National Library of Energy BETA

Sample records for facilities safety board

  1. Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    8, 2014 Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNSFB) Vice Chairwoman Jesse Roberson visited and toured the WIPP site this week. While...

  2. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Letters and Recommenda...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Letters and Recommendations Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Letters and Recommendations Defense Nuclear Facilities ...

  3. NNSA and Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board certifications...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    allocated funding NNSA and Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board certifications free up 47 million in previously allocated funding The DNFSB and NNSA required the CMRR...

  4. Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    (DNFSB) | Department of Energy Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) The Office of the Departmental Representative ensures effective cross-organizational leadership and coordination to resolve DNFSB-identified technical and management issues as we work to ensure the health, safety, and security of the workers, public, and environment. This web site is an important

  5. Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1999-01-26

    This Manual presents the process the Department of Energy will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) and its staff. Cancels DOE M 140.1-1.

  6. Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-03-30

    This Manual presents the process the Department of Energy will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) and its staff. Supersedes DOE M 140.1-1A.

  7. Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1996-12-30

    The manual defines the process DOE will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and its staff. Canceled by DOE M 140.1-1A. Does not cancel other directives.

  8. Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting- October 2012

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting on the Status of Integration of Safety Into the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility [HIAR-Y-12-2012-10-02

  9. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-11-20

    The objective of this Order is to establish facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. The Order has Change 1 dated 11-16-95, Change 2 dated 10-24-96, and the latest Change 3 dated 11-22-00 incorporated. The latest change satisfies a commitment made to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in response to DNFSB recommendation 97-2, Criticality Safety.

  10. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1996-10-24

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  11. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-11-16

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation.

  12. Annual Report To Congress. Department of Energy Activities Relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Calendar Year 2003

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    None, None

    2004-02-28

    The Department of Energy (Department) submits an Annual Report to Congress each year detailing the Departmentís activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), which provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) regarding public health and safety issues at the Departmentís defense nuclear facilities. In 2003, the Department continued ongoing activities to resolve issues identified by the Board in formal recommendations and correspondence, staff issue reports pertaining to Department facilities, and public meetings and briefings. Additionally, the Department is implementing several key safety initiatives to address and prevent safety issues: safety culture and review of the Columbia accident investigation; risk reduction through stabilization of excess nuclear materials; the Facility Representative Program; independent oversight and performance assurance; the Federal Technical Capability Program (FTCP); executive safety initiatives; and quality assurance activities. The following summarizes the key activities addressed in this Annual Report.

  13. Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 1998

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1999-02-01

    This is the ninth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy (Department) activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department`s defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department`s defense nuclear facilities. The locations of the major Department facilities are provided. During 1998, Departmental activities resulted in the proposed closure of one Board recommendation. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with four other Board recommendations. Two new Board recommendations were received and accepted by the Department in 1998, and two new implementation plans are being developed to address these recommendations. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, a renewed effort to increase the technical capabilities of the federal workforce, and a revised plan for stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  14. Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 October...

  15. Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Calendar Year 1999

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2000-02-01

    This is the tenth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department's defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department's defense nuclear facilities. During 1999, Departmental activities resulted in the closure of nine Board recommendations. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with three Board recommendations. One new Board recommendation was received and accepted by the Department in 1999, and a new implementation plan is being developed to address this recommendation. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, opening of a repository for long-term storage of transuranic wastes, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  16. Annual report to Congress. Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 2000

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    2001-03-01

    This Annual Report to the Congress describes the Department of Energy's activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. During 2000, the Department completed its implementation and proposed closure of one Board recommendation and completed all implementation plan milestones associated with two additional Board recommendations. Also in 2000, the Department formally accepted two new Board recommendations and developed implementation plans in response to those recommendations. The Department also made significant progress with a number of broad-based safety initiatives. These include initial implementation of integrated safety management at field sites and within headquarters program offices, issuance of a nuclear safety rule, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  17. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22

    This Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for Department of Energy facilities, which includes nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards mitigation, and the System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1A. DOE O 420.1B Chg 1 issued 4-19-10.

  18. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. This Page Change is limited in scope to changes necessary to invoke DOE-STD-1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Document, and revised DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis as required methods. DOE O 420.1C Chg 1, dated 2-27-15, supersedes DOE O 420.1C.

  19. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-12-22

    The order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for nuclear and explosives safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and the System Engineer Program.Chg 1 incorporates the use of DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, mandatory for Hazard Category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities. Cancels DOE O 420.1A.

  20. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. Cancels DOE O 420.1B, DOE G 420.1-2 and DOE G 420.1-3.

  1. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1995-10-13

    Establishes facility safety requirements related to: nuclear safety design, criticality safety, fire protection and natural phenomena hazards mitigation. Cancels DOE 5480.7A, DOE 5480.24, DOE 5480.28 and Division 13 of DOE 6430.1A. Canceled by DOE O 420.1A.

  2. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2002-05-20

    To establish facility safety requirements for the Department of Energy, including National Nuclear Security Administration. Cancels DOE O 420.1. Canceled by DOE O 420.1B.

  3. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-06-21

    DOE-STD-1104 contains the Department's method and criteria for reviewing and approving nuclear facility's documented safety analysis (DSA). This review and approval formally document the basis for DOE, concluding that a facility can be operated safely in a manner that adequately protects workers, the public, and the environment. Therefore, it is appropriate to formally require implementation of the review methodology and criteria contained in DOE-STD-1104.

  4. Hanford Advisory Board Advice: Testing Safety Culture in Practice,

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Hanford Advisory Board Advice: Testing Safety Culture in Practice, Draft 3, Feb 3, 2016 Lead Issue Managers: Dirk Dunning and Liz Mattson Background The Hanford Advisory Board (HAB, Board) has been focused on reviewing, discussing, and issuing advice on safety culture since the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued its Recommendation 2011-1: Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in June 2011. Safety culture terminology has created confusion in our discussions,

  5. CRAD, Facility Safety- Nuclear Facility Safety Basis

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Nuclear Facility Safety Basis.

  6. Facility Disposition Safety Strategy RM

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    ... facility and nuclear safety requirements defined in 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management, and worker safety requirements defined in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program. ...

  7. Facility Safety | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Facility Safety Facility Safety In addition to establishing nuclear safety requirements related to safety management programs that are essential to the safety of DOE nuclear facilities, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nuclear Facility Safety works proactively with headquarters and field offices to foster continuous improvement and nuclear safety excellence. In addition, the Office provides high quality, customer-oriented assistance that enables improved DOE program and field

  8. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-03-01

    Through the Atomic Energy Act, Congress made is possible for the public to get a full and fair hearing on civilian nuclear matters. Individuals who are directly affected by any licensing action involving a facility producing or utilizing nuclear materials may participate in a formal hearing, on the record, before independent judges on the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP or Panel). Frequently, in deciding whether a license, permit, amendment, or extension should be granted to a particular applicant, the Panel members must be more than mere umpires. If appropriate, they are authorized to go beyond the issues the parties place before them in order to identify, explore, and resolve significant questions involving threats to the public health and safety that come to a board`s attention during the proceedings. This brochure explains the purpose of the panel. Also addressed are: type of hearing handled; method of public participation; formality of hearings; high-level waste; other panel responsibilities and litigation technology.

  9. CRAD, Facility Safety - Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Department of Energy Facility Safety - Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements CRAD, Facility Safety - Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process.. CRADs provide a recommended approach and the types of information to

  10. Safety and Security at Trident Laser Facility

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safety and Security Safety and Security at Trident Laser Facility Enabling world-class science in high-energy density physics and fundamental laser-matter interactions Contact Operations Team Leader Randy Johnson (505) 665-5089 Email Governing Board Contact Ray Leeper (505) 667-3653 Email Safety and security at Trident are of utmost importance. All of our policies and procedures are in conformance with the integrated work management (IWM) policies of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Integrated

  11. Facility Safety | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nuclear Facility Safety works proactively with headquarters and field offices to foster continuous improvement and nuclear safety excellence. ...

  12. Facility Disposition Safety Strategy RM

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Facility Disposition Safety Strategy (FDSS) Review Module is a tool that assists DOE federal project review teams in evaluating the adequacy of the facility documentation, preparations or...

  13. Salt Waste Processing Facility, Line Management Review Board...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Line Management Review Board Charter Salt Waste Processing Facility, Line Management Review Board Charter The Line Management Review Board (LMRB) serves an important oversight ...

  14. Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    0.1C Chg 1, Facility Safety by Pranab Guha Functional areas: DNFSB, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety and Health Requirement, Facility Safety, Requires Crosswalk When Revised,...

  15. Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    O 420.1C Chg 1, Facility Safety by Pranab Guha Functional areas: DNFSB, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety and Health Requirement, Facility Safety, Requires Crosswalk When Revised, ...

  16. Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    The Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs establishes nuclear safety requirements related to safety management programs that are essential to the safety of DOE nuclear facilities.

  17. Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2011-07-21

    The order defines accelerators and establishes accelerator specific safety requirements and approval authorities which, when supplemented by other applicable safety and health requirements, promote safe operations to ensure protection of workers, the public, and the environment. Supersedes DOE O 420.2B.

  18. Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2001-01-08

    To establish accelerator-specific safety requirements which, when supplemented by other applicable safety and health requirements, will serve to prevent injuries and illnesses associated with Department of Energy (DOE) or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) accelerator operations. Cancels DOE O 420.2. Canceled by DOE O 420.2B.

  19. Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2004-07-23

    To establish accelerator-specific safety requirements which, when supplemented by other applicable safety and health requirements, will serve to prevent injuries and illnesses associated with Department of Energy (DOE) or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) accelerator operations. Cancels DOE O 420.2A. Certified 5-13-08. Canceled by DOE O 420.2C.

  20. CRAD, Facility Safety- Documented Safety Analysis

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Documented Safety Analysis.

  1. CRAD, Facility Safety- Technical Safety Requirements

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Technical Safety Requirments (TSA).

  2. Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH)...

  3. Salt Waste Processing Facility, Line Management Review Board Charter

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Line Management Review Board (LMRB) serves an important oversight function to monitor the readiness processes and associated deliverables for the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). The...

  4. AGING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C.E. Sanders

    2004-09-10

    The purpose of this design calculation is to revise and update the previous criticality calculation for the Aging Facility (documented in BSC 2004a). This design calculation will also demonstrate and ensure that the storage and aging operations to be performed in the Aging Facility meet the criticality safety design criteria in the ''Project Design Criteria Document'' (Doraswamy 2004, Section 4.9.2.2), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirement described in the ''SNF Aging System Description Document'' (BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004f, p. 3-12). The scope of this design calculation covers the systems and processes for aging commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and staging Department of Energy (DOE) SNF/High-Level Waste (HLW) prior to its placement in the final waste package (WP) (BSC 2004f, p. 1-1). Aging commercial SNF is a thermal management strategy, while staging DOE SNF/HLW will make loading of WPs more efficient (note that aging DOE SNF/HLW is not needed since these wastes are not expected to exceed the thermal limits form emplacement) (BSC 2004f, p. 1-2). The description of the changes in this revised document is as follows: (1) Include DOE SNF/HLW in addition to commercial SNF per the current ''SNF Aging System Description Document'' (BSC 2004f). (2) Update the evaluation of Category 1 and 2 event sequences for the Aging Facility as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004c, Section 7). (3) Further evaluate the design and criticality controls required for a storage/aging cask, referred to as MGR Site-specific Cask (MSC), to accommodate commercial fuel outside the content specification in the Certificate of Compliance for the existing NRC-certified storage casks. In addition, evaluate the design required for the MSC that will accommodate DOE SNF/HLW. This design calculation will achieve the objective of providing the criticality safety results to support the preliminary design of the Aging

  5. Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    104-2014, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents by Website Administrator This Standard describes a framework and the criteria to be...

  6. Facility Safety (9-23-10)--Withdrawn

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2010-09-23

    Withdrawn, 5-19-2014--This approval includes revision of the three implementing Guides: DOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide for Use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety; DOE G 420.1-2, Guide for the Mitigation of Natural Phenomena Hazards for DOE Nuclear Facilities and NonNuclear Facilities; and DOE G 420.1-3, Implementation Guide for DOE Fire Protection and Emergency Services Programs for Use with DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety

  7. Preparation Of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    9-2014, Preparation Of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis by Website Administrator This Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD), DOE-STD-3009-2014, describes...

  8. CRAD, Facility Safety- Nuclear Facility Design

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Nuclear Facility Design.

  9. Charter for the ARM Climate Research Facility Science Board

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ferrell, W

    2013-03-08

    The objective of the ARM Science Board is to promote the Nation’s scientific enterprise by ensuring that the best quality science is conducted at the DOE’s User Facility known as the ARM Climate Research Facility. The goal of the User Facility is to serve scientific researchers by providing unique data and tools to facilitate scientific applications for improving understanding and prediction of climate science.

  10. Facility Safety Policy, Guidance & Reports | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Facility Safety Policy, Guidance & Reports Facility Safety Policy, Guidance & Reports The Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs within the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Environment, Health, Safety and Security organization, establishes nuclear safety requirements related to safety management programs that are essential to the safety of DOE nuclear facilities. In addition, establishes requirements for facility design and operation for facility-wide hazards that are not unique to

  11. Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    MITCHELL,GERRY W.; LONGLEY,SUSAN W.; PHILBIN,JEFFREY S.; MAHN,JEFFREY A.; BERRY,DONALD T.; SCHWERS,NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK,THOMAS E.; NAEGELI,ROBERT E.

