be safe with respect to criticality.

  3. HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS & RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    EVANS, C B

    2004-12-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S&M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard.

  4. Reducing nuclear danger through intergovernmental technical exchanges on nuclear materials safety management

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Peddicord, K.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States); Witmer, F.E.; Krumpe, P.F. [USDOE, Washington, DC (United States); Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M. [Radievyj Inst., Leningrad (Russian Federation)

    1997-04-09T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons and generating hundreds of tons of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium fissile nuclear materials that require disposition. The U.S. Department of Energy and Russian Minatom organizations.are planning and implementing safe, secure storage and disposition operations for these materials in numerous facilities. This provides a new opportunity for technical exchanges between Russian and Western scientists that can establish an improved and sustained common safety culture for handling these materials. An initiative that develops and uses personal relationships and joint projects among Russian and Western participants involved in fissile nuclear materials safety management contributes to improving nuclear materials nonproliferation and to making a safer world. Technical exchanges and workshops are being used to systematically identify opportunities in the nuclear fissile materials facilities to improve and ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment.

  5. Disposition of surplus fissile materials via immobilization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Sutcliffe, W.G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); McKibben, J.M. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Danker, W. [USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)

    1995-07-23T23:59:59.000Z

    In the Cold War aftermath, the US and Russia have agreed to large reductions in nuclear weapons. To aid in the selection of long-term management options, the USDOE has undertaken a multifaceted study to select options for storage and disposition of surplus plutonium (Pu). One disposition alternative being considered is immobilization. Immobilization is a process in which surplus Pu would be embedded in a suitable material to produce an appropriate form for ultimate disposal. To arrive at an appropriate form, we first reviewed published information on HLW immobilization technologies to identify forms to be prescreened. Surviving forms were screened using multi-attribute utility analysis to determine promising technologies for Pu immobilization. We further evaluated the most promising immobilization families to identify and seek solutions for chemical, chemical engineering, environmental, safety, and health problems; these problems remain to be solved before we can make technical decisions about the viability of using the forms for long-term disposition of Pu. All data, analyses, and reports are being provided to the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition to support the Record of Decision that is anticipated in Summer of 1996.

  6. Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Calendar Year 1999

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2000-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This is the tenth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department's defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department's defense nuclear facilities. During 1999, Departmental activities resulted in the closure of nine Board recommendations. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with three Board recommendations. One new Board recommendation was received and accepted by the Department in 1999, and a new implementation plan is being developed to address this recommendation. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, opening of a repository for long-term storage of transuranic wastes, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  7. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) storage and disposition program plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Arms, W.M.; Everitt, D.A.; O`Dell, C.L.

    1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Recent changes in international relations and other changes in national priorities have profoundly affected the management of weapons-usable fissile materials within the United States (US). The nuclear weapon stockpile reductions agreed to by the US and Russia have reduced the national security requirements for these fissile materials. National policies outlined by the US President seek to prevent the accumulation of nuclear weapon stockpiles of plutonium (Pu) and HEU, and to ensure that these materials are subjected to the highest standards of safety, security and international accountability. The purpose of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage and Disposition Program Plan is to define and establish a planned approach for storage of all HEU and disposition of surplus HEU in support of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Material Disposition Program. Elements Of this Plan, which are specific to HEU storage and disposition, include program requirements, roles and responsibilities, program activities (action plans), milestone schedules, and deliverables.

  8. Annual report to Congress. Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 2000

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2001-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This Annual Report to the Congress describes the Department of Energy's activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. During 2000, the Department completed its implementation and proposed closure of one Board recommendation and completed all implementation plan milestones associated with two additional Board recommendations. Also in 2000, the Department formally accepted two new Board recommendations and developed implementation plans in response to those recommendations. The Department also made significant progress with a number of broad-based safety initiatives. These include initial implementation of integrated safety management at field sites and within headquarters program offices, issuance of a nuclear safety rule, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  9. SHSD Manager Safety Engineering Group Manager

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Safety, Machine Shop Safety, Tier I Program, Traffic Safety S. Moss: Nuclear Criticality Safety G. Shepherd: Explosives Safety, Facility Authorization Basis, Nuclear Safety R. Travis: Readiness Evaluations

  10. Safety analysis--200 Area Savannah River Site: Separations Area operations Building 211-H Outside Facilities. Supplement 11, Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The H-Area Outside Facilities are located in the 200-H Separations Area and are comprised of a number of processes, utilities, and services that support the separations function. Included are enriched uranium loadout, bulk chemical storage, water handling, acid recovery, general purpose evaporation, and segregated solvent facilities. In addition, services for water, electricity, and steam are provided. This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents an analysis of the H-Area Outside Facilities and is one of a series of documents for the Separations Area as specified in the SR Implementation Plan for DOE order 5481.1A. The primary purpose of the analysis was to demonstrate that the facility can be operated without undue risk to onsite or offsite populations, to the environment, and to operating personnel. In this report, risks are defined as the expected frequencies of accidents, multiplied by the resulting radiological consequences in person-rem. Following the summary description of facility and operations is the site evaluation including the unique features of the H-Area Outside Facilities. The facility and process design are described in Chapter 3.0 and a description of operations and their impact is given in Chapter 4.0. The accident analysis in Chapter 5.0 is followed by a list of safety related structures and systems (Chapter 6.0) and a description of the Quality Assurance program (Chapter 7.0). The accident analysis in this report focuses on estimating the risk from accidents as a result of operation of the facilities. The operations were evaluated on the basis of three considerations: potential radiological hazards, potential chemical toxicity hazards, and potential conditions uniquely different from normal industrial practice.

  11. Optimal facility and equipment specification to support cost-effective recycling

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Redus, K.S. [MACTEC, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Yuracko, K.L. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States)

    1998-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The authors demonstrate a project management approach for D and D projects to select those facility areas or equipment systems on which to concentrate resources so that project materials disposition costs are minimized, safety requirements are always met, recycle and reuse goals are achieved, and programmatic or stakeholder concerns are met. The authors examine a facility that contains realistic areas and equipment, and they apply the approach to illustrate the different results that can be obtained depending on the strength or weakness of safety risk requirements, goals for recycle and reuse of materials, and programmatic or stakeholder concerns.

  12. Upgrades to meet LANL SF, 121-2011, hazardous waste facility permit requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    French, Sean B [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Johns - Hughes, Kathryn W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-21T23:59:59.000Z

    Members of San IIdefonso have requested information from LANL regarding implementation of the revision to LANL's Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (the RCRA Permit). On January 26, 2011, LANL staff from the Waste Disposition Project and the Environmental Protection Division will provide a status update to Pueblo members at the offices of the San IIdefonso Department of Environmental and Cultural Preservation. The Waste Disposition Project presentation will focus on upgrades and improvements to LANL waste management facilities at TA-50 and TA-54. The New Mexico Environment Department issued LANL's revised Hazardous Waste Facility permit on November 30, 2010 with a 30-day implementation period. The Waste Disposition Project manages and operates four of LANL's permitted facilities; the Waste Characterization, Reduction and Repackaging Facility (WCRRF) at TA-SO, and Area G, Area L and the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing facility (RANT) at TA-54. By implementing a combination of permanent corrective action activities and shorter-term compensatory measures, WDP was able to achieve functional compliance on December 30, 2010 with new Permit requirements at each of our facilities. One component of WOP's mission at LANL is centralized management and disposition of the Laboratory's hazardous and mixed waste. To support this mission objective, WOP has undertaken a project to upgrade our facilities and equipment to achieve fully compliant and efficient waste management operations. Upgrades to processes, equipment and facilities are being designed to provide defense-in-depth beyond the minimum, regulatory requirements where worker safety and protection of the public and the environment are concerned. Upgrades and improvements to enduring waste management facilities and operations are being designed so as not to conflict with future closure activities at Material Disposal Area G and Material Disposal Area L.

  13. Safety training and safe operating procedures written for PBFA (Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator) II and applicable to other pulsed power facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Donovan, G.L.; Goldstein, S.A.

    1986-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    To ensure that work in advancing pulsed power technology is performed with an acceptably low risk, pulsed power research facilities at Sandia National Laboratories must satisfy general safety guidelines established by the Department of Energy, policies and formats of the Environment, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Department, and detailed procedures formulated by the Pulsed Power Sciences Directorate. The approach to safety training and to writing safe operating procedures, and the procedures presented here are specific to the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II (PBFA II) Facility but are applicable as guidelines to other research and development facilities which have similar hazards.

  14. An overview of research activities on materials for nuclear applications at the INL Safety, Tritium and Applied Research facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    P. Calderoni; P. Sharpe; M. Shimada

    2009-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safety, Tritium and Applied Research facility at the Idaho National Laboratory is a US Department of Energy National User Facility engaged in various aspects of materials research for nuclear applications related to fusion and advanced fission systems. Research activities are mainly focused on the interaction of tritium with materials, in particular plasma facing components, liquid breeders, high temperature coolants, fuel cladding, cooling and blanket structures and heat exchangers. Other activities include validation and verification experiments in support of the Fusion Safety Program, such as beryllium dust reactivity and dust transport in vacuum vessels, and support of Advanced Test Reactor irradiation experiments. This paper presents an overview of the programs engaged in the activities, which include the US-Japan TITAN collaboration, the US ITER program, the Next Generation Power Plant program and the tritium production program, and a presentation of ongoing experiments as well as a summary of recent results with emphasis on fusion relevant materials.

  15. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Following President Clinton`s Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.

  16. U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide [Fulfills ORO Safety Basis Competency 1, 2 (Part 1), or 7 (Part 1)

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    "This self-study guide provides an overview of safety basis terminology, requirements, and activities that are applicable to DOE and Oak Ridge Operations Office (ORO) nuclear facilities on the Oak...

  17. Subject: Integrated Safety Analysis: Why It Is Appropriate for Fuel Recycling Facilities Project Number: 689Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Letter, 9/10/10

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Enclosed for your review is a Nuclear Energy Institute white paper on the use of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed recycling facilities. This paper is...

  18. EM Waste and Materials Disposition & Transportation | Department...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    EM Waste and Materials Disposition & Transportation EM Waste and Materials Disposition & Transportation DOE's Radioactive Waste Management Priorities: Continue to manage waste...

  19. Guidance for the design and management of a maintenance plan to assure safety and improve the predictability of a DOE nuclear irradiation facility. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Booth, R.S.; Kryter, R.C.; Shepard, R.L.; Smith, O.L. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Upadhyaya, B.R. [Univ. of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN (United States). Dept. of Nuclear Engineering; Rowan, W.J.

    1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A program is recommended for planning the maintenance of DOE nuclear facilities that will help safety and enhance availability throughout a facility`s life cycle. While investigating the requirements for maintenance activities, a major difference was identified between the strategy suitable for a conventional power reactor and one for a research reactor facility: the latter should provide a high degree of predicted availability (referred to hereafter as ``predictability``) to its users, whereas the former should maximize total energy production. These differing operating goals necessitate different maintenance strategies. A strategy for scheduling research reactor facility operation and shutdown for maintenance must balance safety, reliability,and predicted availability. The approach developed here is based on three major elements: (1) a probabilistic risk analysis of the balance between assured reliability and predictability (presented in Appendix C), (2) an assessment of the safety and operational impact of maintenance activities applied to various components of the facility, and (3) a data base of historical and operational information on the performance and requirements for maintenance of various components. These factors are integrated into a set of guidelines for designing a new highly maintainable facility, for preparing flexible schedules for improved maintenance of existing facilities, and for anticipating the maintenance required to extend the life of an aging facility. Although tailored to research reactor facilities, the methodology has broader applicability and may therefore be used to improved the maintenance of power reactors, particularly in anticipation of peak load demands.

  20. Major Risk Factors Integrated Facility Disposition Project -...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    through private property to waters of the State of Tennessee, and its uptake by fish, plants, and other animal life. DOE, regulators, and the public need to have reasonable...

  1. Summary - Major Risk Factors Integrated Facility Disposition...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    TN Why DOE-EM Did This Review Approximately two million pounds of mercury are unaccounted for at Y-12 and mercury contamination has been detected in both soils and...

  2. Hight-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC) EnvironmentalGyroSolé(tm) Harmonicbetand ModelingHigh-Level Waste (HLW) and

  3. Nuclear Safety Regulatory Framework

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    overall Nuclear Safety Policy & ESH Goals Safety Basis Review and Approval In the DOE governance model, contractors responsible for the facility develop the safety basis and...

  4. Technical safety requirements (TSR) for waste receiving and processing (WRAP) facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Weidert, J.R.

    1997-11-18T23:59:59.000Z

    The scope of this TSR document is based on the WRAP Final Safety Analysis Report (HNF-SD-W026-SAR-002) and supporting documents. The administrative controls set forth in this TSR document are derived from the WRAP Final Safety Analysis Report.

  5. The safety climate of a Department of Energy nuclear facility: A sociotechnical analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, A.E.; Harbour, J.L.

    1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Government- and public-sponsored groups are increasingly demanding greater accountability by the Department of Energy`s weapons complex. Many of these demands have focused on the development of a positive safety climate, one that not only protects workers onsite, but also the surrounding populace and environment as well. These demands are, in part, a response to findings which demonstrate a close linkage between actual organizational safety performance and the organization`s safety climate, i.e., the collective attitudes employees hold concerning the level of safety in their organization. This paper describes the approach taken in the systematic assessment of the safety climate at EG&G Rocky Flats Plant (RFP).

  6. Independent Assessment of the Savannah River Site High-Level Waste Salt Disposition Alternatives Evaluation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. T. Case (DOE-ID); M. L. Renfro (INEEL)

    1998-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report presents the results of the Independent Project Evaluation (IPE) Team assessment of the Westinghouse Savannah River Company High-Level Waste Salt Disposition Systems Engineering (SE) Team's deliberations, evaluations, and selections. The Westinghouse Savannah River Company concluded in early 1998 that production goals and safety requirements for processing SRS HLW salt to remove Cs-137 could not be met in the existing In-Tank Precipitation Facility as currently configured for precipitation of cesium tetraphenylborate. The SE Team was chartered to evaluate and recommend an alternative(s) for processing the existing HLW salt to remove Cs-137. To replace the In-Tank Precipitation process, the Savannah River Site HLW Salt Disposition SE Team downselected (October 1998) 140 candidate separation technologies to two alternatives: Small-Tank Tetraphenylborate (TPB) Precipitation (primary alternative) and Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST) Nonelutable Ion Exchange (backup alternative). The IPE Team, commissioned by the Department of Energy, concurs that both alternatives are technically feasible and should meet all salt disposition requirements. But the IPE Team judges that the SE Team's qualitative criteria and judgments used in their downselection to a primary and a backup alternative do not clearly discriminate between the two alternatives. To properly choose between Small-Tank TPB and CST Ion Exchange for the primary alternative, the IPE Team suggests the following path forward: Complete all essential R and D activities for both alternatives and formulate an appropriate set of quantitative decision criteria that will be rigorously applied at the end of the R and D activities. Concurrent conceptual design activities should be limited to common elements of the alternatives.

  7. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Industrial Hygiene program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility.

  8. Alternative technical summary report for direct disposition in deep boreholes: Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound canisters, Version 4.0. Fissile Materials Disposition Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.

    1996-08-23T23:59:59.000Z

    This report summarizes and compares the Immobilized and Direct Beep Borehole Disposition Alternatives. The important design concepts, facility features and operational procedures are briefly described, and a discussion of the issues that affect the evaluation of each alternative against the programmatic assessment criteria that have been established for selecting the preferred alternatives for plutonium disposition.

  9. Criticality Safety Evaluation Report for the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facilities Process Water Handling System

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    KESSLER, S.F.

    2000-08-10T23:59:59.000Z

    This report addresses the criticality concerns associated with process water handling in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility. The controls and limitations on equipment design and operations to control potential criticality occurrences are identified.

  10. Fuel-cycle facilities: preliminary safety and environmental information document. Volume VII

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Information is presented concerning the mining and milling of uranium and thorium; uranium hexafluoride conversion; enrichment; fuel fabrication; reprocessing; storage options; waste disposal options; transportation; heavy-water-production facilities; and international fuel service centers.

  11. Chemical Safety Vulnerability Working Group report. Volume 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Chemical Safety Vulnerability (CSV) Working Group was established to identify adverse conditions involving hazardous chemicals at DOE facilities that might result in fires or explosions, release of hazardous chemicals to the environment, or exposure of workers or the public to chemicals. A CSV Review was conducted in 148 facilities at 29 sites. Eight generic vulnerabilities were documented related to: abandoned chemicals and chemical residuals; past chemical spills and ground releases; characterization of legacy chemicals and wastes; disposition of legacy chemicals; storage facilities and conditions; condition of facilities and support systems; unanalyzed and unaddressed hazards; and inventory control and tracking. Weaknesses in five programmatic areas were also identified related to: management commitment and planning; chemical safety management programs; aging facilities that continue to operate; nonoperating facilities awaiting deactivation; and resource allocations. Volume 3 consists of eleven appendices containing the following: Field verification reports for Idaho National Engineering Lab., Rocky Flats Plant, Brookhaven National Lab., Los Alamos National Lab., and Sandia National Laboratories (NM); Mini-visits to small DOE sites; Working Group meeting, June 7--8, 1994; Commendable practices; Related chemical safety initiatives at DOE; Regulatory framework and industry initiatives related to chemical safety; and Chemical inventory data from field self-evaluation reports.

  12. Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

    1992-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report contains health and safety information relating to the chemicals that have been identified in the mixed waste streams at the Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Information is summarized in two summary sections--one for health considerations and one for safety considerations. Detailed health and safety information is presented in material safety data sheets (MSDSs) for each chemical.

  13. Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Part 2, Chemical constituents

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

    1992-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report contains health and safety information relating to the chemicals that have been identified in the mixed waste streams at the Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Information is summarized in two summary sections--one for health considerations and one for safety considerations. Detailed health and safety information is presented in material safety data sheets (MSDSs) for each chemical.

  14. Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    TOMASZEWSKI, T.A.

    2000-04-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The Waste Receiving and Processing Facility (WRAP), 2336W Building, on the Hanford Site is designed to receive, confirm, repackage, certify, treat, store, and ship contact-handled transuranic and low-level radioactive waste from past and present U.S. Department of Energy activities. The WRAP facility is comprised of three buildings: 2336W, the main processing facility (also referred to generically as WRAP); 2740W, an administrative support building; and 2620W, a maintenance support building. The support buildings are subject to the normal hazards associated with industrial buildings (no radiological materials are handled) and are not part of this analysis except as they are impacted by operations in the processing building, 2336W. WRAP is designed to provide safer, more efficient methods of handling the waste than currently exist on the Hanford Site and contributes to the achievement of as low as reasonably achievable goals for Hanford Site waste management.

  15. CFN Operations and Safety Awareness (COSA) Checklist Nanofabrication (Clean Room) Facility

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ohta, Shigemi

    -ESH-USERS [ ] [ ] [ ] Cyber Security Training GE-CYBERSEC X X X Laboratory Standard HP-IND-220 X X X Hazardous Waste HP Safety for Benchtop Workers TQ-ELECT-BENCHTOP [ ] [ ] [ ] Oxygen Deficiency Hazard TQ-ODH X X X and understood clean room orientation/protocols Gowning procedure: demonstrate proper clean room dress Personal

  16. Safety Software Quality Assurance Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities for Nuclear Facilities and Activities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-08-27T23:59:59.000Z

    To assign roles and responsibilities for improving the quality of safety software. DOE N 411.2 (archived) extends this Notice until 01/31/2005. DOE N 411.3 extends this Notice until 1/31/06. Canceled by DOE O 414.1C. does not cancel other directives.

  17. Report on the American Nuclear Society International Topical Meeting: {open_quotes}The safety, status, and future of non-commercial reactors and irradiation Facilities{close_quotes}

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Silver, E.G. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, TN (United States)

    1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The American Nuclear Society`s International Topical Meeting, The Safety, Status, and Future of Non-Commercial Reactors and Irradiation Facilities, also known as SAFOR 90, was held in Boise, Idaho, September 30 to October 4, 1990. In 19 half-day sessions, 102 papers were presented which covered operating research reactors, production reactors, the use of reactors for training and research, probabilistic risk assessments applied to research reactors, plans for new facilities, and new fuels and reactor types. A special session on space reactor safety was also presented. 11 refs., 1 tab.

  18. Safety aspects related to the operation of the Cabril L/ILW disposal facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ruiz, M.C. [Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, Madrid (Spain); Alonso, J.A. [ENRESA, Madrid (Spain). Safety and Licensing Dept.

    1993-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    In October 1992 the Spanish Ministry of Industry granted the operating permit to the Centro de Almacenamiento de El Cabril (C.A. El Cabril). The Annex 1 to this permit contains the limits and conditions related to safety and to radiological health protection, set by nuclear regulatory authority, the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN). The main aspects of the operation regulated in the permit as well as their technical basis and practical meaning are discussed in this paper.

  19. Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Disposal Research and Development...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    & Publications Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Disposal Research and Development Roadmap Used Fuel Disposition Campaign International Activities Implementation Plan Review of...

  20. Evaluation of the US Department of Energy's occupational safety and health program for its government-owned contractor-operated facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this report is to present to Secretary of Energy James Watkins the findings and recommendations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) evaluation of the Department of Energy's (DOE) programs for worker safety and health at DOE's government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) nuclear facilities. The OSHA evaluation is based on an intensive and comprehensive review and analysis of DOE's worker safety and health programs including: written programs; safety and health inspection programs; and the adequacy of resource, training, and management controls. The evaluation began on April 10, 1990 and involved over three staff years before its conclusion. The evaluation was initiated by former Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole in response to Secretary of Energy James Watkins' request that OSHA assist him in determining the actions needed to assure that DOE has an exemplary safety and health program in place at its GOCOs. 6 figs.

  1. Order Module--DOE O 420.2B, SAFETY OF ACCELERATOR FACILITIES | Department

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page onYou are now leaving Energy.gov You are now leaving Energy.gov You are being directed offOCHCO2:Introduction toManagementOPAM PolicyOfEnergy Online1of Energy 2B, SAFETY OF

  2. Technology, safety and costs of decommissioning reference nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Elder, H.K.

    1986-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The radioactive wastes expected to result from decommissioning nuclear fuel cycle facilities are reviewed and classified in accordance with 10 CFR 61. Most of the wastes from the MOX plant (exclusive of the lagoon wastes) will require interim storage (11% Class A 49 m/sup 3/; 89% interim storage, 383 m/sup 3/). The MOX plant lagoon wastes are Class A waste (2930 m/sup 3/). All of the wastes from the U-Fab and UF/sub 6/ plants are designated as Class A waste (U-Fab 1090 m/sup 3/, UF/sub 6/ 1259 m/sup 3/).

