National Library of Energy BETA

Sample records for facility disposition safety

  1. Facility Disposition Safety Strategy RM

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    that address key functional areas of project management, engineering and design, safety, environment, security, and quality assurance, grouped by each specific CD phase. This...

  2. Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-05-01

    Volume One of this Standard has been revised to provide a Department of Energy (DOE) approved methodology for preparing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, as well as environmental restoration activities that involve work not done within a permanent structure. Methodologies provided in this Standard are intended to be compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements. Volume Two contains the appendices that provide additional environment, safety and health (ES&H) information to complement Volume 1 of this Standard. Volume 2 of the Standard is much broader in scope than Volume 1 and satisfies several purposes. Integrated safety management expectations are provided in accordance with facility disposition requirements contained in DOE O 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management.

  3. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1996-10-24

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  4. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-11-16

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  5. Major Risk Factors to the Integrated Facility Disposition Project...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Major Risk Factors to the Integrated Facility Disposition Project Major Risk Factors to the Integrated Facility Disposition Project The scope of the Integrated Facility Disposition...

  6. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-11-20

    The objective of this Order is to establish facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. The Order has Change 1 dated 11-16-95, Change 2 dated 10-24-96, and the latest Change 3 dated 11-22-00 incorporated. The latest change satisfies a commitment made to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in response to DNFSB recommendation 97-2, Criticality Safety.

  7. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22

    This Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for Department of Energy facilities, which includes nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards mitigation, and the System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1A. DOE O 420.1B Chg 1 issued 4-19-10.

  8. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22

    The order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and the System Engineer Program.Chg 1 incorporates the use of DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, mandatory for Hazard Category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities. Cancels DOE O 420.1A.

  9. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-10-13

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. Cancels DOE 5480.7A, DOE 5480.24, DOE 5480.28 and Division 13 of DOE 6430.1A. Canceled by DOE O 420.1A.

  10. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1B, DOE G 420.1-2 and DOE G 420.1-3.

  11. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2002-05-20

    To establish facility safety requirements for the Department of Energy, including National Nuclear Security Administration. Cancels DOE O 420.1. Canceled by DOE O 420.1B.

  12. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-06-21

    DOE-STD-1104 contains the Department's method and criteria for reviewing and approving nuclear facility's documented safety analysis (DSA). This review and approval formally document the basis for DOE, concluding that a facility can be operated safely in a manner that adequately protects workers, the public, and the environment. Therefore, it is appropriate to formally require implementation of the review methodology and criteria contained in DOE-STD-1104.

  13. Idaho High-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition, Final Environmental...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Copies of the Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement are available at the...

  14. CRAD, Facility Safety- Nuclear Facility Safety Basis

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Nuclear Facility Safety Basis.

  15. DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility Disposition Activities DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility Disposition...

  16. Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs establishes nuclear safety requirements related to safety management programs that are essential to the safety of DOE nuclear facilities.

  17. Site selection for the Salt Disposition Facility at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bowers, J.A.

    2000-01-03

    The purpose of this report is to identify, assess, and rank potential sites for the proposed Salt Disposition Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site.

  18. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wike, L.D.

    2000-12-13

    The purpose of this study is to identify, assess, and rank potential sites for the proposed Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities complex at the Savannah River Site.

  19. Facility Safety | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    improved DOE program and field implementation of nuclear safety management programs and fire protection and natural phenomena hazard control requirements. Nuclear facility program...

  20. Implementation Guide for Surveillance and Maintenance during Facility Transition and Disposition

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1999-09-29

    As DOE facilities complete mission operations and are declared excess, they pass into a transition phase that ultimately prepares them for disposition. The disposition phase of a facility's life cycle usually includes deactivation, decommissioning, and surveillance and maintenance (S&M) activities.

  1. Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 October...

  2. Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-07-23

    To establish accelerator-specific safety requirements which, when supplemented by other applicable safety and health requirements, will serve to prevent injuries and illnesses associated with Department of Energy (DOE) or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) accelerator operations. Cancels DOE O 420.2A. Certified 5-13-08. Canceled by DOE O 420.2C.

  3. Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21

    The order defines accelerators and establishes accelerator specific safety requirements and approval authorities which, when supplemented by other applicable safety and health requirements, promote safe operations to ensure protection of workers, the public, and the environment. Supersedes DOE O 420.2B.

  4. Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-01-08

    To establish accelerator-specific safety requirements which, when supplemented by other applicable safety and health requirements, will serve to prevent injuries and illnesses associated with Department of Energy (DOE) or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) accelerator operations. Cancels DOE O 420.2. Canceled by DOE O 420.2B.

  5. CRAD, Facility Safety- Technical Safety Requirements

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Technical Safety Requirments (TSA).

  6. CRAD, Facility Safety- Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process.

  7. 2015 Nuclear & Facility Safety Programs Workshop | Department...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    featuring tracks for the Facility Representative (FR), Safety System Oversight (SSO), Fire Safety (FS) and Readiness communities. Distinguished speakers from inside and outside...

  8. Facility Safety | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE: Alternative Fuelsof Energy Services Ā» Program ManagementAct4Facility Safety Policy,

  9. Evaluation of existing United States` facilities for use as a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beard, C.A.; Buksa, J.J.; Chidester, K.; Eaton, S.L.; Motley, F.E.; Siebe, D.A.

    1995-12-31

    A number of existing US facilities were evaluated for use as a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition. These facilities include the Fuels Material Examination Facility (FMEF) at Hanford, the Washington Power Supply Unit 1 (WNP-1) facility at Hanford, the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) at Barnwell, SC, the Fuel Processing Facility (FPF) at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and the P-reactor at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The study consisted of evaluating each facility in terms of available process space, available building support systems (i.e., HVAC, security systems, existing process equipment, etc.), available regional infrastructure (i.e., emergency response teams, protective force teams, available transportation routes, etc.), and ability to integrate the MOX fabrication process into the facility in an operationally-sound manner that requires a minimum amount of structural modifications.

  10. Major Risk Factors to the Integrated Facility Disposition Project

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    facilities which might satisfy HRMP&D during the reconfiguration in Bethel Valley Planning at Y-12 to bypass utilities during D&D of excess facilities should consider...

  11. Nano Research Facility Lab Safety Manual Nano Research Facility

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Subramanian, Venkat

    1 Nano Research Facility Lab Safety Manual Nano Research Facility: Weining Wang Office: Brauer---chemical, biological, or radiological. Notify the lab manager, Dr. Yujie Xiong at 5-4530. Eye Contact: Promptly flush

  12. Superfund Policy Statements and Guidance Regarding Disposition of Radioactive Waste in Non-NRC Licensed Disposal Facilities - 13407

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Walker, Stuart

    2013-07-01

    This talk will discuss EPA congressional testimony and follow-up letters, as well as letters to other stakeholders on EPA's perspectives on the disposition of radioactive waste outside of the NRC licensed disposal facility system. This will also look at Superfund's historical practices, and emerging trends in the NRC and agreement states on waste disposition. (author)

  13. Facility Safety (9-23-10)--Withdrawn

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-09-23

    Withdrawn, 5-19-2014--This approval includes revision of the three implementing Guides: DOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide for Use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety; DOE G 420.1-2, Guide for the Mitigation of Natural Phenomena Hazards for DOE Nuclear Facilities and NonNuclear Facilities; and DOE G 420.1-3, Implementation Guide for DOE Fire Protection and Emergency Services Programs for Use with DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety

  14. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wike, L.D.

    2000-08-17

    A site selection study was conducted to evaluate locations for the proposed Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities. Facilities to be located include the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), and the Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) facility. Objectives of the study include: (1) Confirm that the Department of Energy (DOE) selected locations for the MOX and PDCF were suitable based on selected siting criteria, (2) Recommend a site in the vicinity of F Area that is suitable for the PIP, and (3) Identify alternative suitable sites for one or more of these facilities in the event that further geotechnical characterization or other considerations result in disqualification of a currently proposed site.

  15. CRAD, Facility Safety- Nuclear Facility Design

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Nuclear Facility Design.

  16. Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MITCHELL,GERRY W.; LONGLEY,SUSAN W.; PHILBIN,JEFFREY S.; MAHN,JEFFREY A.; BERRY,DONALD T.; SCHWERS,NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK,THOMAS E.; NAEGELI,ROBERT E.

    2000-11-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.

  17. Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer...

  18. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Update - Dale...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Update - Dale Govan, Departmental Representative to the DNFSB Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Update - Dale Govan,...

  19. Implementation of safeguards and security for fissile materials disposition reactor alternative facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1995-10-01

    A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered and include facilities which provide for long-ten-n and interim storage, convert and stabilize fissile materials for other disposition alternatives, immobilize fissile material in glass and/or ceramic material, fabricate fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and dispose of fissile material using a number of geologic alternatives. Particular attention will be given to the reactor alternatives which include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary LWRs and CANDU reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include processing which converts Pu to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility located in either the US or in Europe, US LWRs or the CANDU reactors and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository. This paper focuses on how the objectives of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction and nonproliferation will be accomplished and the possible impacts of meeting these objectives on facility operations and design. Some of the areas in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threat, and (4) potential proliferation risks, the impacts on the facilities, and safeguards and security issues unique to the presence of Category 1 or strategic special nuclear material.

  20. SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT KOP DISPOSITION - THERMAL AND GAS ANALYSIS FOR THE COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    SWENSON JA; CROWE RD; APTHORPE R; PLYS MG

    2010-03-09

    The purpose of this document is to present conceptual design phase thermal process calculations that support the process design and process safety basis for the cold vacuum drying of K Basin KOP material. This document is intended to demonstrate that the conceptual approach: (1) Represents a workable process design that is suitable for development in preliminary design; and (2) Will support formal safety documentation to be prepared during the definitive design phase to establish an acceptable safety basis. The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) is responsible for the disposition of Knock Out Pot (KOP) sludge within the 105-K West (KW) Basin. KOP sludge consists of size segregated material (primarily canister particulate) from the fuel and scrap cleaning process used in the Spent Nuclear Fuel process at K Basin. The KOP sludge will be pre-treated to remove fines and some of the constituents containing chemically bound water, after which it is referred to as KOP material. The KOP material will then be loaded into a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO), dried at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and stored in the Canister Storage Building (CSB). This process is patterned after the successful drying of 2100 metric tons of spent fuel, and uses the same facilities and much of the same equipment that was used for drying fuel and scrap. Table ES-l present similarities and differences between KOP material and fuel and between MCOs loaded with these materials. The potential content of bound water bearing constituents limits the mass ofKOP material in an MCO load to a fraction of that in an MCO containing fuel and scrap; however, the small particle size of the KOP material causes the surface area to be significantly higher. This relatively large reactive surface area represents an input to the KOP thermal calculations that is significantly different from the calculations for fuel MCOs. The conceptual design provides for a copper insert block that limits the volume available to receive KOP material, enhances heat conduction, and functions as a heat source and sink during drying operations. This use of the copper insert represents a significant change to the thermal model compared to that used for the fuel calculations. A number of cases were run representing a spectrum of normal and upset conditions for the drying process. Dozens of cases have been run on cold vacuum drying of fuel MCOs. Analysis of these previous calculations identified four cases that provide a solid basis for judgments on the behavior of MCO in drying operations. These four cases are: (1) Normal Process; (2) Degraded vacuum pumping; (3) Open MCO with loss of annulus water; and (4) Cool down after vacuum drying. The four cases were run for two sets of input parameters for KOP MCOs: (1) a set of parameters drawn from safety basis values from the technical data book and (2) a sensitivity set using parameters selected to evaluate the impact of lower void volume and smaller particle size on MCO behavior. Results of the calculations for the drying phase cases are shown in Table ES-2. Cases using data book safety basis values showed dry out in 9.7 hours and heat rejection sufficient to hold temperature rise to less than 25 C. Sensitivity cases which included unrealistically small particle sizes and corresponding high reactive surface area showed higher temperature increases that were limited by water consumption. In this document and in the attachment (Apthorpe, R. and M.G. Plys, 2010) cases using Technical Databook safety basis values are referred to as nominal cases. In future calculations such cases will be called safety basis cases. Also in these documents cases using parameters that are less favorable to acceptable performance than databook safety values are referred to as safety cases. In future calculations such cases will be called sensitivity cases or sensitivity evaluations Calculations to be performed in support of the detailed design and formal safety basis documentation will expand the calculations presented in this document to include: additional features of th

  1. Occupational Safety Review of High Technology Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lee Cadwallader

    2005-01-31

    This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators. These data are useful to form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known sets of safety rules and regulations. Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other industrial hazards. Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for comparison.

  2. Office of Nuclear Safety Basis and Facility Design

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Nuclear Safety Basis & Facility Design establishes safety basis and facility design requirements and expectations related to analysis and design of nuclear facilities to ensure protection of workers and the public from the hazards associated with nuclear operations.

  3. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Guidance

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1996-05-01

    This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in DOE-STD-6002-96, Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities: Requirements. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While the requirements in DOE-STD-6002-96 are generally applicable to a wide range of fusion facilities, this Standard, DOE-STD-6003-96, is concerned mainly with the implementation of those requirements in large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This Standard is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment as opposed to regulation by other regulatory agencies. As the need for guidance involving other types of fusion facilities or other regulatory environments emerges, additional guidance volumes should be prepared. The concepts, processes, and recommendations set forth here are for guidance only. They will contribute to safety at magnetic fusion facilities.

  4. Facility Disposition Safety Strategy RM | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum12, 2015Executive Order14, 20111,FY 2007 FeeFederalFirst2 DOEMeeting

  5. Safety of Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Batandjieva, B.; Warnecke, E.; Coates, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

    2008-01-15

    Full text of publication follows: ensuring safety during all stages of facility life cycle is a widely recognised responsibility of the operators, implemented under the supervision of the regulatory body and other competent authorities. As the majority of the facilities worldwide are still in operation or shutdown, there is no substantial experience in decommissioning and evaluation of safety during decommissioning in majority of Member States. The need for cooperation and exchange of experience and good practices on ensuring and evaluating safety of decommissioning was one of the outcomes of the Berlin conference in 2002. On this basis during the last three years IAEA initiated a number of international projects that can assist countries, in particular small countries with limited resources. The main IAEA international projects addressing safety during decommissioning are: (i) DeSa Project on Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety during Decommissioning; (ii) R{sup 2}D{sup 2}P project on Research Reactors Decommissioning Demonstration Project; and (iii) Project on Evaluation and Decommissioning of Former Facilities that used Radioactive Material in Iraq. This paper focuses on the DeSa Project activities on (i) development of a harmonised methodology for safety assessment for decommissioning; (ii) development of a procedure for review of safety assessments; (iii) development of recommendations on application of the graded approach to the performance and review of safety assessments; and (iv) application of the methodology and procedure to the selected real facilities with different complexities and hazard potentials (a nuclear power plant, a research reactor and a nuclear laboratory). The paper also outlines the DeSa Project outcomes and planned follow-up activities. It also summarises the main objectives and activities of the Iraq Project and introduces the R{sup 2}D{sup 2} Project, which is a subject of a complementary paper.

  6. CRAD, New Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis and Technical...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    December 2, 2014 New Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements Criteria Review and Approach Document (EA CRAD 31-07, Rev. 0) CRAD, New Nuclear...

  7. Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide for Use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-03-28

    This Guide provides guidance on the application of requirements for nonreactor nuclear facilities and explosives facilities of Department of Energy (DOE) O 420.1, Facility Safety, Section 4.1, Nuclear and Explosives Safety Design Criteria. No cancellation.

  8. NEW - DOE O 420.1 Chg 1, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. This Page Change is limited in scope to changes necessary to invoke DOE-STD-1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Document, and revised DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis as required methods. DOE O 420.1C Chg 1, dated 2-27-15, cancels DOE O 420.1C, dated 12-4-12.

  9. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE O 420.2B, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-07-01

    This document is an aid to understanding and meeting the requirements of DOE O 420.2B, Safety of Accelerator Facilities, dated 7/23/04. It does not impose requirements beyond those stated in that Order or any other DOE Order. No cancellation.

  10. Safety Culture And Best Practices At Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rule, K. [Princeton Plasma Physics Lab., Princeton, NJ (United States); King, M. [General Atomics, San Diego, CA (United States); Takase, Y. [Univ. of Tokyo (Japan); Oshima, Y. [Univ. of Tokyo (Japan); Nishimura, K. [National Institute for Fusion Science, Toki (Japan); Sukegawa, A. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Naka (Japan)

    2014-04-01

    The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

  11. Safety Culture and Best Practices at Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rule, Keith

    2014-05-01

    The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

  12. Safety analysis report for the Waste Storage Facility. Revision 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bengston, S.J.

    1994-05-01

    This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Storage Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Storage Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume.

  13. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    WEISS, E.V.

    2000-12-15

    Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste.

  14. Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1996-12-30

    The manual defines the process DOE will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and its staff. Canceled by DOE M 140.1-1A. Does not cancel other directives.

  15. Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-03-30

    This Manual presents the process the Department of Energy will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) and its staff. Supersedes DOE M 140.1-1A.

  16. Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1999-01-26

    This Manual presents the process the Department of Energy will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) and its staff. Cancels DOE M 140.1-1.

  17. Office of Emergency Management UCF Facilities and Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wu, Shin-Tson

    is lost. Bring extra batteries Fully charge cell phones and lap tops and keep chargers with you #12;Office, and charger Fire extinguisher Important documents #12;Office of Emergency Management UCF Facilities and Safety

  18. Preparation Of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-11-12

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD), DOE-STD-3009-2014, describes a method for preparing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) that is acceptable to DOE for nonreactor nuclear facilities.

  19. NEW - DOE O 420.1 Chg 1, Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena...

  20. CUNY EXPORT CONTROL PROCEDURES 10. Facilities Management / Public Safety

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rosen, Jay

    CUNY EXPORT CONTROL PROCEDURES 10. Facilities Management / Public Safety This Section addresses Export Control Administrator, with assistance from the College's Public Safety staff, will ensure adequate resources are in place to implement the TCP, when applicable. For assistance with export control

  1. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Idaho MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a February 2006 Commencement of Operations assessment of the Occupational Safety and Industrial Hygiene programs at the MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project.

  2. SAVANNAH RIVER SITE'S H-CANYON FACILITY: IMPACTS OF FOREIGN OBLIGATIONS ON SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Magoulas, V.

    2013-06-03

    The US has a non-proliferation policy to receive foreign and domestic research reactor returns of spent fuel materials of US origin. These spent fuel materials are returned to the Department of Energy (DOE) and placed in storage in the L-area spent fuel basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The foreign research reactor returns fall subject to the 123 agreements for peaceful cooperation. These “123 agreements” are named after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and govern the conditions of nuclear cooperation with foreign partners. The SRS management of these foreign obligations while planning material disposition paths can be a challenge.

  3. Collaboration and Commitment to Sealed Source Safety, Security, and Disposition - 13627

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jennison, Meaghan [National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC (United States)] [National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC (United States); Martin, David W. [National Nuclear Security Administration/Energetics Inc., Washington, DC (United States)] [National Nuclear Security Administration/Energetics Inc., Washington, DC (United States)

    2013-07-01

    EnergySolutions, the Division of Radiation Control at the Utah Department of Environmental Quality (UDEQ), the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD), and the Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) are collaborating on a truly innovative effort to expand opportunities for cost-effective sealed source disposal. These entities have developed a first-of-its-kind initiative to dispose of certain sealed sources at the EnergySolutions disposal facility near Clive, Utah, which normally cannot accept sealed sources of any type. This creative and collaborative effort to improve radiation health, safety, and security exemplifies the spirit and commitment represented by the Richard S. Hodes, M.D. Honor Lecture Award, which is presented annually at the Waste Management Symposia by the Southeast Compact Commission to encourage environmental professionals and political leaders to develop innovative approaches to waste management in the United States. The participants in the collaborative initiative are honored to receive special recognition for their efforts thus far. They also recognize that the hard work remains to be done. (authors)

  4. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility.

  5. Safety and Security at Trident Laser Facility

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservation of Fe(II) byMultidayAlumni > The2/01/12University SafetyHealth SafetySafety

  6. Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Guide for use with DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04

    This Guide provides an acceptable approach for safety design of DOE hazard category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities for satisfying the requirements of DOE O 420.1C. Supersedes DOE G 420.1-1.

  7. Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformation Current HABFES OctoberEvan Racah861 ANNUAL|Facility Operations Facility20.1C

  8. CRAD, Facility Safety- Readiness Review Program

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Readiness Review Program.

  9. Fuel Storage Facility Final Safety Analysis Report. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Linderoth, C.E.

    1984-03-01

    The Fuel Storage Facility (FSF) is an integral part of the Fast Flux Test Facility. Its purpose is to provide long-term storage (20-year design life) for spent fuel core elements used to provide the fast flux environment in FFTF, and for test fuel pins, components and subassemblies that have been irradiated in the fast flux environment. This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and its supporting documentation provides a complete description and safety evaluation of the site, the plant design, operations, and potential accidents.

  10. Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration would like submitKansasCommunitiesofExtrans -ORGANIZATIONOperations Ā»Department ofFacility

  11. The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility: Status-2004

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anderl, R.A.; Longhurst, G.R.; Pawelko, R.J.; Sharpe, J.P.; Schuetz, S.T.; Petti, D.A.

    2005-07-15

    The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility, a US DOE National User Facility at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), comprises capabilities and infrastructure to support both tritium and non-tritium research activities important to the development of safe and environmentally friendly fusion energy. Research thrusts include (1) interactions of tritium and deuterium with plasma-facing-component (PFC) materials, (2) fusion safety issues [PFC material chemical reactivity and dust/debris generation, activation product mobilization, tritium behavior in fusion systems], and (3) molten salts and fusion liquids for tritium breeder and coolant applications. This paper updates the status of STAR and the capabilities for ongoing research activities, with an emphasis on the development, testing and integration of the infrastructure to support tritium research activities. Key elements of this infrastructure include a tritium storage and assay system, a tritium cleanup system to process glovebox and experiment tritiated effluent gases, and facility tritium monitoring systems.

  12. PF-4 actinide disposition strategy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Margevicius, Robert W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-05-28

    The dwindling amount of Security Category I processing and storage space across the DOE Complex has driven the need for more effective storage of nuclear materials at LANL's Plutonium Facility's (PF-4's) vault. An effort was begun in 2009 to create a strategy, a roadmap, to identify all accountable nuclear material and determine their disposition paths, the PF-4 Actinide Disposition Strategy (PADS). Approximately seventy bins of nuclear materials with similar characteristics - in terms of isotope, chemical form, impurities, disposition location, etc. - were established in a database. The ultimate disposition paths include the material to remain at LANL, disposition to other DOE sites, and disposition to waste. If all the actions described in the document were taken, over half of the containers currently in the PF-4 vault would been eliminated. The actual amount of projected vault space will depend on budget and competing mission requirements, however, clearly a significant portion of the current LANL inventory can be either dispositioned or consolidated.

  13. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laycak, D T

    2010-03-05

    This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  14. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laycak, D

    2008-06-16

    This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  15. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-01-14

    These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S & H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules.

  16. Facility Safety Policy, Guidance & Reports | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE: Alternative Fuelsof Energy Services Ā» Program ManagementAct4Facility Safety Policy, Guidance

  17. Preliminary safety assessment for an IFE target fabrication facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Latkowski, J F; Reyes, S; Besenbruch, G E; Goodin, D T

    2000-10-13

    We estimate possible ranges of tritium inventories for an inertial fusion energy (IFE) target fabrication facility producing various types of targets and using various production technologies. Target fill is the key subtask in determining the overall tritium inventory for the plant. By segmenting the inventory into multiple, parallel production lines--each with its own fill canister--and including an expansion tank to limit releases, we are able to ensure that a target fabrication facility would meet the accident dose goals of 10 mSv (1 rem) set forth in the Department of Energy's Fusion Safety Standards. For indirect-drive targets, we calculate release fractions for elements from lithium to bismuth and show that nearly all elements meet the dose goal. Our work suggests directions for future R&D that will help reduce total tritium inventories and increase the flexibility of target fabrication facilities.

  18. 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) based pyroprocessing facility safety evaluation plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ku, J.H.; Choung, W.M.; You, G.S.; Moon, S.I.; Park, S.H.; Kim, H.D. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute - KAERI, 989-111 Daeduk-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, 305-353 (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-07-01

    The big advantage of pyroprocessing for the management of spent fuels against the conventional reprocessing technologies lies in its proliferation resistance since the pure plutonium cannot be separated from the spent fuel. The extracted materials can be directly used as metal fuel in a fast reactor, and pyroprocessing reduces drastically the volume and heat load of the spent fuel. KAERI has implemented the SBD (Safeguards-By-Design) concept in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The goal of SBD is to integrate international safeguards into the entire facility design process since the very beginning of the design phase. This paper presents a safety evaluation plan using a conceptual design of a reference pyroprocessing facility, in which 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety)-By-Design (3SBD) concept is integrated from early conceptual design phase. The purpose of this paper is to establish an advanced pyroprocessing hot cell facility design concept based on 3SBD for the successful realization of pyroprocessing technology with enhanced safety and proliferation resistance.

  19. Fast Flux Test Facility final safety analysis report. Amendment 73

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gantt, D.A.

    1993-08-01

    This report provides Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 73 for incorporation into the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTR) FSAR set. This page change incorporates Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) issued subsequent to Amendment 72 and approved for incorparoration before May 6, 1993. These changes include: Chapter 3, design criteria structures, equipment, and systems; chapter 5B, reactor coolant system; chapter 7, instrumentation and control systems; chapter 9, auxiliary systems; chapter 11, reactor refueling system; chapter 12, radiation protection and waste management; chapter 13, conduct of operations; chapter 17, technical specifications; chapter 20, FFTF criticality specifications; appendix C, local fuel failure events; and appendix Fl, operation at 680{degrees}F inlet temperature.

  20. DOE-STD-1120-2005; Integration of Environment Safety and Health into Facility Disposition Activities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum Based| Department8, 2015 GATEWAY6.1viiiDepartmentMaster

  1. DOE-STD-1120-2005; Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious Rank EERE:FinancingPetroleum Based| Department8, 2015 GATEWAY6.1viiiDepartmentMaster120-2005 Volume 2 of 2

  2. Facility Disposition Projects

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    5 37.5 A4 Independent Cost EstimateSchedule Review P 3.0 NA 0.0 5 15.0 5 15.0 A5 Life Cycle Cost P 3.0 1 3.0 4 12.0 5 15.0 A6 Forecast of Cost at Completion P 3.0 NA 0.0 3 9.0 5...

  3. Integrated Facilities Disposition Program

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Hole 8 Plume 6 Managed by UT-Battelle for the U.S. Department of Energy Remediating aging waste treatment and collection systems is an integral part of the Central Campus...

  4. Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-02-07

    This standard provides a framework for generating Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) supporting fissionable material operations at Department of Energy (DOE) nonreactor nuclear facilities. This standard imposes no new criticality safety analysis requirements.

  5. Mixed Waste Management Facility Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Chapters 1 to 20

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01

    This document provides information on waste management practices, occupational safety, and a site characterization of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A facility description, safety engineering analysis, mixed waste processing techniques, and auxiliary support systems are included.

  6. Proceedings of the 1984 DOE nuclear reactor and facility safety conference. Volume II

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1984-01-01

    This report is a collection of papers on reactor safety. The report takes the form of proceedings from the 1984 DOE Nuclear Reactor and Facility Safety Conference, Volume II of two. These proceedings cover Safety, Accidents, Training, Task/Job Analysis, Robotics and the Engineering Aspects of Man/Safety interfaces.

  7. Examining factors affecting the safety performance and design of exclusive truck facilities 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Iragavarapu, Vichika

    2008-10-10

    Many state agencies consider exclusive truck facilities to be an alternative to handle the safety and operational issues due to the increasing truck volumes. No such facilities exist, and there are no standard tools or procedures for measuring...

  8. Superconducting Magnet Safety Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) facilities present unique hazards not found in most

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Maroncelli, Mark

    Superconducting Magnet Safety Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) facilities present unique hazards not found in most laboratory environments. The NMR facilities maintain superconducting magnets which have the units. Facility design and installation: Design and installation of a new NMR facility requires a number

  9. Mission Need Statement: Calcine Disposition Project Major Systems Acquisition Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. T. Beck

    2007-04-26

    This document identifies the need to establish the Calcine Disposition Project to determine and implement the final disposition of calcine including characterization, retrieval, treatment (if necessary), packaging, loading, onsite interim storage pending shipment to a repository or interim storage facility, and disposition of related facilities.

  10. Modal Dispositionalism 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Barthuly, Joshua

    2015-05-01

    Let a modal truth be any truth that is about modal entities, such as essences, abilities, or dispositional properties, or that contains modal expressions such as: possibly, necessarily, may, must, could, would, can, and so on. Examples of modal...

  11. MINIMIZING WASTE AND COST IN DISPOSITION OF LEGACY RESIDUES

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. BALKEY; M. ROBINSON

    2001-05-01

    Research is being conducted at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) which is directed toward development of a quantitative basis for disposition of actinide-bearing process residues (both legacy residues and residues generated from ongoing programmatic operations). This research is focused in two directions: (1) identifying minimum negative consequence (waste, dose, cost) dispositions working within regulatory safeguards termination criteria, and (2) evaluating logistics/consequences of across-the-board residue discards such as authorized at Rocky Flats under a safeguards termination variance. The first approach emphasizes Laboratory commitments to environmental stewardship, worker safety, and fiscal responsibility. This approach has been described as the Plutonium Disposition Methodology (PDM) in deference to direction provided by DOE Albuquerque. The second approach is born of the need to expedite removal of residues from storage for programmatic and reasons and residue storage safety concerns. Any disposition path selected must preserve the legal distinction between residues as Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and discardable materials as waste in order to insure the continuing viability of Laboratory plutonium processing facilities for national security operations.

  12. Style, content and format guide for writing safety analysis documents. Volume 1, Safety analysis reports for DOE nuclear facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-06-01

    The purpose of Volume 1 of this 4-volume style guide is to furnish guidelines on writing and publishing Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) for DOE nuclear facilities at Sandia National Laboratories. The scope of Volume 1 encompasses not only the general guidelines for writing and publishing, but also the prescribed topics/appendices contents along with examples from typical SARs for DOE nuclear facilities.

  13. Safety-related issues associated with implementing wireless systems in nuclear facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kaldenbach, B. J.; Ewing, P. D.; Moore, M. R.; Korsah, K. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, MS-6006, P. O. Box 2008, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (United States); Antonescu, C. E.; Govan, T. V. [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, MS T-10-D20, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852 (United States)

    2006-07-01

    Currently, wireless technology is not used as an integral element of safety-related systems in nuclear facilities. The most prevalent introductory uses of wireless technology are for in-facility communications among personnel and for supplemental information transmission. However, further system upgrades and implementations at new facilities might introduce wireless communications into safety-significant applications. This paper documents the deployment issues and implementation considerations that can contribute to the technical basis for guidance on wireless systems. (authors)

  14. DOE's Approach to Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis and Management

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presenter: Dr. James O'Brien, Director, Office of Nuclear Safety, Office of Health, Safety and Security, US Department of Energy

  15. On-Line Educational Means on Radiological Protection and Accelerator General Safety Policy in Radiotherapy and Industrial Sterilization Facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Spyropoulos, B

    1999-01-01

    On-Line Educational Means on Radiological Protection and Accelerator General Safety Policy in Radiotherapy and Industrial Sterilization Facilities

  16. Observation challenges in a glovebox environment : behavior based safety at a plutonium facility.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Montalvo, M. L. (Maryrose L.)

    2002-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is one of the Nation's leading scientific and defense laboratories, owned by the Department of Energy and managed by the University of California. LANL is one of the original weapons complex labs dating back to the days of the Manhattan Project during World War II. Since then, radioactive materials research has continued at LANLs Plutonium Facility, and remains a primary responsibility of the Laboratory. The Nuclear Materials Technology Division (NMT) is a multidisciplinary organization responsible for daily operations of the Plutonium Facility and the Chemistry Research Metallurgy Facility. NMT Division is responsible for the saence, engineering and technology of plutonium and other actinides in support of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear materials disposition, and nuclear energy programs. A wide amy of activities are performed within NMT Division, such as analytical chemistry, metallurgical operations, actinide processes, waste operations, radioactive materials research and related administrative tasks.

  17. Records Disposition

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1988-09-13

    To assign responsibilities and authorities and to prescribe policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines for the orderly disposition of records of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its management and operating contractors. Cancels DOE O 1324.2 dated 5-28-80. Chg 1 dated 4-9-92. Canceled by DOE O 1324.2B dated 1-12-95.

  18. EA-1410: Proposed Disposition of the Omega West Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EA evaluates the environmental impacts for the proposal to remove the Omega West Facility and the remaining support structures from Los Alamos Canyon at the U.S. Department of Energy Los...

  19. 340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. J. Rodovsky

    2010-10-25

    The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3.

  20. Collaborating for Quality and Safety: Implementing Therapeutic Phlebotomy in Connecticut Correctional Facility Infirmaries

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Oliver, Douglas L.

    Collaborating for Quality and Safety: Implementing Therapeutic Phlebotomy in Connecticut to be performed in Connecticut Correctional facility medical unit infirmaries, and improve the patient care in Connecticut Correctional Managed Heath Care (CMHC)Connecticut Correctional Managed Heath Care (CMHC) medical

  1. Implementation plan for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Borsheim, G.L.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1992-12-01

    This document revises the original plan submitted in March 1991 for implementing the recommendations made by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in their Recommendation 90-7 to the US Department of Energy. Recommendation 90-7 addresses safety issues of concern for 24 single-shell, high-level radioactive waste tanks containing ferrocyanide compounds at the Hanford Site. The waste in these tanks is a potential safety concern because, under certain conditions involving elevated temperatures and low concentrations of nonparticipating diluents, ferrocyanide compounds in the presence of oxidizing materials can undergo a runaway (propagating) chemical reaction. This document describes those activities underway by the Hanford Site contractor responsible for waste tank safety that address each of the six parts of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7. This document also identifies the progress made on these activities since the beginning of the ferrocyanide safety program in September 1990. Revised schedules for planned activities are also included.

  2. ESTIMATING IMPURITIES IN SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Moore, E.

    2013-07-17

    The United States holds at least 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Many of the items that require disposition are only partially characterized, and SRNL uses a variety of techniques to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that are important for processing through the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and alternative disposition paths. Recent advances in laboratory tools, including Prompt Gamma Analysis and Peroxide Fusion treatment, provide data on the existing inventories that will enable disposition without additional, costly sampling and destructive analysis.

  3. Secure Pesticide Storage: Security and Safety-promoting Features of Pesticide Storage Facilities1

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hill, Jeffrey E.

    PI32 Secure Pesticide Storage: Security and Safety-promoting Features of Pesticide Storage pesticide storage facility security and safety. Introduction In actual practice, the fundamental goal of "security" is always the same: effective safeguard. Therefore, certain features of a pesticide storage

  4. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility, Appendix A

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-06-26

    Topics covered in this appendix include: General Rules-Code of Safe Practices; 2. Personal Protective Equipment; Hazardous Material Control; Traffic Control; Fire Prevention; Sanitation and First Aid; Confined Space Safety Requirements; Ladders and Stairways; Scaffolding and Lift Safety; Machinery, Vehicles, and Heavy Equipment; Welding and Cutting-General; Arc Welding; Oxygen/Acetylene Welding and Cutting; Excavation, Trenching, and Shoring; Fall Protection; Steel Erection; Working With Asbestos; Radiation Safety; Hand Tools; Electrical Safety; Nonelectrical Work Performed Near Exposed High-Voltage Power-Distribution Equipment; Lockout/Tagout Requirements; Rigging; A-Cranes; Housekeeping; Material Handling and Storage; Lead; Concrete and Masonry Construction.

  5. Records Disposition

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1980-05-28

    To assign responsibilities and authorities and to prescribe policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines for the orderly disposition of records of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its operating and onsite service contractors. Cancels DOE O 1324.1 dated 7-10-78. Chg 1 dated 7-2-81. Chg 2 dated 11-9-82. Canceled by DOE O 1324.2A dated 9-13-88.

  6. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Occupational and Industrial Safety and Hygiene Program portion of an Operational Readiness Review at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility.

  7. CRAD, Safety Basis- Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Safety Basis portion of an Operational Readiness Review at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility.

  8. CRAD, Criticality Safety- Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Criticality Safety program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, TA 55 SST Facility.

  9. CRAD, Criticality Safety- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Criticality Safety program at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Facility.

  10. CRAD, Safety Basis- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Safety Basis at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

  11. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of Industrial Safety and Industrial Health programs at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

  12. Interim safety basis for fuel supply shutdown facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brehm, J.R.; Deobald, T.L.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-05-23

    This ISB in conjunction with the new TSRs, will provide the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the Facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements. It is concluded that the risk associated with the current operational mode of the Facility, uranium closure, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within Risk Acceptance Guidelines. The Facility is classified as a Moderate Hazard Facility because of the potential for an unmitigated fire associated with the uranium storage buildings.