    2000-11-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.

  12. 2015 Nuclear & Facility Safety Programs Workshop Agenda | Department...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    2015 Nuclear and Facility Safety Programs Workshop agenda outlining following: Training Plenary Session Award Presentations Guest speakers Fire Safety Workshop Facility...

  13. Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars ...

  14. Occupational Safety Review of High Technology Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Lee Cadwallader

    2005-01-31

    This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators. These data are useful to form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known sets of safety rules and regulations. Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other industrial hazards. Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for comparison.

  15. 2016 Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop 2016 Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop March 22, 2016 - 3:48pm Addthis 2016 Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop The Office of Environmental Health, Safety, and Security will sponsor the 2016 Nuclear and Facility Safety Program Workshop which will be held May 2-6, 2016 at the Alexis Park in Las Vegas, Nevada. The Workshop will include meetings for the DOE Safety Culture Improvement Panel, Federal Technical Capability Panel, Facility

  16. Office of Nuclear Safety Basis and Facility Design

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Nuclear Safety Basis & Facility Design establishes safety basis and facility design requirements and expectations related to analysis and design of nuclear facilities to ensure protection of workers and the public from the hazards associated with nuclear operations.

  17. Safety of Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Batandjieva, B.; Warnecke, E.; Coates, R.

    2008-01-15

    Full text of publication follows: ensuring safety during all stages of facility life cycle is a widely recognised responsibility of the operators, implemented under the supervision of the regulatory body and other competent authorities. As the majority of the facilities worldwide are still in operation or shutdown, there is no substantial experience in decommissioning and evaluation of safety during decommissioning in majority of Member States. The need for cooperation and exchange of experience and good practices on ensuring and evaluating safety of decommissioning was one of the outcomes of the Berlin conference in 2002. On this basis during the last three years IAEA initiated a number of international projects that can assist countries, in particular small countries with limited resources. The main IAEA international projects addressing safety during decommissioning are: (i) DeSa Project on Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety during Decommissioning; (ii) R{sup 2}D{sup 2}P project on Research Reactors Decommissioning Demonstration Project; and (iii) Project on Evaluation and Decommissioning of Former Facilities that used Radioactive Material in Iraq. This paper focuses on the DeSa Project activities on (i) development of a harmonised methodology for safety assessment for decommissioning; (ii) development of a procedure for review of safety assessments; (iii) development of recommendations on application of the graded approach to the performance and review of safety assessments; and (iv) application of the methodology and procedure to the selected real facilities with different complexities and hazard potentials (a nuclear power plant, a research reactor and a nuclear laboratory). The paper also outlines the DeSa Project outcomes and planned follow-up activities. It also summarises the main objectives and activities of the Iraq Project and introduces the R{sup 2}D{sup 2} Project, which is a subject of a complementary paper.

  18. Safety overview of the National Ignition Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brereton, S.J.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.; Singh, M.; Tobin, M.; Trent, M.

    1996-05-23

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed US Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 laser beams onto a tiny deuterium- tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF mission is to achieve inertial confinement fusion (ICF) ignition, access physical conditions in matter of interest to nuclear weapons physics, provide an above ground simulation capability for nuclear weapons effects testing, and contribute to the development of inertial fusion for electrical power production. The NIF has been classified as a radiological, low hazard facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A draft Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been written, and this will be finalized later in 1996. This paper summarizes the safety issues associated with the operation of the NIF. It provides an overview of the hazards, estimates maximum routine and accidental exposures for the preferred site of LLNL, and concludes that the risks from NIF operations are low.

  19. Safety overview of the National Ignition Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brereton, S.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.; Singh, M.; Tobin, M.; Trent, M.; Yatabe, J.

    1996-12-31

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed U.S. Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory - New Mexico, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 laser beams onto a tiny deuterium-tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF has been classified as a radiological, low hazard facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A draft Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been written, and this will be finalized later in 1996, after independent review. This paper summarizes the safety issues associated with the construction and operation of the NIF. It provides an overview of the hazards, estimates maximum routine and accidental exposures for the preferred site of LLNL, and concludes that the risks from NIF operations are low. 9 refs., 2 figs., 2 tabs.

  20. DRY TRANSFER FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-05-17

    This design calculation updates the previous criticality evaluation for the fuel handling, transfer, and staging operations to be performed in the Dry Transfer Facility (DTF) including the remediation area. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that operations performed in the DTF and RF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Dry Transfer Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173737], p. 3-8). A description of the changes is as follows: (1) Update the supporting calculations for the various Category 1 and 2 event sequences as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 171429], Section 7). (2) Update the criticality safety calculations for the DTF staging racks and the remediation pool to reflect the current design. This design calculation focuses on commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies, i.e., pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) SNF. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) owned SNF is evaluated in depth in the ''Canister Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173284]) and is also applicable to DTF operations. Further, the design and safety analyses of the naval SNF canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. Also, note that the results for the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) Site specific Cask (MSC) calculations are limited to the

  1. CRAD, New Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis and Technical...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    December 2, 2014 New Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements Criteria Review and Approach Document (EA CRAD 31-07, Rev. 0) CRAD, New Nuclear...

  2. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-04-07

    This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the CHF and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility

  3. Radiological Safety Training for Accelerator Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    TS NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1108-2002 May 2002 Reaffirmation with Change Notice 2 July 2013 DOE HANDBOOK RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING FOR ACCELERATOR FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document is available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web Site at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds/ Change Notice No.2 Radiological Training

  4. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    145-2008 April 2008 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax (301) 903-9823. Available to the public

  5. Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide for Use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2000-03-28

    This Guide provides guidance on the application of requirements for nonreactor nuclear facilities and explosives facilities of Department of Energy (DOE) O 420.1, Facility Safety, Section 4.1, Nuclear and Explosives Safety Design Criteria. No cancellation.

  6. CRAD, Nuclear Facility Safety System- September 25, 2009

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Nuclear Facility Safety System Functionality Inspection Criteria, Inspection Activities, and Lines of Inquiry (HSS CRAD 64-17, Rev 0 )

  7. Safety | Department of Energy

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    On February 7, 2014, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Safety, Security, and Quality Programs Environmental Management, ... Serves as liaison to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board ...

  8. Hanford Advisory Board Draft Advice Topic: Transportation Infrastructure Updates Safety Consideration

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Transportation Infrastructure Updates Safety Consideration Authors: Bloom, Korenko & Holland Originating Committee: Health, Safety & Environmental Protection Version #1 Color: __pink_X_yellow__green__salmon__purple__blue Background The Hanford Advisory Board (Board) understands that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is currently focusing on updates to the Hanford Site infrastructure, including water, sewer, data, utilities, roads, and traffic safety. The Board is aware of the effort

  9. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1145-2013 March 2013 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy TRNG-0061 Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax (301) 903-9823. Available to the

  10. Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    DOE HDBK-1113-2008 April 2008 DOE HANDBOOK RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING FOR URANIUM FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy FSC 6910 Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1113-2008 ii This document is available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web Site at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds/ DOE-HDBK-1113-2008 iii Foreword This Handbook describes a recommended

  11. Compressed Gas Safety for Experimental Fusion Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    2005-05-15

    Experimental fusion facilities present a variety of hazards to the operators and staff. There are unique or specialized hazards, including magnetic fields, cryogens, radio frequency emissions, and vacuum reservoirs. There are also more general industrial hazards, such as a wide variety of electrical power, pressurized air and cooling water systems in use, there are crane and hoist loads, working at height, and handling compressed gas cylinders. This paper outlines the projectile hazard associated with compressed gas cylinders and methods of treatment to provide for compressed gas safety. This information should be of interest to personnel at both magnetic and inertial fusion experiments.

  12. Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Documents (Documented Safety Analyses and Technical Safety Requirements)

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    DOE-STD-1104-96 November 2005 CHANGE NOTICE NO. 3 Date December 2005 DOE STANDARD REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY BASIS DOCUMENTS (DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSES AND TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS) U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, DC 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information

  13. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE O 420.2B, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2005-07-01

    This document is an aid to understanding and meeting the requirements of DOE O 420.2B, Safety of Accelerator Facilities, dated 7/23/04. It does not impose requirements beyond those stated in that Order or any other DOE Order. No cancellation.

  14. NEW - DOE O 420.1 Chg 1, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, natural phenomena hazards (NPH) mitigation, and System Engineer Program. This Page Change is limited in scope to changes necessary to invoke DOE-STD-1104, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Document, and revised DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis as required methods. DOE O 420.1C Chg 1, dated 2-27-15, cancels DOE O 420.1C, dated 12-4-12.

  15. Safety in urban environment and emergency notice boards

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Confortini, Claudia; Tira, Maurizio

    2008-07-08

    Reliable and safe urban system conditions have to be a crucial goal of ordinary planning activities. Among planning goals, priority must be given to indications relating to the safety levels to be achieved and to the amount of resources to be directed towards reducing the vulnerability of urban systems and therefore of the measures to be taken. Uban vulnerability cannot in fact be reduced to the sum of the vulnerability of single buildings or to the physical vulnerability of its various components. This research work consists of identifying those urban sub-areas that are important for safety in relation to natural risks, ambits that should be highlighted by means of permanent emergency notice boards/billboards. What are the hazard notices relating to all natural hazards and related risks? Where are they located? Are they clear and straightforward so that all residents and visitors are able to understand them, as it is already the case for road signs (or at least it should be)? What urban sub-areas are worth highlighting in relation to natural risks, acting for example as escape routes or meeting points? How is information for the public managed in order that people are immediately, easily and regularly notified? What is the relation of such signals to ordinary traffic signals? Research into the state of the art of permanent notice boards/billboards of this type, currently distinguished only by sporadic and local initiatives, aims at carrying out a census of and recognizing urban elements already considered as important for reducing the vulnerability of the urban system to different natural calamities and at providing new highlights as regards the identification of new ones. The next step is to work out a decision and common-language strategy for planning these elements and for their adequate signposting, so as to be able to live in the urban environment with awareness, safety and confidence, including with respect to more remote and therefore often neglected

  16. Safety Culture And Best Practices At Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rule, K.; King, M.; Takase, Y.; Oshima, Y.; Nishimura, K.; Sukegawa, A.

    2014-04-01

    The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

  17. Safety Culture and Best Practices at Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Rule, Keith

    2014-05-01

    The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

  18. Excellence Award in the 2012 Facilities Environmental, Safety...

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Excellence Award in the 2012 Facilities Environmental, Safety and Health Go Green Initiative - Sandia Energy Energy Search Icon Sandia Home Locations Contact Us Employee Locator ...

  19. Charter for the ARM Climate Research Facility Science Board ...

    Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI)

    The objective of the ARM Science Board is to promote the Nation's scientific enterprise by ... scientific applications for improving understanding and prediction of climate science. ...

  20. FUEL HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-06-30

    The purpose of this design calculation is to perform a criticality evaluation of the Fuel Handling Facility (FHF) and the operations and processes performed therein. The current intent of the FHF is to receive transportation casks whose contents will be unloaded and transferred to waste packages (WP) or MGR Specific Casks (MSC) in the fuel transfer bays. Further, the WPs will also be prepared in the FHF for transfer to the sub-surface facility (for disposal). The MSCs will be transferred to the Aging Facility for storage. The criticality evaluation of the FHF features the following: (I) Consider the types of waste to be received in the FHF as specified below: (1) Uncanistered commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF); (2) Canistered CSNF (with the exception of horizontal dual-purpose canister (DPC) and/or multi-purpose canisters (MPCs)); (3) Navy canistered SNF (long and short); (4) Department of Energy (DOE) canistered high-level waste (HLW); and (5) DOE canistered SNF (with the exception of MCOs). (II) Evaluate the criticality analyses previously performed for the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-certified transportation casks (under 10 CFR 71) to be received in the FHF to ensure that these analyses address all FHF conditions including normal operations, and Category 1 and 2 event sequences. (III) Evaluate FHF criticality conditions resulting from various Category 1 and 2 event sequences. Note that there are currently no Category 1 and 2 event sequences identified for FHF. Consequently, potential hazards from a criticality point of view will be considered as identified in the ''Internal Hazards Analysis for License Application'' document (BSC 2004c, Section 6.6.4). (IV) Assess effects of potential moderator intrusion into the fuel transfer bay for defense in depth. The SNF/HLW waste transfer activity (i.e., assembly and canister transfer) that is being carried out in the FHF has been classified as safety category in the ''Q-list'' (BSC 2003, p. A-6

  1. Safety analysis report for the Waste Storage Facility. Revision 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Bengston, S.J.

    1994-05-01

    This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Storage Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Storage Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume.

  2. Facility Safety - DOE Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Alamos Site Office | National Nuclear Security Administration | (NNSA) Facility Representative, Technical Area (TA-55) Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos Site Office John Krepps John Krepps June 2010 U.S. Department of Energy Facility Representative of the Year John Krepps, a facility representative for the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Los Alamos Site Office, received the Department of Energy's top award for oversight of nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. Krepps, a Los

  3. Utah - UC 54-14 - Utility Facility Review Board Act | Open Energy...

    Open Energy Info (EERE)

    Utah - UC 54-14 - Utility Facility Review Board Act Jump to: navigation, search OpenEI Reference LibraryAdd to library Legal Document- StatuteStatute: Utah - UC 54-14 - Utility...