  3. Disposition of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Currently Located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 12232

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Glenn, J. [U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, 200 Administrative Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37830 (United States); Patterson, J.; DeRoos, K. [SEC Federal Services Corporation (SEC), 2800 Solway Road, Knoxville, TN 37931 (United States); Patterson, J.E.; Mitchell, K.G. [Strata-G, LLC, 2027 Castaic Lane, Knoxville, TN 37932 (United States)

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) awarded SEC Federal Services Corporation (SEC) a 34-building demolition and disposal (D and D) project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) that included the disposition of six Strontium (Sr-90) powered Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) stored outside of ORNL Building 3517. Disposition of the RTGs is very complex both in terms of complying with disposal facility waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for packaging and transportation in commerce. Two of the RTGs contain elemental mercury which requires them to be Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) compliant prior to disposal. In addition, all of the RTGs exceed the Class C waste concentration limits under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Waste Classification Guidelines. In order to meet the LDR requirements and Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) WAC, a site specific treatability variance for mercury was submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to allow macro-encapsulation to be an acceptable treatment standard for elemental mercury. By identifying and confirming the design configuration of the mercury containing RTGs, the SEC team proved that the current configuration met the macro-encapsulation standard of 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 268.45. The SEC Team also worked with NNSS to demonstrate that all radioisotope considerations are compliant with the NNSS low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility performance assessment and WAC. Lastly, the SEC team determined that the GE2000 Type B cask met the necessary size, weight, and thermal loading requirements for five of the six RTGs. The sixth RTG (BUP-500) required a one-time DOT shipment exemption request due to the RTG's large size. The DOT exemption justification for the BUP-500 relies on the inherent robust construction and material make-up of the BUP- 500 RTG. DOE-ORO, SEC, and the entire SEC RTG team are nearing the conclusion of the Sr-90 RTG disposition challenge - a legacy now 50 years in the making. Over 600,000 Ci of Sr-90 waste await disposal and its removal from ORNL will mark an historical moment in the clean-up of the cold-war legacy in the ORNL central industrial area. Elimination (i.e., removal) of the RTGs will reduce security risks at ORNL and disposal will permanently eliminate security risks. The RTGs will eventually decay to benign levels within a reasonable timeframe relative to radiological risks posed by long-lived isotopes. The safety authorization basis at ORNL Building 3517 will be reduced enabling greater operational flexibility in future clean-out and D and D campaigns. Upon disposition the Department of Energy will realize reduced direct and indirect surveillance and maintenance costs that can be reapplied to accelerated and enhanced clean-up of the Oak Ridge Reservation. At present, waste profiles for the RTGs are developed and under review by NNSS RWAP staff and approval authorities. Disposition schedule is driven by the availability of compliant shipping casks necessary to safely transport the RTGs from ORNL to NNSS. The first disposal of the RCA RTG is expected in April 2012 and the remaining RTGs disposed in 2012 and 2013. (authors)

  4. Conventional Facilities Chapter 11: Environment, Safety and Health 11-1 NSLS-II Preliminary Design Report

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Ohta, Shigemi

    Analysis 4. Fire Protection 5. Pressure Safety 6. Industrial Hygiene 7. Other ES&H Issues This document Program a) Fire protection b) Pressure safety c) Industrial hygiene d) Biological safety e) Electrical

  5. Pipeline Safety (Pennsylvania)

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Pennsylvania legislature has empowered the Public Utility Commission to direct and enforce safety standards for pipeline facilities and to regulate safety practices of certificated utilities...

  6. Safeguards and security issues for the disposition of fissile materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Moya, R.W.; Duggan, R.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rutherford, D.; Fearey, B. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Moore, L. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy`s Office of Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) is analyzing long-term storage and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials, preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), preparing for a record of decision (ROD) regarding this material and conducting other activities. The primary security objectives of this program are to reduce major security risks and strengthen arms reduction and nonproliferation (NP). To help achieve these objectives, a safeguards and security (S&S) team consisting of participants from Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories was established. The S&S activity for this program is a cross-cutting task which addresses all of the FMD program options. It includes both domestic and international safeguards and includes areas such as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will discuss the activities of the Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) S&S team as well as some specific S&S issues associated with various FMDP options/facilities. Some of the items to be discussed include the threat, S&S requirements, S&S criteria for assessing risk, S&S issues concerning fissile material processing/facilities, and international and domestic safeguards.

  7. Biosafety Facilities - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    G 151.1-5, Biosafety Facilities by David Freshwater Functional areas: Defense Nuclear Facility Safety and Health Requirement, Safety and Security, The Guide assists DOENNSA field...

  8. Safety Basis Requirements for Nonnuclear Facilities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site-Specific Work Smart Standard Revision 3 December 2006

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beach, D; Brereton, S; Failor, R; Hildum, J; Ingram, C; Spagnolo, S; van Warmerdam, C

    2007-06-07T23:59:59.000Z

    This standard establishes requirements that, when coupled with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL's) Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) methods and other Work Smart Standards for assuring worker safety, assure that the impacts of nonnuclear operations authorized in LLNL facilities are well understood and controlled in a manner that protects the health of workers, the public, and the environment. All LLNL facilities shall be classified based on potential for adverse impact of operations to the health of co-located (i.e., nearby) workers and the public in accordance with this standard, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 830, Subpart B, and Department of Energy Order (DOE O) 420.2A.

  9. Alternative technical summary report for immobilized disposition in deep boreholes: Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout without canisters, Version 4.0. Fissile materials disposition program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.

    1996-08-23T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper summarizes and compares the immobilized and direct borehole disposition alternatives previously presented in the alternative technical summary. The important design concepts, facility features and operational procedures are first briefly described. This is followed by a discussion of the issues that affect the evaluation of each alternative against the programmatic assessment criteria that have been established for selecting the preferred alternatives for plutonium disposition.

  10. Chemical Safety Vulnerability Working Group report. Volume 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Chemical Safety Vulnerability (CSV) Working Group was established to identify adverse conditions involving hazardous chemicals at DOE facilities that might result in fires or explosions, release of hazardous chemicals to the environment, or exposure of workers or the public to chemicals. A CSV Review was conducted in 148 facilities at 29 sites. Eight generic vulnerabilities were documented related to: abandoned chemicals and chemical residuals; past chemical spills and ground releases; characterization of legacy chemicals and wastes; disposition of legacy chemicals; storage facilities and conditions; condition of facilities and support systems; unanalyzed and unaddressed hazards; and inventory control and tracking. Weaknesses in five programmatic areas were also identified related to: management commitment and planning; chemical safety management programs; aging facilities that continue to operate; nonoperating facilities awaiting deactivation; and resource allocations. Volume 2 consists of seven appendices containing the following: Tasking memorandums; Project plan for the CSV Review; Field verification guide for the CSV Review; Field verification report, Lawrence Livermore National Lab.; Field verification report, Oak Ridge Reservation; Field verification report, Savannah River Site; and the Field verification report, Hanford Site.

  11. Management response plan for the Chemical Safety Vulnerability Working Group report. Volume 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Chemical Safety Vulnerability (CSV) Working Group was established to identify adverse conditions involving hazardous chemicals at DOE facilities that might result in fires or explosions, release of hazardous chemicals to the environment, or exposure of workers or the public to chemicals. A CSV Review was conducted in 146 facilities at 29 sites. Eight generic vulnerabilities were documented related to: abandoned chemicals and chemical residuals; past chemical spills and ground releases; characterization of legacy chemicals and wastes; disposition of legacy chemicals; storage facilities and conditions; condition of facilities and support systems; unanalyzed and unaddressed hazards; and inventory control and tracking. Weaknesses in five programmatic areas were also identified related to: management commitment and planning; chemical safety management programs; aging facilities that continue to operate; nonoperating facilities awaiting deactivation; and resource allocations. Volume 1 contains a discussion of the chemical safety improvements planned or already underway at DOE sites to correct facility or site-specific vulnerabilities. The main part of the report is a discussion of each of the programmatic deficiencies; a description of the tasks to be accomplished; the specific actions to be taken; and the organizational responsibilities for implementation.

  12. Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    N /A

    1999-05-14T23:59:59.000Z

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering & Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone & Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested services. The procurement process included the environmental review specified in DOE's NEPA regulations in 10 CFR 1021.216. The six reactors selected are Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in South Carolina McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in North Carolina, and North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 in Virginia. The Supplement describes the potential environmental impacts of using MOX fuel in these six specific reactors named in the DCS proposal as well as other program changes made since the SPD Draft EIS was published.

  13. Toolbox Safety Talk Welding & Metal Work Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    Toolbox Safety Talk Welding & Metal Work Safety Environmental Health & Safety Facilities Safety or harmful emission giving metals. Welding Safety When welding outside of a designated welding booth, ensure injury. Avoid welding on materials such as galvanized or stainless steel in order to minimize toxic fume

  14. Feasibility study for a transportation operations system cask maintenance facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rennich, M.J.; Medley, L.G.; Attaway, C.R.

    1991-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for the development of a waste management program for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW). The program will include a transportation system for moving the nuclear waste from the sources to a geologic repository for permanent disposal. Specially designed casks will be used to safely transport the waste. The cask systems must be operated within limits imposed by DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Department of Transportation (DOT). A dedicated facility for inspecting, testing, and maintaining the cask systems was recommended by the General Accounting Office (in 1979) as the best means of assuring their operational effectiveness and safety, as well as regulatory compliance. In November of 1987, OCRWM requested a feasibility study be made of a Cask Maintenance Facility (CMF) that would perform the required functions. 46 refs., 16 figs., 13 tabs.

  15. Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition NNSS Capabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pat Arnold

    2011-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has tasked the WDD working group to disposition the large inventory of legacy classified weapon components scattered across the complex.

  16. Personal Property Disposition - Community Reuse Organizations...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Owen (signed) Director, Office of Worker and Community Transition Department of Energy Washington, DC 20505 January 22, 2003 Disposition of Excess Personal Property...

  17. Processing and Disposition of Special Actinide Target Materials - 13138

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robinson, Sharon M.; Patton, Brad D. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P.O. Box 2008, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (United States)] [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P.O. Box 2008, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (United States); Allender, Jeffrey S. [Savannah River National Laboratory (United States)] [Savannah River National Laboratory (United States)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy (DOE) manages an inventory of materials that contains a range of long-lived radioactive isotopes that were produced from the 1960's through the 1980's by irradiating targets in high-flux reactors at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to produce special heavy isotopes for DOE programmatic use, scientific research, and industrial and medical applications. Among the products were californium-252, heavy curium (including Cm-246 through Cm-248), and plutonium-242 and -244. Many of the isotopes are still in demand today, and they can be recovered from the remaining targets previously irradiated at SRS or produced from the recovered isotopes. Should the existing target materials be discarded, the plutonium (Pu) and curium (Cm) isotopes cannot be replaced readily with existing production sources. Some of these targets are stored at SRS, while other target material is stored at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at several stages of processing. The materials cannot be stored in their present form indefinitely. Their long-term management involves processing items for beneficial use and/or for disposition, using storage and process facilities at SRS and ORNL. Evaluations are under way for disposition options for these materials, and demonstrations of improved flow sheets to process the materials are being conducted at ORNL and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The disposition options and a management evaluation process have been developed. Processing demonstrations and evaluations for these unique materials are under way. (authors)

  18. Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 3 Disposition Decision Analysis and...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 3 Disposition Decision Analysis and Timeline Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 3 Disposition Decision Analysis and Timeline This Report to Congress provides a...

  19. New Applications of Gamma Spectroscopy: Characterization Tools for D&D Process Development, Inventory Reduction Planning & Shipping, Safety Analysis & Facility Management During the Heavy Element Facility Risk Reduction Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mitchell, M; Anderson, B; Gray, L; Vellinger, R; West, M; Gaylord, R; Larson, J; Jones, G; Shingleton, J; Harris, L; Harward, N

    2006-01-23T23:59:59.000Z

    Novel applications of gamma ray spectroscopy for D&D process development, inventory reduction, safety analysis and facility management are discussed in this paper. These applications of gamma spectroscopy were developed and implemented during the Risk Reduction Program (RPP) to successfully downgrade the Heavy Element Facility (B251) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) from a Category II Nuclear Facility to a Radiological Facility. Non-destructive assay in general, gamma spectroscopy in particular, were found to be important tools in project management, work planning, and work control (''Expect the unexpected and confirm the expected''), minimizing worker dose, and resulted in significant safety improvements and operational efficiencies. Inventory reduction activities utilized gamma spectroscopy to identify and confirm isotopics of legacy inventory, ingrowth of daughter products and the presence of process impurities; quantify inventory; prioritize work activities for project management; and to supply information to satisfy shipper/receiver documentation requirements. D&D activities utilize in-situ gamma spectroscopy to identify and confirm isotopics of legacy contamination; quantify contamination levels and monitor the progress of decontamination efforts; and determine the point of diminishing returns in decontaminating enclosures and glove boxes containing high specific activity isotopes such as {sup 244}Cm and {sup 238}Pu. In-situ gamma spectroscopy provided quantitative comparisons of several decontamination techniques (e.g. TLC-free Stripcoat{trademark}, Radiac{trademark} wash, acid wash, scrubbing) and was used as a part of an iterative process to determine the appropriate level of decontamination and optimal cost to benefit ratio. Facility management followed a formal, rigorous process utilizing an independent, state certified, peer-reviewed gamma spectroscopy program, in conjunction with other characterization techniques, process knowledge, and historical records, to provide information for work planning, work prioritization, work control, and safety analyses (e.g. development of hold points, stop work points); and resulted in B251 successfully achieving Radiological status on schedule. Gamma spectroscopy helped to define operational approaches to achieve radiation exposure ALARA, e.g. hold points, appropriate engineering controls, PPE, workstations, and time/distance/shielding in the development of ALARA plans. These applications of gamma spectroscopy can be used to improve similar activities at other facilities.

  20. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    N /A

    1999-11-19T23:59:59.000Z

    In December 1996, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Storage and Disposition PEIS)'' (DOE 1996a). That PEIS analyzes the potential environmental consequences of alternative strategies for the long-term storage of weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the disposition of weapons-usable plutonium that has been or may be declared surplus to national security needs. The Record of Decision (ROD) for the ''Storage and Disposition PEIS'', issued on January 14, 1997 (DOE 1997a), outlines DOE's decision to pursue an approach to plutonium disposition that would make surplus weapons-usable plutonium inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use. DOE's disposition strategy, consistent with the Preferred Alternative analyzed in the ''Storage and Disposition PEIS'', allows for both the immobilization of some (and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium and use of some of the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of both the immobilized plutonium and the MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a potential geologic repository.

  1. Evaluation of Calcine Disposition Path Forward

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Birrer, S.A.; Heiser, M.B.

    2003-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

    This document describes an evaluation of the baseline and two alternative disposition paths for the final disposition of the calcine wastes stored at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. The pathways are evaluated against a prescribed set of criteria and a recommendation is made for the path forward.

  2. Evaluation of Calcine Disposition - Path Forward

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Steve Birrer

    2003-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document describes an evaluation of the baseline and two alternative disposition paths for the final disposition of the calcine wastes stored at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. The pathways are evaluated against a prescribed set of criteria and a recommendation is made for the path forward.

  3. Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Part 1, Waste streams and treatment technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

    1992-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes health and safety concerns associated with the Mixed and Low-level Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Various hazards are described such as fire, electrical, explosions, reactivity, temperature, and radiation hazards, as well as the potential for accidental spills, exposure to toxic materials, and other general safety concerns.

  4. Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

    1992-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes health and safety concerns associated with the Mixed and Low-level Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Various hazards are described such as fire, electrical, explosions, reactivity, temperature, and radiation hazards, as well as the potential for accidental spills, exposure to toxic materials, and other general safety concerns.

  5. Nuclear Explosive Safety Manual - DOE Directives, Delegations...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    1A Admin Chg 1, Nuclear Explosive Safety Manual by Carl Sykes Functional areas: Administrative Change, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety and Health Requirement, Nuclear Safety,...

  6. Safety analysis report for the National Low-Temperature Neutron Irradiation Facility (NLTNIF) at the ORNL Bulk Shielding Reactor (BSR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Coltman, R.R. Jr.; Kerchner, H.R.; Klabunde, C.E.; Richardson, S.A.

    1986-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report provides information concerning: the experiment facility; experiment assembly; instrumentation and controls; materials; radioactivity; shielding; thermodynamics; estimated or measured reactivity effects; procedures; hazards; and quality assurance. (JDB)

  7. Barriers and Issues Related to Achieving Final Disposition of Depleted Uranium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gillas, D. L.; Chambers, B. K.

    2002-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

    Approximately 750,000 metric tons (MT) of surplus depleted uranium (DU) in various chemical forms are stored at several Department of Energy (DOE) sites throughout the United States. Most of the DU is in the form of DU hexafluoride (DUF6) that resulted from uranium enrichment operations over the last several decades. DOE plans to convert the DUF6 to ''a more stable form'' that could be any one or combination of DU tetrafluoride (DUF4 or green salt), DU oxide (DUO3, DUO2, or DU3O8), or metal depending on the final disposition chosen for any given quantity. Barriers to final disposition of this material have existed historically and some continue today. Currently, the barriers are more related to finding uses for this material versus disposing as waste. Even though actions are beginning to convert the DUF6, ''final'' disposition of the converted material has yet to be decided. Unless beneficial uses can be implemented, DOE plans to dispose of this material as waste. This expresses the main barrier to DU disposition; DOE's strategy is to dispose unless uses can be found while the strategy should be only dispose as a last resort and make every effort to find uses. To date, only minimal research programs are underway to attempt to develop non-fuel uses for this material. Other issues requiring resolution before these inventories can reach final disposition (uses or disposal) include characterization, disposal of large quantities, storage (current and future), and treatment options. Until final disposition is accomplished, these inventories must be managed in a safe and environmentally sound manner; however, this is becoming more difficult as materials and facilities age. The most noteworthy final disposition technical issues include the development of reuse and treatment options.

  8. EIS-0283: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium.

  9. Environmental Health and Safety Department

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    . Fire Safety, Radiation Safety and Hazardous Materials Facility are at other locations on campus Training Requirements If you work with: ∑ Biological Materials ∑ Chemical Agents ∑ Radiological Materials

  10. Comparison of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for Fuel Cycle Facilities, 2/17/11

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    During the 580th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), February10-12, 2011, we reviewed the staffís white paper, ďA Comparison of Integrated Safety Analysisand...

  11. Capturing Process Knowledge for Facility Deactivation and Decommissioning

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for the disposition of a vast number of facilities at numerous sites around the country which have been declared excess to current mission...

  12. Pre-title I safety evaluation for the retrieval operations of transuranic waste drums in the Solid Waste Disposal Facility. Revision 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rabin, M.S.

    1992-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Phase I of the Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facility Line Item Project includes the retrieval and safe storage of the pad drums that are stored on TRU pads 2-6 in the Solid Waste Disposal Facility (SWDF). Drums containing TRU waste were placed on these pads as early as 1974. The pads, once filled, were mounded with soil. The retrieval activities will include the excavation of the soil, retrieval of the pad drums, placing the drums in overpacks (if necessary) and venting and purging the retrieved drums. Once the drums have been vented and purged, they will be transported to other pads within the SWDF or in a designated area until they are eventually treated as necessary for ultimate shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico. This safety evaluation provides a bounding assessment of the radiological risk involved with the drum retrieval activities to the maximally exposed offsite individual and the co-located worker. The results of the analysis indicate that the risk to the maximally exposed offsite individual and the co-located worker using maximum frequencies and maximum consequences are within the acceptance criteria defined in WSRC Procedural Manual 9Q. The purpose of this evaluation is to demonstrate the incremental risk from the SWDF due to the retrieval activities for use as design input only. As design information becomes available, this evaluation can be revised to satisfy the safety analysis requirements of DOE Orders 4700 and 5480.23.

  13. Facility stabilization project, fiscal year 1998 -- Multi-year workplan (MYWP) for WBS 1.4

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Floberg, W.C.

    1997-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The primary Facility Stabilization mission is to provide minimum safe surveillance and maintenance of facilities and deactivate facilities on the Hanford Site, to reduce risks to workers, the public and environment, transition the facilities to a low cost, long term surveillance and maintenance state, and to provide safe and secure storage of special nuclear materials, nuclear materials, and nuclear fuel. Facility Stabilization will protect the health and safety of the public and workers, protect the environment and provide beneficial use of the facilities and other resources. Work will be in accordance with the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement), local, national, international and other agreements, and in compliance with all applicable Federal, state, and local laws. The stakeholders will be active participants in the decision processes including establishing priorities, and in developing a consistent set of rules, regulations, and laws. The work will be leveraged with a view of providing positive, lasting economic impact in the region. Effectiveness, efficiency, and discipline in all mission activities will enable Hanford Site to achieve its mission in a continuous and substantive manner. As the mission for Facility Stabilization has shifted from production to support of environmental restoration, each facility is making a transition to support the Site mission. The mission goals include the following: (1) Achieve deactivation of facilities for transfer to EM-40, using Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) plant deactivation as a model for future facility deactivation; (2) Manage nuclear materials in a safe and secure condition and where appropriate, in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards rules; (3) Treat nuclear materials as necessary, and store onsite in long-term interim safe storage awaiting a final disposition decision by US Department of Energy; (4) Implement nuclear materials disposition directives. In the near term these are anticipated to mostly involve transferring uranium to other locations for beneficial use. Work will be in accordance with the Tri-Party Agreement, and other agreements and in compliance with all applicable Federal, state and local laws. The transition to deactivation will be accomplished through a phased approach, while maintaining the facilities in a safe and compliant configuration. In addition, Facility Stabilization will continue to maintain safe long-term storage facilities for Special Nuclear Material (SNM), Nuclear Material (NM), and Nuclear Fuel (NF). The FSP deactivation strategy aligns with the deactivate facilities mission outlined in Hanford Site SE documentation. Inherent to the FSP strategies are specific Hanford Strategic Plan success indicators such as: reduction of risks to workers, the public and environment; increasing the amount of resources recovered for other uses; reduction/elimination of inventory and materials; and reduction/elimination of costly mortgages.

  14. SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NORTON SH

    2010-02-23T23:59:59.000Z

    CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material. The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford nuclear reservation. Workers had to pass through metal detectors when they arrived at the plant and materials leaving the plant had to be scanned for security reasons. Whereas other high-security nuclear materials were shipped from the PFP to Savannah River, S.C. as part ofa Department of Energy (DOE) program to consolidate weapons-grade plutonium, it was determined that the SIF should remain onsite pending disposition to a national repository. Nevertheless, the SIF still requires a high level of security that the PFP complex has always provided. With the 60-year PFP mission of producing and storing plutonium concluded, the environmental cleanup plans for Hanford call for the demolition of the 63-building PFP complex. Consequently, if the SIF remained at PFP it not only would have interfered with the environmental cleanup plans, but would have required $100 million in facility upgrades to meet increased national security requirements imposed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A new smaller and more cost-effective area was needed to store this material, which led to the SIF Project. Once the SIF project was successfully completed and the SIF was safely removed from PFP, the existing Protected Area at PFP could be removed, and demolition could proceed more quickly without being encumbered by restrictive security requirements that an active Protected Area requires. The lightened PFP security level brought by safely removing and storing the SIF would also yield lowered costs for deactivation and demolition, as well as reduce overall life-cycle costs.

  15. Facilities Condition and Hazards Assessment for Materials and Fuel Complex Facilities MFC-799, 799A, and 770C

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gary Mecham; Don Konoyer

    2009-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Materials & Fuel Complex (MFC) facilities 799 Sodium Processing Facility (a single building consisting of two areas: the Sodium Process Area (SPA) and the Carbonate Process Area (CPA), 799A Caustic Storage Area, and 770C Nuclear Calibration Laboratory have been declared excess to future Department of Energy mission requirements. Transfer of these facilities from Nuclear Energy to Environmental Management, and an associated schedule for doing so, have been agreed upon by the two offices. The prerequisites for this transfer to occur are the removal of nonexcess materials and chemical inventory, deinventory of the calibration source in MFC-770C, and the rerouting and/or isolation of utility and service systems. This report provides a description of the current physical condition and any hazards (material, chemical, nuclear or occupational) that may be associated with past operations of these facilities. This information will document conditions at time of transfer of the facilities from Nuclear Energy to Environmental Management and serve as the basis for disposition planning. The process used in obtaining this information included document searches, interviews and facility walk-downs. A copy of the facility walk-down checklist is included in this report as Appendix A. MFC-799/799A/770C are all structurally sound and associated hazardous or potentially hazardous conditions are well defined and well understood. All installed equipment items (tanks, filters, etc.) used to process hazardous materials remain in place and appear to have maintained their integrity. There is no evidence of leakage and all openings are properly sealed or closed off and connections are sound. The pits appear clean with no evidence of cracking or deterioration that could lead to migration of contamination. Based upon the available information/documentation reviewed and the overall conditions observed during the facilities walk-down, it is concluded that these facilities may be disposed of at minimal risk to human health, safety or the environment.