  13. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility, Appendix B

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-06-26

    This Appendix contains material from the LLNL Health and Safety Manual as listed below. For sections not included in this list, please refer to the Manual itself. The areas covered are: asbestos, lead, fire prevention, lockout, and tag program confined space traffic safety.

  14. Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-12-19

    This Standard describes a framework and the criteria to be used for approval of (1) safety basis documents, as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulation (C.F.R.) 830, Nuclear Safety Management, and (2) safety design basis documents, as required by Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD)-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process.

  15. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE Order (0) 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-07-17

    The revision will address implementation of roles and responsibilities, improve operational efficiency using operating experience, and clarify the use of program requirements such as the Unreviewed Safety Issue and Accelerator Readiness Review.

  16. Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and the Resin Regeneration Facility Safety Analysis Report, Executive Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shedrow, C.B.

    1999-11-29

    The Safety Analysis Report documents the safety authorization basis for the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF) and the Resin Regeneration Facility (RRF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The present mission of the RBOF and RRF is to continue in providing a facility for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel assemblies from power and research reactors in the United States, fuel from SRS and other Department of Energy (DOE) reactors, and foreign research reactors fuel, in support of the nonproliferation policy. The RBOF and RRF provide the capability to handle, separate, and transfer wastes generated from nuclear fuel element storage. The DOE and Westinghouse Savannah River Company, the prime operating contractor, are committed to managing these activities in such a manner that the health and safety of the offsite general public, the site worker, the facility worker, and the environment are protected.

  17. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-06-26

    The Construction Safety Program (CSP) for NIF sets forth the responsibilities, guidelines, rules, policies and regulations for all workers involved in the construction, special equipment installation, acceptance testing, and initial activation and operation of NIF at LLNL during the construction period of NIF.

  18. Los Alamos National Laboratory corregated metal pipe saw facility preliminary safety analysis report. Volume I

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1990-09-19

    This Preliminary Safety Analysis Report addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and design operation of the processing systems in the Corrugated Metal Pipe Saw Facility with respect to normal and abnormal conditions. Potential hazards are identified, credible accidents relative to the operation of the facility and the process systems are analyzed, and the consequences of postulated accidents are presented. The risk associated with normal operations, abnormal operations, and natural phenomena are analyzed. The accident analysis presented shows that the impact of the facility will be acceptable for all foreseeable normal and abnormal conditions of operation. Specifically, under normal conditions the facility will have impacts within the limits posted by applicable DOE guidelines, and in accident conditions the facility will similarly meet or exceed the requirements of all applicable standards. 16 figs., 6 tabs.

  19. Introduction to the nuclear criticality safety evaluation of facility X-705, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sheaffer, M.K.; Keeton, S.C.

    1993-08-16

    This report is the first in a series of documents that will evaluate nuclear criticality safety in the Decontamination and Recovery Facility, X-705, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. It provides an overview of the facility, categorizes its functions for future analysis, reviews existing NCS documentation, and explains the follow-on effort planned for X-705. A detailed breakdown of systems, subsystems, and operational areas is presented and cross-referenced to existing NCS documentation.

  20. Preliminary Safety Design Report for Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Timothy Solack; Carol Mason

    2012-03-01

    A new onsite, remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled low-level waste disposal for remote-handled low-level waste from the Idaho National Laboratory and for nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled low-level waste in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This preliminary safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by discussing site characteristics that impact accident analysis, by providing the facility and process information necessary to support the hazard analysis, by identifying and evaluating potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled low-level waste, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  1. CONGRESS BEIJING 2000 Question 79 (Gated Spillways and Other Controlled Release Facilities, and Dam Safety)

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Rahmeyer, William J.

    Facilities, and Dam Safety) d) Rehabilitation of Gated and Ungated Spillways THE DESIGN OF A FUSEGATE SYSTEM FOR INCREASING THE RESERVOIR CAPACITY OF TERMINUS DAM AIDED BY A FULLY FUNCTIONING PHYSICAL MODEL STUDY" Authors International SUMMARY A number of designs for increasing reservoir capacity without raising the dam embankment

  2. Integration of health physics, safety and operational processes for management and disposition of recycled uranium wastes at the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Barber, James; Buckley, James

    2003-02-23

    Fluor Fernald, Inc. (Fluor Fernald), the contractor for the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP), recently submitted a new baseline plan for achieving site closure by the end of calendar year 2006. This plan was submitted at DOE's request, as the FEMP was selected as one of the sites for their accelerated closure initiative. In accordance with the accelerated baseline, the FEMP Waste Management Project (WMP) is actively evaluating innovative processes for the management and disposition of low-level uranium, fissile material, and thorium, all of which have been classified as waste. These activities are being conducted by the Low Level Waste (LLW) and Uranium Waste Disposition (UWD) projects. Alternatives associated with operational processing of individual waste streams, each of which poses potentially unique health physics, industrial hygiene and industrial hazards, are being evaluated for determination of the most cost effective and safe met hod for handling and disposition. Low-level Mixed Waste (LLMW) projects are not addressed in this paper. This paper summarizes historical uranium recycling programs and resultant trace quantity contamination of uranium waste streams with radionuclides, other than uranium. The presentation then describes how waste characterization data is reviewed for radiological and/or chemical hazards and exposure mitigation techniques, in conjunction with proposed operations for handling and disposition. The final part of the presentation consists of an overview of recent operations within LLW and UWD project dispositions, which have been safely completed, and a description of several current operations.

  3. Annual Report To Congress. Department of Energy Activities Relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Calendar Year 2003

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None, None

    2004-02-28

    The Department of Energy (Department) submits an Annual Report to Congress each year detailing the Department’s activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), which provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) regarding public health and safety issues at the Department’s defense nuclear facilities. In 2003, the Department continued ongoing activities to resolve issues identified by the Board in formal recommendations and correspondence, staff issue reports pertaining to Department facilities, and public meetings and briefings. Additionally, the Department is implementing several key safety initiatives to address and prevent safety issues: safety culture and review of the Columbia accident investigation; risk reduction through stabilization of excess nuclear materials; the Facility Representative Program; independent oversight and performance assurance; the Federal Technical Capability Program (FTCP); executive safety initiatives; and quality assurance activities. The following summarizes the key activities addressed in this Annual Report.

  4. Safety analysis of the MYRRHA facility with different core configurations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Arien, B.; Heusdains, S.; Alt Abderrahim, H.; Malambu, E. [SCK-CEN, Boeretang 200, B-2400 Mol (Belgium)

    2006-07-01

    In the framework of the IAEA Coordinated Research Project on 'Studies of Innovative Reactor Technology Options for Effective Incineration of Radioactive Waste', a benchmark exercise was undertaken to analyse the behaviour of the MYRRHA facility in various accidental conditions. The transients were simulated by means of the RELAP and SITHER codes and the following set of accident scenarios was considered: loss of flow, loss of heat sink, overpower transient, overcooling and partial blockage of a subassembly. In addition, those accidents were simulated in two different situations depending on whether the proton beam is cut off (protected case) or not (unprotected case). In the IAEA benchmark two subcritical core configurations are considered: a typical core configuration composed only of (U-Pu)O{sub 2} MOX fuel assemblies and another one including additional U-free minor actinides fuel assemblies. The present paper summarized the main results obtained with the first core configuration. (authors)

  5. Lessons learnt from ITER safety & licensing for DEMO and future nuclear fusion facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Taylor, Neill

    2013-01-01

    One of the strong motivations for pursuing the development of fusion energy is its potentially low environmental impact and very good safety performance. But this safety and environmental potential can only be fully realized by careful design choices. For DEMO and other fusion facilities that will require nuclear licensing, S&E objectives and criteria should be set at an early stage and taken into account when choosing basic design options and throughout the design process. Studies in recent decades of the safety of fusion power plant concepts give a useful basis on which to build the S&E approach and to assess the impact of design choices. The experience of licensing ITER is of particular value, even though there are some important differences between ITER and DEMO. The ITER project has developed a safety case, produced a preliminary safety report and had it examined by the French nuclear safety authorities, leading to the licence to construct the facility. The key technical issues that arose during ...

  6. Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyd D. Christensen

    2010-02-01

    A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  7. Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyd D. Christensen

    2010-05-01

    A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  8. Management of radioactive material safety programs at medical facilities. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Camper, L.W.; Schlueter, J.; Woods, S. [and others

    1997-05-01

    A Task Force, comprising eight US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and two Agreement State program staff members, developed the guidance contained in this report. This report describes a systematic approach for effectively managing radiation safety programs at medical facilities. This is accomplished by defining and emphasizing the roles of an institution`s executive management, radiation safety committee, and radiation safety officer. Various aspects of program management are discussed and guidance is offered on selecting the radiation safety officer, determining adequate resources for the program, using such contractual services as consultants and service companies, conducting audits, and establishing the roles of authorized users and supervised individuals; NRC`s reporting and notification requirements are discussed, and a general description is given of how NRC`s licensing, inspection and enforcement programs work.

  9. The dual axis radiographic hydrodynamic test (DARHT) facility personnel safety system (PSS) control system

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jacquez, Edward B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01

    The mission of the Dual Axis Radiograph Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility is to conduct experiments on dynamic events of extremely dense materials. The PSS control system is designed specifically to prevent personnel from becoming exposed to radiation and explosive hazards during machine operations and/or the firing site operation. This paper will outline the Radiation Safety System (RSS) and the High Explosive Safety System (HESS) which are computer-controlled sets of positive interlocks, warning devices, and other exclusion mechanisms that together form the PSS.

  10. Preclosure radiological safety analysis for the exploratory shaft facilities; Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ma, C.W.; Miller, D.D.; Jardine, L.J. [Bechtel National, Inc., San Francisco, CA (United States)

    1992-06-01

    This study assesses which structures, systems, and components of the exploratory shaft facility (ESF) are important to safety when the ESF is converted to become part of the operating waste repository. The assessment follows the methodology required by DOE Procedure AP-6.10Q. Failures of the converted ESF during the preclosure period have been evaluated, along with other underground accidents, to determine the potential offsite radiation doses and associated probabilities. The assessment indicates that failures of the ESF will not result in radiation doses greater than 0.5 rem at the nearest unrestricted area boundary. Furthermore, credible accidents in other underground facilities will not result in radiation doses larger than 0.5 rem, even if any structure, system, or component of the converted ESF fails at the same time. Therefore, no structure, system, or component of the converted ESF is important to safety.

  11. Investigation of criticality safety control infraction data at a nuclear facility

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Merhege, James F.; Costa, David A.; Art, Blair M.; Gubernatis, David C.

    2014-10-27

    Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other nuclear materials account for most activities performed at the LANL's Plutonium Facility (PF-4). The presence of large quantities of fissile materials in numerous forms at PF-4 makes it necessary to maintain an active criticality safety program. The LANL Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program provides guidance to enable efficient operations while ensuring prevention of criticality accidents in the handling, storing, processing and transportation of fissionable material at PF-4. In order to achieve and sustain lower criticality safety control infraction (CSCI) rates, PF-4 operations are continuously improved, through the use of Lean Manufacturing andmore »Six Sigma (LSS) business practices. Employing LSS, statistically significant variations (trends) can be identified in PF-4 CSCI reports. In this study, trends have been identified in the NCS Program using the NCS Database. An output metric has been developed that measures ADPSM Management progress toward meeting its NCS objectives and goals. Using a Pareto Chart, the primary CSCI attributes have been determined in order of those requiring the most management support. Data generated from analysis of CSCI data help identify and reduce number of corresponding attributes. In-field monitoring of CSCI's contribute to an organization's scientific and technological excellence by providing information that can be used to improve criticality safety operation safety. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety.« less

  12. Investigation of criticality safety control infraction data at a nuclear facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Merhege, James F.; Costa, David A.; Art, Blair M.; Gubernatis, David C.

    2014-10-27

    Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other nuclear materials account for most activities performed at the LANL's Plutonium Facility (PF-4). The presence of large quantities of fissile materials in numerous forms at PF-4 makes it necessary to maintain an active criticality safety program. The LANL Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program provides guidance to enable efficient operations while ensuring prevention of criticality accidents in the handling, storing, processing and transportation of fissionable material at PF-4. In order to achieve and sustain lower criticality safety control infraction (CSCI) rates, PF-4 operations are continuously improved, through the use of Lean Manufacturing and Six Sigma (LSS) business practices. Employing LSS, statistically significant variations (trends) can be identified in PF-4 CSCI reports. In this study, trends have been identified in the NCS Program using the NCS Database. An output metric has been developed that measures ADPSM Management progress toward meeting its NCS objectives and goals. Using a Pareto Chart, the primary CSCI attributes have been determined in order of those requiring the most management support. Data generated from analysis of CSCI data help identify and reduce number of corresponding attributes. In-field monitoring of CSCI's contribute to an organization's scientific and technological excellence by providing information that can be used to improve criticality safety operation safety. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety.

  13. The Greening of a Plutonium Facility through Personnel Safety, Operational Efficiency, and Infrastructure Improvements - 12108

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dodge, Robert L.; Cournoyer, Michael E.

    2012-07-01

    Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other hazardous materials account for most activities performed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Plutonium Facility (TA-55). Engineered barriers provide the most effective protection from hazardous materials. These safety features serve to protect workers and provide defense in depth against the hazards associated with operations. Although not designed to specifically meet environmental requirements the safety-based design does meet or exceed the requirements of the environmental regulations enacted during and since its construction. TA-55's Waste Services Group supports this safety methodology by ensuring safe, efficient and compliant management of all radioactive and hazardous wastes generated at the TA-55. A key function of this group is the implementation of measures that lower the overall risk of radiological and hazardous material operations. Processes and procedures that reduce waste generation compared to current, prevalent processes or procedures used for the same purpose are identified. Some of these 'Best Practices' include implementation of a chemical control system, elimination of aerosol cans, reduction in hazardous waste, implementation of zero liquid discharge, and the re-cyclization of nitric acid. P2/WMin opportunities have been implemented in the areas of personnel and facility attributes, environmental compliance, energy conservation, and green focused infrastructure expansion with the overall objective of minimizing raw material and energy consumption and waste generation. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety. (authors)

  14. EIS-0229: Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The EIS will evaluate the reasonable alternatives and potential environmental impacts for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three types of facilities for plutonium disposition.

  15. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-06-25

    Changes include invoking DOE-STD-3009 and DOE-STD-1104 as requirements documents. NOTE: The two standards are not final documents but can be found in Technical Standards RevCom at https://www.standards.doe.gov/login.jsp. Login as an SME using your email address.

  16. ACCELERATION OF LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY TRANSURANIC WASTE DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O'LEARY, GERALD A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2007-01-04

    One of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) most significant risks is the site's inventory of transuranic waste retrievably stored above and below-ground in Technical Area (TA) 54 Area G, particularly the dispersible high-activity waste stored above-ground in deteriorating facilities. The high activity waste represents approximately 50% (by activity) of the total 292,000 PE-Ci inventory remaining to be disposed. The transuramic waste inventory includes contact-handled and remote-handled waste packaged in drums, boxes, and oversized containers which are retrievably stored both above and below-ground. Although currently managed as transuranic waste, some of the inventory is low-level waste that can be disposed onsite or at approved offsite facilities. Dispositioning the transuranic waste inventory requires retrieval of the containers from above and below-ground storage, examination and repackaging or remediation as necessary, characterization, certification and loading for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad New Mexico, all in accordance with well-defined requirements and controls. Although operations are established to process and characterize the lower-activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers, LAN L does not currently have the capability to repack high activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers (> 56 PE-Ci) or to process oversized containers with activity levels over 0.52 PE-Ci. Operational issues and compliance requirements have resulted in less than optimal processing capabilities for lower activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers, limiting preparation and reducing dependability of shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Since becoming the Los Alamos National Laboratory contract in June 2006, Los Alamos National Security (LANS) L.L.C. has developed a comprehensive, integrated plan to effectively and efficiently disposition the transuranic waste inventory, working in concert with the Department of Energy Los Alamos Site Office, Carlsbad Field Office and the Department of Energy Headquaeters. Rather than simply processing containers as retrieved, the plan places priority on efficient curie disposition, a direct correlation to reducing risk. Key elements of the approch include balancing inventory and operational risks, tailoring methods to meet requirements, optimizing existing facilities, equipment and staff, and incorporating best practices from other Department of Energy sites. With sufficient funding this will enable LANL to ship the above-ground high activity contact-handled transuranic waste offsite by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 and to disposition the remaining above- and below-ground contact-handled and remote-handled transuranic waste inventory by December 2010. Nearly 70% of the contact-handled transuranic waste containers, including the high activity waste, require processing and repackaging before characterization and certification for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. LANL is employing a balanced risk approach that accomplishes significant long-term risk reduction by accepting short-term increased facility operations risk under well-developed and justified interim controls. Reviews of facility conditions and additional analyses show that the Waste Characterization, Reduction and Repackaging Facility and the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility are the most appropriate facilities to safetly remediate, repackage, and ship lower activity and the remaining high activity drums. Updated safety documentation supporting limited Hazard Category 2 operations in these facilities has been developed. Once approved, limited-term operations to process the high activity drums can begin in early 2007, building upon the experience base established performing Hazard Category 3 operations processing lower activity waste in these facilities. LANL is also implementing a series of actions to improve and sustain operations for processing contact-handled transuranic waste inventory. Building 412 Decontamination and Volume Facility and Dom

  17. Acceleration of Los Alamos National Laboratory transuranic waste disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O'Leary, G.A.; Palmer, B.A.; Starke, T.P.; Phelps, A.K. [Los Alamos National Security, L.L.C., Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2007-07-01

    One of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) most significant risks is the site's inventory of transuranic waste retrievably stored above and below-ground in Technical Area (TA) 54 Area G, particularly the dispersible high-activity waste stored above-ground in deteriorating facilities. The high activity waste represents approximately 50% (by activity) of the total 292,000 PE-Ci inventory remaining to be disposed. The transuranic waste inventory includes contact-handled and remote-handled waste packaged in drums, boxes, and oversized containers which are retrievably stored both above and below-ground. Although currently managed as transuranic waste, some of the inventory is low-level waste that can be disposed onsite or at approved offsite facilities. Dis-positioning the transuranic waste inventory requires retrieval of the containers from above and below- ground storage, examination and repackaging or remediation as necessary, characterization, certification and loading for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, all in accordance with well-defined requirements and controls. Although operations are established to process and characterize the lower-activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers, LANL does not currently have the capability to repack high activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers (> 56 PE-Ci) or to process oversized containers with activity levels over 0.52 PE-Ci. Operational issues and compliance requirements have resulted in less than optimal processing capabilities for lower activity contact-handled transuranic waste containers, limiting preparation and reducing dependability of shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Since becoming the Los Alamos National Laboratory contractor in June 2006, Los Alamos National Security (LANS) L.L.C. has developed a comprehensive, integrated plan to effectively and efficiently disposition the transuranic waste inventory, working in concert with the Department of Energy Los Alamos Site Office, Carlsbad Field Office and the Department of Energy Headquarters. Rather than simply processing containers as retrieved, the plan places priority on efficient curie disposition, a direct correlation to reducing risk. Key elements of the approach include balancing inventory and operational risks, tailoring methods to meet requirements, optimizing existing facilities, equipment and staff, and incorporating best practices from other Department of Energy sites. With sufficient funding this will enable LANL to ship the above-ground high activity contact-handled transuranic waste offsite by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 and to disposition the remaining above- and below-ground contact-handled and remote-handled transuranic waste inventory by December 2010. Nearly 70% of the contact-handled transuranic waste containers, including the high activity waste, require processing and repackaging before characterization and certification for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. LANL is employing a balanced risk approach that accomplishes significant long-term risk reduction by accepting short-term increased facility operations risk under well-developed and justified interim controls. Reviews of facility conditions and additional analyses show that the Waste Characterization, Reduction and Repackaging Facility and the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing Facility are the most appropriate facilities to safely remediate, repackage, and ship lower activity and the remaining high activity drums. Updated safety documentation supporting limited Hazard Category 2 operations in these facilities has been developed. Once approved, limited-term operations to process the high activity drums can begin in early 2007, building upon the experience base established performing Hazard Category 3 operations processing lower activity waste in these facilities. LANL is also implementing a series of actions to improve and sustain operations for processing contact-handled transuranic waste inventory. Building 412 Decontamination and Volume Reduction Fa

  18. Preliminary safety analysis report for the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    OSCAR,DEBBY S.; WALKER,SHARON ANN; HUNTER,REGINA LEE; WALKER,CHERYL A.

    1999-12-01

    The Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) will be a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility used to characterize, treat, and repackage radioactive and mixed material and waste for reuse, recycling, or ultimate disposal. A significant upgrade to a previous facility, the Temporary Hot Cell, will be implemented to perform this mission. The following major features will be added: a permanent shield wall; eight floor silos; new roof portals in the hot-cell roof; an upgraded ventilation system; and upgraded hot-cell jib crane; and video cameras to record operations and facilitate remote-handled operations. No safety-class systems, structures, and components will be present in the AHCF. There will be five safety-significant SSCs: hot cell structure, permanent shield wall, shield plugs, ventilation system, and HEPA filters. The type and quantity of radionuclides that could be located in the AHCF are defined primarily by SNL/NM's legacy materials, which include radioactive, transuranic, and mixed waste. The risk to the public or the environment presented by the AHCF is minor due to the inventory limitations of the Hazard Category 3 classification. Potential doses at the exclusion boundary are well below the evaluation guidelines of 25 rem. Potential for worker exposure is limited by the passive design features incorporated in the AHCF and by SNL's radiation protection program. There is no potential for exposure of the public to chemical hazards above the Emergency Response Protection Guidelines Level 2.

  19. Safety and licensing issues that are being addressed by the Power Burst Facility test programs. [PWR; BWR

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McCardell, R.K.; MacDonald, P.E.

    1980-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of the results of the experimental program being conducted in the Power Burst Facility and the relationship of these results to certain safety and licensing issues. The safety issues that were addressed by the Power-Cooling-Mismatch, Reactivity Initiated Accident, and Loss of Coolant Accident tests, which comprised the original test program in the Power Burst Facility, are discussed. The resolution of these safety issues based on the results of the thirty-six tests performed to date, is presented. The future resolution of safety issues identified in the new Power Burst Facility test program which consists of tests which simulate BWR and PWR operational transients, anticipated transients without scram, and severe fuel damage accidents, is described.

  20. Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Environmental Data Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fledderman, P.D.

    2000-08-24

    This document provides an overview of existing environmental and ecological information at areas identified as potential locations of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) facilities. This information is required to document existing environmental and baseline conditions from which SPD construction and operation impacts can be defined. It will be used in developing the required preoperational monitoring plan to be used at specific SPD facilities construction sites.

  1. Risk-Informing Safety Reviews for Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mubayi, V.; Azarm, A.; Yue, M.; Mukaddam, W.; Good, G.; Gonzalez, F.; Bari, R.A.

    2011-03-13

    This paper describes a methodology used to model potential accidents in fuel cycle facilities that employ chemical processes to separate and purify nuclear materials. The methodology is illustrated with an example that uses event and fault trees to estimate the frequency of a specific energetic reaction that can occur in nuclear material processing facilities. The methodology used probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)-related tools as well as information about the chemical reaction characteristics, information on plant design and operational features, and generic data about component failure rates and human error rates. The accident frequency estimates for the specific reaction help to risk-inform the safety review process and assess compliance with regulatory requirements.

  2. Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Flynn, N.C. Bechtel Jacobs

    2008-04-21

    The Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) policy is to provide a safe and healthy workplace for all employees and subcontractors. The implementation of this policy requires that operations of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF), located one-half mile west of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex, be guided by an overall plan and consistent proactive approach to environment, safety and health (ES&H) issues. The BJC governing document for worker safety and health, BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', describes the key elements of the BJC Safety and Industrial Hygiene (IH) programs, which includes the requirement for development and implementation of a site-specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) where required by regulation (refer also to BJC-EH-1012, 'Development and Approval of Safety and Health Plans'). BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', implements the requirements for worker protection contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 851. The EMWMF site-specific HASP requirements identifies safe operating procedures, work controls, personal protective equipment, roles and responsibilities, potential site hazards and control measures, site access requirements, frequency and types of monitoring, site work areas, decontamination procedures, and outlines emergency response actions. This HASP will be available on site for use by all workers, management and supervisors, oversight personnel and visitors. All EMWMF assigned personnel will be briefed on the contents of this HASP and will be required to follow the procedures and protocols as specified. The policies and procedures referenced in this HASP apply to all EMWMF operations activities. In addition the HASP establishes ES&H criteria for the day-to-day activities to prevent or minimize any adverse effect on the environment and personnel safety and health and to meet standards that define acceptable waste management practices. The HASP is written to make use of past experience and best management practices to eliminate or minimize hazards to workers or the environment from events such as fires, falls, mechanical hazards, or any unplanned release to the environment.

  3. DISPOSITION PATHS FOR ROCKY FLATS GLOVEBOXES: EVALUATING OPTIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lobdell, D.; Geimer, R.; Larsen, P.; Loveland, K.

    2003-02-27

    The Kaiser-Hill Company, LLC has the responsibility for closure activities at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). One of the challenges faced for closure is the disposition of radiologically contaminated gloveboxes. Evaluation of the disposition options for gloveboxes included a detailed analysis of available treatment capabilities, disposal facilities, and lifecycle costs. The Kaiser-Hill Company, LLC followed several processes in determining how the gloveboxes would be managed for disposition. Currently, multiple disposition paths have been chosen to accommodate the needs of the varying styles and conditions of the gloveboxes, meet the needs of the decommissioning team, and to best manage lifecycle costs. Several challenges associated with developing a disposition path that addresses both the radiological and RCRA concerns as well as offering the most cost-effective solution were encountered. These challenges included meeting the radiological waste acceptance criteria of available disposal facilities, making a RCRA determination, evaluating treatment options and costs, addressing void requirements associated with disposal, and identifying packaging and transportation options. The varying disposal facility requirements affected disposition choices. Facility conditions that impacted decisions included radiological and chemical waste acceptance criteria, physical requirements, and measurement for payment options. The facility requirements also impacted onsite activities including management strategies, decontamination activities, and life-cycle cost.

  4. Development of a pilot safety information document (PSID) for the replacement of radioactive liquid waste treatment facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Selvage, Ronald Derek

    1995-01-01

    Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility. The PSID documents risk analysis for the proposed facility and some of the alternatives, accident analysis, radioactive and hazardous material doses to off-site individuals, and the cumulative safety risk from...

  5. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 for the period ending December 31, 1992

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Forbes, C.J.

    1993-03-01

    This is the seventh quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks that contain ferrocyanide compounds. In the presence of oxidizing materials, such as nitrates or nitrites, ferrocyanide can be made to explode in the laboratory by heating it to high temperatures [above 285{degrees}C (545{degrees}F)]. In the mid 1950s approximately 140 metric tons of ferrocyanide were added to 24 underground high-level radioactive waste tanks. An implementation plan (Cash 1991) responding to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990) was issued in March 1991 describing the activities that were planned and underway to address each of the six parts of Recommendation 90-7. A revision to the original plan was transmitted to US Department of Energy by Westinghouse Hanford Company in December 1992. Milestones completed this quarter are described in this report. Contents of this report include: Introduction; Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Implementation Plan Task Activities (Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation for enhanced temperature measurement, Recommendation for continuous temperature monitoring, Recommendation for cover gas monitoring, Recommendation for ferrocyanide waste characterization, Recommendation for chemical reaction studies, and Recommendation for emergency response planning); Schedules; and References. All actions recommended by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board for emergency planning by Hanford Site emergency preparedness organizations have been completed.

  6. Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 1998

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1999-02-01

    This is the ninth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy (Department) activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department`s defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department`s defense nuclear facilities. The locations of the major Department facilities are provided. During 1998, Departmental activities resulted in the proposed closure of one Board recommendation. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with four other Board recommendations. Two new Board recommendations were received and accepted by the Department in 1998, and two new implementation plans are being developed to address these recommendations. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, a renewed effort to increase the technical capabilities of the federal workforce, and a revised plan for stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  7. A technical basis for proliferation-resistant plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laidler, J.; DeVolpi, A.

    1995-12-01

    Final disposition of fissile materials cannot be reached without intermediate stages. Major uncertainties now exist in the physical and chemical form suitable for ultimate disposition. Forecasts are heavily dependent on interim experience and on policy evolution. Meanwhile, technical options for disposition can be examined and tested. Two of these options -- pyrochemical conditioning and vitrification -- have been the subject of research and development at Argonne. Using these technologies, weapons plutonium could be demilitarized by being blended with spent fuel. End-products suitable for disposal of weapons plutonium are particularly controversial because of factors associated with alternative energy uses, potential recovery for weapons, nuclear safeguards, criticality safety, and changing standards.

  8. Characterizing surplus US plutonium for disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, Jeffrey S.; Moore, Edwin N.

    2013-02-26

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems.

  9. Characterizing Surplus US Plutonium for Disposition - 13199

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, Jeffrey S. [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)] [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken SC 29808 (United States); Moore, Edwin N. [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC, Savannah River Site, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)] [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC, Savannah River Site, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems. (authors)

  10. SELECTION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FOR DISPOSITION TO WIPP

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Mcclard, J.; Christopher, J.

    2012-06-08

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing a Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). Included in the evaluation are up to 6 metric tons (MT) of plutonium in the form of impure oxides and metals for which a disposition plan has not been decided, among options that include preparation as feed for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility; disposing to high-level waste through the Savannah River Site (SRS) HB Line and H Canyon; can-in-canister disposal using the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility; and preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE and SRS have identified at least 0.5 MT of plutonium that, because of high levels of chemical and isotopic impurities, is impractical for disposition by methods other than the WIPP pathway. Characteristics of these items and the disposition strategy are discussed.

  11. Safety requirements, facility user needs, and reactor concepts for a new Broad Application Test Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Liebenthal, J.L.; Denison, A.B.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1992-07-01

    This report describes the EG&G Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program (LDRD) Broad Application Test Reactor (BATR) Project that was conducted in fiscal year 1991. The scope of this project was divided into three phases: a project process definition phase, a requirements development phase, and a preconceptual reactor design and evaluation phase. Multidisciplinary teams of experts conducted each phase. This report presents the need for a new test reactor, the project process definition, a set of current and projected regulatory compliance and safety requirements, a set of facility user needs for a broad range of projected testing missions, and descriptions of reactor concepts capable of meeting these requirements. This information can be applied to strategic planning to provide the Department of Energy with management options.

  12. Safety requirements, facility user needs, and reactor concepts for a new Broad Application Test Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Liebenthal, J.L.; Denison, A.B.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1992-07-01

    This report describes the EG G Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program (LDRD) Broad Application Test Reactor (BATR) Project that was conducted in fiscal year 1991. The scope of this project was divided into three phases: a project process definition phase, a requirements development phase, and a preconceptual reactor design and evaluation phase. Multidisciplinary teams of experts conducted each phase. This report presents the need for a new test reactor, the project process definition, a set of current and projected regulatory compliance and safety requirements, a set of facility user needs for a broad range of projected testing missions, and descriptions of reactor concepts capable of meeting these requirements. This information can be applied to strategic planning to provide the Department of Energy with management options.

  13. HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS & RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    EVANS, C B

    2004-12-21

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S&M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard.

  14. Criticality safety strategy for the Fuel Cycle Facility electrorefiner at Argonne National Laboratory, West

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mariani, R.D.; Benedict, R.W. [Argonne National Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Lell, R.M.; Turski, R.B.; Fujita, E.K. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1993-09-01

    The Integral Fast Reactor being developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) combines the advantages of metal-fueled, liquid-metal-cooled reactors and a closed fuel cycle. Presently, the Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) at ANL-West in Idaho Falls, Idaho is being modified to recycle spent metallic fuel from Experimental Breeder Reactor II as part of a demonstration project sponsored by the Department of Energy. A key component of the FCF is the electrorefiner (ER) in which the actinides are separated from the fission products. In the electrorefining process, the metal fuel is anodically dissolved into a high-temperature molten salt and refined uranium or uranium/plutonium products are deposited at cathodes. In this report, the criticality safety strategy for the FCF ER is summarized. FCF ER operations and processes formed the basis for evaluating criticality safety and control during actinide metal fuel refining. In order to show criticality safety for the FCF ER, the reference operating conditions for the ER had to be defined. Normal operating envelopes (NOES) were then defined to bracket the important operating conditions. To keep the operating conditions within their NOES, process controls were identified that can be used to regulate the actinide forms and content within the ER. A series of operational checks were developed for each operation that wig verify the extent or success of an operation. The criticality analysis considered the ER operating conditions at their NOE values as the point of departure for credible and incredible failure modes. As a result of the analysis, FCF ER operations were found to be safe with respect to criticality.

  15. Integrated approach to nuclear materials safety management in the U.S. and Russia

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-06-01

    The United States and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons and generating hundreds of tons of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium fissile nuclear materials that require disposition. The U.S. Department of Energy and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (Minatom) organizations are planning and implementing safe, secure storage and disposition operations for these materials in numerous facilities. This provides a new opportunity for technical exchanges between Russian and Western scientists that can establish an integrated and improved common safety culture for handling these materials. The development and use of personal relationships and joint projects among Russian and Western participants involved in fissile nuclear materials safety management contributes to improving nuclear materials nonproliferation and to making a safer world. Technical exchanges and workshops are being used to systematically identify opportunities in the nuclear fissile materials facilities to improve and ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment.

  16. Reducing nuclear danger through intergovernmental technical exchanges on nuclear materials safety management

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Peddicord, K.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States); Witmer, F.E.; Krumpe, P.F. [USDOE, Washington, DC (United States); Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M. [Radievyj Inst., Leningrad (Russian Federation)

    1997-04-09

    The United States and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons and generating hundreds of tons of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium fissile nuclear materials that require disposition. The U.S. Department of Energy and Russian Minatom organizations.are planning and implementing safe, secure storage and disposition operations for these materials in numerous facilities. This provides a new opportunity for technical exchanges between Russian and Western scientists that can establish an improved and sustained common safety culture for handling these materials. An initiative that develops and uses personal relationships and joint projects among Russian and Western participants involved in fissile nuclear materials safety management contributes to improving nuclear materials nonproliferation and to making a safer world. Technical exchanges and workshops are being used to systematically identify opportunities in the nuclear fissile materials facilities to improve and ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment.

  17. Disposition of fuel elements from the Aberdeen and Sandia pulse reactor (SPR-II) assemblies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mckerley, Bill [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bustamante, Jacqueline M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Costa, David A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Drypolcher, Anthony F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hickey, Joseph [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01

    We describe the disposition of fuel from the Aberdeen (APR) and the Sandia Pulse Reactors (SPR-II) which were used to provide intense neutron bursts for radiation effects testing. The enriched Uranium - 10% Molybdenum fuel from these reactors was shipped to the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for size reduction prior to shipment to the Savannah River Site (SRS) for final disposition in the H Canyon facility. The Shipper/Receiver Agreements (SRA), intra-DOE interfaces, criticality safety evaluations, safety and quality requirements and key materials management issues required for the successful completion of this project will be presented. This work is in support of the DOE Consolidation and Disposition program. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has operated pulse nuclear reactor research facilities for the Department of Energy since 1961. The Sandia Pulse Reactor (SPR-II) was a bare metal Godiva-type reactor. The reactor facilities have been used for research and development of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems, advanced nuclear reactors, reactor safety, simulation sources and energy related programs. The SPR-II was a fast burst reactor, designed and constructed by SNL that became operational in 1967. The SPR-ll core was a solid-metal fuel enriched to 93% {sup 235}U. The uranium was alloyed with 10 weight percent molybdenum to ensure the phase stabilization of the fuel. The core consisted of six fuel plates divided into two assemblies of three plates each. Figure 1 shows a cutaway diagram of the SPR-II Reactor with its decoupling shroud. NNSA charged Sandia with removing its category 1 and 2 special nuclear material by the end of 2008. The main impetus for this activity was based on NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino's six focus areas to reenergize NNSA's nuclear material consolidation and disposition efforts. For example, the removal of SPR-II from SNL to DAF was part of this undertaking. This project was in support of NNSA's efforts to consolidate the locations of special nuclear material (SNM) to reduce the cost of securing many SNM facilities. The removal of SPR-II from SNL was a significant accomplishment in SNL's de-inventory efforts and played a key role in reducing the number of locations requiring the expensive security measures required for category 1 and 2 SNM facilities. A similar pulse reactor was fabricated at the Y-12 National Security Complex beginning in the late 1960's. This Aberdeen Pulse Reactor (APR) was operated at the Army Pulse Radiation Facility (APRF) located at the Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) in Maryland. When the APRF was shut down in 2003, a portion of the DOE-owned Special Nuclear Material (SNM) was shipped to an interim facility for storage. Subsequently, the DOE determined that the material from both the SPR-II and the APR would be processed in the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Because of the SRS receipt requirements some of the material was sent to the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for size-reduction prior to shipment to the SRS for final disposition.