  4. Hanford Advisory Board Draft Letter Topic: Environmental Restoration and Disposal Facility

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Topic: Environmental Restoration and Disposal Facility Authors: Mattson, Leckband, Suyama Originating Committee: River & Plateau Version #1 packet 1 Dear Ms. Charboneau and Mr. Faulk, The Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) agencies announced that they were proceeding with a vertical expansion approach for the Environmental Restoration and Disposal Facility (ERDF) during the Feb. 2016 full Hanford Advisory Board (Board) meeting, and again at the Feb. 2016 River and Plateau (RAP) committee meeting.

  5. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    WEISS, E.V.

    2000-12-15

    Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste.

  6. A Focus on Offshore Safety: Recent Reports by The Marine Board of the National Research Council

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1997-10-01

    During the last three years, the Marine Board of the National Research Council (NRC) has published four study reports that focused on enhancing safety in offshore oil and gas activities and in the marine and maritime fields. The objective of these studies was to provide recommendations for actions that will reduce or eliminate deaths and injuries, reduce pollution from accidents and operations, and protect resources and structures from loss. Several recurring themes are woven through many of these reports. The themes deal with using technology already available and demonstrated, using risk analyses to establish priorities for use of resources (such as inspection facilities and personnel) despite the lack of data for decision making, using advanced tools for inspection and monitoring, and using long-term monitoring to gauge performance. One report about improving marine pipeline safety describes the safety challenges associated with designing, regulating, and monitoring over 20,000 miles of underwater pipelines in federal and state waters. The report on the restoration and protection of marine habitats comments on the institutional, regulatory, and managerial impediments to the wider application of the best engineering technologies and practices and the ways to deal with these impediments. The report on assessment techniques for removing offshore structures provides guidance on the use of technologies and their associated hazards and the development of strategies to mitigate environmental damage when offshore structures must be removed. One of the most recent reports describes a concept for using present undersea vehicles technology and systems to perform tasks that respond to the need to monitor the condition of offshore pipelines and seabed facilities. Two studies now underway continue several of the themes noted in aforementioned reports: one theme being a review of the uses of risk assessment opportunities in an effort to find useful experience from other

  7. Preparation Of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-11-12

    This Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD), DOE-STD-3009-2014, describes a method for preparing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) that is acceptable to DOE for nonreactor nuclear facilities.

  8. Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Armstrong, D.L.

    1994-08-01

    This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

  9. 2015 Nuclear & Facility Safety Programs Workshop

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    The workshop will feature training opportunities, sharing of best practices and lessons-learned, thought-provoking discussions, and an award ceremony recognizing outstanding performance by DOE safety professionals.

  10. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Idaho MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a February 2006 Commencement of Operations assessment of the Occupational Safety and Industrial Hygiene programs at the MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project.

  11. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Update - Dale...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Identify Department vulnerabilities in design, construction and operations to allow the Secretary to address issues before they become major problems. Review and evaluate the ...

  12. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laycak, D. T.

    2014-04-16

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  13. Facility Safety (For Informational Purposes Only)

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-12-04

    This draft has been scheduled for final review before the Directives Review Board on 12/18/14. All major comments and concerns should be provided to your DRB representative, following your organization process. If you do not know who your representative is, please see the list of DRB members. If your office is represented by Ingrid Kolb, Director, Office of Management, please submit your major concerns and comments to the DRB Liaison, Camille Beben (Camille.Beben@hq.doe.gov; 202-586-1014). All major comments and concerns should be submitted by COB 12/16/2014.

  14. Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    1998-05-01

    Volume One of this Standard has been revised to provide a Department of Energy (DOE) approved methodology for preparing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, as well as environmental restoration activities that involve work not done within a permanent structure. Methodologies provided in this Standard are intended to be compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B, Safety Basis Requirements. Volume Two contains the appendices that provide additional environment, safety and health (ES&H) information to complement Volume 1 of this Standard. Volume 2 of the Standard is much broader in scope than Volume 1 and satisfies several purposes. Integrated safety management expectations are provided in accordance with facility disposition requirements contained in DOE O 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management.

  15. A safety overview of Sandia National Laboratories' reactor facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Philbin, J.S.

    1989-04-01

    This report provides an overview of Sandia National Laboratories' safety policies and practices supporting the operation of Sandia's nuclear reactor facilities. These policies and practices have evolved from Sandia's 30 years of experience and leadership in the design, construction, and operation of steady-state and pulse research reactors. The report illustrates how Sandia has implemented DOE orders and research reactor standards with the goal of reducing risks to the lowest reasonable levels for its employees, contractors, the public, and the environment. The impact of DOE orders and standards on virtually all aspects of reactor operations and administration is illustrated. Included in the report are descriptions of safety documentation (Technical Specifications and Safety Analysis Reports); the facility safety review system for addressing radiological protection and other environmental, safety and health issues; experiment activities; quality assurance; training and certification; and emergency planning.

  16. CRAD, Facility Safety- Readiness Review Program

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Readiness Review Program.

  17. Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Guide for use with DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2012-12-04

    This Guide provides an acceptable approach for safety design of DOE hazard category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities for satisfying the requirements of DOE O 420.1C. Supersedes DOE G 420.1-1.

  18. NNSA and Defense Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    and Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board certifications free up 47 million in previously allocated funding October 2, 2009 Los Alamos, New Mexico, Oct. 2, 2009 - The Chemistry...

  19. Fuel Storage Facility Final Safety Analysis Report. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Linderoth, C.E.

    1984-03-01

    The Fuel Storage Facility (FSF) is an integral part of the Fast Flux Test Facility. Its purpose is to provide long-term storage (20-year design life) for spent fuel core elements used to provide the fast flux environment in FFTF, and for test fuel pins, components and subassemblies that have been irradiated in the fast flux environment. This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and its supporting documentation provides a complete description and safety evaluation of the site, the plant design, operations, and potential accidents.

  20. Nuclear and Facility Safety Directives | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Directives Nuclear and Facility Safety Directives DOE Order (O) 252.1A, Technical Standards Program DOE O 252.1A promotes DOE's use of Voluntary Consensus Standards (VCS) as the primary method for application of technical standards and establishes and manages the DOE Technical Standards Program (TSP) including technical standards development, information, activities, issues, and interactions. AU-30 Contact: Jeff Feit DOE Policy (P) 420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy DOE P 420.1,

  1. Statement of Matt Moury Deputy Assistant Secretary, Safety, Security...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Matt Moury Deputy Assistant Secretary, Safety, Security, and Quality Programs for Environmental Management Office ... Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board ...

  2. Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S.; Delicate, W.S.

    1995-05-01

    This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities.

  3. CRAD, Safety Basis- Idaho MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a May 2007 readiness assessment of the Safety Basis at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project.

  4. The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility: Status-2004

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Anderl, R.A.; Longhurst, G.R.; Pawelko, R.J.; Sharpe, J.P.; Schuetz, S.T.; Petti, D.A.

    2005-07-15

    The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility, a US DOE National User Facility at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), comprises capabilities and infrastructure to support both tritium and non-tritium research activities important to the development of safe and environmentally friendly fusion energy. Research thrusts include (1) interactions of tritium and deuterium with plasma-facing-component (PFC) materials, (2) fusion safety issues [PFC material chemical reactivity and dust/debris generation, activation product mobilization, tritium behavior in fusion systems], and (3) molten salts and fusion liquids for tritium breeder and coolant applications. This paper updates the status of STAR and the capabilities for ongoing research activities, with an emphasis on the development, testing and integration of the infrastructure to support tritium research activities. Key elements of this infrastructure include a tritium storage and assay system, a tritium cleanup system to process glovebox and experiment tritiated effluent gases, and facility tritium monitoring systems.

  5. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laycak, D

    2008-06-16

    This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  6. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Laycak, D T

    2010-03-05

    This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  7. Nuclear Safety Information | Department of Energy

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Nuclear Safety Information Nuclear Safety Information Idaho National Laboratory's Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) | April 8, 2009 Idaho National Laboratory's Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) | April 8, 2009 Nuclear Facilities List and Map Nuclear Safety Regulatory Framework Summary Pamphlet, Nuclear Safety at the Department of Energy External Nuclear Safety Links Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Contact Tom Staker

  8. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-01-14

    These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S & H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules.

  9. Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    SENSITIVE DOE-STD-1104-2014 December 2014 Superseding DOE-STD-1104-2009 DOE STANDARD REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY BASIS AND SAFETY DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, DC 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-1104-2014 i FOREWORD 1. This Standard describes a framework and the criteria to be used for approval of (1) safety basis documents, as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulation

  10. Pre-operational safety appraisal Tritiated Scrap Recovery Facility, Mound facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dauby, J.J.; Flanagan, T.M.; Metcalf, L.W.; Rhinehammer, T.B.

    1996-07-01

    The purpose of this report is to identify, assess, and document the hazards which are associated with the proposed operation of the Tritiated Scrap Recovery Facility at Mound Facility. A Pre-operational Safety Appraisal is a requirement as stated in Department of Energy Order 5481.1, Safety Analysis and Review System. The operations to be conducted in the new Tritiated Scrap Waste Recovery Facility are not new, but a continuation of a prime mission of Mound`s i.e. recovery of tritium from waste produced throughout the DOE complex. The new facility is a replacement of an existing process started in the early 1960`s and incorporates numerous design changes to enhance personnel and environmental safety. This report also documents the safety of a one time operation involving the recovery of tritium from material obtained by the Department of Energy from the State of Arizona. This project will involve the processing of 240,000 curies of tritium contained in glass ampoules that were to be used in items such as luminous dial watches. These were manufactured by the now defunct American Atomics Corporation, Tucson, Arizona.

  11. Preliminary safety assessment for an IFE target fabrication facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Latkowski, J F; Reyes, S; Besenbruch, G E; Goodin, D T

    2000-10-13

    We estimate possible ranges of tritium inventories for an inertial fusion energy (IFE) target fabrication facility producing various types of targets and using various production technologies. Target fill is the key subtask in determining the overall tritium inventory for the plant. By segmenting the inventory into multiple, parallel production lines--each with its own fill canister--and including an expansion tank to limit releases, we are able to ensure that a target fabrication facility would meet the accident dose goals of 10 mSv (1 rem) set forth in the Department of Energy's Fusion Safety Standards. For indirect-drive targets, we calculate release fractions for elements from lithium to bismuth and show that nearly all elements meet the dose goal. Our work suggests directions for future R&D that will help reduce total tritium inventories and increase the flexibility of target fabrication facilities.

  12. TRANSPORTATION CASK RECEIPT/RETURN FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY EVALUATIONS

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-04-26

    The purpose of this design calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of transportation casks performed in the Transportation Cask Receipt and Return Facility (TCRRF) and Buffer Area meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirement described in the ''Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170217], Section 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of the following items: (1) Evaluate criticality effects for both dry and fully flooded conditions pertaining to TCRRF and Buffer Area operations for defense in depth. (2) Evaluate Category 1 and 2 event sequences for the TCRRF as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). This evaluation includes credible fuel reconfiguration conditions. In addition to the scope of work listed above, an evaluation was also performed of modeling assumptions for commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) regarding inclusion of plenum and end regions of the active fuel. This calculation is limited to CSNF and US Department of Energy (DOE) SNF. it should be mentioned that the latter waste form is evaluated more in depth in the ''Canister Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167614]). Further, the design and safety analyses of the naval SNF canisters are the responsibility of the US Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the TCRRF and Buffer Area and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility. However, it is anticipated that design changes to the facility layout will have little or no impact on the criticality results and/or conclusions

  13. Risk Assessment in Support of DOE Nuclear Safety, Risk Information Notice, June 2010

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    On August 12, 2009, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board(DNFSB) issued Recommendation 2009‚Äź1, Risk Assessment Methodologies at Defense Nuclear Facilities. Thisrecommendation focused on the...

  14. 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) based pyroprocessing facility safety evaluation plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ku, J.H.; Choung, W.M.; You, G.S.; Moon, S.I.; Park, S.H.; Kim, H.D.

    2013-07-01

    The big advantage of pyroprocessing for the management of spent fuels against the conventional reprocessing technologies lies in its proliferation resistance since the pure plutonium cannot be separated from the spent fuel. The extracted materials can be directly used as metal fuel in a fast reactor, and pyroprocessing reduces drastically the volume and heat load of the spent fuel. KAERI has implemented the SBD (Safeguards-By-Design) concept in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The goal of SBD is to integrate international safeguards into the entire facility design process since the very beginning of the design phase. This paper presents a safety evaluation plan using a conceptual design of a reference pyroprocessing facility, in which 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety)-By-Design (3SBD) concept is integrated from early conceptual design phase. The purpose of this paper is to establish an advanced pyroprocessing hot cell facility design concept based on 3SBD for the successful realization of pyroprocessing technology with enhanced safety and proliferation resistance.