  16. Facilities Management (FM) has run a highly successful safety incentive program since 2009 that has saved millions

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Webb, Peter

    that has saved millions of dollars. During the initial two-year program, 12 FM work teams avoided lost time and its employees have saved more than $3 million, while lowering the number and severity of injuries costs -- a drop of more than $1 million. These savings were generated from a $40,000 annual safety

  17. Disposition of intravenous radioactive acyclovir

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    de Miranda, P.; Good, S.S.; Laskin, O.L.; Krasny, H.C.; Connor, J.D.; Lietman, P.S.

    1981-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The kinetic and metabolic disposition of (8-14C)acyclovir (ACV) was investigated in five subjects with advanced malignancy. The drug was administered by 1-hr intravenous infusion at doses of 0.5 and 2.5 mg/kg. Plasma and blood radioactivity-time, and plasma concentration-time data were defined by a two-compartment open kinetic model. There was nearly equivalent distribution of radioactivity in blood and plasma. The overall mean plasma half-life and total body clearance +/- SD of ACV were 2.1 +/- 0.5 hr and 297 +/- 53 ml/min/1.73 m2. Binding of ACV to plasma proteins was 15.4 +/- 4.4%. Most of the radioactive dose excreted was recovered in the urine (71% to 99%) with less than 2% excretion in the feces and only trace amounts in the expired Co2. Analyses by reverse-phase high-performance liquid chromatography indicated that 9-(carboxymethoxymethyl)guanine was the only significant urinary metabolite of ACV, accounting for 8.5% to 14.1% of the dose. A minor metabolite (less than 0.2% of dose) had the retention time of 8-hydroxy-9-((2-hydroxyethoxy)methyl)guanine. Unchanged urinary ACV ranged from 62% to 91% of the dose. There was no indication of ACV cleavage to guanine. Renal clearance of ACV was approximately three times the corresponding creatinine clearances.

  18. CRAD, Safety Basis - Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characteriza...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Safety Basis - Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility CRAD, Safety Basis - Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste...

  19. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1997-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement.

  20. NRC comprehensive records disposition schedule. Revision 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Title 44 US Code, ``Public Printing and Documents,`` regulations issued by the General Service Administration (GSA) in 41 CFR Chapter 101, Subchapter B, ``Management and Use of Information and Records,`` and regulations issued by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in 36 CFR Chapter 12, Subchapter B, ``Records Management,`` require each agency to prepare and issue a comprehensive records disposition schedule that contains the NARA approved records disposition schedules for records unique to the agency and contains the NARA`s General Records Schedules for records common to several or all agencies. The approved records disposition schedules specify the appropriate duration of retention and the final disposition for records created or maintained by the NRC. NUREG-0910, Rev. 3, contains ``NRC`s Comprehensive Records Disposition Schedule,`` and the original authorized approved citation numbers issued by NARA. Rev. 3 incorporates NARA approved changes and additions to the NRC schedules that have been implemented since the last revision dated March, 1992, reflects recent organizational changes implemented at the NRC, and includes the latest version of NARA`s General Records Schedule (dated August 1995).

  1. Life cycle costs for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition option

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, K.A.

    1999-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Projected constant dollar life cycle cost (LCC) estimates are presented for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition program being managed by the US Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD). The scope of the LCC estimate includes: design, construction, licensing, operation, and deactivation of a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility (FFF) that will be used to purify and convert weapons-derived plutonium oxides to MOX fuel pellets and fabricate MOX fuel bundles for use in commercial pressurized-water reactors (PWRs); fuel qualification activities and modification of facilities required for manufacture of lead assemblies that will be used to qualify and license this MOX fuel; and modification, licensing, and operation of commercial PWRs to allow irradiation of a partial core of MOX fuel in combination with low-enriched uranium fuel. The baseline cost elements used for this document are the same as those used for examination of the preferred sites described in the site-specific final environmental impact statement and in the DOE Record of Decision that will follow in late 1999. Cost data are separated by facilities, government accounting categories, contract phases, and expenditures anticipated by the various organizations who will participate in the program over a 20-year period. Total LCCs to DOE/MD are projected at approximately $1.4 billion for a 33-MT plutonium disposition mission.

  2. Independent Oversight Assessment, Salt Waste Processing Facility...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Salt Waste Processing Facility Project - January 2013 January 2013 Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing Facility Project The U.S. Department...

  3. Analysis of disposition alternatives for radioactively contaminated scrap metal

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nieves, L.A.; Chen, S.Y.; Kohout, E.J.; Nabelssi, B.; Tilbrook, R.W.; Wilson, S.E.

    1997-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Millions of tonnes of slightly radioactive, scrap iron and steel, stainless steel, and copper are likely to become available as nuclear and other facilities and equipment are withdrawn from service. Disposition of this material is an international policy issue under consideration currently. The major alternatives for managing this material are to either develop a regulatory process for decontamination and recycling that will safeguard human health or to dispose of the scrap and replace the metal stocks. To evaluate the alternatives, we estimate quantities of scrap arising from nuclear power plant decommissioning, evaluate potential price impacts of recycling on regional markets, and assess the health and environmental impacts of the management alternatives. We conclude that decontaminating and recycling the scrap is the superior alternative.

  4. Environmental, Health and Safety Assessment: ATS 7H Program (Phase 3R) Test Activities at the GE Power Systems Gas Turbine Manufacturing Facility, Greenville, SC

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    1998-11-17T23:59:59.000Z

    International Technology Corporation (IT) was contracted by General Electric Company (GE) to assist in the preparation of an Environmental, Health and Safety (HI&3) assessment of the implementation of Phase 3R of the Advanced Turbine System (ATS) 7H program at the GE Gas Turbines facility located in Greenville, South Carolina. The assessment was prepared in accordance with GE's contractual agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy (GE/DOE Cooperative Agreement DE-FC21-95MC3 1176) and supports compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970. This report provides a summary of the EH&S review and includes the following: General description of current site operations and EH&S status, Description of proposed ATS 7H-related activities and discussion of the resulting environmental, health, safety and other impacts to the site and surrounding area. Listing of permits and/or licenses required to comply with federal, state and local regulations for proposed 7H-related activities. Assessment of adequacy of current and required permits, licenses, programs and/or plans.

  5. EIS-0287: Idaho High-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS analyzes the potential environmental consequences of alternatives for managing high-level waste (HLW) calcine, mixed transuranic waste/sodium bearing waste (SBW) and newly generated liquid...

  6. Major Risk Factors Integrated Facility Disposition Project - Oak Ridge |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 111 1,613 122Commercial602 1,39732on

  7. Assessment of the Integrated Facility Disposition Project at Oak Ridge

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T, Inc.'s ReplyApplication of Training April 30,WindAssessment ofASSESSMENTNational

  8. Master EM Project Definition Rating Index - Facility Disposition Definitions

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels DataDepartment of Energy Your Density Isn't YourTransport(FactDepartment3311, 3312), October 20122 DOE Hydrogenis Winding theremoved3243

  9. Major Risk Factors to the Integrated Facility Disposition Project

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently Asked Questions forCheney suggesting a billVehiclesJune59Products28,Into Service ToTech

  10. Major Risk Factors Integrated Facility Disposition Project - Oak Ridge

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic2 OPAM Flash2011-12Approvedof6,Projects |MANAGEMENTMOJAVEApril 17, 2009Projects

  11. Major Risk Factors to the Integrated Facility Disposition Project |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic2 OPAM Flash2011-12Approvedof6,Projects |MANAGEMENTMOJAVEApril 17,

  12. Independent Oversight Inspection, Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility- August 2008

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Inspection of Environment, Safety and Health Programs at the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility

  13. Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1994-04-30T23:59:59.000Z

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.

  14. BNL | CFN Operations Safety Awareness (COSA) Training

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    CFN Operations Safety Awareness (COSA) Training All users at the CFN must complete the CFN Operations Safety Awareness (COSA) Training before they can access the facilities. COSA...

  15. Nuclear Explosive Safety Evaluation Processes - DOE Directives...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    2 Admin Chg 1, Nuclear Explosive Safety Evaluation Processes by Carl Sykes Functional areas: Administrative Change, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety and Health Requirement, Defense...

  16. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required.

  17. PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT: UNITED STATES PLUTONIUM CONSOLIDATION AND DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Koenig, R.; Davies, S.

    2009-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Following the end of the Cold War, the United States identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium and larger quantities of enriched uranium that are permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) also began shutting down, stabilizing, and removing inventories from production facilities that were no longer needed to support weapons programs and non-weapons activities. The storage of 'Category I' nuclear materials at Rocky Flats, Sandia National Laboratories, and several smaller sites has been terminated to reduce costs and safeguards risks. De-inventory continues at the Hanford site and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Consolidation of inventories works in concert with the permanent disposition of excess inventories, including several tonnes of plutonium that have already been disposed to waste repositories and the preparation for transfers to the planned Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (for the bulk of the excess plutonium) and alternative disposition methods for material that cannot be used readily in the MOX fuel cycle. This report describes status of plutonium consolidation and disposition activities and their impacts on continuing operations, particularly at the Savannah River Site.

  18. Disposition and transportation of surplus radioactive low specific activity nitric acid. Volume 1, Environmental Assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    DOE is deactivating the PUREX plant at Hanford; this will involve the disposition of about 692,000 liters (183,000 gallons) of surplus nitric acid contaminated with low levels of U and other radionuclides. The nitric acid, designated as low specific activity, is stored in 4 storage tanks at PUREX. Five principal alternatives were evaluated: transfer for reuse (sale to BNF plc), no action, continued storage in Hanford upgraded or new facility, consolidation of DOE surplus acid, and processing the LSA nitric acid as waste. The transfer to BNF plc is the preferred alternative. From the analysis, it is concluded that the proposed disposition and transportation of the acid does not constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of NEPA; therefore an environmental impact statement is not required.

  19. FLUOR HANFORD SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    GARVIN, L J; JENSEN, M A

    2004-04-13T23:59:59.000Z

    This document summarizes safety management programs used within the scope of the ''Project Hanford Management Contract''. The document has been developed to meet the format and content requirements of DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses''. This document provides summary descriptions of Fluor Hanford safety management programs, which Fluor Hanford nuclear facilities may reference and incorporate into their safety basis when producing facility- or activity-specific documented safety analyses (DSA). Facility- or activity-specific DSAs will identify any variances to the safety management programs described in this document and any specific attributes of these safety management programs that are important for controlling potentially hazardous conditions. In addition, facility- or activity-specific DSAs may identify unique additions to the safety management programs that are needed to control potentially hazardous conditions.

  20. Used fuel disposition research and development roadmap - FY10 status.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nutt, W. M. (Nuclear Engineering Division)

    2010-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Since 1987 the U.S. has focused research and development activities relevant to the disposal of commercial used nuclear fuel and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned spent nuclear fuel and high level waste on the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. At the same time, the U.S. successfully deployed a deep geologic disposal facility for defense-related transuranic waste in bedded salt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. In 2009 the DOE established the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) within the Office of Nuclear Energy. The Mission of the UFDC is to identify alternatives and conduct scientific research and technology development to enable storage, transportation and disposal of used nuclear fuel and wastes generated by existing and future nuclear fuel cycles. The U.S. national laboratories have participated on these programs and has conducted research and development related to these issues to a limited extent. However, a comprehensive research and development (R&D) program investigating a variety of geologic media has not been a part of the U.S. waste management program since the mid 1980s. Such a comprehensive R&D program is being developed in the UFDC with a goal of meeting the UFDC Grand Challenge to provide a sound technical basis for absolute confidence in the safety and security of long-term storage, transportation, and disposal of used nuclear fuel and wastes from the nuclear energy enterprise. The DOE has decided to no longer pursue the development of a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Since a repository site will ultimately have to be selected, sited, characterized, designed, and licensed, other disposal options must now be considered. In addition to the unsaturated volcanic tuff evaluated at Yucca Mountain, several different geologic media are under investigation internationally and preliminary assessments indicate that disposal of used nuclear fuel and high level waste in these media is feasible. Considerable progress has been made in the U.S. and other nations in understanding disposal concepts in different geologic media, but gaps in knowledge still exist. A principal aspect of concern to the UFDC as it considers the broad issues of siting a repository in different geologic media are the marked differences in the regulatory bases for assessing suitability and safety of a repository between the U.S. and other nations. Because the probability based - risked informed nature of the current U.S. regulations for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel is sufficiently different from other regulations, information gained in previous studies, while useful, likely need to be supplemented to enable more convincing communication with the public, better defense of the numerical models, and stronger safety cases. Thus, it was recognized when the UFDC was established that there were readily identified disposal-related R&D opportunities to address knowledge gaps. An effort to document these research opportunities was a key component of Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 engineered system, natural system, and system-level modeling activities for a range of disposal environments. A principal contribution to identifying these gaps was a workshop held to gather perspectives from experts both within and external to the UFDC regarding R&D opportunities. In the planning for FY2010 it was expected that these activities would culminate with a UFDC research and development roadmap that would identify the knowledge gaps, discuss the R&D needed to fill these gaps, and prioritize the proposed R&D over both the near- and long-term. A number of knowledge gaps and needed R&D were identified and are discussed in this report. However, these preliminary R&D topics have not been evaluated in detail nor have they been prioritized to support future planning efforts. This will be completed in FY11 and the final UFDC Research and Development Roadmap will be completed. This report discusses proposed R&D topics in three areas related to repository siting, design, and performance: natural systems

  1. CRAD, Facility Safety - Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements |

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T, Inc.'sEnergy Bush HydrogenEmissions andDepartment of EnergyDepartment of

  2. High Purity Germanium Gamma-PHA Assay of Uranium Storage Pigs for 321-M Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dewberry, R.A.

    2001-09-18T23:59:59.000Z

    The Analytical Development Section of SRTC was requested by the Facilities Disposition Division (FDD) to determine the holdup of enriched uranium in the 321-M facility as part of an overall deactivation project of the facility. The 321-M facility was used to fabricate enriched uranium fuel assemblies, lithium-aluminum target tubes, neptunium assemblies, and miscellaneous components for the production reactors. The facility also includes the 324-M storage building and the passageway connecting it to 321-M. The results of the holdup assays are essential for determining compliance with the Solid Waste's Waste Acceptance Criteria, Material Control and Accountability, and to meet criticality safety controls. This report describes and documents the use of a portable HPGe detector and EG and G Dart system that contains a high voltage power supply, signal processing electronics, a personal computer with Gamma-Vision software, and space to store and manipulate multiple 4096-channel g-ray spectra to assay for 235U content in 268 uranium shipping and storage pigs. This report includes a description of three efficiency calibration configurations and also the results of the assay. A description of the quality control checks is included as well.

  3. NASA Benchmarks Safety Functions Assessment plan - Developed...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    SAFETY FUNCTIONS Assessment Plan Developed By NNSANevada Site Office Facility Representative Division Performance Objective: Management should be proactive in addressing...

  4. Summary report of the screening process to determine reasonable alternatives for long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-03-29T23:59:59.000Z

    Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials (primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium) have become surplus to national defense needs both in the US and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety and health consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. As announced in the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the Department of Energy is currently conducting an evaluation process for disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials determined surplus to National Security needs, and long-term storage of national security and programmatic inventories, and surplus weapons-usable fissile materials that are not able to go directly from interim storage to disposition. An extensive set of long-term storage and disposition options was compiled. Five broad long-term storage options were identified; thirty-seven options were considered for plutonium disposition; nine options were considered for HEU disposition; and eight options were identified for Uranium-233 disposition. Section 2 discusses the criteria used in the screening process. Section 3 describes the options considered, and Section 4 provides a detailed summary discussions of the screening results.

  5. The ultimate disposition of depleted uranium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lemons, T.R. [Uranium Enrichment Organization, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    1991-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    Depleted uranium (DU) is produced as a by-product of the uranium enrichment process. Over 340,000 MTU of DU in the form of UF{sub 6} have been accumulated at the US government gaseous diffusion plants and the stockpile continues to grow. An overview of issues and objectives associated with the inventory management and the ultimate disposition of this material is presented.

  6. Nuclear Materials Disposition | Department of Energy

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level:Energy: Grid Integration Redefining What's Possible for Renewable Energy:Nanowire3627 Federal Register /7 ThisNuclear Materials Disposition

  7. INCIDENT # CHARGE SECTION OF NYS PENAL LAW DISPOSITION TYPE REPORTED TO PLACE OF OCCURRENCE DATE & TIME OF OCCURRENCE DATE & TIME REPORTED 1304224 None

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johnson Jr.,, Ray

    INCIDENT # CHARGE SECTION OF NYS PENAL LAW DISPOSITION TYPE REPORTED TO PLACE OF OCCURRENCE DATE Public Safety Department Music Building 6442 Kissena Blvd., Flushing, NY 11367 April 29, 2013 2:15PM Building 6660 Kissena Blvd., Flushing, NY 11367 May 1, 2013 12:15PM May 1, 2013 2:50PM 1305279 None Petit

  8. Portsmouth Proposed Plan for the Site-wide Waste Disposition...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Proposed Plan for the Site-wide Waste Disposition Evaluation Project DOE has evaluated alternatives for managing waste that would be created by decomtamination and...

  9. Additional public meeting on plutonium disposition on September...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    produce an oxide form of plutonium suitable for disposition and the use of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabricated from surplus plutonium in domestic commercial nuclear power reactors...

  10. DRAFT EM SSAB Chairźs Meeting Waste Disposition Strategies...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    EM HQ Updates Waste Disposition Overview Christine Gelles Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Waste Management Office of Environmental Management EM SSAB Chairs Meeting 5...

  11. DOE handbook electrical safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Electrical Safety Handbook presents the Department of Energy (DOE) safety standards for DOE field offices or facilities involved in the use of electrical energy. It has been prepared to provide a uniform set of electrical safety guidance and information for DOE installations to effect a reduction or elimination of risks associated with the use of electrical energy. The objectives of this handbook are to enhance electrical safety awareness and mitigate electrical hazards to employees, the public, and the environment.

  12. Electrical safety guidelines

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Electrical Safety Guidelines prescribes the DOE safety standards for DOE field offices or facilities involved in the use of electrical energy. It has been prepared to provide a uniform set of electrical safety standards and guidance for DOE installations in order to affect a reduction or elimination of risks associated with the use of electrical energy. The objectives of these guidelines are to enhance electrical safety awareness and mitigate electrical hazards to employees, the public, and the environment.

  13. Team Surpasses 1 Million Hours Safety Milestone

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    NISKAYUNA, N.Y. Ė Vigilance and dedication to safety led the EM programís disposition project team at the Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU) to achieve a milestone of one million hours ó over two-and-a-half-years ó without injury or illness resulting in time away from work.

  14. Policies,Safety&U Annual Security and Fire Safety Report

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Lee, Dongwon

    ................................................................................ 5 ABOUT THE PENN STATE HARRISBURG SAFETY AND POLICE SERVICES ..... 5 Role, Authority, and Training .................................................................... 7 SECURITY OF and ACCESS TO PENN STATE HARRISBURG FACILITIES ........ 8 Special Considerations

  15. High Purity Germanium Gamma-PHA Assay of Uranium in Scrap Cans for 321-M Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Salaymeh, S.R.

    2002-03-22T23:59:59.000Z

    The Analytical Development Section of SRTC was requested by the Facilities Disposition Division to determine the holdup of enriched uranium in the 321-M facility as part of an overall deactivation project of the facility. This report includes a description of two efficiency calibration configurations and also the results of the assay. A description of the quality control checks is included as well.

  16. Toolbox Safety Talk Lead Awareness

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    Toolbox Safety Talk Lead Awareness Environmental Health & Safety Facilities Safety & Health Section Health & Safety for recordkeeping. Lead based paint is commonly found in homes built before 1978 and many industrial paints today still contain lead. Lead overexposure is one of the leading causes of workplace

  17. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States). Fission Energy and Systems Safety Program

    1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient.

  18. Facility worker technical basis document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    EVANS, C.B.

    2003-03-21T23:59:59.000Z

    This report documents the technical basis for facility worker safety to support the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis and described the criteria and methodology for allocating controls to hazardous conditions with significant facility worker consequences and presents the results of the allocation.

  19. Facility Safety | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic Plan| Department of.pdf6-OPAMDepartment6 FY 2007FY

  20. Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power Administration wouldDECOMPOSITIONPortal Decision Support forDeep Insights from8, 2014

  1. Seismic Safety Guide

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eagling, D.G. (ed.)

    1983-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This guide provides managers with practical guidelines for administering a comprehensive earthquake safety program. The Guide is comprehensive with respect to earthquakes in that it covers the most important aspects of natural hazards, site planning, evaluation and rehabilitation of existing buildings, design of new facilities, operational safety, emergency planning, special considerations related to shielding blocks, non-structural elements, lifelines, fire protection and emergency facilities. Management of risk and liabilities is also covered. Nuclear facilities per se are not dealt with specifically. The principles covered also apply generally to nuclear facilities but the design and construction of such structures are subject to special regulations and legal controls.

  2. TWRS safety program plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Calderon, L.M., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Management of Nuclear Safety, Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene, and Fire Protection programs, functions, and field support resources for Tank Waste Remediation Systems (TWRS) has, until recently, been centralized in TWRS Safety, under the Emergency, Safety, and Quality organization. Industrial hygiene technician services were also provided to support operational needs related to safety basis compliance. Due to WHC decentralization of safety and reengineering efforts in West Tank Farms, staffing and safety responsibilities have been transferred to the facilities. Under the new structure, safety personnel for TWRS are assigned directly to East Tank Farms, West Tank Farms, and a core Safety Group in TWRS Engineering. The Characterization Project Operations (CPO) safety organization will remain in tact as it currently exists. Personnel assigned to East Tank Farms, West Tank Farms, and CPO will perform facility-specific or project-specific duties and provide field implementation of programs. Those assigned to the core group will focus on activities having a TWRS-wide or programmatic focus. Hanford-wide activities will be the responsibility of the Safety Center of Expertise. In order to ensure an effective and consistent safety program for TWRS under the new organization program functions, goals, organizational structure, roles, responsibilities, and path forward must be clearly established. The purpose of the TWRS Safety Program Plan is to define the overall safety program, responsibilities, relationships, and communication linkages for safety personnel under the new structure. In addition, issues associated with reorganization transition are addressed, including training, project ownership, records management, and dissemination of equipment. For the purpose of this document ``TWRS Safety`` refers to all safety professionals and technicians (Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene, Fire Protection, and Nuclear Safety) within the TWRS organization, regardless of their location in the organization.