  18. Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Calendar Year 1999

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2000-02-01

    This is the tenth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department's defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department's defense nuclear facilities. During 1999, Departmental activities resulted in the closure of nine Board recommendations. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with three Board recommendations. One new Board recommendation was received and accepted by the Department in 1999, and a new implementation plan is being developed to address this recommendation. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, opening of a repository for long-term storage of transuranic wastes, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  19. CHARACTERIZATION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION OPTIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J; Edwin Moore, E; Scott Davies, S

    2008-07-15

    The United States (U.S.) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Except for materials that remain in use for programs outside of national defense, including programs for nuclear-energy development, the surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. Some items will be disposed as transuranic waste, low-level waste, or spent fuel. The remaining surplus plutonium will be managed through: (1) the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (FFF), to be constructed at the Savannah River Site (SRS), where the plutonium will be converted to fuel that will be irradiated in civilian power reactors and later disposed to a high-level waste (HLW) repository as spent fuel; (2) the SRS H-Area facilities, by dissolving and transfer to HLW systems, also for disposal to the repository; or (3) alternative immobilization techniques that would provide durable and secure disposal. From the beginning of the U.S. program for surplus plutonium disposition, DOE has sponsored research to characterize the surplus materials and to judge their suitability for planned disposition options. Because many of the items are stored without extensive analyses of their current chemical content, the characterization involves three interacting components: laboratory sample analysis, if available; non-destructive assay data; and rigorous evaluation of records for the processing history for items and inventory groups. This information is collected from subject-matter experts at inventory sites and from materials stabilization and surveillance programs, in cooperation with the design agencies for the disposition facilities. This report describes the operation and status of the characterization program.

  20. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board recommendation 90-7 for the period ending September 30, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Meacham, J.E.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1993-12-01

    This is the tenth quarterly repose on the progress of activities addressing safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks that contain ferrocyanide compounds. In the Presence of oxidizing materials, such as nitrates or nitrites, ferrocyanide can be made to explode in the laboratory by hearing it to high temperatures [above 285{degree} C (545{degree} F)]. In the mid 1950s, approximately 140 metric tons of ferrocyanide were added to waste now stored in underground high-level radioactive waste tanks. An implementation plan responding to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990){sup 2} was issued in March 1991 describing the activities that were planned and underway to address each of the six parts of Recommendation 90-7. A revision to the original plan was transmitted to the US Department of Energy by Westinghouse Hanford in December 1992, and subsequently to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in 1993.

  1. Disposition of surplus fissile materials via immobilization

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Sutcliffe, W.G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); McKibben, J.M. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Danker, W. [USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)

    1995-07-23

    In the Cold War aftermath, the US and Russia have agreed to large reductions in nuclear weapons. To aid in the selection of long-term management options, the USDOE has undertaken a multifaceted study to select options for storage and disposition of surplus plutonium (Pu). One disposition alternative being considered is immobilization. Immobilization is a process in which surplus Pu would be embedded in a suitable material to produce an appropriate form for ultimate disposal. To arrive at an appropriate form, we first reviewed published information on HLW immobilization technologies to identify forms to be prescreened. Surviving forms were screened using multi-attribute utility analysis to determine promising technologies for Pu immobilization. We further evaluated the most promising immobilization families to identify and seek solutions for chemical, chemical engineering, environmental, safety, and health problems; these problems remain to be solved before we can make technical decisions about the viability of using the forms for long-term disposition of Pu. All data, analyses, and reports are being provided to the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition to support the Record of Decision that is anticipated in Summer of 1996.

  2. Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested PartiesBuilding energyDepartmentNEA-2011-03 |Disposition Project Volume

  3. Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreator Nuclear Facility Document Safety Analysis

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested PartiesBuilding energyDepartmentNEA-2011-03 |Disposition Project Volume

  4. Annual report to Congress. Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 2000

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2001-03-01

    This Annual Report to the Congress describes the Department of Energy's activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. During 2000, the Department completed its implementation and proposed closure of one Board recommendation and completed all implementation plan milestones associated with two additional Board recommendations. Also in 2000, the Department formally accepted two new Board recommendations and developed implementation plans in response to those recommendations. The Department also made significant progress with a number of broad-based safety initiatives. These include initial implementation of integrated safety management at field sites and within headquarters program offices, issuance of a nuclear safety rule, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  5. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1991-10-01

    This is the second quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks that contain ferrocyanide compounds. An implementation plan (Cash 1991) responding to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990) was issued in March 1991 describing the activities planned and underway to address each of the six parts of the recommendation. All of the activities listed in the implementation plan are underway, including the multifunctional instrument tree and infrared tasks which resumed in late July. Although technical difficulties and resource limitations delayed some work, noteworthy progress has been made in completing a number of ferrocyanide program milestones. Thermal modeling shows that the heat loading of tank 241-BY-104 is much lower than previously listed and that significant hot spots within the waste are highly unlikely, if not possible. Computerized continuous temperature monitoring was installed on schedule on five of the highest interest tanks and five additional tanks will be on-line in December. Tank intrusive sampling is proceeding and the first vapor samples were obtained in mid-October. Spectral scans were completed for twelve tanks and substantial progress was made on design of an infrared scanning system. Chemical reaction studies are underway with synthetic ferrocyanide compounds believed to be more representative of the ferrocyanide materials actually deposited in the tanks. Tests indicate that water plays a major role in impeding a possible runaway reaction. An emergency planning exercise was conducted in May, emergency procedures were updated this quarter, and validation of the procedures and a second emergency exercise is scheduled for October.

  6. Safety analysis--200 Area Savannah River Site: Separations Area operations Building 211-H Outside Facilities. Supplement 11, Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-01-01

    The H-Area Outside Facilities are located in the 200-H Separations Area and are comprised of a number of processes, utilities, and services that support the separations function. Included are enriched uranium loadout, bulk chemical storage, water handling, acid recovery, general purpose evaporation, and segregated solvent facilities. In addition, services for water, electricity, and steam are provided. This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents an analysis of the H-Area Outside Facilities and is one of a series of documents for the Separations Area as specified in the SR Implementation Plan for DOE order 5481.1A. The primary purpose of the analysis was to demonstrate that the facility can be operated without undue risk to onsite or offsite populations, to the environment, and to operating personnel. In this report, risks are defined as the expected frequencies of accidents, multiplied by the resulting radiological consequences in person-rem. Following the summary description of facility and operations is the site evaluation including the unique features of the H-Area Outside Facilities. The facility and process design are described in Chapter 3.0 and a description of operations and their impact is given in Chapter 4.0. The accident analysis in Chapter 5.0 is followed by a list of safety related structures and systems (Chapter 6.0) and a description of the Quality Assurance program (Chapter 7.0). The accident analysis in this report focuses on estimating the risk from accidents as a result of operation of the facilities. The operations were evaluated on the basis of three considerations: potential radiological hazards, potential chemical toxicity hazards, and potential conditions uniquely different from normal industrial practice.

  7. EVILS AND DISPOSITIONS 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Flattery, Tobias

    2012-04-18

    ? The privation theorist must ontologically account for evils in some way. As a provisional statement, on the account I propose, privative evils are understood in terms of dispositional properties, or powers, which a being that suffers the evil lacks but ought...

  8. Safety training and safe operating procedures written for PBFA (Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator) II and applicable to other pulsed power facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Donovan, G.L.; Goldstein, S.A.

    1986-12-01

    To ensure that work in advancing pulsed power technology is performed with an acceptably low risk, pulsed power research facilities at Sandia National Laboratories must satisfy general safety guidelines established by the Department of Energy, policies and formats of the Environment, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Department, and detailed procedures formulated by the Pulsed Power Sciences Directorate. The approach to safety training and to writing safe operating procedures, and the procedures presented here are specific to the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II (PBFA II) Facility but are applicable as guidelines to other research and development facilities which have similar hazards.

  9. An overview of research activities on materials for nuclear applications at the INL Safety, Tritium and Applied Research facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    P. Calderoni; P. Sharpe; M. Shimada

    2009-09-01

    The Safety, Tritium and Applied Research facility at the Idaho National Laboratory is a US Department of Energy National User Facility engaged in various aspects of materials research for nuclear applications related to fusion and advanced fission systems. Research activities are mainly focused on the interaction of tritium with materials, in particular plasma facing components, liquid breeders, high temperature coolants, fuel cladding, cooling and blanket structures and heat exchangers. Other activities include validation and verification experiments in support of the Fusion Safety Program, such as beryllium dust reactivity and dust transport in vacuum vessels, and support of Advanced Test Reactor irradiation experiments. This paper presents an overview of the programs engaged in the activities, which include the US-Japan TITAN collaboration, the US ITER program, the Next Generation Power Plant program and the tritium production program, and a presentation of ongoing experiments as well as a summary of recent results with emphasis on fusion relevant materials.

  10. Emergency preparedness source term development for the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards-Licensed Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutter, S.L.; Mishima, J.; Ballinger, M.Y.; Lindsey, C.G.

    1984-08-01

    In order to establish requirements for emergency preparedness plans at facilities licensed by the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) needs to develop source terms (the amount of material made airborne) in accidents. These source terms are used to estimate the potential public doses from the events, which, in turn, will be used to judge whether emergency preparedness plans are needed for a particular type of facility. Pacific Northwest Laboratory is providing the NRC with source terms by developing several accident scenarios for eleven types of fuel cycle and by-product operations. Several scenarios are developed for each operation, leading to the identification of the maximum release considered for emergency preparedness planning (MREPP) scenario. The MREPP scenarios postulated were of three types: fire, tornado, and criticality. Fire was significant at oxide fuel fabrication, UF/sub 6/ production, radiopharmaceutical manufacturing, radiopharmacy, sealed source manufacturing, waste warehousing, and university research and development facilities. Tornadoes were MREPP events for uranium mills and plutonium contaminated facilities, and criticalities were significant at nonoxide fuel fabrication and nuclear research and development facilities. Techniques for adjusting the MREPP release to different facilities are also described.

  11. Examining factors affecting the safety performance and design of exclusive truck facilities 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Iragavarapu, Vichika

    2009-05-15

    on freeway facilities. Based on conclusions derived from the literature review and statistical analyses, straight segments with wider shoulders and uniform grades are recommended for exclusive truck facilities. It is also recommended to provide ramps...

  12. U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide [Fulfills ORO Safety Basis Competency 1, 2 (Part 1), or 7 (Part 1)

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    "This self-study guide provides an overview of safety basis terminology, requirements, and activities that are applicable to DOE and Oak Ridge Operations Office (ORO) nuclear facilities on the Oak...

  13. Subject: Integrated Safety Analysis: Why It Is Appropriate for Fuel Recycling Facilities Project Number: 689Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Letter, 9/10/10

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Enclosed for your review is a Nuclear Energy Institute white paper on the use of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed recycling facilities. This paper is...

  14. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    Following President Clinton`s Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.

  15. Savannah River Site Waste Disposition Project

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Terrel J. Spears Assistant Manager Waste Disposition Project DOE Savannah River Operations Office Savannah River Site Savannah River Site Waste Disposition Project Waste...

  16. DOE-HDBK-1113-98; Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    D. Foulke:3-5865 ATTN OF: REAFFIRMATION WITH ERRATA OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) URANIUM FACILITIES" Dennis Kubicki, Technical Standards Manager, EH-24 SUBJECT. HANDBOOK,...

  17. PROJECT STRATEGY FOR THE REMEDIATION AND DISPOSITION OF LEGACY TRANSURANIC WASTE AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE, South Carolina, USA

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rodriguez, M.

    2010-12-17

    This paper discusses the Savannah River Site Accelerated Transuranic (TRU) Waste Project that was initiated in April of 2009 to accelerate the disposition of remaining legacy transuranic waste at the site. An overview of the project execution strategy that was implemented is discussed along with the lessons learned, challenges and improvements to date associated with waste characterization, facility modifications, startup planning, and remediation activities. The legacy waste was generated from approximately 1970 through 1990 and originated both on site as well as at multiple US Department of Energy sites. Approximately two thirds of the waste was previously dispositioned from 2006 to 2008, with the remaining one third being the more hazardous waste due to its activity (curie content) and the plutonium isotope Pu-238 quantities in the waste. The project strategy is a phased approach beginning with the lower activity waste in existing facilities while upgrades are made to support remediation of the higher activity waste. Five waste remediation process lines will be used to support the full remediation efforts which involve receipt of the legacy waste container, removal of prohibited items, venting of containers, and resizing of contents to fit into current approved waste shipping containers. Modifications have been minimized to the extent possible to meet the accelerated goals and involve limited upgrades to address life safety requirements, radiological containment needs, and handling equipment for the larger waste containers. Upgrades are also in progress for implementation of the TRUPACT III for the shipment of Standard Large Boxes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the US TRU waste repository. The use of this larger shipping container is necessary for approximately 20% of the waste by volume due to limited size reduction capability. To date, approximately 25% of the waste has been dispositioned, and several improvements have been made to the overall processing plan as well as facility processing rates. These lessons learned, challenges, and improvements will be discussed to aid other sites in their efforts to conduct similar activities.

  18. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 for the period ending March 31, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Forbes, C.J.; Meacham, J.E.

    1993-06-01

    This is the eighth quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks that contain ferrocyanide compounds. In the presence of oxidizing materials, such as nitrates or nitrites, ferrocyanide can be made to explode in the laboratory by heating it to high temperatures [above 285{degree}C (545{degree}F)]. In the mid 1950s, approximately 140 metric tons of ferrocyanide were added to 24 underground high-level radioactive waste tanks. An implementation plan (Cash 1991) responding to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990) was issued in March 1991 describing the activities that were planned and underway to address each of the six parts of Recommendation 90-7. A revision to the original plan was transmitted to the US Department of Energy by Westinghouse Hanford Company in December 1992.

  19. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 for the period ending March 31, 1992

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1992-05-01

    This is the fourth quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks that contain ferrocyanide compounds. In the presence of oxidizing materials, such as nitrates or nitrites, ferrocyanide can be made to explode in the laboratory by heating it to high temperatures (above 285{degrees}C (545{degree}F)). In the mid 1950s approximately 140 metric tons of ferrocyanide were added to 24 underground high-level radioactive waste tanks. An implementation plan (Cash 1991) responding to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990) was issued in March 1991 describing the activities planned and underway to address each of the six parts of the recommendation.

  20. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 for the period ending March 31, 1992

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1992-05-01

    This is the fourth quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks that contain ferrocyanide compounds. In the presence of oxidizing materials, such as nitrates or nitrites, ferrocyanide can be made to explode in the laboratory by heating it to high temperatures [above 285{degrees}C (545{degree}F)]. In the mid 1950s approximately 140 metric tons of ferrocyanide were added to 24 underground high-level radioactive waste tanks. An implementation plan (Cash 1991) responding to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990) was issued in March 1991 describing the activities planned and underway to address each of the six parts of the recommendation.

  1. Major Risk Factors Integrated Facility Disposition Project -...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    technologies could affect that decision. * Assumption and timing of D&D the hot cells in Bethel Valley and building new ones in Melton Valley as part of the relocation of...

  2. Summary - Major Risk Factors Integrated Facility Disposition...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    mercury are unaccounted for at Y-12 and mercury contamination has been detected in both soils and groundwater. The IFDP will provide remediation of legacy contamination at the Oak...

  3. 8.0 FACILITY DISPOSITION PROCESS

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservationBio-InspiredAtmosphericdevicesPPONeApril351APPLICATION OFsafer The mp4 23HeĪ±,8-1

  4. Hight-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home Room NewsInformation CurrentHenry Bellamy, Ph.D. Title:Highlights LANS invests inHigh-Level Waste

  5. Independent Assessment of the Savannah River Site High-Level Waste Salt Disposition Alternatives Evaluation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    J. T. Case (DOE-ID); M. L. Renfro (INEEL)

    1998-12-01

    This report presents the results of the Independent Project Evaluation (IPE) Team assessment of the Westinghouse Savannah River Company High-Level Waste Salt Disposition Systems Engineering (SE) Team's deliberations, evaluations, and selections. The Westinghouse Savannah River Company concluded in early 1998 that production goals and safety requirements for processing SRS HLW salt to remove Cs-137 could not be met in the existing In-Tank Precipitation Facility as currently configured for precipitation of cesium tetraphenylborate. The SE Team was chartered to evaluate and recommend an alternative(s) for processing the existing HLW salt to remove Cs-137. To replace the In-Tank Precipitation process, the Savannah River Site HLW Salt Disposition SE Team downselected (October 1998) 140 candidate separation technologies to two alternatives: Small-Tank Tetraphenylborate (TPB) Precipitation (primary alternative) and Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST) Nonelutable Ion Exchange (backup alternative). The IPE Team, commissioned by the Department of Energy, concurs that both alternatives are technically feasible and should meet all salt disposition requirements. But the IPE Team judges that the SE Team's qualitative criteria and judgments used in their downselection to a primary and a backup alternative do not clearly discriminate between the two alternatives. To properly choose between Small-Tank TPB and CST Ion Exchange for the primary alternative, the IPE Team suggests the following path forward: Complete all essential R and D activities for both alternatives and formulate an appropriate set of quantitative decision criteria that will be rigorously applied at the end of the R and D activities. Concurrent conceptual design activities should be limited to common elements of the alternatives.

  6. Fuel-cycle facilities: preliminary safety and environmental information document. Volume VII

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-01-01

    Information is presented concerning the mining and milling of uranium and thorium; uranium hexafluoride conversion; enrichment; fuel fabrication; reprocessing; storage options; waste disposal options; transportation; heavy-water-production facilities; and international fuel service centers.

  7. Criticality Safety Evaluation Report for the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facilities Process Water Handling System

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    KESSLER, S.F.

    2000-08-10

    This report addresses the criticality concerns associated with process water handling in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility. The controls and limitations on equipment design and operations to control potential criticality occurrences are identified.

  8. Chemical Safety Vulnerability Working Group report. Volume 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01

    The Chemical Safety Vulnerability (CSV) Working Group was established to identify adverse conditions involving hazardous chemicals at DOE facilities that might result in fires or explosions, release of hazardous chemicals to the environment, or exposure of workers or the public to chemicals. A CSV Review was conducted in 148 facilities at 29 sites. Eight generic vulnerabilities were documented related to: abandoned chemicals and chemical residuals; past chemical spills and ground releases; characterization of legacy chemicals and wastes; disposition of legacy chemicals; storage facilities and conditions; condition of facilities and support systems; unanalyzed and unaddressed hazards; and inventory control and tracking. Weaknesses in five programmatic areas were also identified related to: management commitment and planning; chemical safety management programs; aging facilities that continue to operate; nonoperating facilities awaiting deactivation; and resource allocations. Volume 3 consists of eleven appendices containing the following: Field verification reports for Idaho National Engineering Lab., Rocky Flats Plant, Brookhaven National Lab., Los Alamos National Lab., and Sandia National Laboratories (NM); Mini-visits to small DOE sites; Working Group meeting, June 7--8, 1994; Commendable practices; Related chemical safety initiatives at DOE; Regulatory framework and industry initiatives related to chemical safety; and Chemical inventory data from field self-evaluation reports.

  9. Safety - Radiation Effects Facility / Cyclotron Institute / Texas A&M

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservation of Fe(II) byMultidayAlumni > The2/01/12University Safety Numerous safety

  10. Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    General Employee Radiological HS4240-W Chemical Safety HS4680-W PPE To access these training modules link here LTRAIN from inside LLNL, or here from anywhere. All JLF...

  11. Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    TOMASZEWSKI, T.A.

    2000-04-25

    The Waste Receiving and Processing Facility (WRAP), 2336W Building, on the Hanford Site is designed to receive, confirm, repackage, certify, treat, store, and ship contact-handled transuranic and low-level radioactive waste from past and present U.S. Department of Energy activities. The WRAP facility is comprised of three buildings: 2336W, the main processing facility (also referred to generically as WRAP); 2740W, an administrative support building; and 2620W, a maintenance support building. The support buildings are subject to the normal hazards associated with industrial buildings (no radiological materials are handled) and are not part of this analysis except as they are impacted by operations in the processing building, 2336W. WRAP is designed to provide safer, more efficient methods of handling the waste than currently exist on the Hanford Site and contributes to the achievement of as low as reasonably achievable goals for Hanford Site waste management.

  12. Safety Software Quality Assurance Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities for Nuclear Facilities and Activities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-08-27

    To assign roles and responsibilities for improving the quality of safety software. DOE N 411.2 (archived) extends this Notice until 01/31/2005. DOE N 411.3 extends this Notice until 1/31/06. Canceled by DOE O 414.1C. does not cancel other directives.

  13. CRAD, Assessment Criteria and Guidelines for Determining the Adequacy of Software Used in the Safety Analysis and Design of Defense Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    These guidelines and criteria provide a consistent overall framework for assessment of the processes that are currently in place to ensure that the software being used in the safety analysis and design of the SSCs in defense nuclear facilities is adequate. These reviews will be conducted only on software that is currently in use, not on software that was previously used as part of a safety analysis and design process.

  14. Safety considerations in the disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources in borehole facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    International Atomic Energ Agency. Vienna

    2003-01-01

    Sealed radioactive sources are used in medicine, industry and research for a wide range of purposes. They can contain different radionuclides in greatly varying amounts. At the end of their useful lives, they are termed 'disused sources' but their activity levels can still be quite high. They are, for all practical purposes, another type of radioactive waste that needs to be disposed of safely. Disused sealed radioactive sources can represent a significant hazard to people if not managed properly. Many countries have no special facilities for the management or disposal of radioactive waste, as they have no nuclear power programmes requiring such facilities. Even in countries with developed nuclear programmes, disused sealed sources present problems as they often fall outside the common categories of radioactive waste for which disposal options have been identified. As a result, many disused sealed sources are kept in storage. Depending on the nature of the storage arrangements, this situation may represent a ...

  15. Order Module--DOE O 420.1B, FACILITY SAFETY | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested Parties -DepartmentAvailableHighOffice| DepartmentWebinarOrder1B, FACILITY

  16. Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing Facility Project

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirley Ann Jackson About UsEnergy Marketing Corp. |Storage, Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety

  17. DOE Order Self Study Modules - DOE O 420.1B Facility Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i n c i pStateDOE FederalThe Department ofFederal Employees |CFR1B FACILITY

  18. Disposition of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Currently Located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 12232

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Glenn, J.; Patterson, J.; DeRoos, K.; Patterson, J.E.; Mitchell, K.G.

    2012-07-01

    Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) awarded SEC Federal Services Corporation (SEC) a 34-building demolition and disposal (D and D) project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) that included the disposition of six Strontium (Sr-90) powered Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) stored outside of ORNL Building 3517. Disposition of the RTGs is very complex both in terms of complying with disposal facility waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for packaging and transportation in commerce. Two of the RTGs contain elemental mercury which requires them to be Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) compliant prior to disposal. In addition, all of the RTGs exceed the Class C waste concentration limits under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Waste Classification Guidelines. In order to meet the LDR requirements and Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) WAC, a site specific treatability variance for mercury was submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to allow macro-encapsulation to be an acceptable treatment standard for elemental mercury. By identifying and confirming the design configuration of the mercury containing RTGs, the SEC team proved that the current configuration met the macro-encapsulation standard of 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 268.45. The SEC Team also worked with NNSS to demonstrate that all radioisotope considerations are compliant with the NNSS low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility performance assessment and WAC. Lastly, the SEC team determined that the GE2000 Type B cask met the necessary size, weight, and thermal loading requirements for five of the six RTGs. The sixth RTG (BUP-500) required a one-time DOT shipment exemption request due to the RTG's large size. The DOT exemption justification for the BUP-500 relies on the inherent robust construction and material make-up of the BUP- 500 RTG. DOE-ORO, SEC, and the entire SEC RTG team are nearing the conclusion of the Sr-90 RTG disposition challenge - a legacy now 50 years in the making. Over 600,000 Ci of Sr-90 waste await disposal and its removal from ORNL will mark an historical moment in the clean-up of the cold-war legacy in the ORNL central industrial area. Elimination (i.e., removal) of the RTGs will reduce security risks at ORNL and disposal will permanently eliminate security risks. The RTGs will eventually decay to benign levels within a reasonable timeframe relative to radiological risks posed by long-lived isotopes. The safety authorization basis at ORNL Building 3517 will be reduced enabling greater operational flexibility in future clean-out and D and D campaigns. Upon disposition the Department of Energy will realize reduced direct and indirect surveillance and maintenance costs that can be reapplied to accelerated and enhanced clean-up of the Oak Ridge Reservation. At present, waste profiles for the RTGs are developed and under review by NNSS RWAP staff and approval authorities. Disposition schedule is driven by the availability of compliant shipping casks necessary to safely transport the RTGs from ORNL to NNSS. The first disposal of the RCA RTG is expected in April 2012 and the remaining RTGs disposed in 2012 and 2013. (authors)

  19. Policy on Asset Disposition Policy on Asset Disposition

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sridhar, Srinivas

    than two years and a unit cost of more than $5,000. Federal Capital Assets ­ (capitalizable assets and disposes of these assets in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles property, whether capital or non-capital assets, but does not apply to disposition of real property. II

  20. Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic Safety Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4) Seismic Safety Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (PF-4)...

  1. Amended Record of Decision: Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    of Decision: Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Amended Record of Decision. SUMMARY:...

  2. Biosafety Facilities - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    5, Biosafety Facilities by David Freshwater Functional areas: Defense Nuclear Facility Safety and Health Requirement, Safety and Security, The Guide assists DOENNSA field elements...

  3. Chemical Safety Vulnerability Working Group report. Volume 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01

    The Chemical Safety Vulnerability (CSV) Working Group was established to identify adverse conditions involving hazardous chemicals at DOE facilities that might result in fires or explosions, release of hazardous chemicals to the environment, or exposure of workers or the public to chemicals. A CSV Review was conducted in 148 facilities at 29 sites. Eight generic vulnerabilities were documented related to: abandoned chemicals and chemical residuals; past chemical spills and ground releases; characterization of legacy chemicals and wastes; disposition of legacy chemicals; storage facilities and conditions; condition of facilities and support systems; unanalyzed and unaddressed hazards; and inventory control and tracking. Weaknesses in five programmatic areas were also identified related to: management commitment and planning; chemical safety management programs; aging facilities that continue to operate; nonoperating facilities awaiting deactivation; and resource allocations. Volume 2 consists of seven appendices containing the following: Tasking memorandums; Project plan for the CSV Review; Field verification guide for the CSV Review; Field verification report, Lawrence Livermore National Lab.; Field verification report, Oak Ridge Reservation; Field verification report, Savannah River Site; and the Field verification report, Hanford Site.

  4. Safety Basis Requirements for Nonnuclear Facilities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site-Specific Work Smart Standard Revision 3 December 2006

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Beach, D; Brereton, S; Failor, R; Hildum, J; Ingram, C; Spagnolo, S; van Warmerdam, C

    2007-06-07

    This standard establishes requirements that, when coupled with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL's) Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) methods and other Work Smart Standards for assuring worker safety, assure that the impacts of nonnuclear operations authorized in LLNL facilities are well understood and controlled in a manner that protects the health of workers, the public, and the environment. All LLNL facilities shall be classified based on potential for adverse impact of operations to the health of co-located (i.e., nearby) workers and the public in accordance with this standard, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 830, Subpart B, and Department of Energy Order (DOE O) 420.2A.

  5. Management response plan for the Chemical Safety Vulnerability Working Group report. Volume 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01

    The Chemical Safety Vulnerability (CSV) Working Group was established to identify adverse conditions involving hazardous chemicals at DOE facilities that might result in fires or explosions, release of hazardous chemicals to the environment, or exposure of workers or the public to chemicals. A CSV Review was conducted in 146 facilities at 29 sites. Eight generic vulnerabilities were documented related to: abandoned chemicals and chemical residuals; past chemical spills and ground releases; characterization of legacy chemicals and wastes; disposition of legacy chemicals; storage facilities and conditions; condition of facilities and support systems; unanalyzed and unaddressed hazards; and inventory control and tracking. Weaknesses in five programmatic areas were also identified related to: management commitment and planning; chemical safety management programs; aging facilities that continue to operate; nonoperating facilities awaiting deactivation; and resource allocations. Volume 1 contains a discussion of the chemical safety improvements planned or already underway at DOE sites to correct facility or site-specific vulnerabilities. The main part of the report is a discussion of each of the programmatic deficiencies; a description of the tasks to be accomplished; the specific actions to be taken; and the organizational responsibilities for implementation.

  6. Feasibility study for a transportation operations system cask maintenance facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rennich, M.J.; Medley, L.G.; Attaway, C.R.

    1991-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for the development of a waste management program for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW). The program will include a transportation system for moving the nuclear waste from the sources to a geologic repository for permanent disposal. Specially designed casks will be used to safely transport the waste. The cask systems must be operated within limits imposed by DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Department of Transportation (DOT). A dedicated facility for inspecting, testing, and maintaining the cask systems was recommended by the General Accounting Office (in 1979) as the best means of assuring their operational effectiveness and safety, as well as regulatory compliance. In November of 1987, OCRWM requested a feasibility study be made of a Cask Maintenance Facility (CMF) that would perform the required functions. 46 refs., 16 figs., 13 tabs.

  7. Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    N /A

    1999-05-14

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering & Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone & Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested services. The procurement process included the environmental review specified in DOE's NEPA regulations in 10 CFR 1021.216. The six reactors selected are Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in South Carolina McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in North Carolina, and North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 in Virginia. The Supplement describes the potential environmental impacts of using MOX fuel in these six specific reactors named in the DCS proposal as well as other program changes made since the SPD Draft EIS was published.

  8. Review of Nevada Site Office Criticality Safety Assessments at the Criticality Experiments Facility and Training Assembly for Criticality Safety and Appraisal of the Criticality Experiments Facility Startup Plan, October 2011

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This report provides the results of an independent oversight review of criticality safety assessment activities conducted by the Department of Energy's (DOE) Nevada Site Office

  9. Management response plan for the Chemical Safety Vulnerability Working Group report. Volume 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01

    The Chemical Safety Vulnerability (CSV) Working Group was established to identify adverse conditions involving hazardous chemicals at DOE facilities that might result in fires or explosions, release of hazardous chemicals to the environment, or exposure of workers or the public to chemicals. A CSV Review was conducted in 146 facilities at 29 sites. Eight generic vulnerabilities were documented related to: abandoned chemicals and chemical residuals; past chemical spills and ground releases; characterization of legacy chemicals and wastes; disposition of legacy chemicals; storage facilities and conditions; condition of facilities and support systems; unanalyzed and unaddressed hazards; and inventory control and tracking. Weaknesses in five programmatic areas were also identified related to: management commitment and planning; chemical safety management programs; aging facilities that continue to operate; nonoperating facilities awaiting deactivation; and resource allocations. To address the facility-specific and site-specific vulnerabilities, responsible DOE and site-contractor line organizations have developed initial site response plans. These plans, presented as Volume 2 of this Management Response Plan, describe the actions needed to mitigate or eliminate the facility- and site-specific vulnerabilities identified by the CSV Working Group field verification teams. Initial site response plans are described for: Brookhaven National Lab., Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Lab., Lawrence Livermore National Lab., Los Alamos National Lab., Oak Ridge Reservation, Rocky Flats Plant, Sandia National Laboratories, and Savannah River Site.

  10. Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition NNSS Capabilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pat Arnold

    2011-12-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has tasked the WDD working group to disposition the large inventory of legacy classified weapon components scattered across the complex.

  11. EM Waste and Materials Disposition & Transportation

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    On Closure Success 1 EM Waste and Materials Disposition & Transportation National Transportation Stakeholders Forum Chicago, Illinois May 26, 2010 Frank Marcinowski Acting Chief...

  12. EM Waste and Materials Disposition & Transportation | Department...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    & Transportation EM Waste and Materials Disposition & Transportation DOE's Radioactive Waste Management Priorities: Continue to manage waste inventories in a safe and compliant...

  13. Personal Property Disposition - Community Reuse Organizations...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    TO: DISTRIBUTION FROM: Michael Owen (signed) Director, Office of Worker and Community Transition Department of Energy Washington, DC 20505 January 22, 2003 Disposition of...

  14. Disposition of excess plutonium using ``off-spec`` MOX pellets as a sintered ceramic waste form

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Jardine, L.J.

    1996-02-01

    The authors describe a potential strategy for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium in a way that minimizes (1) technological risks, (2) implementation costs and completion schedules, and (3) requirements for constructing and operating new or duplicative Pu disposition facilities. This is accomplished by an optimized combination of (1) using existing nuclear power reactors to ``burn`` relatively pure excess Pu inventories as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and (2) using the same MOX fuel fabrication facilities to fabricate contaminated or impure excess Pu inventories into an ``off-spec`` MOX solid ceramic waste form for geologic disposition. Diversion protection for the SCWF to meet the ``spent fuel standard`` introduced by the National Academy of Sciences can be achieved in at least three ways. (1) One can utilize the radiation field from defense high-level nuclear waste by first packaging the SCWF pellets in 2- to 4-L cans that are subsequently encapsulated in radioactive glass in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) glass canisters (a ``can-in-canister`` approach). (2) One can add {sup 137}Cs (recovered from defense wastes at Hanford and currently stored as CsCl in capsules) to an encapsulating matrix such as cement for the SCWF pellets in a small hot-cell facility and thus fabricate large monolithic forms. (3) The SCWF can be fabricated into reactor fuel-like pellets and placed in tubes similar to fuel assemblies, which can then be mixed in sealed repository containers with irradiated spent nuclear fuel for geologic disposition.

  15. Processing and Disposition of Special Actinide Target Materials - 13138

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Robinson, Sharon M.; Patton, Brad D. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P.O. Box 2008, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (United States)] [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P.O. Box 2008, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (United States); Allender, Jeffrey S. [Savannah River National Laboratory (United States)] [Savannah River National Laboratory (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) manages an inventory of materials that contains a range of long-lived radioactive isotopes that were produced from the 1960's through the 1980's by irradiating targets in high-flux reactors at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to produce special heavy isotopes for DOE programmatic use, scientific research, and industrial and medical applications. Among the products were californium-252, heavy curium (including Cm-246 through Cm-248), and plutonium-242 and -244. Many of the isotopes are still in demand today, and they can be recovered from the remaining targets previously irradiated at SRS or produced from the recovered isotopes. Should the existing target materials be discarded, the plutonium (Pu) and curium (Cm) isotopes cannot be replaced readily with existing production sources. Some of these targets are stored at SRS, while other target material is stored at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at several stages of processing. The materials cannot be stored in their present form indefinitely. Their long-term management involves processing items for beneficial use and/or for disposition, using storage and process facilities at SRS and ORNL. Evaluations are under way for disposition options for these materials, and demonstrations of improved flow sheets to process the materials are being conducted at ORNL and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The disposition options and a management evaluation process have been developed. Processing demonstrations and evaluations for these unique materials are under way. (authors)

  16. New Applications of Gamma Spectroscopy: Characterization Tools for D&D Process Development, Inventory Reduction Planning & Shipping, Safety Analysis & Facility Management During the Heavy Element Facility Risk Reduction Program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mitchell, M; Anderson, B; Gray, L; Vellinger, R; West, M; Gaylord, R; Larson, J; Jones, G; Shingleton, J; Harris, L; Harward, N

    2006-01-23

    Novel applications of gamma ray spectroscopy for D&D process development, inventory reduction, safety analysis and facility management are discussed in this paper. These applications of gamma spectroscopy were developed and implemented during the Risk Reduction Program (RPP) to successfully downgrade the Heavy Element Facility (B251) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) from a Category II Nuclear Facility to a Radiological Facility. Non-destructive assay in general, gamma spectroscopy in particular, were found to be important tools in project management, work planning, and work control (''Expect the unexpected and confirm the expected''), minimizing worker dose, and resulted in significant safety improvements and operational efficiencies. Inventory reduction activities utilized gamma spectroscopy to identify and confirm isotopics of legacy inventory, ingrowth of daughter products and the presence of process impurities; quantify inventory; prioritize work activities for project management; and to supply information to satisfy shipper/receiver documentation requirements. D&D activities utilize in-situ gamma spectroscopy to identify and confirm isotopics of legacy contamination; quantify contamination levels and monitor the progress of decontamination efforts; and determine the point of diminishing returns in decontaminating enclosures and glove boxes containing high specific activity isotopes such as {sup 244}Cm and {sup 238}Pu. In-situ gamma spectroscopy provided quantitative comparisons of several decontamination techniques (e.g. TLC-free Stripcoat{trademark}, Radiac{trademark} wash, acid wash, scrubbing) and was used as a part of an iterative process to determine the appropriate level of decontamination and optimal cost to benefit ratio. Facility management followed a formal, rigorous process utilizing an independent, state certified, peer-reviewed gamma spectroscopy program, in conjunction with other characterization techniques, process knowledge, and historical records, to provide information for work planning, work prioritization, work control, and safety analyses (e.g. development of hold points, stop work points); and resulted in B251 successfully achieving Radiological status on schedule. Gamma spectroscopy helped to define operational approaches to achieve radiation exposure ALARA, e.g. hold points, appropriate engineering controls, PPE, workstations, and time/distance/shielding in the development of ALARA plans. These applications of gamma spectroscopy can be used to improve similar activities at other facilities.