  15. Preparation of Safety Basis Documents for Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    5506-2007 April 2007 DOE STANDARD Preparation of Safety Basis Documents for Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facilities U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585 AREA-SAFT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-5506-2007 ii Available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web Site at Http://tis.eh.doe.gov/techstds/ DOE-STD-5506-2007 iii Foreword This Standard provides analytical assumptions and methods, as well as hazard controls

  16. Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    SENSITIVE DOE-STD-1104-2009 May 2009 Superseding DOE-STD-1104-96 DOE STANDARD REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY BASIS AND SAFETY DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, DC 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-1104-2009 ii Available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards web page at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/ns/techstds/ DOE-STD-1104-2009 iii CONTENTS FOREWORD

  17. Revisions to the Facility Safety Order and DOE-STD-1066 | Department of

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Energy Revisions to the Facility Safety Order and DOE-STD-1066 Revisions to the Facility Safety Order and DOE-STD-1066 May 15, 2012 Presenter: Jim Bisker, Fire Protection Program Manager, Office of Health, Safety and Security (HS-32) Topics Covered: Facility Safety Order Revisions Order 420.1 C Specifics DOE-STD-1066 Fire Protection Program Specifics Revisions to the Facility Safety Order and DOE-STD-1066 (412.73 KB) More Documents & Publications DOE Order 420.1C Briefing DOE O 420.1B/1C

  18. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding DOE Order 420.1C, Facility Safety |

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Department of Energy Frequently Asked Questions Regarding DOE Order 420.1C, Facility Safety Frequently Asked Questions Regarding DOE Order 420.1C, Facility Safety February 9, 2016 Frequently Asked Questions Regarding DOE Order 420.1C, Facility Safety, and its supporting directives, DOE-STD-1020-2012, Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities, and DOE-STD-1066-2012, Fire Protection. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding DOE Order 420.1C, Facility Safety (462.41

  19. Type B Accident Investigation Board Report of the Savannah River Site Hand Injury at the Salt Waste Processing Facility on October 6, 2009

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    This report documents the results of the Type B Accident Investigation Board (Board) investigation of the October 6, 2009, hand injury at the Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) Salt Waste Processing Facility construction site.

  20. National ignition facility environment, safety, and health management plan

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-11-01

    The ES&H Management Plan describes all of the environmental, safety, and health evaluations and reviews that must be carried out in support of the implementation of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) Project. It describes the policy, organizational responsibilities and interfaces, activities, and ES&H documents that will be prepared by the Laboratory Project Office for the DOE. The only activity not described is the preparation of the NIF Project Specific Assessment (PSA), which is to be incorporated into the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management (PEIS). This PSA is being prepared by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) with input from the Laboratory participants. As the independent NEPA document preparers ANL is directly contracted by the DOE, and its deliverables and schedule are agreed to separately with DOE/OAK.

  1. Mixed Waste Management Facility Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Chapters 1 to 20

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1994-09-01

    This document provides information on waste management practices, occupational safety, and a site characterization of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A facility description, safety engineering analysis, mixed waste processing techniques, and auxiliary support systems are included.

  2. Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2007-02-07

    This standard provides a framework for generating Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) supporting fissionable material operations at Department of Energy (DOE) nonreactor nuclear facilities. This standard imposes no new criticality safety analysis requirements.

  3. Proceedings of the 1984 DOE nuclear reactor and facility safety conference. Volume II

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1984-01-01

    This report is a collection of papers on reactor safety. The report takes the form of proceedings from the 1984 DOE Nuclear Reactor and Facility Safety Conference, Volume II of two. These proceedings cover Safety, Accidents, Training, Task/Job Analysis, Robotics and the Engineering Aspects of Man/Safety interfaces.

  4. CRAD, New Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements- December 2, 2014 (EA CRAD 31-07, Rev. 0)

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    New Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements Criteria Review and Approach Document (EA CRAD 31-07, Rev. 0)

  5. DOE's Approach to Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis and Management

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Presenter: Dr. James O'Brien, Director, Office of Nuclear Safety, Office of Health, Safety and Security, US Department of Energy

  6. Microsoft Word - 2015 12 7 Organizational Safety Culture - HAB Advice first draft Rev 1.....docx

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    COMMITTEE DISCUSSION Hanford Advisory Board Advice: Testing Safety Culture in Practice Lead Issue Managers: Dirk Dunning and Liz Mattson Background The Hanford Advisory Board (HAB, Board) has been focused on reviewing, discussing, and issuing advice on safety culture since the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued its Recommendation 2011-1: Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in June 2011. Safety culture terminology has created confusion in our discussions, as

  7. Hanford Advisory Board

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    June 8-9, 2016 Attachment 7: Transcript of Sounding Board comments The following paragraphs are transcribed member responses from Hanford Advisory Board's (HAB or Board) June Safety Culture Sounding Board. The follow responses do not represent consensus views of the Board. Each Board seat was provided with up to four minutes to respond to two safety culture framing questions: Q1: What does safety culture mean to you? Q2: Given the information provided at the April Board meeting, are there any

  8. Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-12-01

    The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by DOE itself. The three major recommendations are: under any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE`s nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation.

  9. Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report: Appendices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1995-12-01

    The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE`s nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation.

  10. Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Facilities Facilities LANL's mission is to develop and apply science and technology to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; reduce global threats; and solve other emerging national security and energy challenges. Contact Operator Los Alamos National Laboratory (505) 667-5061 Some LANL facilities are available to researchers at other laboratories, universities, and industry. Unique facilities foster experimental science, support the Lab's security mission

  11. Hanford Advisory Board Hanford Update

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Richland Operations Office Maintenance Policy August 9, 2012 Burt Hill and Pete Garcia DOE- RL Maintenance Policy * Events at Fukushima challenged the Department of Energy- Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) and CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (PRC) to review our nuclear operations * Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) assessment of Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) identified several weaknesses regarding maintenance of facility systems * October 17: PRC with

  12. 340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    T. J. Rodovsky

    2010-10-25

    The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3.

  13. Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    safety Safety All JLF participants must comply fully with all LLNL safety regulations and procedures by becoming a Registered User of the facility. All JLF participants must complete available LLNL safety training: HS5200-W Laser Safety HS4258-W Beryllium Awareness HS4261-W Lead Awareness HS5220-W Electrical Safety Awareness HS6001-W General Employee Radiological HS4240-W Chemical Safety HS4680-W PPE To access these training modules link here [LTRAIN] from inside LLNL, or here from anywhere. All

  14. Guidance for preparation of safety analysis reports for nonreactor facilities and operations. Revision 2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-11-06

    Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5480.23, ``Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,`` and 5481.1B, ``Safety Analysis and Review System`` require the preparation of appropriate safety analyses for each DOE operation and subsequent significant modifications including decommissioning, and independent review of each safety analysis. The purpose of this guide is to assist in the preparation and review of safety documentation for Oak Ridge Field Office (OR) nonreactor facilities and operation. Appendix A lists DOE Orders, NRC Regulatory Guides and other documents applicable to the preparation of safety analysis reports.

  15. Guidance for preparation of safety analysis reports for nonreactor facilities and operations

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1992-11-06

    Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,'' and 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System'' require the preparation of appropriate safety analyses for each DOE operation and subsequent significant modifications including decommissioning, and independent review of each safety analysis. The purpose of this guide is to assist in the preparation and review of safety documentation for Oak Ridge Field Office (OR) nonreactor facilities and operation. Appendix A lists DOE Orders, NRC Regulatory Guides and other documents applicable to the preparation of safety analysis reports.

  16. Description of the OSU APEX test facility to assess AP600 passive safety

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Hochreiter, L.E.; Lau, L.K.; Reyes, J.N. Jr.; Groome, J.T.

    1995-12-31

    The objective of this paper is to describe the Advanced Plant Experiment (APEX) test facility, which is a new integral system test facility located at Oregon State University (OSU) specifically scaled, designed, and built to simulate all of the important geometrical details of the Westinghouse AP600. The APEX facility has been designed and constructed to develop a database that can be used to validate the thermal hydraulic safety analysis codes that will be used in the AP600 design certification process. The test facility has been specifically designed and scaled to model small break loss-of-coolant and long-term cooling transients, which utilize the AP600 passive safety systems.

  17. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility, Appendix A

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-06-26

    Topics covered in this appendix include: General Rules-Code of Safe Practices; 2. Personal Protective Equipment; Hazardous Material Control; Traffic Control; Fire Prevention; Sanitation and First Aid; Confined Space Safety Requirements; Ladders and Stairways; Scaffolding and Lift Safety; Machinery, Vehicles, and Heavy Equipment; Welding and Cutting-General; Arc Welding; Oxygen/Acetylene Welding and Cutting; Excavation, Trenching, and Shoring; Fall Protection; Steel Erection; Working With Asbestos; Radiation Safety; Hand Tools; Electrical Safety; Nonelectrical Work Performed Near Exposed High-Voltage Power-Distribution Equipment; Lockout/Tagout Requirements; Rigging; A-Cranes; Housekeeping; Material Handling and Storage; Lead; Concrete and Masonry Construction.

  18. Interim Safety Basis for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-09-07

    This ISB, in conjunction with the IOSR, provides the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements or the facility is shut down. It is concluded that the risks associated with tha current and anticipated mode of the facility, uranium disposition, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within risk guidelines.

  19. OAK RIDGE CERCLA DISPOSAL FACILITY ACHIEVES SAFETY MILESTONE

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Oak Ridge, TN - The Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) provides the onsite disposal capability for the majority of cleanup-generated wastes on the Oak Ridge Reservation....

  20. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility, Appendix B

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-06-26

    This Appendix contains material from the LLNL Health and Safety Manual as listed below. For sections not included in this list, please refer to the Manual itself. The areas covered are: asbestos, lead, fire prevention, lockout, and tag program confined space traffic safety.

  1. Overview of the preliminary safety analysis of the National Ignition Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Brereton, S.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.

    1997-06-01

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed U.S. Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 individual laser beams onto a tiny deuterium-tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF has been classified as a low hazard, radiological facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis report be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been approved, which documents and evaluates the safety issues associated with the construction, operation, and decommissioning of the NIF. 10 refs., 6 figs., 4 tabs.

  2. DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility Disposition Activities

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The original release of DOE-STD-1120-98 provided integrated safety management guidance for enhancing worker, public, and environmental protection during all facility disposition activities.

  3. Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-12-19

    This Standard describes a framework and the criteria to be used for approval of (1) safety basis documents, as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulation (C.F.R.) 830, Nuclear Safety Management, and (2) safety design basis documents, as required by Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD)-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process.

  4. DOE Standard 3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis, Roll Out Training

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Office of Nuclear Safety is performing a series of site visits to provide roll-out training and assistance to Program and Site Offices and their contractors on effective implementation of the new revision to DOE Standard 3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis.

  5. 2015 Nuclear and Facility Safety Programs Workshop Block Agenda

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    Worthington (AU-10) ISM o Colette Broussard (AU-23) QA and Other Data Trending o Pat Lewis (SC-CH) Lessons From Safety Basis Reviews o Carl Sykes (NA-511) Exemptions * Readiness...

  6. CRAD, Criticality Safety- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Criticality Safety program at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Facility.

  7. CRAD, Criticality Safety- Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Criticality Safety program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, TA 55 SST Facility.

  8. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of Industrial Safety and Industrial Health programs at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

  9. CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health- Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Occupational and Industrial Safety and Hygiene Program portion of an Operational Readiness Review at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility.

  10. CRAD, Safety Basis- Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Safety Basis portion of an Operational Readiness Review at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility.

  11. CRAD, Safety Basis- Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for a January 2005 assessment of the Safety Basis at the Y-12 - Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility.

  12. CRAD, Safety Basis- Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) used for an assessment of the Safety Basis at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility.

  13. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project path forward: nuclear safety equivalency to comparable NRC-licensed facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Garvin, L.J.

    1995-11-01

    This document includes the Technical requirements which meet the nuclear safety objectives of the NRC regulations for fuel treatment and storage facilities. These include requirements regarding radiation exposure limits, safety analysis, design and construction. This document also includes administrative requirements which meet the objectives of the major elements of the NRC licensing process. These include formally documented design and safety analysis, independent technical review, and oppportunity for public involvement.

  14. Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE Order (0) 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-07-17

    The revision will address implementation of roles and responsibilities, improve operational efficiency using operating experience, and clarify the use of program requirements such as the Unreviewed Safety Issue and Accelerator Readiness Review.

  15. Appraisal of the Uranium Processing Facility Safety Basis Preliminary Safety Design Report Process at the Y-12 National Security Complex, May 2013

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Independent Oversight Appraisal of the Uranium Processing Facility Safety Basis Preliminary Safety Design Report Process at the Y-12 National Security Complex May 2011 May 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U. S. Department of Energy Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose

  16. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-06-26

    The Construction Safety Program (CSP) for NIF sets forth the responsibilities, guidelines, rules, policies and regulations for all workers involved in the construction, special equipment installation, acceptance testing, and initial activation and operation of NIF at LLNL during the construction period of NIF.

  17. Type A Accident Investigation Board report on the January 17, 1996, electrical accident with injury in Technical Area 21 Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility Los Alamos National Laboratory. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1996-04-01

    An electrical accident was investigated in which a crafts person received serious injuries as a result of coming into contact with a 13.2 kilovolt (kV) electrical cable in the basement of Building 209 in Technical Area 21 (TA-21-209) in the Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility (TSFF) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In conducting its investigation, the Accident Investigation Board used various analytical techniques, including events and causal factor analysis, barrier analysis, change analysis, fault tree analysis, materials analysis, and root cause analysis. The board inspected the accident site, reviewed events surrounding the accident, conducted extensive interviews and document reviews, and performed causation analyses to determine the factors that contributed to the accident, including any management system deficiencies. Relevant management systems and factors that could have contributed to the accident were evaluated in accordance with the guiding principles of safety management identified by the Secretary of Energy in an October 1994 letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and subsequently to Congress.