  3. Plutonium Disposition Program | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)IntegratedSpeeding accessPeptoidLabPhysics PhysicsPlatinumPlatinumDisposition

  4. Material Disposition | National Nuclear Security Administration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOE Office of Science (SC)Integrated Codes |IsLove Your Home andDisposition | National Nuclear Security

  5. A little here, a little there, a fairly big problem everywhere: Small quantity site transuranic waste disposition alternatives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    D. Luke; D. Parker; J. Moss; T. Monk (INEEL); L. Fritz (DOE-ID); B. Daugherty (SRS); K. Hladek (WM Federal Services Hanford); S. Kosiewicx (LANL)

    2000-02-27T23:59:59.000Z

    Small quantities of transuranic (TRU) waste represent a significant challenge to the waste disposition and facility closure plans of several sites in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. This paper presents the results of a series of evaluations, using a systems engineering approach, to identify the preferred alternative for dispositioning TRU waste from small quantity sites (SQSs). The TRU waste disposition alternatives evaluation used semi-quantitative data provided by the SQSs, potential receiving sites, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to select and recommend candidate sites for waste receipt, interim storage, processing, and preparation for final disposition of contact-handled (CH) and remote-handled (RH) TRU waste. The evaluations of only four of these SQSs resulted in potential savings to the taxpayer of $33 million to $81 million, depending on whether mobile systems could be used to characterize, package, and certify the waste or whether each site would be required to perform this work. Small quantity shipping sites included in the evaluation included the Battelle Columbus Laboratory (BCL), University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR), Energy Technology Engineering Center (ETEC), and Mound Laboratory. Candidate receiving sites included the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), the Savannah River Site (SRS), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Oak Ridge (OR), and Hanford. At least 14 additional DOE sites having TRU waste may be able to save significant money if cost savings are similar to the four evaluated thus far.

  6. A Little Here, A Little There, A Fairly Big Problem Everywhere: Small Quantity Site Transuranic Waste Disposition Alternatives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Luke, Dale Elden; Parker, Douglas Wayne; Moss, J.; Monk, Thomas Hugh; Fritz, Lori Lee; Daugherty, B.; Hladek, K.; Kosiewicx, S.

    2000-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Small quantities of transuranic (TRU) waste represent a significant challenge to the waste disposition and facility closure plans of several sites in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. This paper presents the results of a series of evaluations, using a systems engineering approach, to identify the preferred alternative for dispositioning TRU waste from small quantity sites (SQSs). The TRU waste disposition alternatives evaluation used semi-quantitative data provided by the SQSs, potential receiving sites, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to select and recommend candidate sites for waste receipt, interim storage, processing, and preparation for final disposition of contact-handled (CH) and remote-handled (RH) TRU waste. The evaluations of only four of these SQSs resulted in potential savings to the taxpayer of $33 million to $81 million, depending on whether mobile systems could be used to characterize, package, and certify the waste or whether each site would be required to perform this work. Small quantity shipping sites included in the evaluation included the Battelle Columbus Laboratory (BCL), University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR), Energy Technology Engineering Center (ETEC), and Mound. Candidate receiving sites included the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), the Savannah River Site (SRS), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Oak Ridge (OR), and Hanford. At least 14 additional DOE sites having TRU waste may be able to save significant money if cost savings are similar to the four evaluated thus far.

  7. FACILITY WORKER TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    SHULTZ, M.V.

    2005-03-31T23:59:59.000Z

    This technical basis document was developed to support RPP-13033, ''Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). It describes the criteria and methodology for allocating controls to hazardous conditions with significant facility worker (FW) consequence and presents the results of the allocation. The criteria and methodology for identifying controls that address FW safety are in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses''.

  8. Safety study application guide. Safety Analysis Report Update Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., (Energy Systems) is committed to performing and documenting safety analyses for facilities it manages for the Department of Energy (DOE). Included are analyses of existing facilities done under the aegis of the Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program, and analyses of new and modified facilities. A graded approach is used wherein the level of analysis and documentation for each facility is commensurate with the magnitude of the hazard(s), the complexity of the facility and the stage of the facility life cycle. Safety analysis reports (SARs) for hazard Category 1 and 2 facilities are usually detailed and extensive because these categories are associated with public health and safety risk. SARs for Category 3 are normally much less extensive because the risk to public health and safety is slight. At Energy Systems, safety studies are the name given to SARs for Category 3 (formerly {open_quotes}low{close_quotes}) facilities. Safety studies are the appropriate instrument when on-site risks are limited to irreversible consequences to a few people, and off-site consequences are limited to reversible consequences to a few people. This application guide provides detailed instructions for performing safety studies that meet the requirements of DOE Orders 5480.22, {open_quotes}Technical Safety Requirements,{close_quotes} and 5480.23, {open_quotes}Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.{close_quotes} A seven-chapter format has been adopted for safety studies. This format allows for discussion of all the items required by DOE Order 5480.23 and for the discussions to be readily traceable to the listing in the order. The chapter titles are: (1) Introduction and Summary, (2) Site, (3) Facility Description, (4) Safety Basis, (5) Hazardous Material Management, (6) Management, Organization, and Institutional Safety Provisions, and (7) Accident Analysis.

  9. Evaluation of the US Department of Energy's occupational safety and health program for its government-owned contractor-operated facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    An evaluation of the Department of Energy's (DOE) occupational safety and health programs for its government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) activities was completed by the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in response to DOE's request for assistance. The purpose of the evaluation was to provide DOE with a blueprint for strengthening these programs. Under the leadership of Secretary of Energy James Watkins, DOE has launched a number of significant initiatives designed to instill a new culture of safety and health accountability within the Department. The Secretary of Energy's personal concern for safety and health was not being reflected in the priorities, resource allocation decisions and planning of DOE and GOCO managers. The report recommends that DOE consider major organizational changes, changes in priorities, and the development of operationally meaningful safety and health goals and objectives together with the accountability systems necessary to measure progress.

  10. The Use of the Hanford Onsite Packaging and Transportation Safety Program to Meet Cleanup Milestones Under the Hanford Site Cleanup 2015 Vision and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 - 12403

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lavender, John C. [CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company, Richland, WA 99354 (United States); Edwards, W. Scott [Areva Federal Services, Richland, WA 99354 (United States); Macbeth, Paul J.; Self, Richard J. [U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office, Richland, WA 99352 (United States); West, Lori D. [Materials and Energy Corporation, Richland, WA 99354 (United States)

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Hanford Site presents unique challenges in meeting the U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) 2015 Cleanup Vision. CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), its subcontractors, and DOE-RL were challenged to retrieve, transport and remediate a wide range of waste materials. Through a collaborative effort by all Hanford Onsite Central Plateau Cleanup Team Members, disposition pathways for diverse and seemingly impossible to ship wastes were developed under a DOE Order 460.1C-compliant Hanford Onsite Transportation Safety Program. The team determined an effective method for transporting oversized compliant waste payloads to processing and disposition facilities. The use of the onsite TSD packaging authorizations proved to be vital to safely transporting these materials for processing and eventual final disposition. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provided additional resources to expedite planning and execution of these important cleanup milestones. Through the innovative and creative use of the TSD, the Hanford Onsite Central Plateau Cleanup Team Members have developed and are executing an integrated project plan that enables the safe and compliant transport of a wide variety of difficult-to-transport waste items, accelerating previous cleanup schedules to meet cleanup milestones. (authors)

  11. Hanford Surplus Facilities Program plan, Fiscal year 1991

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hughes, M.C.; Wahlen, R.K.; Winship, R.A.

    1990-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Hanford Surplus Facilities Program is responsible for the safe and cost-effective surveillance, maintenance, and decommissioning of surplus facilities at the Hanford Site. The management of these facilities requires a surveillance and maintenance program to keep them in a safe condition and development of a plan for ultimate disposition. Criteria used to evaluate each factor relative to decommissioning are based on the guidelines presented by the US Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office, Environmental Restoration Division, and are consistent with the Westinghouse Hanford Company commitment to decommission the Hanford Site retired facilities in the safest and most cost-effective way achievable. This document outlines the plan for managing these facilities to the end of disposition. 12 refs., 2 figs., 4 tabs.

  12. Comparison of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and Probabilistic...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Comparison of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for Fuel Cycle Facilities, 21711 Comparison of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and...

  13. Nuclear Reactor Safety Design Criteria

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1993-01-19T23:59:59.000Z

    The order establishes nuclear safety criteria applicable to the design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements of nuclear reactor facilities and safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) within these facilities. Cancels paragraphs 8a and 8b of DOE 5480.6. Cancels DOE O 5480.6 in part. Certified 11-18-10.

  14. Integrated Safety Management Policy

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-04-25T23:59:59.000Z

    The policy establishes DOE's expectation for safety, including integrated safety management that will enable the Departmentís mission goals to be accomplished efficiently while ensuring safe operations at all departmental facilities and activities. Cancels DOE P 411.1, DOE P 441.1, DOE P 450.2A, DOE P 450.4, and DOE P 450.7

  15. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S. [and others

    1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition.

  16. Surveillance Guide - OSS 19.2 Electrical Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Date: Facility Representative RL Facility Representative Program March 9, 1995 Surveillance Guide OSS 19.2 Revision 0 Electrical Safety Page 5 of 8...

  17. Surveillance Guide - NSS 18.1 Criticality Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Date: Facility Representative RL Facility Representative Program May 26, 1995 Surveillance Guide NSS-18.1 Revision 0 Criticality Safety Page 5 of 7...

  18. Surveillance Guide - NSS 18.2 Technical Safety Requirements

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Date: Facility Representative RL Facility Representative Program December 8, 2003 Surveillance Guide NSS 18.2 Revision 2 Technical Safety Requirements Page 5 of 5...

  19. The ultimate disposition of depleted uranium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Significant amounts of the depleted uranium (DU) created by past uranium enrichment activities have been sold, disposed of commercially, or utilized by defense programs. In recent years, however, the demand for DU has become quite small compared to quantities available, and within the US Department of Energy (DOE) there is concern for any risks and/or cost liabilities that might be associated with the ever-growing inventory of this material. As a result, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), was asked to review options and to develop a comprehensive plan for inventory management and the ultimate disposition of DU accumulated at the gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs). An Energy Systems task team, under the chairmanship of T. R. Lemons, was formed in late 1989 to provide advice and guidance for this task. This report reviews options and recommends actions and objectives in the management of working inventories of partially depleted feed (PDF) materials and for the ultimate disposition of fully depleted uranium (FDU). Actions that should be considered are as follows. (1) Inspect UF{sub 6} cylinders on a semiannual basis. (2) Upgrade cylinder maintenance and storage yards. (3) Convert FDU to U{sub 3}O{sub 8} for long-term storage or disposal. This will include provisions for partial recovery of costs to offset those associated with DU inventory management and the ultimate disposal of FDU. Another recommendation is to drop the term tails'' in favor of depleted uranium'' or DU'' because the tails'' label implies that it is waste.'' 13 refs.

  20. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  1. ACTION: Technical Position on the Use of National Consensus and Building Codes to Meet DOE Order 420.18, Facility Safety, Albright, 9/13/07

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The attached technical position was developed in response to line organization requests for clarification and it will be posted on the Office ofNuclear Safety and Environmental Policy web page for...

  2. Development of a pilot safety information document (PSID) for the replacement of radioactive liquid waste treatment facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Selvage, Ronald Derek

    1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Based on recent decisions made by Los Alamos National Laboratory concerning the development of site-wide National Environmental Policy Act documents, an effort was undertaken to develop a Pilot Safety Information Document (PSID) for the replacement...

  3. General Engineer / Physical Scientist (Facility Representative)

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Facility Representatives (FRs) are line management's on-site technical representative with responsibility for identifying and evaluating environmental, safety and health issues and concerns,...

  4. Cold vacuum drying facility design requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    IRWIN, J.J.

    1999-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides the detailed design requirements for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Cold Vacuum Drying Facility. Process, safety, and quality assurance requirements and interfaces are specified.

  5. Toolbox Safety Talk Heat Stress

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    Toolbox Safety Talk Heat Stress Environmental Health & Safety Facilities Safety & Health Section for inducing heat stress. When the body is unable to cool itself by sweating, several heat-induced illnesses Stress ∑ Know signs/symptoms of heat-related illnesses; monitor yourself and coworkers. ∑ Block out

  6. Health and Safety Training Reciprocity

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-04-14T23:59:59.000Z

    Establishes a policy for reciprocity of employee health and safety training among DOE entities responsible for employee health and safety at DOE sites and facilities to increase efficiency and effectiveness of Departmental operations while meeting established health and safety requirements. Does not cancel other directives.

  7. Americium/Curium Disposition Life Cycle Planning Study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jackson, W.N. [Westinghouse Savannah River Company, AIKEN, SC (United States); Krupa, J.; Stutts, P.; Nester, S.; Raimesch, R.

    1998-04-30T23:59:59.000Z

    At the request of the Department of Energy Savannah River Office (DOE- SR), Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) evaluated concepts to complete disposition of Americium and Curium (Am/Cm) bearing materials currently located at the Savannah River Site (SRS).

  8. EIS-0327: Disposition of Scrap Metals Programmatic EIS

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS will evaluate the environmental impacts of policy alternatives for the disposition of scrap metals (primarily carbon steel and stainless steel) that may have residual surface radioactivity. DOE is cancelling this EIS.

  9. A Study of Cattle Disposition: Exploring QTL Associated with Temperament

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Boldt, Clayton Ryan

    2008-05-16T23:59:59.000Z

    In any production setting, cattle disposition (temperament) has a great impact on handling and performance. Thus, behavior can be economically important, yielding the rationale for study. Wegenhoft (2005) previously identified several quantitative...

  10. Associate Vice President Facilities Management

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Milchberg, Howard

    Operations & Energy Services Jack Baker Executive Director Building & Landscape Maintenance Harry Teabout III Safety HVAC Systems HVAC Systems Administration/ Signs & Graphics Administration/ Signs & Graphics Piped-Campus Facilities Director Department of Engineering & Energy VACANT Energy Management Energy Management Engineering

  11. Homeland Security Issues for Facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McClure, J. D.; Fisher, D.; Fenter, T.

    2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    more aware of safety, security, and protecting property and people should similar incidents occur in the future. The initial steps in facility protection are identifying potential threats and evaluating the condition of existing building infrastructure...

  12. Facility worker technical basis document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    SHULTZ, M.V.

    2003-08-28T23:59:59.000Z

    This technical basis document was developed to support the Tank Farm Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). It describes the criteria and methodology for allocating controls to hazardous conditions with significant facility work consequence and presents the results of the allocation.

  13. Hanford MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site (SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. Hanford has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 1 facility. In all, a total of three LA MOX fuel fabrication options were identified by Hanford that could accommodate the program. In every case, only minor modification would be required to ready any of the facilities to accept the equipment necessary to accomplish the LA program.

  14. LANL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.; Ludwig, S.B. [and others

    1998-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. LANL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within both Category 1 and 2 areas. Technical Area (TA) 55/Plutonium Facility 4 will be used to store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, assemble rods, and store fuel bundles. Bundles will be assembled at a separate facility, several of which have been identified as suitable for that activity. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (at TA-3) will be used for analytical chemistry support. Waste operations will be conducted in TA-50 and TA-54. Only very minor modifications will be needed to accommodate the LA program. These modifications consist mostly of minor equipment upgrades. A commercial reactor operator has not been identified for the LA irradiation. Postirradiation examination (PIE) of the irradiated fuel will take place at either Oak Ridge National Laboratory or ANL-W. The only modifications required at either PIE site would be to accommodate full-length irradiated fuel rods. Results from this program are critical to the overall plutonium distribution schedule.

  15. Evaluation of alternatives for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dyer, J.S.; Butler, J.C. [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States); Edmunds, T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)] [and others

    1997-04-04T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy Record of Decision (ROD) selected alternatives for disposition of surplus, weapons grade plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns addressed included economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The analysis reported here was conducted in parallel with technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses; it uses multiattribute utility theory to combine these considerations in order to facilitate an integrated evaluation of alternatives. This analysis is intended to provide additional insight regarding alternative evaluation and to assist in understanding the rationale for the choice of alternatives recommended in the ROD. Value functions were developed for objectives of disposition, and used to rank alternatives. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the ranking of alternatives for the base case was relatively insensitive to changes in assumptions over reasonable ranges. The analyses support the recommendation of the ROD to pursue parallel development of the vitrification immobilization alternative and the use of existing light water reactors alternative. 27 refs., 109 figs., 20 tabs.

  16. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16T23:59:59.000Z

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  17. University Loaned Normal Uranium Slug Disposition Study: University survey responses. Predecisional draft

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Becker, G.W. Jr.

    1992-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    During the 1950`s and 1960`s, the Atomic Energy Commission loaned rejected natural uranium slugs from the Savannah River Site to United States universities for use in subcritical assemblies. Currently, there are sixty-two universities holding 91,798 slugs, containing about 167 metric tons of natural uranium. It was originally planned that the universities would return the material to Fernald when they no longer required it. Fernald has not received slugs since it was shut down in 1988. The Department of Energy`s Office of Weapons and Materials Planning requested that the Planning Support Group develop information to assist them in facilitating the return of the unwanted slugs to one or more of their facilities and develop alternatives for the ultimate disposition of this material. This supplemental report to the University Loaned Normal Uranium Slug Disposition Study documents responses to and summarizes the results of a survey of fifty-eight universities. University contacts and survey responses covering loaned slug descriptions, historical information, radiological data, current status, and plans and schedules are documented.

  18. Optimization and implementation study of plutonium disposition using existing CANDU Reactors. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Since early 1994, the Department of Energy has been sponsoring studies aimed at evaluating the merits of disposing of surplus US weapons plutonium as Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel in existing commercial Canadian Pressurized Heavy Water reactors, known as CANDU`s. The first report, submitted to DOE in July, 1994 (the 1994 Executive Summary is attached), identified practical and safe options for the consumption of 50 to 100 tons of plutonium in 25 years in some of the existing CANDU reactors operating the Bruce A generating station, on Lake Huron, about 300 km north east of Detroit. By designing the fuel and nuclear performance to operate within existing experience and operating/performance envelope, and by utilizing existing fuel fabrication and transportation facilities and methods, a low cost, low risk method for long term plutonium disposition was developed. In December, 1995, in response to evolving Mission Requirements, the DOE requested a further study of the CANDU option with emphasis on more rapid disposition of the plutonium, and retaining the early start and low risk features of the earlier work. This report is the result of that additional work.

  19. Los Alamos National Laboratory summary plan to fabricate mixed oxide lead assemblies for the fissile material disposition program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Buksa, J.J.; Eaton, S.L.; Trellue, H.R.; Chidester, K.; Bowidowicz, M.; Morley, R.A.; Barr, M.

    1997-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report summarizes an approach for using existing Los Alamos National Laboratory (Laboratory) mixed oxide (MOX) fuel-fabrication and plutonium processing capabilities to expedite and assure progress in the MOX/Reactor Plutonium Disposition Program. Lead Assembly MOX fabrication is required to provide prototypic fuel for testing in support of fuel qualification and licensing requirements. It is also required to provide a bridge for the full utilization of the European fabrication experience. In part, this bridge helps establish, for the first time since the early 1980s, a US experience base for meeting the safety, licensing, safeguards, security, and materials control and accountability requirements of the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, a link is needed between the current research and development program and the production of disposition mission fuel. This link would also help provide a knowledge base for US regulators. Early MOX fabrication and irradiation testing in commercial nuclear reactors would provide a positive demonstration to Russia (and to potential vendors, designers, fabricators, and utilities) that the US has serious intent to proceed with plutonium disposition. This report summarizes an approach to fabricating lead assembly MOX fuel using the existing MOX fuel-fabrication infrastructure at the Laboratory.

  20. Toolbox Safety Talk Aerial Work Platforms

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    Toolbox Safety Talk Aerial Work Platforms Environmental Health & Safety Facilities Safety & Health to Environmental Health & Safety for recordkeeping. Aerial work platforms are important tools and if used correctly, and equipment damage. This guide addresses safe use of aerial work platforms and provides tips to prevent

  1. SAFETY PROCEDURE SP-24 NATIONAL HIGH MAGNETIC

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Weston, Ken

    affecting facility operations or equipment, including electrical, life safety, mechanical, or plumbing outages to any area in the NHMFL. Advance notice to affected areas shall be provided by the Facilities

  2. X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy for the elemental analysis of plutonium-bearing materials for the materials disposition program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Voit, S.L.; Boerigter, S.T.; Rising, T.L.

    1997-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The US Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) program will disposition about 50 MT of plutonium in the next century. Both of the alternative technologies for disposition, MOX Fuel and Immobilization require knowledge of the incoming composition to 1--5 wt%. Wavelength Dispersive X-Ray Fluorescence (WDXRF) systems, a common elemental analysis technology with a variety of industrial applications and commercial vendors, can readily achieve this level of characterization. Since much of the excess plutonium will be packaged in a long-term storage container as part of the DOE Environmental Management (DOE-EM) program to stabilize plutonium-bearing materials, the characterization system must be implemented during the packaging process. The authors describe a preliminary design for the integration of the WDXRF system into the packaging system to be used at the Rocky Flats site. The Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS), coupled with the WDXRF characterization system will provide MD with stabilized plutonium-bearing excess material that can be more readily fed to an immobilization facility. The overall added expense to the MD program of obtaining analytical information after materials have been packaged in long-term storage containers could far exceed the expense of implementing XRF analysis during the packaging process.

  3. Safety and Training | Advanced Photon Source

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Form Reference Material APS domain only Configuration Control Incidents and Follow-ups Facility Hazard Analysis Glove Selection | Safety Shoe Mobile LOM Shop Usage Recycling:...

  4. Safety and Security Enforcement Coordinator Handbook

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    DART Days Away, Restricted, or Transferred DOE U.S. Department of Energy DSA Documented Safety Analysis EFCOG Energy Facility Contractors Group EGS Enforcement Guidance Supplement...

  5. Total safety: A new safety culture to integrate nuclear safety and operational safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Saji, G. [Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Ibaraki-ken (Japan); Murphy, G.A. [ed.

    1991-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The creation of a complete and thorough safety culture is proposed for the purpose of providing additional assurance about nuclear safety and improving the performance of nuclear power plants. The safety philosophy developed a combination of the former hardware-oriented nuclear safety approach and recent operational safety concepts. The improvement of the latter, after TMI-2 and Chernobyl, has been proven very effective in reducing the total risk associated with nuclear power plants. The first part of this article introduces a {open_quotes}total safety{close_quotes} concept. This extends the concept of {open_quotes}nuclear safety{close_quotes} and makes it closer to the public perception of safety. This concept is defined by means of a taxonomy of total safety. The second part of the article shows that total safety can be achieved by integrating it into a modern quality assurance (QA) system since it is tailored to make implementation into a framework of QA easier. The author believes that the outstanding success experienced by various industries as a result of introducing the modern QA system should lead to its application for ensuring the safety and performance of nuclear facilities. 15 refs., 3 figs.

  6. FUEL CYCLE POTENTIAL WASTE FOR DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carter, J.

    2011-01-03T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States (U.S.) currently utilizes a once-through fuel cycle where used nuclear fuel (UNF) is stored on-site in either wet pools or in dry storage systems with ultimate disposal in a deep mined geologic repository envisioned. Within the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), the Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program (FCR&D) develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development of advanced fuel cycles, including modified open and closed cycles. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Yet, the routine disposal of used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste remains problematic. Advanced fuel cycles will generate different quantities and forms of waste than the current LWR fleet. This study analyzes the quantities and characteristics of potential waste forms including differing waste matrices, as a function of a variety of potential fuel cycle alternatives including: (1) Commercial UNF generated by uranium fuel light water reactors (LWR). Four once through fuel cycles analyzed in this study differ by varying the assumed expansion/contraction of nuclear power in the U.S. (2) Four alternative LWR used fuel recycling processes analyzed differ in the reprocessing method (aqueous vs. electro-chemical), complexity (Pu only or full transuranic (TRU) recovery) and waste forms generated. (3) Used Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel derived from the recovered Pu utilizing a single reactor pass. (4) Potential waste forms generated by the reprocessing of fuels derived from recovered TRU utilizing multiple reactor passes.