  17. EM Makes Significant Progress on Dispositioning Transuranic Waste...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Makes Significant Progress on Dispositioning Transuranic Waste at Idaho Site EM Makes Significant Progress on Dispositioning Transuranic Waste at Idaho Site December 24, 2013 -...

  18. Hanford Tank Waste Retrieval, Treatment, and Disposition Framework...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Hanford Tank Waste Retrieval, Treatment, and Disposition Framework Hanford Tank Waste Retrieval, Treatment, and Disposition Framework Forty years of plutonium production at the...

  19. Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

    1992-09-01

    This report describes health and safety concerns associated with the Mixed and Low-level Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Various hazards are described such as fire, electrical, explosions, reactivity, temperature, and radiation hazards, as well as the potential for accidental spills, exposure to toxic materials, and other general safety concerns.

  20. Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Part 1, Waste streams and treatment technologies

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

    1992-09-01

    This report describes health and safety concerns associated with the Mixed and Low-level Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Various hazards are described such as fire, electrical, explosions, reactivity, temperature, and radiation hazards, as well as the potential for accidental spills, exposure to toxic materials, and other general safety concerns.

  1. Environmental Health and Safety Department

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    . Fire Safety, Radiation Safety and Hazardous Materials Facility are at other locations on campus://www.ehs.gatech.edu/EHS_Policy_Statement.pdf #12;EHS The main Georgia Tech Environmental Health and Safety Office is located at 490 Tenth Street: Radiation Safety Fire SafetyHazardous Materials #12;SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY Safety is a shared responsibility

  2. Generic safety documentation model

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mahn, J.A.

    1994-04-01

    This document is intended to be a resource for preparers of safety documentation for Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico facilities. It provides standardized discussions of some topics that are generic to most, if not all, Sandia/NM facilities safety documents. The material provides a ``core`` upon which to develop facility-specific safety documentation. The use of the information in this document will reduce the cost of safety document preparation and improve consistency of information.

  3. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    N /A

    1999-11-19

    In December 1996, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Storage and Disposition PEIS)'' (DOE 1996a). That PEIS analyzes the potential environmental consequences of alternative strategies for the long-term storage of weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the disposition of weapons-usable plutonium that has been or may be declared surplus to national security needs. The Record of Decision (ROD) for the ''Storage and Disposition PEIS'', issued on January 14, 1997 (DOE 1997a), outlines DOE's decision to pursue an approach to plutonium disposition that would make surplus weapons-usable plutonium inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use. DOE's disposition strategy, consistent with the Preferred Alternative analyzed in the ''Storage and Disposition PEIS'', allows for both the immobilization of some (and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium and use of some of the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of both the immobilized plutonium and the MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a potential geologic repository.

  4. Barriers and Issues Related to Achieving Final Disposition of Depleted Uranium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gillas, D. L.; Chambers, B. K.

    2002-02-26

    Approximately 750,000 metric tons (MT) of surplus depleted uranium (DU) in various chemical forms are stored at several Department of Energy (DOE) sites throughout the United States. Most of the DU is in the form of DU hexafluoride (DUF6) that resulted from uranium enrichment operations over the last several decades. DOE plans to convert the DUF6 to ''a more stable form'' that could be any one or combination of DU tetrafluoride (DUF4 or green salt), DU oxide (DUO3, DUO2, or DU3O8), or metal depending on the final disposition chosen for any given quantity. Barriers to final disposition of this material have existed historically and some continue today. Currently, the barriers are more related to finding uses for this material versus disposing as waste. Even though actions are beginning to convert the DUF6, ''final'' disposition of the converted material has yet to be decided. Unless beneficial uses can be implemented, DOE plans to dispose of this material as waste. This expresses the main barrier to DU disposition; DOE's strategy is to dispose unless uses can be found while the strategy should be only dispose as a last resort and make every effort to find uses. To date, only minimal research programs are underway to attempt to develop non-fuel uses for this material. Other issues requiring resolution before these inventories can reach final disposition (uses or disposal) include characterization, disposal of large quantities, storage (current and future), and treatment options. Until final disposition is accomplished, these inventories must be managed in a safe and environmentally sound manner; however, this is becoming more difficult as materials and facilities age. The most noteworthy final disposition technical issues include the development of reuse and treatment options.

  5. Comparison of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for Fuel Cycle Facilities, 2/17/11

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    During the 580th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), February10-12, 2011, we reviewed the staff’s white paper, “A Comparison of Integrated Safety Analysisand...

  6. EIS-0283: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium.

  7. Capturing Process Knowledge for Facility Deactivation and Decommissioning

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for the disposition of a vast number of facilities at numerous sites around the country which have been declared excess to current mission...

  8. Progress on ARRA-funded Facility & Capability Upgrades for the...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    ARRA-funded Facility & Capability Upgrades for the Battery AbuseSafety Laboratory Progress on ARRA-funded Facility & Capability Upgrades for the Battery AbuseSafety Laboratory...

  9. Facility stabilization project, fiscal year 1998 -- Multi-year workplan (MYWP) for WBS 1.4

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Floberg, W.C.

    1997-09-30

    The primary Facility Stabilization mission is to provide minimum safe surveillance and maintenance of facilities and deactivate facilities on the Hanford Site, to reduce risks to workers, the public and environment, transition the facilities to a low cost, long term surveillance and maintenance state, and to provide safe and secure storage of special nuclear materials, nuclear materials, and nuclear fuel. Facility Stabilization will protect the health and safety of the public and workers, protect the environment and provide beneficial use of the facilities and other resources. Work will be in accordance with the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement), local, national, international and other agreements, and in compliance with all applicable Federal, state, and local laws. The stakeholders will be active participants in the decision processes including establishing priorities, and in developing a consistent set of rules, regulations, and laws. The work will be leveraged with a view of providing positive, lasting economic impact in the region. Effectiveness, efficiency, and discipline in all mission activities will enable Hanford Site to achieve its mission in a continuous and substantive manner. As the mission for Facility Stabilization has shifted from production to support of environmental restoration, each facility is making a transition to support the Site mission. The mission goals include the following: (1) Achieve deactivation of facilities for transfer to EM-40, using Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) plant deactivation as a model for future facility deactivation; (2) Manage nuclear materials in a safe and secure condition and where appropriate, in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards rules; (3) Treat nuclear materials as necessary, and store onsite in long-term interim safe storage awaiting a final disposition decision by US Department of Energy; (4) Implement nuclear materials disposition directives. In the near term these are anticipated to mostly involve transferring uranium to other locations for beneficial use. Work will be in accordance with the Tri-Party Agreement, and other agreements and in compliance with all applicable Federal, state and local laws. The transition to deactivation will be accomplished through a phased approach, while maintaining the facilities in a safe and compliant configuration. In addition, Facility Stabilization will continue to maintain safe long-term storage facilities for Special Nuclear Material (SNM), Nuclear Material (NM), and Nuclear Fuel (NF). The FSP deactivation strategy aligns with the deactivate facilities mission outlined in Hanford Site SE documentation. Inherent to the FSP strategies are specific Hanford Strategic Plan success indicators such as: reduction of risks to workers, the public and environment; increasing the amount of resources recovered for other uses; reduction/elimination of inventory and materials; and reduction/elimination of costly mortgages.

  10. Excess plutonium disposition using ALWR technology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Phillips, A.; Buckner, M.R.; Radder, J.A.; Angelos, J.G.; Inhaber, H.

    1993-02-01

    The Office of Nuclear Energy of the Department of Energy chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force in August 1992. The Task Force was created to assess the range of practicable means of disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. Within the Task Force, working groups were formed to consider: (1) storage, (2) disposal,and(3) fission options for this disposition,and a separate group to evaluate nonproliferation concerns of each of the alternatives. As a member of the Fission Working Group, the Savannah River Technology Center acted as a sponsor for light water reactor (LWR) technology. The information contained in this report details the submittal that was made to the Fission Working Group of the technical assessment of LWR technology for plutonium disposition. The following aspects were considered: (1) proliferation issues, (2) technical feasibility, (3) technical availability, (4) economics, (5) regulatory issues, and (6) political acceptance.

  11. CRAD, Criteria and Guidelines For the Assessment of Safety System Software and Firmware at Defense Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The purpose and scope of this CRAD is to provide a set of consistent assessment criteria and guidelines for the assessment of safety system software and firmware that performs an SC or SS function, as described in the Background section. The scope of the assessment, henceforth, is called "I&C software."

  12. 324 Facility special-case waste assessment in support of 324 closure (TPA milestone M-89-05)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hobart, R.L.

    1998-06-25

    Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, also known as the Tri-Party Agreement Milestone M-89-05, requires US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office to complete a 324 Facility Special-Case Waste Assessment in Support of 324 Closure. This document, HNF-1270, has been prepared with the intent of meeting this regulatory commitment. Alternatives for the special-case wastes located in the 324 Building were defined and analyzed. Based on the criteria of safety, environmental, complexity of interfaces, risk, cost, schedule, and long-term operability and maintainability, the best alternative was chosen. Waste packaging and transportation options are also included in the recommendations. The waste disposition recommendations for the B-Cell dispersibles/tank heels and High-Level Vault packaged residuals are to direct them to the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility (PUREX) Number 2 storage tunnel.

  13. SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NORTON SH

    2010-02-23

    CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material. The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford nuclear reservation. Workers had to pass through metal detectors when they arrived at the plant and materials leaving the plant had to be scanned for security reasons. Whereas other high-security nuclear materials were shipped from the PFP to Savannah River, S.C. as part ofa Department of Energy (DOE) program to consolidate weapons-grade plutonium, it was determined that the SIF should remain onsite pending disposition to a national repository. Nevertheless, the SIF still requires a high level of security that the PFP complex has always provided. With the 60-year PFP mission of producing and storing plutonium concluded, the environmental cleanup plans for Hanford call for the demolition of the 63-building PFP complex. Consequently, if the SIF remained at PFP it not only would have interfered with the environmental cleanup plans, but would have required $100 million in facility upgrades to meet increased national security requirements imposed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A new smaller and more cost-effective area was needed to store this material, which led to the SIF Project. Once the SIF project was successfully completed and the SIF was safely removed from PFP, the existing Protected Area at PFP could be removed, and demolition could proceed more quickly without being encumbered by restrictive security requirements that an active Protected Area requires. The lightened PFP security level brought by safely removing and storing the SIF would also yield lowered costs for deactivation and demolition, as well as reduce overall life-cycle costs.

  14. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Los Alamos National Laboratory...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Occupational Safety & Health - Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility A section of...

  15. CRAD, Safety Basis - Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characteriza...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Safety Basis - Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility CRAD, Safety Basis - Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste...

  16. Facilities Condition and Hazards Assessment for Materials and Fuel Complex Facilities MFC-799, 799A, and 770C

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gary Mecham; Don Konoyer

    2009-11-01

    The Materials & Fuel Complex (MFC) facilities 799 Sodium Processing Facility (a single building consisting of two areas: the Sodium Process Area (SPA) and the Carbonate Process Area (CPA), 799A Caustic Storage Area, and 770C Nuclear Calibration Laboratory have been declared excess to future Department of Energy mission requirements. Transfer of these facilities from Nuclear Energy to Environmental Management, and an associated schedule for doing so, have been agreed upon by the two offices. The prerequisites for this transfer to occur are the removal of nonexcess materials and chemical inventory, deinventory of the calibration source in MFC-770C, and the rerouting and/or isolation of utility and service systems. This report provides a description of the current physical condition and any hazards (material, chemical, nuclear or occupational) that may be associated with past operations of these facilities. This information will document conditions at time of transfer of the facilities from Nuclear Energy to Environmental Management and serve as the basis for disposition planning. The process used in obtaining this information included document searches, interviews and facility walk-downs. A copy of the facility walk-down checklist is included in this report as Appendix A. MFC-799/799A/770C are all structurally sound and associated hazardous or potentially hazardous conditions are well defined and well understood. All installed equipment items (tanks, filters, etc.) used to process hazardous materials remain in place and appear to have maintained their integrity. There is no evidence of leakage and all openings are properly sealed or closed off and connections are sound. The pits appear clean with no evidence of cracking or deterioration that could lead to migration of contamination. Based upon the available information/documentation reviewed and the overall conditions observed during the facilities walk-down, it is concluded that these facilities may be disposed of at minimal risk to human health, safety or the environment.

  17. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1997-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement.

  18. Environmental, Health and Safety Assessment: ATS 7H Program (Phase 3R) Test Activities at the GE Power Systems Gas Turbine Manufacturing Facility, Greenville, SC

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-11-17

    International Technology Corporation (IT) was contracted by General Electric Company (GE) to assist in the preparation of an Environmental, Health and Safety (HI&3) assessment of the implementation of Phase 3R of the Advanced Turbine System (ATS) 7H program at the GE Gas Turbines facility located in Greenville, South Carolina. The assessment was prepared in accordance with GE's contractual agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy (GE/DOE Cooperative Agreement DE-FC21-95MC3 1176) and supports compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970. This report provides a summary of the EH&S review and includes the following: General description of current site operations and EH&S status, Description of proposed ATS 7H-related activities and discussion of the resulting environmental, health, safety and other impacts to the site and surrounding area. Listing of permits and/or licenses required to comply with federal, state and local regulations for proposed 7H-related activities. Assessment of adequacy of current and required permits, licenses, programs and/or plans.

  19. NRC comprehensive records disposition schedule. Revision 3

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-02-01

    Title 44 US Code, ``Public Printing and Documents,`` regulations issued by the General Service Administration (GSA) in 41 CFR Chapter 101, Subchapter B, ``Management and Use of Information and Records,`` and regulations issued by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in 36 CFR Chapter 12, Subchapter B, ``Records Management,`` require each agency to prepare and issue a comprehensive records disposition schedule that contains the NARA approved records disposition schedules for records unique to the agency and contains the NARA`s General Records Schedules for records common to several or all agencies. The approved records disposition schedules specify the appropriate duration of retention and the final disposition for records created or maintained by the NRC. NUREG-0910, Rev. 3, contains ``NRC`s Comprehensive Records Disposition Schedule,`` and the original authorized approved citation numbers issued by NARA. Rev. 3 incorporates NARA approved changes and additions to the NRC schedules that have been implemented since the last revision dated March, 1992, reflects recent organizational changes implemented at the NRC, and includes the latest version of NARA`s General Records Schedule (dated August 1995).

  20. Life cycle costs for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition option

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Williams, K.A.

    1999-10-01

    Projected constant dollar life cycle cost (LCC) estimates are presented for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition program being managed by the US Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD). The scope of the LCC estimate includes: design, construction, licensing, operation, and deactivation of a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility (FFF) that will be used to purify and convert weapons-derived plutonium oxides to MOX fuel pellets and fabricate MOX fuel bundles for use in commercial pressurized-water reactors (PWRs); fuel qualification activities and modification of facilities required for manufacture of lead assemblies that will be used to qualify and license this MOX fuel; and modification, licensing, and operation of commercial PWRs to allow irradiation of a partial core of MOX fuel in combination with low-enriched uranium fuel. The baseline cost elements used for this document are the same as those used for examination of the preferred sites described in the site-specific final environmental impact statement and in the DOE Record of Decision that will follow in late 1999. Cost data are separated by facilities, government accounting categories, contract phases, and expenditures anticipated by the various organizations who will participate in the program over a 20-year period. Total LCCs to DOE/MD are projected at approximately $1.4 billion for a 33-MT plutonium disposition mission.

  1. U.S. and Russia Sign Plutonium Disposition Agreement | National...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Plutonium Disposition Agreement | National Nuclear Security Administration Facebook Twitter Youtube Flickr RSS People Mission Managing the Stockpile Preventing Proliferation...

  2. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 for the period ending June 30, 1993

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Forbes, C.J.; Meacham, J.E.

    1993-10-01

    This is the ninth quarterly report on the progress of activities that address safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks containing ferrocyanide compounds. Milestones completed this quarter include (1) a report on the credibility of hot spots and a recommendation on infrared scans; (2) a document discussing the strength and limitations of proposed moisture monitoring technologies; (3) limited calibration of the neutron probe in simulant-filled drums; (4) a report interpreting data from auger surface samples of ferrocyanide tank 241-BY-104; (5) a document on the effect of possible catalyst, initiator, and diluents on ferrocyanide reactivity; (6) a report on small scale sensitivity tests of ferrocyanide flowsheet simulants; and (7) preparation and shipment of T Plant simulants for calorimetric and dryout tests.

  3. Independent Oversight Inspection, Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility- August 2008

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Inspection of Environment, Safety and Health Programs at the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility

  4. A COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF DISPOSITIONS Lotfi A. Zadeh

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    right, etc. Dispositions play a central role in human reasoning, since much of human knowledge and, especially, commousense knowledge, may be viewed as a collection of dispositions. The concept described in this paper is that a disposition may be viewed as a proposition with suppressed, or, more

  5. Master EM Project Definition Rating Index - Facility Disposition...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    cost estimate and schedule changes incorporated. A5 Life Cycle Cost The project Life Cycle Costs (LCC) have been rough-order-of-magnitude estimated, including relevant...

  6. Major Risk Factors Integrated Facility Disposition Project - Oak Ridge |

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested Parties - WAPA PublicLED1,400 JobsDepartment of Energy76Major DOE101

  7. Sandia Energy - Test Site Operations & Maintenance Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Test Site Operations & Maintenance Safety Home Stationary Power Energy Conversion Efficiency Wind Energy SWiFT Facility & Testing Test Site Operations & Maintenance Safety Test...

  8. FLUOR HANFORD SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    GARVIN, L J; JENSEN, M A

    2004-04-13

    This document summarizes safety management programs used within the scope of the ''Project Hanford Management Contract''. The document has been developed to meet the format and content requirements of DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses''. This document provides summary descriptions of Fluor Hanford safety management programs, which Fluor Hanford nuclear facilities may reference and incorporate into their safety basis when producing facility- or activity-specific documented safety analyses (DSA). Facility- or activity-specific DSAs will identify any variances to the safety management programs described in this document and any specific attributes of these safety management programs that are important for controlling potentially hazardous conditions. In addition, facility- or activity-specific DSAs may identify unique additions to the safety management programs that are needed to control potentially hazardous conditions.

  9. Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1994-04-30

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.

  10. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required.

  11. PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT: UNITED STATES PLUTONIUM CONSOLIDATION AND DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Koenig, R.; Davies, S.

    2009-06-01

    Following the end of the Cold War, the United States identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium and larger quantities of enriched uranium that are permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) also began shutting down, stabilizing, and removing inventories from production facilities that were no longer needed to support weapons programs and non-weapons activities. The storage of 'Category I' nuclear materials at Rocky Flats, Sandia National Laboratories, and several smaller sites has been terminated to reduce costs and safeguards risks. De-inventory continues at the Hanford site and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Consolidation of inventories works in concert with the permanent disposition of excess inventories, including several tonnes of plutonium that have already been disposed to waste repositories and the preparation for transfers to the planned Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (for the bulk of the excess plutonium) and alternative disposition methods for material that cannot be used readily in the MOX fuel cycle. This report describes status of plutonium consolidation and disposition activities and their impacts on continuing operations, particularly at the Savannah River Site.

  12. Used fuel disposition research and development roadmap - FY10 status.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nutt, W. M. (Nuclear Engineering Division)

    2010-10-01

    Since 1987 the U.S. has focused research and development activities relevant to the disposal of commercial used nuclear fuel and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned spent nuclear fuel and high level waste on the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. At the same time, the U.S. successfully deployed a deep geologic disposal facility for defense-related transuranic waste in bedded salt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. In 2009 the DOE established the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) within the Office of Nuclear Energy. The Mission of the UFDC is to identify alternatives and conduct scientific research and technology development to enable storage, transportation and disposal of used nuclear fuel and wastes generated by existing and future nuclear fuel cycles. The U.S. national laboratories have participated on these programs and has conducted research and development related to these issues to a limited extent. However, a comprehensive research and development (R&D) program investigating a variety of geologic media has not been a part of the U.S. waste management program since the mid 1980s. Such a comprehensive R&D program is being developed in the UFDC with a goal of meeting the UFDC Grand Challenge to provide a sound technical basis for absolute confidence in the safety and security of long-term storage, transportation, and disposal of used nuclear fuel and wastes from the nuclear energy enterprise. The DOE has decided to no longer pursue the development of a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Since a repository site will ultimately have to be selected, sited, characterized, designed, and licensed, other disposal options must now be considered. In addition to the unsaturated volcanic tuff evaluated at Yucca Mountain, several different geologic media are under investigation internationally and preliminary assessments indicate that disposal of used nuclear fuel and high level waste in these media is feasible. Considerable progress has been made in the U.S. and other nations in understanding disposal concepts in different geologic media, but gaps in knowledge still exist. A principal aspect of concern to the UFDC as it considers the broad issues of siting a repository in different geologic media are the marked differences in the regulatory bases for assessing suitability and safety of a repository between the U.S. and other nations. Because the probability based - risked informed nature of the current U.S. regulations for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel is sufficiently different from other regulations, information gained in previous studies, while useful, likely need to be supplemented to enable more convincing communication with the public, better defense of the numerical models, and stronger safety cases. Thus, it was recognized when the UFDC was established that there were readily identified disposal-related R&D opportunities to address knowledge gaps. An effort to document these research opportunities was a key component of Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 engineered system, natural system, and system-level modeling activities for a range of disposal environments. A principal contribution to identifying these gaps was a workshop held to gather perspectives from experts both within and external to the UFDC regarding R&D opportunities. In the planning for FY2010 it was expected that these activities would culminate with a UFDC research and development roadmap that would identify the knowledge gaps, discuss the R&D needed to fill these gaps, and prioritize the proposed R&D over both the near- and long-term. A number of knowledge gaps and needed R&D were identified and are discussed in this report. However, these preliminary R&D topics have not been evaluated in detail nor have they been prioritized to support future planning efforts. This will be completed in FY11 and the final UFDC Research and Development Roadmap will be completed. This report discusses proposed R&D topics in three areas related to repository siting, design, and performance: natural systems

  13. Seismic Safety Study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Tokarz, F J; Coats, D W

    2006-05-16

    During the past three decades, the Laboratory has been proactive in providing a seismically safe working environment for its employees and the general public. Completed seismic upgrades during this period have exceeded $30M with over 24 buildings structurally upgraded. Nevertheless, seismic questions still frequently arise regarding the safety of existing buildings. To address these issues, a comprehensive study was undertaken to develop an improved understanding of the seismic integrity of the Laboratory's entire building inventory at the Livermore Main Site and Site 300. The completed study of February 2005 extended the results from the 1998 seismic safety study per Presidential Executive Order 12941, which required each federal agency to develop an inventory of its buildings and to estimate the cost of mitigating unacceptable seismic risks. Degenkolb Engineers, who performed the first study, was recontracted to perform structural evaluations, rank order the buildings based on their level of seismic deficiencies, and to develop conceptual rehabilitation schemes for the most seriously deficient buildings. Their evaluation is based on screening procedures and guidelines as established by the Interagency Committee on Seismic Safety in Construction (ICSSC). Currently, there is an inventory of 635 buildings in the Laboratory's Facility Information Management System's (FIMS's) database, out of which 58 buildings were identified by Degenkolb Engineers that require seismic rehabilitation. The remaining 577 buildings were judged to be adequate from a seismic safety viewpoint. The basis for these evaluations followed the seismic safety performance objectives of DOE standard (DOE STD 1020) Performance Category 1 (PC1). The 58 buildings were ranked according to three risk-based priority classifications (A, B, and C) as shown in Figure 1-1 (all 58 buildings have structural deficiencies). Table 1-1 provides a brief description of their expected performance and damage state following a major earthquake, rating the seismic vulnerability (1-10) where the number 10 represents the highest and worst. Buildings in classifications A and B were judged to require the Laboratory's highest attention towards rehabilitation, classification C buildings could defer rehabilitation until a major remodel is undertaken. Strengthening schemes were developed by Degenkolb Engineers for the most seriously deficient A and B classifications (15 total), which the Laboratory's Plant Engineering Department used as its basis for rehabilitation construction cost estimates. A detailed evaluation of Building 2580, a strengthening scheme, and a construction cost estimate are pending. Specific details of the total estimated rehabilitation costs, a proposed 10-year seismic rehabilitation plan, exemption categories by building, DOE performance guidelines, cost comparisons for rehabilitation, and LLNL reports by Degenkolb Engineers are provided in Appendix A. Based on the results of Degenkolb Engineers evaluations, along with the prevailing practice for the disposition of seismically deficient buildings and risk-based evaluations, it is concluded that there is no need to evacuate occupants from these 58 buildings prior to their rehabilitation.

  14. Electrical safety guidelines

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-09-01

    The Electrical Safety Guidelines prescribes the DOE safety standards for DOE field offices or facilities involved in the use of electrical energy. It has been prepared to provide a uniform set of electrical safety standards and guidance for DOE installations in order to affect a reduction or elimination of risks associated with the use of electrical energy. The objectives of these guidelines are to enhance electrical safety awareness and mitigate electrical hazards to employees, the public, and the environment.

  15. DOE handbook electrical safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-01-01

    Electrical Safety Handbook presents the Department of Energy (DOE) safety standards for DOE field offices or facilities involved in the use of electrical energy. It has been prepared to provide a uniform set of electrical safety guidance and information for DOE installations to effect a reduction or elimination of risks associated with the use of electrical energy. The objectives of this handbook are to enhance electrical safety awareness and mitigate electrical hazards to employees, the public, and the environment.

  16. Summary report of the screening process to determine reasonable alternatives for long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-03-29

    Significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile materials (primarily plutonium and highly enriched uranium) have become surplus to national defense needs both in the US and Russia. These stocks of fissile materials pose significant dangers to national and international security. The dangers exist not only in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons but also in the potential for environmental, safety and health consequences if surplus fissile materials are not properly managed. As announced in the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the Department of Energy is currently conducting an evaluation process for disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials determined surplus to National Security needs, and long-term storage of national security and programmatic inventories, and surplus weapons-usable fissile materials that are not able to go directly from interim storage to disposition. An extensive set of long-term storage and disposition options was compiled. Five broad long-term storage options were identified; thirty-seven options were considered for plutonium disposition; nine options were considered for HEU disposition; and eight options were identified for Uranium-233 disposition. Section 2 discusses the criteria used in the screening process. Section 3 describes the options considered, and Section 4 provides a detailed summary discussions of the screening results.

  17. Toolbox Safety Talk Lead Awareness

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    Toolbox Safety Talk Lead Awareness Environmental Health & Safety Facilities Safety & Health Section Health & Safety for recordkeeping. Lead based paint is commonly found in homes built before 1978 and many industrial paints today still contain lead. Lead overexposure is one of the leading causes of workplace

  18. Facilities Management Mike Johnson

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Capogna, Luca

    , Design & Construction Services Bob Beeler Director, Facility Operations & Maintenance / Environmental Health & Safety Ron Edwards Director, Utility Operations & Maintenance Scott Turley Director, Business & Distribution Utility Plant Operations Water Treatment Zone C Utility Maintenance (HEAT) Power Distribution

  19. The ultimate disposition of depleted uranium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lemons, T.R. [Uranium Enrichment Organization, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    1991-12-31

    Depleted uranium (DU) is produced as a by-product of the uranium enrichment process. Over 340,000 MTU of DU in the form of UF{sub 6} have been accumulated at the US government gaseous diffusion plants and the stockpile continues to grow. An overview of issues and objectives associated with the inventory management and the ultimate disposition of this material is presented.

  20. TWRS safety program plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Calderon, L.M., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-08-01

    Management of Nuclear Safety, Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene, and Fire Protection programs, functions, and field support resources for Tank Waste Remediation Systems (TWRS) has, until recently, been centralized in TWRS Safety, under the Emergency, Safety, and Quality organization. Industrial hygiene technician services were also provided to support operational needs related to safety basis compliance. Due to WHC decentralization of safety and reengineering efforts in West Tank Farms, staffing and safety responsibilities have been transferred to the facilities. Under the new structure, safety personnel for TWRS are assigned directly to East Tank Farms, West Tank Farms, and a core Safety Group in TWRS Engineering. The Characterization Project Operations (CPO) safety organization will remain in tact as it currently exists. Personnel assigned to East Tank Farms, West Tank Farms, and CPO will perform facility-specific or project-specific duties and provide field implementation of programs. Those assigned to the core group will focus on activities having a TWRS-wide or programmatic focus. Hanford-wide activities will be the responsibility of the Safety Center of Expertise. In order to ensure an effective and consistent safety program for TWRS under the new organization program functions, goals, organizational structure, roles, responsibilities, and path forward must be clearly established. The purpose of the TWRS Safety Program Plan is to define the overall safety program, responsibilities, relationships, and communication linkages for safety personnel under the new structure. In addition, issues associated with reorganization transition are addressed, including training, project ownership, records management, and dissemination of equipment. For the purpose of this document ``TWRS Safety`` refers to all safety professionals and technicians (Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene, Fire Protection, and Nuclear Safety) within the TWRS organization, regardless of their location in the organization.

  1. Seismic Safety Guide

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eagling, D.G.

    1983-09-01

    This guide provides managers with practical guidelines for administering a comprehensive earthquake safety program. The Guide is comprehensive with respect to earthquakes in that it covers the most important aspects of natural hazards, site planning, evaluation and rehabilitation of existing buildings, design of new facilities, operational safety, emergency planning, special considerations related to shielding blocks, non-structural elements, lifelines, fire protection and emergency facilities. Management of risk and liabilities is also covered. Nuclear facilities per se are not dealt with specifically. The principles covered also apply generally to nuclear facilities but the design and construction of such structures are subject to special regulations and legal controls.

  2. Used Fuel Disposition Used Nuclear Fuel Storage and Transportation

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Lead Idaho National Laboratory NEET ASI Review Meeting September 17, 2014 Used Fuel Disposition Today's Discussion n Our R&D Objectives n What Guides Our Work n...

  3. Additional public meeting on plutonium disposition on September...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    period for the Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). September 1, 2012 dummy image Read our archives Contacts Editor Linda...

  4. DRAFT EM SSAB Chairs Meeting Waste Disposition Strategies...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    EM HQ Updates Waste Disposition Overview Christine Gelles Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Waste Management Office of Environmental Management EM SSAB Chairs Meeting 5...

  5. ,"U.S. Natural Gas Monthly Supply and Disposition Balance"

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Monthly Supply and Disposition Balance" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  6. ,"U.S. Natural Gas Annual Supply and Disposition Balance"

    U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Indexed Site

    Annual Supply and Disposition Balance" ,"Click worksheet name or tab at bottom for data" ,"Worksheet Name","Description"," Of Series","Frequency","Latest Data for" ,"Data...

  7. Development and implementation of attractiveness Level E criteria and the plutonium disposition methodology

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Christensen, D.C.; Robinson, M.A.

    1998-03-01

    Historically, the Department of Energy used the Economic Discard Limits (EDLs), those Special Nuclear Material (SNM) concentrations in residue matrices below which production of new SNM was more economic than SNM recovery, as a basis for discard decisions. In 1994, a joint team from DOE Defense Programs (DP) and Environmental Management (EM) determined that the EDLs were no longer a valid discriminator and directed that SNM disposition consider instead 12 specific criteria, foremost of which are waste minimization, environmental impacts, safety, proliferation concerns, and cost. In response, the Los Alamos National Laboratory developed a technical basis for determining SNM bearing materials unattractive for proliferation purposes and a quantitative method for predicting materials disposition consequences as a basis for decision making called the plutonium disposition methodology. The objective of attractiveness Level E criteria is to insure that waste is unattractive for proliferation or terrorist purposes. Level E criteria is about 0.17 kg Pu per 208 liter drum (requiring diversion of a minimum of 54 drums, assuming 100% recovery efficiency).

  8. Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration would like submit theCovalent Bonding Low-Cost2 DOENERSCDecemberDeclarationHANFORD8, 2014

  9. Driver Safety Training Facilities Management's

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Soerens, Thomas

    order Check gauges- be sure fuel, oil, battery, and temperature are normal (with motor running) Report as you approach bridges and overpasses in the winter. These sections freeze first and stay frozen long seatbelt. Always look out for pedestrians. Obey traffic signals/signs/laws. Do not use your cell phone

  10. Facility Safety | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergy A plug-inPPLforLDRD Report to Congress MoreHyd rog enOffice of

  11. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States). Fission Energy and Systems Safety Program

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient.

  12. Bases, Assumptions, and Results of the Flowsheet Calculations for the Decision Phase Salt Disposition Alternatives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dimenna, R.A.; Jacobs, R.A.; Taylor, G.A.; Durate, O.E.; Paul, P.K.; Elder, H.H.; Pike, J.A.; Fowler, J.R.; Rutland, P.L.; Gregory, M.V.; Smith III, F.G.; Hang, T.; Subosits, S.G.; Campbell, S.G.

    2001-03-26

    The High Level Waste (HLW) Salt Disposition Systems Engineering Team was formed on March 13, 1998, and chartered to identify options, evaluate alternatives, and recommend a selected alternative(s) for processing HLW salt to a permitted wasteform. This requirement arises because the existing In-Tank Precipitation process at the Savannah River Site, as currently configured, cannot simultaneously meet the HLW production and Authorization Basis safety requirements. This engineering study was performed in four phases. This document provides the technical bases, assumptions, and results of this engineering study.

  13. Portsmouth RI/FS Report for the Site-Wide Waste Disposition Evaluation...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    RIFS Report for the Site-Wide Waste Disposition Evaluation Project Portsmouth RIFS Report for the Site-Wide Waste Disposition Evaluation Project This Remedial Investigation and...

  14. Plutonium disposition study phase 1b final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1993-09-15

    This report provides the results of the Westinghouse activities performed as part of the Plutonium Disposition Study Phase 1b. These activities, which took place from May 16, 1993 to September 15, 1993, build upon the work completed in Phase 1a, which concluded on May 15, 1993. In Phase 1a, three Plutonium Disposal Reactor (PDR) options were developed for the disposal of excess weapons grade plutonium from returned and dismantled nuclear weapons. This report documents the results of several tasks that were performed to further knowledge in specific areas leading up to Phase 2 of the PDR Study. The Westinghouse activities for Phase 1b are summarized as follows: (1) resolved technical issues concerning reactor physics including equilibrium cycle calculations, use of gadolinium, moderator temperature coefficient, and others as documented in Section 2.0; (2) analyzed large Westinghouse commercial plants for plutonium disposal; (3) reactor safety issues including the steam line break were resolved, and are included in Section 2.0; (4) several tasks related to the PDR Fuel Cycle were examined; (5) cost and deployment options were examined to determine optimal configuration for both plutonium disposal and tritium production; (6) response to questions from DOE and National Academy of Scientists (NAS) reviewers concerning the PDR Phase 1a report are included in Appendix A.

  15. Savannah River Site - Salt Waste Processing Facility Independent...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    SALT WASTE PROCESSING FACILITY INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW November 22, 2006 Conducted by: Harry Harmon, Team Lead CivilStructural Sub Team Facility Safety Sub Team Engineering...

  16. Sandia Energy - Excellence Award in the 2012 Facilities Environmental...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Excellence Award in the 2012 Facilities Environmental, Safety and Health Go Green Initiative Home Renewable Energy Energy Events Facilities News News & Events Concentrating Solar...

  17. Dismantlement and Disposition | National Nuclear Security Administration

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefield Municipal Gas &SCE-SessionsSouthReport for the t-) S/,,5 'a CConversion| Nationaland Disposition |

  18. Disposition of nuclear waste using subcritical accelerator-driven systems

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Venneri, F.; Li, N.; Williamson, M.; Houts, M.; Lawrence, G.