  18. ARM - ARM Science Board

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Board Members An eleven-member Facility Board has been selected to serve as an independent review body for the ARM Facility and ensure it is used to conduct the highest quality ...

  19. Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and the Resin Regeneration Facility Safety Analysis Report, Executive Summary

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Shedrow, C.B.

    1999-11-29

    The Safety Analysis Report documents the safety authorization basis for the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF) and the Resin Regeneration Facility (RRF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The present mission of the RBOF and RRF is to continue in providing a facility for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel assemblies from power and research reactors in the United States, fuel from SRS and other Department of Energy (DOE) reactors, and foreign research reactors fuel, in support of the nonproliferation policy. The RBOF and RRF provide the capability to handle, separate, and transfer wastes generated from nuclear fuel element storage. The DOE and Westinghouse Savannah River Company, the prime operating contractor, are committed to managing these activities in such a manner that the health and safety of the offsite general public, the site worker, the facility worker, and the environment are protected.

  20. Type B Accident Investigation Board Report Employee Puncture Wound at the F-TRU Waste Remediation Facility at the Savannah River Site on June 14, 2010

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This report documents the results of the Type B Accident Investigation Board investigation of the June 14, 2010, employee puncture wound at the Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) F-TRU Wste Facility located in the F Canyon Facility.

  1. Los Alamos National Laboratory corregated metal pipe saw facility preliminary safety analysis report. Volume I

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1990-09-19

    This Preliminary Safety Analysis Report addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and design operation of the processing systems in the Corrugated Metal Pipe Saw Facility with respect to normal and abnormal conditions. Potential hazards are identified, credible accidents relative to the operation of the facility and the process systems are analyzed, and the consequences of postulated accidents are presented. The risk associated with normal operations, abnormal operations, and natural phenomena are analyzed. The accident analysis presented shows that the impact of the facility will be acceptable for all foreseeable normal and abnormal conditions of operation. Specifically, under normal conditions the facility will have impacts within the limits posted by applicable DOE guidelines, and in accident conditions the facility will similarly meet or exceed the requirements of all applicable standards. 16 figs., 6 tabs.

  2. Order Module--DOE O 420.2B, SAFETY OF ACCELERATOR FACILITIES | Department

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    of Energy 2B, SAFETY OF ACCELERATOR FACILITIES Order Module--DOE O 420.2B, SAFETY OF ACCELERATOR FACILITIES This module will discuss the objectives and requirements associated with the Order and the contractor requirements document. We have provided an example to help familiarize you with the material. The example will also help prepare you for the practice at the end of this module and for the criterion test. Before continuing, you should obtain a copy of the Order at DOE Directives,

  3. Safety - Radiation Effects Facility / Cyclotron Institute / Texas A&M

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    University Safety Numerous safety mechanisms in the form of administrative and engineered controls are incorporated into the design of the Radiation Effects Facility. Radiation levels in the surrounding areas were measured while each available beam was brought into the heavily shielded target area at full intensity. It was found that the measured radiation levels would be safe for the beam intensities several orders of magnitude larger than those needed for typical radiation testing

  4. Excellence Award in the 2012 Facilities Environmental, Safety and Health Go

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Green Initiative Excellence Award in the 2012 Facilities Environmental, Safety and Health Go Green Initiative - Sandia Energy Energy Search Icon Sandia Home Locations Contact Us Employee Locator Energy & Climate Secure & Sustainable Energy Future Stationary Power Energy Conversion Efficiency Solar Energy Wind Energy Water Power Supercritical CO2 Geothermal Natural Gas Safety, Security & Resilience of the Energy Infrastructure Energy Storage Nuclear Power & Engineering Grid

  5. Preliminary Safety Design Report for Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Timothy Solack; Carol Mason

    2012-03-01

    A new onsite, remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled low-level waste disposal for remote-handled low-level waste from the Idaho National Laboratory and for nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled low-level waste in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This preliminary safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by discussing site characteristics that impact accident analysis, by providing the facility and process information necessary to support the hazard analysis, by identifying and evaluating potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled low-level waste, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  6. DOE standard: Integration of environment, safety, and health into facility disposition activities. Volume 1: Technical standard

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-05-01

    This Department of Energy (DOE) technical standard (referred to as the Standard) provides guidance for integrating and enhancing worker, public, and environmental protection during facility disposition activities. It provides environment, safety, and health (ES and H) guidance to supplement the project management requirements and associated guidelines contained within DOE O 430.1A, Life-Cycle Asset Management (LCAM), and amplified within the corresponding implementation guides. In addition, the Standard is designed to support an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS), consistent with the guiding principles and core functions contained in DOE P 450.4, Safety Management System Policy, and discussed in DOE G 450.4-1, Integrated Safety Management System Guide. The ISMS guiding principles represent the fundamental policies that guide the safe accomplishment of work and include: (1) line management responsibility for safety; (2) clear roles and responsibilities; (3) competence commensurate with responsibilities; (4) balanced priorities; (5) identification of safety standards and requirements; (6) hazard controls tailored to work being performed; and (7) operations authorization. This Standard specifically addresses the implementation of the above ISMS principles four through seven, as applied to facility disposition activities.

  7. Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyd D. Christensen

    2010-02-01

    A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  8. Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyd D. Christensen

    2010-05-01

    A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  9. FINAL MEETING SUMMARY HANFORD ADVISORY BOARD HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMITTEE

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMITTEE November 14, 2013 Richland, WA Topics in this Meeting Summary Opening ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 DOE's Emergency Preparedness Program - Joint with the River and Plateau (RAP) Committee and Public Information and Communication (PIC) Committee ..........................................................................

  10. Management of radioactive material safety programs at medical facilities. Final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Camper, L.W.; Schlueter, J.; Woods, S.

    1997-05-01

    A Task Force, comprising eight US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and two Agreement State program staff members, developed the guidance contained in this report. This report describes a systematic approach for effectively managing radiation safety programs at medical facilities. This is accomplished by defining and emphasizing the roles of an institution`s executive management, radiation safety committee, and radiation safety officer. Various aspects of program management are discussed and guidance is offered on selecting the radiation safety officer, determining adequate resources for the program, using such contractual services as consultants and service companies, conducting audits, and establishing the roles of authorized users and supervised individuals; NRC`s reporting and notification requirements are discussed, and a general description is given of how NRC`s licensing, inspection and enforcement programs work.

  11. Enterprise Assessments Review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Transuranic Waste Facility 90% Draft Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements Submittals ‚Äď EA-LANL-2015-07-07

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    Operational Awareness Record for the Review of the Transuranic Waste Facility 90% Draft Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements Submittals

  12. Independent Oversight Review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Transuranic Waste Facility Safety Basis and Design Development, July 2014

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Los Alamos National Laboratory Transuranic Waste Facility Safety Basis and Design Development July 2014 Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments Office of Independent Enterprise Assessments U.S. Department of Energy Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................ 1 2.0 Scope ...

  13. Review of the Savannah River Site Salt Waste Processing Facility Safety Basis and Design Development, August 2013

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Savannah River Site Salt Waste Processing Facility Safety Basis and Design Development May 2011 August 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose.................................................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 Background

  14. DESIGN SAFETY FEATURES OF THE BNL HIGH-TEMPERATURE COMBUSTION FACILITY

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    GINSBERG,T.; CICCARELLI,G.; BOCCIO,J.

    2000-06-11

    The Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) High-Temperature Combustion Facility (HTCF) was used to perform hydrogen deflagration and detonation experiments at temperatures to 650 K. Safety features that were designed to ensure safe and reliable operation of the experimental program are described. Deflagration and detonation experiments have been conducted using mixtures of hydrogen, air, and steam. Detonation cell size measurements were made as a function of mixture composition and thermodynamic gas conditions. Deflagration-to-detonation transition experiments were also conducted. Results of the experimental program are presented, and implications with respect to hydrogen safety are discussed.

  15. Analysis of Integrated Safety Management at the Activity Level: Work

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Planning and Control, Final Report | Department of Energy Analysis of Integrated Safety Management at the Activity Level: Work Planning and Control, Final Report Analysis of Integrated Safety Management at the Activity Level: Work Planning and Control, Final Report May 15, 2013 Presenter: Stephen L. Domotor, Director, Office of Analysis, Office of Health, Safety and Security Topic: On August 28, 2012, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or "Board") wrote to the

  16. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - final report

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Gerton, R.E.

    1997-07-25

    On May 14, 1997, at 7:53 p.m. (PDT), a chemical explosion occur-red in Tank A- 109 in Room 40 of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (Facility) located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site, approximately 30 miles north of Richland, Washington. The inactive processing Facility is part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). On May 16, 1997, Lloyd L. Piper, Deputy Manager, acting for John D. Wagoner, Manager, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), formally established an Accident Investigation Board (Board) to investigate the explosion in accordance with DOE Order 225. 1, Accident Investigations. The Board commenced its investigation on May 15, 1997, completed the investigation on July 2, 1997, and submitted its findings to the RL Manager on July 26, 1997. The scope of the Board`s investigation was to review and analyze the circumstances of the events that led to the explosion; to analyze facts and to determine the causes of the accident; and to develop conclusions and judgments of need that may help prevent a recurrence of the accident. The scope also included the application of lessons learned from similar accidents within DOE. In addition to this detailed report, a companion document has also been prepared that provides a concise summary of the facts and conclusions of this report, with an emphasis on management issues (DOE/RL-97-63).

  17. SUBJECT: Guidance on Retention of Facility Representative Technical Competence during Reductions in Force, 4/21/1998

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    The Department’s Revised Implementation Plan (IP) for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 93-3 renews the Department’s commitment to maintaining the technical capability necessary to safely manage and operate defense nuclear facilities.

  18. Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2014-06-25

    Changes include invoking DOE-STD-3009 and DOE-STD-1104 as requirements documents. NOTE: The two standards are not final documents but can be found in Technical Standards RevCom at https://www.standards.doe.gov/login.jsp. Login as an SME using your email address.

  19. Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    STD-3007-2007 February 2007 DOE STANDARD GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CRITICALITY SAFETY EVALUATIONS AT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONREACTOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE This document has been reproduced from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge,

  20. Preparation of Documented Safety Analysis for Interim Operations at DOE Nuclear Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    3011-2016 January 2016 DOE STANDARD PREPARATION OF DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR INTERIM OPERATIONS AT DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, DC 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-3011-2016 ii FOREWORD 1. This Department of Energy (DOE) Standard (STD) has been approved to be used by DOE, including the National Nuclear Security Administration, and their contractors. 2. Beneficial comments

  1. Investigation of criticality safety control infraction data at a nuclear facility

    DOE Public Access Gateway for Energy & Science Beta (PAGES Beta)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Merhege, James F.; Costa, David A.; Art, Blair M.; Gubernatis, David C.

    2014-10-27

    Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other nuclear materials account for most activities performed at the LANL's Plutonium Facility (PF-4). The presence of large quantities of fissile materials in numerous forms at PF-4 makes it necessary to maintain an active criticality safety program. The LANL Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program provides guidance to enable efficient operations while ensuring prevention of criticality accidents in the handling, storing, processing and transportation of fissionable material at PF-4. In order to achieve and sustain lower criticality safety control infraction (CSCI) rates, PF-4 operations are continuously improved, through the use of Lean Manufacturing andmore¬†¬Ľ Six Sigma (LSS) business practices. Employing LSS, statistically significant variations (trends) can be identified in PF-4 CSCI reports. In this study, trends have been identified in the NCS Program using the NCS Database. An output metric has been developed that measures ADPSM Management progress toward meeting its NCS objectives and goals. Using a Pareto Chart, the primary CSCI attributes have been determined in order of those requiring the most management support. Data generated from analysis of CSCI data help identify and reduce number of corresponding attributes. In-field monitoring of CSCI's contribute to an organization's scientific and technological excellence by providing information that can be used to improve criticality safety operation safety. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety.¬ę¬†less

  2. Investigation of criticality safety control infraction data at a nuclear facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Merhege, James F.; Costa, David A.; Art, Blair M.; Gubernatis, David C.

    2014-10-27

    Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other nuclear materials account for most activities performed at the LANL's Plutonium Facility (PF-4). The presence of large quantities of fissile materials in numerous forms at PF-4 makes it necessary to maintain an active criticality safety program. The LANL Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program provides guidance to enable efficient operations while ensuring prevention of criticality accidents in the handling, storing, processing and transportation of fissionable material at PF-4. In order to achieve and sustain lower criticality safety control infraction (CSCI) rates, PF-4 operations are continuously improved, through the use of Lean Manufacturing and Six Sigma (LSS) business practices. Employing LSS, statistically significant variations (trends) can be identified in PF-4 CSCI reports. In this study, trends have been identified in the NCS Program using the NCS Database. An output metric has been developed that measures ADPSM Management progress toward meeting its NCS objectives and goals. Using a Pareto Chart, the primary CSCI attributes have been determined in order of those requiring the most management support. Data generated from analysis of CSCI data help identify and reduce number of corresponding attributes. In-field monitoring of CSCI's contribute to an organization's scientific and technological excellence by providing information that can be used to improve criticality safety operation safety. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety.

  3. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding DOE-STD-1195-2011, Design of Safety Significant Safety Instrumented Systems Used at DOE Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Frequently Asked Questions Regarding DOE-STD-1195-2011 which provides requirements and guidance for the design, procurement, installation, testing, maintenance, operation, and quality assurance of safety instrumented systems (SIS) that may be used at Department of Energy (DOE) nonreactor nuclear facilities for safety significant (SS) functions.