  7. FUEL CYCLE POTENTIAL WASTE FOR DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jones, R.; Carter, J.

    2010-10-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The United States (U.S.) currently utilizes a once-through fuel cycle where used nuclear fuel (UNF) is stored on-site in either wet pools or in dry storage systems with ultimate disposal in a deep mined geologic repository envisioned. Within the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), the Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program (FCR&D) develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development of advanced fuel cycles, including modified open and closed cycles. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Yet, the routine disposal of used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste remains problematic. Advanced fuel cycles will generate different quantities and forms of waste than the current LWR fleet. This study analyzes the quantities and characteristics of potential waste forms including differing waste matrices, as a function of a variety of potential fuel cycle alternatives including: (1) Commercial UNF generated by uranium fuel light water reactors (LWR). Four once through fuel cycles analyzed in this study differ by varying the assumed expansion/contraction of nuclear power in the U.S; (2) Four alternative LWR used fuel recycling processes analyzed differ in the reprocessing method (aqueous vs. electro-chemical), complexity (Pu only or full transuranic (TRU) recovery) and waste forms generated; (3) Used Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel derived from the recovered Pu utilizing a single reactor pass; and (4) Potential waste forms generated by the reprocessing of fuels derived from recovered TRU utilizing multiple reactor passes.

  8. INFORMATION: Management Alert on Environmental Management's Select Strategy for Disposition of Savannah River Site Depleted Uranium Oxides

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2010-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Administration and the Congress, through policy statements and passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), have signaled that they hope that proactive actions by agency Inspectors General will help ensure that Federal Recovery Act activities are transparent, effective and efficient. In that context, the purpose of this management alert is to share with you concerns that have been raised to the Office of Inspector General regarding the planned disposition of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) inventory of Depleted Uranium (DU) oxides. This inventory, generated as a by-product of the nuclear weapons production process and amounting to approximately 15,600 drums of DU oxides, has been stored at SRS for decades. A Department source we deem reliable and credible recently came to the Office of Inspector General expressing concern that imminent actions are planned that may not provide for the most cost effective disposition of these materials. During April 2009, the Department chose to use funds provided under the Recovery Act to accelerate final disposition of the SRS inventory of DU oxides. After coordination with State of Utah regulators, elected officials and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department initiated a campaign to ship the material to a facility operated by EnergySolutions in Clive, Utah. Although one shipment of a portion of the material has already been sent to the EnergySolutions facility, the majority of the product remains at SRS. As had been planned, both for the shipment already made and those planned in the near term, the EnergySolutions facility was to have been the final disposal location for the material. Recently, a member of Congress and various Utah State officials raised questions regarding the radioactive and other constituents present in the DU oxides to be disposed of at the Clive, Utah, facility. These concerns revolved around the characterization of the material and its acceptability under existing licensing criteria. As a consequence, the Governor of Utah met with Department officials to voice concerns regarding further shipments of the material and to seek return of the initial shipment of DU oxides to SRS. Utah's objections and the Department's agreement to accede to the State's demands effectively prohibit the transfer of the remaining material from South Carolina to Utah. In response, the Department evaluated its options and issued a draft decision paper on March 1, 2010, which outlined an alternative for temporary storage until the final disposition issue could be resolved. Under the terms of the proposed option, the remaining shipments from SRS are to be sent on an interim basis to a facility owned by Waste Control Specialists (WCS) in Andrews, Texas. Clearly, this choice carries with it a number of significant logistical burdens, including substantial additional costs for, among several items, repackaging at SRS, transportation to Texas, storage at the interim site, and, repackaging and transportation to the yet-to-be-determined final disposition point. The Department source expressed the concern that the proposal to store the material on an interim basis in Texas was inefficient and unnecessary, asserting: (1) that the materials could remain at SRS until a final disposition path is identified, and that this could be done safely, securely and cost effectively; and, (2) that the nature of the material was not subject to existing compliance agreements with the State of South Carolina, suggesting the viability of keeping the material in storage at SRS until a permanent disposal site is definitively established. We noted that, while the Department's decision paper referred to 'numerous project and programmatic factors that make it impractical to retain the remaining inventory at Savannah River,' it did not outline the specific issues involved nor did it provide any substantive economic or environmental analysis supporting the need for the planned interim storage action. The only apparent driver in this case was a Recovery Act-related goal esta

  9. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the tank farm facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Crummel, G.M.

    1998-05-18T23:59:59.000Z

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements.

  10. Development of a fresh MOX fuel transport package for disposition of weapons plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ludwig, S.B.; Pope, R.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Michelhaugh, R.D. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Chae, S.M. [Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    1998-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The US Department of Energy announced its Record of Decision on January 14, 1997, to embark on a dual-track approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium using immobilization in glass or ceramics and burning plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in reactors. In support of the MOX fuel alternative, Oak Ridge National Laboratory initiated development of conceptual designs for a new package for transporting fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel assemblies between the MOX fabrication facility and existing commercial light-water reactors in the US. This paper summarizes progress made in development of new MOX transport package conceptual designs. The development effort has included documentation of programmatic and technical requirements for the new package and development and analysis of conceptual designs that satisfy these requirements.

  11. 324 Building safety basis criteria document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    STEFFEN, J.M.

    1999-06-02T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safety Basis Criteria document describes the proposed format, content, and schedule for the preparation of an updated Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and Operational Safety Requirements document (OSR) for the 324 Building. These updated safety authorization basis documents are intended to cover stabilization and deactivation activities that will prepare the facility for turnover to the Environmental Restoration Contractor for final decommissioning. The purpose of this document is to establish the specific set of criteria needed for technical upgrades to the 324 Facility Safety Authorization Basis, as required by Project Hanford Procedure HNF-PRO-705, Safety Basis Planning, Documentation, Review, and Approval.

  12. Fissile material disposition program final immobilization form assessment and recommendation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cochran, S.G.; Dunlop, W.H.; Edmunds, T.A.; MacLean, L.M.; Gould, T.H. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States)

    1997-10-03T23:59:59.000Z

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in its role as the lead laboratory for the development of plutonium immobilization technologies for the Department of Energy`s Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD), has been requested by MD to recommend an immobilization technology for the disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The recommendation and supporting documentation was requested to be provided by September 1, 1997. This report addresses the choice between glass and ceramic technologies for immobilizing plutonium using the can-in-canister approach. Its purpose is to provide a comparative evaluation of the two candidate technologies and to recommend a form based on technical considerations.

  13. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility hazard analysis report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Krahn, D.E.

    1998-02-23T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) hazard analysis to support the CVDF phase 2 safety analysis report (SAR), and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, and implements the requirements of US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

  14. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DANNA, M.A.

    2003-10-24T23:59:59.000Z

    The TSRs define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), in parallel with the DSA.

  15. RESEARCH SAFETY RADIATION SAFETY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    and Communications Manager (951) 827-6303 janette.ducut@ucr.edu Beiwei Tu, MS, CIH, CSP Safety and Industrial Hygiene

  16. LANSCE | Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    LINAC Outreach Affiliations Visiting LANSCE Facilities Isotope Production Facility Lujan Neutron Scattering Center MaRIE Proton Radiography Ultracold Neutrons Weapons Neutron...

  17. Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lavender, J.C.

    1994-09-09T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

  18. Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical Safety Requirements

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-11-03T23:59:59.000Z

    This Guide provides elaboration for the content of TSRs. Section 10 CFR 830.205 of the Nuclear Safety Management rule, requires Department of Energy (DOE) contractors responsible for category 1, 2, and 3 DOE nuclear facilities to develop Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). These TSRs identify the limitations to each DOE owned, contractor operated nuclear facility based on the documented safety analysis (DSA) and any additional safety requirements established for the facility. Cancels DOE G 423.1-1.

  19. Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical Safety Requirements

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-11-03T23:59:59.000Z

    This Guide provides elaboration for the content of TSRs. Section 10 CFR 830.205 of the Nuclear Safety Management rule, requires Department of Energy (DOE) contractors responsible for category 1, 2, and 3 DOE nuclear facilities to develop Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). These TSRs identify the limitations to each DOE owned, contractor operated nuclear facility based on the documented safety analysis (DSA) and any additional safety requirements established for the facility. Does not cancel other directives.

  20. SRS MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site(SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. SRS has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 2 or 3 facility with storage of bulk PuO{sub 2} and assembly, storage, and shipping of fuel bundles in an S and S Category 1 facility. The total Category 1 approach, which is the recommended option, would be done in the 221-H Canyon Building. A facility that was never in service will be removed from one area, and a hardened wall will be constructed in another area to accommodate execution of the LA fuel fabrication. The non-Category 1 approach would require removal of process equipment in the FB-Line metal production and packaging glove boxes, which requires work in a contamination area. The Immobilization Hot Demonstration Program equipment in the Savannah River Technology Center would need to be removed to accommodate pellet fabrication. This work would also be in a contaminated area.

  1. California Institute of Technology Records Retention and Disposition Policy

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    of the Records Retention and Disposition Policy is to establish and maintain a uniform records management policy activities and are subject to records management review and evaluation prior to any decisions regarding of Technology Records Retention Schedule ("Retention Schedule"). Department and division management should

  2. Microsoft PowerPoint - Fire Safety workshop NQA-1 CGD 4 29 15...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Nuclear and Facility Safety Programs Workshop Fire Safety Track May 5th, 2015 Overview NQA 1 Commercial Grade Dedication Critical Characteristics Department of Energy Nuclear and...

  3. K Basin safety analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Porten, D.R.; Crowe, R.D.

    1994-12-16T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this accident safety analysis is to document in detail, analyses whose results were reported in summary form in the K Basins Safety Analysis Report WHC-SD-SNF-SAR-001. The safety analysis addressed the potential for release of radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous material located in the K Basins and their supporting facilities. The safety analysis covers the hazards associated with normal K Basin fuel storage and handling operations, fuel encapsulation, sludge encapsulation, and canister clean-up and disposal. After a review of the Criticality Safety Evaluation of the K Basin activities, the following postulated events were evaluated: Crane failure and casks dropped into loadout pit; Design basis earthquake; Hypothetical loss of basin water accident analysis; Combustion of uranium fuel following dryout; Crane failure and cask dropped onto floor of transfer area; Spent ion exchange shipment for burial; Hydrogen deflagration in ion exchange modules and filters; Release of Chlorine; Power availability and reliability; and Ashfall.

  4. Facility Microgrids

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ye, Z.; Walling, R.; Miller, N.; Du, P.; Nelson, K.

    2005-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Microgrids are receiving a considerable interest from the power industry, partly because their business and technical structure shows promise as a means of taking full advantage of distributed generation. This report investigates three issues associated with facility microgrids: (1) Multiple-distributed generation facility microgrids' unintentional islanding protection, (2) Facility microgrids' response to bulk grid disturbances, and (3) Facility microgrids' intentional islanding.

  5. ANNUAL SECURITY & FIRE SAFETY REPORT

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Maxwell, Bruce D.

    ANNUAL SECURITY & FIRE SAFETY REPORT 2014 A guide to policies, procedures, practices, and programs implemented to keep students, faculty, and staff safe and facilities secure. www.montana.edu/reports/security.pdf #12;Inside this Report 2014 Annual Security and Fire Safety Report for Reporting Year 2013

  6. Risk Assessment in Support of DOE Nuclear Safety, Risk Information Notice, June 2010

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    On August 12, 2009, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board(DNFSB) issued Recommendation 2009?1, Risk Assessment Methodologies at Defense Nuclear Facilities. Thisrecommendation focused on the...

  7. Safe actinide disposition in molten salt reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gat, U.

    1997-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Safe molten salt reactors (MSR) can readily accommodate the burning of all fissile actinides. Only minor compromises associated with plutonium are required. The MSRs can dispose safely of actinides and long lived isotopes to result in safer and simpler waste. Disposing of actinides in MSRs does increase the source term of a safety optimized MSR. It is concluded that the burning and transmutation of actinides in MSRs can be done in a safe manner. Development is needed for the processing to handle and separate the actinides. Calculations are needed to establish the neutron economy and the fuel management. 9 refs.

  8. STAR Facility Tritium Accountancy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    R. J. Pawelko; J. P. Sharpe; B. J. Denny

    2007-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) facility has been established to provide a laboratory infrastructure for the fusion community to study tritium science associated with the development of safe fusion energy and other technologies. STAR is a radiological facility with an administrative total tritium inventory limit of 1.5g (14,429 Ci) [1]. Research studies with moderate tritium quantities and various radionuclides are performed in STAR. Successful operation of the STAR facility requires the ability to receive, inventory, store, dispense tritium to experiments, and to dispose of tritiated waste while accurately monitoring the tritium inventory in the facility. This paper describes tritium accountancy in the STAR facility. A primary accountancy instrument is the tritium Storage and Assay System (SAS): a system designed to receive, assay, store, and dispense tritium to experiments. Presented are the methods used to calibrate and operate the SAS. Accountancy processes utilizing the Tritium Cleanup System (TCS), and the Stack Tritium Monitoring System (STMS) are also discussed. Also presented are the equations used to quantify the amount of tritium being received into the facility, transferred to experiments, and removed from the facility. Finally, the STAR tritium accountability database is discussed.

  9. STAR facility tritium accountancy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pawelko, R. J.; Sharpe, J. P.; Denny, B. J. [Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415 (United States)

    2008-07-15T23:59:59.000Z

    The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) facility has been established to provide a laboratory infrastructure for the fusion community to study tritium science associated with the development of safe fusion energy and other technologies. STAR is a radiological facility with an administrative total tritium inventory limit of 1.5 g (14,429 Ci) [1]. Research studies with moderate tritium quantities and various radionuclides are performed in STAR. Successful operation of the STAR facility requires the ability to receive, inventory, store, dispense tritium to experiments, and to dispose of tritiated waste while accurately monitoring the tritium inventory in the facility. This paper describes tritium accountancy in the STAR facility. A primary accountancy instrument is the tritium Storage and Assay System (SAS): a system designed to receive, assay, store, and dispense tritium to experiments. Presented are the methods used to calibrate and operate the SAS. Accountancy processes utilizing the Tritium Cleanup System (TCS), and the Stack Tritium Monitoring System (STMS) are also discussed. Also presented are the equations used to quantify the amount of tritium being received into the facility, transferred to experiments, and removed from the facility. Finally, the STAR tritium accountability database is discussed. (authors)

  10. A Methodology for the Analysis and Selection of Alternative for the Disposition of Surplus Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1999-08-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy (DOE) - Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) has announced a Record of Decision (ROD) selecting alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to further U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns that were addressed include economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses supporting the ROD are documented in three DOE reports [DOE-TSR 96, DOE-PEIS 96, and DOE-NN 97, respectively]. At the request of OFMD, a team of analysts from the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) provided an independent evaluation of the alternatives for plutonium that were considered during the evaluation effort. This report outlines the methodology used by the ANRCP team. This methodology, referred to as multiattribute utility theory (MAU), provides a structure for assembling results of detailed technical, economic, schedule, environment, and nonproliferation analyses for OFMD, DOE policy makers, other stakeholders, and the general public in a systematic way. The MAU methodology has been supported for use in similar situations by the National Research Council, an agency of the National Academy of Sciences.1 It is important to emphasize that the MAU process does not lead to a computerized model that actually determines the decision for a complex problem. MAU is a management tool that is one component, albeit a key component, of a decision process. We subscribe to the philosophy that the result of using models should be insights, not numbers. The MAU approach consists of four steps: (1) identification of alternatives, objectives, and performance measures, (2) estimation of the performance of the alternatives with respect to the objectives, (3) development of value functions and weights for the objectives, and (4) evaluation of the alternatives and sensitivity analysis. These steps are described below.

  11. Assessment of technologies for hazardous waste site remediation: Non-treatment technologies and pilot scale facility implementation -- excavation -- storage technology -- safety analysis and review statement. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, H.R.; Overbey, W.K. Jr.; Koperna, G.J. Jr.

    1994-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this study is to assess the state-of-the-art of excavation technology as related to environmental remediation applications. A further purpose is to determine which of the excavation technologies reviewed could be used by the US Corp of Engineers in remediating contaminated soil to be excavated in the near future for construction of a new Lock and Dam at Winfield, WV. The study is designed to identify excavation methodologies and equipment which can be used at any environmental remediation site but more specifically at the Winfield site on the Kanawha River in Putnam County, West Virginia. A technical approach was determined whereby a functional analysis was prepared to determine the functions to be conducted during the excavation phase of the remediation operations. A number of excavation technologies were identified from the literature. A set of screening criteria was developed that would examine the utility and ranking of the technologies with respect to the operations that needed to be conducted at the Winfield site. These criteria were performance, reliability, implementability, environmental safety, public health, and legal and regulatory compliance. The Loose Bulk excavation technology was ranked as the best technology applicable to the Winfield site. The literature was also examined to determine the success of various methods of controlling fugitive dust. Depending upon any changes in the results of chemical analyses, or prior remediation of the VOCs from the vadose zone, consideration should be given to testing a new ``Pneumatic Excavator`` which removes the VOCs liberated during the excavation process as they outgas from the soil. This equipment however would not be needed on locations with low levels of VOC emissions.

  12. 222-S Laboratory interim safety basis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    WEAVER, L.L.

    2001-09-10T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this document is to establish the Interim Safety Basis (ISB) for the 222-S Laboratory. An ISB is a documented safety basis that provides the justification for the continued operation of the facility until an upgraded documented safety analysis (DSA) is prepared in compliance with 10CFR 830, Subpart B. The 222-S Laboratory ISB is based on revised facility and process descriptions and revised accident analyses that reflect current conditions.

  13. Hazard Baseline Downgrade Effluent Treatment Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blanchard, A.

    1998-10-21T23:59:59.000Z

    This Hazard Baseline Downgrade reviews the Effluent Treatment Facility, in accordance with Department of Energy Order 5480.23, WSRC11Q Facility Safety Document Manual, DOE-STD-1027-92, and DOE-EM-STD-5502-94. It provides a baseline grouping based on the chemical and radiological hazards associated with the facility. The Determination of the baseline grouping for ETF will aid in establishing the appropriate set of standards for the facility.

  14. Engineering evaluation of alternatives for the disposition of Niagara Falls Storage Site, its residues and wastes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1984-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The final disposition scenarios selected by DOE for assessment in this document are consistent with those stated in the Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Niagara Falls Storage Site (NFSS) (DOE, 1983d) and the modifications to the alternatives resulting from the public scoping process. The scenarios are: take no action beyond interim remedial measures other than maintenance and surveillance of the NFSS; retain and manage the NFSS as a long-term waste management facility for the wastes and residues on the site; decontaminate, certify, and release the NFSS for other use, with long-term management of the wastes and residues at other DOE sites; and partially decontaminate the NFSS by removal and transport off site of only the more radioactive residues, and upgrade containment of the remaining wastes and residues on site. The objective of this document is to present to DOE the conceptual engineering, occupational radiation exposure, construction schedule, maintenance and surveillance requirements, and cost information relevant to design and implementation of each of the four scenarios. The specific alternatives within each scenario used as the basis for discussion in this document were evaluated on the bases of engineering considerations, technical feasibility, and regulatory requirements. Selected alternatives determined to be acceptable for each of the four final disposition scenarios for the NFSS were approved by DOE to be assessed and costed in this document. These alternatives are also the subject of the EIS for the NFSS currently being prepared by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). 40 figures, 38 tables.

  15. CRITICALITY SAFETY TRAINING AT FLUOR HANFORD (FH)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    TOFFER, H.

    2005-05-02T23:59:59.000Z

    The Fluor Hanford Criticality Safety engineers are extensively trained. The objectives and requirements for training are derived from Department of Energy (DOE) and American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society Standards (ANSI/ANS), and are captured in the Hanford Criticality Safety Program manual, HNF-7098. Qualification cards have been established for the general Criticality Safety Engineer (CSE) analyst, CSEs who support specific facilities, and for the facility Criticality Safety Representatives (CSRs). Refresher training and continuous education in the discipline are emphasized. Weekly Brown Bag Sessions keep the criticality safety engineers informed of the latest developments and historic perspectives.

  16. Toolbox Safety Talk DOT Materials of Trade

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    Toolbox Safety Talk DOT ≠ Materials of Trade Environmental Health & Safety Facilities Safety by Trades personnel that meet the definition of hazardous materials even though they may be sold as consumer commodities. The DOT regulations have exceptions for Materials of Trade (MOT). The MOT exception provides

  17. Chemical Safety Vulnerability Working Group Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report marks the culmination of a 4-month review conducted to identify chemical safety vulnerabilities existing at DOE facilities. This review is an integral part of DOE's efforts to raise its commitment to chemical safety to the same level as that for nuclear safety.

  18. Toolbox Safety Talk Articulating Boom Work Platforms

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    Toolbox Safety Talk Articulating Boom Work Platforms Environmental Health & Safety Facilities sign-in sheet to Environmental Health & Safety for recordkeeping. Articulating boom work platforms platforms and provides tips to prevent injuries, death, and equipment damage. More information can be found

  19. Safety Basis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    R.J. Garrett

    2002-01-14T23:59:59.000Z

    As part of the internal Integrated Safety Management Assessment verification process, it was determined that there was a lack of documentation that summarizes the safety basis of the current Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) site characterization activities. It was noted that a safety basis would make it possible to establish a technically justifiable graded approach to the implementation of the requirements identified in the Standards/Requirements Identification Document. The Standards/Requirements Identification Documents commit a facility to compliance with specific requirements and, together with the hazard baseline documentation, provide a technical basis for ensuring that the public and workers are protected. This Safety Basis Report has been developed to establish and document the safety basis of the current site characterization activities, establish and document the hazard baseline, and provide the technical basis for identifying structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that perform functions necessary to protect the public, the worker, and the environment from hazards unique to the YMP site characterization activities. This technical basis for identifying SSCs serves as a grading process for the implementation of programs such as Conduct of Operations (DOE Order 5480.19) and the Suspect/Counterfeit Items Program. In addition, this report provides a consolidated summary of the hazards analyses processes developed to support the design, construction, and operation of the YMP site characterization facilities and, therefore, provides a tool for evaluating the safety impacts of changes to the design and operation of the YMP site characterization activities.

  20. Lessons Learned from Three Mile Island Packaging, Transportation and Disposition that Apply to Fukushima Daiichi Recovery

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Layne Pincock; Wendell Hintze; Dr. Koji Shirai

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Following the massive earthquake and resulting tsunami damage in March of 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, interest was amplified for what was done for recovery at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) in the United States following its meltdown in 1979. Many parallels could be drawn between to two accidents. This paper presents the results of research done into the TMI-2 recovery effort and its applicability to the Fukushima Daiichi cleanup. This research focused on three topics: packaging, transportation, and disposition. This research work was performed as a collaboration between Japanís Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Hundreds of TMI-2 related documents were searched and pertinent information was gleaned from these documents. Other important information was also obtained by interviewing employees who were involved first hand in various aspects of the TMI-2 cleanup effort. This paper is organized into three main sections: (1) Transport from Three Mile Island to Central Facilities Area at INL, (2) Transport from INL Central Receiving Facility to INL Test Area North (TAN) and wet storage at TAN, and (3) Transport from TAN to INL Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) and Dry Storage at INTEC. Within each of these sections, lessons learned from performing recovery activities are presented and their applicability to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant cleanup are outlined.