    1998-12-01

    Studies have shown that the repository long-term radiological risk is from the long-lived transuranics and the fission products Tc-99 and I-129, thermal loading concerns arise mainly form the short-lived fission products Sr-90 and Cs-137. In relation to the disposition of nuclear waste, ATW is expected to accomplish the following: (1) destroy over 99.9% of the actinides; (2) destroy over 99.9% of the Tc and I; (3) separate Sr and Cs (short half-life isotopes); (4) separate uranium; (5) produce electricity. In the ATW concept, spent fuel would be shipped to a ATW site where the plutonium, other transuranics and selected long-lived fission products would be destroyed by fission or transmutation in their only pass through the facility. This approach contrasts with the present-day reprocessing practices in Europe and Japan, during which high purity plutonium is produced and used in the fabrication of fresh mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) that is shipped off-site for use in light water reactors.

  19. Integrated Safety Management Policy

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-04-25

    The policy establishes DOE's expectation for safety, including integrated safety management that will enable the Department’s mission goals to be accomplished efficiently while ensuring safe operations at all departmental facilities and activities. Supersedes DOE P 450.4, DOE P 411.1, DOE P 441.1, DOE P 450.2A, and DOE P 450.7

  20. Enforcement handbook: Enforcement of DOE nuclear safety requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    This Handbook provides detailed guidance and procedures to implement the General Statement of DOE Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy). A copy of this Enforcement Policy is included for ready reference in Appendix D. The guidance provided in this Handbook is qualified, however, by the admonishment to exercise discretion in determining the proper disposition of each potential enforcement action. As discussed in subsequent chapters, the Enforcement and Investigation Staff will apply a number of factors in assessing each potential enforcement situation. Enforcement sanctions are imposed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy for the purpose of promoting public and worker health and safety in the performance of activities at DOE facilities by DOE contractors (and their subcontractors and suppliers) who are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. These indemnified contractors, and their suppliers and subcontractors, will be referred to in this Handbook collectively as DOE contractors. It should be remembered that the purpose of the Department`s enforcement policy is to improve nuclear safety for the workers and the public, and this goal should be the prime consideration in exercising enforcement discretion.

  1. CRAD, Criteria and Guidelines For the Assessment of Safety System...

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Criteria and Guidelines For the Assessment of Safety System Software and Firmware at Defense Nuclear Facilities CRAD, Criteria and Guidelines For the Assessment of Safety System...

  2. Tritium research activities in Safety and Tritium Applied Research...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    research activities in Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) facility, Idaho National Laboratory Tritium research activities in Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR)...

  3. Analysis and section of processes for the disposition of excess fissile material from nuclear weapon dismantlement in the United States

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Myers, B.R.; Armantrout, G.A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Erickson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1995-02-01

    The end of the cold war and the acceleration of nuclear disarmament efforts by the United States (US) and Russia are generating large quantities of surplus fissile nuclear materials that are no longer needed for military purposes. The safe and secure disposition of this surplus material to prevent theft or reuse in weapons has become a high priority for the US Department of Energy (USDOE). Many options exist for storage and disposition (use or disposal) of these surplus materials. The criteria, which have been developed from the basis for a preliminary ``screening`` of options, to eliminate from further consideration those options that do not meet minimal requirements. Factors, or attributes, contained in the screening and selection criteria include: (1) resistance to theft and diversion by unauthorized parties, (2) resistance to retrieval, extraction, and reuse by the host nation, (3) technical viability, (4) environmental, safety, and health impacts, (5) cost effectiveness, (6) timeliness, (7) fostering of progress and cooperation with Russia and others, (8) public and institutional acceptance, and (9) additional benefits. The evaluation of environmental impacts, in accordance with the US National Environmental Policy Ac (NEPA) process, is an integral part of the overall evaluation process. Because of the variety of physical and chemical forms of the nuclear material inventory, and because of the large number of possible disposition technologies and final forms, several hundred possible pathways to disposition have been defined and have undergone a systematic selection process. Also, because nuclear material disposition will have far ranging impacts, extensive public, in the form of public and stakeholder, input was integral to the selection process.

  4. Interim Storage of Plutonium in Existing Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Woodsmall, T.D.

    1999-05-10

    'In this era of nuclear weapons disarmament and nonproliferation treaties, among many problems being faced by the Department of Energy is the safe disposal of plutonium. There is a large stockpile of plutonium at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Center and it remains politically and environmentally strategic to relocate the inventory closer to a processing facility. Savannah River Site has been chosen as the final storage location, and the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) is currently under construction for this purpose. With the ability of APSF to receive Rocky Flats material an estimated ten years away, DOE has decided to use the existing reactor building in K-Area of SRS as temporary storage to accelerate the removal of plutonium from Rocky Flats. There are enormous cost savings to the government that serve as incentive to start this removal as soon as possible, and the KAMS project is scheduled to receive the first shipment of plutonium in January 2000. The reactor building in K-Area was chosen for its hardened structure and upgraded seismic qualification, both resulting from an effort to restart the reactor in 1991. The KAMS project has faced unique challenges from Authorization Basis and Safety Analysis perspectives. Although modifying a reactor building from a production facility to a storage shelter is not technically difficult, the nature of plutonium has caused design and safety analysis engineers to make certain that the design of systems, structures and components included will protect the public, SRS workers, and the environment. A basic overview of the KAMS project follows. Plutonium will be measured and loaded into DOT Type-B shipping packages at Rocky Flats. The packages are 35-gallon stainless steel drums with multiple internal containment boundaries. DOE transportation vehicles will be used to ship the drums to the KAMS facility at SRS. They will then be unloaded, stacked and stored in specific locations throughout the reactor building. The storage life is projected to be ten years to allow the preparation of APSF. DOE has stipulated that there be no credible release during storage, since there are no design features in place to mitigate a release of plutonium (i.e. HEPA filters, facility containment boundaries, etc.). This mandate has presented most of the significant challenges to the safety analysis team. The shipping packages are designed to withstand certain accidents and conditions, but in order to take credit for these the storage environment must be strictly controlled. Damages to the packages from exposure to fire, dropping, crushing and other impact accidents have been analyzed, and appropriate preventative design features have been incorporated. Other efforts include the extension of the shipping life (roughly two years) to a suitable storage life of ten years. These issues include the effects of internal pressure increases, seal degradation and the presence of impurities. A process known as the Container Qualification Program has been conducted to address these issues. The KAMS project will be ready to receive the first shipment from Rocky Flats in January 2000. No credible design basis scenarios resulting in the release of plutonium exist. This work has been useful in the effort to provide a safer disposition of plutonium, but also the lessons learned and techniques established by the team will help with the analysis of future facility modifications.'

  5. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  6. Toolbox Safety Talk Heat Stress

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pawlowski, Wojtek

    Toolbox Safety Talk Heat Stress Environmental Health & Safety Facilities Safety & Health Section for inducing heat stress. When the body is unable to cool itself by sweating, several heat-induced illnesses Stress · Know signs/symptoms of heat-related illnesses; monitor yourself and coworkers. · Block out

  7. Health and Safety Training Reciprocity

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-04-14

    Establishes a policy for reciprocity of employee health and safety training among DOE entities responsible for employee health and safety at DOE sites and facilities to increase efficiency and effectiveness of Departmental operations while meeting established health and safety requirements. Does not cancel other directives.

  8. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S. [and others

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition.

  9. Model for multi-strata safety performance measurements in the process industry 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Keren, Nir

    2004-09-30

    of process safety elements within facilities; (2) benchmarking of process safety elements among facilities; and (3) use of incident data collection from various sources for industrial safety performance assessment. The methods presently available...

  10. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-02-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage on options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to bum the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE`s Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the nonproliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative.

  11. Neutron Assay System for Confinement Vessel Disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Frame, Katherine C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bourne, Mark M. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Crooks, William J. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Evans, Louise [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mayo, Douglas R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miko, David K. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Salazar, William R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stange, Sy [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Valdez, Jose I. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Vigil, Georgiana M. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-13

    Los Alamos National Laboratory has a number of spherical confinement vessels (CVs) remaining from tests involving nuclear materials. These vessels have an inner diameter of 6 feet with 1-inch thick steel walls. The goal of the Confinement Vessel Disposition (CVD) project is to remove debris and reduce contamination inside the CVs. The Confinement Vessel Assay System (CVAS) was developed to measure the amount of special nuclear material (SNM) in CVs before and after cleanout. Prior to cleanout, the system will be used to perform a verification measurement of each vessel. After cleanout, the system will be used to perform safeguards-quality assays of {le}100-g {sup 239}Pu equivalent in a vessel for safeguards termination. The CVAS has been tested and calibrated in preparation for verification and safeguards measurements.

  12. Independent Oversight Assessment, Salt Waste Processing Facility...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing Facility Project The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Enforcement and Oversight (Independent Oversight),...

  13. Cold vacuum drying facility design requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    IRWIN, J.J.

    1999-07-01

    This document provides the detailed design requirements for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Cold Vacuum Drying Facility. Process, safety, and quality assurance requirements and interfaces are specified.

  14. Americium/Curium Disposition Life Cycle Planning Study

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jackson, W.N.; Krupa, J.; Stutts, P.; Nester, S.; Raimesch, R.

    1998-04-30

    At the request of the Department of Energy Savannah River Office (DOE- SR), Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) evaluated concepts to complete disposition of Americium and Curium (Am/Cm) bearing materials currently located at the Savannah River Site (SRS).

  15. EIS-0327: Disposition of Scrap Metals Programmatic EIS

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS will evaluate the environmental impacts of policy alternatives for the disposition of scrap metals (primarily carbon steel and stainless steel) that may have residual surface radioactivity. DOE is cancelling this EIS.

  16. Off-scale salary dispositions It is very important that the dispositions of off-scale salaries be specified in departmental letters

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    California at San Diego, University of

    Off-scale salary dispositions It is very important that the dispositions of off-scale salaries in determining the correct disposition. Market off-scale salaries New: A department may propose a "new" market off-scale salary award in the following circumstances: 1) a market off-scale salary is being requested

  17. Disposition of excess weapons plutonium from dismantled weapons

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of various nuclear arms reduction agreements, US and Russia have been actively dismantling tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. As a result,large quantities of fissile materials, including more than 100 (tonnes?) of weapons-grade Pu, have become excess to both countries` military needs. To meet nonproliferation goals and to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, this excess weapons Pu must be placed in secure storage and then, in timely manner, either used in nuclear reactors as fuel or discarded in geologic repositories as solid waste. This disposition in US and Russia must be accomplished in a safe, secure manner and as quickly as practical. Storage of this Pu is a prerequisite to any disposition process, but the length of storage time is unknown. Whether by use as fuel or discard as solid waste, disposition of that amount of Pu will require decades--and perhaps longer, if disposition operations encounter delays. Neither US nor Russia believes that long-term secure storage is a substitute for timely disposition of excess Pu, but long-term, safe, secure storage is a critical element of all excess Pu disposition activities.

  18. Meeting and Presentation Materials

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Review Seismic Design Expectations Reviews Protocol for EM ReviewField Self- Assessment of Site-Specific QAPsQIPs Safety Design Strategy Facility Disposition Safety...

  19. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Safety Management Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garvin, L.J.

    1996-02-01

    The Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Safety Management Plan describes the new nuclear facility regulatory requirements basis for the Spemt Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project and establishes the plan to achieve compliance with this basis at the new SNF Project facilities.

  20. Hanford MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site (SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. Hanford has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 1 facility. In all, a total of three LA MOX fuel fabrication options were identified by Hanford that could accommodate the program. In every case, only minor modification would be required to ready any of the facilities to accept the equipment necessary to accomplish the LA program.

  1. LANL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.; Ludwig, S.B. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. LANL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within both Category 1 and 2 areas. Technical Area (TA) 55/Plutonium Facility 4 will be used to store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, assemble rods, and store fuel bundles. Bundles will be assembled at a separate facility, several of which have been identified as suitable for that activity. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (at TA-3) will be used for analytical chemistry support. Waste operations will be conducted in TA-50 and TA-54. Only very minor modifications will be needed to accommodate the LA program. These modifications consist mostly of minor equipment upgrades. A commercial reactor operator has not been identified for the LA irradiation. Postirradiation examination (PIE) of the irradiated fuel will take place at either Oak Ridge National Laboratory or ANL-W. The only modifications required at either PIE site would be to accommodate full-length irradiated fuel rods. Results from this program are critical to the overall plutonium distribution schedule.

  2. Evaluation of alternatives for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dyer, J.S.; Butler, J.C. [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States); Edmunds, T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)] [and others

    1997-04-04

    The Department of Energy Record of Decision (ROD) selected alternatives for disposition of surplus, weapons grade plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns addressed included economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The analysis reported here was conducted in parallel with technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses; it uses multiattribute utility theory to combine these considerations in order to facilitate an integrated evaluation of alternatives. This analysis is intended to provide additional insight regarding alternative evaluation and to assist in understanding the rationale for the choice of alternatives recommended in the ROD. Value functions were developed for objectives of disposition, and used to rank alternatives. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the ranking of alternatives for the base case was relatively insensitive to changes in assumptions over reasonable ranges. The analyses support the recommendation of the ROD to pursue parallel development of the vitrification immobilization alternative and the use of existing light water reactors alternative. 27 refs., 109 figs., 20 tabs.

  3. Los Alamos National Laboratory summary plan to fabricate mixed oxide lead assemblies for the fissile material disposition program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Buksa, J.J.; Eaton, S.L.; Trellue, H.R.; Chidester, K.; Bowidowicz, M.; Morley, R.A.; Barr, M.

    1997-12-01

    This report summarizes an approach for using existing Los Alamos National Laboratory (Laboratory) mixed oxide (MOX) fuel-fabrication and plutonium processing capabilities to expedite and assure progress in the MOX/Reactor Plutonium Disposition Program. Lead Assembly MOX fabrication is required to provide prototypic fuel for testing in support of fuel qualification and licensing requirements. It is also required to provide a bridge for the full utilization of the European fabrication experience. In part, this bridge helps establish, for the first time since the early 1980s, a US experience base for meeting the safety, licensing, safeguards, security, and materials control and accountability requirements of the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, a link is needed between the current research and development program and the production of disposition mission fuel. This link would also help provide a knowledge base for US regulators. Early MOX fabrication and irradiation testing in commercial nuclear reactors would provide a positive demonstration to Russia (and to potential vendors, designers, fabricators, and utilities) that the US has serious intent to proceed with plutonium disposition. This report summarizes an approach to fabricating lead assembly MOX fuel using the existing MOX fuel-fabrication infrastructure at the Laboratory.

  4. Job Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Job Safety and Health It's the law EMPLOYEES: Must have access to: DOE safety and health publications; The worker safety and health program for their location; This...

  5. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  6. SSC Safety Review Document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Toohig, T.E. [ed.

    1988-11-01

    The safety strategy of the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) Central Design Group (CDG) is to mitigate potential hazards to personnel, as far as possible, through appropriate measures in the design and engineering of the facility. The Safety Review Document identifies, on the basis of the Conceptual Design Report (CDR) and related studies, potential hazards inherent in the SSC project independent of its site. Mitigative measures in the design of facilities and in the structuring of laboratory operations are described for each of the hazards identified.

  7. INFORMATION: Management Alert on Environmental Management's Select Strategy for Disposition of Savannah River Site Depleted Uranium Oxides

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2010-04-01

    The Administration and the Congress, through policy statements and passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), have signaled that they hope that proactive actions by agency Inspectors General will help ensure that Federal Recovery Act activities are transparent, effective and efficient. In that context, the purpose of this management alert is to share with you concerns that have been raised to the Office of Inspector General regarding the planned disposition of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) inventory of Depleted Uranium (DU) oxides. This inventory, generated as a by-product of the nuclear weapons production process and amounting to approximately 15,600 drums of DU oxides, has been stored at SRS for decades. A Department source we deem reliable and credible recently came to the Office of Inspector General expressing concern that imminent actions are planned that may not provide for the most cost effective disposition of these materials. During April 2009, the Department chose to use funds provided under the Recovery Act to accelerate final disposition of the SRS inventory of DU oxides. After coordination with State of Utah regulators, elected officials and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department initiated a campaign to ship the material to a facility operated by EnergySolutions in Clive, Utah. Although one shipment of a portion of the material has already been sent to the EnergySolutions facility, the majority of the product remains at SRS. As had been planned, both for the shipment already made and those planned in the near term, the EnergySolutions facility was to have been the final disposal location for the material. Recently, a member of Congress and various Utah State officials raised questions regarding the radioactive and other constituents present in the DU oxides to be disposed of at the Clive, Utah, facility. These concerns revolved around the characterization of the material and its acceptability under existing licensing criteria. As a consequence, the Governor of Utah met with Department officials to voice concerns regarding further shipments of the material and to seek return of the initial shipment of DU oxides to SRS. Utah's objections and the Department's agreement to accede to the State's demands effectively prohibit the transfer of the remaining material from South Carolina to Utah. In response, the Department evaluated its options and issued a draft decision paper on March 1, 2010, which outlined an alternative for temporary storage until the final disposition issue could be resolved. Under the terms of the proposed option, the remaining shipments from SRS are to be sent on an interim basis to a facility owned by Waste Control Specialists (WCS) in Andrews, Texas. Clearly, this choice carries with it a number of significant logistical burdens, including substantial additional costs for, among several items, repackaging at SRS, transportation to Texas, storage at the interim site, and, repackaging and transportation to the yet-to-be-determined final disposition point. The Department source expressed the concern that the proposal to store the material on an interim basis in Texas was inefficient and unnecessary, asserting: (1) that the materials could remain at SRS until a final disposition path is identified, and that this could be done safely, securely and cost effectively; and, (2) that the nature of the material was not subject to existing compliance agreements with the State of South Carolina, suggesting the viability of keeping the material in storage at SRS until a permanent disposal site is definitively established. We noted that, while the Department's decision paper referred to 'numerous project and programmatic factors that make it impractical to retain the remaining inventory at Savannah River,' it did not outline the specific issues involved nor did it provide any substantive economic or environmental analysis supporting the need for the planned interim storage action. The only apparent driver in this case was a Recovery Act-related goal esta

  8. Nuclear Reactor Safety Design Criteria

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1993-01-19

    The order establishes nuclear safety criteria applicable to the design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements of nuclear reactor facilities and safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) within these facilities. Cancels paragraphs 8a and 8b of DOE 5480.6. Cancels DOE O 5480.6 in part. Supersedes DOE 5480.1, dated 1-19-93. Certified 11-18-10.

  9. Hanford Generic Interim Safety Basis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lavender, J.C.

    1994-09-09

    The purpose of this document is to identify WHC programs and requirements that are an integral part of the authorization basis for nuclear facilities that are generic to all WHC-managed facilities. The purpose of these programs is to implement the DOE Orders, as WHC becomes contractually obligated to implement them. The Hanford Generic ISB focuses on the institutional controls and safety requirements identified in DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

  10. Development of a fresh MOX fuel transport package for disposition of weapons plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ludwig, S.B.; Pope, R.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Michelhaugh, R.D.; Chae, S.M.

    1998-11-01

    The US Department of Energy announced its Record of Decision on January 14, 1997, to embark on a dual-track approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium using immobilization in glass or ceramics and burning plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in reactors. In support of the MOX fuel alternative, Oak Ridge National Laboratory initiated development of conceptual designs for a new package for transporting fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel assemblies between the MOX fabrication facility and existing commercial light-water reactors in the US. This paper summarizes progress made in development of new MOX transport package conceptual designs. The development effort has included documentation of programmatic and technical requirements for the new package and development and analysis of conceptual designs that satisfy these requirements.

  11. FUEL CYCLE POTENTIAL WASTE FOR DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jones, R.; Carter, J.

    2010-10-13

    The United States (U.S.) currently utilizes a once-through fuel cycle where used nuclear fuel (UNF) is stored on-site in either wet pools or in dry storage systems with ultimate disposal in a deep mined geologic repository envisioned. Within the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), the Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program (FCR&D) develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development of advanced fuel cycles, including modified open and closed cycles. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Yet, the routine disposal of used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste remains problematic. Advanced fuel cycles will generate different quantities and forms of waste than the current LWR fleet. This study analyzes the quantities and characteristics of potential waste forms including differing waste matrices, as a function of a variety of potential fuel cycle alternatives including: (1) Commercial UNF generated by uranium fuel light water reactors (LWR). Four once through fuel cycles analyzed in this study differ by varying the assumed expansion/contraction of nuclear power in the U.S; (2) Four alternative LWR used fuel recycling processes analyzed differ in the reprocessing method (aqueous vs. electro-chemical), complexity (Pu only or full transuranic (TRU) recovery) and waste forms generated; (3) Used Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel derived from the recovered Pu utilizing a single reactor pass; and (4) Potential waste forms generated by the reprocessing of fuels derived from recovered TRU utilizing multiple reactor passes.

  12. FUEL CYCLE POTENTIAL WASTE FOR DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carter, J.

    2011-01-03

    The United States (U.S.) currently utilizes a once-through fuel cycle where used nuclear fuel (UNF) is stored on-site in either wet pools or in dry storage systems with ultimate disposal in a deep mined geologic repository envisioned. Within the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), the Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program (FCR&D) develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development of advanced fuel cycles, including modified open and closed cycles. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Yet, the routine disposal of used nuclear fuel and radioactive waste remains problematic. Advanced fuel cycles will generate different quantities and forms of waste than the current LWR fleet. This study analyzes the quantities and characteristics of potential waste forms including differing waste matrices, as a function of a variety of potential fuel cycle alternatives including: (1) Commercial UNF generated by uranium fuel light water reactors (LWR). Four once through fuel cycles analyzed in this study differ by varying the assumed expansion/contraction of nuclear power in the U.S. (2) Four alternative LWR used fuel recycling processes analyzed differ in the reprocessing method (aqueous vs. electro-chemical), complexity (Pu only or full transuranic (TRU) recovery) and waste forms generated. (3) Used Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel derived from the recovered Pu utilizing a single reactor pass. (4) Potential waste forms generated by the reprocessing of fuels derived from recovered TRU utilizing multiple reactor passes.

  13. METHODOLOGIES FOR REVIEW OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF PROPOSED NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL SITES AND FACILITIES. VOLUME 9 OF THE FINAL REPORT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL ELECTRIC GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nero, A.V.

    2010-01-01

    considering the Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety reviewof the Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety review has onlyc..1 HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND

  14. Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical Safety Requirements

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-11-03

    This Guide provides elaboration for the content of TSRs. Section 10 CFR 830.205 of the Nuclear Safety Management rule, requires Department of Energy (DOE) contractors responsible for category 1, 2, and 3 DOE nuclear facilities to develop Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). These TSRs identify the limitations to each DOE owned, contractor operated nuclear facility based on the documented safety analysis (DSA) and any additional safety requirements established for the facility. Does not cancel other directives.

  15. Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical Safety Requirements

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-11-03

    This Guide provides elaboration for the content of TSRs. Section 10 CFR 830.205 of the Nuclear Safety Management rule, requires Department of Energy (DOE) contractors responsible for category 1, 2, and 3 DOE nuclear facilities to develop Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). These TSRs identify the limitations to each DOE owned, contractor operated nuclear facility based on the documented safety analysis (DSA) and any additional safety requirements established for the facility. Cancels DOE G 423.1-1.

  16. Microsoft PowerPoint - Fire Safety workshop NQA-1 CGD 4 29 15...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Programs Workshop Fire Safety Track May 5th, 2015 Overview NQA 1 Commercial Grade Dedication Critical Characteristics Department of Energy Nuclear and Facility Safety Programs...

  17. CRAD, Safety Basis Upgrade Review (DOE-STD-3009-2014) - May 15...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    1) provides objectives, criteria, and approaches for establishing and maintaining the safety basis at nuclear facilities. CRAD, Safety Basis Upgrade Review (DOE-STD-3009-2014)...

  18. METHODOLOGIES FOR REVIEW OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF PROPOSED NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL SITES AND FACILITIES. VOLUME 9 OF THE FINAL REPORT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL ELECTRIC GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nero, A.V.

    2010-01-01

    with applicable safety design criteria. Two generic areasSAFETY DESIGN Stage 3 would determine compliance with applicable safety criteria,design and operating criteria and to show the adequacy of the site characteristics from a safety

  19. Transportable Vitrification System RCRA Closure Practical Waste Disposition Saves Time And Money

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brill, Angie; Boles, Roger; Byars, Woody

    2003-02-26

    The Transportable Vitrification System (TVS) was a large-scale vitrification system for the treatment of mixed wastes. The wastes contained both hazardous and radioactive materials in the form of sludge, soil, and ash. The TVS was developed to be moved to various United States Department of Energy (DOE) facilities to vitrify mixed waste as needed. The TVS consists of four primary modules: (1) Waste and Additive Materials Processing Module; (2) Melter Module; (3) Emissions Control Module; and (4) Control and Services Module. The TVS was demonstrated at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) during September and October of 1997. During this period, approximately 16,000 pounds of actual mixed waste was processed, producing over 17,000 pounds of glass. After the demonstration was complete it was determined that it was more expensive to use the TVS unit to treat and dispose of mixed waste than to direct bury this waste in Utah permitted facility. Thus, DOE had to perform a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) closure of the facility and find a reuse for as much of the equipment as possible. This paper will focus on the following items associated with this successful RCRA closure project: TVS site closure design and implementation; characterization activities focused on waste disposition; pollution prevention through reuse; waste minimization efforts to reduce mixed waste to be disposed; and lessons learned that would be integrated in future projects of this magnitude.

  20. Risk Assessment in Support of DOE Nuclear Safety, Risk Information Notice, June 2010

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    On August 12, 2009, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board(DNFSB) issued Recommendation 2009?1, Risk Assessment Methodologies at Defense Nuclear Facilities. Thisrecommendation focused on the...

  1. New Mexico State University Facilities and Services

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johnson, Eric E.

    New Mexico State University Facilities and Services ADM-001: Procedure Process Effective: June 30 and Services #12;New Mexico State University Facilities and Services ADM-002: Use of Facilities and Services & Procedures: 1. New Mexico State University Vehicle Use Procedures issued by Environmental Health and Safety

  2. SRS MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site(SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. SRS has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 2 or 3 facility with storage of bulk PuO{sub 2} and assembly, storage, and shipping of fuel bundles in an S and S Category 1 facility. The total Category 1 approach, which is the recommended option, would be done in the 221-H Canyon Building. A facility that was never in service will be removed from one area, and a hardened wall will be constructed in another area to accommodate execution of the LA fuel fabrication. The non-Category 1 approach would require removal of process equipment in the FB-Line metal production and packaging glove boxes, which requires work in a contamination area. The Immobilization Hot Demonstration Program equipment in the Savannah River Technology Center would need to be removed to accommodate pellet fabrication. This work would also be in a contaminated area.

  3. ISIS Facility: Facility Design Challenges

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McDonald, Kirk

    ISIS Facility: Facility Design Challenges Matt Fletcher Head, Design Division ISIS Department, FNAL #12;ISIS -- neutrons Diamond -- X-rays #12;#12;· Lifetime · Reliable Operation · Flexibility

  4. Assessment of technologies for hazardous waste site remediation: Non-treatment technologies and pilot scale facility implementation -- excavation -- storage technology -- safety analysis and review statement. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Johnson, H.R.; Overbey, W.K. Jr.; Koperna, G.J. Jr.

    1994-02-01

    The purpose of this study is to assess the state-of-the-art of excavation technology as related to environmental remediation applications. A further purpose is to determine which of the excavation technologies reviewed could be used by the US Corp of Engineers in remediating contaminated soil to be excavated in the near future for construction of a new Lock and Dam at Winfield, WV. The study is designed to identify excavation methodologies and equipment which can be used at any environmental remediation site but more specifically at the Winfield site on the Kanawha River in Putnam County, West Virginia. A technical approach was determined whereby a functional analysis was prepared to determine the functions to be conducted during the excavation phase of the remediation operations. A number of excavation technologies were identified from the literature. A set of screening criteria was developed that would examine the utility and ranking of the technologies with respect to the operations that needed to be conducted at the Winfield site. These criteria were performance, reliability, implementability, environmental safety, public health, and legal and regulatory compliance. The Loose Bulk excavation technology was ranked as the best technology applicable to the Winfield site. The literature was also examined to determine the success of various methods of controlling fugitive dust. Depending upon any changes in the results of chemical analyses, or prior remediation of the VOCs from the vadose zone, consideration should be given to testing a new ``Pneumatic Excavator`` which removes the VOCs liberated during the excavation process as they outgas from the soil. This equipment however would not be needed on locations with low levels of VOC emissions.

  5. Independent Oversight Review, Los Alamos National Laboratory Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility- January 2012

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Fire Suppression Vital Safety System

  6. Health & Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Health & Safety Health & Safety1354608000000Health & SafetySome of these resources are LANL-only and will require Remote Access.NoQuestions? 667-5809library@lanl.gov Health &...

  7. STAR Facility Tritium Accountancy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    R. J. Pawelko; J. P. Sharpe; B. J. Denny

    2007-09-01

    The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) facility has been established to provide a laboratory infrastructure for the fusion community to study tritium science associated with the development of safe fusion energy and other technologies. STAR is a radiological facility with an administrative total tritium inventory limit of 1.5g (14,429 Ci) [1]. Research studies with moderate tritium quantities and various radionuclides are performed in STAR. Successful operation of the STAR facility requires the ability to receive, inventory, store, dispense tritium to experiments, and to dispose of tritiated waste while accurately monitoring the tritium inventory in the facility. This paper describes tritium accountancy in the STAR facility. A primary accountancy instrument is the tritium Storage and Assay System (SAS): a system designed to receive, assay, store, and dispense tritium to experiments. Presented are the methods used to calibrate and operate the SAS. Accountancy processes utilizing the Tritium Cleanup System (TCS), and the Stack Tritium Monitoring System (STMS) are also discussed. Also presented are the equations used to quantify the amount of tritium being received into the facility, transferred to experiments, and removed from the facility. Finally, the STAR tritium accountability database is discussed.

  8. STAR facility tritium accountancy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pawelko, R. J.; Sharpe, J. P.; Denny, B. J.

    2008-07-15

    The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) facility has been established to provide a laboratory infrastructure for the fusion community to study tritium science associated with the development of safe fusion energy and other technologies. STAR is a radiological facility with an administrative total tritium inventory limit of 1.5 g (14,429 Ci) [1]. Research studies with moderate tritium quantities and various radionuclides are performed in STAR. Successful operation of the STAR facility requires the ability to receive, inventory, store, dispense tritium to experiments, and to dispose of tritiated waste while accurately monitoring the tritium inventory in the facility. This paper describes tritium accountancy in the STAR facility. A primary accountancy instrument is the tritium Storage and Assay System (SAS): a system designed to receive, assay, store, and dispense tritium to experiments. Presented are the methods used to calibrate and operate the SAS. Accountancy processes utilizing the Tritium Cleanup System (TCS), and the Stack Tritium Monitoring System (STMS) are also discussed. Also presented are the equations used to quantify the amount of tritium being received into the facility, transferred to experiments, and removed from the facility. Finally, the STAR tritium accountability database is discussed. (authors)

  9. A Methodology for the Analysis and Selection of Alternative for the Disposition of Surplus Plutonium

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NONE

    1999-08-31

    The Department of Energy (DOE) - Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) has announced a Record of Decision (ROD) selecting alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to further U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns that were addressed include economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses supporting the ROD are documented in three DOE reports [DOE-TSR 96, DOE-PEIS 96, and DOE-NN 97, respectively]. At the request of OFMD, a team of analysts from the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) provided an independent evaluation of the alternatives for plutonium that were considered during the evaluation effort. This report outlines the methodology used by the ANRCP team. This methodology, referred to as multiattribute utility theory (MAU), provides a structure for assembling results of detailed technical, economic, schedule, environment, and nonproliferation analyses for OFMD, DOE policy makers, other stakeholders, and the general public in a systematic way. The MAU methodology has been supported for use in similar situations by the National Research Council, an agency of the National Academy of Sciences.1 It is important to emphasize that the MAU process does not lead to a computerized model that actually determines the decision for a complex problem. MAU is a management tool that is one component, albeit a key component, of a decision process. We subscribe to the philosophy that the result of using models should be insights, not numbers. The MAU approach consists of four steps: (1) identification of alternatives, objectives, and performance measures, (2) estimation of the performance of the alternatives with respect to the objectives, (3) development of value functions and weights for the objectives, and (4) evaluation of the alternatives and sensitivity analysis. These steps are described below.

  10. Guidelines for Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Training Programs...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Guidelines for Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Training Programs Type: Invoked Technical Standards OPI: HS - Office of Health, Safety and Security Status: Current...

  11. Waste receiving and processing facility module 1 auditable safetyanalysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bottenus, R.J.

    1997-02-01

    The Waste Receiving and Processing Facility Module 1 Auditable Safety Analysis analyzes postulated accidents and determines controls to prevent the accidents or mitigate the consequences.

  12. Lessons Learned from Three Mile Island Packaging, Transportation and Disposition that Apply to Fukushima Daiichi Recovery

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Layne Pincock; Wendell Hintze; Dr. Koji Shirai

    2012-07-01

    Following the massive earthquake and resulting tsunami damage in March of 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, interest was amplified for what was done for recovery at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) in the United States following its meltdown in 1979. Many parallels could be drawn between to two accidents. This paper presents the results of research done into the TMI-2 recovery effort and its applicability to the Fukushima Daiichi cleanup. This research focused on three topics: packaging, transportation, and disposition. This research work was performed as a collaboration between Japan’s Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Hundreds of TMI-2 related documents were searched and pertinent information was gleaned from these documents. Other important information was also obtained by interviewing employees who were involved first hand in various aspects of the TMI-2 cleanup effort. This paper is organized into three main sections: (1) Transport from Three Mile Island to Central Facilities Area at INL, (2) Transport from INL Central Receiving Facility to INL Test Area North (TAN) and wet storage at TAN, and (3) Transport from TAN to INL Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) and Dry Storage at INTEC. Within each of these sections, lessons learned from performing recovery activities are presented and their applicability to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant cleanup are outlined.

  13. Process modeling of plutonium conversion and MOX fabrication for plutonium disposition

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schwartz, K.L. [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States). Dept. of Nuclear Engineering

    1998-10-01

    Two processes are currently under consideration for the disposition of 35 MT of surplus plutonium through its conversion into fuel for power production. These processes are the ARIES process, by which plutonium metal is converted into a powdered oxide form, and MOX fuel fabrication, where the oxide powder is combined with uranium oxide powder to form ceramic fuel. This study was undertaken to determine the optimal size for both facilities, whereby the 35 MT of plutonium metal will be converted into fuel and burned for power. The bounding conditions used were a plutonium concentration of 3--7%, a burnup of 20,000--40,000 MWd/MTHM, a core fraction of 0.1 to 0.4, and the number of reactors ranging from 2--6. Using these boundary conditions, the optimal cost was found with a plutonium concentration of 7%. This resulted in an optimal throughput ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 kg Pu/year. The data showed minimal costs, resulting from throughputs in this range, at 3,840, 2,779, and 3,497 kg Pu/year, which results in a facility lifetime of 9.1, 12.6, and 10.0 years, respectively.

  14. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Greager, E.M.

    1997-12-11

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan will ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated, at a minimum, every 3 years.

  15. Hanford safety analysis and risk assessment handbook (SARAH)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    GARVIN, L.J.

    2003-01-20

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities. SARAH describes currently acceptable methodology for development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of technical safety requirements (TSR) based on 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management,'' Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements,'' and provides data to ensure consistency in approach.

  16. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements [VOL 1 and 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-12-28

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

  17. Nuclear safety information sharing agreement between NRC and...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    for DOE and NRC to exchange information related to safety issues associated with non-reactor nuclear facilities. The NRC-DOE Inter-Agency nuclear safety information sharing...

  18. Revised 4/15/2002 _____________________________ Environment, Health, & Safety _________ __________________

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Eisen, Michael

    , and the areas for storage of various hazardous, radioactive and mixed wastes. Instructors: Howard Hansen RudyardRevised 4/15/2002 _____________________________ Environment, Health, & Safety at Building 85, the Hazardous Waste Handling Facility (HWHF), regarding the safety, alarm, fire detection

  19. Radiation Safety System

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Vylet, Vaclav; Liu, James C.; Walker, Lawrence S.; /Los Alamos

    2012-04-04

    The goal of this work is to provide an overview of a Radiation safety system (RSS) designed for protection from prompt radiation hazard at accelerator facilities. RSS design parameters, functional requirements and constraints are derived from hazard analysis and risk assessment undertaken in the design phase of the facility. The two main subsystems of a RSS are access control system (ACS) and radiation control system (RCS). In this text, a common approach to risk assessment, typical components of ACS and RCS, desirable features and general design principles applied to RSS are described.

  20. Update of the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Implementation Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jens Birkholzer; Robert MacKinnon; Kevin McMahon; Sylvia Saltzstein; Ken Sorenson; Peter Swift

    2014-09-01

    This Campaign Implementation Plan provides summary level detail describing how the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) supports achievement of the overarching mission and objectives of the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycle Technologies Program The implementation plan begins with the assumption of target dates that are set out in the January 2013 DOE Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste (http://energy.gov/downloads/strategy-management-and-disposal-used-nuclear-fuel-and-high-level-radioactive-waste). These target dates and goals are summarized in section III. This implementation plan will be maintained as a living document and will be updated as needed in response to progress in the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign and the Fuel Cycle Technologies Program.