  4. Enterprise Assessments Lessons Learned from Targeted Reviews of the Management of Safety Systems at U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities ‚Äď April 2016

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Lessons Learned from Targeted Reviews of the Management of Safety Systems at U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities

  5. The Greening of a Plutonium Facility through Personnel Safety, Operational Efficiency, and Infrastructure Improvements - 12108

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Dodge, Robert L.; Cournoyer, Michael E.

    2012-07-01

    Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other hazardous materials account for most activities performed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Plutonium Facility (TA-55). Engineered barriers provide the most effective protection from hazardous materials. These safety features serve to protect workers and provide defense in depth against the hazards associated with operations. Although not designed to specifically meet environmental requirements the safety-based design does meet or exceed the requirements of the environmental regulations enacted during and since its construction. TA-55's Waste Services Group supports this safety methodology by ensuring safe, efficient and compliant management of all radioactive and hazardous wastes generated at the TA-55. A key function of this group is the implementation of measures that lower the overall risk of radiological and hazardous material operations. Processes and procedures that reduce waste generation compared to current, prevalent processes or procedures used for the same purpose are identified. Some of these 'Best Practices' include implementation of a chemical control system, elimination of aerosol cans, reduction in hazardous waste, implementation of zero liquid discharge, and the re-cyclization of nitric acid. P2/WMin opportunities have been implemented in the areas of personnel and facility attributes, environmental compliance, energy conservation, and green focused infrastructure expansion with the overall objective of minimizing raw material and energy consumption and waste generation. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety. (authors)

  6. DOE standard: Integration of environment, safety, and health into facility disposition activities. Volume 2: Appendices

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-05-01

    This volume contains the appendices that provide additional environment, safety, and health (ES and H) information to complement Volume 1 of this Standard. Appendix A provides a set of candidate DOE ES and H directives and external regulations, organized by hazard types that may be used to identify potentially applicable directives to a specific facility disposition activity. Appendix B offers examples and lessons learned that illustrate implementation of ES and H approaches discussed in Section 3 of Volume 1. Appendix C contains ISMS performance expectations to guide a project team in developing and implementing an effective ISMS and in developing specific performance criteria for use in facility disposition. Appendix D provides guidance for identifying potential Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs) when decommissioning facilities fall under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability Act (CERCLA) process. Appendix E discusses ES and H considerations for dispositioning facilities by privatization. Appendix F is an overview of the WSS process. Appendix G provides a copy of two DOE Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Standards memoranda that form the bases for some of the guidance discussed within the Standard. Appendix H gives information on available hazard analysis techniques and references. Appendix I provides a supplemental discussion to Sections 3.3.4, Hazard Baseline Documentation, and 3.3.6, Environmental Permits. Appendix J presents a sample readiness evaluation checklist.

  7. Documented Safety Analysis Addendum for the Neutron Radiography Reactor Facility Core Conversion

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Boyd D. Christensen

    2009-05-01

    The Neutron Radiography Reactor Facility (NRAD) is a Training, Research, Isotope Production, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor which was installed in the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Hot Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) in the mid 1970s. The facility provides researchers the capability to examine both irradiated and non-irradiated materials in support of reactor fuel and components programs through non-destructive neutron radiography examination. The facility has been used in the past as one facet of a suite of reactor fuels and component examination facilities available to researchers at the INL and throughout the DOE complex. The facility has also served various commercial research activities in addition to the DOE research and development support. The reactor was initially constructed using Fuel Lifetime Improvement Program (FLIP)- type highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel obtained from the dismantled Puerto Rico Nuclear Center (PRNC) reactor. In accordance with international non-proliferation agreements, the NRAD core will be converted to a low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and will continue to utilize the PRNC control rods, control rod drives, startup source, and instrument console as was previously used with the HEU core. The existing NRAD Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was created and maintained in the preferred format of the day, combining sections of both DOE-STD-3009 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.70. An addendum was developed to cover the refueling and reactor operation with the LEU core. This addendum follows the existing SAR format combining required formats from both the DOE and NRC. This paper discusses the project to successfully write a compliant and approved addendum to the existing safety basis documents.

  8. Preliminary safety analysis report for the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    OSCAR,DEBBY S.; WALKER,SHARON ANN; HUNTER,REGINA LEE; WALKER,CHERYL A.

    1999-12-01

    The Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) will be a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility used to characterize, treat, and repackage radioactive and mixed material and waste for reuse, recycling, or ultimate disposal. A significant upgrade to a previous facility, the Temporary Hot Cell, will be implemented to perform this mission. The following major features will be added: a permanent shield wall; eight floor silos; new roof portals in the hot-cell roof; an upgraded ventilation system; and upgraded hot-cell jib crane; and video cameras to record operations and facilitate remote-handled operations. No safety-class systems, structures, and components will be present in the AHCF. There will be five safety-significant SSCs: hot cell structure, permanent shield wall, shield plugs, ventilation system, and HEPA filters. The type and quantity of radionuclides that could be located in the AHCF are defined primarily by SNL/NM's legacy materials, which include radioactive, transuranic, and mixed waste. The risk to the public or the environment presented by the AHCF is minor due to the inventory limitations of the Hazard Category 3 classification. Potential doses at the exclusion boundary are well below the evaluation guidelines of 25 rem. Potential for worker exposure is limited by the passive design features incorporated in the AHCF and by SNL's radiation protection program. There is no potential for exposure of the public to chemical hazards above the Emergency Response Protection Guidelines Level 2.

  9. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Safety Class Instrumentation and Control System Design Description SYS 93-2

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    WHITEHURST, R.

    1999-07-02

    This document describes the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) Safety Class Instrumentation and Control system (SCIC). The SCIC provides safety functions and features to protect the environment, off-site and on-site personnel and equipment. The function of the SCIC is to provide automatic trip features, valve interlocks, alarms, indication and control for the cold vacuum drying process.

  10. Securing Operating Data From Passive Safety Tests at the Fast Flux Test Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wootan, David W.; Omberg, Ronald P.; Makenas, Bruce J.; Nielsen, Deborah L.; Nelson, Joseph V.; Polzin, David L.

    2011-06-01

    The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is the most recent Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) to operate in the United States, from 1982 to 1992. The technologies employed in designing and constructing this reactor, along with information obtained from tests conducted during its operation, are currently being secured and archived by the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program. This report is one in a series documenting the overall project efforts to retrieve and preserve critical information related to advanced reactors. A previous report summarized the initial efforts to review, retrieve and preserve the most salient documents related to Passive Safety Testing (PST) in the FFTF. Efforts continue to locate, secure, and retrieve record copies of original plant data tapes for the series of passive safety tests conducted between 1986 and 1991.

  11. Securing Operating Data From Passive Safety Tests at the Fast Flux Test Facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Wootan, David W.; Omberg, Ronald P.; Makenas, Bruce J.; Nielsen, Deborah L.; Nelson, Joseph V.; Polzin, David L.

    2011-06-01

    The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is the most recent Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) to operate in the United States, from 1982 to 1992. The technologies employed in designing and constructing this reactor, along with information obtained from tests conducted during its operation, are currently being secured and archived by the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program. This report is one in a series documenting the overall project efforts to retrieve and preserve critical information related to advanced reactors. A previous report summarized the initial efforts to review, retrieve and preserve the most salient documents related to Passive Safety Testing (PST) in the FFTF. Efforts continue to locate, secure, and retrieve record copies of original plant data tapes for the series of passive safety tests conducted between 1986 and 1991.

  12. FAST FLUX TEST FACILITY (FFTF) A HISTORY OF SAFETY & OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NIELSEN, D L

    2004-02-26

    The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is a 400-megawatt (thermal) sodium-cooled, high temperature, fast neutron flux, loop-type test reactor. The facility was constructed to support development and testing of fuels, materials and equipment for the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program. FFTF began operation in 1980 and over the next 10 years demonstrated its versatility to perform experiments and missions far beyond the original intent of its designers. The reactor had several distinctive features including its size, flux, core design, extensive instrumentation, and test features that enabled it to simultaneously carry out a significant array of missions while demonstrating its features that contributed to a high level of plant safety and availability. FFTF is currently being deactivated for final closure.

  13. Risk-Informing Safety Reviews for Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Mubayi, V.; Azarm, A.; Yue, M.; Mukaddam, W.; Good, G.; Gonzalez, F.; Bari, R.A.

    2011-03-13

    This paper describes a methodology used to model potential accidents in fuel cycle facilities that employ chemical processes to separate and purify nuclear materials. The methodology is illustrated with an example that uses event and fault trees to estimate the frequency of a specific energetic reaction that can occur in nuclear material processing facilities. The methodology used probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)-related tools as well as information about the chemical reaction characteristics, information on plant design and operational features, and generic data about component failure rates and human error rates. The accident frequency estimates for the specific reaction help to risk-inform the safety review process and assess compliance with regulatory requirements.

  14. DOE-HDBK-1113-98; Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities (Reaffirmation Memorandum)

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    DATE M a y 9, 2005 REPLY TO EH-52:Judith D. Foulke:3-5865 ATTN OF: REAFFIRMATION WITH ERRATA OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) URANIUM FACILITIES" Dennis Kubicki, Technical Standards Manager, EH-24 SUBJECT. HANDBOOK, DOE-HDBK-1113-98, "RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING FOR TO: In February 2005, a notice of intent to reaffirm with errata DOE-HDBK-1113-98 was sent to the DOE Technical Standards Managers. The notice requested comments regarding the planned reaffirmation of the handbook. No

  15. DOE-STD-6002-96; DOE Standard Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities: Requirements

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    2-96 May 1996 DOE STANDARD SAFETY OF MAGNETIC FUSION FACILITIES: REQUIREMENTS U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831; (423) 576-8401. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce,

  16. Incentives for the Department's Facility Representative Program,

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    12/17/1998 | Department of Energy Incentives for the Department's Facility Representative Program, 12/17/1998 Incentives for the Department's Facility Representative Program, 12/17/1998 The Department's Revised Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 93-3 has once again underscored the Department's commitment to maintaining the technical capability necessary to safely manage and operate our defense nuclear facilities. Attracting and retaining highly

  17. Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Flynn, N.C. Bechtel Jacobs

    2008-04-21

    The Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) policy is to provide a safe and healthy workplace for all employees and subcontractors. The implementation of this policy requires that operations of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF), located one-half mile west of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex, be guided by an overall plan and consistent proactive approach to environment, safety and health (ES&H) issues. The BJC governing document for worker safety and health, BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', describes the key elements of the BJC Safety and Industrial Hygiene (IH) programs, which includes the requirement for development and implementation of a site-specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) where required by regulation (refer also to BJC-EH-1012, 'Development and Approval of Safety and Health Plans'). BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', implements the requirements for worker protection contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 851. The EMWMF site-specific HASP requirements identifies safe operating procedures, work controls, personal protective equipment, roles and responsibilities, potential site hazards and control measures, site access requirements, frequency and types of monitoring, site work areas, decontamination procedures, and outlines emergency response actions. This HASP will be available on site for use by all workers, management and supervisors, oversight personnel and visitors. All EMWMF assigned personnel will be briefed on the contents of this HASP and will be required to follow the procedures and protocols as specified. The policies and procedures referenced in this HASP apply to all EMWMF operations activities. In addition the HASP establishes ES&H criteria for the day-to-day activities to prevent or minimize any adverse effect on the environment and personnel safety and health and to meet standards that define acceptable waste management practices. The

  18. Safety and licensing issues that are being addressed by the Power Burst Facility test programs. [PWR; BWR

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    McCardell, R.K.; MacDonald, P.E.

    1980-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of the results of the experimental program being conducted in the Power Burst Facility and the relationship of these results to certain safety and licensing issues. The safety issues that were addressed by the Power-Cooling-Mismatch, Reactivity Initiated Accident, and Loss of Coolant Accident tests, which comprised the original test program in the Power Burst Facility, are discussed. The resolution of these safety issues based on the results of the thirty-six tests performed to date, is presented. The future resolution of safety issues identified in the new Power Burst Facility test program which consists of tests which simulate BWR and PWR operational transients, anticipated transients without scram, and severe fuel damage accidents, is described.

  19. Safety Assessment for the Kozloduy National Disposal Facility in Bulgaria - 13507

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Biurrun, E.; Haverkamp, B.; Lazaro, A.; Miralles, A.; Stefanova, I.

    2013-07-01

    Due to the early decommissioning of four Water-Water Energy Reactors (WWER) 440-V230 reactors at the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near the city of Kozloduy in Bulgaria, large amounts of low and intermediate radioactive waste will arise much earlier than initially scheduled. In or-der to manage the radioactive waste from the early decommissioning, Bulgaria has intensified its efforts to provide a near surface disposal facility at Radiana with the required capacity. To this end, a project was launched and assigned in international competition to a German-Spanish consortium to provide the complete technical planning including the preparation of the Intermediate Safety Assessment Report. Preliminary results of operational and long-term safety show compliance with the Bulgarian regulatory requirements. The long-term calculations carried out for the Radiana site are also a good example of how analysis of safety assessment results can be used for iterative improvements of the assessment by pointing out uncertainties and areas of future investigations to reduce such uncertainties in regard to the potential radiological impact. The computer model used to estimate the long-term evolution of the future repository at Radiana predicted a maximum total annual dose for members of the critical group, which is carried to approximately 80 % by C-14 for a specific ingestion pathway. Based on this result and the outcome of the sensitivity analysis, existing uncertainties were evaluated and areas for reasonable future investigations to reduce these uncertainties were identified. (authors)

  20. Preclosure radiological safety evaluation: Exploratory Studies Facility; Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Schelling, F.J.; Smith, J.D.