  1. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium uranium extraction facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wiegand, D.L.

    1994-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years.

  2. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Greager, E.M.

    1997-12-11T23:59:59.000Z

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan will ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated, at a minimum, every 3 years.

  3. Sandia National Laboratories: Excellence Award in the 2012 Facilities...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Testing Excellence Award in the 2012 Facilities Environmental, Safety and Health Go Green Initiative On December 19, 2012, in Concentrating Solar Power, Energy, Events,...

  4. Waste receiving and processing facility module 1 auditable safetyanalysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bottenus, R.J.

    1997-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Waste Receiving and Processing Facility Module 1 Auditable Safety Analysis analyzes postulated accidents and determines controls to prevent the accidents or mitigate the consequences.

  5. FACILITIES INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (FIMS) DATA VALIDATION...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    not scored xii) Year Acquired - Validated not scored xiii) Disposition Date (Archived data) xiv) Disposition Method (Archived data) xv) Net Proceeds (Archived data) b) The...

  6. Analysis of environment, safety, and health (ES{ampersand}H) management systems for Department of Energy (DOE) Defense Programs (DP) facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Neglia, A. V., LLNL

    1998-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a summary analysis and comparison of various environment, safety, and health (ES&H) management systems required of, or suggested for use by, the Departrnent of Energy Defense Programs` sites. The summary analysis is provided by means of a comparison matrix, a set of Vean diagrams that highlights the focus of the systems, and an `End Gate` filter diagram that integrates the three Vean diagrams. It is intended that this paper will act as a starting point for implementing a particular system or in establishing a comprehensive site-wide integrated ES&H management system. Obviously, the source documents for each system would need to be reviewed to assure proper implementation of a particular system. The matrix compares nine ES&H management systems against a list of elements generated by identifying the unique elements of all the systems. To simplify the matrix, the elements are listed by means of a brief title. An explanation of the matrix elements is provided in Attachment 2 entitled, `Description of System Elements.` The elements are categorized under the Total Quality Management (TQM) `Plan, Do, Check, Act` framework with the added category of `Policy`. (The TQM concept is explained in the `DOE Quality Management implementation Guidelines,` July 1997 (DOE/QM- 0008)). The matrix provides a series of columns and rows to compare the unique elements found in each of the management systems. A `V` is marked if the element is explicitly identified as part of the particular ES&H management system. An `X` is marked if the element is not found in the particular ES&H management system, or if it is considered to be inadequately addressed. A `?` is marked if incorporation of the element is not clear. Attachment I provides additional background information which explains the justification for the marks in the matrix cells. Through the Vean diagrams and the `End Gate` filter in Section 3, the paper attempts to pictorially display the focus of each system with respect to ES&H, the hazard of concern, and any limitations with respect to the TQM categories. A summary evaluation and explanation of each of the systems is provided in Section 4 of the paper. Several other ES&H systems were reviewed in preparation of the paper, but were not specifically included as a system in this matrix. Only those ES&H management systems that are potentially applicable to DOE Defense Program sites were included as part of the matrix comparison. A description of other ES&H management systems that were evaluated, but not specifically incorporated in this matrix comparison, are provided in Attachment 3 entitled, `Other ES&H Management Systems Reviewed.` In the past, it has been difficult integrating ES&H into work planning for several reasons. One barrier to this integration has been the complexity caused by the existence of several `stove pipe` ES&H systems. By analyzing the unique elements of the various ES&H systems, as well as their strengths and limitations, and their similarities and differences, it is envisioned that this paper will aid in facilitating the integration of ES&H into work planning. This paper was developed by the Office of Defense Programs (DP-45) and all questions or comments should be directed to Anthony Neglia of that office at (301) 903-3531 or Anthony.Neglia@dp.doe.gov.

  7. SNM measurement uncertainites: potential impacts for materials disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fearey, B.L.; Burr, T.L.; Pickrell, M.M.

    1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A discussion of nuclear material measurement uncertainties and impacts to the Materials Disposition (MD) Program is presented. Many of the options under consideration by the disposition program present new measurement challenges include significant material processing throughputs, a variety of material forms, unique waste streams, and difficult-to-measure matrices. There are also some questions regarding the ability to achieve International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification requirements and to achieve measurement uncertainties that are small enough to meet the IAEA loss detection goals. We present a detailed formalism for determining the measurement error for nondestructive assay systems applied to the MD Program, which is an essential component for planning the safeguards and security of these systems.

  8. Plutonium disposition via immobilization in ceramic or glass

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, A.

    1997-03-05T23:59:59.000Z

    The management of surplus weapons plutonium is an important and urgent task with profound environmental, national, and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Policy Directive 13, and various analyses by renown scientific, technical, and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths for the long term disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The central goal of this effort is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in spent fuel from civilian reactors. One disposition option being considered for surplus plutonium is immobilization, in which the plutonium would be incorporated into a glass or ceramic material that would ultimately be entombed permanently in a geologic repository for high-level waste.

  9. Joint U.S./Russian plutonium disposition study: Nonproliferation issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Erkkila, B.; Fearey, B. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Ehinger, M. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); McAllister, S. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Chitaykin, V. [Inst. of Physics and Power Engineering, Obninsk (Russian Federation); Ptashny, V. [Inst. of Technical Physics, Snezhinsk (Russian Federation)

    1996-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In an effort to establish joint activities in the disposition of fissile materials from nuclear materials, the US and Russia agreed to conduct joint work to develop consistent comparisons of various alternatives for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Joint working groups were established for the analysis of alternatives for plutonium management for water reactors, fast reactors, storage, geological formations, immobilization and stabilization of solutions and other forms. In addition cross-cutting working groups were established for economic analysis and nonproliferation (NP). This paper reviews the activities of the NP working group in support of these studies. The NP working group provided integrated support in the area of nuclear NP to the other US/Russian Study teams. It involved both domestic safeguards and security and international safeguards. The analysis of NP involved consideration of the resistance to theft or diversion and resistance to retrieval, extraction or reuse.

  10. Update of the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Implementation Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jens Birkholzer; Robert MacKinnon; Kevin McMahon; Sylvia Saltzstein; Ken Sorenson; Peter Swift

    2014-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This Campaign Implementation Plan provides summary level detail describing how the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) supports achievement of the overarching mission and objectives of the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycle Technologies Program The implementation plan begins with the assumption of target dates that are set out in the January 2013 DOE Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste (http://energy.gov/downloads/strategy-management-and-disposal-used-nuclear-fuel-and-high-level-radioactive-waste). These target dates and goals are summarized in section III. This implementation plan will be maintained as a living document and will be updated as needed in response to progress in the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign and the Fuel Cycle Technologies Program.

  11. MPC&A for plutonium disposition in the Russian federation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1995-08-08T23:59:59.000Z

    The issue of what to do with excess fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons has been discussed for a number of years. The options or alternatives commanding the most attention were identified by the American National Academy of Sciences. For plutonium these options are: (1) the fabrication and use of mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel followed by the disposal of the spent fuel, or (2) vitrification (immobilization) of plutonium combined with highly radioactive material followed by direct disposal. The Academy report also identified the alternative of disposal in a deep borehole as requiring further study before being eliminated or accepted. The report emphasized security of nuclear materials as a principal factor in considering management and disposition decisions. Security of materials is particularly important in the near term-now-long before ultimate disposition can be accomplished. The MOX option was the subject of a NATO workshop held at Obninsk, Russia in October 1994. Hence this paper does not deal with the MOX alternative in detail. It deals with the following: materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) for immobilization and disposal; the immobilization vs MOX alternatives; the security of disposed plutonium; the need to demonstrate MTC&A for plutonium disposition; and, finally, a recommended investment to quickly and inexpensively improve the protection of fissile materials in Russia. It is the author`s view that near-term management is of overriding importance. That is, with respect to the ultimate disposition of excess nuclear materials, how we get there is more important than where we are going.

  12. Radium Disposition Options for the Department of Energy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Parks, D. L.; Thiel, E. C.; Seidel, B. R.

    2002-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed plans to disposition its excess nuclear materials, including radium-containing materials. Within DOE, there is no significant demand for radium at this time. However, DOE is exploring reuse options, including uses that may not exist at this time. The Nonactinide Isotopes and Sealed Sources Management Group (NISSMG) has identified 654 radium-containing items, and concluded that there are no remaining radium items that do not have a pathway to disposition. Unfortunately, most of these pathways end with disposal, whereas reuse would be preferable. DOE has a number of closure sites that must remove the radium at their sites as part of their closure activities. NISSMG suggests preserving the larger radium sources that can easily be manufactured into targets for future reuse, and disposing the other items. As alternatives to disposal, there exist reuse options for radium, especially in nuclear medicine. These options were identified by NISSMG. The NISSMG recommends that DOE set up receiver sites to store these radium materials until reuse options become available. The NISSMG recommends two pathways for dispositioning radium sources, depending on the activity and volume of material. Low activity radium sources can be managed as low level radioactive waste per DOE Order 5820.2A. Higher activity radium sources are more appropriate for reuse in nuclear medicine applications and other applications.

  13. Disposition of actinides released from high-level waste glass

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ebert, W.L.; Bates, J.K.; Buck, E.C.; Gong, M.; Wolf, S.F.

    1994-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A series of static leach tests was conducted using glasses developed for vitrifying tank wastes at the Savannah River Site to monitor the disposition of actinide elements upon corrosion of the glasses. In these tests, glasses produced from SRL 131 and SRL 202 frits were corroded at 90{degrees}C in a tuff groundwater. Tests were conducted using crushed glass at different glass surface area-to-solution volume (S/V) ratios to assess the effect of the S/V on the solution chemistry, the corrosion of the glass, and the disposition of actinide elements. Observations regarding the effects of the S/V on the solution chemistry and the corrosion of the glass matrix have been reported previously. This paper highlights the solution analyses performed to assess how the S/V used in a static leach test affects the disposition of actinide elements between fractions that are suspended or dissolved in the solution, and retained by the altered glass or other materials.

  14. Update to the Fissile Materials Disposition program SST/SGT transportation estimation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    John Didlake

    1999-11-15T23:59:59.000Z

    This report is an update to ``Fissile Materials Disposition Program SST/SGT Transportation Estimation,'' SAND98-8244, June 1998. The Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition requested this update as a basis for providing the public with an updated estimation of the number of transportation loads, load miles, and costs associated with the preferred alternative in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

  15. Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    (TSR), ABD-WFM-006, Revision 2.1 Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility (WCRRF)Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), ABD-WFM-006, Revision 2.1 The...

  16. Oak Ridge Critical Experiment Facility (Building 9213)

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Joe has continued to hold up this facility as one of the key elements in today's nuclear criticality safety program worldwide. He attributes much of what is routine about...

  17. Hanford safety analysis and risk assessment handbook (SARAH)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    GARVIN, L.J.

    2003-01-20T23:59:59.000Z

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities. SARAH describes currently acceptable methodology for development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of technical safety requirements (TSR) based on 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management,'' Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements,'' and provides data to ensure consistency in approach.

  18. Hanford surplus facilities programs facilities listings and descriptions. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kiser, S.K.; Witt, T.L.

    1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    On the Hanford Site, many surplus facilities exist (including buildings, stacks, tanks, cribs, burial grounds, and septic systems) that are scheduled to be decommissioned. Many of these facilities contain large inventories of radionuclides, which present potential radiological hazards on and off the Hanford Site. Some structures with limited structural deterioration present potential radiological and industrial safety hazards to personnel. Because of the condition of these facilities, a systematic surveillance and maintenance program is performed to identify and correct potential hazards to personnel and the environment until eventual decommissioning operations are completed.

  19. Microsoft Word - CX-MountainAvenueDispositionFY12_WEB.doc

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    1, 2012 REPLY TO ATTN OF: KEPR-4 SUBJECT: Environmental Clearance Memorandum Joan Kendall Realty Specialist - TERR-3 Proposed Action: Disposition of Mountain Avenue Substation and...

  20. Environmental Health and Safety Radiation Control and Radiological

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Slatton, Clint

    Environmental Health and Safety Radiation Control and Radiological Services #12;∑ Course focuses into six departments: 1) Facility and Fire Safety Pest Control and Fire Equipment Service Units 2) Radiation Control and Radiological Services University-wide radiation protection 3) Occupational

  1. Energy Department Announces Creation of New Health, Safety and...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    the health, safety, and security of the DOE workers, facilities and the public. The new office, called the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), will help formulate and...

  2. 2015 DOE Safety and Security Enforcement Workshop | Department...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    2015 DOE Safety and Security Enforcement Workshop 2015 DOE Safety and Security Enforcement Workshop WHEN: May 5 and 6, 2015 (EFCOG Meeting on May 7) WHERE: Nevada Support Facility...

  3. CRAD, Criteria and Guidelines For the Assessment of Safety System...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    and Guidelines For the Assessment of Safety System Software and Firmware at Defense Nuclear Facilities Performance Objective: The purpose and scope of this CRAD is to provide...

  4. Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments | Department...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    examine implementation of safety management programs during phases of the life cycle of a nuclear facility including operation, deactivation, decontamination, decommissioning and...

  5. DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    of Energy (DOE) approved methodology for preparing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, as well as environmental restoration activities...

  6. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Safety, must comply with national consensus industry standards and the model building codes applicable for the state or region in which the facility is located. Certain...

  7. Safety evaluation for packaging (onsite) product removal can containers

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boettger, J.S.

    1997-04-29T23:59:59.000Z

    This safety evaluation for packaging allows the transport of nine Product Removal (PR) Cans with their Containers from the PUREX Facility to the Plutonium Finishing Plant.

  8. Safety System Oversight Assessment of the Los Alamos National...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Safety System Oversight Assessment of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Tritium Gas Handling System INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW This report...

  9. Sandia National Laboratories: Safety and Health Go Green Initiative

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Initiative Excellence Award in the 2012 Facilities Environmental, Safety and Health Go Green Initiative On December 19, 2012, in Concentrating Solar Power, Energy, Events,...

  10. Comparison of Intergrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and Probabilistic...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    DC 20555-0001 SUBJECT: COMPARISON OF INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS (ISA) AND PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA) FOR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES Dear Chairman Jaczko: During the 580 th...

  11. Final Demolition and Disposition of 209-E Critical Mass Laboratory - 12267

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Woolery, Wade [US Department of Energy, Richland WA (United States); Dodd, Edwin III [CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company, Richland WA (United States)

    2012-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The 209-E Critical Mass Laboratory was constructed in 1960 to provide a heavy shielded reactor room where quantities of plutonium or uranium in solution could be brought to near-critical configurations under carefully controlled and monitored conditions. In the late 1980's, the responsible contractor, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), was directed by the Department of Energy (DOE) to prepare the facility for unoccupied status. The facility was demolished under a Removal Action Work Plan pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). The funding for this project was provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The primary rooms of concern with regards to contamination in 209-E facility, which is over 9,000 square feet, are the criticality assembly room (CAR), the mix room, and the change room. The CAR contained two reactor hoods (HO-140 and HO-170), which each had a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter system. The CAR contained 13 tanks ranging from 38 L (10 gal) to 401 L (106 gal). Tanks TK-109 and TK-110 are below grade, and were removed as part of this demolition and disposition remedy. Nonradiological and radiological hazardous substances were removed, decontaminated, or fixed in place, prior to demolition. Except for the removal of below grade tanks TK-109 and TK-110, the facility was demolished to slab-on-grade. PNNL performed stabilization and deactivation activities that included removal of bulk fissile material and chemicals, flushing tanks, stabilizing contamination within gloveboxes and hoods, and packaging and removing waste. The removal of the contaminated plutonium equipment and materials from the 209E facility presented a number of challenges similar in nature to those associated with the inventory reduction and cleanup activities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Although there were no bulk fissile materials or chemicals within the facility, there were residual radiological materials (isotopes of plutonium and americium) in the tanks and hoods. The complexity of the remedy was present because of the various configurations of the tanks and hoods, combined with the residual contaminants. Because of the weight and dimensional configuration, size reduction of the slab tanks, as well as removal and disposal of the different material used for moderation and absorption, were two examples of challenges that were resolved to complete the remedy. One of the key methods developed and implemented at the facility was the design and construction of a shroud to allow the cutting of the Pu contaminated tanks. The shroud design, development and implementation at the 209E Project was an example of enhanced work planning and task hazards analysis with worker involvement. This paper will present the lessons learned from the 209E facility inventory reduction activities including the shroud and other methodologies used. The initial Lessons Learned discussion for this project was scheduled for late January 2012. This facility is the first open-air demolition of a highly contaminated plutonium-contaminated facility accomplished by CH2M Hill under the Plateau Remediation Contract. The demolition was completed without spread of contamination to the workers and the surrounding area. As with any project of this complexity, there are significant accomplishments, as well as experience that can be applied to future demolition of plutonium-contaminated facilities on the Hanford Site. These experiences will be documented at a later date. (authors)

  12. Weapons engineering tritium facility overview

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Najera, Larry [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-20T23:59:59.000Z

    Materials provide an overview of the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) as introductory material for January 2011 visit to SRS. Purpose of the visit is to discuss Safety Basis, Conduct of Engineering, and Conduct of Operations. WETF general description and general GTS program capabilities are presented in an unclassified format.

  13. CRAD, Facility Safety - Documented Safety Analysis | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742Energy China U.S. Department ofJune 2,The BigSidingState6Report,COMMENTS ONPRGMofRev.A section of

  14. CRAD, New Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742Energy China U.S. Department ofJune 2,The BigSidingState6Report,COMMENTSpurpose of

  15. Radiological safety training for uranium facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1998-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This handbook contains recommended training materials consistent with DOE standardized core radiological training material. These materials consist of a program management guide, instructor`s guide, student guide, and overhead transparencies.

  16. Facility Safety (For Informational Purposes Only)

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-12-04T23:59:59.000Z

    This draft has been scheduled for final review before the Directives Review Board on 12/18/14. All major comments and concerns should be provided to your DRB representative, following your organization process. If you do not know who your representative is, please see the list of DRB members. If your office is represented by Ingrid Kolb, Director, Office of Management, please submit your major concerns and comments to the DRB Liaison, Camille Beben (Camille.Beben@hq.doe.gov; 202-586-1014). All major comments and concerns should be submitted by COB 12/16/2014.

  17. Radiological Safety Training for Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn April 23, 2014, an OHASeptember 2010In addition to 1 |D IMEASUREMENT1-20082TS NOT

  18. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn April 23, 2014, an OHASeptember 2010In addition to 1 |D IMEASUREMENT1-20082TS

  19. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn April 23, 2014, an OHASeptember 2010In addition to 1 |D IMEASUREMENT1-20082TSNOT

  20. Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOn April 23, 2014, an OHASeptember 2010In addition to 1 |DDOE HDBK-1113-2008 April 2008 DOE

  1. History of the US weapons-usable plutonium disposition program leading to DOE`s record of decision

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Spellman, D.J.; Thomas, J.F.; Bugos, R.G.

    1997-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This report highlights important events and studies concerning surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition in the United States. Included are major events that led to the creation of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition in 1994 and to that DOE office issuing the January 1997 Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Useable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Emphasis has been given to reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives.

  2. EIS-0240: Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Department proposes to eliminate the proliferation threat of surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) by blending it down to low enriched uranium (LEU), which is not weapons-usable. The EIS assesses the disposition of a nominal 200 metric tons of surplus HEU. The Preferred Alternative is, where practical, to blend the material for use as LEU and use overtime, in commercial nuclear reactor field to recover its economic value. Material that cannot be economically recovered would be blended to LEU for disposal as low-level radioactive waste.

  3. Disposition of plutonium as non-fertile fuel for water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Chidester, K.; Eaton, S.L.; Ramsey, K.B.

    1998-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This is the final report of a three-year, Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The original intent of this project was to investigate the possible use of a new fuel form as a means of dispositioning the declared surplus inventory of weapons-grade plutonium. The focus soon changed, however, to managing the larger and rapidly growing inventories of plutonium arising in commercial spent nuclear fuel through implementation of a new fuel form in existing nuclear reactors. LANL embarked on a parallel path effort to study fuel performance using advanced physics codes, while also demonstrating the ability to fabricate a new fuel form using standard processes in LANL's Plutonium Facility. An evolutionary fuel form was also examined which could provide enhanced performance over standard fuel forms, but which could be implemented in a much shorter time frame than a completely new fuel form. Recent efforts have focused on implementation of results into global energy models and development of follow-on funding to continue this research.

  4. Facility effluent monitoring plan for 242-A evaporator facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Crummel, G.M.; Gustavson, R.D.

    1995-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U.S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could affect employee or public safety or the environment. A facility effluent monitoring plan determination was performed during Calendar Year 1991 and the evaluation showed the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-1. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated, as a minimum, every three years.

  5. Reactor operation safety information document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The report contains a reactor facility description which includes K, P, and L reactor sites, structures, operating systems, engineered safety systems, support systems, and process and effluent monitoring systems; an accident analysis section which includes cooling system anomalies, radioactive materials releases, and anticipated transients without scram; a summary of onsite doses from design basis accidents; severe accident analysis (reactor core disruption); a description of operating contractor organization and emergency planning; and a summary of reactor safety evolution. (MB)

  6. EIS-0287: Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    EIS-0287 (September 2002) This EIS analyzes the potential environmental consequences of alternatives for managing high-level waste (HLW) calcine, mixed transuranic wastesodium...

  7. DOE/EIS-0287 Idaho High-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    e S B W s t o rage in Ta n k F a r m S B W s t o rage in Ta n k F a r m Idaho HLW & FD EIS 4-17 DOEEIS-0287D The genus is collected for food, medicine, and dye. This onion is...

  8. Facilities Infrastructure & Services Unneeded Materials and Chemicals Disposition Project (4579)

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power AdministrationField8,Dist. Category UC-lFederalFY 2008 FOIAFabricatedJuanTim

  9. West Valley Demonstration Project Phase I Decommissioning - Facility Disposition Partnering Performance Agreement

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently20,000 Russian Nuclear Warheads|ofEvents ¬Ľ WebinarSeptember 2003 Volume 1,ofNuclear

  10. Idaho High-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition, Final Environmental Impact Statement

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33Frequently Asked Questions for DOEthe RankingReform at the Department of Energy| Department

  11. EIS-0287: Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic Plan Department ofNotices | DepartmentEnvironmental Impactin7: Amended

  12. Summary - Major Risk Factors Integrated Facility Disposition Project (IFDP) Oak Ridge, TN

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011 Strategic2Uranium Transferon the Passing of AdmiraltheOil and Less

  13. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ``Unreviewed Safety Questions,`` DOE 5480.22, ``Technical Safety Requirements,`` and DOE 5480.23, ``Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.`` WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ``Safety Basis`` for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules.