  1. Plutonium disposition via immobilization in ceramic or glass

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, A.

    1997-03-05

    The management of surplus weapons plutonium is an important and urgent task with profound environmental, national, and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Policy Directive 13, and various analyses by renown scientific, technical, and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths for the long term disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The central goal of this effort is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in spent fuel from civilian reactors. One disposition option being considered for surplus plutonium is immobilization, in which the plutonium would be incorporated into a glass or ceramic material that would ultimately be entombed permanently in a geologic repository for high-level waste.

  2. MPC&A for plutonium disposition in the Russian federation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1995-08-08

    The issue of what to do with excess fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons has been discussed for a number of years. The options or alternatives commanding the most attention were identified by the American National Academy of Sciences. For plutonium these options are: (1) the fabrication and use of mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel followed by the disposal of the spent fuel, or (2) vitrification (immobilization) of plutonium combined with highly radioactive material followed by direct disposal. The Academy report also identified the alternative of disposal in a deep borehole as requiring further study before being eliminated or accepted. The report emphasized security of nuclear materials as a principal factor in considering management and disposition decisions. Security of materials is particularly important in the near term-now-long before ultimate disposition can be accomplished. The MOX option was the subject of a NATO workshop held at Obninsk, Russia in October 1994. Hence this paper does not deal with the MOX alternative in detail. It deals with the following: materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) for immobilization and disposal; the immobilization vs MOX alternatives; the security of disposed plutonium; the need to demonstrate MTC&A for plutonium disposition; and, finally, a recommended investment to quickly and inexpensively improve the protection of fissile materials in Russia. It is the author`s view that near-term management is of overriding importance. That is, with respect to the ultimate disposition of excess nuclear materials, how we get there is more important than where we are going.

  3. Accelerating the disposition of transuranic waste from LANL - 9495

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shepard, Mark D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stiger, Susan G [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Blankenhorn, James A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Rael, George J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Moody, David C [U.S DOE

    2009-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was established during World War II with a single mission -- to design and build an atomic bomb. In the 65 years since, nuclear weapons physics, design and engineering have been the Laboratory's primary and sustaining mission. Experimental and process operations -- and associated cleanout and upgrade activities -- have generated a significant inventory of transuranic (TRU) waste that is stored at LANL's Technical Area 54, Material Disposal Area G (MDA G). When the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) opened its doors in 1999, LANL's TRU inventory totaled about 10,200 m{sup 3}, with a plutonium 239-equivalent curie (PE Ci) content of approximately 250,000 curies. By December 2008, a total of about 2,300 m3 (61,000 PE Ci) had been shipped to WIPP from LANL. This has resulted in a net reduction of about 1,000 m{sup 3} of TRU inventory over that time frame. This paper presents progress in dispositioning legacy and newly-generated transuranic waste (TRU) from ongoing missions at the LANL. The plans for, and lessons learned, in dispositioning several hundred high-activity TRU waste drums are reviewed. This waste population was one of the highest risks at LANL. Technical challenges in disposition of the high-activity drums are presented. These provide a preview of challenges to be addressed in dispositioning the remaining 6,800 m{sup 3} of TRU stored above ground and 2,400 m{sup 3} of TRU waste that is 'retrievably' stored below-grade. LANL is using subcontractors for much of this work and has formed a strong partnership with WIPP and its contractor to address this cleanup challenge.

  4. Portsmouth Waste Disposition Record of Decision | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested PartiesBuilding energyDepartment of Energy PortsmouthWaste Disposition

  5. REQUEST FOR RECORDS DISPOSITION AUTHORITY | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested PartiesBuildingBudget ||Department ofRequest for Records Disposition Authority

  6. REQUEST FOR RECORDS DISPOSITION AUTHORITY | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested PartiesBuildingBudget ||Department ofRequest for Records Disposition

  7. Research To Underpin The UK Plutonium Disposition Strategy

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hanson, B.C.; Scales, C.R.; Worrall, A.; Thomas, M. [Nexia Solutions, Risley, Warrington, Cheshire, WA3 6AS (United Kingdom); Davies, P.; Gilchrist, P. [Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Pelham House, Calderbridge, Cumbria, CA20 1DB (United Kingdom)

    2006-07-01

    In April 2005, the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) took ownership of most of the civil nuclear liabilities and assets in the UK. These include separated civil plutonium stocks, which are expected to rise to over 100 tonnes. Future UK national policy for disposition remains to be finalised. The feasibility of management options needs to be determined in order to allow the NDA to advise government on the ultimate disposition of this material. Nexia Solutions has a contract with NDA to develop and carry out a research project which will result in a recommendation on the technical feasibility of a number of disposition options, focussing on re-use and immobilisation of plutonium as a waste for disposal. Initial work is already underway evaluating re-use with MOX and IMF fuels and immobilisation using ceramics, glasses and MOX for disposal. The programme is expected to result, circa 2010, in a recommendation of a preferred route for immobilisation and a preferred route for re-use for the UK's civil Pu stocks. (authors)

  8. Nuclear Safety Information Agreement Between the U.S. Nuclear...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    for the two agencies to exchange information related to safety issues associated with non-reactor nuclear facilities that would be beneficial to both agencies in performance of...

  9. Ultrasonic cleaner cuts costs, enhances safety | Y-12 National...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Ultrasonic cleaner cuts ... Ultrasonic cleaner cuts costs, enhances safety Posted: August 27, 2013 - 1:42pm System engineers, Facility Design engineers, Production personnel and...

  10. Facilities Operations, Planning, and Engineering Services

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    McLaughlin, Richard M.

    Facilities Operations, Planning, and Design Engineering Services Energy Management & Water Reception Campus Maintenance Housing Support Life Safety Services HVAC Energy Management Controls Campus Grounds Maintenance Carolina North Forest Management Stormwater Maintenance In-house Landscape

  11. Associate Vice President for Facilities Glen Haubold

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Johnson, Eric E.

    719717 Environmental Health & Safety Organization Chart May 2015 #12;Fire Chief Johnny Carrillo 198910 Officer Greg Walke Manager, Environmental Policy and Sustainability joni newcomer Executive Director Executive Director of Administration Florarine Jones Facilities and Services Organization Chart May 2015

  12. A model for computer frustration: the role of instrumental and dispositional factors

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Shneiderman, Ben

    A model for computer frustration: the role of instrumental and dispositional factors on incident 20742, USA Available online 16 April 2004 Abstract Frustration is almost universally accepted

  13. Hanford surplus facilities programs facilities listings and descriptions. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kiser, S.K.; Witt, T.L.

    1994-01-01

    On the Hanford Site, many surplus facilities exist (including buildings, stacks, tanks, cribs, burial grounds, and septic systems) that are scheduled to be decommissioned. Many of these facilities contain large inventories of radionuclides, which present potential radiological hazards on and off the Hanford Site. Some structures with limited structural deterioration present potential radiological and industrial safety hazards to personnel. Because of the condition of these facilities, a systematic surveillance and maintenance program is performed to identify and correct potential hazards to personnel and the environment until eventual decommissioning operations are completed.

  14. CRAD, Facility Safety - Documented Safety Analysis | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i n c i p a l DeInsulation at04-86)ContractorsCNGFact SL RiskofRev. 0)section of

  15. CRAD, New Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i n c i p a l DeInsulation at04-86)ContractorsCNGFact SLCriticality

  16. Supporting Fernald Site Closure with Integrated Health and Safety Plans as Documented Safety Analyses

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kohler, S.; Brown, T.; Fisk, P.; Krach, F.; Klein, B.

    2004-03-01

    At the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) near Cincinnati, Ohio, environmental restoration activities are supported by Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) that combine the required project-specific Health and Safety Plans, Safety Basis Requirements (SBRs), and Process Requirements (PRs) into single Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs). These integrated DSAs employ Integrated Safety Management methodology in support of simplified restoration and remediation activities that, so far, have resulted in the decontamination and demolition (D&D) of over 200 structures, including eight major nuclear production plants. There is one of twelve nuclear facilities still remaining (Silos containing uranium ore residues) with its own safety basis documentation. This paper presents the status of the FCP's safety basis documentation program, illustrating that all of the former nuclear facilities and activities have now replaced. Basis of Interim Operations (BIOs) with I-HASPs as their safety basis during the closure process.

  17. Southern Great Plains Safety Orientation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schatz, John

    2014-05-01

    Welcome to the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) Climate Research Facility (ARM) Southern Great Plains (SGP) site. This U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) site is managed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). It is very important that all visitors comply with all DOE and ANL safety requirements, as well as those of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Fire Protection Association, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and with other requirements as applicable.

  18. Reactor operation safety information document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1990-01-01

    The report contains a reactor facility description which includes K, P, and L reactor sites, structures, operating systems, engineered safety systems, support systems, and process and effluent monitoring systems; an accident analysis section which includes cooling system anomalies, radioactive materials releases, and anticipated transients without scram; a summary of onsite doses from design basis accidents; severe accident analysis (reactor core disruption); a description of operating contractor organization and emergency planning; and a summary of reactor safety evolution. (MB)

  19. Sandia Energy - Transportation Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Transportation Safety Home Stationary Power Nuclear Fuel Cycle Nuclear Energy Safety Technologies Risk and Safety Assessment Transportation Safety Transportation SafetyTara...

  20. Biological Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The DOE's Biological Safety Program provides a forum for the exchange of best practices, lessons learned, and guidance in the area of biological safety. This content is supported by the Biosurety Executive Team. The Biosurety Executive Team is a DOE-chartered group. The DOE Office of Worker Safety and Health Policy provides administrative support for this group. The group identifies biological safety-related issues of concern to the DOE and pursues solutions to issues identified.

  1. Final Demolition and Disposition of 209-E Critical Mass Laboratory - 12267

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Woolery, Wade [US Department of Energy, Richland WA (United States); Dodd, Edwin III [CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company, Richland WA (United States)

    2012-07-01

    The 209-E Critical Mass Laboratory was constructed in 1960 to provide a heavy shielded reactor room where quantities of plutonium or uranium in solution could be brought to near-critical configurations under carefully controlled and monitored conditions. In the late 1980's, the responsible contractor, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), was directed by the Department of Energy (DOE) to prepare the facility for unoccupied status. The facility was demolished under a Removal Action Work Plan pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). The funding for this project was provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The primary rooms of concern with regards to contamination in 209-E facility, which is over 9,000 square feet, are the criticality assembly room (CAR), the mix room, and the change room. The CAR contained two reactor hoods (HO-140 and HO-170), which each had a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter system. The CAR contained 13 tanks ranging from 38 L (10 gal) to 401 L (106 gal). Tanks TK-109 and TK-110 are below grade, and were removed as part of this demolition and disposition remedy. Nonradiological and radiological hazardous substances were removed, decontaminated, or fixed in place, prior to demolition. Except for the removal of below grade tanks TK-109 and TK-110, the facility was demolished to slab-on-grade. PNNL performed stabilization and deactivation activities that included removal of bulk fissile material and chemicals, flushing tanks, stabilizing contamination within gloveboxes and hoods, and packaging and removing waste. The removal of the contaminated plutonium equipment and materials from the 209E facility presented a number of challenges similar in nature to those associated with the inventory reduction and cleanup activities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Although there were no bulk fissile materials or chemicals within the facility, there were residual radiological materials (isotopes of plutonium and americium) in the tanks and hoods. The complexity of the remedy was present because of the various configurations of the tanks and hoods, combined with the residual contaminants. Because of the weight and dimensional configuration, size reduction of the slab tanks, as well as removal and disposal of the different material used for moderation and absorption, were two examples of challenges that were resolved to complete the remedy. One of the key methods developed and implemented at the facility was the design and construction of a shroud to allow the cutting of the Pu contaminated tanks. The shroud design, development and implementation at the 209E Project was an example of enhanced work planning and task hazards analysis with worker involvement. This paper will present the lessons learned from the 209E facility inventory reduction activities including the shroud and other methodologies used. The initial Lessons Learned discussion for this project was scheduled for late January 2012. This facility is the first open-air demolition of a highly contaminated plutonium-contaminated facility accomplished by CH2M Hill under the Plateau Remediation Contract. The demolition was completed without spread of contamination to the workers and the surrounding area. As with any project of this complexity, there are significant accomplishments, as well as experience that can be applied to future demolition of plutonium-contaminated facilities on the Hanford Site. These experiences will be documented at a later date. (authors)

  2. Radiological safety training for uranium facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-02-01

    This handbook contains recommended training materials consistent with DOE standardized core radiological training material. These materials consist of a program management guide, instructor`s guide, student guide, and overhead transparencies.

  3. Facility Safety (For Informational Purposes Only)

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-12-04

    This draft has been scheduled for final review before the Directives Review Board on 12/18/14. All major comments and concerns should be provided to your DRB representative, following your organization process. If you do not know who your representative is, please see the list of DRB members. If your office is represented by Ingrid Kolb, Director, Office of Management, please submit your major concerns and comments to the DRB Liaison, Camille Beben (Camille.Beben@hq.doe.gov; 202-586-1014). All major comments and concerns should be submitted by COB 12/16/2014.

  4. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious RankADVANCED MANUFACTURINGEnergy BillsNo. 195 - Oct. 7, 2011REMSViewEnergyRadioactiveDOE.Fthe

  5. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Delicious RankADVANCED MANUFACTURINGEnergy BillsNo. 195 - Oct. 7, 2011REMSViewEnergyRadioactiveDOE.FtheNOT

  6. Radiological Safety Training for Accelerator Facilities

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested PartiesBuildingBudget ||Department ofRequest7of 9 Radiological Control8 of

  7. Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterested PartiesBuildingBudget ||Department ofRequest7of 9 Radiological Control8 ofDOE

  8. Safety evaluation for packaging transportation of equipment for tank 241-C-106 waste sluicing system

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Calmus, D.B.

    1994-08-25

    A Waste Sluicing System (WSS) is scheduled for installation in nd waste storage tank 241-C-106 (106-C). The WSS will transfer high rating sludge from single shell tank 106-C to double shell waste tank 241-AY-102 (102-AY). Prior to installation of the WSS, a heel pump and a transfer pump will be removed from tank 106-C and an agitator pump will be removed from tank 102-AY. Special flexible receivers will be used to contain the pumps during removal from the tanks. After equipment removal, the flexible receivers will be placed in separate containers (packagings). The packaging and contents (packages) will be transferred from the Tank Farms to the Central Waste Complex (CWC) for interim storage and then to T Plant for evaluation and processing for final disposition. Two sizes of packagings will be provided for transferring the equipment from the Tank Farms to the interim storage facility. The packagings will be designated as the WSSP-1 and WSSP-2 packagings throughout the remainder of this Safety Evaluation for Packaging (SEP). The WSSP-1 packagings will transport the heel and transfer pumps from 106-C and the WSSP-2 packaging will transport the agitator pump from 102-AY. The WSSP-1 and WSSP-2 packagings are similar except for the length.

  9. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ``Unreviewed Safety Questions,`` DOE 5480.22, ``Technical Safety Requirements,`` and DOE 5480.23, ``Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.`` WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ``Safety Basis`` for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules.

  10. On the quantification of safety margins

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Pagani, Lorenzo P

    2004-01-01

    The nuclear industry has relied on the concept of Defense in Depth (DID) and traditional safety margins to deal with the uncertainties associated with the design and operation of nuclear facilities. These concepts were ...

  11. COMPARATIVE MEDICINE LABORATORY ANIMAL FACILITIES

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Krovi, Venkat

    Procedure Suite, 310 BEB. 1. Except for routine diagnostic radiographs ordered by veterinarians all other with CMLAF Facility Manager and CMLAF Main office 116 BEB 3.5 Fluoroscopic procedures are performed are stored in 204 BEB. 3. Notify Radiation Safety when there is an addition in personnel by sending

  12. History of the US weapons-usable plutonium disposition program leading to DOE`s record of decision

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Spellman, D.J.; Thomas, J.F.; Bugos, R.G.

    1997-04-01

    This report highlights important events and studies concerning surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition in the United States. Included are major events that led to the creation of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition in 1994 and to that DOE office issuing the January 1997 Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Useable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Emphasis has been given to reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives.

  13. -Actin: disposition, quantities, and estimated effects on lung recoil and compliance

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    -Actin: disposition, quantities, and estimated effects on lung recoil and compliance E. H. OLDMIXON, Jr. -Actin: disposition, quantities, and estimated effects on lung recoil and compliance. J Appl by measuring dispo- sition and quantities of -smooth muscle actin in rat and guinea pig lungs and modeling its

  14. Policy on Retention and Disposition of University Records Policy on Retention and

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Sridhar, Srinivas

    Policy on Retention and Disposition of University Records 06/01/2012 Policy on Retention and Disposition of University Records I. Purpose and Scope This policy and its implementing procedures will assist, as well as to optimize the use of storage space and minimize the cost of record retention. This policy

  15. EIS-0240: Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Department proposes to eliminate the proliferation threat of surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) by blending it down to low enriched uranium (LEU), which is not weapons-usable. The EIS assesses the disposition of a nominal 200 metric tons of surplus HEU. The Preferred Alternative is, where practical, to blend the material for use as LEU and use overtime, in commercial nuclear reactor field to recover its economic value. Material that cannot be economically recovered would be blended to LEU for disposal as low-level radioactive waste.

  16. Microsoft PowerPoint - REVWaste_Disposition_Update.061411.pptx

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustments (BillionProvedTravelInformation ResourcesĀ»Jim ManionBrochureFACA and EMMaterials and Disposition

  17. CXD 4605, Disposition Excess Equipment from Alpha 1 (4605)

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 OutreachProductswsicloudwsiclouddenDVA N C E D B LReports from the CloudGEGR-N Goods POCTBT |CUD-55Disposition

  18. Status of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zygmunt, S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Peko, D. [Dept. of Energy, Washington, DC (United States). Office of Fissile Materials Disposition

    1998-12-31

    A planned new facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) will be used to disassemble the nation`s inventory of surplus nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium recovered from those pits into a form suitable for storage, international inspection, and final disposition. Sized to handle 35 metric tons of plutonium from pits and other sources over its 10-year operating life, the PDCF will apply the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) technology. ARIES process technology has been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and an integrated system is being demonstrated LANL. Four sites were considered for locating the PDCF: Pantex Plant, Savannah River Site (SRS), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), and Hanford Site. Each site offers a different opportunity for constructing the PDCF, ranging from a new building at Pantex Plant to using an existing building at Hanford Site or INEEL. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement was prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) to aid in site selection. This paper describes the initial scoping activities, preconceptual and conceptual design work, and the status of the PDCF.

  19. Facility Representatives

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-04-06

    REPLACED BY DOE-STD-1063 | SUPERSEDING DOE-STD-1063-2000 (MARCH 2000) The purpose of the DOE Facility Representative Program is to ensure that competent DOE staff personnel are assigned to oversee the day-to-day contractor operations at DOE’s hazardous nuclear and non-nuclear facilities.

  20. Site Selection for Concrete Batch Plant to Support Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wike, L.D.

    2001-06-15

    WSRC conducted a site selection study to identify, assess, and rank candidate sites for an onsite concrete batch plant at the Savannah River Site in the vicinity of F-Area.

  1. EIS-0287: Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    (September 2002) This EIS analyzes the potential environmental consequences of alternatives for managing high-level waste (HLW) calcine, mixed transuranic wastesodium bearing...

  2. Facilities Infrastructure & Services Unneeded Materials and Chemicals Disposition Project (4579)

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration would like submitKansasCommunitiesofExtrans -ORGANIZATION

  3. Safety of Nuclear Explosive Operations

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-08-07

    This directive establishes responsibilities and requirements to ensure the safety of routine and planned nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and facilities. Cancels DOE O 452.2A and DOE G 452.2A-1A. Canceled by DOE O 452.2C.

  4. Environment, Safety and Health Reporting

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-06-27

    The order addresses DOE/NNSA receiving timely, accurate information about events that have affected or could adversely affect the health, safety and security of the public or workers, the environment, the operations of DOE facilities, or the credibility of the Department. Admin Chg 1, dated 11-28-12, Supersedes DOE O 231.1B.

  5. MANAGING HANFORD'S LEGACY NO-PATH-FORWARD WASTES TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    WEST LD

    2011-01-13

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Richland Operations Office (RL) has adopted the 2015 Vision for Cleanup of the Hanford Site. This vision will protect the Columbia River, reduce the Site footprint, and reduce Site mortgage costs. The CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company's (CHPRC) Waste and Fuels Management Project (W&FMP) and their partners support this mission by providing centralized waste management services for the Hanford Site waste generating organizations. At the time of the CHPRC contract award (August 2008) slightly more than 9,000 m{sup 3} of waste was defined as 'no-path-forward waste.' The majority of these wastes are suspect transuranic mixed (TRUM) wastes which are currently stored in the low-level Burial Grounds (LLBG), or stored above ground in the Central Waste Complex (CWC). A portion of the waste will be generated during ongoing and future site cleanup activities. The DOE-RL and CHPRC have collaborated to identify and deliver safe, cost-effective disposition paths for 90% ({approx}8,000 m{sup 3}) of these problematic wastes. These paths include accelerated disposition through expanded use of offsite treatment capabilities. Disposal paths were selected that minimize the need to develop new technologies, minimize the need for new, on-site capabilities, and accelerate shipments of transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico.

  6. Evaluation of Possible Surrogates for Validation of the Oxidation Furnace for the Plutonium Disposition Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Duncan, A.

    2007-12-31

    The Plutonium Disposition project (PuD) is considering an alternative furnace design for direct metal oxidation (DMO) of plutonium metal to use as a feed for potential disposition routes. The proposed design will use a retort to oxidize the feed at temperatures up to 500 C. The atmosphere will be controlled using a metered mixture of oxygen, helium and argon to control the oxidation at approximately 400 torr. Since plutonium melts at 664 C, and may potentially react with retort material to form a lower melting point eutectic, the oxidation process will be controlled by metering the flow of oxygen to ensure that the bulk temperature of the material does not exceed this temperature. A batch processing time of <24 hours is desirable to meet anticipated furnace throughput requirements. The design project includes demonstration of concept in a small-scale demonstration test (i.e., small scale) and validation of design in a full-scale test. These tests are recommended to be performed using Pu surrogates due to challenges in consideration of the nature of plutonium and operational constraints required when handling large quantities of accountable material. The potential for spreading contamination and exposing workers to harmful levels of cumulative radioactive dose are motivation to utilize non-radioactive surrogates. Once the design is demonstrated and optimized, implementation would take place in a facility designed to accommodate these constraints. Until then, the use of surrogates would be a safer, less expensive option for the validation phase of the project. This report examines the potential for use of surrogates in the demonstration and validation of the DMO furnace for PuD. This report provides a compilation of the technical information and process requirements for the conversion of plutonium metal to oxide by burning in dry environments. Several potential surrogates were evaluated by various criteria in order to select a suitable candidate for large scale demonstration. First, the structure of the plutonium metal/oxide interface was compared to potential surrogates. Second the data for plutonium oxidation kinetics were reviewed and rates for oxidation were compared with surrogates. The criteria used as a basis for recommendation was selected in order to provide a reasonable oxidation rate during the validation phase. Several reference documents were reviewed and used to compile the information in this report. Since oxidation of large monolithic pieces of plutonium in 75% oxygen is the preferable oxidizing atmosphere for the intended process, this report does not focus on the oxidation of powders, but focuses instead on larger samples in flowing gas.

  7. METHODOLOGIES FOR REVIEW OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF PROPOSED NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL SITES AND FACILITIES. VOLUME 9 OF THE FINAL REPORT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL ELECTRIC GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nero, A.V.

    2010-01-01

    geothermal facilities are well-drilling and steam venting.Field Emissions Drilling new wells and venting are all

  8. Safety Engineer

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A successful candidate in this position will ensure DOE Federal personnel and contractors develop effective safety programs and continuously evaluates those activities to ensure compliance with DOE...

  9. Siting analyses for existing facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ford, K.; Mannan, M. [RMT/Jones and Neuse, Inc., Austin, TX (United States)

    1996-08-01

    The term {open_quotes}facility siting{close_quotes} refers to the spacial relationships between process units, process equipment within units, and the location of buildings relative to process equipment. Facility siting is an important consideration for the safe operation of manufacturing facilities. Paragraph (d) of the Process Safety Management (PSM) rule (29 CFR 1910.119) requires employers to document the codes and standards used for designing process equipment. This documentation includes facility siting. The regulation also requires employers to document that the design of the facility complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. In addition, paragraph (e) of the PSM regulation requires that facility siting be evaluated during Process Hazard Analyses. Facility siting issues may also need to be considered in emergency planning and response which are required under paragraph (n) of the PSM rule. This paper will demonstrate, by utilizing an example, one technique for evaluating whether buildings could be affected by a catastrophic incident and for determining if these buildings should be included in the PSM programs developed at the facility such as Process Hazard Analysis and Mechanical Integrity. In addition, this example will illustrate a methodology for determining if the buildings are designed and located in accordance with good engineering practice and industry standards.

  10. Transportation Safety Excellence in Operations Through Improved Transportation Safety Document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; MAL

    2007-05-01

    A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC. This accomplishment supported excellence in operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport costs; and making facility operations more efficient. The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers. Previously, the TSD did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums. Previous practice was to package the waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations. This practice allowed operations to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations friendly. An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were used effectively to directly support excellence in operations. Several factors contributed to the success of MFC’s effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities. 1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to better integrate nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements. MFC’s efforts illustrate that utilizing the requirements of other disciplines, beyond nuclear safety, can provide an efficient process. Analyzing current processes to find better ways of meeting the requirements of multiple disciplines within a safety basis can lead to a more cost-effective, streamlined process. 2) Incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the MFC TSD was efficient because safety analysts utilized a transportation plan that provided analysis that could also be used for the change to the TSD addendum. In addition, because the plan they used had already been approved and was in use by the Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) at the INL, justification for the change to the TSD was more compelling. MFC safety analysts proved that streamlining a process can be made more feasible by drawing from analysis that has already been completed.

  11. Guidelines for Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Training Programs

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-11-22

    The Guidelines for Evaluation of Nuclear Facility Training Programs establish objectives and criteria for evaluating nuclear facility training programs. The guidance in this standard provides a framework for the systematic evaluation of training programs at nuclear facilities and is based, in part, on established criteria for Technical Safety Appraisals, Tiger Team Assessments, commercial nuclear industry evaluations, and the DOE Training Accreditation Program.

  12. Facility Status

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Chinese Academy of Sciences, Hefei, Anhui, P.R. China The Engineering Design of ARC: A Compact, High Field, Fusion Nuclear Science Facility and Demonstration Power Plant B. N....

  13. Facility Name Facility Name Facility FacilityType Owner Developer...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    FacilityStatus Coordinates D Metals D Metals D Metals Definition Small Scale Wind Valley City OH MW Northern Power Systems In Service AB Tehachapi Wind Farm AB Tehachapi...

  14. CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS AND THE SAFETY BASIS AT PFP

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Kessler, S

    2009-04-21

    With the implementation of DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, and DOE-STD-3007-2007, 'Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities', a new requirement was imposed that all criticality safety controls be evaluated for inclusion in the facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and that the evaluation process be documented in the site Criticality Safety Program Description Document (CSPDD). At the Hanford site in Washington State the CSPDD, HNF-31695, 'General Description of the FH Criticality Safety Program', requires each facility develop a linking document called a Criticality Control Review (CCR) to document performance of these evaluations. Chapter 5, Appendix 5B of HNF-7098, Criticality Safety Program, provided an example of a format for a CCR that could be used in lieu of each facility developing its own CCR. Since the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is presently undergoing Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D), new procedures are being developed for cleanout of equipment and systems that have not been operated in years. Existing Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) are revised, or new ones written, to develop the controls required to support D&D activities. Other Hanford facilities, including PFP, had difficulty using the basic CCR out of HNF-7098 when first implemented. Interpretation of the new guidelines indicated that many of the controls needed to be elevated to TSR level controls. Criterion 2 of the standard, requiring that the consequence of a criticality be examined for establishing the classification of a control, was not addressed. Upon in-depth review by PFP Criticality Safety staff, it was not clear that the programmatic interpretation of criterion 8C could be applied at PFP. Therefore, the PFP Criticality Safety staff decided to write their own CCR. The PFP CCR provides additional guidance for the evaluation team to use by clarifying the evaluation criteria in DOE-STD-3007-2007. In reviewing documents used in classifying controls for Nuclear Safety, it was noted that DOE-HDBK-1188, 'Glossary of Environment, Health, and Safety Terms', defines an Administrative Control (AC) in terms that are different than typically used in Criticality Safety. As part of this CCR, a new term, Criticality Administrative Control (CAC) was defined to clarify the difference between an AC used for criticality safety and an AC used for nuclear safety. In Nuclear Safety terms, an AC is a provision relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, assessment, and reporting necessary to ensure safe operation of a facility. A CAC was defined as an administrative control derived in a criticality safety analysis that is implemented to ensure double contingency. According to criterion 2 of Section IV, 'Linkage to the Documented Safety Analysis', of DOESTD-3007-2007, the consequence of a criticality should be examined for the purposes of classifying the significance of a control or component. HNF-PRO-700, 'Safety Basis Development', provides control selection criteria based on consequence and risk that may be used in the development of a Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) to establish the classification of a component as a design feature, as safety class or safety significant, i.e., an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), or as equipment important to safety; or merely provides defense-in-depth. Similar logic is applied to the CACs. Criterion 8C of DOE-STD-3007-2007, as written, added to the confusion of using the basic CCR from HNF-7098. The PFP CCR attempts to clarify this criterion by revising it to say 'Programmatic commitments or general references to control philosophy (e.g., mass control or spacing control or concentration control as an overall control strategy for the process without specific quantification of individual limits) is included in the PFP DSA'. Table 1 shows the PFP methodology for evaluating CACs. This evaluation process has been in use since February of 2008 and has proven to be simple and effective. Each control identified i

  15. METHODOLOGIES FOR REVIEW OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF PROPOSED NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL SITES AND FACILITIES. VOLUME 9 OF THE FINAL REPORT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR, GEOTHERMAL, AND FOSSIL-FUEL ELECTRIC GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Nero, A.V.

    2010-01-01

    Screws, Bolts, Nuts 2.7 - Testing 2.8 - Safety 2.9 - Others BOILERS AND PRESSURE VESSELS GENERATORS, MOTORS, TURBINES,

  16. Radiation Damage Effects in Candidate Titanates for Pu Disposition: Zirconolite

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Strachan, Denis M.; Scheele, Randall D.; Buck, Edgar C.; Kozelisky, Anne E.; Sell, Rachel L.; Elovich, Robert J.; Buchmiller, William C.

    2008-01-15

    Specimens of titanate ceramics containing approximately 10 mass% 238Pu were tested to determine the long-term effects of radiation-induced damage from the ? decay of 239Pu that would have been disposed of in the nuclear-waste repository at Yucca Mountain. These tests provided information on the changes in bulk properties such as dimensions, densities, and chemical durability. Although these materials become amorphous at low doses, the specimens remained physically strong. Even after the radiation-induced swelling saturated, the specimens remained physically intact with no evidence for microcracking. Thus, in combination with results reported previously on similar materials, the material remains a physically viable material for the disposition of surplus weapons-grade Pu.

  17. Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition: Opportunities, Options, and Issues

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Greene, S.R.

    1999-07-17

    The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in the United States (U.S.) and the former Soviet Union. These materials pose a danger to national and international security. During the past few years, the U.S. and Russia have engaged in an ongoing dialog concerning the safe storage and disposition of surplus fissile material stockpiles. In January 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced the U. S. would pursue a dual track approach to rendering approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons. One track involves immobilizing the plutonium by combining it with high-level radioactive waste in glass or ceramic ''logs''. The other method, referred to as reactor-based disposition, converts plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear reactors. The U.S. and Russia are moving ahead rapidly to develop and demonstrate the technology required to implement the MOX option in their respective countries. U.S. MOX fuel research and development activities were started in the 1950s, with irradiation of MOX fuel rods in commercial light water reactors (LWR) from the 1960s--1980s. In all, a few thousand MOX fuel rods were successfully irradiated. Though much of this work was performed with weapons-grade or ''near'' weapons-grade plutonium--and favorable fuel performance was observed--the applicability of this data for licensing and use of weapons-grade MOX fuel manufactured with modern fuel fabrication processes is somewhat limited. The U.S. and Russia are currently engaged in an intensive research, development, and demonstration program to support implementation of the MOX option in our two countries. This paper focuses on work performed in the U.S. and provides a brief summary of joint U.S./Russian work currently underway.

  18. Radiation Damage Effects in Candidate Titanates for Pu Disposition: Zirconolite

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Strachan, Denis M.; Scheele, Randall D.; Buck, Edgar C.; Kozelisky, Anne E.; Sell, Rachel L.; Elovich, Robert J.; Buchmiller, William C.

    2008-01-15

    This is the second of two papers on the results of radiation-induced damage accumulation in titanate ceramics that potentially could be used for weapons grade plutonium disposition. In the first paper we discussed the results from pyrochlore (betafite) based ceramics. In this paper, we discuss the effects of radiation-induced damage on the density and crystal structure of a nominally phase-pure zirconolite and two other zirconolite-bearing ceramics from the alpha decay of 238Pu. Macro (bulk) and micro (X-ray diffraction) swelling were found to be temperature independent, whereas the density determined with He gas pycnometry was temperature dependent. It took approximately 740 days (2.6?1018 ?/g) for the specimens to become X-ray amorphous—longer for the swelling to saturate. Unlike what we observed for the pyrochlore-based ceramics, we did not observe any phase changes associated with storage temperature and damage ingrowth. The forward dissolution rate at a pH value of 2 for material containing essentially all zirconolite is 1.7(4)?10-3 g/(m2?d). Very little pH dependence was observed for zirconolite specimens and, like we observed for the pyrochlore-bearing ceramics in this study, there was no dependence on the amount of radiation-induced damage. As with the pyrochlore, these materials did not become substantially friable with increasing radiation-induced damage. Even after the radiation-induced swelling saturated, the specimens remained physically intact with no evidence for microcracking. Thus, the material remains physically a viable material for the disposition of surplus weapons-grade Pu.

  19. Complications Associated with Long-Term Disposition of Newly-Generated Transuranic Waste: A National Laboratory Perspective

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    B.J. Orchard; L.A. Harvego; T.L. Carlson; R.P. Grant

    2009-03-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a multipurpose national laboratory delivering specialized science and engineering solutions for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Sponsorship of INL was formally transferred to the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (NE) by Secretary Spencer Abraham in July 2002. The move to NE, and designation as the DOE lead nuclear energy laboratory for reactor technology, supports the nation’s expanding nuclear energy initiatives, placing INL at the center of work to develop advanced Generation IV nuclear energy systems; nuclear energy/hydrogen coproduction technology; advanced nuclear energy fuel cycle technologies; and providing national security answers to national infrastructure needs. As a result of the Laboratory’s NE mission, INL generates both contact-handled and remote-handled transuranic (TRU) waste from ongoing operations. Generation rates are relatively small and fluctuate based on specific programs and project activities being conducted; however, the Laboratory will continue to generate TRU waste well into the future in association with the NE mission. Currently, plans and capabilities are being established to transfer INL’s contact-handled TRU waste to the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP) for certification and disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Remote-handled TRU waste is currently placed in storage at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). In an effort to minimize future liabilities associated with the INL NE mission, INL is evaluating and assessing options for the management and disposition of all its TRU waste on a real-time basis at time of generation. This paper summarizes near-term activities to minimize future re handling of INL’s TRU waste, as well as, potential complications associated with the long-term disposition of newly-generated TRU waste. Potential complications impacting the disposition of INL newly-generated TRU waste include, but are not limited to: 1) required remote-handled TRU packaging configuration(s) vs. current facility capabilities, 2) long-term NE mission activities, 3) WIPP certification requirements, and 4) budget considerations.

  20. Safety, Security

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity ofkandz-cm11 Outreach Home RoomPreservation of Fe(II) byMultidayAlumni > The2/01/12University SafetyHealthSafetySafety,

  1. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 4. Plutonium dispositioning in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sterbentz, J.W.; Olsen, C.S.; Sinha, U.P.