    1993-07-01

    A radiological safety evaluation is performed to determine the impacts of Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) design changes on the preclosure public radiological safety for a potential nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Although the ESF design has undergone significant modification, incorporation of the modified design requires only modest changes to the conceptual repository configuration. To the extent feasible, the results of earlier safety evaluations presented in SAND84-2641, SAND88-7061, and SAND89-7024, which were based on the original ESF configuration, are compared with the results for the modified configuration. This comparison provides an estimate of the range of analysis uncertainty. This preliminary analysis indicates that there are no Q-scenarios, which are defined as those scenarios with a net occurrence probability of greater than 10{sup {minus}6}/yr and produce a radiological dose at the 5-km controlled area boundary of greater than 0.5 rem. The analysis yielded estimates for an underground accident of a probability of 3.8 {times} 10{sup {minus}15}/yr and a dose of 1.5 rem. For a surface-initiated accident, a probability of 1.5 {times} 10{sup {minus}12}/yr and a dose of 0.6 rem was estimated.

  1. Type A Accident Investigation Board Report on the January 17, 1996, Electrical Accident With Injury in Building 209, Technical Area 21, Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    This report is an independent product of the Type A Accident Investigation Board appointed by Tara O’Toole, M.D., M.P.H., Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health (EH-1).

  2. Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in a Deactivation and Decommissioning Environment [A Guide for Facility and Project Managers

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NIRIDER, L.T.

    2003-08-06

    This document was designed as a reference and a primer for facility and project managers responsible for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) processes in facilities containing significant inventories of fissionable materials. The document contains lessons learned and guidance for the development and management of criticality safety programs. It also contains information gleaned from occurrence reports, assessment reports, facility operations and management, NDA program reviews, criticality safety experts, and criticality safety evaluations. This information is designed to assist in the planning process and operational activities. Sufficient details are provided to allow the reader to understand the events, the lessons learned, and how to apply the information to present or planned D&D processes. Information is also provided on general lessons learned including criticality safety evaluations and criticality safety program requirements during D&D activities. The document also explores recent and past criticality accidents in operating facilities, and it extracts lessons learned pertinent to D&D activities. A reference section is included to provide additional information. This document does not address D&D lessons learned that are not pertinent to criticality safety.

  3. Hanford Advisory Board Draft Letter

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Draft Letter Topic: Worker safety and communication restrictions Authors: Bob Suyama, Shelley Cimon, Susan Leckband, Jerry Peltier Originating Committee: Executive Issues Committee Version #1 10.14.15 Draft letter: worker safety and communication restrictions v.1 Since the inception of the Hanford Advisory Board (Board), one of the Board's primary values is the protection of worker health and safety at the Hanford Site. The Board continues to be concerned about the consequences of worker

  4. Type B Accident Investigation Board Report of the Savannah River...

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Processing Facility on October 6, 2009 Type B Accident Investigation Board Report of the ... This report documents the results of the Type B Accident Investigation Board (Board) ...

  5. Notice of Intent to Develop a Page Change for DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2013-06-21

    The Page Change will be strictly limited in scope to changes necessary to accomplish the following objectives: (1) to invoke revised DOE-STD- 1104-20xx, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Document, as a required method; (2) to invoke revised DOE-STD-3009-20xx, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis, as a required method for new nuclear facilities as discussed below; and (3) to make miscellaneous administrative corrections and clarifications based on the one-year implementation review required by DOE O 251.1C, Departmental Directives Program. This JM is an update to one approved June 21, 2013.

  6. Safety requirements, facility user needs, and reactor concepts for a new Broad Application Test Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Liebenthal, J.L.; Denison, A.B.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1992-07-01

    This report describes the EG&G Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program (LDRD) Broad Application Test Reactor (BATR) Project that was conducted in fiscal year 1991. The scope of this project was divided into three phases: a project process definition phase, a requirements development phase, and a preconceptual reactor design and evaluation phase. Multidisciplinary teams of experts conducted each phase. This report presents the need for a new test reactor, the project process definition, a set of current and projected regulatory compliance and safety requirements, a set of facility user needs for a broad range of projected testing missions, and descriptions of reactor concepts capable of meeting these requirements. This information can be applied to strategic planning to provide the Department of Energy with management options.

  7. Safety requirements, facility user needs, and reactor concepts for a new Broad Application Test Reactor

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Liebenthal, J.L.; Denison, A.B.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1992-07-01

    This report describes the EG G Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program (LDRD) Broad Application Test Reactor (BATR) Project that was conducted in fiscal year 1991. The scope of this project was divided into three phases: a project process definition phase, a requirements development phase, and a preconceptual reactor design and evaluation phase. Multidisciplinary teams of experts conducted each phase. This report presents the need for a new test reactor, the project process definition, a set of current and projected regulatory compliance and safety requirements, a set of facility user needs for a broad range of projected testing missions, and descriptions of reactor concepts capable of meeting these requirements. This information can be applied to strategic planning to provide the Department of Energy with management options.

  8. Enterprise Assessments Targeted Review of the Safety System Management of the Secondary Confinement System and Power Distribution Safety System at the Y-12 National Security Complex Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility ¬Ö December 2015

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Targeted Review of the Safety System Management of the Secondary Confinement System and Safety Significant Power Distribution System at the Y-12 National Security Complex Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility December 2015 Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments Office of Enterprise Assessments U.S. Department of Energy i Table of Contents Acronyms

  9. Office of Health, Safety and Security Report to the Secretary of Energy- February 2011

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Status and Effectiveness of DOE Efforts to Learn from Internal and External Operating Experience in Accordance with Commitment #20 of the DOE Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1

  10. Use of Administrative Controls for Specific Safety Functions, 10/21/03.

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    On December 11,2002, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued Recommendation 2002-3. Recommendation 2002-3 noted concerns about the lack of rigor and quality assurance accorded some...

  11. Hanford Advisory Board Draft Advice Topic: In-trench Macroencapsulation of Waste at the Environmental Restoration Disposal

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Topic: In-trench Macroencapsulation of Waste at the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility Authors: Bloom, Cimon, Hudson, Vanni, Pollet and Leckband Originating Committee: River & Plateau Version #1 : Color: __pink__yellow__green__salmon__purple_X_blue Background Worker safety during the performance of work to achieve environmental clean-up at Hanford is a core value of the Hanford Advisory Board (Board) as articulated in the Hanford Advisory Board Values White Paper (11/2/2012). As

  12. Fire Risk Implications in Safety Analysis Reports

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Blanchard, A.

    1999-03-31

    Fire can be a significant risk for facilities that store and handle radiological material. Such events must be evaluated as part of a comprehensive safety analysis. SRS has been developing methods to evaluate radiological fire risk in such facilities. These methods combined with the analysis techniques proposed by DOE-STD-3009-94 have provided a better understanding of how fire risks in nuclear facilities should be managed. To ensure that these new insights are properly disseminated the DOE Savannah River Office and the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) requested Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) prepare this paper.

  13. Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Secure and Sustainable Energy Future Mission/Facilities Facilities Tara Camacho-Lopez 2016-04-06T18:06:13+00:00 National Solar Thermal Test Facility (NSTTF) facility_nsttf_slide NSTTF's primary goal is to provide experimental engineering data for the design, construction, and operation of unique components and systems in proposed solar thermal electrical plants, which have three generic system architectures: line-focus (trough and continuous linear Fresnel reflector systems), point-focus central

  14. Enterprise Assessments Lessons Learned from Targeted Reviews of the Management of Safety Systems at U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities ¬Ö April 2016

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Lessons Learned from Targeted Reviews of the Management of Safety Systems at U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities April 2016 Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments Office of Enterprise Assessments U.S. Department of Energy i Table of Contents Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................... ii Executive Summary

  15. Enterprise Assessments Review of the Delegation of Safety Basis Approval Authority for Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 Nuclear Facilities ¬Ö April 2016

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Review of the Delegation of Safety Basis Approval Authority for Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 Nuclear Facilities April 2016 Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments Office of Enterprise Assessments U.S. Department of Energy i Table of Contents Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................... ii Executive Summary

  16. Enterprise Assessments Targeted Assessment of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant High-Level Waste Facility Radioactive Liquid Waste Disposal System Safety Basis Change Package ¬Ö May 2016

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Assessment of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant High-Level Waste Facility Radioactive Liquid Waste Disposal System Safety Basis Change Package May 2016 Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments Office of Enterprise Assessments U.S. Department of Energy i Table of Contents Acronyms

  17. Enterprise Assessments Targeted Review of the Safety Basis at the Savannah River Site F-Area Central Laboratory Facility ¬Ö January 2016

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Indexed Site

    Review of the Safety Basis at the Savannah River Site F-Area Central Laboratory Facility January 2016 Office of Nuclear Safety and Environmental Assessments Office of Environment, Safety and Health Assessments Office of Enterprise Assessments U.S. Department of Energy i Table of Contents Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................... ii Executive Summary

  18. Safety analysis--200 Area Savannah River Site: Separations Area operations Building 211-H Outside Facilities. Supplement 11, Revision 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1993-01-01

    The H-Area Outside Facilities are located in the 200-H Separations Area and are comprised of a number of processes, utilities, and services that support the separations function. Included are enriched uranium loadout, bulk chemical storage, water handling, acid recovery, general purpose evaporation, and segregated solvent facilities. In addition, services for water, electricity, and steam are provided. This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents an analysis of the H-Area Outside Facilities and is one of a series of documents for the Separations Area as specified in the SR Implementation Plan for DOE order 5481.1A. The primary purpose of the analysis was to demonstrate that the facility can be operated without undue risk to onsite or offsite populations, to the environment, and to operating personnel. In this report, risks are defined as the expected frequencies of accidents, multiplied by the resulting radiological consequences in person-rem. Following the summary description of facility and operations is the site evaluation including the unique features of the H-Area Outside Facilities. The facility and process design are described in Chapter 3.0 and a description of operations and their impact is given in Chapter 4.0. The accident analysis in Chapter 5.0 is followed by a list of safety related structures and systems (Chapter 6.0) and a description of the Quality Assurance program (Chapter 7.0). The accident analysis in this report focuses on estimating the risk from accidents as a result of operation of the facilities. The operations were evaluated on the basis of three considerations: potential radiological hazards, potential chemical toxicity hazards, and potential conditions uniquely different from normal industrial practice.

  19. An overview of research activities on materials for nuclear applications at the INL Safety, Tritium and Applied Research facility

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    P. Calderoni; P. Sharpe; M. Shimada

    2009-09-01

    The Safety, Tritium and Applied Research facility at the Idaho National Laboratory is a US Department of Energy National User Facility engaged in various aspects of materials research for nuclear applications related to fusion and advanced fission systems. Research activities are mainly focused on the interaction of tritium with materials, in particular plasma facing components, liquid breeders, high temperature coolants, fuel cladding, cooling and blanket structures and heat exchangers. Other activities include validation and verification experiments in support of the Fusion Safety Program, such as beryllium dust reactivity and dust transport in vacuum vessels, and support of Advanced Test Reactor irradiation experiments. This paper presents an overview of the programs engaged in the activities, which include the US-Japan TITAN collaboration, the US ITER program, the Next Generation Power Plant program and the tritium production program, and a presentation of ongoing experiments as well as a summary of recent results with emphasis on fusion relevant materials.

  20. Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safety, Security & Resilience of the Energy Infrastructure Energy Storage Nuclear Power & ... large rotary actuators, which reduces system cost; and common inletsoutlets, to ...

  1. Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Safety, Security & Resilience of the Energy Infrastructure Energy Storage Nuclear Power & ... A view upwind of SWIS' aerosol-generating system. Permalink Gallery Sandia ...

  2. Safety Oversight of Decommissioning Activities at DOE Nuclear Sites

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Zull, Lawrence M.; Yeniscavich, William

    2008-01-15

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is an independent federal agency established by Congress in 1988 to provide nuclear safety oversight of activities at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. The activities under the Board's jurisdiction include the design, construction, startup, operation, and decommissioning of defense nuclear facilities at DOE sites. This paper reviews the Board's safety oversight of decommissioning activities at DOE sites, identifies the safety problems observed, and discusses Board initiatives to improve the safety of decommissioning activities at DOE sites. The decommissioning of former defense nuclear facilities has reduced the risk of radioactive material contamination and exposure to the public and site workers. In general, efforts to perform decommissioning work at DOE defense nuclear sites have been successful, and contractors performing decommissioning work have a good safety record. Decommissioning activities have recently been completed at sites identified for closure, including the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, the Fernald Closure Project, and the Miamisburg Closure Project (the Mound site). The Rocky Flats and Fernald sites, which produced plutonium parts and uranium materials for defense needs (respectively), have been turned into wildlife refuges. The Mound site, which performed R and D activities on nuclear materials, has been converted into an industrial and technology park called the Mound Advanced Technology Center. The DOE Office of Legacy Management is responsible for the long term stewardship of these former EM sites. The Board has reviewed many decommissioning activities, and noted that there are valuable lessons learned that can benefit both DOE and the contractor. As part of its ongoing safety oversight responsibilities, the Board and its staff will continue to review the safety of DOE and contractor decommissioning activities at DOE defense nuclear sites.