  14. DOE plutonium disposition study: Analysis of existing ABB-CE Light Water Reactors for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Core reactivity and basic fuel management calculations were conducted on the selected reactors (with emphasis on the System 80 units as being the most desirable choice). Methods used were identical to those reported in the Evolutionary Reactor Report. From these calculations, the basic mission capability was assessed. The selected reactors were studied for modification, such as the addition of control rod nozzles to increase rod worth, and internals and control system modifications that might also be needed. Other system modifications studied included the use of enriched boric acid as soluble poison, and examination of the fuel pool capacities. The basic geometry and mechanical characteristics, materials and fabrication techniques of the fuel assemblies for the selected existing reactors are the same as for System 80+. There will be some differences in plutonium loading, according to the ability of the reactors to load MOX fuel. These differences are not expected to affect licensability or EPA requirements. Therefore, the fuel technology and fuel qualification sections provided in the Evolutionary Reactor Report apply to the existing reactors. An additional factor, in that the existing reactor availability presupposes the use of that reactor for the irradiation of Lead Test Assemblies, is discussed. The reactor operating and facility licenses for the operating plants were reviewed. Licensing strategies for each selected reactor were identified. The spent fuel pool for the selected reactors (Palo Verde) was reviewed for capacity and upgrade requirements. Reactor waste streams were identified and assessed in comparison to uranium fuel operations. Cost assessments and schedules for converting to plutonium disposition were estimated for some of the major modification items. Economic factors (incremental costs associated with using weapons plutonium) were listed and where possible under the scope of work, estimates were made.

  15. On the quantification of safety margins

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pagani, Lorenzo P

    2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The nuclear industry has relied on the concept of Defense in Depth (DID) and traditional safety margins to deal with the uncertainties associated with the design and operation of nuclear facilities. These concepts were ...

  16. University Services University Health and Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Minnesota, University of

    Management Storm and Waste Water Compliance Promote Environmental Health Drinking Water Quality Human with environmental, health and safety standards, rules and best practices. Through partnerships with units with Capital Planning and Project Management, Facilities Management and academic departments throughout

  17. Safety assured financial evaluation of maintenance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Erguina, Vera

    2004-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    Management decisions in complex industrial facilities usually consider both the economic and environmental aspects of the plant's performance. For nuclear power plants (NPPs), safety is also a very substantial issue. The objectives...

  18. Materials Sciences Division Integrated Safety Management Plan

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Materials Sciences Division Integrated Safety Management Plan Revised: February 9, 2012 Prepared by: signed Feb. 9, 2012 Rick Kelly, Facility/EH&S Manager Submitted by: signed Feb. 9, 2012 Miquel Salmeron.1 RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY THROUGH LINE MANAGEMENT............................................................5

  19. Biological Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The DOE's Biological Safety Program provides a forum for the exchange of best practices, lessons learned, and guidance in the area of biological safety. This content is supported by the Biosurety Executive Team. The Biosurety Executive Team is a DOE-chartered group. The DOE Office of Worker Safety and Health Policy provides administrative support for this group. The group identifies biological safety-related issues of concern to the DOE and pursues solutions to issues identified.

  20. MANAGING HANFORD'S LEGACY NO-PATH-FORWARD WASTES TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    WEST LD

    2011-01-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Richland Operations Office (RL) has adopted the 2015 Vision for Cleanup of the Hanford Site. This vision will protect the Columbia River, reduce the Site footprint, and reduce Site mortgage costs. The CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company's (CHPRC) Waste and Fuels Management Project (W&FMP) and their partners support this mission by providing centralized waste management services for the Hanford Site waste generating organizations. At the time of the CHPRC contract award (August 2008) slightly more than 9,000 m{sup 3} of waste was defined as 'no-path-forward waste.' The majority of these wastes are suspect transuranic mixed (TRUM) wastes which are currently stored in the low-level Burial Grounds (LLBG), or stored above ground in the Central Waste Complex (CWC). A portion of the waste will be generated during ongoing and future site cleanup activities. The DOE-RL and CHPRC have collaborated to identify and deliver safe, cost-effective disposition paths for 90% ({approx}8,000 m{sup 3}) of these problematic wastes. These paths include accelerated disposition through expanded use of offsite treatment capabilities. Disposal paths were selected that minimize the need to develop new technologies, minimize the need for new, on-site capabilities, and accelerate shipments of transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico.

  1. A comparative assessment of the economics of plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, K.A.; Miller, J.W.; Reid, R.L.

    1997-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The US Department of Energy office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD) has been evaluating three technologies for the disposition of approximately 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium from defense-related programs: reactors, immobilization, and deep boreholes. As part of the process supporting an early CY 1997 Record of Decision (ROD), a comprehensive assessment of technical viability, cost, and schedule has been conducted by DOE/MD and its national laboratory contractors. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has managed and coordinated the life-cycle cost (LCC) assessment effort for this program. This paper discusses the economic analysis methodology and the results prior to ROD. A secondary intent of the paper is to discuss major technical and economic issues that impact cost and schedule. To evaluate the economics of these technologies on an equitable basis, a set of cost-estimating guidelines and a common cost-estimating format were utilized by all three technology teams. This paper also includes the major economic analysis assumptions and the comparative constant-dollar and discounted-dollar LCCs.

  2. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Hazards Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    CROWE, R.D.

    2000-08-07T23:59:59.000Z

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) Hazard Analysis to support the CVDF Final Safety Analysis Report and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports,'' and implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.''

  3. Evaluation of Possible Surrogates for Validation of the Oxidation Furnace for the Plutonium Disposition Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duncan, A.

    2007-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

    The Plutonium Disposition project (PuD) is considering an alternative furnace design for direct metal oxidation (DMO) of plutonium metal to use as a feed for potential disposition routes. The proposed design will use a retort to oxidize the feed at temperatures up to 500 C. The atmosphere will be controlled using a metered mixture of oxygen, helium and argon to control the oxidation at approximately 400 torr. Since plutonium melts at 664 C, and may potentially react with retort material to form a lower melting point eutectic, the oxidation process will be controlled by metering the flow of oxygen to ensure that the bulk temperature of the material does not exceed this temperature. A batch processing time of <24 hours is desirable to meet anticipated furnace throughput requirements. The design project includes demonstration of concept in a small-scale demonstration test (i.e., small scale) and validation of design in a full-scale test. These tests are recommended to be performed using Pu surrogates due to challenges in consideration of the nature of plutonium and operational constraints required when handling large quantities of accountable material. The potential for spreading contamination and exposing workers to harmful levels of cumulative radioactive dose are motivation to utilize non-radioactive surrogates. Once the design is demonstrated and optimized, implementation would take place in a facility designed to accommodate these constraints. Until then, the use of surrogates would be a safer, less expensive option for the validation phase of the project. This report examines the potential for use of surrogates in the demonstration and validation of the DMO furnace for PuD. This report provides a compilation of the technical information and process requirements for the conversion of plutonium metal to oxide by burning in dry environments. Several potential surrogates were evaluated by various criteria in order to select a suitable candidate for large scale demonstration. First, the structure of the plutonium metal/oxide interface was compared to potential surrogates. Second the data for plutonium oxidation kinetics were reviewed and rates for oxidation were compared with surrogates. The criteria used as a basis for recommendation was selected in order to provide a reasonable oxidation rate during the validation phase. Several reference documents were reviewed and used to compile the information in this report. Since oxidation of large monolithic pieces of plutonium in 75% oxygen is the preferable oxidizing atmosphere for the intended process, this report does not focus on the oxidation of powders, but focuses instead on larger samples in flowing gas.

  4. Nuclear Criticality Safety Application Guide: Safety Analysis Report Update Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (MMES) is committed to performing and documenting safety analyses for facilities it manages for the Department of Energy (DOE). Safety analyses are performed to identify hazards and potential accidents; to analyze the adequacy of measures taken to eliminate, control, or mitigate hazards; and to evaluate potential accidents and determine associated risks. Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) are prepared to document the safety analysis to ensure facilities can be operated safely and in accordance with regulations. Many of the facilities requiring a SAR process fissionable material creating the potential for a nuclear criticality accident. MMES has long had a nuclear criticality safety program that provides the technical support to fissionable material operations to ensure the safe processing and storage of fissionable materials. The guiding philosophy of the program has always been the application of the double-contingency principle, which states: {open_quotes}process designs shall incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is possible.{close_quotes} At Energy Systems analyses have generally been maintained to document that no single normal or abnormal operating conditions that could reasonably be expected to occur can cause a nuclear criticality accident. This application guide provides a summary description of the MMES Nuclear Criticality Safety Program and the MMES Criticality Accident Alarm System requirements for inclusion in facility SARs. The guide also suggests a way to incorporate the analyses conducted pursuant to the double-contingency principle into the SAR. The prime objective is to minimize duplicative effort between the NCSA process and the SAR process and yet adequately describe the methodology utilized to prevent a nuclear criticality accident.

  5. Guidelines for Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Training Programs

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-11-22T23:59:59.000Z

    The Guidelines for Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Training Programs establish objectives and criteria for evaluating nuclear facility training programs. The guidance in this standard provides a framework for the systematic evaluation of training programs at nuclear facilities and is based, in part, on established criteria for Technical Safety Appraisals, Tiger Team Assessments, commercial nuclear industry evaluations, and the DOE Training Accreditation Program.

  6. Non-Motorized Facility Inventory CTS Annual Transportation Research Conference

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Minnesota, University of

    Non-Motorized Facility Inventory CTS Annual Transportation Research Conference May 23, 2012 Jesse an inventory and assessment of the non-motorized facilities along Carver County roadways 2. Identify the gaps-8 Safety Issues Identified #12;non-motorized facilities inventory #12;GIS mapping capabilities #12;An

  7. 200 Area Deactivation Project Facilities Authorization Envelope Document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DODD, E.N.

    2000-03-28T23:59:59.000Z

    Project facilities as required by HNF-PRO-2701, Authorization Envelope and Authorization Agreement. The Authorization Agreements (AA's) do not identify the specific set of environmental safety and health requirements that are applicable to the facility. Therefore, the facility Authorization Envelopes are defined here to identify the applicable requirements. This document identifies the authorization envelopes for the 200 Area Deactivation.

  8. Ris-R-1019(EN) Nuclear Safety Research

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    .2 Severe accidents 7 2.3 Decommissioning of research reactors 9 2.4 Nuclear information 10 3 RadiationRis√ł-R-1019(EN) Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department Annual Report 1997 Edited by B of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1997. The department¬īs research

  9. Ris-R-1104(EN) Nuclear Safety Research

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    .4 Radioanalytical chemistry 36 3.5 Ecophysiology 38 3.6 Radioactive waste 41 4 Nuclear facilities and services 43 4RisÝ-R-1104(EN) Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department Annual Report 1998 Edited by B, Roskilde, Denmark April 1999 #12;Abstract The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety

  10. Ris-R-1162(EN) Nuclear Safety Research

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    .4 Radioanalytical chemistry 26 3.5 Radioactive waste 29 4 Nuclear facilities and services 30 4.1 Research reactor DRRisÝ-R-1162(EN) Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department Annual Report 1999 Edited by B, Denmark April 2000 #12;Abstract The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research

  11. METHODOLOGIES FOR REVIEW OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF PROPOSED NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL SITES AND FACILITIES. VOLUME 9 OF THE FINAL REPORT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL ELECTRIC GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nero, A.V.

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    rights of way have been adequately established for all parts of the facility including: basic generation unit transmission

  12. System Design and the Safety Basis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ellingson, Darrel

    2008-05-06T23:59:59.000Z

    The objective of this paper is to present the Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC (BJC) Lessons Learned for system design as it relates to safety basis documentation. BJC has had to reconcile incomplete or outdated system description information with current facility safety basis for a number of situations in recent months. This paper has relevance in multiple topical areas including documented safety analysis, decontamination & decommissioning (D&D), safety basis (SB) implementation, safety and design integration, potential inadequacy of the safety analysis (PISA), technical safety requirements (TSR), and unreviewed safety questions. BJC learned that nuclear safety compliance relies on adequate and well documented system design information. A number of PIS As and TSR violations occurred due to inadequate or erroneous system design information. As a corrective action, BJC assessed the occurrences caused by systems design-safety basis interface problems. Safety systems reviewed included the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) Fluorination System, K-1065 fire alarm system, and the K-25 Radiation Criticality Accident Alarm System. The conclusion was that an inadequate knowledge of system design could result in continuous non-compliance issues relating to nuclear safety. This was especially true with older facilities that lacked current as-built drawings coupled with the loss of 'historical knowledge' as personnel retired or moved on in their careers. Walkdown of systems and the updating of drawings are imperative for nuclear safety compliance. System design integration with safety basis has relevance in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. This paper presents the BJC Lessons Learned in this area. It will be of benefit to DOE contractors that manage and operate an aging population of nuclear facilities.

  13. Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis [Sec 1 thru 4

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    GOETZ, T.G.

    2003-10-24T23:59:59.000Z

    The Tank Farm Documented Safety Analysis documents the basis for the conclusion that authorized Tank Farms facility operations comply with the requirements of DOE 5480.23 and DOE 5480.22. This documented safety analysis establishes the safety basis for the tank farms by documenting the results of the hazard and accident analyses for the tank farm facilities and operations and describing the significant features and programs that prevent or mitigate the identified hazards. The documented safety analysis also establishes the envelope within which the tank farm facilities can continue to operate safely.

  14. Safety of Nuclear Explosive Operations

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-08-07T23:59:59.000Z

    This directive establishes responsibilities and requirements to ensure the safety of routine and planned nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and facilities. Cancels DOE O 452.2A and DOE G 452.2A-1A. Canceled by DOE O 452.2C.

  15. Vehicle Management Driver Safety Program

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Machel, Hans

    Vehicle Management and Driver Safety Program Manual Facilities & Operations / Finance & Administration Version 2 April 2012 #12;© 2012 University of Alberta. #12;The Vehicle Management and Driver of employment. Driver Acknowledgement I have received the University of Alberta, Vehicle Management and Driver

  16. R&D plan for immobilization technologies: fissile materials disposition program. Revision 1.0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, G.A.

    1996-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US and Russia have agreed to large reductions in nuclear weapons. To aid in the selection of long- term fissile material management options, the Department of Energy`s Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) is conducting studies of options for the storage and disposition of surplus plutonium (Pu). One set of alternatives for disposition involve immobilization. The immobilization alternatives provide for fixing surplus fissile materials in a host matrix in order to create a solid disposal form that is nuclear criticality-safe, proliferation-resistant and environmentally acceptable for long-term storage or disposal.

  17. Disposition of clorazepate in dogs after single- and multiple-dose oral administration

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Forrester, Sharon Dru

    1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    to compare single-dose disposition values with multiple-dose disposition values. The paired t test was also used to compare body weight on day 0 with that on day 21. Analysis of variance with repeated measures was used to evaluate results of routine... on both sets of parameters, comparing single-dose with multiple-dose disposition. Hecause the values for Vd(ss)/F from trapezoidal analysis were not normally distributed, nonparametric statistical analysis (ie, Wilcoxon rank sum test) was used...

  18. An Evaluation of Single Phase Ceramic Formulations for Plutonium Disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Stennett, Martin C.; Hyatt, Neil C. [Engineering Materials, University of Sheffield, Mappin Street, Sheffield, S1 3JD (United Kingdom); Maddrell, Ewan R.; Scales, Charlie R. [Nexia Solutions Ltd., Sellafield, Seascale, CA20 1PG (United Kingdom); Livens, Francis R.; Gilbert, Matthew [Chemistry, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL (United Kingdom)

    2007-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Ceramics are promising potential hosts for the immobilization of actinide containing wastes. Work has been reported in the literature on multiphase systems, such as SYNROC [1], and on single phase systems such as pyrochlores [2] and zirconia [3], but assessment of the different waste-forms by direct comparison of literature data is not always easy due to the different processing and fabrication routes employed. In this study a potential range of different ceramic systems were investigated for plutonium disposition using the same processing scheme. Durable actinide containing minerals exist in nature and provided excellent target phases for the titanate, zirconate, silicate and phosphate based formulations examined here [4]. The Ce solid solution limits for each particular substitution mechanism were established and the processing parameters required to produce high quality ceramic specimens were optimised. Importantly, this was achieved within the constraints of a generic processing route suitable for fabrication of Pu bearing samples. (authors)

  19. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 4. Plutonium dispositioning in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sterbentz, J.W.; Olsen, C.S.; Sinha, U.P.

    1993-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This study is in response to a request by the Reactor Panel Subcommittee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to evaluate the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing conventional or advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs and in low temperature/pressure LWR designs that might be developed for plutonium disposal. Three plutonium-based fuel forms (oxides, aluminum metallics, and carbides) are evaluated for neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and material and compatibility issues. For the carbides, only the fabrication technologies are addressed. Viable plutonium oxide fuels for conventional or advanced LWRs include plutonium-zirconium-calcium oxide (PuO{sub 2}-ZrO{sub 2}-CaO) with the addition of thorium oxide (ThO{sub 2}) or a burnable poison such as erbium oxide (Er{sub 2}O{sub 3}) or europium oxide (Eu{sub 2}O{sub 3}) to achieve acceptable neutronic performance. Thorium will breed fissile uranium that may be unacceptable from a proliferation standpoint. Fabrication of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuels is well established; however, fabrication of plutonium-based oxide fuels will require further development. Viable aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels for a low temperature/pressure LWR include plutonium aluminide in an aluminum matrix (PuAl{sub 4}-Al) with the addition of a burnable poison such as erbium (Er) or europium (Eu). Fabrication of low-enriched plutonium in aluminum-plutonium metallic fuel rods was initially established 30 years ago and will require development to recapture and adapt the technology to meet current environmental and safety regulations. Fabrication of high-enriched uranium plate fuel by the picture-frame process is a well established process, but the use of plutonium would require the process to be upgraded in the United States to conform with current regulations and minimize the waste streams.

  20. Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition: Opportunities, Options, and Issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Greene, S.R.

    1999-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

    The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in the United States (U.S.) and the former Soviet Union. These materials pose a danger to national and international security. During the past few years, the U.S. and Russia have engaged in an ongoing dialog concerning the safe storage and disposition of surplus fissile material stockpiles. In January 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced the U. S. would pursue a dual track approach to rendering approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons. One track involves immobilizing the plutonium by combining it with high-level radioactive waste in glass or ceramic ''logs''. The other method, referred to as reactor-based disposition, converts plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear reactors. The U.S. and Russia are moving ahead rapidly to develop and demonstrate the technology required to implement the MOX option in their respective countries. U.S. MOX fuel research and development activities were started in the 1950s, with irradiation of MOX fuel rods in commercial light water reactors (LWR) from the 1960s--1980s. In all, a few thousand MOX fuel rods were successfully irradiated. Though much of this work was performed with weapons-grade or ''near'' weapons-grade plutonium--and favorable fuel performance was observed--the applicability of this data for licensing and use of weapons-grade MOX fuel manufactured with modern fuel fabrication processes is somewhat limited. The U.S. and Russia are currently engaged in an intensive research, development, and demonstration program to support implementation of the MOX option in our two countries. This paper focuses on work performed in the U.S. and provides a brief summary of joint U.S./Russian work currently underway.

  1. Chemical Hazards and Safety Issues in Fusion Safety Design

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cadwallader, L.C. [Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (United States)

    2003-09-15T23:59:59.000Z

    Radiological inventory releases have dominated accident consequences for fusion; these consequences are important to analyze and are generally the most severe result of a fusion facility accident event. However, the advent of, or plan for, large-scale usage of some toxic materials poses the additional hazard of chemical exposure from an accident event. Examples of toxic chemicals are beryllium for magnetic fusion and fluorine for laser fusion. Therefore, chemical exposure consequences must also be addressed in fusion safety assessment. This paper provides guidance for fusion safety analysis. US Department of Energy (DOE) chemical safety assessment practices for workers and the public are reviewed. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has published some guidance on public exposure to releases of mixtures of chemicals, this guidance has been used to create an initial guideline for treating mixed radiological and toxicological releases in fusion; for example, tritiated hazardous dust from a tokamak vacuum vessel. There is no convenient means to judge the hazard severity of exposure to mixed materials. The chemical fate of mixed material constituents must be reviewed to determine if there is a separate or combined radiological and toxicological carcinogenesis, or if other health threats exist with radiological carcinogenesis. Recommendations are made for fusion facility chemical safety evaluation and safety guidance for protecting the public from chemical releases, since such levels are not specifically identified in the DOE fusion safety standard.

  2. DOE/EA-1607: Final Environmental Assessment for Disposition of...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    domestic and one foreign). The U.S. enrichment facilities are (1) the currently operating United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) in Paducah,...

  3. DOE/EA-1607 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DISPOSITION OF DOE...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    domestic and one foreign). The U.S. enrichment facilities are (1) the currently operating United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) in Paducah,...

  4. Complications Associated with Long-Term Disposition of Newly-Generated Transuranic Waste: A National Laboratory Perspective

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    B.J. Orchard; L.A. Harvego; T.L. Carlson; R.P. Grant

    2009-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a multipurpose national laboratory delivering specialized science and engineering solutions for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Sponsorship of INL was formally transferred to the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (NE) by Secretary Spencer Abraham in July 2002. The move to NE, and designation as the DOE lead nuclear energy laboratory for reactor technology, supports the nationís expanding nuclear energy initiatives, placing INL at the center of work to develop advanced Generation IV nuclear energy systems; nuclear energy/hydrogen coproduction technology; advanced nuclear energy fuel cycle technologies; and providing national security answers to national infrastructure needs. As a result of the Laboratoryís NE mission, INL generates both contact-handled and remote-handled transuranic (TRU) waste from ongoing operations. Generation rates are relatively small and fluctuate based on specific programs and project activities being conducted; however, the Laboratory will continue to generate TRU waste well into the future in association with the NE mission. Currently, plans and capabilities are being established to transfer INLís contact-handled TRU waste to the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP) for certification and disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Remote-handled TRU waste is currently placed in storage at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). In an effort to minimize future liabilities associated with the INL NE mission, INL is evaluating and assessing options for the management and disposition of all its TRU waste on a real-time basis at time of generation. This paper summarizes near-term activities to minimize future re handling of INLís TRU waste, as well as, potential complications associated with the long-term disposition of newly-generated TRU waste. Potential complications impacting the disposition of INL newly-generated TRU waste include, but are not limited to: 1) required remote-handled TRU packaging configuration(s) vs. current facility capabilities, 2) long-term NE mission activities, 3) WIPP certification requirements, and 4) budget considerations.

  5. Environmental behavior of hafnium : the impact on the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cerefice, Gary Steven

    1999-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Experimental and analytical studies were performed to examine the environmental behavior of hafnium and its utility as a neutron poison for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Yucca Mountain. The hydrolysis of ...

  6. Enabling completion of the material disposition area G closure at the Los Alamos National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blankenhorn, James Allen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bishop, Milton L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) and the Los Alamos Site Office (LASO) have developed and are implementing an integrated strategy to accelerate the disposition of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) legacy transuranic waste inventory currently stored in Technical Area 54, Material Disposition Area (MDA) G. As that strategy has been implemented the easier waste streams have been certified and shipped leaving the harder more challenging wastes to be dispositioned. Lessons learned from around the complex and a partnership with the National Transuranic Program located in Carlsbad, New Mexico, are enabling this acceleration. The Waste Disposition Program is responsible for the removal of both the above ground and below grade, retrievably stored transuranic waste in time to support the negotiated consent order with the State of New Mexico which requires closure of MDA G by the year 2015. The solutions and strategy employed at LANL are applicable to any organization that is currently managing legacy transuranic waste.

  7. EIS-0283-S2: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This Supplemental EIS (SEIS) analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with changes to the surplus plutonium disposition program, including changes to the inventory of surplus plutonium and proposed new alternatives.