    1993-06-01

    This study is in response to a request by the Reactor Panel Subcommittee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to evaluate the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing conventional or advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs and in low temperature/pressure LWR designs that might be developed for plutonium disposal. Three plutonium-based fuel forms (oxides, aluminum metallics, and carbides) are evaluated for neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and material and compatibility issues. For the carbides, only the fabrication technologies are addressed. Viable plutonium oxide fuels for conventional or advanced LWRs include plutonium-zirconium-calcium oxide (PuO{sub 2}-ZrO{sub 2}-CaO) with the addition of thorium oxide (ThO{sub 2}) or a burnable poison such as erbium oxide (Er{sub 2}O{sub 3}) or europium oxide (Eu{sub 2}O{sub 3}) to achieve acceptable neutronic performance. Thorium will breed fissile uranium that may be unacceptable from a proliferation standpoint. Fabrication of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuels is well established; however, fabrication of plutonium-based oxide fuels will require further development. Viable aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels for a low temperature/pressure LWR include plutonium aluminide in an aluminum matrix (PuAl{sub 4}-Al) with the addition of a burnable poison such as erbium (Er) or europium (Eu). Fabrication of low-enriched plutonium in aluminum-plutonium metallic fuel rods was initially established 30 years ago and will require development to recapture and adapt the technology to meet current environmental and safety regulations. Fabrication of high-enriched uranium plate fuel by the picture-frame process is a well established process, but the use of plutonium would require the process to be upgraded in the United States to conform with current regulations and minimize the waste streams.

  2. DOE/EA-1607 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DISPOSITION OF DOE...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    domestic and one foreign). The U.S. enrichment facilities are (1) the currently operating United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) in Paducah,...

  3. DOE/EA-1607: Final Environmental Assessment for Disposition of...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    domestic and one foreign). The U.S. enrichment facilities are (1) the currently operating United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) in Paducah,...

  4. US weapons-useable plutonium disposition policy: implementation of the MOX fuel option 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Gonzalez, Vanessa L

    1998-01-01

    A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of U.S. weapons-grade plutonium which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option...

  5. Sample results from the interim salt disposition program macrobatch 9 tank 21H qualification samples

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peters, T. B.

    2015-11-01

    Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) analyzed samples from Tank 21H in support of qualification of Macrobatch (Salt Batch) 9 for the Interim Salt Disposition Program (ISDP). This document reports characterization data on the samples of Tank 21H.

  6. 105-N basin sediment disposition phase-two sampling and analysis plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Smith, R. C.

    1997-03-14

    The sampling and analysis plan for Phase 2 of the 105-N Basin sediment disposition task defines the sampling and analytical activities that will be performed to support characterization of the sediment and selection of an appropriate sediment disposal option.

  7. Environmental behavior of hafnium : the impact on the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Cerefice, Gary Steven

    1999-01-01

    Experimental and analytical studies were performed to examine the environmental behavior of hafnium and its utility as a neutron poison for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Yucca Mountain. The hydrolysis of ...

  8. Enabling completion of the material disposition area G closure at the Los Alamos National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blankenhorn, James Allen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Bishop, Milton L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01

    Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) and the Los Alamos Site Office (LASO) have developed and are implementing an integrated strategy to accelerate the disposition of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) legacy transuranic waste inventory currently stored in Technical Area 54, Material Disposition Area (MDA) G. As that strategy has been implemented the easier waste streams have been certified and shipped leaving the harder more challenging wastes to be dispositioned. Lessons learned from around the complex and a partnership with the National Transuranic Program located in Carlsbad, New Mexico, are enabling this acceleration. The Waste Disposition Program is responsible for the removal of both the above ground and below grade, retrievably stored transuranic waste in time to support the negotiated consent order with the State of New Mexico which requires closure of MDA G by the year 2015. The solutions and strategy employed at LANL are applicable to any organization that is currently managing legacy transuranic waste.

  9. The ORNL Surplus Facilities Management Program Long Range Plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Myrick, T.E.

    1984-09-01

    The Surplus Facilities Management Program (SFMP) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is part of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) National SFMP, administered by the Richland Operations Office. This program was established to provide for the management of DOE surplus radioactively contaminated facilities from the end of their operating life until final facility disposition is completed. As part of this program, the ORNL SFMP oversees some 76 individual surplus facilities, ranging in complexity from abandoned waste storage tanks to large experimental reactors. The ORNL SFMP has prepared this Long Range Plan to outline the long-term management strategy for those facilities included in the program. The primary objective of this plan are to: (1) develop a base of information for each ORNL SFMP facility, (2) conduct preliminary decommissioning analyses to identify feasible alternatives, (3) assess the current and future risk of each facility, (4) establish a priority list for the decommissioning projects, and (5) integrate the individual project costs and schedules into an overall program schedule and cost estimate for the ORNL site. The Long Range Plan also provides an overview of the ORNL SFMP management structure, specifies the decommissioning criteria to be employed, and identifies special technical problems, research and development needs, and special facilities and equipment that may be required for decommissioning operations.

  10. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE Order 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-08-30

    This is a guide to understanding and meeting the requirements of DOE Order 420.2C and shares lessons learned based on valuable experience within the community.

  11. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE O 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-08-01

    This document is a guide to understanding and meeting the requirements of DOE O 420.2C, and shares lessons learned based on valuable experience within the community. Supersedes DOE G 420.2-1.

  12. Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-08-19

    To ensure timely collection, reporting, analysis, and dissemination of information on environment, safety, and health issues as required by law or regulations or as needed to ensure that the Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are kept fully informed on a timely basis about events that could adversely affect the health and safety of the public or the workers, the environment, the intended purpose of DOE facilities, or the credibility of the Department. Cancels DOE O 210.1, DOE O 231.1, and DOE O 232.1A. Canceled by DOE O 232.2.

  13. BLENDING STUDY FOR SRR SALT DISPOSITION INTEGRATION: TANK 50H SCALE-MODELING AND COMPUTER-MODELING FOR BLENDING PUMP DESIGN, PHASE 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Leishear, R.; Poirier, M.; Fowley, M.

    2011-05-26

    The Salt Disposition Integration (SDI) portfolio of projects provides the infrastructure within existing Liquid Waste facilities to support the startup and long term operation of the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). Within SDI, the Blend and Feed Project will equip existing waste tanks in the Tank Farms to serve as Blend Tanks where 300,000-800,000 gallons of salt solution will be blended in 1.3 million gallon tanks and qualified for use as feedstock for SWPF. Blending requires the miscible salt solutions from potentially multiple source tanks per batch to be well mixed without disturbing settled sludge solids that may be present in a Blend Tank. Disturbing solids may be problematic both from a feed quality perspective as well as from a process safety perspective where hydrogen release from the sludge is a potential flammability concern. To develop the necessary technical basis for the design and operation of blending equipment, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) completed scaled blending and transfer pump tests and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling. A 94 inch diameter pilot-scale blending tank, including tank internals such as the blending pump, transfer pump, removable cooling coils, and center column, were used in this research. The test tank represents a 1/10.85 scaled version of an 85 foot diameter, Type IIIA, nuclear waste tank that may be typical of Blend Tanks used in SDI. Specifically, Tank 50 was selected as the tank to be modeled per the SRR, Project Engineering Manager. SRNL blending tests investigated various fixed position, non-rotating, dual nozzle pump designs, including a blending pump model provided by the blend pump vendor, Curtiss Wright (CW). Primary research goals were to assess blending times and to evaluate incipient sludge disturbance for waste tanks. Incipient sludge disturbance was defined by SRR and SRNL as minor blending of settled sludge from the tank bottom into suspension due to blending pump operation, where the sludge level was shown to remain constant. To experimentally model the sludge layer, a very thin, pourable, sludge simulant was conservatively used for all testing. To experimentally model the liquid, supernate layer above the sludge in waste tanks, two salt solution simulants were used, which provided a bounding range of supernate properties. One solution was water (H{sub 2}O + NaOH), and the other was an inhibited, more viscous salt solution. The research performed and data obtained significantly advances the understanding of fluid mechanics, mixing theory and CFD modeling for nuclear waste tanks by benchmarking CFD results to actual experimental data. This research significantly bridges the gap between previous CFD models and actual field experiences in real waste tanks. A finding of the 2009, DOE, Slurry Retrieval, Pipeline Transport and Plugging, and Mixing Workshop was that CFD models were inadequate to assess blending processes in nuclear waste tanks. One recommendation from that Workshop was that a validation, or bench marking program be performed for CFD modeling versus experiment. This research provided experimental data to validate and correct CFD models as they apply to mixing and blending in nuclear waste tanks. Extensive SDI research was a significant step toward bench marking and applying CFD modeling. This research showed that CFD models not only agreed with experiment, but demonstrated that the large variance in actual experimental data accounts for misunderstood discrepancies between CFD models and experiments. Having documented this finding, SRNL was able to provide correction factors to be used with CFD models to statistically bound full scale CFD results. Through the use of pilot scale tests performed for both types of pumps and available engineering literature, SRNL demonstrated how to effectively apply CFD results to salt batch mixing in full scale waste tanks. In other words, CFD models were in error prior to development of experimental correction factors determined during this research, which provided a technique to use CFD models fo

  14. Facility Operations and Maintenance Facilities Management

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Capogna, Luca

    Facility Operations and Maintenance Facilities Management D101 Facilities Management R -575/affirmative action institution. 354 3 373 4 373A,B,C,D 4 Alm8/31/12 #12;Facility Operations and Maintenance, B 5 1409 5 1403 5 1403 A, B 4 1408 3 1408 A,B,C 3 1610 3 #12;Facility Operations and Maintenance

  15. Subsurface Facility System Description Document

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eric Loros

    2001-07-31

    The Subsurface Facility System encompasses the location, arrangement, size, and spacing of the underground openings. This subsurface system includes accesses, alcoves, and drifts. This system provides access to the underground, provides for the emplacement of waste packages, provides openings to allow safe and secure work conditions, and interfaces with the natural barrier. This system includes what is now the Exploratory Studies Facility. The Subsurface Facility System physical location and general arrangement help support the long-term waste isolation objectives of the repository. The Subsurface Facility System locates the repository openings away from main traces of major faults, away from exposure to erosion, above the probable maximum flood elevation, and above the water table. The general arrangement, size, and spacing of the emplacement drifts support disposal of the entire inventory of waste packages based on the emplacement strategy. The Subsurface Facility System provides access ramps to safely facilitate development and emplacement operations. The Subsurface Facility System supports the development and emplacement operations by providing subsurface space for such systems as ventilation, utilities, safety, monitoring, and transportation.

  16. Facility effluent monitoring plan for 242-A Evaporator facility. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Crummel, G.M.; Gustavson, R.D.

    1993-03-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1* for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could affect employee or public safety or the environment. A facility effluent monitoring plan determination was performed during Calendar Year 1991 and the evaluation showed the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-1**. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements.

  17. Chemical Disposition of Plutonium in Hanford Site Tank Wastes

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Delegard, Calvin H.; Jones, Susan A.

    2015-05-07

    This report examines the chemical disposition of plutonium (Pu) in Hanford Site tank wastes, by itself and in its observed and potential interactions with the neutron absorbers aluminum (Al), cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn), nickel (Ni), and sodium (Na). Consideration also is given to the interactions of plutonium with uranium (U). No consideration of the disposition of uranium itself as an element with fissile isotopes is considered except tangentially with respect to its interaction as an absorber for plutonium. The report begins with a brief review of Hanford Site plutonium processes, examining the various means used to recover plutonium from irradiated fuel and from scrap, and also examines the intermediate processing of plutonium to prepare useful chemical forms. The paper provides an overview of Hanford tank defined-waste–type compositions and some calculations of the ratios of plutonium to absorber elements in these waste types and in individual waste analyses. These assessments are based on Hanford tank waste inventory data derived from separately published, expert assessments of tank disposal records, process flowsheets, and chemical/radiochemical analyses. This work also investigates the distribution and expected speciation of plutonium in tank waste solution and solid phases. For the solid phases, both pure plutonium compounds and plutonium interactions with absorber elements are considered. These assessments of plutonium chemistry are based largely on analyses of idealized or simulated tank waste or strongly alkaline systems. The very limited information available on plutonium behavior, disposition, and speciation in genuine tank waste also is discussed. The assessments show that plutonium coprecipitates strongly with chromium, iron, manganese and uranium absorbers. Plutonium’s chemical interactions with aluminum, nickel, and sodium are minimal to non-existent. Credit for neutronic interaction of plutonium with these absorbers occurs only if they are physically proximal in solution or the plutonium present in the solid phase is intimately mixed with compounds or solutions of these absorbers. No information on the potential chemical interaction of plutonium with cadmium was found in the technical literature. Definitive evidence of sorption or adsorption of plutonium onto various solid phases from strongly alkaline media is less clear-cut, perhaps owing to fewer studies and to some well-attributed tests run under conditions exceeding the very low solubility of plutonium. The several studies that are well-founded show that only about half of the plutonium is adsorbed from waste solutions onto sludge solid phases. The organic complexants found in many Hanford tank waste solutions seem to decrease plutonium uptake onto solids. A number of studies show plutonium sorbs effectively onto sodium titanate. Finally, this report presents findings describing the behavior of plutonium vis-ą-vis other elements during sludge dissolution in nitric acid based on Hanford tank waste experience gained by lab-scale tests, chemical and radiochemical sample characterization, and full-scale processing in preparation for strontium-90 recovery from PUREX sludges.

  18. Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE`s independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91.

  19. Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-02-13

    The Order defines the safety management program required by 10 CFR 830.204(b)(5) for maintenance and the reliable performance of Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) that are part of the safety basis required by 10 CFR 830.202.1 at hazard category 1, 2 and 3 Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities. Cancels DOE O 433.1. Canceled by DOE O 433.1B.

  20. Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-04-21

    The order defines the safety management program required by 10 CFR 830.204(b)(5) for maintenance and the reliable performance of structures, systems and components that are part of the safety basis required by 10 CFR 830.202 at hazard category 1, 2 and 3 DOE nuclear facilities. Admin Chg 1, dated 3-12-2013. Cancels DOE O 433.1A.

  1. Maintenance Management Program for DOE Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-04-21

    The order defines the safety management program required by 10 CFR 830.204(b)(5) for maintenance and the reliable performance of structures, systems and components that are part of the safety basis required by 10 CFR 830.202 at hazard category 1, 2 and 3 DOE nuclear facilities. Admin Chg 1, dated 3-12-2013, supersedes DOE O 433.1B.

  2. Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning Program Surveillance and Maintenance Plan, Revision 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Poderis, Reed J.; King, Rebecca A.

    2013-09-30

    This Surveillance and Maintenance (S&M) Plan describes the activities performed between deactivation and final decommissioning of the following facilities located on the Nevada National Security Site, as documented in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order under the Industrial Sites program as decontamination and decommissioning sites: ? Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (EMAD) Facility: o EMAD Building (Building 25-3900) o Locomotive Storage Shed (Building 25-3901) ? Test Cell C (TCC) Facility: o Equipment Building (Building 25-3220) o Motor Drive Building (Building 25-3230) o Pump Shop (Building 25-3231) o Cryogenic Lab (Building 25-3232) o Ancillary Structures (e.g., dewars, water tower, piping, tanks) These facilities have been declared excess and are in various stages of deactivation (low-risk, long-term stewardship disposition state). This S&M Plan establishes and implements a solid, cost-effective, and balanced S&M program consistent with federal, state, and regulatory requirements. A graded approach is used to plan and conduct S&M activities. The goal is to maintain the facilities in a safe condition in a cost-effective manner until their final end state is achieved. This plan accomplishes the following: ? Establishes S&M objectives and framework ? Identifies programmatic guidance for S&M activities to be conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) ? Provides present facility condition information and identifies hazards ? Identifies facility-specific S&M activities to be performed and their frequency ? Identifies regulatory drivers, NNSA/NFO policies and procedures, and best management practices that necessitate implementation of S&M activities ? Provides criteria and frequencies for revisions and updates ? Establishes the process for identifying and dispositioning a condition that has not been previously identified or documented ? Provides instructions for implementing annual S&M inspections and activities The following facilities that were included in Revision 1 of this plan have reached final disposition and are no longer in the S&M program: ? Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility, Building 25-3110 ? Test Cell A Facility, Building 25-3113 ? TCC Facility, Building 25-3210 ? Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 26-2201 ? Super Kukla Facility, Building 27-5400

  3. Environment, Safety and Health Reporting

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-06-27

    The order addresses DOE/NNSA receiving timely, accurate information about events that have affected or could adversely affect the health, safety and security of the public or workers, the environment, the operations of DOE facilities, or the credibility of the Department. Cancels DOE N 234.1. Supersedes DOE O 231.1A Chg 1, DOE M 231.1-1A Chg 2.

  4. CRAD, NNSA- Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities (SNF)

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    CRAD for Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities (SNF). Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used to conduct a well-organized and thorough assessment of elements of safety and health programs.

  5. University of Toronto Control Program for Liquid Cryogenic Transfer Facilities

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Chan, Hue Sun

    ; 2. the provision of appropriate design criteria for transfer facilities; 3. the provision atmosphere: · Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) rooms / laboratories The basic elements of the Program of appropriate safety design requirements for pressurized systems used for liquid cryogenic materials; 4

  6. Managing a Process Safety Management inspection

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mulvey, N.P. [AcuTech Consulting, Inc., Princeton, NJ (United States)

    1995-12-31

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations (29 CFR {section} 1910.119) have been in effect for almost three years. State level risk management programs, in New Jersey, California, and Delaware have been in effect for over six years. More recently, Nevada and Louisiana have enacted process safety management programs. These regulations have had a significant impact on all phases of plant operations, including preliminary design, construction, startup, and operations. Through proper planning and the commitment of resources, many facilities are beginning to realize the benefits of well developed PSM programs. This paper will discuss in greater detail some of these benefits, and in particular, the subject of governmental inspections of facilities for process safety management programs.

  7. Science &Technology Facilities Council

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Science &Technology Facilities Council Science &Technology Facilities Council Science and Technology Facilities Council Annual Report and Accounts 2011-2012 Science and Technology Facilities Council Laboratory, Cheshire; UK Astronomy Technology Centre, Edinburgh; Chilbolton Observatory, Hampshire; Isaac

  8. The Vapor Plume at Material Disposal Are C in Relation to Pajarito Corridor Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Masse, William B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-04-02

    A vapor plume made up of volatile organic compounds is present beneath Material Disposal Area C (MDA C) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The location and concentrations within the vapor plume are discussed in relation to existing and planned facilities and construction activities along Pajarito Road (the 'Pajarito Corridor') and in terms of worker health and safety. This document provides information that indicates that the vapor plume does not pose a threat to the health of LANL workers nor will it pose a threat to workers during construction of proposed facilities along Pajarito Road. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) monitors emissions, effluents, and environmental media to meet environmental compliance requirements, determine actions to protect the environment, and monitor the long-term health of the local environment. LANL also studies and characterizes 'legacy' waste from past Laboratory operations to make informed decisions regarding eventual corrective actions and the disposition of that waste. Starting in 1969, these activities have been annually reported in the LANL Environmental Report (formerly Environmental Surveillance Report), and are detailed in publicly accessible technical reports meeting environmental compliance requirements. Included among the legacy sites being investigated are several formerly used material disposal areas (MDAs) set aside by the Laboratory for the general on-site disposal of waste from mission-related activities. One such area is MDA C located in Technical Area 50 (TA-50), which was used for waste disposal between 1948 and 1974. The location of TA-50 is depicted in Figure 1. The present paper uses a series of maps and cross sections to address the public concerns raised about the vapor plume at MDA C. As illustrated here, extensive sampling and data interpretation indicate that the vapor plume at MDA C does not pose a threat to the health of LANL workers nor will it pose a threat to workers during construction of the proposed facilities and utility trenches. The public cannot be directly exposed to the vapor plume beneath MDA C because Pajarito Road is closed to the public.

  9. Environment, Safety and Health Reporting

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-01-01

    To ensure timely collection, reporting, analysis, and dissemination of information on environment, safety, and health issues as required by law or regulations or as needed to ensure that the Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration are kept fully informed on a timely basis about events that could adversely affect the health and safety of the public or the workers, the environment, the intended purpose of DOE facilities, or the credibility of the Department. Cancels DOE O 210.1, DOE O 231.1, DOE O 232.1A. Canceled by DOE O 231.1B. DOE O 231.1B cancels all portions pertaining to environment, safety, and health reporting. Occurrence reporting and processing of operations information provisions remain in effect until January 1, 2012.

  10. Science Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDidDevelopment Top LDRDUniversitySchedules PrintNIF About BlogFacilities

  11. Mobile Facility

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of NaturalDukeWakefieldSulfateSciTechtail.Theory ofDid you notHeatMaRIEdioxide capture |GE PutsgovSitesMobile Facility AMF

  12. Decommissioning of Active Ventilation Systems in a Nuclear R and D Facility to Prepare for Building Demolition (Whiteshell Laboratories Decommissioning Project, Canada) - 13073

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wilcox, Brian; May, Doug; Howlett, Don; Bilinsky, Dennis [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Ara Mooradian Way, Pinawa, Manitoba (Canada)] [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Ara Mooradian Way, Pinawa, Manitoba (Canada)

    2013-07-01

    Whiteshell Laboratories (WL) is a nuclear research establishment owned by the Canadian government and operated by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) since the early 1960's. WL is currently under a decommissioning license and the mandate is to remediate the nuclear legacy liabilities in a safe and cost effective manner. The WL Project is the first major nuclear decommissioning project in Canada. A major initiative underway is to decommission and demolish the main R and D Laboratory complex. The Building 300 R and D complex was constructed to accommodate laboratories and offices which were mainly used for research and development associated with organic-cooled reactors, nuclear fuel waste management, reactor safety, advanced fuel cycles and other applications of nuclear energy. Building 300 is a three storey structure of approximately 16,000 m{sup 2}. In order to proceed with building demolition, the contaminated systems inside the building have to be characterized, removed, and the waste managed. There is a significant focus on volume reduction of radioactive waste for the WL project. The active ventilation system is one of the significant contaminated systems in Building 300 that requires decommissioning and removal. The active ventilation system was designed to manage hazardous fumes and radioactivity from ventilation devices (e.g., fume hoods, snorkels and glove boxes) and to prevent the escape of airborne hazardous material outside of the laboratory boundary in the event of an upset condition. The system includes over 200 ventilation devices and 32 active exhaust fan units and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. The strategy to remove the ventilation system was to work from the laboratory end back to the fan/filter system. Each ventilation duct was radiologically characterized. Fogging was used to minimize loose contamination. Sections of the duct were removed by various cutting methods and bagged for temporary storage prior to disposition. Maintenance of building heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) balancing was critical to ensure proper airflow and worker safety. Approximately 103 m{sup 3} of equipment and materials were recovered or generated by the project. Low level waste accounted for approximately 37.4 m{sup 3}. Where possible, ducting was free released for metal recycling. Contaminated ducts were compacted into B-1000 containers and stored in a Shielded Modular Above-Ground Storage Facility (SMAGS) on the WL site awaiting final disposition. The project is divided into three significant phases, with Phases 1 and 2 completed. Lessons learned during the execution of Phases 1 and 2 have been incorporated into the current ventilation removal. (authors)

  13. Setting clear expectations for safety basis development

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MORENO, M.R.

    2003-05-03

    DOE-RL has set clear expectations for a cost-effective approach for achieving compliance with the Nuclear Safety Management requirements (10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Rule) which will ensure long-term benefit to Hanford. To facilitate implementation of these expectations, tools were developed to streamline and standardize safety analysis and safety document development resulting in a shorter and more predictable DOE approval cycle. A Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) was issued to standardized methodologies for development of safety analyses. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (RADIDOSE) was issued for the evaluation of radiological consequences for accident scenarios often postulated for Hanford. A standard Site Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) detailing the safety management programs was issued for use as a means of compliance with a majority of 3009 Standard chapters. An in-process review was developed between DOE and the Contractor to facilitate DOE approval and provide early course correction. As a result of setting expectations and providing safety analysis tools, the four Hanford Site waste management nuclear facilities were able to integrate into one Master Waste Management Documented Safety Analysis (WM-DSA).

  14. DEVELOPMENT OF GLASS AND CRYSTALLINE CERAMIC FORMS FOR DISPOSITION OF EXCESS PLUTONIUM

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Marra, James; Cozzi, A; Crawford, C.; Herman, C.; Marra, John; Peeler, D.

    2009-09-10

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) has identified up to 50 metric tons of excess plutonium that needs to be dispositioned. The bulk of the material is slated to be blended with uranium and fabricated into a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel for subsequent burning in commercial nuclear reactors. Excess plutonium-containing impurity materials making it unsuitable for fabrication into MOX fuel will need to be dispositioned via other means. Glass and crystalline ceramics have been developed and studied as candidate forms to immobilize these impure plutonium feeds. A titanate-based ceramic was identified as an excellent actinide material host. This composition was based on Synroc compositions previously developed for nuclear waste immobilization. These titanate ceramics were found to be able to accommodate extremely high quantities of fissile material and exhibit excellent aqueous durability. A lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass was developed to accommodate high concentrations of plutonium and to be very tolerant of impurities yet still maintain good aqueous durability. Recent testing of alkali borosilicate compositions showed promise of using these compositions to disposition lower concentrations of plutonium using existing high level waste vitrification processes. The developed waste forms all appear to be suitable for Pu disposition. Depending on the actual types and concentrations of the Pu residue streams slated for disposition, each waste form offers unique advantages.

  15. FPS 12.1 Life Safety, 5/24/2000

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The objective of this surveillance is for the Facility Representative to verify that conditions in the plant provide an appropriate level of life safety for workers conducting operations in the...

  16. Energy Department Announces Creation of New Health, Safety and...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    The Department of Energy (DOE) today announced the creation of a new office to strengthen and improve the health, safety, and security of the DOE workers, facilities and the...

  17. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Department of Occupational Health and Safety Revised December 2009 #12;Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Management System 1. Introduction.............................................................................................................. 3 2.2 Management of Health and Safety

  18. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    PIEPHO, M.G.

    1999-10-20

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Annex B, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, ''Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).'' All assumptions, parameters and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the FSAR.

  19. Safety harness

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Gunter, Larry W. (615 Sand Pit Rd., Leesville, SC 29070)

    1993-01-01

    A safety harness to be worn by a worker, especially a worker wearing a plastic suit thereunder for protection in a radioactive or chemically hostile environment, which safety harness comprises a torso surrounding portion with at least one horizontal strap for adjustably securing the harness about the torso, two vertical shoulder straps with rings just forward of the of the peak of the shoulders for attaching a life-line and a pair of adjustable leg supporting straps releasibly attachable to the torso surrounding portion. In the event of a fall, the weight of the worker, when his fall is broken and he is suspended from the rings with his body angled slightly back and chest up, will be borne by the portion of the leg straps behind his buttocks rather than between his legs. Furthermore, the supporting straps do not restrict the air supplied through hoses into his suit when so suspended.

  20. Building Access Program Facilities Management Bridge Group

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Building Access Program Facilities Management Bridge Group January 21, 2014 #12;Campus Safety Initiatives · Lighting and Landscaping · Video Surveillance · Building Access #12;The Challenge · How do we;Components of Building Access · Perimeter automation · Tightening of public hours #12;Perimeter Automation

  1. Safety valve

    DOE Patents [OSTI]

    Bergman, Ulf C. (Malmoe, SE)

    1984-01-01

    The safety valve contains a resilient gland to be held between a valve seat and a valve member and is secured to the valve member by a sleeve surrounding the end of the valve member adjacent to the valve seat. The sleeve is movable relative to the valve member through a limited axial distance and a gap exists between said valve member and said sleeve.

  2. Features, Events and Processes for the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blink, J A; Greenberg, H R; Caporuscio, F A; Houseworth, J E; Freeze, G A; Mariner, P; Cunnane, J C

    2010-12-15

    The Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) Campaign within DOE-NE is evaluating storage and disposal options for a range of waste forms and a range of geologic environments. To assess the potential performance of conceptual repository designs for the combinations of waste form and geologic environment, a master set of Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs) has been developed and evaluated. These FEPs are based on prior lists developed by the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) and the international repository community. The objective of the UFD FEPs activity is to identify and categorize FEPs that are important to disposal system performance for a variety of disposal alternatives (i.e., combinations of waste forms, disposal concepts, and geologic environments). FEP analysis provides guidance for the identification of (1) important considerations in disposal system design, and (2) gaps in the technical bases. The UFD FEPs also support the development of performance assessment (PA) models to evaluate the long-term performance of waste forms in the engineered and geologic environments of candidate disposal system alternatives. For the UFD FEP development, five waste form groups and seven geologic settings are being considered. A total of 208 FEPs have been identified, categorized by the physical components of the waste disposal system as well as cross-cutting physical phenomena. The combination of 35 waste-form/geologic environments and 208 FEPs is large; however, some FEP evaluations can cut across multiple waste/environment combinations, and other FEPs can be categorized as not-applicable for some waste/environment combinations, making the task of FEP evaluation more tractable. A FEP status tool has been developed to document progress. The tool emphasizes three major areas that can be statused numerically. FEP Applicability documents whether the FEP is pertinent to a waste/environment combination. FEP Completion Status documents the progress of the evaluation for the FEP/waste/environment combination. FEP Importance documents the potential importance for the FEP/waste/environment combination to repository performance.

  3. Generation!and!Disposition!of!Municipal!Solid!Waste! (MSW)!in!the!United!States!A!National!Survey!

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Columbia University

    of solid wastes and advance sustainable waste management in the U.S. to the level of several leading! 1! ! Generation!and!Disposition!of!Municipal!Solid!Waste! (MSW on Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) Generation and Disposition in the U.S., in collaboration with Ms. Nora Goldstein

  4. Pharmacokinetic disposition of lidocaine and its metabolites following a single intravenous dose in healthy and proteinuric dogs 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Wilkie, William Scott

    2002-01-01

    collection when disposition of lidocaine is used as a test of hepatic dysfunction. The second goal was to compare the disposition of lidocaine and its metabolites in normal dogs (G1) and dogs with Alport syndrome, a hereditary proteinuric nephritis (G2...

  5. Audit Report The Procurement of Safety Class/Safety-Significant Items at the Savannah River Site

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None

    2009-04-01

    The Department of Energy operates several nuclear facilities at its Savannah River Site, and several additional facilities are under construction. This includes the National Nuclear Security Administration's Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) which is designated to help maintain the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX Facility) is being constructed to manufacture commercial nuclear reactor fuel assemblies from weapon-grade plutonium oxide and depleted uranium. The Interim Salt Processing (ISP) project, managed by the Office of Environmental Management, will treat radioactive waste. The Department has committed to procuring products and services for nuclear-related activities that meet or exceed recognized quality assurance standards. Such standards help to ensure the safety and performance of these facilities. To that end, it issued Departmental Order 414.1C, Quality Assurance (QA Order). The QA Order requires the application of Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (NQA-1) for nuclear-related activities. The NQA-1 standard provides requirements and guidelines for the establishment and execution of quality assurance programs during the siting, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. These requirements, promulgated by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, must be applied to 'safety-class' and 'safety-significant' structures, systems and components (SSCs). Safety-class SSCs are defined as those necessary to prevent exposure off site and to protect the public. Safety-significant SSCs are those whose failure could irreversibly impact worker safety such as a fatality, serious injury, or significant radiological or chemical exposure. Due to the importance of protecting the public, workers, and environment, we initiated an audit to determine whether the Department of Energy procured safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that met NQA-1 standards at the Savannah River Site. Our review disclosed that the Department had procured and installed safety-class and safety-significant SSCs that did not meet NQA-1 quality standards. Specifically, we identified multiple instances in which critical components did not meet required quality and safety standards. For example: (1) Three structural components were procured and installed by the prime contractor at Savannah River during construction of the MOX Facility that did not meet the technical specifications for items relied on for safety. These substandard items necessitated costly and time consuming remedial action to, among other things, ensure that nonconforming materials and equipment would function within safety margins; (2) In six instances, items used in the construction of TEF failed to satisfy quality standards. In one of these situations, operating procedures had to be modified to ensure that the problem item did not compromise safety; and (3) Finally, at the ISP, one component that did not meet quality standards was procured. The failure of the item could have resulted in a spill of up to 15,000 gallons of high-level radioactive waste. Based on an extensive examination of relevant internal controls and procurement practices, we concluded that these failures were attributable to inadequate attention to quality assurance at Savannah River. Simply put, Departmental controls were not adequate to prevent and/or detect quality assurance problems. For example, Federal and prime contractor officials did not expressly require that subcontractors or lower-tiered vendors comply with quality assurance requirements. Additionally, management did not effectively communicate quality assurance concerns between the several Departmental program elements operating at Savannah River. The procurement and installation of these nonconforming components resulted in cost increases. For example, as of October 2008, the MOX Facility had incurred costs of more than $680,000 due to problems associated with the procurement of $11 million of nonconforming safety-class reinforcing steel.

  6. 2011 Annual Criticality Safety Program Performance Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Andrea Hoffman

    2011-12-01

    The 2011 review of the INL Criticality Safety Program has determined that the program is robust and effective. The review was prepared for, and fulfills Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) item H.20, 'Annual Criticality Safety Program performance summary that includes the status of assessments, issues, corrective actions, infractions, requirements management, training, and programmatic support.' This performance summary addresses the status of these important elements of the INL Criticality Safety Program. Assessments - Assessments in 2011 were planned and scheduled. The scheduled assessments included a Criticality Safety Program Effectiveness Review, Criticality Control Area Inspections, a Protection of Controlled Unclassified Information Inspection, an Assessment of Criticality Safety SQA, and this management assessment of the Criticality Safety Program. All of the assessments were completed with the exception of the 'Effectiveness Review' for SSPSF, which was delayed due to emerging work. Although minor issues were identified in the assessments, no issues or combination of issues indicated that the INL Criticality Safety Program was ineffective. The identification of issues demonstrates the importance of an assessment program to the overall health and effectiveness of the INL Criticality Safety Program. Issues and Corrective Actions - There are relatively few criticality safety related issues in the Laboratory ICAMS system. Most were identified by Criticality Safety Program assessments. No issues indicate ineffectiveness in the INL Criticality Safety Program. All of the issues are being worked and there are no imminent criticality concerns. Infractions - There was one criticality safety related violation in 2011. On January 18, 2011, it was discovered that a fuel plate bundle in the Nuclear Materials Inspection and Storage (NMIS) facility exceeded the fissionable mass limit, resulting in a technical safety requirement (TSR) violation. The TSR limits fuel plate bundles to 1085 grams U-235, which is the maximum loading of an ATR fuel element. The overloaded fuel plate bundle contained 1097 grams U-235 and was assembled under an 1100 gram U-235 limit in 1982. In 2003, the limit was reduced to 1085 grams citing a new criticality safety evaluation for ATR fuel elements. The fuel plate bundle inventories were not checked for compliance prior to implementing the reduced limit. A subsequent review of the NMIS inventory did not identify further violations. Requirements Management - The INL Criticality Safety program is organized and well documented. The source requirements for the INL Criticality Safety Program are from 10 CFR 830.204, DOE Order 420.1B, Chapter III, 'Nuclear Criticality Safety,' ANSI/ANS 8-series Industry Standards, and DOE Standards. These source requirements are documented in LRD-18001, 'INL Criticality Safety Program Requirements Manual.' The majority of the criticality safety source requirements are contained in DOE Order 420.1B because it invokes all of the ANSI/ANS 8-Series Standards. DOE Order 420.1B also invokes several DOE Standards, including DOE-STD-3007, 'Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities.' DOE Order 420.1B contains requirements for DOE 'Heads of Field Elements' to approve the criticality safety program and specific elements of the program, namely, the qualification of criticality staff and the method for preparing criticality safety evaluations. This was accomplished by the approval of SAR-400, 'INL Standardized Nuclear Safety Basis Manual,' Chapter 6, 'Prevention of Inadvertent Criticality.' Chapter 6 of SAR-400 contains sufficient detail and/or reference to the specific DOE and contractor documents that adequately describe the INL Criticality Safety Program per the elements specified in DOE Order 420.1B. The Safety Evaluation Report for SAR-400 specifically recognizes that the approval of SAR-400 approves the INL Criticality Safety Program. No new source requirements were released in 2011. A revision to LRD-18001 is

  7. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility Module 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lewis, C.J.

    1995-10-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure lonq-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years.

  8. Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Documents (Documented Safety Analyses and Technical Safety Requirements)

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Google Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on DeliciousMathematicsEnergyInterestedReplacement-2-A WholesaleRetrofit Existing BuildingsImpact ofNOT MEASUREMENT

  9. INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT OF STORMWATER AND WASTEWATER AT THE SEPARATIONS PROCESS RESEARCH UNIT (SPRU) DISPOSITION PROJECT, NEW YORK

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Abitz, R.; Jackson, D.; Eddy-Dilek, C.

    2011-06-27

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is currently evaluating the water management procedures at the Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU). The facility has three issues related to water management that require technical assistance: (1) due to a excessive rainfall event in October, 2010, contaminated water collected in basements of G2 and H2 buildings. As a result of this event, the contractor has had to collect and dispose of water offsite; (2) The failure of a sump pump at a KAPL outfall resulted in a Notice of Violation issued by the New York State Department of Environment and Conservation (NYSDEC) and subsequent Consent Order. On-site water now requires treatment and off-site disposition; and (3) stormwater infiltration has resulted in Strontium-90 levels discharged to the storm drains that exceed NR standards. The contractor has indicated that water management at SPRU requires major staff resources (at least 50 persons). The purpose of this review is to determine if the contractor's technical approach warrants the large number of staff resources and to ensure that the technical approach is compliant and in accordance with federal, state and NR requirements.

  10. Simplifying documentation while approaching site closure: integrated health & safety plans as documented safety analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brown, Tulanda

    2003-06-01

    At the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) near Cincinnati, Ohio, environmental restoration activities are supported by Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) that combine the required project-specific Health and Safety Plans, Safety Basis Requirements (SBRs), and Process Requirements (PRs) into single Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs). By isolating any remediation activities that deal with Enriched Restricted Materials, the SBRs and PRs assure that the hazard categories of former nuclear facilities undergoing remediation remain less than Nuclear. These integrated DSAs employ Integrated Safety Management methodology in support of simplified restoration and remediation activities that, so far, have resulted in the decontamination and demolition (D&D) of over 150 structures, including six major nuclear production plants. This paper presents the FCP method for maintaining safety basis documentation, using the D&D I-HASP as an example.

  11. SUBJECT: Guidance on Retention of Facility Representative Technical Competence during Reductions in Force, 4/21/1998

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Department’s Revised Implementation Plan (IP) for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 93-3 renews the Department’s commitment to maintaining the technical capability necessary to safely manage and operate defense nuclear facilities.

  12. Safety Share from National Safety Council

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Slide Presentation by Joe Yanek, Fluor Government Group. National Safety Council Safety Share. The Campbell Institute is the “Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) Center of Excellence” at the National Safety Council and provides a Forum for Leaders in EHS to exchange ideas and collaborate across industry sectors and organizational types.

  13. Fast reactor safety program. Progress report, January-March 1980

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-05-01

    The goal of the DOE LMFBR Safety Program is to provide a technology base fully responsive to safety considerations in the design, evaluation, licensing, and economic optimization of LMFBRs for electrical power generation. A strategy is presented that divides safety technology development into seven program elements, which have been used as the basis for the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) for the Program. These elements include four lines of assurance (LOAs) involving core-related safety considerations, an element supporting non-core-related plant safety considerations, a safety R and D integration element, and an element for the development of test facilities and equipment to be used in Program experiments: LOA-1 (prevent accidents); LOA-2 (limit core damage); LOA-3 (maintain containment integrity); LOA-4 (attenuate radiological consequences); plant considerations; R and D integration; and facility development.

  14. Construction safety in DOE. Part 1, Students guide

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Handwerk, E C

    1993-08-01

    This report is the first part of a compilation of safety standards for construction activities on DOE facilities. This report covers the following areas: general safety and health provisions; occupational health and environmental control/haz mat; personal protective equipment; fire protection and prevention; signs, signals, and barricades; materials handling, storage, use, and disposal; hand and power tools; welding and cutting; electrical; and scaffolding.

  15. OSHA safety regulation calls for step-by-step approach

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bellomo, P.J. (Arthur D. Little Inc., Houston, TX (US))

    1992-06-01

    The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's long-awaited process safety management (PSM) regulation mandates the implementation of a PSM program at facilities handling highly hazardous materials, including oil refineries and petrochemical plants. This article presents a step-by-step PSM program compliance strategy, delineated and explored through practical examples.

  16. SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF THE ARIES COMPACT STELLARATOR DESIGN

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    California at San Diego, University of

    -CS by report- ing radiological inventories, decay heat, and radioactive waste management optionsARIES-CS and the facility can meet the no-evacuation requirement. KEYWORDS: ARIES-CS, safety assessment, stellarator Note In this paper we examine the safety and environmen- tal performance of ARIES-CS by reporting radiological

  17. Implementation Guide for Use in Addressing Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2006-07-24

    This Guide provides information to assist in implementation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 830.203, "Unreviewed Safety Question Process," of the Nuclear Safety Management Rules for Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities owned or operated by the Department of Energy, including the National Nuclear Security Administration. Cancels DOE G 424.1-1.

  18. Implementation Guide for Use in Addressing Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-10-24

    This Guide provides information to assist in the implementation and interpretation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830.203, Unreviewed Safety Question Process, of the Nuclear Safety Management Rules for applicable nuclear facilities owned or operated by the Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Canceled by DOE N 251.93.

  19. Delivering safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Baldwin, N.D.; Spooner, K.G.; Walkden, P.

    2007-07-01

    In the United Kingdom there have been significant recent changes to the management of civil nuclear liabilities. With the formation in April 2005 of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), ownership of the civil nuclear licensed sites in the UK, including the Magnox Reactor Stations, passed to this new organisation. The NDAs mission is to seek acceleration of the nuclear clean up programme and deliver increased value for money and, consequently, are driving their contractors to seek more innovative ways of performing work. British Nuclear Group manages the UK Magnox stations under contract to the NDA. This paper summarises the approach being taken within its Reactor Sites business to work with suppliers to enhance working arrangements at sites, improve the delivery of decommissioning programmes and deliver improvements in safety and environmental performance. The UK Magnox stations are 1. generation gas-graphite reactors, constructed in the 1950's and 1960's. Two stations are currently still operating, three are shut-down undergoing defueling and the other five are being decommissioned. Despite the distractions of industry restructuring, an uncompromising policy of demanding improved performance in conjunction with improved safety and environmental standards has been adopted. Over the past 5 years, this policy has resulted in step-changes in performance at Reactor Sites, with increased electrical output and accelerated defueling and decommissioning. The improvements in performance have been mirrored by improvements in safety (DACR of 0 at 5 sites); environmental standards (reductions in energy and water consumption, increased waste recycling) and the overall health of the workforce (20% reduction in sickness absence). These achievements have, in turn, been recognised by external bodies, resulting in several awards, including: the world's first ISRS and IERS level 10 awards (Sizewell, 2006), the NUMEX plant maintenance award (Bradwell, 2006), numerous RoSPA awards at site and sector level and nomination, at Company level, for the RoSPA George Earle trophy for outstanding performance in Health and Safety (Reactor Sites, 2006). After 'setting the scene' and describing the challenges that the company has had to respond to, the paper explains how these improvements have been delivered. Specifically it explains the process that has been followed and the parts played by sites and suppliers to deliver improved performance. With the experience of already having transitioned several Magnox stations from operations to defueling and then to decommissioning, the paper describes the valuable experience that has been gained in achieving an optimum change process and maintaining momentum. (authors)

  20. Safety Issues

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power AdministrationRobust, High-Throughput Analysis of Protein1-0845*RV6STATDecember29/2011 Page 1 of 6Site Safety

  1. Radiation Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantityBonneville Power Administration wouldMassR&D100 Winners * Impacts on GlobalRachel Ruggirello RachelRadiation DrySafety Home

  2. Job Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergyTher i nA Guidephysics_today_article.pdf MoreEnergy JulyTemansonupdatedJob Safety

  3. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-11-01

    The following provides a summary of the specific issues addressed in this FY-95 Annual Update as they relate to the CH TRU safety bases: Executive Summary; Site Characteristics; Principal Design and Safety Criteria; Facility Design and Operation; Hazards and Accident Analysis; Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements; Radiological and Hazardous Material Protection; Institutional Programs; Quality Assurance; and Decontamination and Decommissioning. The System Design Descriptions`` (SDDS) for the WIPP were reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 3, Principal Design and Safety Criteria and Chapter 4, Facility Design and Operation. This provides the most currently available final engineering design information on waste emplacement operations throughout the disposal phase up to the point of permanent closure. Also, the criteria which define the TRU waste to be accepted for disposal at the WIPP facility were summarized in Chapter 3 based on the WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.`` This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety analyses that develop and evaluate the adequacy of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Transuranic Wastes (WIPP CH TRU) safety bases necessary to ensure the safety of workers, the public and the environment from the hazards posed by WIPP waste handling and emplacement operations during the disposal phase and hazards associated with the decommissioning and decontamination phase. The analyses of the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) disposal of TRU and TRU mixed waste, and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 191, Subpart B and 40 CFR 268.6 will be addressed in detail in the WIPP Final Certification Application scheduled for submittal in October 1996 (40 CFR 191) and the No-Migration Variance Petition (40 CFR 268.6) scheduled for submittal in June 1996. Section 5.4, Long-Term Waste Isolation Assessment summarizes the current status of the assessment.

  4. High Exposure Facility Technical Description

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Carter, Gregory L.; Stithem, Arthur R.; Murphy, Mark K.; Smith, Alex K.

    2008-02-12

    The High Exposure Facility is a collimated high-level gamma irradiator that is located in the basement of the 318 building. It was custom developed by PNNL back in 1982 to meet the needs for high range radiological instrument calibrations and dosimeter irradiations. At the time no commercially available product existed that could create exposure rates up to 20,000 R/h. This document is intended to pass on the design criteria that was employed to create this unique facility, while maintaining compliance with ANSI N543-1974, "General Safety Standard for Installations Using Non-Medical X-Ray and Sealed Gamma-Ray Sources, Energies up to 10 MeV."

  5. Natural Phenomena Hazard Analysis and Design Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-08-03

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD)-1020-2012, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities, provides criteria and guidance for the analysis and design of facility structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are necessary to implement the requirements of DOE Order (O) 420.1C, Facility Safety, and to ensure that the SSCs will be able to effectively perform their intended safety functions under the effects of natural phenomena hazards (NPHs).

  6. Progress of the High Level Waste Program at the Defense Waste Processing Facility - 13178

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bricker, Jonathan M.; Fellinger, Terri L.; Staub, Aaron V.; Ray, Jeff W.; Iaukea, John F. [Savannah River Remediation, Aiken, South Carolina, 29808 (United States)] [Savannah River Remediation, Aiken, South Carolina, 29808 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The Defense Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site treats and immobilizes High Level Waste into a durable borosilicate glass for safe, permanent storage. The High Level Waste program significantly reduces environmental risks associated with the storage of radioactive waste from legacy efforts to separate fissionable nuclear material from irradiated targets and fuels. In an effort to support the disposition of radioactive waste and accelerate tank closure at the Savannah River Site, the Defense Waste Processing Facility recently implemented facility and flowsheet modifications to improve production by 25%. These improvements, while low in cost, translated to record facility production in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. In addition, significant progress has been accomplished on longer term projects aimed at simplifying and expanding the flexibility of the existing flowsheet in order to accommodate future processing needs and goals. (authors)

  7. Sealed Source Security and Disposition: Progress and Prospects - 13515

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jennison, Meaghan [National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC (United States)] [National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC (United States); Martin, David W. [National Nuclear Security Administration/Energetics Inc., Washington, DC (United States)] [National Nuclear Security Administration/Energetics Inc., Washington, DC (United States); Cuthbertson, Abigail [US DOE, Washington, DC (United States)] [US DOE, Washington, DC (United States)

    2013-07-01

    Due to their high activity and portability, unsecured or abandoned sealed sources could cause significant health or environmental damage. Further, some of these sources could be used either individually or in aggregate in radiological dispersal devices commonly referred to as 'dirty bombs', resulting in significant social disruption and economic impacts in the billions of dollars. Disposal access for disused sealed sources, however, has been a serious challenge. From 2008 to 2012, sealed source disposal was available to only 14 states; additionally, waste acceptance criteria for sealed sources at the low-level waste disposal facilities in operation both prior to and after 2012 exclude some common yet potentially dangerous sealed sources. Recent developments, however, suggest that significant improvement in addressing this challenge is possible, although challenges remain. These developments include 1) the initiation of operations at the Waste Control Specialists (WCS) commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facility in Andrews County, Texas; 2) the potential for significant revisions of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) 1995 'Final Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation' (1995 BTP); and 3) the Utah Department of Environmental Quality's (UDEQ) approval of a license variance for sealed source disposal at the EnergySolutions LLRW disposal facility near Clive, Utah. (authors)

  8. Sample Results from the Interim Salt Disposition Program Macrobatch 6 Tank 21H Qualification Samples

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peters, T. B.; Fink, S. D.

    2012-12-11

    Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) analyzed samples from Tank 21H in support of qualification of Macrobatch (Salt Batch) 6 for the Interim Salt Disposition Project (ISDP). This document reports partial results of the analyses of samples of Tank 21H. No issues with the projected Salt Batch 6 strategy are identified.

  9. Sample Results From The Interim Salt Disposition Program Macrobatch 6 Tank 21H Qualification Samples

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Peters, T. B.; Fink, S. D.

    2012-12-20

    Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) analyzed samples from Tank 21H in support of qualification of Macrobatch (Salt Batch) 6 for the Interim Salt Disposition Project (ISDP). This document reports partial results of the analyses of samples of Tank 21H. No issues with the projected Salt Batch 6 strategy are identified.

  10. EIS-0475: Disposition of the Bannister Federal Complex, Kansas City, MO

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    NNSA/DOE announces its intent to prepare an EIS for the disposition of the Bannister Federal Complex, Kansas City, MO. NNSA previously decided in a separate NEPA review (EA-1592) to relocate its operations from the Bannister Federal Complex to a newly constructed industrial campus eight miles from the current location.

  11. Plutonium-bearing materials feed report for the DOE Fissile Materials Disposition Program alternatives

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brough, W.G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Boerigter, S.T. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1995-04-06

    This report has identified all plutonium currently excess to DOE Defense Programs under current planning assumptions. A number of material categories win clearly fan within the scope of the MD (Materials Disposition) program, but the fate of the other categories are unknown at the present time. MD planning requires that estimates be made of those materials likely to be considered for disposition actions so that bounding cases for the PEIS (Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement) can be determined and so that processing which may be required can be identified in considering the various alternatives. A systematic analysis of the various alternatives in reachmg the preferred alternative requires an understanding of the possible range of values which may be taken by the various categories of feed materials. One table identifies the current total inventories excess to Defense Program planning needs and represents the bounding total of Pu which may become part of the MD disposition effort for all materials, except site return weapons. The other categories, principally irradiated fuel, rich scrap, and lean scrap, are discussed. Another table summarizes the ranges and expected quantities of Pu which could become the responsibility of the MD program. These values are to be used for assessing the impact of the various alternatives and for scaling operations to assess PEIS impact. Determination of the actual materials to be included in the disposition program will be done later.

  12. Reactor options for disposition of excess weapon plutonium: Selection criteria and decision process for assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Edmunds, T.; Buonpane, L.; Sicherman, A.; Sutcliffe, W.; Walter, C.; Holman, G.

    1994-01-01

    DOE is currently considering a wide range of alternatives for disposition of excess weapon plutonium, including using plutonium in mixed oxide fuel for light water reactors (LWRs). Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has been tasked to assist DOE in its efforts to develop a decision process and criteria for evaluating the technologies and reactor designs that have been proposed for the fission disposition alternative. This report outlines an approach for establishing such a decision process and selection criteria. The approach includes the capability to address multiple, sometimes conflicting, objectives, and to incorporate the impact of uncertainty. The approach has a firm theoretical foundation and similar approaches have been used successfully by private industry, DOE, and other government agencies to support and document complex, high impact technology choice decisions. Because of their similarity and relatively simple technology, this report focuses on three light water reactors studied in Phase 1 of the DOE Plutonium Disposition Study. The decision process can be extended to allow evaluation of other reactor technologies and disposition options such as direct disposal and retrievable storage.

  13. IDENTIFYING IMPURITIES IN SURPLUS NON PIT PLUTONIUM FEEDS FOR MOX OR ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Allender, J; Moore, E

    2010-07-14

    This report provides a technical basis for estimating the level of corrosion products in materials stored in DOE-STD-3013 containers based on extrapolating available chemical sample results. The primary focus is to estimate the levels of nickel, iron, and chromium impurities in plutonium-bearing materials identified for disposition in the United States Mixed Oxide fuel process.

  14. ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND SAFETY

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    California at Davis, University of

    ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAMS SPRING 2012 Including: Free Information Session New Program in Health and Safety CONTINUING AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION #12;2 Our Health and Safety Programs Workplace Health and Safety Certificate Program For every dollar invested in workplace safety, organizations

  15. Nuclear Safety | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Nuclear Safety Nuclear Safety The Office of Nuclear Safety establishes and maintains nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidance including policy and requirements relating to...

  16. Guide to research facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-06-01

    This Guide provides information on facilities at US Department of Energy (DOE) and other government laboratories that focus on research and development of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. These laboratories have opened these facilities to outside users within the scientific community to encourage cooperation between the laboratories and the private sector. The Guide features two types of facilities: designated user facilities and other research facilities. Designated user facilities are one-of-a-kind DOE facilities that are staffed by personnel with unparalleled expertise and that contain sophisticated equipment. Other research facilities are facilities at DOE and other government laboratories that provide sophisticated equipment, testing areas, or processes that may not be available at private facilities. Each facility listing includes the name and phone number of someone you can call for more information.

  17. DOE Records Disposition Schedule Changes | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    AFDC Printable Version Share this resource Send a link to EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page to someone by E-mail Share EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Facebook Tweet about EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Home Page on Twitter Bookmark EERE: Alternative Fuels Data Center Homesum_a_epg0_fpd_mmcf_m.xls" ,"Available from WebQuantity of Natural GasAdjustmentsShirleyEnergy A plug-in electric vehicle10nominateEnergy U.S.Safety, Cost Savings

  18. Used fuel disposition campaign international activities implementation plan.

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Nutt, W. M. (Nuclear Engineering Division)

    2011-06-29

    The management of used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste is required for any country using nuclear energy. This includes the storage, transportation, and disposal of low and intermediate level waste (LILW), used nuclear fuel (UNF), and high level waste (HLW). The Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC), within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT), is responsible for conducting research and development pertaining to the management of these materials in the U.S. Cooperation and collaboration with other countries would be beneficial to both the U.S. and other countries through information exchange and a broader participation of experts in the field. U.S. participation in international UNF and HLW exchanges leads to safe management of nuclear materials, increased security through global oversight, and protection of the environment worldwide. Such interactions offer the opportunity to develop consensus on policy, scientific, and technical approaches. Dialogue to address common technical issues helps develop an internationally recognized foundation of sound science, benefiting the U.S. and participating countries. The UNF and HLW management programs in nuclear countries are at different levels of maturity. All countries utilizing nuclear power must store UNF, mostly in wet storage, and HLW for those countries that reprocess UNF. Several countries either utilize or plan to utilize dry storage systems for UNF, perhaps for long periods of time (several decades). Geologic disposal programs are at various different states, ranging from essentially 'no progress' to selected sites and pending license applications to regulators. The table below summarizes the status of UNF and HLW management programs in several countriesa. Thus, the opportunity exists to collaborate at different levels ranging from providing expertise to those countries 'behind' the U.S. to obtaining access to information and expertise from those countries with more mature programs. The U.S. fuel cycle is a once through fuel cycle involving the direct disposal of UNF, as spent nuclear fuel, in a geologic repository (previously identified at Yucca Mountain, Nevada), following at most a few decades of storage (wet and dry). The geology at Yucca Mountain, unsaturated tuff, is unique among all countries investigating the disposal of UNF and HLW. The decision by the U.S. Department of Energy to no longer pursue the disposal of UNF at Yucca Mountain and possibly utilize very long term storage (approaching 100 years or more) while evaluating future fuel cycle alternatives for managing UNF, presents a different UNF and HLW management R&D portfolio that has been pursued in the U.S. In addition, the research and development activities managed by OCRWM have been transferred to DOE-NE. This requires a reconsideration of how the UFDC will engage in cooperative and collaborative activities with other countries. This report presents the UFDC implementation plan for international activities. The DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) has cooperated and collaborated with other countries in many different 'arenas' including the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and through bilateral agreements with other countries. These international activities benefited OCRWM through the acquisition and exchange of information, database development, and peer reviews by experts from other countries. DOE-NE cooperates and collaborates with other countries in similar 'arenas' with similar objectives and realizing similar benefits. However the DOE-NE focus has not typically been in the area of UNF and HLW management. This report will first summarize these recent cooperative and collaborative activities. The manner that the UFDC will cooperate and collaborate in the future is expected to change as R&D is conducted regarding long-term storage and the potential disposal of UNF and HLW in different geolo

  19. SHIPBOARD LABORATORY SAFETY PROGRAM

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    SHIPBOARD LABORATORY SAFETY PROGRAM INTEGRATED OCEAN DRILLING PROGRAM U.S. IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATION AUGUST 2013 #12;IODP Shipboard Laboratory Safety: Introduction 2 CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................................................6 TAMU EHSD: Laboratory Safety Manual

  20. Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Commercial Vehicle Safety...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Program Update: Ensuring Safe Transportation of Radioactive Material Carlisle Smith Director, Hazardous Materials Programs Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Email:...

  1. Fusion safety program Annual report, Fiscal year 1995

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Longhurst, G.R.; Cadwallader, L.C.; Carmack, W.J. [and others

    1995-12-01

    This report summarizes the major activities of the Fusion Safety Program in FY-95. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) is the designated lead laboratory, and Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company is the prime contractor for this program. The Fusion Safety Program was initiated in 1979. Activities are conducted at the INEL, at other DOE laboratories, and at other institutions. Among the technical areas covered in this report are tritium safety, beryllium safety, chemical reactions and activation product release, safety aspects of fusion magnet systems, plasma disruptions, risk assessment failure rate database development, and safety code development and application to fusion safety issues. Most of this work has been done in support of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Also included in the report are summaries of the safety and environmental studies performed by the Fusion Safety Program for the Tokamak Physics Experiment and the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor and the technical support for commercial fusion facility conceptual design studies. A final activity described is work to develop DOE Technical Standards for Safety of Fusion Test Facilities.

  2. Joint nuclear safety research projects between the US and Russian Federation International Nuclear Safety Centers

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bougaenko, S.E.; Kraev, A.E. [International Nuclear Safety Center of the Russian MINATOM, Moscow (Russian Federation); Hill, D.L.; Braun, J.C.; Klickman, A.E. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States). International Nuclear Safety Center

    1998-08-01

    The Russian Federation Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the US Department of Energy (USDOE) formed international Nuclear Safety Centers in October 1995 and July 1996, respectively, to collaborate on nuclear safety research. Since January 1997, the two centers have initiated the following nine joint research projects: (1) INSC web servers and databases; (2) Material properties measurement and assessment; (3) Coupled codes: Neutronic, thermal-hydraulic, mechanical and other; (4) Severe accident management for Soviet-designed reactors; (5) Transient management and advanced control; (6) Survey of relevant nuclear safety research facilities in the Russian Federation; (8) Advanced structural analysis; and (9) Development of a nuclear safety research and development plan for MINATOM. The joint projects were selected on the basis of recommendations from two groups of experts convened by NEA and from evaluations of safety impact, cost, and deployment potential. The paper summarizes the projects, including the long-term goals, the implementing strategy and some recent accomplishments for each project.

  3. Use of InSpector{sup TM} 1 1000 Instrument with LaBr{sub 3} for Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Applications at the Westinghouse Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP) - 13132

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Pritchard, Megan [Nuclear Safety Associates, P.O. Box 471488, Charlotte, NC 28247 (United States)] [Nuclear Safety Associates, P.O. Box 471488, Charlotte, NC 28247 (United States); Guido, Joe [System One Services, 12 Federal St. Ste. 205, Pittsburgh, PA 15212 (United States)] [System One Services, 12 Federal St. Ste. 205, Pittsburgh, PA 15212 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The Westinghouse Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP) is a former nuclear fuel cycle facility that is currently undergoing decommissioning. One aspect of the decommissioning scope is remediation of buried nuclear waste in unlined burial pits. The current Nuclear Criticality Safety program relies on application of criticality controls based on radiological setpoints from a 2 x 2 Sodium Iodide (NaI) detector. Because of the nature of the material buried (Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), depleted uranium, thorium, and radium) and the stringent threshold for application of criticality controls based on waste management (0.1 g {sup 235}U/L), a better method for {sup 235}U identification and quantification has been developed. This paper outlines the early stages of a quick, in-field nuclear material assay and {sup 235}U mass estimation process currently being deployed at HDP. Nuclear material initially classified such that NCS controls are necessary can be demonstrated not to require such controls and dispositioned as desired by project operations. Using Monte Carlo techniques and a high resolution Lanthanum Bromide (LaBr) detector with portable Multi-Channel Analyzer (MCA), a bounding {sup 235}U mass is assigned to basic geometries of nuclear material as it is excavated. The deployment of these methods and techniques has saved large amounts of time and money in the nuclear material remediation process. (authors)

  4. Hydrogen Safety Panel

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    or otherwise restricted information. Project ID: scs07weiner PNNL-SA-65397 2 IEA HIA Task 19 Working Group Hydrogen Safety Training Props Hydrogen Safety Panel Incident...

  5. August 2012 Safety Forecast

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    During the month of August, the focus safety areas be ramp safety and seat belt awareness. Heat continues to be a factor during the month of August. Continue...

  6. FIRE SAFETY REPORT ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH & SAFETY SERVICES

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Hong, Don

    FIRE SAFETY REPORT 2014 ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH & SAFETY SERVICES #12;1 | M T S U F I R E S A F E T Y R E P O R T FIRE SAFETY REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 2 RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF THE MTSU FIRE MARSHAL 2 GENERAL 3 SMOKING POLICY 3 CLASS A COMBUSTIBLES 4 CLASS B COMBUSTIBLES 4 FIRE

  7. Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    DAVIS, W.E.

    2000-03-08

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U.S. Department of Energy in Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee public safety, or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan ensures long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and must be updated, as a minimum, every 3 years.

  8. Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Tehran Research Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hosseini, Seyed Mohammad Hadi; Nematollahi, Mohammad Reza; Sepanloo, Kamran

    2004-07-01

    Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) application is found to be a practical tool for research reactor safety due to intense involvement of human interactions in an experimental facility. In this paper the application of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment to the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) is presented. The level 1 PSA application involved: Familiarization with the plant, selection of accident initiators, mitigating functions and system definitions, event tree constructions and quantification, fault tree constructions and quantification, human reliability, component failure data base development and dependent failure analysis. Each of the steps of the analysis given above is discussed with highlights from the selected results. Quantification of the constructed models is done using SAPHIRE software. This Study shows that the obtained core damage frequency for Tehran Research Reactor (8.368 E-6 per year) well meets the IAEA criterion for existing nuclear power plants (1E-4). But safety improvement suggestions are offered to decrease the most probable accidents. (authors)

  9. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Environmental Restoration (ER) Program Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-09-01

    The Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF) is a facility safety reference document for the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) environmental restoration activities. The BSAF contains information and guidance for safety analysis documentation required by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for environmental restoration (ER) activities, including: Characterization of potentially contaminated sites. Remedial investigations to identify and remedial actions to clean up existing and potential releases from inactive waste sites Decontamination and dismantlement of surplus facilities. The information is INEL-specific and is in the format required by DOE-EM-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports. An author of safety analysis documentation need only write information concerning that activity and refer to BSAF for further information or copy applicable chapters and sections. The information and guidance provided are suitable for: {sm_bullet} Nuclear facilities (DOE Order 5480-23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports) with hazards that meet the Category 3 threshold (DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports) {sm_bullet} Radiological facilities (DOE-EM-STD-5502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation) Nonnuclear facilities (DOE-EM-STD-5502-94) that are classified as {open_quotes}low{close_quotes} hazard facilities (DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System). Additionally, the BSAF could be used as an information source for Health and Safety Plans and for Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) for nuclear facilities with hazards equal to or greater than the Category 2 thresholds, or for nonnuclear facilities with {open_quotes}moderate{close_quotes} or {open_quotes}high{close_quotes} hazard classifications.

  10. Evaluation of disposition scores in Bos indicus/Bos taurus cross calves at different stages of production 

    E-Print Network [OSTI]

    Funkhouser, Rena Rebecca

    2008-10-10

    Aggressiveness, nervousness, flightiness, gregariousness and overall disposition were evaluated in F2 Nellore-Angus embryo transfer calves (n = 443) from 13 full sib families and in half Bos indicus, half Bos taurus ...

  11. DOE explosives safety manual. Revision 7

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-08-01

    This manual prescribes the Department of Energy (DOE) safety rules used to implement the DOE safety policy for operations involving explosives. This manual is applicable to all DOE facilities engaged in operations of development, manufacturing, handling, storage, transportation, processing, or testing of explosives, pyrotechnics and propellants, or assemblies containing these materials. The standards of this manual deal with the operations involving explosives, pyrotechnics and propellants, and the safe management of such operations. The design of all new explosives facilities shall conform to the requirements established in this manual and implemented in DOE 6430.1A, ``General Design Criteria Manual.`` It is not intended that existing physical facilities be changed arbitrarily to comply with these provisions, except as required by law. Existing facilities that do not comply with these standards may continue to be used for the balance of their functional life, as long as the current operation presents no significantly greater risk than that assumed when the facility was originally designed and it can be demonstrated clearly that a modification to bring the facility into compliance is not feasible. However, in the case of a major renovation, the facility must be brought into compliance with current standards. The standards are presented as either mandatory or advisory. Mandatory standards, denoted by the words ``shall,`` ``must,`` or ``will,`` are requirements that must be followed unless written authority for deviation is granted as an exemption by the DOE. Advisory standards denoted by ``should`` or ``may`` are standards that may be deviated from with a waiver granted by facility management.

  12. Pressure Safety Program Implementation at ORNL

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lower, Mark; Etheridge, Tom; Oland, C. Barry

    2013-01-01

    The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a US Department of Energy (DOE) facility that is managed by UT-Battelle, LLC. In February 2006, DOE promulgated worker safety and health regulations to govern contractor activities at DOE sites. These regulations, which are provided in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program, establish requirements for worker safety and health program that reduce or prevent occupational injuries, illnesses, and accidental losses by providing DOE contractors and their workers with safe and healthful workplaces at DOE sites. The regulations state that contractors must achieve compliance no later than May 25, 2007. According to 10 CFR 851, Subpart C, Specific Program Requirements, contractors must have a structured approach to their worker safety and health programs that at a minimum includes provisions for pressure safety. In implementing the structured approach for pressure safety, contractors must establish safety policies and procedures to ensure that pressure systems are designed, fabricated, tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, and operated by trained, qualified personnel in accordance with applicable sound engineering principles. In addition, contractors must ensure that all pressure vessels, boilers, air receivers, and supporting piping systems conform to (1) applicable American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (2004) Sections I through XII, including applicable code cases; (2) applicable ASME B31 piping codes; and (3) the strictest applicable state and local codes. When national consensus codes are not applicable because of pressure range, vessel geometry, use of special materials, etc., contractors must implement measures to provide equivalent protection and ensure a level of safety greater than or equal to the level of protection afforded by the ASME or applicable state or local codes. This report documents the work performed to address legacy pressure vessel deficiencies and comply with pressure safety requirements in 10 CFR 851. It also describes actions taken to develop and implement ORNL’s Pressure Safety Program.

  13. Nuclear criticality safety evaluation of Spray Booth Operations in X-705, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sheaffer, M.K.; Keeton, S.C.

    1993-09-20

    This report evaluates nuclear criticality safety for Spray Booth Operations in the Decontamination and Recovery Facility, X-705, at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. A general description of current procedures and related hardware/equipment is presented. Control parameters relevant to nuclear criticality safety are explained, and a consolidated listing of administrative controls and safety systems is developed. Based on compliance with DOE Orders and MMES practices, the overall operation is evaluated, and recommendations for enhanced safety are suggested.

  14. DOE Plutonium Disposition Study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 1, Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-05-15

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document, Volume 1, presents a technical description of the various elements of the System 80 + Standard Plant Design upon which the Plutonium Disposition Study was based. The System 80 + Standard Design is fully developed and directly suited to meeting the mission objectives for plutonium disposal. The bass U0{sub 2} plant design is discussed here.

  15. Immobilization as a route to surplus fissile materials disposition. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); McKibben, J.M. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States)

    1996-03-15

    The safe management of surplus weapons plutonium is a very important and urgent task with profound environmental, national and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Police Directive 13 and various analysis by renown scientific, technical and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths forward for the long term disposition of surplus weapons usable plutonium. The central, overarching goal is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons, as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in civilian spent reactor fuel. One disposition alternative considered for surplus Pu is immobilization, in which plutonium would be emplaced in glass, ceramic or glass-bonded zeolite. This option, along with some of the progress over the last year is discussed.

  16. U.S. weapons-usable plutonium disposition policy: Implementation of the MOX fuel option

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Woods, A.L. [ed.] [Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium, TX (United States); Gonzalez, V.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States). Dept. of Political Science

    1998-10-01

    A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of US weapons-grade plutonium, which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option was examined in the context of national and international nonproliferation policy, and in contrast to US plutonium policy. The study reveals numerous difficulties in achieving effective implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option including unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, technological uncertainties, public opposition, potentially conflicting federal policies, and the need for international assurances of reciprocal plutonium disposition activities. It is believed that these difficulties can be resolved in time so that the implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option can eventually be effective in accomplishing its policy objective.

  17. Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition: Plutonium Packaging, Storage and Transportation and Waste Treatment, Storage and Disposal Activities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Jardine, L J; Borisov, G B

    2004-07-21

    A fifth annual Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition meeting organized by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was held February 16-18, 2004, at the State Education Center (SEC), 4 Aerodromnya Drive, St. Petersburg, Russia. The meeting discussed Excess Weapons Plutonium Disposition topics for which LLNL has the US Technical Lead Organization responsibilities. The technical areas discussed included Radioactive Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal, Plutonium Oxide and Plutonium Metal Packaging, Storage and Transportation and Spent Fuel Packaging, Storage and Transportation. The meeting was conducted with a conference format using technical presentations of papers with simultaneous translation into English and Russian. There were 46 Russian attendees from 14 different Russian organizations and six non-Russian attendees, four from the US and two from France. Forty technical presentations were made. The meeting agenda is given in Appendix B and the attendance list is in Appendix C.

  18. EIS-0287: Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement, EIS-0287 (September 2002)

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This EIS analyzes the potential environmental consequences of alternatives for managing high-level waste (HLW) calcine, mixed transuranic waste/sodium bearing waste (SBW) and newly generated liquid...

  19. Safety assessment of outdoor live fire range

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1989-05-01

    The following Safety Assessment (SA) pertains to the outdoor live fire range facility (LFR). The purpose of this facility is to supplement the indoor LFR. In particular it provides capacity for exercises that would be inappropriate on the indoor range. This SA examines the risks that are attendant to the training on the outdoor LFR. The outdoor LFR used by EG&G Mound is privately owned. It is identified as the Miami Valley Shooting Grounds. Mondays are leased for the exclusive use of EG&G Mound.

  20. Liquid Effluent Retention Facility (LERF) Final Hazard Category Determination

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    HUTH, L.L.

    2001-06-06

    The Liquid Effluent Retention Facility was designed to store 242-A Evaporator process condensate and other liquid waste streams for treatment at the 200 East Area Effluent Treatment Facility. The Liquid Effluent Retention Facility has been previously classified as a Category 3 Nonreactor Nuclear Facility. As defined in Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports (DOE 1992, DOE 1997), Category 3 Nuclear Facilities have the potential for significant localized (radiological) consequences. However, based on current facility design, operations, and radioactive constituent concentrations, the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility does not have the potential for significant localized (radiological) consequences and is categorized as a Radiological Facility. This report documents the final hazard categorization process performed in accordance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. This report describes the current configuration and operations of the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility. Also included is a preliminary hazard categorization, which is based on current and proposed radioactive and hazardous material inventories, a preliminary hazards and accident analysis, and a final hazard category determination. The results of the hazards and accident analysis, based on the current configuration and operations of the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility and the current and proposed radioactive and hazardous material inventories, demonstrate that the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility does not have the potential for significant localized (radiological) consequences. Based on the final hazard category analysis, the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility is a Radiological Facility. The final hazard category determination is based on a comparative evaluation of the consequence basis for the Category 3 threshold quantities to the calculated consequences for credible releases The basis for the Category 3 threshold quantities is 10 rem-equivalent man at 30 meters (98 feet) (DOE 1992, DOE 1997). The calculated 12 hour consequences to an individual located at 30 meters (98 feet) for two credible scenarios, spray release and a pool release, are 3.50 rem and 1.32 rem, respectively, which based upon the original hazard categorization criteria (DOE 1992) classified the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility as a Radiological Facility. Comparison of the calculated 24 hour consequences to an individual located at 30 meters (98 feet) for two credible scenarios, spray release and a pool release, 7.00 rem and 2.64 rem respectively, confirmed the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility classification as a Radiological Facility under the current hazard categorization criteria (DOE 1997). Both result in dose consequence values less than the allowable, 10 rem, meeting the requirements for categorizing the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility as a Radiological Facility.