  3. Enterprise Assessments Review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Transuranic Waste Facility 90% Draft Documented Safety Analysis and Technical Safety Requirements Submittals ¬Ö EA-LANL-2015-07-07

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Plutonium Facility Restart of Fissile Material Operations - January 2016 | Department of Energy Plutonium Facility Restart of Fissile Material Operations - January 2016 Enterprise Assessments Review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility Restart of Fissile Material Operations - January 2016 January 2016 Review of the Plutonium Facility Restart of Fissile Material Operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safety and

  4. Emergency preparedness source term development for the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards-Licensed Facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Sutter, S.L.; Mishima, J.; Ballinger, M.Y.; Lindsey, C.G.

    1984-08-01

    In order to establish requirements for emergency preparedness plans at facilities licensed by the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) needs to develop source terms (the amount of material made airborne) in accidents. These source terms are used to estimate the potential public doses from the events, which, in turn, will be used to judge whether emergency preparedness plans are needed for a particular type of facility. Pacific Northwest Laboratory is providing the NRC with source terms by developing several accident scenarios for eleven types of fuel cycle and by-product operations. Several scenarios are developed for each operation, leading to the identification of the maximum release considered for emergency preparedness planning (MREPP) scenario. The MREPP scenarios postulated were of three types: fire, tornado, and criticality. Fire was significant at oxide fuel fabrication, UF/sub 6/ production, radiopharmaceutical manufacturing, radiopharmacy, sealed source manufacturing, waste warehousing, and university research and development facilities. Tornadoes were MREPP events for uranium mills and plutonium contaminated facilities, and criticalities were significant at nonoxide fuel fabrication and nuclear research and development facilities. Techniques for adjusting the MREPP release to different facilities are also described.

  5. Safety training and safe operating procedures written for PBFA (Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator) II and applicable to other pulsed power facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Donovan, G.L.; Goldstein, S.A.

    1986-12-01

    To ensure that work in advancing pulsed power technology is performed with an acceptably low risk, pulsed power research facilities at Sandia National Laboratories must satisfy general safety guidelines established by the Department of Energy, policies and formats of the Environment, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Department, and detailed procedures formulated by the Pulsed Power Sciences Directorate. The approach to safety training and to writing safe operating procedures, and the procedures presented here are specific to the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II (PBFA II) Facility but are applicable as guidelines to other research and development facilities which have similar hazards.

  6. Health and safety plan for characterization sampling of ETR and MTR facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Baxter, D.E.

    1994-10-01

    This health and safety plan establishes the procedures and requirements that will be used to minimize health and safety risks to persons performing Engineering Test Reactor and Materials Test Reactor characterization sampling activities, as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration standard, 29 CFR 1910.120. It contains information about the hazards involved in performing the tasks, and the specific actions and equipment that will be used to protect persons working at the site.

  7. DOE Order Self Study Modules - DOE O 420.1B Facility Safety

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    a comprehensive fire protection program. 6. State the objectives of the nuclear criticality safety program. 7. State the general requirements for evaluating and documenting a ...

  8. Facilities

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Facilities The the WTGa1 turbine (aka DOE/SNL #1) retuns to power as part of a final series of commissioning tests. Permalink Gallery First Power for SWiFT Turbine Achieved during Recommissioning Facilities, News, Renewable Energy, SWIFT, Wind Energy, Wind News First Power for SWiFT Turbine Achieved during Recommissioning The Department of Energy's Scaled Wind Farm Technology (SWiFT) Facility reached an exciting milestone with the return to power production of the WTGa1 turbine (aka DOE/SNL #1)

  9. U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide [Fulfills ORO Safety Basis Competency 1, 2 (Part 1), or 7 (Part 1)

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    "This self-study guide provides an overview of safety basis terminology, requirements, and activities that are applicable to DOE and Oak Ridge Operations Office (ORO) nuclear facilities on the Oak...

  10. Subject: Integrated Safety Analysis: Why It Is Appropriate for Fuel Recycling Facilities Project Number: 689Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Letter, 9/10/10

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Enclosed for your review is a Nuclear Energy Institute white paper on the use of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed recycling facilities. This paper is...

  11. ARM - Facility News Article

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    26, 2010 [Facility News] ARM Science Board Welcomes New Members Bookmark and Share Several new members have joined the ARM Science Board. This eleven-member board is an independent body that reviews proposals for use of the ARM Climate Research Facility. The board is preparing to review the recently received proposals for the FY2012 campaigns and will be meeting in August. Thanks to the following outgoing Science Board members for their service. Dr. Dave Bader, Lawrence Livermore National

  12. DNFSB 2002-1 Software Quality Assurance Improvement Plan Commitment 4.2.1.2: Safety Quality Assurance Plan and Criteria for the Safety Analysis Toolbox Codes

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    EH-4.2.1.2-Criteria Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2002-1 Software Quality Assurance Improvement Plan Commitment 4.2.1.2: Software Quality Assurance Plan and Criteria for the Safety Analysis Toolbox Codes U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment, Safety and Health 1000 Independence Ave., S.W. Washington, DC 20585-2040 November 2003 Software Quality Assurance Criteria for Safety Analysis Codes November 2003 INTENTIONALLY BLANK ii Software Quality Assurance Criteria

  13. safety

    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    contractor at the Nevada National Security Site, has been recognized by the Department of Energy for excellence in occupational safety and health protection. National Nuclear...

  14. Safety

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    Solar Energy Wind Energy Water Power Supercritical CO2 Geothermal Natural Gas Safety, Security & Resilience of the Energy Infrastructure Energy Storage Nuclear Power & Engineering ...

  15. Microsoft Word - EM QA Corporate Board Meeting Minutes - Oct...

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Board Meeting Minutes October 27, 2014 - Nevada Site Office Page 1 of 10 Voting Board ... Safety Topic and General Information - Brian Barbero A representative from the Nevada Site ...

  16. National Ignition Facility sub-system design requirements integrated safety systems SSDR 1.5.4

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Reed, R.; VanArsdall, P.; Bliss, E.

    1996-09-01

    This System Design Requirement document establishes the performance, design, development, and test requirements for the Integrated Safety System, which is part of the NIF Integrated Computer Control System (ICCS).

  17. Order Module--DOE O 420.1B, FACILITY SAFETY | Department of Energy

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    To ensure that new DOE nuclear reactors comply with the requirements of DOE O 420.1B and the design requirements of DOE O 5480.30, Nuclear Reactor Safety Design Criteria. DOE Order ...

  18. DOE-HDBK-1113-98; Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities...

    Broader source: Energy.gov (indexed) [DOE]

    DATE M a y 9, 2005 REPLY TO EH-52:Judith D. Foulke:3-5865 ATTN OF: REAFFIRMATION WITH ERRATA OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) URANIUM FACILITIES" Dennis Kubicki, Technical Standards ...

  19. Criticality safety evaluation report for the cold vacuum drying facility's process water handling system

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    NELSON, J.V.

    1999-05-12

    This report addresses the criticality concerns associated with process water handling in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility. The controls and limitations on equipment design and operations to control potential criticality occurrences are identified.

  20. Fuel-cycle facilities: preliminary safety and environmental information document. Volume VII

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    Not Available

    1980-01-01

    Information is presented concerning the mining and milling of uranium and thorium; uranium hexafluoride conversion; enrichment; fuel fabrication; reprocessing; storage options; waste disposal options; transportation; heavy-water-production facilities; and international fuel service centers.

  1. Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico Facilities and Safety Information Document [NOTE: Volume I, Chapter 1

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    March, F.; Guerrero, J.V.; Johns, W.H.; Schetnan, R.; Bayliss, L.S.; Kuzio, K.A.; White, B.B.

    1999-09-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) began in 1945 as the ''Z'' Division of what was then Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory on Oxnard Field, which was owned by the Air Technical Service Command, as a base of operations to store materials and house personnel. Oxnard Field was transferred to the U.S. Engineers, Manhattan District, on July 21, 1945, who converted several wood frame structures to serve functions that were transferred from Los Alamos. Development of the SNL/New Mexico (SNL/NM) site began in 1946 and 1947 with construction of the first four buildings in what is now Tech Area I. Construction of another 14 permanent buildings in Tech Area I began in 1948. SNL constructed a high-explosive assembly area in Tech Area II, a half mile south of Tech Area I, and started plans for several outdoor testing facilities for Tech Area III, about seven miles to the south of Tech Area I, in 1952. By 1953, SNL completed and put into operation the first group of Tech Area III facilities, which included a rocket sled track, a large centrifuge, a vibration facility, and an instrument control center. Tech Area IV and Tech Area V were developed later to provide facilities for pulsed power and high-energy experiments. As the need developed for outdoor testing facilities remote from the public and other work areas, SNL added many facilities on U.S. Air Force and other federal property in the area known as Coyote Test Field (Sandia National Laboratories, 1997b). Most recently, DOE leased U.S. Air Force facilities in the Manzano Area for SNL to use for storage of low-level radioactive waste, mixed waste (a combination of radioactive and hazardous waste), and transuranic waste (Sandia National Laboratories, 1997a).

  2. Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    TOMASZEWSKI, T.A.

    2000-04-25

    The Waste Receiving and Processing Facility (WRAP), 2336W Building, on the Hanford Site is designed to receive, confirm, repackage, certify, treat, store, and ship contact-handled transuranic and low-level radioactive waste from past and present U.S. Department of Energy activities. The WRAP facility is comprised of three buildings: 2336W, the main processing facility (also referred to generically as WRAP); 2740W, an administrative support building; and 2620W, a maintenance support building. The support buildings are subject to the normal hazards associated with industrial buildings (no radiological materials are handled) and are not part of this analysis except as they are impacted by operations in the processing building, 2336W. WRAP is designed to provide safer, more efficient methods of handling the waste than currently exist on the Hanford Site and contributes to the achievement of as low as reasonably achievable goals for Hanford Site waste management.

  3. Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    IDAHO FALLS, Idaho ‚Äď Continual operations improvements are integral to the mission of the Idaho site‚Äôs Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP). Two recent developments in retrieval operations save taxpayer dollars and illustrate advancements in employee safety and efficiency.

  4. Safety Software Quality Assurance Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities for Nuclear Facilities and Activities

    Broader source: Directives, Delegations, and Requirements [Office of Management (MA)]

    2003-08-27

    To assign roles and responsibilities for improving the quality of safety software. DOE N 411.2 (archived) extends this Notice until 01/31/2005. DOE N 411.3 extends this Notice until 1/31/06. Canceled by DOE O 414.1C. does not cancel other directives.

  5. Nuclear Safety Regulatory Framework

    Energy Savers [EERE]

    Authority and responsibility to regulate nuclear safety at DOE facilities 10 CFR 830 10 CFR 835 10 CFR 820 Regulatory Implementation Nuclear Safety Radiological Safety Procedural ...

  6. Criticality Safety | Department of Energy

    Office of Environmental Management (EM)

    Contact Garrett Smith 301-903-7440 DOE Employee Concerns Program Environment Worker Health & Safety Facility Safety Nuclear Safety Criticality Safety Quality Assurance Risk ...

  7. ARM - Facility News Article

    Broader source: All U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office Webpages (Extended Search)

    8, 2010 Facility News TWP Site Scientist Selected for Journal's Editorial Board Bookmark and Share Dr. Long was recently selected as a member of the editorial board of The Open...

  8. CRAD, Assessment Criteria and Guidelines for Determining the Adequacy of Software Used in the Safety Analysis and Design of Defense Nuclear Facilities

    Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)

    These guidelines and criteria provide a consistent overall framework for assessment of the processes that are currently in place to ensure that the software being used in the safety analysis and design of the SSCs in defense nuclear facilities is adequate. These reviews will be conducted only on software that is currently in use, not on software that was previously used as part of a safety analysis and design process.

  9. NNMCAB Board Minutes: May 2000 Santa Fe

    Broader source: Energy.gov [DOE]

    Minutes of the May 24, 2000 Board meeting at NM Energy Minerals and Natural Resources Department Presentation LANL, Environmental Safety and Health, Lee McAtee

  10. ORNL necessary and sufficient standards for environment, safety, and health. Final report of the Identification Team for other industrial, radiological, and non-radiological hazard facilities

    SciTech Connect (OSTI)

    1998-07-01

    This Necessary and Sufficient (N and S) set of standards is for Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These facility classifications are based on a laboratory-wide approach to classify facilities by hazard category. An analysis of the hazards associated with the facilities at ORNL was conducted in 1993. To identify standards appropriate for these Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities, the activities conducted in these facilities were assessed, and the hazards associated with the activities were identified. A preliminary hazards list was distributed to all ORNL organizations. The hazards identified in prior hazard analyses are contained in the list, and a category of other was provided in each general hazard area. A workshop to assist organizations in properly completing the list was held. Completed hazard screening lists were compiled for each ORNL division, and a master list was compiled for all Other Industrial, Radiological Hazard, and Non-Radiological facilities and activities. The master list was compared against the results of prior hazard analyses by research and development and environment, safety, and health personnel to ensure completeness. This list, which served as a basis for identifying applicable environment, safety, and health standards, appears in Appendix A.