  8. CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS AND THE SAFETY BASIS AT PFP

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kessler, S

    2009-04-21T23:59:59.000Z

    With the implementation of DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, and DOE-STD-3007-2007, 'Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities', a new requirement was imposed that all criticality safety controls be evaluated for inclusion in the facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and that the evaluation process be documented in the site Criticality Safety Program Description Document (CSPDD). At the Hanford site in Washington State the CSPDD, HNF-31695, 'General Description of the FH Criticality Safety Program', requires each facility develop a linking document called a Criticality Control Review (CCR) to document performance of these evaluations. Chapter 5, Appendix 5B of HNF-7098, Criticality Safety Program, provided an example of a format for a CCR that could be used in lieu of each facility developing its own CCR. Since the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is presently undergoing Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D), new procedures are being developed for cleanout of equipment and systems that have not been operated in years. Existing Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) are revised, or new ones written, to develop the controls required to support D&D activities. Other Hanford facilities, including PFP, had difficulty using the basic CCR out of HNF-7098 when first implemented. Interpretation of the new guidelines indicated that many of the controls needed to be elevated to TSR level controls. Criterion 2 of the standard, requiring that the consequence of a criticality be examined for establishing the classification of a control, was not addressed. Upon in-depth review by PFP Criticality Safety staff, it was not clear that the programmatic interpretation of criterion 8C could be applied at PFP. Therefore, the PFP Criticality Safety staff decided to write their own CCR. The PFP CCR provides additional guidance for the evaluation team to use by clarifying the evaluation criteria in DOE-STD-3007-2007. In reviewing documents used in classifying controls for Nuclear Safety, it was noted that DOE-HDBK-1188, 'Glossary of Environment, Health, and Safety Terms', defines an Administrative Control (AC) in terms that are different than typically used in Criticality Safety. As part of this CCR, a new term, Criticality Administrative Control (CAC) was defined to clarify the difference between an AC used for criticality safety and an AC used for nuclear safety. In Nuclear Safety terms, an AC is a provision relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, assessment, and reporting necessary to ensure safe operation of a facility. A CAC was defined as an administrative control derived in a criticality safety analysis that is implemented to ensure double contingency. According to criterion 2 of Section IV, 'Linkage to the Documented Safety Analysis', of DOESTD-3007-2007, the consequence of a criticality should be examined for the purposes of classifying the significance of a control or component. HNF-PRO-700, 'Safety Basis Development', provides control selection criteria based on consequence and risk that may be used in the development of a Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) to establish the classification of a component as a design feature, as safety class or safety significant, i.e., an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), or as equipment important to safety; or merely provides defense-in-depth. Similar logic is applied to the CACs. Criterion 8C of DOE-STD-3007-2007, as written, added to the confusion of using the basic CCR from HNF-7098. The PFP CCR attempts to clarify this criterion by revising it to say 'Programmatic commitments or general references to control philosophy (e.g., mass control or spacing control or concentration control as an overall control strategy for the process without specific quantification of individual limits) is included in the PFP DSA'. Table 1 shows the PFP methodology for evaluating CACs. This evaluation process has been in use since February of 2008 and has proven to be simple and effective. Each control identified i

  9. The ORNL Surplus Facilities Management Program Long Range Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Myrick, T.E.

    1984-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Surplus Facilities Management Program (SFMP) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is part of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) National SFMP, administered by the Richland Operations Office. This program was established to provide for the management of DOE surplus radioactively contaminated facilities from the end of their operating life until final facility disposition is completed. As part of this program, the ORNL SFMP oversees some 76 individual surplus facilities, ranging in complexity from abandoned waste storage tanks to large experimental reactors. The ORNL SFMP has prepared this Long Range Plan to outline the long-term management strategy for those facilities included in the program. The primary objective of this plan are to: (1) develop a base of information for each ORNL SFMP facility, (2) conduct preliminary decommissioning analyses to identify feasible alternatives, (3) assess the current and future risk of each facility, (4) establish a priority list for the decommissioning projects, and (5) integrate the individual project costs and schedules into an overall program schedule and cost estimate for the ORNL site. The Long Range Plan also provides an overview of the ORNL SFMP management structure, specifies the decommissioning criteria to be employed, and identifies special technical problems, research and development needs, and special facilities and equipment that may be required for decommissioning operations.

  10. BLENDING STUDY FOR SRR SALT DISPOSITION INTEGRATION: TANK 50H SCALE-MODELING AND COMPUTER-MODELING FOR BLENDING PUMP DESIGN, PHASE 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Leishear, R.; Poirier, M.; Fowley, M.

    2011-05-26T23:59:59.000Z

    The Salt Disposition Integration (SDI) portfolio of projects provides the infrastructure within existing Liquid Waste facilities to support the startup and long term operation of the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). Within SDI, the Blend and Feed Project will equip existing waste tanks in the Tank Farms to serve as Blend Tanks where 300,000-800,000 gallons of salt solution will be blended in 1.3 million gallon tanks and qualified for use as feedstock for SWPF. Blending requires the miscible salt solutions from potentially multiple source tanks per batch to be well mixed without disturbing settled sludge solids that may be present in a Blend Tank. Disturbing solids may be problematic both from a feed quality perspective as well as from a process safety perspective where hydrogen release from the sludge is a potential flammability concern. To develop the necessary technical basis for the design and operation of blending equipment, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) completed scaled blending and transfer pump tests and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling. A 94 inch diameter pilot-scale blending tank, including tank internals such as the blending pump, transfer pump, removable cooling coils, and center column, were used in this research. The test tank represents a 1/10.85 scaled version of an 85 foot diameter, Type IIIA, nuclear waste tank that may be typical of Blend Tanks used in SDI. Specifically, Tank 50 was selected as the tank to be modeled per the SRR, Project Engineering Manager. SRNL blending tests investigated various fixed position, non-rotating, dual nozzle pump designs, including a blending pump model provided by the blend pump vendor, Curtiss Wright (CW). Primary research goals were to assess blending times and to evaluate incipient sludge disturbance for waste tanks. Incipient sludge disturbance was defined by SRR and SRNL as minor blending of settled sludge from the tank bottom into suspension due to blending pump operation, where the sludge level was shown to remain constant. To experimentally model the sludge layer, a very thin, pourable, sludge simulant was conservatively used for all testing. To experimentally model the liquid, supernate layer above the sludge in waste tanks, two salt solution simulants were used, which provided a bounding range of supernate properties. One solution was water (H{sub 2}O + NaOH), and the other was an inhibited, more viscous salt solution. The research performed and data obtained significantly advances the understanding of fluid mechanics, mixing theory and CFD modeling for nuclear waste tanks by benchmarking CFD results to actual experimental data. This research significantly bridges the gap between previous CFD models and actual field experiences in real waste tanks. A finding of the 2009, DOE, Slurry Retrieval, Pipeline Transport and Plugging, and Mixing Workshop was that CFD models were inadequate to assess blending processes in nuclear waste tanks. One recommendation from that Workshop was that a validation, or bench marking program be performed for CFD modeling versus experiment. This research provided experimental data to validate and correct CFD models as they apply to mixing and blending in nuclear waste tanks. Extensive SDI research was a significant step toward bench marking and applying CFD modeling. This research showed that CFD models not only agreed with experiment, but demonstrated that the large variance in actual experimental data accounts for misunderstood discrepancies between CFD models and experiments. Having documented this finding, SRNL was able to provide correction factors to be used with CFD models to statistically bound full scale CFD results. Through the use of pilot scale tests performed for both types of pumps and available engineering literature, SRNL demonstrated how to effectively apply CFD results to salt batch mixing in full scale waste tanks. In other words, CFD models were in error prior to development of experimental correction factors determined during this research, which provided a technique to use CFD models fo

  11. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Arboricultural Operations Safety Requirements LBNL Arboricultural Operation Safety Requirements

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Eisen, Michael

    Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Arboricultural Operations Safety Requirements 1 of 3 LBNL reviewed with LBNL Facilities Electric Shop (6023)? * IF THE ANSWER TO 3E WAS NO, STOP THIS WORK ACTIVITY AND CONTACT FACILITIES ELECTRIC SHOP a. Name of LBNL individual consulted? #12;LBNL Arboricultural Operations

  12. Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-04-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The order defines the safety management program required by 10 CFR 830.204(b)(5) for maintenance and the reliable performance of structures, systems and components that are part of the safety basis required by 10 CFR 830.202 at hazard category 1, 2 and 3 DOE nuclear facilities. Admin Chg 1, dated 3-12-2013. Cancels DOE O 433.1A.

  13. Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-04-21T23:59:59.000Z

    The order defines the safety management program required by 10 CFR 830.204(b)(5) for maintenance and the reliable performance of structures, systems and components that are part of the safety basis required by 10 CFR 830.202 at hazard category 1, 2 and 3 DOE nuclear facilities. Cancels DOE O 433.1A. Admin Chg 1, dated 3-12-2013, cancels DOE O 433.1B.

  14. Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-02-13T23:59:59.000Z

    The Order defines the safety management program required by 10 CFR 830.204(b)(5) for maintenance and the reliable performance of Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) that are part of the safety basis required by 10 CFR 830.202.1 at hazard category 1, 2 and 3 Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities. Cancels DOE O 433.1. Canceled by DOE O 433.1B.

  15. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE O 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document is a guide to understanding and meeting the requirements of DOE O 420.2C, and shares lessons learned based on valuable experience within the community. Cancels DOE G 420.2-1.

  16. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE Order 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-08-30T23:59:59.000Z

    This is a guide to understanding and meeting the requirements of DOE Order 420.2C and shares lessons learned based on valuable experience within the community.

  17. Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning Program Surveillance and Maintenance Plan, Revision 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Poderis, Reed J. [NSTec] [NSTec; King, Rebecca A. [NSTec] [NSTec

    2013-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    This Surveillance and Maintenance (S&M) Plan describes the activities performed between deactivation and final decommissioning of the following facilities located on the Nevada National Security Site, as documented in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order under the Industrial Sites program as decontamination and decommissioning sites: ? Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (EMAD) Facility: o EMAD Building (Building 25-3900) o Locomotive Storage Shed (Building 25-3901) ? Test Cell C (TCC) Facility: o Equipment Building (Building 25-3220) o Motor Drive Building (Building 25-3230) o Pump Shop (Building 25-3231) o Cryogenic Lab (Building 25-3232) o Ancillary Structures (e.g., dewars, water tower, piping, tanks) These facilities have been declared excess and are in various stages of deactivation (low-risk, long-term stewardship disposition state). This S&M Plan establishes and implements a solid, cost-effective, and balanced S&M program consistent with federal, state, and regulatory requirements. A graded approach is used to plan and conduct S&M activities. The goal is to maintain the facilities in a safe condition in a cost-effective manner until their final end state is achieved. This plan accomplishes the following: ? Establishes S&M objectives and framework ? Identifies programmatic guidance for S&M activities to be conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) ? Provides present facility condition information and identifies hazards ? Identifies facility-specific S&M activities to be performed and their frequency ? Identifies regulatory drivers, NNSA/NFO policies and procedures, and best management practices that necessitate implementation of S&M activities ? Provides criteria and frequencies for revisions and updates ? Establishes the process for identifying and dispositioning a condition that has not been previously identified or documented ? Provides instructions for implementing annual S&M inspections and activities The following facilities that were included in Revision 1 of this plan have reached final disposition and are no longer in the S&M program: ? Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility, Building 25-3110 ? Test Cell A Facility, Building 25-3113 ? TCC Facility, Building 25-3210 ? Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 26-2201 ? Super Kukla Facility, Building 27-5400

  18. LASER SAFETY POLICY MANUAL ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH & SAFETY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Houston, Paul L.

    LASER SAFETY POLICY MANUAL ISSUED BY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH & SAFETY OFFICE OF RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY and GEORGIA TECH LASER SAFETY COMMITTEE July 1, 2010 Revised July 31, 2012 #12;Laser Safety Program 1-1 #12;Laser Safety Policy Manual TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. POLICY AND SCOPE

  19. ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY GENERAL SAFETY MANUAL

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Maroncelli, Mark

    ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY GENERAL SAFETY MANUAL May 10, 2002 #12;i Acknowledgements Environmental Health and Safety gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by the University Safety Council extremely helpful. #12;ii Environmental Health and Safety General Safety Manual Table of Contents Section

  20. Tank farms criticality safety manual

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    FORT, L.A.

    2003-03-27T23:59:59.000Z

    This document defines the Tank Farms Contractor (TFC) criticality safety program, as required by Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Subpart 830.204(b)(6), ''Documented Safety Analysis'' (10 CFR 830.204 (b)(6)), and US Department of Energy (DOE) 0 420.1A, Facility Safety, Section 4.3, ''Criticality Safety.'' In addition, this document contains certain best management practices, adopted by TFC management based on successful Hanford Site facility practices. Requirements in this manual are based on the contractor requirements document (CRD) found in Attachment 2 of DOE 0 420.1A, Section 4.3, ''Nuclear Criticality Safety,'' and the cited revisions of applicable standards published jointly by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS) as listed in Appendix A. As an informational device, requirements directly imposed by the CRD or ANSI/ANS Standards are shown in boldface. Requirements developed as best management practices through experience and maintained consistent with Hanford Site practice are shown in italics. Recommendations and explanatory material are provided in plain type.

  1. Safety Bulletin

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    in the documented safety analysis. BACKGROUND On March 11 , 2011 , the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in Japan was damaged by a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the...

  2. Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-08-19T23:59:59.000Z

    To ensure timely collection, reporting, analysis, and dissemination of information on environment, safety, and health issues as required by law or regulations or as needed to ensure that the Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are kept fully informed on a timely basis about events that could adversely affect the health and safety of the public or the workers, the environment, the intended purpose of DOE facilities, or the credibility of the Department. Cancels DOE O 210.1, DOE O 231.1, and DOE O 232.1A. Canceled by DOE O 232.2.

  3. Mobile Facility

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742EnergyOnItemResearch > The EnergyCenterDioxide Capture inFacility AMF Information Science

  4. Facility Representatives

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,OfficeEnd ofEvaluations in Covered Facilities | Department of Energy

  5. Facility Representatives

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645 3,625 1,006 492 742 33 1112011AT&T,OfficeEnd ofEvaluations in Covered Facilities | Department of Energy063-2011

  6. Facility Status

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative1 First Use of Energy for All Purposes (Fuel and Nonfuel), 2002; Level: National5Sales for4,645U.S. DOEThe Bonneville Power AdministrationField8,Dist. Category UC-lFederalFYRANDOM DRUG TESTING The requirementFacility

  7. RFP RHB-5-52467 Guidelines for Non-Construction Health and Safety...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    4 NREL Guidelines for Preparing a Subcontractor's Health and Safety Plan - Non-Construction NREL requires that all activities at the NREL facilities shall be conducted in a...

  8. DOE G 414.1-4, Safety Software Guide for Use with 10 CFR 830...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    to implement effective quality assurance (QA) processes and achieve safe nuclear facility operations. DOE promulgated the safety software requirements and this guidance to...

  9. Review of Management of Safety Systems at the Hanford Tank Farms...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Document CSE Cognizant System Engineer DOE U.S. Department of Energy DSA Documented Safety Analysis DST Double Shell Tank EIR Event Investigation Report FR Facility...

  10. Model for multi-strata safety performance measurements in the process industry

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Keren, Nir

    2004-09-30T23:59:59.000Z

    ) benchmarking of process safety elements among facilities; and (3) use of incident data collection from various sources for industrial safety performance assessment. The methods presently available for measurement of process safety within facilities... to explore the potential of integrating data sources and harnessing these databases for industrial safety performance assessment. In this study we developed models to pursue the measurement of samples of the strata described above. The measurement...

  11. Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE`s independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91.

  12. Toolbox Safety Talk Ladder Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    Health & Safety for recordkeeping. Slips, trips, and falls constitute the majority of general industry and construction worker injuries. Falls cause 15% of all accidental deaths, and are second only to motor vehicle

  13. The Vapor Plume at Material Disposal Are C in Relation to Pajarito Corridor Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Masse, William B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-04-02T23:59:59.000Z

    A vapor plume made up of volatile organic compounds is present beneath Material Disposal Area C (MDA C) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The location and concentrations within the vapor plume are discussed in relation to existing and planned facilities and construction activities along Pajarito Road (the 'Pajarito Corridor') and in terms of worker health and safety. This document provides information that indicates that the vapor plume does not pose a threat to the health of LANL workers nor will it pose a threat to workers during construction of proposed facilities along Pajarito Road. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) monitors emissions, effluents, and environmental media to meet environmental compliance requirements, determine actions to protect the environment, and monitor the long-term health of the local environment. LANL also studies and characterizes 'legacy' waste from past Laboratory operations to make informed decisions regarding eventual corrective actions and the disposition of that waste. Starting in 1969, these activities have been annually reported in the LANL Environmental Report (formerly Environmental Surveillance Report), and are detailed in publicly accessible technical reports meeting environmental compliance requirements. Included among the legacy sites being investigated are several formerly used material disposal areas (MDAs) set aside by the Laboratory for the general on-site disposal of waste from mission-related activities. One such area is MDA C located in Technical Area 50 (TA-50), which was used for waste disposal between 1948 and 1974. The location of TA-50 is depicted in Figure 1. The present paper uses a series of maps and cross sections to address the public concerns raised about the vapor plume at MDA C. As illustrated here, extensive sampling and data interpretation indicate that the vapor plume at MDA C does not pose a threat to the health of LANL workers nor will it pose a threat to workers during construction of the proposed facilities and utility trenches. The public cannot be directly exposed to the vapor plume beneath MDA C because Pajarito Road is closed to the public.

  14. DEVELOPMENT OF GLASS AND CRYSTALLINE CERAMIC FORMS FOR DISPOSITION OF EXCESS PLUTONIUM

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Marra, James; Cozzi, A; Crawford, C.; Herman, C.; Marra, John; Peeler, D.

    2009-09-10T23:59:59.000Z

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) has identified up to 50 metric tons of excess plutonium that needs to be dispositioned. The bulk of the material is slated to be blended with uranium and fabricated into a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel for subsequent burning in commercial nuclear reactors. Excess plutonium-containing impurity materials making it unsuitable for fabrication into MOX fuel will need to be dispositioned via other means. Glass and crystalline ceramics have been developed and studied as candidate forms to immobilize these impure plutonium feeds. A titanate-based ceramic was identified as an excellent actinide material host. This composition was based on Synroc compositions previously developed for nuclear waste immobilization. These titanate ceramics were found to be able to accommodate extremely high quantities of fissile material and exhibit excellent aqueous durability. A lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass was developed to accommodate high concentrations of plutonium and to be very tolerant of impurities yet still maintain good aqueous durability. Recent testing of alkali borosilicate compositions showed promise of using these compositions to disposition lower concentrations of plutonium using existing high level waste vitrification processes. The developed waste forms all appear to be suitable for Pu disposition. Depending on the actual types and concentrations of the Pu residue streams slated for disposition, each waste form offers unique advantages.

  15. Decommissioning of Active Ventilation Systems in a Nuclear R and D Facility to Prepare for Building Demolition (Whiteshell Laboratories Decommissioning Project, Canada) - 13073

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wilcox, Brian; May, Doug; Howlett, Don; Bilinsky, Dennis [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Ara Mooradian Way, Pinawa, Manitoba (Canada)] [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Ara Mooradian Way, Pinawa, Manitoba (Canada)

    2013-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

    Whiteshell Laboratories (WL) is a nuclear research establishment owned by the Canadian government and operated by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) since the early 1960's. WL is currently under a decommissioning license and the mandate is to remediate the nuclear legacy liabilities in a safe and cost effective manner. The WL Project is the first major nuclear decommissioning project in Canada. A major initiative underway is to decommission and demolish the main R and D Laboratory complex. The Building 300 R and D complex was constructed to accommodate laboratories and offices which were mainly used for research and development associated with organic-cooled reactors, nuclear fuel waste management, reactor safety, advanced fuel cycles and other applications of nuclear energy. Building 300 is a three storey structure of approximately 16,000 m{sup 2}. In order to proceed with building demolition, the contaminated systems inside the building have to be characterized, removed, and the waste managed. There is a significant focus on volume reduction of radioactive waste for the WL project. The active ventilation system is one of the significant contaminated systems in Building 300 that requires decommissioning and removal. The active ventilation system was designed to manage hazardous fumes and radioactivity from ventilation devices (e.g., fume hoods, snorkels and glove boxes) and to prevent the escape of airborne hazardous material outside of the laboratory boundary in the event of an upset condition. The system includes over 200 ventilation devices and 32 active exhaust fan units and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. The strategy to remove the ventilation system was to work from the laboratory end back to the fan/filter system. Each ventilation duct was radiologically characterized. Fogging was used to minimize loose contamination. Sections of the duct were removed by various cutting methods and bagged for temporary storage prior to disposition. Maintenance of building heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) balancing was critical to ensure proper airflow and worker safety. Approximately 103 m{sup 3} of equipment and materials were recovered or generated by the project. Low level waste accounted for approximately 37.4 m{sup 3}. Where possible, ducting was free released for metal recycling. Contaminated ducts were compacted into B-1000 containers and stored in a Shielded Modular Above-Ground Storage Facility (SMAGS) on the WL site awaiting final disposition. The project is divided into three significant phases, with Phases 1 and 2 completed. Lessons learned during the execution of Phases 1 and 2 have been incorporated into the current ventilation removal. (authors)

  16. Reactor Safety Research Programs

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dotson, CW

    1980-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This document summarizes the work performed by Pacific Northwest laboratory from October 1 through December 31, 1979, for the Division of Reactor Safety Research within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluation of nondestructive examination (NDE) techniques and instrumentation are reported; areas of investigation include demonstrating the feasibilty of determining structural graphite strength, evaluating the feasibilty of detecting and analyzing flaw growth in reactor pressure boundary systems, examining NDE reliability and probabilistic fracture mechanics, and assessing the remaining integrity of pressurized water reactor steam generator tubes where service-induced degradation has been indicated. Test assemblies and analytical support are being provided for experimental programs at other facilities. These programs include the loss-of-coolant accident simulation tests at the NRU reactor, Chalk River, Canada; the fuel rod deformation and post-accident coolability tests for the ESSOR Test Reactor Program, lspra, Italy; the blowdown and reflood tests in the test facility at Cadarache, France; the instrumented fuel assembly irradiation program at Halden, Norway; and the experimental programs at the Power Burst Facility, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. These programs will provide data for computer modeling of reactor system and fuel performance during various abnormal operating conditions.

  17. Environment, Safety and Health Reporting

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-06-27T23:59:59.000Z

    The order addresses DOE/NNSA receiving timely, accurate information about events that have affected or could adversely affect the health, safety and security of the public or workers, the environment, the operations of DOE facilities, or the credibility of the Department. Cancels DOE O 231.1A Chg 1, DOE M 231.1-1A Chg 2 and DOE N 234.1. Admin Chg 1, dated 11-28-12, cancels DOE O 231.1B.

  18. Environment, Safety and Health Reporting

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-06-27T23:59:59.000Z

    The order addresses DOE/NNSA receiving timely, accurate information about events that have affected or could adversely affect the health, safety and security of the public or workers, the environment, the operations of DOE facilities, or the credibility of the Department. Cancels DOE O 231.1A Chg 1, DOE M 231.1-1A Chg 2 and DOE N 234.1. Admin Chg 1, dated 11-28-12.

  19. Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the Transuranic Storage Area Retrieval Enclosure at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Revision 8

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

    This Transuranic Storage Area Retrieval Enclosure Preliminary Safety Analysis Report was completed as required by DOE Order 5480.23. The purpose of this document is to construct a safety basis that supports the design and permits construction of the facility. The facility has been designed to the requirements of a Radioactive Solid Waste Facility presented in DOE Order 6430.1A.

  20. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    PIEPHO, M.G.

    1999-10-20T23:59:59.000Z

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).'' All assumptions, parameters and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR.