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Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


1

NNSA and Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board certifications...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

allocated funding NNSA and Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board certifications free up 47 million in previously allocated funding The DNFSB and NNSA required the CMRR...

2

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's enabling legislation  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

ENABLING STATUTE OF THE ENABLING STATUTE OF THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 42 U.S.C. § 2286 et seq. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1989 (Pub. L. No. 100-456, September 29, 1988), AS AMENDED BY NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1991 (Pub. L. No. 101-510, November 5, 1990), NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993 (Pub. L. No. 102-190, December 5, 1991), ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-486, October 24, 1992), NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FISCAL YEAR 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-160, November 30, 1993), FEDERAL REPORTS ELIMINATION ACT OF 1998 (Pub. L. No. 105-362, November 10, 1998), NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FISCAL YEAR 2001 (Pub. L. No. 106-398, October 30, 2000), AND

3

Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 October 2012 Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting on the Status of Integration of Safety Into the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility [HIAR-Y-12-2012-10-02] The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) observed the public hearing of the DNFSB review of the UPF project status for integrating safety into design. The meeting was broken into three parts: a panel discussion and questioning of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversight and execution; a panel discussion and questioning of the B&W Y-12 Technical Services, LLC (B&W Y-12) design project team leadership; and an open public

4

Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 October 2012 Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting on the Status of Integration of Safety Into the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility [HIAR-Y-12-2012-10-02] The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) observed the public hearing of the DNFSB review of the UPF project status for integrating safety into design. The meeting was broken into three parts: a panel discussion and questioning of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversight and execution; a panel discussion and questioning of the B&W Y-12 Technical Services, LLC (B&W Y-12) design project team leadership; and an open public

5

Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 Independent Activity Report, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting - October 2012 October 2012 Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting on the Status of Integration of Safety Into the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility [HIAR-Y-12-2012-10-02] The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) observed the public hearing of the DNFSB review of the UPF project status for integrating safety into design. The meeting was broken into three parts: a panel discussion and questioning of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversight and execution; a panel discussion and questioning of the B&W Y-12 Technical Services, LLC (B&W Y-12) design project team leadership; and an open public

6

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board - Strategic Plan...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

all of its defense nuclear facilities. Message from the Board Peter S. Winokur, Chariman Jessie H. Roberson, Vice Chariman John E. Mansfield Joseph F. Bader DEFENSE NUCLEAR...

7

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Review at the Nevada...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

air filters. The Board members and staff toured CEF, DAF, and the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) facility. Additional discussions of subcritical...

8

DOE M 140.1-1B, Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This Manual presents the process the Department of Energy will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) and its staff. Cancels ...

2001-03-30T23:59:59.000Z

9

September 10, 2010 HSS Briefing to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) on Union Activities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Labor Union and Stakeholder Labor Union and Stakeholder Outreach and Collaboration Office of Health, Safety and Security Briefing to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Briefing to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Leadership Commitment Leadership Commitment " h "It is imperative that we communicate and establish relationships with those elements that train manage and elements that train, manage and represent our workforce to improve the safety culture at DOE sites." safety culture at DOE sites. Glenn S. Podonsky Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer 2 History History History History October 2006: Formation of HSS to provide an integrated DOE HQ-level function for health, safety, environment, and security into one unified office. February 2007: Established HSS Focus Group -

10

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Review at the Nevada National Security Site  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

NNSS-2011-001 NNSS-2011-001 Site: Nevada National Security Site Subject: Office of Independent Oversight's Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations Activity Report for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Review at the Nevada National Security Site Dates of Activity 02/14/2011 - 02/17/2011 Report Preparer William Macon Activity Description/Purpose: The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Independent Oversight, within the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), visited the Nevada Site Office (NSO) and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) from February 14-17, 2011. The purpose of the visit was to observe the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) review and maintain operational awareness of NNSS activities. Result:

11

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting on the...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

HSS Independent Activity Report - Rev. 0 Report Number: HIAR-Y-12-2012-10-02 Site: Y-12 UPF Subject: Office of Enforcement and Oversight's Office of Safety and Emergency Management...

12

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, ACTION: Notice...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

upon to accomplish the mission assigned to DOE and NNSA under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, at defense nuclear facilities . We will focus on what impact DOE's and...

13

Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 1998  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This is the ninth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy (Department) activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department`s defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department`s defense nuclear facilities. The locations of the major Department facilities are provided. During 1998, Departmental activities resulted in the proposed closure of one Board recommendation. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with four other Board recommendations. Two new Board recommendations were received and accepted by the Department in 1998, and two new implementation plans are being developed to address these recommendations. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, a renewed effort to increase the technical capabilities of the federal workforce, and a revised plan for stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

NONE

1999-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

14

.Dear Secretary Bodman: In its response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board)  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

of Energy (DOE) committed to revitalizing Integrated Safety Management (ISM) with "a set of actions the Department will pursue to re-confirm that ISM will be the foundation of the Department's safety management approach and to address identified weaknesses in implementation. " The enclosed technical report, DNFSB/TECH-36, Integrated Safety Management: The Foundation for an Effective Safety Culture, provides an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the current state of ISM implementation at the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) production plants and laboratories. ISM was established 10 years ago as a new approach to integrating work and safety. The concept was adopted by DOE to enhance safety awareness, upgrade formality of operations, and improve safety performance. However, the potential for this practical safety system to achieve operational excellence and instill a sustainable safety culture has not been fully realized. From the broadest perspective, requirements and mechanisms to implement ISM are established, but implementation of safety management systems varies from site to site. This report examines the current status of the effectiveness of ISM systems at the seven NNSA weapons sites, summarizes

Joseph F. Bader; John E Mansfield; The Honorable; Samuel W. Bodman; Oversight Of Complex; High-hazard Organizations; The Department; A J. Eggenberger; Ms Patty Wagner

2006-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

15

Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Calendar Year 1999  

SciTech Connect

This is the tenth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department's defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department's defense nuclear facilities. During 1999, Departmental activities resulted in the closure of nine Board recommendations. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with three Board recommendations. One new Board recommendation was received and accepted by the Department in 1999, and a new implementation plan is being developed to address this recommendation. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, opening of a repository for long-term storage of transuranic wastes, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

None

2000-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

16

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting on the Status of Integration of Safety Into the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility, October 2012  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

HSS Independent Activity Report - HSS Independent Activity Report - Rev. 0 Report Number: HIAR-Y-12-2012-10-02 Site: Y-12 UPF Subject: Office of Enforcement and Oversight's Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Activity Report for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Public Meeting on the Status of Integration of Safety into the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Dates of Activity: October 2, 2012 Report Preparer: Timothy Mengers Activity Description/Purpose: The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) observed the public hearing of the DNFSB review of the UPF project status for integrating safety into design. The meeting was broken into three parts: a panel discussion and questioning of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversight and execution; a panel discussion and questioning of the B&W Y-12

17

Annual report to Congress. Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 2000  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This Annual Report to the Congress describes the Department of Energy's activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. During 2000, the Department completed its implementation and proposed closure of one Board recommendation and completed all implementation plan milestones associated with two additional Board recommendations. Also in 2000, the Department formally accepted two new Board recommendations and developed implementation plans in response to those recommendations. The Department also made significant progress with a number of broad-based safety initiatives. These include initial implementation of integrated safety management at field sites and within headquarters program offices, issuance of a nuclear safety rule, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

None

2001-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

18

Defense Nuclear Facilitiets Safety Board Visit and Site Lead...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Activity Report for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Visit and Site Lead Planning Activities at the Los Alamos...

19

APS Experiment Safety Review Board  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Charter for the APS Experiment Safety Review Board May 12, 2011 1. Purpose The APS Experiment Safety Review Board (ESRB) advises the AES Division Director on the safe implementation of experiments performed by APS users on the experiment hall floor. The ESRB reviews each experiment that is submitted to the APS via the APS Experiment Safety Assessment System (ESAF). These experiments are conducted in beamline endstations in the APS Experiment Hall. 2. Membership The ESRB members are appointed by the AES Division Director. The current members of the ESRB are: Bruce Glagola AES - Chair Edmund Chang AES Paul Rossi XSD Nena Moonier AES Tom Barkalow PSC Patricia Pedergnana AES Wendy VanWingeren AES 3. Method After an experiment is submitted to the APS Experiment Safety Review system

20

Status and Effectiveness of DOE Efforts to Learn from Internal and External Operating Experience in Accordance with Commitment #20 of the DOE Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Safety and Security Safety and Security Report to the Secretary on the Status and Effectiveness of DOE Efforts to Learn from Internal and External Operating Experience in Accordance with Commitment #20 of the DOE Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1 February 2011 Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety and Security HSS Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 Department-wide Action Plan for the Columbia Accident and Davis-Besse Event ........... 3 3.0 Comprehensive Operating Experience Program ................................................................. 5

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


21

Status and Effectiveness of DOE Efforts to Learn from Internal and External Operating Experience in Accordance with Commitment #20 of the DOE Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety and Security Safety and Security Report to the Secretary on the Status and Effectiveness of DOE Efforts to Learn from Internal and External Operating Experience in Accordance with Commitment #20 of the DOE Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1 February 2011 Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety and Security HSS Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 Department-wide Action Plan for the Columbia Accident and Davis-Besse Event ........... 3 3.0 Comprehensive Operating Experience Program ................................................................. 5

22

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel  

SciTech Connect

Through the Atomic Energy Act, Congress made is possible for the public to get a full and fair hearing on civilian nuclear matters. Individuals who are directly affected by any licensing action involving a facility producing or utilizing nuclear materials may participate in a formal hearing, on the record, before independent judges on the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP or Panel). Frequently, in deciding whether a license, permit, amendment, or extension should be granted to a particular applicant, the Panel members must be more than mere umpires. If appropriate, they are authorized to go beyond the issues the parties place before them in order to identify, explore, and resolve significant questions involving threats to the public health and safety that come to a board`s attention during the proceedings. This brochure explains the purpose of the panel. Also addressed are: type of hearing handled; method of public participation; formality of hearings; high-level waste; other panel responsibilities and litigation technology.

NONE

1998-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

23

FACILITY SAFETY (FS)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

FACILITY SAFETY (FS) FACILITY SAFETY (FS) OBJECTIVE FS.1 - (Core Requirement 7) Facility safety documentation in support of SN process operations,is in place and has been implemented that describes the safety envelope of the facility. The, safety documentation should characterize the hazards/risks associated with the facility and should, identify preventive and mitigating measures (e.g., systems, procedures, and administrative, controls) that protect workers and the public from those hazards/risks. (Old Core Requirement 4) Criteria 1. A DSA has been prepared by FWENC, approved by DOE, and implemented to reflect the SN process operations in the WPF. (10 CFR 830.200, DOE-STD-3009-94) 2. A configuration control program is in place and functioning such that the DSA is

24

Nuclear Facility Safety Basis  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Safety Basis Safety Basis FUNCTIONAL AREA GOAL: A fully compliant Nuclear Facility Safety Basis. Program is implemented and maintained across the site. REQUIREMENTS:  10 CFR 830 Subpart B Guidance:  DOE STD 3009  DOE STD 1104  DOE STD  DOE G 421.1-2 Implementation Guide For Use in Developing Documented Safety Analyses To Meet Subpart B Of 10 CFR 830  DOE G 423.1-1 Implementation Guide For Use In Developing Technical Safety Requirements  DOE G 424.1-1 Implementation Guide For Use In Addressing Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements Performance Objective 1: Contractor Program Documentation The site contractor has developed an up-to-date, comprehensive, compliant, documented nuclear facility safety basis and associated implementing mechanisms and procedures for all required nuclear facilities and activities (10 CFR

25

APS Experiment Safety Review Board  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Meeting Minutes * Laser Safety Notifications Charter for the APS Laser Safety Committee 1. Purpose The Laser Safety Committee advises APS Management on laser safety matters,...

26

CRAD, Facility Safety - Nuclear Facility Safety Basis | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

CRAD, Facility Safety - Nuclear Facility Safety Basis CRAD, Facility Safety - Nuclear Facility Safety Basis CRAD, Facility Safety - Nuclear Facility Safety Basis A section of Appendix C to DOE G 226.1-2 "Federal Line Management Oversight of Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities." Consists of Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs) that can be used for assessment of a contractor's Nuclear Facility Safety Basis. CRADs provide a recommended approach and the types of information to gather to assess elements of a DOE contractor's programs. CRAD, Facility Safety - Nuclear Facility Safety Basis More Documents & Publications CRAD, Facility Safety - Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements Site Visit Report, Livermore Site Office - February 2011 FAQS Job Task Analyses - Nuclear Safety Specialist

27

Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 for the period ending June 30, 1993  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This is the ninth quarterly report on the progress of activities that address safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks containing ferrocyanide compounds. Milestones completed this quarter include (1) a report on the credibility of hot spots and a recommendation on infrared scans; (2) a document discussing the strength and limitations of proposed moisture monitoring technologies; (3) limited calibration of the neutron probe in simulant-filled drums; (4) a report interpreting data from auger surface samples of ferrocyanide tank 241-BY-104; (5) a document on the effect of possible catalyst, initiator, and diluents on ferrocyanide reactivity; (6) a report on small scale sensitivity tests of ferrocyanide flowsheet simulants; and (7) preparation and shipment of T Plant simulants for calorimetric and dryout tests.

Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Forbes, C.J.; Meacham, J.E.

1993-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

28

Facility Disposition Safety Strategy RM  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The Facility Disposition Safety Strategy (FDSS) Review Module is a tool that assists DOE federal project review teams in evaluating the adequacy of the facility documentation, preparations or...

29

FACILITY SAFETY (FS)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE OP.1 - (Core Requirements 4 and 6) Sufficient numbers of qualified personnel are available to conduct and support operations. Adequate facilities and equipment are available to ensure operational support services are adequate for operations. The level of knowledge of managers, operations personnel, and support personnel is adequate based on reviews of examinations and examination results and selected interviews of personnel. (Old Core Requirements 3, 8, 13, and 19) Criteria 1. Minimum staffing requirements for safe operations have been established for operations personnel, supervisors, and managers. These staffing levels are met and are consistent with the safety basis requirements and assumptions. (DOE O 5480.19; WPF DSA) 2. All ES&H matrix support functions are identified for system operations. Adequate

30

Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Rules  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Safety (HS-30) Office of Nuclear Safety Home Directives Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Rules Nuclear Safety Workshops Technical Standards Program Search ...

31

Facilities Services and Environmental Health and Safety  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Facilities Services and Environmental Health and Safety Laboratory Ventilation Management Program Guidance Document Facilities Services and Environmental Health and Safety This group is comprised of support staff from Facilities Services and Environmental Health and Safety who make observations

Pawlowski, Wojtek

32

FACILITY SAFETY (FS)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

- (Core Requirement 1) Line management has established a QA program to ensure safe accomplishment of work. Personnel exhibit an awareness of public and worker safety, health, and...

33

Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety Programs establishes requirements related to safety management programs that are essential to the safety of DOE nuclear facilities. In addition, establishes requirements...

34

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting Presentations - NNSA Safety...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

of the Facility Representative program to focus our technical resources on high risk facilities. This program is an essential element of our nuclear safety oversight...

35

Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs: Nuclear Facility Training  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety (HS-30) Safety (HS-30) Office of Nuclear Safety Home » Directives » Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Rules » Nuclear Safety Workshops Technical Standards Program » Search » Approved Standards » Recently Approved » RevCom for TSP » Monthly Status Reports » Archive » Feedback DOE Nuclear Safety Research & Development Program Office of Nuclear Safety Basis & Facility Design (HS-31) Office of Nuclear Safety Basis & Facility Design - About Us » Nuclear Policy Technical Positions/Interpretations » Risk Assessment Working Group » Criticality Safety » DOE O 420.1C Facility Safety » Beyond Design Basis Events Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs (HS-32) Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs - About Us » Facility Representative Program

36

Facility Disposition Safety Strategy RM  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Facility Disposition Safety Strategy Review Module Facility Disposition Safety Strategy Review Module March 2010 CD-0 O 0 OFFICE OF Facilit C CD-1 F ENVIRO Standard R ty Dispos Rev Critical Decis CD-2 M ONMENTAL Review Plan sition Saf view Module sion (CD) Ap CD March 2010 L MANAGE n (SRP) fety Strat e pplicability D-3 EMENT tegy CD-4 Post Ope eration Standard Review Plan, 2 nd Edition, March 2010 i FOREWORD The Standard Review Plan (SRP) 1 provides a consistent, predictable corporate review framework to ensure that issues and risks that could challenge the success of Office of Environmental Management (EM) projects are identified early and addressed proactively. The internal EM project review process encompasses key milestones established by DOE O 413.3A, Change 1, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, DOE-STD-1189-2008,

37

Charter for the ARM Climate Research Facility Science Board  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The objective of the ARM Science Board is to promote the Nations scientific enterprise by ensuring that the best quality science is conducted at the DOEs User Facility known as the ARM Climate Research Facility. The goal of the User Facility is to serve scientific researchers by providing unique data and tools to facilitate scientific applications for improving understanding and prediction of climate science.

Ferrell, W

2013-03-08T23:59:59.000Z

38

February 2, 2004, Board announcement of changes in the Public Meeting previously scheduled for February 3, 2004 on safety oversight  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD Pursuant to the provisions of the "Government in the Sunshine Act" (5 U.S.C. § 552b), notice is hereby given of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board) meeting. FEDERAL REGISTER CITATION OF PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT: 69 Fed. Reg. 1,699 (January 12, 2004). PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED TIME AND DATE OF THE MEETING: 9:00 a.m., February 3, 2004. CHANGES IN THE MEETING: On February 9, 2004, at 9:00 a.m., the Board will hear from the Department of Energy's Office of Environment, Safety, and Health concerning its roles and responsibilities in the oversight process of defense nuclear facilities. This testimony was previously scheduled for the February 3, 2004, public meeting. The meeting will be held at the

39

January 7, 2013, Department letter accepting Board Recommendation 2012-2, Hanford Tank Farms Flammable Gas Safety Strategy  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

7, 2013 7, 2013 The Honorable PeterS. Winokur Chairman Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana A venue, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004 Dear Mr. Chairman: The Department of Energy (DOE) acknowledges receipt of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) Recommendation 2012-2, Iianford Tank Fanns Flammable Gas Safety Strategy, issued on September 28, 2012, published in the Federal Register on October 12, 20 12, and accepts the Recommendation. The Board acknowledged in its Recommendation that some improvements had been made to the specific administrative controls used for flamn1able gas monitoring, but noted that more work was needed to make the ventilation systetn a credited safety control. DOE agrees. In developing an Implementation Plan (IP), DOE will take the

40

December 14, 2004, Board letter providing Board Technical Report DNFSB/TECH-35, Safety Management of Complex, High-Hazard Organizations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

1 Conwdy, Chalrmm 1 Conwdy, Chalrmm DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES , I SAFETY BOARD A J bggenberger, V i ~ e Charman John I Mansfield K Brucc lwdtthewa 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C 20004-290 1 (202) 694-7000 December 14,2004 The Honorable Spencer Abraham Secretary of Energy 1 000 Independence Avenue, S W Washington, DC 20585- 1000 Dear Secretary Abraham: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) issued Recommendation 2004- I, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations, on May 2 1, 2004. On July 2 1,2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) accepted Recommendation 2004- 1 . The enclosed technical report, DNFSBITECH-35, Safety Management of Complex, High-Hazard Organizations, provides background information and ideas for implementing the Recommendation.

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


41

Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Requirements  

SciTech Connect

This Standard identifies safety requirements for magnetic fusion facilities. Safety functions are used to define outcomes that must be achieved to ensure that exposures to radiation, hazardous materials, or other hazards are maintained within acceptable limits. Requirements applicable to magnetic fusion facilities have been derived from Federal law, policy, and other documents. In addition to specific safety requirements, broad direction is given in the form of safety principles that are to be implemented and within which safety can be achieved.

1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

42

AGING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The purpose of this design calculation is to revise and update the previous criticality calculation for the Aging Facility (documented in BSC 2004a). This design calculation will also demonstrate and ensure that the storage and aging operations to be performed in the Aging Facility meet the criticality safety design criteria in the ''Project Design Criteria Document'' (Doraswamy 2004, Section 4.9.2.2), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirement described in the ''SNF Aging System Description Document'' (BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004f, p. 3-12). The scope of this design calculation covers the systems and processes for aging commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and staging Department of Energy (DOE) SNF/High-Level Waste (HLW) prior to its placement in the final waste package (WP) (BSC 2004f, p. 1-1). Aging commercial SNF is a thermal management strategy, while staging DOE SNF/HLW will make loading of WPs more efficient (note that aging DOE SNF/HLW is not needed since these wastes are not expected to exceed the thermal limits form emplacement) (BSC 2004f, p. 1-2). The description of the changes in this revised document is as follows: (1) Include DOE SNF/HLW in addition to commercial SNF per the current ''SNF Aging System Description Document'' (BSC 2004f). (2) Update the evaluation of Category 1 and 2 event sequences for the Aging Facility as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004c, Section 7). (3) Further evaluate the design and criticality controls required for a storage/aging cask, referred to as MGR Site-specific Cask (MSC), to accommodate commercial fuel outside the content specification in the Certificate of Compliance for the existing NRC-certified storage casks. In addition, evaluate the design required for the MSC that will accommodate DOE SNF/HLW. This design calculation will achieve the objective of providing the criticality safety results to support the preliminary design of the Aging Facility. As the ongoing design evolution remains fluid, the results from this design calculation should be evaluated for applicability to any new or modified design. Consequently, the results presented in this document are limited to the current design. The information contained in this document was developed by Environmental and Nuclear Engineering and is intended for the use of Design and Engineering in its work regarding the various criticality related activities performed in the Aging Facility. Yucca Mountain Project personnel from Environmental and Nuclear Engineering should be consulted before the use of the information for purposes other than those stated herein or use by individuals other than authorized personnel in Design and Engineering.

C.E. Sanders

2004-09-10T23:59:59.000Z

43

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, SAFETY CULTURE, AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE AT RESEARCH FACILITIES.  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Organizational culture surveys of research facilities conducted several years ago and archival occupational injury reports were used to determine whether differences in safety performance are related to general organizational factors or to ''safety culture'' as reflected in specific safety-related dimensions. From among the organizations surveyed, a pair of facilities was chosen that were similar in size and scientific mission while differing on indices of work-related injuries. There were reliable differences in organizational style between the facilities, especially among workers in environment, safety, and health functions; differences between the facilities (and among job categories) on the safety scale were more modest and less regular.

BROWN,W.S.

2000-07-30T23:59:59.000Z

44

December 16, 2005, Board letter regarding the new DOE Manual on Integrated Safety Management  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

6,2005 6,2005 The Honorable Samuel W. Bodman Secretary of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, S W Washington, DC 20585- 1000 Dear Secretary Bodman: The Department of Energy (DOE) submitted its implementation plan for Recommendation 2004- 1 , Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations, to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) on June 10,2005. Commitment 22 under that implementation plan deals with issuing and implementing expectations for DOE organizations regarding the implementation of Integrated Safety Management (ISM). In particular, Deliverable B is a new DOE Manual on ISM. The due date associated with the manual is December 2005. It is important to note that ISM has been one of the primary success stories of the defense nuclear complex. Your staff has been working with the Board's staff to achieve a satisfactory

45

December 27, 2011, Department letter transmitting the Implementation Plan for Board Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant.  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

December 27,2011 December 27,2011 The Honorable Peter S. Winokur Chairman Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004 Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed is the Depmiment of Energy's (DOE's) Implementation Plan (IP) for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). On June 30, 20 II, the Department accepted Recommendation 20 Il-l in a letter to the Board, which was published in the Federal Register. On August 12,2011, the Board sought additional clarification about this acceptance, and on September 19,2011, I transmitted clarification to the Board, which was also published in the Federal Register. The IP provides DOE's approach to address the Board's three sub-recommendations

46

Defense Nuclear Facilitiets Safety Board Visit and Site Lead Planning Activities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

HSS Independent Activity Report - HSS Independent Activity Report - Rev. 1 Report Number: HIAR LANL-2012-08-16 Site: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Subject: Office of Enforcement and Oversight's Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Activity Report for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Visit and Site Lead Planning Activities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Dates of Activity : 08/14/2012 - 08/16/2012 Report Preparer: Robert Freeman Activity Description/Purpose: The purpose of this Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) activity was to maintain site operational awareness of key nuclear safety performance areas of interest to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), monitor ongoing site oversight and planning activities for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) nuclear facilities, and identify and initiate

47

Defense Nuclear Facilitiets Safety Board Visit and Site Lead Planning Activities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

HSS Independent Activity Report - HSS Independent Activity Report - Rev. 1 Report Number: HIAR LANL-2012-08-16 Site: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Subject: Office of Enforcement and Oversight's Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Activity Report for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Visit and Site Lead Planning Activities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Dates of Activity : 08/14/2012 - 08/16/2012 Report Preparer: Robert Freeman Activity Description/Purpose: The purpose of this Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) activity was to maintain site operational awareness of key nuclear safety performance areas of interest to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), monitor ongoing site oversight and planning activities for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) nuclear facilities, and identify and initiate

48

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting Presentations - DOE Safety Oversight Policy, Practices, and Implementation  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Kyle E. McSlarrow, Kyle E. McSlarrow, Deputy Secretary of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public hearing October 21,2003 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Board for providing me the opportunity to address you today. In my role as the Deputy Secretary of Energy, I serve as the Department's Chief Operating Officer and have responsibility for providing direction to all DOE organizations, including NNSA. The subject of today's hearing - safety oversight - is a critical component of the Department's management system. The Secretary and I take our responsibility to ensure the Department's missions are performed safely very seriously, and the Secretary has made this clear from his first year in office. For example, the Secretary stated, in remarks at the 2001 Executive Safety

49

Board Staff Perspectives Quality Council  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Facilities Safety Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Th B d & T h i l S ff Q li A The Board & Technical Staff Quality Assurance Perspectives for 2011 2010 Dr. W. San Horton, PMP, CSQE Member of the Technical Staff Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board DISCLAIMER The ie s and opinions presented are solel the a thor's No information contained in the presentation nor an associated The views and opinions presented are solely the author's. No information contained in the presentation nor any associated discussion should be construed as official or unofficial views or positions of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board T i Topics B i I f ti B d * Basic Information on Board * Who, what, mission, size, location * Organization of the Board and the Board's staff

50

Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.

MITCHELL,GERRY W.; LONGLEY,SUSAN W.; PHILBIN,JEFFREY S.; MAHN,JEFFREY A.; BERRY,DONALD T.; SCHWERS,NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK,THOMAS E.; NAEGELI,ROBERT E.

2000-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

51

Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars...

52

Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Change Notice No. 1. and Reaffirmation January 2007 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585...

53

Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1145-2013 March 2013 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy TRNG-0061 Washington, D.C. 20585...

54

September 8, 1995, Board announcement of a Public Meeting on tthe status of public health and safety issues pertaining to K-East Basin activities at the Hanford Site  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Notice is hereby given of an open meeting of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Notice is hereby given of an open meeting of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) with representatives of the Department of Energy O E ) regarding the Department's standards-based safety management program. The purpose of the meeting is twofold: (1) for DOE to provide information to the Board regarding the status of DOE'S review and revision of nuclear safety Orders and rules, and (2) to allow the Deputy Secretary of Energy to obtain the preliminary advice of individual Board members in i d e n m g any significant safety issues raised by the Board's review of draft revisions to date. No Board decision will be reached, nor will agency business be finally disposed of during the session. This meeting is noticed pursuant to the provisions of the

55

Occupational Safety Review of High Technology Facilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators. These data are useful to form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known sets of safety rules and regulations. Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other industrial hazards. Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for comparison.

Lee Cadwallader

2005-01-31T23:59:59.000Z

56

August 3, 2011, Board letter forwarding public comments concerning Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

S. W S. W i n o h , C h a i n ~ ~ a ~ ~ DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES Icssie H. Roberson, Vice Chairmall SAFETY BOARD Jofm E. Mansfield Waslhgton, DC 20004-2901 Joseph F. Bader August 3,201 1 The Honorable Steven Chu Secretary of Energy U.S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20585-1000 Dear Secretary Chu: Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6 2286d(a), the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) published Recommendation 201 1-1, Safety Cultlcl-e at the Waste Trentineitt aiid I~nmzobilizatio~i Pinlit, in the Federal Register and invited comments, data, views, or argutnents concerning the Recomtnendation frotn interested persons by July 20, 2011. The enclosed comments concerning Recommendation 201 1-1 have been received by the Board and made available to the public on the Board's internet web site, As required by 42

57

DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, and criticality safety.

58

DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

The Order establishes facility and programmatic safety requirements for DOE and NNSA for nuclear safety design criteria, fire protection, criticality safety, ...

2012-12-04T23:59:59.000Z

59

Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Guidance  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in DOE-STD-6002-96, Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities: Requirements. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While the requirements in DOE-STD-6002-96 are generally applicable to a wide range of fusion facilities, this Standard, DOE-STD-6003-96, is concerned mainly with the implementation of those requirements in large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This Standard is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment as opposed to regulation by other regulatory agencies. As the need for guidance involving other types of fusion facilities or other regulatory environments emerges, additional guidance volumes should be prepared. The concepts, processes, and recommendations set forth here are for guidance only. They will contribute to safety at magnetic fusion facilities.

NONE

1996-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

60

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting Presentations - ESE Safety Oversight Policy, Practices, and Implementation  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Energy, Science and Environment Energy, Science and Environment Before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Hearing October 21, 2003 Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Board for inviting me to address you today. I welcome this opportunity to tell you about the progress the Department has made in assuring safe operations while accomplishing its missions. For my part, I am proud of the record to date. First, we need to understand the historical context underlying the actions of this Administration. The DOE of the 80's was in denial of its defense environmental responsibilities, liabilities and risks. This culminated in the FBI raid on Rocky Flats in 1989. The DOE of the 90's acknowledged the responsibilities and liabilities but didn't understand the risks and couldn't develop systems and processes for addressing them.

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


61

Assessment of criticality safety in DOE facilities  

SciTech Connect

A study was made to assess nuclear criticality safety in DOE Facilities and to assess the effects of various types of possible improvements. The accident statistics in DOE operations show that the fatalities caused by Nuclear Criticality accidents are small compared to other accident categories. The data show the safety performance after 1965, compared to prior years, was considerably improved indicating that overall safety programs have been effective. Data on criticality safety violations were collected from eight major facilities. These data were categorized by severity indexes and causes were assigned. A total of 421 violations were used in the data base for analysis in a fault tree model. Calculations were made using the fault tree methodology to show expected improvement in safety (reduction in probability of a criticality accident) for a fixed reduction in the number of criticality violations. Based on this analysis, about equal emphasis should be placed on reducing mechanical failures and operator errors as efforts in these two areas will likely produce the most significant improvements in safety. A criticality safety infraction form was prepared to facilitate uniformity in recording data on infractions for subsequent analysis. Discussions with Nuclear Safety Specialists working in the field instilled confidence that criticality safety is being handled by concerned, capable, and knowledgable persons.

Lloyd, R.C.; Clayton, E.D.; Converse, W.E.; Kottwitz, D.A.

1981-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

62

Safety audit of refrigerated liquefied gas facilities  

SciTech Connect

An Exxon Research and Engineering Co. comprehensive review of engineering practices and application of safety requirements at Exxon's world-wide refrigerated liquefied hydrocarbon gas storage and handling installations, which included a field audit of about 90 tanks at 30 locations, showed that catastrophic tank failure was not a credible event with properly operated and maintained tanks designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with API Standard 620, Design and Construction of Large Welded Low-Pressure Storage Tanks, although supplemental requirements were suggested to further enhance safety. The review also showed that any meaningful safety audit should be comprehensive and must include all facilities with careful attention to detail. The review embraces products of -1 to -167C and included LNG, ethylene, LPG, and LPG olefins. Recent and proposed LNG safety legislation; some field audit results; and recommendations as to design, construction, and operation of LNG and LPG storage facilities, marine terminals, and tankers, are also discussed.

Feely, F.J.; Sommer, E.C.; Marshall, B.T.; Palmer, A.J.

1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

63

Safety of Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Full text of publication follows: ensuring safety during all stages of facility life cycle is a widely recognised responsibility of the operators, implemented under the supervision of the regulatory body and other competent authorities. As the majority of the facilities worldwide are still in operation or shutdown, there is no substantial experience in decommissioning and evaluation of safety during decommissioning in majority of Member States. The need for cooperation and exchange of experience and good practices on ensuring and evaluating safety of decommissioning was one of the outcomes of the Berlin conference in 2002. On this basis during the last three years IAEA initiated a number of international projects that can assist countries, in particular small countries with limited resources. The main IAEA international projects addressing safety during decommissioning are: (i) DeSa Project on Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety during Decommissioning; (ii) R{sup 2}D{sup 2}P project on Research Reactors Decommissioning Demonstration Project; and (iii) Project on Evaluation and Decommissioning of Former Facilities that used Radioactive Material in Iraq. This paper focuses on the DeSa Project activities on (i) development of a harmonised methodology for safety assessment for decommissioning; (ii) development of a procedure for review of safety assessments; (iii) development of recommendations on application of the graded approach to the performance and review of safety assessments; and (iv) application of the methodology and procedure to the selected real facilities with different complexities and hazard potentials (a nuclear power plant, a research reactor and a nuclear laboratory). The paper also outlines the DeSa Project outcomes and planned follow-up activities. It also summarises the main objectives and activities of the Iraq Project and introduces the R{sup 2}D{sup 2} Project, which is a subject of a complementary paper.

Batandjieva, B.; Warnecke, E.; Coates, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

2008-01-15T23:59:59.000Z

64

September 26, 2011, Department letter transmitting the Implementation Plan for Board Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers.  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

September 26, 2011 September 26, 2011 The Honorable Peter S. Winokur Chairman Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004-2941 Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed is the Department of Energy's Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers. This Plan provides the Department's approach for updating its Documented Safety Analysis Standards and requirements to clarify them in regards to performance of hazard and accident analysis and the identification of safety controls. I have assigned Dr. James B. O'Brien, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Safety in the Office of Health, Safety and Security, as the Department's Responsible

65

Mechanistic facility safety and source term analysis  

SciTech Connect

A PC-based computer program was created for facility safety and source term analysis at Hanford The program has been successfully applied to mechanistic prediction of source terms from chemical reactions in underground storage tanks, hydrogen combustion in double contained receiver tanks, and proccss evaluation including the potential for runaway reactions in spent nuclear fuel processing. Model features include user-defined facility room, flow path geometry, and heat conductors, user-defined non-ideal vapor and aerosol species, pressure- and density-driven gas flows, aerosol transport and deposition, and structure to accommodate facility-specific source terms. Example applications are presented here.

PLYS, M.G.

1999-06-09T23:59:59.000Z

66

DRY TRANSFER FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS  

SciTech Connect

This design calculation updates the previous criticality evaluation for the fuel handling, transfer, and staging operations to be performed in the Dry Transfer Facility (DTF) including the remediation area. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that operations performed in the DTF and RF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Dry Transfer Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173737], p. 3-8). A description of the changes is as follows: (1) Update the supporting calculations for the various Category 1 and 2 event sequences as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 171429], Section 7). (2) Update the criticality safety calculations for the DTF staging racks and the remediation pool to reflect the current design. This design calculation focuses on commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies, i.e., pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) SNF. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) owned SNF is evaluated in depth in the ''Canister Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173284]) and is also applicable to DTF operations. Further, the design and safety analyses of the naval SNF canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. Also, note that the results for the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) Site specific Cask (MSC) calculations are limited to the specific design chosen (see Assumption 3.4). A more current design will be included in the next revision of the criticality calculations for the Aging Facility. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design as provided in Attachment III of the DTF and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility. However, it is anticipated that design changes to the facility layout will have little or no impact on the criticality results and/or conclusions presented in this document.

C.E. Sanders

2005-05-17T23:59:59.000Z

67

Criticality safety and facility design considerations  

SciTech Connect

Operations with fissile material introduce the risk of a criticality accident that may be lethal to nearby personnel. In addition, concerns over criticality safety can result in substantial delays and shutdown of facility operations. For these reasons, it is clear that the prevention of a nuclear criticality accident should play a major role in the design of a nuclear facility. The emphasis of this report will be placed on engineering design considerations in the prevention of criticality. The discussion will not include other important aspects, such as the physics of calculating limits nor criticality alarm systems.

Waltz, W.R.

1991-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

68

Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

145-2008 145-2008 April 2008 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax (301) 903-9823. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; (703) 605-6000. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities DOE-HDBK-1145-2008 Program Management Guide

69

Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

NOT MEASUREMENT NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1145-2013 March 2013 DOE HANDBOOK Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy TRNG-0061 Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax (301) 903-9823. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; (703) 605-6000. ii Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities DOE-HDBK-1145-2013 Program Management Foreword

70

Radiological Safety Training for Accelerator Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

TS TS NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1108-2002 May 2002 Reaffirmation with Change Notice 2 July 2013 DOE HANDBOOK RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING FOR ACCELERATOR FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document is available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web Site at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds/ Change Notice No.2 Radiological Training for Accelerator Facilities Page/Section Change Throughout the document: Program Management Guide Instructor's Guide Student's Guide "Shall" and "Must" statements Revised to: Program Management Instructor's Material Student's Material Reworded to non-mandatory language unless associated with a requirement

71

March 16, 1995, Board staff trip report on DOE Order 6430.1A...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD March 16, 1995 1. Purpose: The purpose of this review was to determine whether the In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) Facility complies with...

72

Facility Safety Assessment - Nuclear Engineering Division (Argonne...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Safety Materials Disposition Decontamination & Decommissioning Nuclear Criticality Safety Nuclear Data Program Nuclear Waste Form Modeling Departments Engineering...

73

Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

DOE HDBK-1113-2008 DOE HDBK-1113-2008 April 2008 DOE HANDBOOK RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING FOR URANIUM FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy FSC 6910 Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1113-2008 ii This document is available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web Site at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/techstds/ DOE-HDBK-1113-2008 iii Foreword This Handbook describes a recommended implementation process for additional training as outlined in DOE-STD-1098-99, Radiological Control (RCS). Its purpose is to assist those individuals, Department of Energy (DOE) employees, Managing and Operating (M&O) contractors, and Managing and Integrating

74

Nuclear and Facility Safety Directives | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Nuclear Safety » Nuclear and Facility Safety Nuclear Safety » Nuclear and Facility Safety Directives Nuclear and Facility Safety Directives DOE Order (O) 252.1A, Technical Standards Program DOE O 252.1A promotes DOE's use of Voluntary Consensus Standards (VCS) as the primary method for application of technical standards and establishes and manages the DOE Technical Standards Program (TSP) including technical standards development, information, activities, issues, and interactions. HS-30 Contact: Jeff Feit DOE Policy (P) 420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy DOE P 420.1, documents the Department's nuclear safety policy to design, construct, operate, and decommission its nuclear facilities in a manner that ensures adequate protection of workers, the public, and the environment. HS-30 Contact: James O'Brien

75

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel annual report, Fiscal year 1992  

SciTech Connect

In Fiscal Year 1992, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (``the Panel``) handled 38 proceedings. The cases addressed issues in the construction, operation, and maintenance of commercial nuclear power reactors and other activities requiring a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This reports sets out the Panel`s caseload during the year and summarizes, highlights, and analyzes how the wide-ranging issues raised in those proceedings were addressed by the Panel`s judges and licensing boards.

Not Available

1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

76

Electrical Safety Assessment Plan--NNSA/NSO IOD Facility Representative,  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Electrical Safety Assessment Plan--NNSA/NSO IOD Facility Electrical Safety Assessment Plan--NNSA/NSO IOD Facility Representative, 12/03 Electrical Safety Assessment Plan--NNSA/NSO IOD Facility Representative, 12/03 An assessment of the Electrical Safety (ES) program at XXXX was conducted during the week of December XX-XX, 2003. The assessment team evaluated the program using the programmatic areas and specific Lines of Inquiry (LOI) contained in the approved Assessment plan provided. The team consisted of the Facility Representative from National Nuclear Security Administration, as well as ES, Subject Matter Expert support. The assessment plan identified 5 areas of review for Electrical Safety. An integrated process has been established to ensure electrical safety hazards are identified and that adequate controls are defined and

77

OAK RIDGE CERCLA DISPOSAL FACILITY ACHIEVES SAFETY MILESTONE | Department  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

OAK RIDGE CERCLA DISPOSAL FACILITY ACHIEVES SAFETY MILESTONE OAK RIDGE CERCLA DISPOSAL FACILITY ACHIEVES SAFETY MILESTONE OAK RIDGE CERCLA DISPOSAL FACILITY ACHIEVES SAFETY MILESTONE December 1, 2010 - 12:00pm Addthis OAK RIDGE CERCLA DISPOSAL FACILITY ACHIEVES SAFETY MILESTONE Oak Ridge, TN - The Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) provides the onsite disposal capability for the majority of cleanup-generated wastes on the Oak Ridge Reservation. EMWMF has continued a long-standing pattern of safe, complaint operations with 3,000 days without a lost workday case since operations commenced on May 28, 2002. The EMWMF has placed 1.5 million tons of waste and fill in the facility. The EMWMF receives waste from many Oak Ridge cleanup projects, including American Recovery and Reinvestment Act-funded projects, multiple

78

September 10, 2003, Board Public Meeting Presentations - Nuclear...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

with Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board on NRC's Reactor Oversight Process Presented by Cynthia Carpenter Deputy Director, Division of Inspection Program Management, Nuclear...

79

December 17, 2010, Board letter forwarding Recommendation 2010...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

. Winokur. hainnan DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES Jessie H. Roberson, VIce Chainnan SAFETY BOARD John E. Mansfield Washington, DC 20004-2901 Joseph F. Bader Larry W. Brown December 17,...

80

December 16, 2003, Board Public Meeting - Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) and others. Our Laboratory was founded in 1952 as a nuclear weapons design laboratory, and national security continues to be our central...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


81

December 16, 2003, Board Public Meeting - Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

TESTIMONY G. Peter Nanos, Director Los Alamos National Laboratory Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public Meeting December 16, 2003 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Defense...

82

Safety analysis report for the Waste Storage Facility. Revision 2  

SciTech Connect

This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Storage Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Storage Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume.

Bengston, S.J.

1994-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

83

FUEL HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this design calculation is to perform a criticality evaluation of the Fuel Handling Facility (FHF) and the operations and processes performed therein. The current intent of the FHF is to receive transportation casks whose contents will be unloaded and transferred to waste packages (WP) or MGR Specific Casks (MSC) in the fuel transfer bays. Further, the WPs will also be prepared in the FHF for transfer to the sub-surface facility (for disposal). The MSCs will be transferred to the Aging Facility for storage. The criticality evaluation of the FHF features the following: (I) Consider the types of waste to be received in the FHF as specified below: (1) Uncanistered commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF); (2) Canistered CSNF (with the exception of horizontal dual-purpose canister (DPC) and/or multi-purpose canisters (MPCs)); (3) Navy canistered SNF (long and short); (4) Department of Energy (DOE) canistered high-level waste (HLW); and (5) DOE canistered SNF (with the exception of MCOs). (II) Evaluate the criticality analyses previously performed for the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-certified transportation casks (under 10 CFR 71) to be received in the FHF to ensure that these analyses address all FHF conditions including normal operations, and Category 1 and 2 event sequences. (III) Evaluate FHF criticality conditions resulting from various Category 1 and 2 event sequences. Note that there are currently no Category 1 and 2 event sequences identified for FHF. Consequently, potential hazards from a criticality point of view will be considered as identified in the ''Internal Hazards Analysis for License Application'' document (BSC 2004c, Section 6.6.4). (IV) Assess effects of potential moderator intrusion into the fuel transfer bay for defense in depth. The SNF/HLW waste transfer activity (i.e., assembly and canister transfer) that is being carried out in the FHF has been classified as safety category in the ''Q-list'' (BSC 2003, p. A-6). Therefore, this design calculation is subject to the requirements of the ''Quality Assurance Requirements and Description'' (DOE 2004), even though the FHF itself has not yet been classified in the Q-list. Performance of the work scope as described and development of the associated technical product conform to the procedure AP-3.124, ''Design Calculations and Analyses''.

C.E. Sanders

2005-06-30T23:59:59.000Z

84

Safety Software Guide Perspectives for the Design of New Nuclear Facilities (U)  

SciTech Connect

In June of this year, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued directives DOE O 414.1C and DOE G 414.1-4 to improve quality assurance programs, processes, and procedures among its safety contractors. Specifically, guidance entitled, ''Safety Software Guide for use with 10 CFR 830 Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements, and DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance, DOE G 414.1-4'', provides information and acceptable methods to comply with safety software quality assurance (SQA) requirements. The guidance provides a roadmap for meeting DOE O 414.1C, ''Quality Assurance'', and the quality assurance program (QAP) requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart A, Quality Assurance, for DOE nuclear facilities and software application activities. [1, 2] The order and guide are part of a comprehensive implementation plan that addresses issues and concerns documented in Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2002-1. [3] Safety SQA requirements for DOE as well as National Nuclear Security Administration contractors are necessary to implement effective quality assurance (QA) processes and achieve safe nuclear facility operations. DOE G 414.1-4 was developed to provide guidance on establishing and implementing effective QA processes tied specifically to nuclear facility safety software applications. The Guide includes software application practices covered by appropriate national and international consensus standards and various processes currently in use at DOE facilities. While the safety software guidance is considered to be of sufficient rigor and depth to ensure acceptable reliability of safety software at all DOE nuclear facilities, new nuclear facilities are well suited to take advantage of the guide to ensure compliant programs and processes are implemented. Attributes such as the facility life-cycle stage and the hazardous nature of each facility operations are considered, along with the category and level of importance of the software. The discussion provided herein illustrates benefits of applying the Safety Software Guide to work activities dependent on software applications and directed toward the design of new nuclear facilities. In particular, the Guide-based systematic approach with software enables design processes to effectively proceed and reduce the likelihood of rework activities. Several application examples are provided for the new facility.

VINCENT, Andrew

2005-07-14T23:59:59.000Z

85

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board - Performance and Accountablit...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

July 9, 2012, the Secretary of Energy issued a memorandum entitled Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework for Directives, announcing a new framework for development,...

86

Policy Statement 3, Board Oversight of Department of Energy Decommissioning  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

3 3 Date: August 19, 1996 Subject Policy Statement on Board oversight of Department of Energy decommissioning activities at defense nuclear facilities. Summary This policy statement describes the decommissioning phase of a DOE defense nuclear facility and identifies the Board's safety oversight responsibilities for decommisioning activities. John T. Conway, Chairman Congress directed the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) to oversee Department of Energy (DOE) practices at defense nuclear facilities that could adversely affect public health and safety during any stage in the life cycle of those facilities, from design, construction, and operation through decommissioning. The Board's objective during decommissioning is identical to its objective during any other phase of a facility's life cycle: to ensure that DOE provides adequate protection of worker and public health and safety at defense nuclear facilities. Congress specifically tasked the Board with reviewing and evaluating:

87

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility  

SciTech Connect

Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste.

WEISS, E.V.

2000-12-15T23:59:59.000Z

88

Review of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Integrated Safety...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Criteria, Review and Approach Document DNFSB Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board DOE U.S. Department of Energy ESH&Q Environment, Safety, Health, and Quality FBP...

89

Facility Representative Program: Nuclear Safety Basis Fundamentals...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Qualification Information Qualification Standards DOE Order Self-Study Modules DOE Fundamentals Handbooks Nuclear Safety Basis Self-Study Guide Energy Online Courses Available...

90

Criticality safety considerations for low-level-waste facilities  

SciTech Connect

The nuclear criticality safety for handling and burial of certain special nuclear materials (SNM) at low-level-waste (LLW) facilities is licensed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Recently, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) staff assisted the NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Low-Level-Waste and Decommissioning Projects Branch, in developing technical specifications for the nuclear criticality safety of {sup 235}U and {sup 235}Pu in LLW facilities. This assistance resulted in a set of nuclear criticality safety criteria that can be uniformly applied to the review of LLW package burial facility license applications. These criteria were developed through the coupling of the historic surface-density criterion with current computational technique to establish safety criteria considering SNM material form and reflector influences. This paper presents a summary of the approach used to establish and to apply the criteria to the licensing review process.

Hopper, C.M.

1995-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

91

Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Documents (Documented Safety Analyses and Technical Safety Requirements)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

February 1996 February 1996 CHANGE NOTICE NO. 2 Date November 2005 DOE STANDARD REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY BASIS DOCUMENTS (DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSES AND TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS) U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, DC 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, Fax: (301) 903-9823. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Adminis tration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; (703) 605-6000.

92

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment  

SciTech Connect

This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

Armstrong, D.L.

1994-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

93

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Biennial Report, Fiscal Years 1993--1994. Volume 6  

SciTech Connect

In Fiscal Year 1993, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (``the Panel``) handled 30 proceedings. In Fiscal Year 1994, the Panel handled 36 proceedings. The cases addressed issues in the construction, operation, and maintenance of commercial nuclear power reactors and other activities requiring a license form the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This report sets out the Panel`s caseload during the year and summarizes, highlight, and analyzes how the wide- ranging issues raised in those proceedings were addressed by the Panel`s judges and licensing boards.

NONE

1995-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

94

Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for Waste Receiving & Processing (WRAP) facility  

SciTech Connect

These Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the Administrative Controls required to ensure safe operation of the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility (WRAP). As will be shown in the report, Safety Limits, Limiting Control Settings, Limiting Conditions for Operation, and Surveillance Requirements are not required for safe operation of WRAP.

TOMASZEWSKI, T.A.

2001-07-10T23:59:59.000Z

95

Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Volume 2, Guidance  

SciTech Connect

This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in Vol. 1 of this Standard. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While Vol. 1 is generally applicable in that requirements there apply to a wide range of fusion facilities, this volume is concerned mainly with large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This volume is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment.

NONE

1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

96

CFN Operations and Safety Awareness (COSA) Checklist Proximal Probes Facility  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Proximal Probes Facility Proximal Probes Facility Building 735 This COSA form must be completed for all experimenters working in the CFN and must be submitted to the CFN User Office for badge access. CFN Safety Awareness Policy: Each user must be instructed in the safe procedures in CFN related activities. CFN Facility Laboratory personnel shall keep readily available all relevant instructions and safety literature. Employee/Guest Name Life/Guest Number Department/Division ES&H Coordinator/Ext. Facility Manager COSA Trainer Guest User Staff USER ADMINISTRATION Checked in at User Administration and has valid BNL ID badge Safety Approval Form (SAF) approved. Training requirements completed (Indicate additional training specified in SAF or ESR in lines provided below): Select ESRs

97

CFN Operations and Safety Awareness (COSA) Checklist Electronic Nanomaterials Facility  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Electronic Nanomaterials Facility Electronic Nanomaterials Facility Building 735 This COSA form must be completed for all experimenters working in the CFN and must be submitted to the CFN User Office for badge access. CFN Safety Awareness Policy: Each user must be instructed in the safe procedures in CFN related activities. CFN Facility Laboratory personnel shall keep readily available all relevant instructions and safety literature. Employee/Guest Name Life/Guest Number Department/Division ES&H Coordinator/Ext. Facility Manager COSA Trainer Guest User Staff USER ADMINISTRATION Checked in at User Administration and has valid BNL ID badge Safety Approval Form (SAF) approved. Training requirements completed (Indicate additional training specified in SAF or ESR in lines provided below):

98

CFN Operations and Safety Awareness (COSA) Checklist Electron Microscopy Facility  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Electron Microscopy Facility Electron Microscopy Facility Building 735 This COSA form must be completed for all experimenters working in the CFN and must be submitted to the CFN User Office for badge access. CFN Safety Awareness Policy: Each user must be instructed in the safe procedures in CFN related activities. CFN Facility Laboratory personnel shall keep readily available all relevant instructions and safety literature. Employee/Guest Name Life/Guest Number Department/Division ES&H Coordinator/Ext. Facility Manager COSA Trainer Guest User Staff USER ADMINISTRATION Checked in at User Administration and has valid BNL ID badge Safety Approval Form (SAF) approved. Training requirements completed (Indicate additional training specified in SAF or ESR in lines provided below):

99

Technical safety requirements for the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF).  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

These Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) identify the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories, in compliance with 10 CFR 830, 'Nuclear Safety Management.' The bases for the TSRs are established in the AHCF Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), which was issued in compliance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements.' The AHCF Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) apply only to the ventilation system, the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and the inventory. Surveillance Requirements (SRs) apply to the ventilation system, HEPA filters, and associated monitoring equipment; to certain passive design features; and to the inventory. No Safety Limits are necessary, because the AHCF is a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility.

Seylar, Roland F.

2004-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

100

Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars Idaho Waste Treatment Facility Improves Worker Safety and Efficiency, Saves Taxpayer Dollars August 27, 2013 - 12:00pm Addthis The box retrieval forklift carriage is used to lift a degraded box as retrieval personnel monitor progress. The box retrieval forklift carriage is used to lift a degraded box as retrieval personnel monitor progress. The new soft-sided overpack is placed for shipment for treatment and repackaging. The new soft-sided overpack is placed for shipment for treatment and repackaging. The box retrieval forklift carriage is used to lift a degraded box as retrieval personnel monitor progress. The new soft-sided overpack is placed for shipment for treatment and repackaging.

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
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101

September 12, 1995, Board staff trip report at Nevada Test Site...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 1. Purpose: This report documents a review of test activities and recent exercises at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The review was performed...

102

ARM - ARM Science Board  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Science Board Board Business About Become a User Recovery Act Mission FAQ History Organization Participants Facility Statistics Forms Contacts Facility Documents ARM Management...

103

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) provides effective cross-organizational leadership in resolving DNFSB-related technical and management issues...

104

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting - DOE Safety Oversight Policy, Practices, and Implementation  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

0 21 2 2 2 3 24 25 11 planned oversight model will address this issue. That concludes my remarks this morning subject to any questions from the Board. I look forward to hearing from the representatives of the Department. CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Mr. McSlarrow, welcome. MR. McSLARROW: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Board, I appreciate having the opportunity to address you today. In my role, as the Deputy Secretary of Energy, I serve as the Department's Chief Operating Officer, and I have responsibility for providing direction to all DOE organizations, including "SA. The subject of today's event, safety oversight, is a critical component of the Department's management system. The Secretary and I take our responsibility to ensure the Department's missions are

105

Criticality safety training at the Hot Fuel Examination Facility  

SciTech Connect

HFEF comprises four hot cells and out-of-cell support facilities for the US breeder program. The HFEF criticality safety program includes training in the basic theory of criticality and in specific criticality hazard control rules that apply to HFEF. A professional staff-member oversees the implementation of the criticality prevention program. (DLC)

Garcia, A.S.; Courtney, J.C.; Thelen, V.N.

1983-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

106

2012 Facility Representative/Safety System Oversight/Fire Safety Workshop - Registrants  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Facility Representative / Safety System Oversight Workshop Facility Representative / Safety System Oversight Workshop DOE Fire Safety Workshop Federal Technical Capability Panel (FTCP) Meeting May 14 - 18, 2012, at the Alexis park Resort Hotel, Las Vegas, NV Registrants As of 5/15/2012 Total Number: 218 First Name Last Name Government /Contractor Agency Secretarial Office Site Position Training Course FTCP FS 5/15 FS 5/16 FR/SSO Plenary FR Track SSO Track Fire Safety Training Tour Ron Alderson Government Employee DOE NNSA Nevada SSO SAF-271 No No No Yes No Yes No No Josh Allen Government Employee DOE EM Richland FR No No No No Yes Yes No No No Mark Alsdorf Government Employee DOE HSS Headquarters NTC Safety Training Manager SAF-271 Yes No No Yes No No No No Xavier Aponte Government Employee

107

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities  

SciTech Connect

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.6. This Introduction to the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES TSRs is not part of the TSR limits or conditions and contains no requirements related to WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES operations or to the safety analyses of the DSA.

Larson, H L

2007-09-07T23:59:59.000Z

108

December 4, 2003, Board Public Meeting - Board Member Opening Remarks  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Armed Services Committee made reference to the goals Armed Services Committee made reference to the goals that they were setting for the Board. The "basic goals," and I ' m quoting now from its report, "The basic goals in establishing an independent safety oversight board are to assure and enhance the safety of operations of DOE's nuclear facilities, and to restore public confidence that these facilities are operated without undue risk to public health and safety. " Now the report set forth, of course, a number of responsibilities given to the Board, but the report also went on to say, "Above all, the Board should be instrumental in restoring public confidence in DOE's management capabilities, a clear prerequisite for the continued production of the nuclear materials vital to the nation's security."

109

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010  

SciTech Connect

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

Laycak, D T

2010-03-05T23:59:59.000Z

110

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

Laycak, D

2008-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

111

DOE | Office of Health, Safety and Security | 2012 Facility Representative,  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Facility Representative Facility Representative Office of Nuclear Safety Home Facility Representative Home Annual Facility Rep Workshop › 2012 › 2011 › 2010 › 2009 › 2008 › 2007 › 2006 › 2005 › 2004 › 2003 › 2002 › 2001 › 2000 DOE Safety Links › ORPS Info › Operating Experience › DOE Lessons Learned › Accident Investigation Assessment Tools › FR CRADs › Surveillance Guides › Manager's Guide for Safety and Health Subject Matter Links General Program Information › Program Mission Statement › Program Directives and Guidance › FR of the Year Award Program › FR of the Year Award › FR Program Assessment Guide (Appendix B, DOE STD 1063-2011) FR Quarterly Performance Indicators Training & Qualification Information › Qualification Standards › Energy Online Courses

112

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities  

SciTech Connect

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.4.

Laycak, D T

2010-03-05T23:59:59.000Z

113

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities  

SciTech Connect

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting of buildings, tents, other structures, and open areas as described in Chapter 2 of the DSA. Section 2.4 of the DSA provides an overview of the buildings, structures, and areas in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, including construction details such as basic floor plans, equipment layout, construction materials, controlling dimensions, and dimensions significant to the hazard and accident analysis. Chapter 5 of the DSA documents the derivation of the TSRs and develops the operational limits that protect the safety envelope defined for the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. This TSR document is applicable to the handling, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste, TRU WASTE, LLW, mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste received or generated in the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Section 5, Administrative Controls, contains those Administrative Controls necessary to ensure safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. Programmatic Administrative Controls are in Section 5.6.

Laycak, D T

2008-06-16T23:59:59.000Z

114

Preparation of Safety Basis Documents for Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

5506-2007 5506-2007 April 2007 DOE STANDARD Preparation of Safety Basis Documents for Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facilities U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585 AREA-SAFT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-5506-2007 ii Available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards Program Web Site at Http://tis.eh.doe.gov/techstds/ DOE-STD-5506-2007 iii Foreword This Standard provides analytical assumptions and methods, as well as hazard controls to be used when developing Safety Basis (SB) documents for transuranic (TRU) waste facilities in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. It also provides supplemental technical

115

Review of the Los Alamos National Laoratory Nuclear Facility...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

CM Configuration Management CMR Chemistry and Metallurgy Research CSE Cognizant System Engineer DNFSB Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board DOE U.S. Department of Energy...

116

2012 Facility Representative/Safety System Oversight/Fire Safety Workshop Agenda  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Facility Representative  Safety System Oversight  Fire Safety Facility Representative  Safety System Oversight  Fire Safety Overall Workshop Agenda May 14-18, 2012  Alexis Park Hotel  Las Vegas, Nevada Monday, May 14, 2012 8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. SAF-271, SSO Assessments (Day 1) Zeus B Quality Assurance Overview for FR/SSO Personnel Zeus A 5:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. Workshop Registration Zeus Foyer Tuesday, May 15, 2012 8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. Fire Safety Workshop Track Begins (see track agenda) Parthenon 4 SAF-271, SSO Assessments (Day 2) Zeus B . Safety Culture Workshop Zeus A Federal Technical Capability Panel Parthenon 2 5:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. Workshop Registration Zeus Foyer Wednesday, May 16, 2012 6:30 a.m. - 7:45 a.m. Workshop Registration Zeus Foyer 8:00 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. FR/SSO Tracks Begin; Plenary session with Fire Safety Track Parthenon 2 & 4

117

Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing Facility Project  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Oversight Assessment of Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing Facility Project May 2011 January 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy Independent Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing Facility Project

118

Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing Facility Project  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Oversight Assessment of Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing Facility Project May 2011 January 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy Independent Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing Facility Project

119

TRANSPORTATION CASK RECEIPT/RETURN FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY EVALUATIONS  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of this design calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of transportation casks performed in the Transportation Cask Receipt and Return Facility (TCRRF) and Buffer Area meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirement described in the ''Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170217], Section 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of the following items: (1) Evaluate criticality effects for both dry and fully flooded conditions pertaining to TCRRF and Buffer Area operations for defense in depth. (2) Evaluate Category 1 and 2 event sequences for the TCRRF as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). This evaluation includes credible fuel reconfiguration conditions. In addition to the scope of work listed above, an evaluation was also performed of modeling assumptions for commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) regarding inclusion of plenum and end regions of the active fuel. This calculation is limited to CSNF and US Department of Energy (DOE) SNF. it should be mentioned that the latter waste form is evaluated more in depth in the ''Canister Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167614]). Further, the design and safety analyses of the naval SNF canisters are the responsibility of the US Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the TCRRF and Buffer Area and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility. However, it is anticipated that design changes to the facility layout will have little or no impact on the criticality results and/or conclusions presented in this document. This calculation is subject to the ''Quality Assurance Requirements and Description'' (DOE 2004 [DIRS 171539]) because the TCRRF is included in the Q-List (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168361], p. A-3) as an item important to safety. This calculation is prepared in accordance with AP-3.12Q, ''Design Calculations and Analyses'' [DIRS 168413].

C.E. Sanders

2005-04-26T23:59:59.000Z

120

Safety System Engineer and Oversight Programs, March 2006  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Used in This Report CSE Cognizant System Engineer DNFSB Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board DOE U.S. Department of Energy FTCP Federal Technical Capability Panel NNSA...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


121

Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Salt Waste Processing...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

BARS Behavioral Anchored Rating Scales DNFSB Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board DOE U.S. Department of Energy DPO Differing Professional Opinion ECP Employee Concern...

122

Order Module--DOE O 420.1B, FACILITY SAFETY | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

DOE O 420.1B, FACILITY SAFETY DOE O 420.1B, FACILITY SAFETY Order Module--DOE O 420.1B, FACILITY SAFETY To ensure that new DOE hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities are designed and constructed in a manner that ensures adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment from nuclear hazards. To ensure that major modifications to hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities comply with the design and construction requirements for new hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. To ensure that new DOE nuclear reactors comply with the requirements of DOE O 420.1B and the design requirements of DOE O 5480.30, Nuclear Reactor Safety Design Criteria. DOE Order Self Study Modules - DOE O 420.1B Facility Safety More Documents & Publications Order Module--DOE O 420.2B, SAFETY OF ACCELERATOR FACILITIES

123

Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The purpose ofthis letter is to update you on Action 2-6 in the Department ofEnergy's Implementation

Pantex Plant; G N S. Podonsky

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

124

Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

SENSITIVE DOE-STD-1104-2009 May 2009 Superseding DOE-STD-1104-96 DOE STANDARD REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY BASIS AND SAFETY DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENTS U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, DC 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-1104-2009 ii Available on the Department of Energy Technical Standards web page at http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/ns/techstds/ DOE-STD-1104-2009 iii CONTENTS FOREWORD .................................................................................................................................. v INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................

125

Independent Oversight Review of the Idaho National Laboratory Fuel Conditioning Facility Safety Basis  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT REVIEW OF THE IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY FUEL CONDITIONING FACILITY SAFETY BASIS April 2010 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety and Security Office of Independent Oversight i INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT REVIEW OF THE IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY FUEL CONDITIONING FACILITY SAFETY BASIS Table of Contents Acronyms ............................................................................................................................ ii Executive Summary ........................................................................................................... iii 1.0 Introduction ..................................................................................................................1

126

Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide - November 2002  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Oak Ridge Operations Office Oak Ridge Operations Office Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide [Fulfills ORO Safety Basis Competency 1, 2 (Part 1), or 7 (Part 1)] November 2002 Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................................................................... iii List of Figures ....................................................................................................................iv List of Tables......................................................................................................................iv INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1

127

Safety analysis of the 700-horsepower combustion test facility  

SciTech Connect

The objective of the program reported herein was to provide a Safety Analysis of the 700 h.p. Combustion Test Facility located in Building 93 at the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center. Extensive safety related measures have been incorporated into the design, construction, and operation of the Combustion Test Facility. These include: nitrogen addition to the coal storage bin, slurry hopper, roller mill and pulverizer baghouse, use of low oxygen content combustion gas for coal conveying, an oxygen analyzer for the combustion gas, insulation on hot surfaces, proper classification of electrical equipment, process monitoring instrumentation and a planned remote television monitoring system. Analysis of the system considering these factors has resulted in the determination of overall probabilities of occurrence of hazards as shown in Table I. Implementation of the recommendations in this report will reduce these probabilities as indicated. The identified hazards include coal dust ignition by hot ductwork and equipment, loss of inerting within the coal conveying system leading to a coal dust fire, and ignition of hydrocarbon vapors or spilled oil, or slurry. The possibility of self-heating of coal was investigated. Implementation of the recommendations in this report will reduce the ignition probability to no more than 1 x 10/sup -6/ per event. In addition to fire and explosion hazards, there are potential exposures to materials which have been identified as hazardous to personal health, such as carbon monoxide, coal dust, hydrocarbon vapors, and oxygen deficient atmosphere, but past monitoring experience has not revealed any problem areas. The major environmental hazard is an oil spill. The facility has a comprehensive spill control plan.

Berkey, B.D.

1981-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

128

DOE-HDBK-1113-98; Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

FACILITIES" Dennis Kubicki, Technical Standards Manager, EH-24 SUBJECT. HANDBOOK, DOE-HDBK-1113-98, "RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING FOR TO: In February 2005, a notice of intent...

129

JM for Page Change to DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

DOE-STD-1104 contains the Department's method and criteria for reviewing and approving nuclear facility's documented safety analysis (DSA). This review and ...

2013-06-21T23:59:59.000Z

130

Environment, safety, and health considerations for a new accelerator facility  

SciTech Connect

A study of siting considerations for possible future accelerators at Fermilab is underway. Each candidate presents important challenges in environment, safety, and health (ES&H) that are reviewed generically in this paper. Some of these considerations are similar to those that have been encountered and solved during the construction and operation of other accelerator facilities. Others have not been encountered previously on the same scale. The novel issues will require particular attention coincident with project design efforts to assure their timely cost-effective resolution. It is concluded that with adequate planning, the issues can be addressed in a manner that merits the support of the Laboratory, the US Department of Energy (DOE), and the public.

J. Donald Cossairt [and others

2001-04-23T23:59:59.000Z

131

December 22, 1998, Board announcement of public meeting scheduled for February 3, 1998, regarding Recommendations 95-2 and 93-3.  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

2 2 '9E ~4:25Pfl P.2 3670-01 DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD Pursuant to the provision of the "Government in the Sunshine Act" (5 U.S.C. ~ 552b), notice is hereby given of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board) meeting described below. TIME AND DATE OF MEETING: 9:00 a.m., February 3, 1999. PLACE: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Public Hearing Room, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20004. STATUS: Open. MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board will convene the ninth quarterly briefing regarding the status of progress of the activities a&ociated with the Department of Energy's Implementation Plans for the Board's Recommendation 95-2, Megrated Safety Management ("ISM") and Recommendation 93-3, Improving DOE Technical Capability in Defense Nuclear Facilities Programs.

132

DOE G 420.2-1, Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE O 420.2B, Safety of Accelerator Facilities  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This document is an aid to understanding and meeting the requirements of DOE O 420.2B, Safety of Accelerator Facilities, dated 7/23/04. It does not impose ...

2005-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

133

Perspectives from the Board's Technical Staff  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

from the Board's from the Board's Technical Staff AP Poloski, S Sircar, MW Dunlevy, F Bamdad, SA Stokes June 5, 2012 This presentation contains information collected by the Board's technical staff and no official support or endorsement of these remarks by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is intended or should be inferred. Outline * Purpose: Review the values used by DOE contractors for dispersion analysis against DOE directives * Summary of Staff Complex-wide Review * Areas of Discussion - methods for determining atmospheric stability class; - use of extremely stable (G) atmospheric stability class; - selection of atmospheric dispersion coefficients; - correction for wind speed height; - selection of surface roughness; - adjusting dispersion coefficients due to surface roughness;

134

Appraisal of the Uranium Processing Facility Safety Basis Preliminary...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety Design Report Process at the Y-12 National Security Complex May 2011 May 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and...

135

Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Documents...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

institutional programs in Integrated Safety Management System documents and site-wide manuals was added. p. 13 Sect. 3 Approval Bases for Technical Safety Requirements New...

136

Development of an auditable safety analysis in support of a radiological facility classification  

SciTech Connect

In recent years, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities commonly have been classified as reactor, non-reactor nuclear, or nuclear facilities. Safety analysis documentation was prepared for these facilities, with few exceptions, using the requirements in either DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System; or DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Traditionally, this has been accomplished by development of an extensive Safety Analysis Report (SAR), which identifies hazards, assesses risks of facility operation, describes and analyzes adequacy of measures taken to control hazards, and evaluates potential accidents and their associated risks. This process is complicated by analysis of secondary hazards and adequacy of backup (redundant) systems. The traditional SAR process is advantageous for DOE facilities with appreciable hazards or operational risks. SAR preparation for a low-risk facility or process can be cost-prohibitive and quite challenging because conventional safety analysis protocols may not readily be applied to a low-risk facility. The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management recognized this potential disadvantage and issued an EM limited technical standard, No. 5502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation. This standard can be used for developing documentation for a facility classified as radiological, including preparation of an auditable (defensible) safety analysis. In support of the radiological facility classification process, the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project has developed an auditable safety analysis document based upon the postulation criteria and hazards analysis techniques defined in DOE Order 5480.23.

Kinney, M.D. [Roy F. Weston, Inc., Rockville, MD (United States); Young, B. [Dept. of Energy, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

1995-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

137

Order Module--DOE O 420.2B, SAFETY OF ACCELERATOR FACILITIES | Department  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

420.2B, SAFETY OF ACCELERATOR FACILITIES 420.2B, SAFETY OF ACCELERATOR FACILITIES Order Module--DOE O 420.2B, SAFETY OF ACCELERATOR FACILITIES This module will discuss the objectives and requirements associated with the Order and the contractor requirements document. We have provided an example to help familiarize you with the material. The example will also help prepare you for the practice at the end of this module and for the criterion test. Before continuing, you should obtain a copy of the Order at DOE Directives, Regulations, and Standards Portal Home Page or through the course manager. You may need to refer to these documents to complete the example, practice, and criterion test. DOE Order Self Study Modules - DOE O 420.1B Facility Safety More Documents & Publications Order Module--DOE O 420.1B, FACILITY SAFETY

138

Type A Accident Investigation Board report on the January 17, 1996, electrical accident with injury in Technical Area 21 Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility Los Alamos National Laboratory. Final report  

SciTech Connect

An electrical accident was investigated in which a crafts person received serious injuries as a result of coming into contact with a 13.2 kilovolt (kV) electrical cable in the basement of Building 209 in Technical Area 21 (TA-21-209) in the Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility (TSFF) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In conducting its investigation, the Accident Investigation Board used various analytical techniques, including events and causal factor analysis, barrier analysis, change analysis, fault tree analysis, materials analysis, and root cause analysis. The board inspected the accident site, reviewed events surrounding the accident, conducted extensive interviews and document reviews, and performed causation analyses to determine the factors that contributed to the accident, including any management system deficiencies. Relevant management systems and factors that could have contributed to the accident were evaluated in accordance with the guiding principles of safety management identified by the Secretary of Energy in an October 1994 letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and subsequently to Congress.

NONE

1996-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

139

Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report: Appendices  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE`s nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation.

NONE

1995-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

140

Style, content and format guide for writing safety analysis documents. Volume 1, Safety analysis reports for DOE nuclear facilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The purpose of Volume 1 of this 4-volume style guide is to furnish guidelines on writing and publishing Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) for DOE nuclear facilities at Sandia National Laboratories. The scope of Volume 1 encompasses not only the general guidelines for writing and publishing, but also the prescribed topics/appendices contents along with examples from typical SARs for DOE nuclear facilities.

Not Available

1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


141

Guidelines for preparing criticality safety evaluations at Department of Energy non-reactor nuclear facilities  

SciTech Connect

This document contains guidelines that should be followed when preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations that will be used to demonstrate the safety of operations performed at DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities. Adherence to these guidelines will provide consistency and uniformity in criticality safety evaluations (CSEs) across the complex and will document compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.24.

1993-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

142

Environmental Management Advisory Board Charter | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Services » Communication & Engagement » EMAB » Environmental Services » Communication & Engagement » EMAB » Environmental Management Advisory Board Charter Environmental Management Advisory Board Charter The Environmental Management Advisory Board's (EMAB)'s most recent charter outlines the objective, structure, and scope of the Board. EMAB Charter More Documents & Publications SEAB Charter 2012 Methane Hydrate Advisory Committee Charter EM SSAB Charter Waste Management Nuclear Materials & Waste Tank Waste and Waste Processing Waste Disposition Packaging and Transportation Site & Facility Restoration Deactivation & Decommissioning (D&D) Facility Engineering Soil & Groundwater Sustainability Program Management Safety Security Quality Assurance Budget & Performance Acquisition Compliance Project Management

143

DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility Disposition Activities DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility Disposition Activities The original release of DOE-STD-1120-98 provided integrated safety management guidance for enhancing worker, public, and environmental protection during all facility disposition activities. Volume One of this Standard has been revised to provide a Department of Energy (DOE) approved methodology for preparing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, as well as environmental restoration activities that involve work not done within a permanent structure. Methodologies provided in this Standard are intended to be compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part

144

DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility Disposition Activities DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility Disposition Activities The original release of DOE-STD-1120-98 provided integrated safety management guidance for enhancing worker, public, and environmental protection during all facility disposition activities. Volume One of this Standard has been revised to provide a Department of Energy (DOE) approved methodology for preparing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, as well as environmental restoration activities that involve work not done within a permanent structure. Methodologies provided in this Standard are intended to be compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part

145

2012 DOE Facility Representatives/Safety System Oversight Workshop...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety System Oversight Fire Safety Overall Workshop Agenda May 14-18, 2012 Alexis Park Hotel Las Vegas, Nevada Monday, May 14, 2012 8:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. SAF-271, SSO...

146

DOE O 420.2C, Safety of Accelerator Facilities  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

The order defines accelerators and establishes accelerator specific safety requirements and approval authorities which, when supplemented by other applicable ...

2011-07-21T23:59:59.000Z

147

Program for documenting the criticality safety basis for operations in a research and development facility consistent with new regulatory requirements  

SciTech Connect

A program was developed and implemented at LLNL to provide more detailed, documented Criticality Safety Evaluations of operations in an R&D facility. The new Criticality Safety evaluations were consistent with regulatory requirements of the then new DOE Order 5480.24, Nuclear Criticality Safety. The evaluations provide a criticality safety basis for each operation in the facility in support of the facility Safety Analysis Report. This implementation program provided a transition from one method of conducting and documenting Criticality Safety Evaluations to a new method consistent with new regulatory requirements. The program also allowed continued safe operation of the facility while the new implementation level Criticality Safety Evaluations were developed.

Pearson, J.S.; Evarts, R.B.; Huang, S.T.; Goebel, G.

1997-04-24T23:59:59.000Z

148

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Legislation Safety Oversight Principles Board Policy Statements Board Strategic Plan Performance Report Board Web Site Road Map to the Board Board Web...

149

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Legislation Safety Oversight Principles Board Policy Statements Board Strategic Plan Performance Report Board Web Site Road Map to the Board Board...

150

December 3, 2003, Board Public Meeting Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

F F Testimony of William L. Hicks Before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board December 3,2003 Thank you Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to provide some thoughts for the consideration of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) as you review the status of DOE, including NNSA, oversight and management of contracts and contractors. As noted in the notice of this series of public meetings, t'he Board "will focus on what impacts, if any, DOE's new initiatives may have or might have had upon assuring adequate protection of the health and safety of the public and workers at DOE's defense nuclear facilities." My experience includes 30 years in the Navy nuclear program and over 12 years within the DOE and NNSA complex associated with operations, oversight,

151

December 3, 2003, Board Public Meeting - Board Opening Remarks  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

PUBLIC MEETING ON OVERSIGHT PUBLIC MEETING ON OVERSIGHT + + + + + WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 3 , 2003 + + + + + The Board met in the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Hearing Room at 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W. , Suite 300, Washington, D.C., at 9 : 0 0 a.m., John T. Conway, Chairman, presiding. PRESENT JOHN T. CONWAY A.J. EGGENBERGER JOHN E. MANSFIELD R. BRUCE MATTHEWS STAFF PRESENT RICHARD A. AZZARO JAMES J. McCONNELL KENNETH M. PUSATERI ALSO PRESENT DANIEL E. GLENN MICHAEL B. MALLORY WILLIAM J. BRUMLY DENNIS R. RUDDY Chairman Vice Chairman Board Member Board Member General Counsel Deputy Technical Director General Manager Manager, Pantex Site Office General Manager, BWXT Pantex, LLC Manager, Y-12 Site Office General Manager, BWXT Y-12, LLC NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

152

Safety analysis of IFR fuel processing in the Argonne National Laboratory Fuel Cycle Facility  

SciTech Connect

The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) concept developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) includes on-site processing and recycling of discharged core and blanket fuel materials. The process is being demonstrated in the Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) at ANL`s Idaho site. This paper describes the safety analyses that were performed in support of the FCF program; the resulting safety analysis report was the vehicle used to secure authorization to operate the facility and carry out the program, which is now under way. This work also provided some insights into safety-related issues of a commercial IFR fuel processing facility. These are also discussed.

Charak, I; Pedersen, D.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Forrester, R.J.; Phipps, R.D. [Argonne National Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

153

Integrated Safety Analysis: Why It Is Appropriate for Fuel Recycling Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Integrated Safety Analysis: Why It Is Appropriate for Fuel Recycling Facilities Executive Summary This paper addresses why the use of an Integrated Safety Analysis ("ISA") is appropriate for fuel recycling facilities 1 which would be licensed under new regulations currently being considered by NRC. The use of the ISA for fuel facilities under Part 70 is described and compared to the use of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment ("PRA") for reactor facilities. A basis is provided for concluding that future recycling facilities - which will possess characteristics similar to today's fuel cycle facilities and distinct from reactors - can best be assessed using established qualitative or semi-quantitative ISA techniques to achieve and demonstrate safety in an effective and efficient manner.

154

U.S. Department of Energy Oak Ridge Operations Nuclear Facility Safety  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Department of Energy Oak Ridge Operations Nuclear Facility U.S. Department of Energy Oak Ridge Operations Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals, Self-Study Guide U.S. Department of Energy Oak Ridge Operations Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals, Self-Study Guide This is an open-book evaluation. Complete the questions, and submit your answers (hand-written or electronically) to the Training Center. Someone will check and grade your answers. If you achieve a score of at least 80%, you will receive a completion certificate. Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide Review Questions More Documents & Publications Requirements in DOE O 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities Cross-referenced to DOE O 422.1, Conduct of Operations. U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office Nuclear Facility

155

340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3.

T. J. Rodovsky

2010-10-25T23:59:59.000Z

156

NASA Benchmarks Safety Functions Assessment plan - Developed By NNSA/Nevada Site Office Facility Representative Division  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

SAFETY FUNCTIONS SAFETY FUNCTIONS Assessment Plan Developed By NNSA/Nevada Site Office Facility Representative Division Performance Objective: Management should be proactive in addressing safety-related issues. Management should have an established system to provide a ranking of safety considerations founded upon risk-based priorities. Criteria: A system is in place to provide a ranking of safety considerations founded upon risk-based priorities. (DOE/EH-0135) Procedures clearly define management's responsibility for safety- related decisions and provide for the escalation of matters in an appropriate time frame. (DOE/EH-0135) Management promotes safety programs and the organization's safety culture through sponsoring and attending safety meetings. (DOE/EH- 0135) Management encourages and supports effective programs for reporting

157

Facility Representative Program: 2007 Facility Representative Workshop  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

7 Facility Representative Workshop 7 Facility Representative Workshop May 15 - 17, 2007 Las Vegas, NV Facility Rep of the Year Award | Attendees list | Summary Report [PDF] WORKSHOP AGENDA Final Day 1: Tuesday, May 15, 2007 8:00 a.m. Opening Remarks Joanne Lorence, Facility Representative Program Manager 8:15 a.m. Welcome from the Nevada Site Office Gerald Talbot, Manager, Nevada Site Office 8:30 a.m. Videotaped Remarks from the Deputy Secretary The Honorable Clay Sell, Deputy Secretary of Energy 8:45 a.m. Keynote Address - Safety Oversight Perspective and Expectations Glenn Podonsky, Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer, Office of Health, Safety and Security 9:10 a.m. Facility Representative of the Year Presentation Mark B. Whitaker, Jr., Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,

158

Development of a safety assessment approach for decontamination and decommissioning operations at nuclear facilities  

SciTech Connect

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for nearly 1000 nuclear facilities which will eventually be decommissioned. In order to ensure that the health and safety of the workers, other personnel on site and the public in general is maintained during decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) operations, a methodology specifically for use in evaluating the nuclear safety of the associated activities is being developed within the Department. This methodology represents not so much a departure from that currently fish in the DOE when conducting safety assessments of operations at nuclear facilities but, rather, a formalization of those methods specifically adapted to the D&D activities. As such, it is intended to provide the safety assessment personnel with a framework on which they can base their technical judgement, to assure a consistent approach to safety assessment of D&D operations and to facilitate the systematic collection of data from facilities in the post-operational part of the life cycle.

Worthington, P.R. [USDOE, Washington, DC (United States); Cowgill, M.G. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)

1994-12-31T23:59:59.000Z

159

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting Testimony - Attachment 3  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Linton Brooks, Administrator Linton Brooks, Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration W .S. Department of Energy Before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board October 2 1,2003 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony on the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) current practices for oversight and management of the contracts and contractors that accomplish the mission assigned to NNSA under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. We understand that the Board particularly wants to focus on the impact NNSA's reengineering may have on assuring adequate protection of the health and safety of the public and workers at NNSA's defense nuclear facilities. I fully understand my personal responsibility for assuring the safety of NNSA's

160

Facility Siting and Layout Optimization Based on Process Safety.  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

??In this work, a new approach to optimize facility layout for toxic release, fire and explosion scenarios is presented. By integrating a risk analysis in (more)

Jung, Seungho

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


161

Interim safety basis for fuel supply shutdown facility  

SciTech Connect

This ISB in conjunction with the new TSRs, will provide the required basis for interim operation or restrictions on interim operations and administrative controls for the Facility until a SAR is prepared in accordance with the new requirements. It is concluded that the risk associated with the current operational mode of the Facility, uranium closure, clean up, and transition activities required for permanent closure, are within Risk Acceptance Guidelines. The Facility is classified as a Moderate Hazard Facility because of the potential for an unmitigated fire associated with the uranium storage buildings.

Brehm, J.R.; Deobald, T.L.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

1995-05-23T23:59:59.000Z

162

May 11, 2000, Board announcement of a public meeting on recommendations 95-2 and 98-1, scheduled for May 31, 2000 at 9 AM to be held at the DNFSB Public Hearing Room in Washington D.C.  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

3670-01 3670-01 DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD Pursuant to the provision of the "Govemrnent in the Sunshine Act" (5 U.S.C. $ 552 b), notice is hereby given of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's ("Board") meeting described below. TIME AND DATE OF MEETING: 9:00 a.m., May31, 2000. PLACE: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Public 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 352, Washington, DC 20004. STATUS: Open. Hearing Room, MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board will convene the thirteenth quarterly briefing regarding the status of progress of the activities associated with the Department of Energy's Implementation Plan for the Board's Recommendation 95-2, Safety Management. Specific matters will include recent and planned site verification reviews, actions needed to achieve fill implementation by September

163

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

An "Expiration Date" was inadvertently placed on DOE M 140.1-1B. In accordance with DOE M 251.1A, Directives of interest to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board...

164

Systems engineering applied to integrated safety management for high consequence facilities  

SciTech Connect

Integrated Safety Management is a concept that is being actively promoted by the U.S. Department of Energy as a means of assuring safe operation of its facilities. The concept involves the integration of safety precepts into work planning rather than adjusting for safe operations after defining the work activity. The system engineering techniques used to design an integrated safety management system for a high consequence research facility are described. An example is given to show how the concepts evolved with the system design.

Barter, R; Morais, B

1998-11-10T23:59:59.000Z

165

Final safety analysis report for the irradiated fuels storage facility  

SciTech Connect

A fuel storage facility has been constructed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to provide safe storage for spent fuel from two commercial HTGR's, Fort St. Vrain and Peach Bottom, and from the Rover nuclear rocket program. The new facility was built as an addition to the existing fuel storage basin building to make maximum use of existing facilities and equipment. The completed facility provides dry storage for one core of Peach Bottom fuel (804 elements), 1$sup 1$/$sub 2$ cores of Fort St. Vrain fuel (2200 elements), and the irradiated fuel from the 20 reactors in the Rover program. The facility is designed to permit future expansion at a minimum cost should additional storage space for graphite-type fuels be required. A thorough study of the potential hazards associated with the Irradiated Fuels Storage Facility has been completed, indicating that the facility is capable of withstanding all credible combinations of internal accidents and pertinent natural forces, including design basis natural phenomena of a 10,000 year flood, a 175-mph tornado, or an earthquake having a bedrock acceleration of 0.33 g and an amplification factor of 1.3, without a loss of integrity or a significant release of radioactive materials. The design basis accident (DBA) postulated for the facility is a complete loss of cooling air, even though the occurrence of this situation is extremely remote, considering the availability of backup and spare fans and emergency power. The occurrence of the DBA presents neither a radiation nor an activity release hazard. A loss of coolant has no effect upon the fuel or the facility other than resulting in a gradual and constant temperature increase of the stored fuel. The temperature increase is gradual enough that ample time (28 hours minimum) is available for corrective action before an arbitrarily imposed maximum fuel centerline temperature of 1100$sup 0$F is reached. (LK)

Bingham, G.E.; Evans, T.K.

1976-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

166

CFN Operations and Safety Awareness (COSA) Checklist Nanofabrication (Clean Room) Facility  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nanofabrication (Clean Room) Facility Nanofabrication (Clean Room) Facility Building 735 This COSA form must be completed for all experimenters working in the CFN and must be submitted to the CFN User Office for badge access. CFN Safety Awareness Policy: Each user must be instructed in the safe procedures in CFN related activities. CFN Facility Laboratory personnel shall keep readily available all relevant instructions and safety literature. Employee/Guest Name Life/Guest Number Department/Division ES&H Coordinator/Ext. Facility Manager COSA Trainer Guest User Staff USER ADMINISTRATION Checked in at User Administration and has valid BNL ID badge Safety Approval Form (SAF) approved. Training requirements completed (Indicate additional training specified in SAF or ESR in lines provided below):

167

CFN Operations and Safety Awareness (COSA) Checklist Soft-Bio Nanomaterials Facility  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Soft-Bio Nanomaterials Facility Soft-Bio Nanomaterials Facility Building 735 This COSA form must be completed for all experimenters working in the CFN and must be submitted to the CFN User Office for badge access. CFN Safety Awareness Policy: Each user must be instructed in the safe procedures in CFN related activities. CFN Facility Laboratory personnel shall keep readily available all relevant instructions and safety literature. Employee/Guest Name Life/Guest Number Department/Division ES&H Coordinator/Ext. Facility Manager COSA Trainer Guest User Staff USER ADMINISTRATION Checked in at User Administration and has valid BNL ID badge Safety Approval Form (SAF) approved. Training requirements completed (Indicate additional training specified in SAF or ESR in lines provided below):

168

DOE G 420.1-1A, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Guide for use with DOE O 420.1C, Facility Safety  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This Guide provides an acceptable approach for safety design of DOE hazard category 1, 2 and 3 nuclear facilities for satisfying the requirements of DOE O ...

2012-12-04T23:59:59.000Z

169

Review of Safety Basis Development for the Savannah River Site Salt Waste Processing Facility  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

of5 of5 U.S. Department of Energy Subject: Review of Safety Basis Development for the Savannah River Site Salt Waste Processing Facility - Inspection Criteria, Approach, and Line:~ HS: Rev: Eff. Date: HSS CRAD 45-57 0 January 31,2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Acting Direc or, Office of Sifety and Emergency Management Evaluations Date: January 31, 2013 Criteria Review and Approach Document LL.v. ~·M Criteria Lead:ife\riew of Safety Basis Development for the Savannah River Site Salt Waste Processing Facility Page 1 of 5 Date: January 31, 2013 1.0 PURPOSE Within the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), the Office of Enforcement and Oversight, Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations (HS-45) mission is to assess the effectiveness of the

170

Review of Safety Basis Development for the Los Alamos National Laboratory Transuranic Waste Facility  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

of6 of6 Subject: Review of Safety Basis HS: HSS CRAD 45-59 U.S. Department of Development for the Los Alamos Rev: 0 National Laboratory Transuranic Eff. Date: May 6, 2013 Energy Waste Facility - Criteria and Review Approach Document Office of Safety and ~ Emergency Management Acting Djector, Of~e of Safety and Evaluations Emergency Management Evaluations Date: May 6, 2013 firo,~ Page 1of6 Criteria and Review e;dJatnes 0. Low Approach Document Date: May 6, 2013 1.0 PURPOSE Within the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), the Office of Enforcement and Oversight, Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations (HS-45) mission is to assess the effectiveness of the environment, safety, health, and emergency management systems and practices used by line and

171

Safety/safeguards interactions during safety-related emergencies at Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report contains an analysis of the safety/safeguards interactions that could occur during safety-related emergencies at licensed nuclear power reactors, and the extent to which these interactions are addressed in existing or proposed NRC guidance. The safety/safeguards interaction during a series of postulated emergencies was systematically examined to identify any potential performance deficiencies or conflicts between the Operations (safety) and Security (safeguards) organizations. This examination included the impacts of coordination with off-site emergency response personnel. Duties, responsibilities, optimal methods, and procedural actions inherent in these interactions were explored.

Moul, D.A.; Pilgrim, M.K.; Schweizer, R.L.; McEwen, J.E. Jr.

1985-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

172

Notices DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD Draft Revised Strategic Plan for FY  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

65979 Federal Register 65979 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 213 / Monday, November 4, 2013 / Notices hq.doe.gov, or by facsimile to 202-586- 8008. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lamont Jackson (Program Office) at 202-586-0808, or by email to Lamont.Jackson@hq.doe.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Exports of electricity from the United States to a foreign country are regulated by the Department of Energy (DOE) pursuant to sections 301(b) and 402(f) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7151(b), 7172(f)) and require authorization under section 202(e) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824a(e)). On February 19, 2009, DOE issued Order No. EA-145-D, which authorized Powerex to transmit electric energy from the United States to Mexico as a power marketer for a five-year term using

173

Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and the Resin Regeneration Facility Safety Analysis Report, Executive Summary  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Safety Analysis Report documents the safety authorization basis for the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF) and the Resin Regeneration Facility (RRF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The present mission of the RBOF and RRF is to continue in providing a facility for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel assemblies from power and research reactors in the United States, fuel from SRS and other Department of Energy (DOE) reactors, and foreign research reactors fuel, in support of the nonproliferation policy. The RBOF and RRF provide the capability to handle, separate, and transfer wastes generated from nuclear fuel element storage. The DOE and Westinghouse Savannah River Company, the prime operating contractor, are committed to managing these activities in such a manner that the health and safety of the offsite general public, the site worker, the facility worker, and the environment are protected.

Shedrow, C.B.

1999-11-29T23:59:59.000Z

174

Facilities  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Facilities Facilities Facilities LANL's mission is to develop and apply science and technology to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; reduce global threats; and solve other emerging national security and energy challenges. Contact Operator Los Alamos National Laboratory (505) 667-5061 Some LANL facilities are available to researchers at other laboratories, universities, and industry. Unique facilities foster experimental science, support LANL's security mission DARHT accelerator DARHT's electron accelerators use large, circular aluminum structures to create magnetic fields that focus and steer a stream of electrons down the length of the accelerator. Tremendous electrical energy is added along the way. When the stream of high-speed electrons exits the accelerator it is

175

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting Presentations - ESE Safety Oversight Policy, Practices, and Implementation  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

De@artment of Energy De@artment of Energy Safety Management In Energy, Science and Environment DNFSB Public Meeting Bob Card Under Secretary October 2 I,2003 Historical Context + The DOE of the 80's (and before) was in denial of its defense environmental responsibilities, liabilities and risks - This culminated in the FBI raid on Rocky Flats in 1989 + The DOE of the 90's acknowledged the responsibilities and liabilities but didn't understand the risks and couldn't develop systems and processes for addressing them + The DNFSB was chartered in 1988 and became an effective agent for helping DOE understand risk priorities and safety systems for addressing them This is Not Your Father's DOE The President and Secretary Want, and Have Achieved, Game Changing Strategies

176

Siting of nuclear facilities. Selections from Nuclear Safety  

SciTech Connect

The report presented siting policy and practice for nuclear power plants as developed in the U.S. and abroad. Twenty-two articles from Nuclear Safety on this general topic are reprinted since they provide a valuable reference source. The appendices also include reprints of some relevant regulatory rules and guides on siting. Advantages and disadvantages of novel siting concepts such as underground containment, offshore siting, and nuclear energy parks are addressed. Other topics include site criteria, risk criteria, and nuclear ship criteria.

Buchanan, J.R.

1976-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

177

RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS LABORATORY SAFETY REPORT, MARTIN NUCLEAR FACILITY, QUEHANNA SITE  

SciTech Connect

A description is given of the safety features and the major alterations to be performed prior to occupancy. The evaluation was made in support of fubrication work on the production of safe isotopic power sources from Cm/sup 242/ and Sr/sup 90/. The chemical, nuclear, and radiobiological properties of Cm/sup 242/ and Sr/sup 90/ are outlined. The projected physical fiow of materials for production of the isotopic power souroes is schematically given. An evaluation of the malfunctions, operational hazards, and remedial health physics procedures is presented. The analysis and evaluation of postulated maximum credible incidents are demonstrated. (B.O.G.)

1960-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

178

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

4 4 BRIEFING REQUEST FORMAT FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD Date of Request: __________________ Requested by: __________________ Phone #: __________________ Briefing Objective: ___________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________ Briefing Date: __________________ Time: __________________ Duration: __________________ Location: 8th Floor Conference Room Other: _____________________ Classified: Yes ____________________ No ____________________ Board Members Requested: Conway ___________________ DiNunno ________________ Eggenberger _______________ Mansfield

179

November 24, 2009, Board Public Meeting on Oversight of Complex, High Hazard Nuclear Operations - Transcript  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

2-234-4433 2-234-4433 Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc. Page 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA + + + + + DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD + + + + + WEDNESDAY MAY 12, 2010 + + + + + The Board met in the DNFSB Hearing Room at 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 300, Washington, D.C., Peter S. Winokur, Chairman, presiding. PRESENT: PETER S. WINOKUR, Chairman JOHN E. MANSFIELD, Vice Chairman JOSEPH F. BADER, Board Member LARRY W. BROWN, Board Member JESSIE H. ROBERSON, Board Member STAFF PRESENT: RICHARD A. AZZARO, General Counsel TIMOTHY J. DWYER, Technical Director

180

Preliminary Safety Design Report for Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility  

SciTech Connect

A new onsite, remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled low-level waste disposal for remote-handled low-level waste from the Idaho National Laboratory and for nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled low-level waste in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This preliminary safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by discussing site characteristics that impact accident analysis, by providing the facility and process information necessary to support the hazard analysis, by identifying and evaluating potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled low-level waste, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

Timothy Solack; Carol Mason

2012-03-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


181

Evaluation of natural phenomena hazards as part of safety assessments for nuclear facilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The continued operation of existing US Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities and laboratories requires a safety reassessment based on current criteria and guidelines. This also includes evaluations for the effects of Natural Phenomena Hazards (NPH), for which these facilities may not have been designed. The NPH evaluations follow the requirements of DOE Order 5480.28, Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation (1993) which establishes NPH Performance Categories (PCs) for DOE facilities and associated target probabilistic performance goals. These goals are expressed as the mean annual probability of exceedance of acceptable behavior for structures, systems and components (SSCs) subjected to NPH effects. The assignment of an NPH Performance Category is based on the overall hazard categorization (low, moderate, high) of a facility and on the function of an SSC under evaluation (DOE-STD-1021, 1992). Detailed guidance for the NPH analysis and evaluation criteria are also provided (DOE-STD-1020, 1994). These analyses can be very resource intensive, and may not be necessary for the evaluation of all SSCs in existing facilities, in particular for low hazard category facilities. An approach relying heavily on screening inspections, engineering judgment and use of NPH experience data (S. J. Eder et al., 1993), can minimize the analytical effort, give reasonable estimates of the NPH susceptibilities, and yield adequate information for an overall safety evaluation of the facility. In the following sections this approach is described in more detail and is illustrated by an application to a nuclear laboratory complex.

Kot, C.A.; Hsieh, B.J.; Srinivasan, M.G.; Shin, Y.W.

1995-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

182

Concurrent consideration of evacuation safety and productivity in manufacturing facility planning using multi-paradigm simulations  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Manufacturing facilities are expected to maintain a high level of production and at the same time, employ strict safety standards to ensure the safe evacuation of the people in the event of emergencies (fire is considered in this paper). These two goals ... Keywords: Agent based simulation, BDI, Emergency management, Layout planning

Karthik Vasudevan; Young-Jun Son

2011-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

183

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting Presentations - DOE Independent Safety Oversight  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

HEARING HEARING Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance October 21,2003 1 Office of Independent Oversight 1 and Performance Assurance 1 h.?s=- Role of Independent Oversight l Direct Report to the Secretary of Energy l Oversight for both NNSA and ESE l DOE's Corporate Oversight Entity l Provides Independent Performance-Based Evaluations Ytl l Well-Established Inspection Processes Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance OA's Technical Competence l Dedicated Team of Experienced Inspectors l Extensive Managerial and Technical Expertise l Technical Qualification Program and External Certifications Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance ? Some Key Inspection Focus Areas i l ISM Programs LY.W 0 Safety Systems

184

Appraisal of the Uranium Processing Facility Safety Basis Preliminary Safety Design Report Process at the Y-12 National Security Complex, May 2013  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Appraisal of the Appraisal of the Uranium Processing Facility Safety Basis Preliminary Safety Design Report Process at the Y-12 National Security Complex May 2011 May 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U. S. Department of Energy Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................. 1 2.0 Background........................................................................................................................................... 1 3.0 Scope..................................................................................................................................................... 2

185

Appraisal of the Uranium Processing Facility Safety Basis Preliminary Safety Design Report Process at the Y-12 National Security Complex, May 2013  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Appraisal of the Appraisal of the Uranium Processing Facility Safety Basis Preliminary Safety Design Report Process at the Y-12 National Security Complex May 2011 May 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U. S. Department of Energy Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................. 1 2.0 Background........................................................................................................................................... 1 3.0 Scope..................................................................................................................................................... 2

186

DOE Order Self Study Modules - DOE O 420.1B Facility Safety  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

0.1B 0.1B FACILITY SAFETY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION LEARNING AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT CHANGE NO: 2 DOE O 420.1B Level: Familiar Date: 12/1/08 1 DOE ORDER O 420.1B FACILITY SAFETY FAMILIAR LEVEL _________________________________________________________________________ OBJECTIVES Given the familiar level of this module and the listed resources, you will be able to perform the following: 1. State the purpose of implementing DOE O 420.1B. 2. State who is responsible for complying with the requirements of this Order. 3. State the general and design requirements for nuclear safety. 4. State the general programmatic requirements for an acceptable fire protection program. 5. State the fire protection design requirements for a comprehensive fire protection

187

DOE standard: Integration of environment, safety, and health into facility disposition activities. Volume 1: Technical standard  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This Department of Energy (DOE) technical standard (referred to as the Standard) provides guidance for integrating and enhancing worker, public, and environmental protection during facility disposition activities. It provides environment, safety, and health (ES and H) guidance to supplement the project management requirements and associated guidelines contained within DOE O 430.1A, Life-Cycle Asset Management (LCAM), and amplified within the corresponding implementation guides. In addition, the Standard is designed to support an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS), consistent with the guiding principles and core functions contained in DOE P 450.4, Safety Management System Policy, and discussed in DOE G 450.4-1, Integrated Safety Management System Guide. The ISMS guiding principles represent the fundamental policies that guide the safe accomplishment of work and include: (1) line management responsibility for safety; (2) clear roles and responsibilities; (3) competence commensurate with responsibilities; (4) balanced priorities; (5) identification of safety standards and requirements; (6) hazard controls tailored to work being performed; and (7) operations authorization. This Standard specifically addresses the implementation of the above ISMS principles four through seven, as applied to facility disposition activities.

NONE

1998-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

188

Lessons learnt from ITER safety & licensing for DEMO and future nuclear fusion facilities  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

One of the strong motivations for pursuing the development of fusion energy is its potentially low environmental impact and very good safety performance. But this safety and environmental potential can only be fully realized by careful design choices. For DEMO and other fusion facilities that will require nuclear licensing, S&E objectives and criteria should be set at an early stage and taken into account when choosing basic design options and throughout the design process. Studies in recent decades of the safety of fusion power plant concepts give a useful basis on which to build the S&E approach and to assess the impact of design choices. The experience of licensing ITER is of particular value, even though there are some important differences between ITER and DEMO. The ITER project has developed a safety case, produced a preliminary safety report and had it examined by the French nuclear safety authorities, leading to the licence to construct the facility. The key technical issues that arose during ...

Taylor, Neill

2013-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

189

November 21, 2006, Board letter providing feedback on the 2004-1  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

November 21, 2006 November 21, 2006 The Honorable Samuel W. Bodman Secretary of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20585-1000 Dear Secretary Bodman: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) received your letter of October 12, 2006, enclosing the revised Implementation Plan (IP) for the Board’s Recommendation 2004-1, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations. The Board has reviewed the IP and finds it to be responsive to the Recommendation. The Board would also like to take this opportunity to close Recommendation 95-2, Safety Management. The Recommendation 2004-1 IP and the recently issued Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 450.4-1, Integrated Safety Management System Manual, contain the actions necessary to reinvigorate Integrated Safety Management (ISM). In addition, DOE has taken an

190

Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility  

SciTech Connect

A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

Boyd D. Christensen

2010-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

191

Conceptual Safety Design Report for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

A new onsite, remote-handled LLW disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled LLW disposal for remote-handled LLW from the Idaho National Laboratory and for spent nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled LLW in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This conceptual safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled LLW disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by identifying potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled LLW, by evaluating consequences of postulated accidents, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

Boyd D. Christensen

2010-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

192

Management of radioactive material safety programs at medical facilities. Final report  

SciTech Connect

A Task Force, comprising eight US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and two Agreement State program staff members, developed the guidance contained in this report. This report describes a systematic approach for effectively managing radiation safety programs at medical facilities. This is accomplished by defining and emphasizing the roles of an institution`s executive management, radiation safety committee, and radiation safety officer. Various aspects of program management are discussed and guidance is offered on selecting the radiation safety officer, determining adequate resources for the program, using such contractual services as consultants and service companies, conducting audits, and establishing the roles of authorized users and supervised individuals; NRC`s reporting and notification requirements are discussed, and a general description is given of how NRC`s licensing, inspection and enforcement programs work.

Camper, L.W.; Schlueter, J.; Woods, S. [and others

1997-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

193

Assessment of nuclear safety and nuclear criticality potential in the Defense Waste Processing Facility  

SciTech Connect

A panel of experts in the fields of process engineering, process chemistry, and safety analysis met together on January 26, 1993, and February 19, 1993, to discuss nuclear safety and nuclear criticality potential in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) processes. Nuclear safety issues and possibilities of nuclear criticality incidents in the DWPF were examined in depth. The discussion started at the receipt of slurry feeds: The Low Point Pump Pit Precipitate Tank (LPPPPT) and the Low Point Pump Pit Sludge Tank (LPPPST), and went into detail the whole DWPF processes. This report provides discussion of each of the areas and processes of the DWPF in terms of potential nuclear safety issues and nuclear criticality concerns.

Ha, B.C.

1993-05-10T23:59:59.000Z

194

Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Y-12 National Security Complex Urnaium Processing Facility Project, June 2012  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Y-12 National Security Complex Y-12 National Security Complex Uranium Processing Facility Project May 2011 June 2012 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy i Independent Oversight Assessment of Safety Culture at the Y-12 National Security Complex Uranium Processing Facility Project Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 Scope and Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 2 3.0 Results and Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 3

195

Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Y-12 National Security Complex Urnaium Processing Facility Project, June 2012  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Y-12 National Security Complex Y-12 National Security Complex Uranium Processing Facility Project May 2011 June 2012 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy i Independent Oversight Assessment of Safety Culture at the Y-12 National Security Complex Uranium Processing Facility Project Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 Scope and Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 2 3.0 Results and Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 3

196

Review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Fire Suppression Vital Safety System, January 2012  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

the the Los Alamos National Laboratory Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Fire Suppression Vital Safety System January 2012 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy i Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 Background ............................................................................................................................................ 1 3.0 Scope ...................................................................................................................................................... 1

197

Review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Fire Suppression Vital Safety System, January 2012  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

the the Los Alamos National Laboratory Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Fire Suppression Vital Safety System January 2012 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy i Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 Background ............................................................................................................................................ 1 3.0 Scope ...................................................................................................................................................... 1

198

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

A General Description A General Description The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is an independent organization within the executive branch chartered with the responsibility of providing recommendations and advice to the President and the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at Department of Energy (Department) defense nuclear facilities. In operation since in October 1989, the Board reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department's defense nuclear facilities. The Board consists of five Board members appointed by the President for staggered five year terms. The Board is supported by almost 100 technical and administrative staff personnel and an annual budget of $22 million. The Board's enabling legislation authorizes a staff of up to 150 personnel. The Board headquarters is located in Washington D.C., at 625 Indiana Avenue NW. Ten Board staff personnel are currently on two-three year rotational assignment at the following DOE sites: Los Alamos, Livermore, Pantex, Hanford, Oak Ridge, and Savannah River.

199

SRTC criticality safety technical review: Nuclear criticality safety evaluation 94-02, uranium solidification facility pencil tank module spacing  

SciTech Connect

Review of NMP-NCS-94-0087, ``Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 94-02: Uranium Solidification Facility Pencil Tank Module Spacing (U), April 18, 1994,`` was requested of the SRTC Applied Physics Group. The NCSE is a criticality assessment to show that the USF process module spacing, as given in Non-Conformance Report SHM-0045, remains safe for operation. The NCSE under review concludes that the module spacing as given in Non-Conformance Report SHM-0045 remains in a critically safe configuration for all normal and single credible abnormal conditions. After a thorough review of the NCSE, this reviewer agrees with that conclusion.

Rathbun, R. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States)

1994-04-26T23:59:59.000Z

200

Criticality Safety  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Left Tab EVENTS Office of Nuclear Safety (HS-30) Office of Nuclear Safety Home Directives Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Rules Nuclear Safety Workshops Technical...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


201

DESIGN SAFETY FEATURES OF THE BNL HIGH-TEMPERATURE COMBUSTION FACILITY  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

The Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) High-Temperature Combustion Facility (HTCF) was used to perform hydrogen deflagration and detonation experiments at temperatures to 650 K. Safety features that were designed to ensure safe and reliable operation of the experimental program are described. Deflagration and detonation experiments have been conducted using mixtures of hydrogen, air, and steam. Detonation cell size measurements were made as a function of mixture composition and thermodynamic gas conditions. Deflagration-to-detonation transition experiments were also conducted. Results of the experimental program are presented, and implications with respect to hydrogen safety are discussed.

GINSBERG,T.; CICCARELLI,G.; BOCCIO,J.

2000-06-11T23:59:59.000Z

202

DOE-HDBK-1145-2001; Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

SENSITIVE SENSITIVE DOE-HDBK-1145-2001 August 2001 DOE STANDARD Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities U.S. Department of Energy AREA TRNG Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax (301) 903-9823. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; (703) 605-6000. Radiological Safety Training for Plutonium Facilities DOE-HDBK-1145-2001 Program Management Guide Foreword This Handbook describes an implementation process for training as recommended in

203

Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

3009-94 3009-94 July 1994 CHANGE NOTICE NO.1 January 2000 CHANGE NOTICE NO. 2 April 2002 CHANGE NOTICE NO. 3 March 2006 DOE STANDARD PREPARATION GUIDE FOR U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONREACTOR NUCLEAR FACILITY DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSES U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, DC 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-STD-3009-94 Page ii This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax: (301) 903-9823. DOE-STD-3009-94 Page iii Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses Table of Changes

204

Preclosure radiological safety analysis for the exploratory shaft facilities; Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project  

SciTech Connect

This study assesses which structures, systems, and components of the exploratory shaft facility (ESF) are important to safety when the ESF is converted to become part of the operating waste repository. The assessment follows the methodology required by DOE Procedure AP-6.10Q. Failures of the converted ESF during the preclosure period have been evaluated, along with other underground accidents, to determine the potential offsite radiation doses and associated probabilities. The assessment indicates that failures of the ESF will not result in radiation doses greater than 0.5 rem at the nearest unrestricted area boundary. Furthermore, credible accidents in other underground facilities will not result in radiation doses larger than 0.5 rem, even if any structure, system, or component of the converted ESF fails at the same time. Therefore, no structure, system, or component of the converted ESF is important to safety.

Ma, C.W.; Miller, D.D.; Jardine, L.J. [Bechtel National, Inc., San Francisco, CA (United States)

1992-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

205

December 5, 2012, Deparment letter transmitting the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 2012-1, Savannah River Site Building 235-F Safety.  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Washington, DC 20585 Washington, DC 20585 December 5, 2012 The Honorable Peter S. Winokur Chairman Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004 Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed is the Department of Energy's (DOE) Implementation Plan (IP) for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board) Recommendation 2012-1, Savannah River Site Building 235-F Sq(et identifing the Depatiment's actions to reduce the hazards

206

August 1, 2003, Board announcement of a Public Meeting on the Department of Energy oversight - September 10, 2003  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

§ 552b), § 552b), notice is hereby given of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board) meeting described below. The Board will also conduct a series of public hearings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2286b and invites any interested persons or groups to present any comments, technical information, or data concerning safety issues related to the matters to be considered. TIME AND DATE OF MEETING: 9:00 - 12:00 a.m., September 10, 2003. PLACE: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Public Hearing Room, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20004-2001. Additionally, as a part of the Board's E-Government initiative, the meeting will be presented live through Internet video streaming. A link to this presentation will be available on the home page of the

207

Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide Review Questions  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Oak Ridge Operations Oak Ridge Operations Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide Review Questions Name: Organization: Directions: This is an open-book evaluation. Complete the questions, and submit your answers (hand-written or electronically) to the Training Center. Someone will check and grade your answers. If you achieve a score of at least 80%, you will receive a completion certificate. Questions: 1. What is safety basis (SB)? 2. How does SB fit with integrated safety management (ISM)? 3. In what primary DOE documents can requirements and guidance for SB be found? 4. What are the "graded approach" factors that DOE takes into account in ensuring that the level of analysis and documentation and the actions used to comply with the requirements are

208

Electrical Safety Assessment Plan - Developed By NNSA/NSO IOD Facility Representative  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

December 2003 December 2003 An assessment of the Electrical Safety (ES) program at XXXX was conducted during the week of December XX-XX, 2003. The assessment team evaluated the program using the programmatic areas and specific Lines of Inquiry (LOI) contained in the approved Assessment plan provided. The team consisted of the Facility Representative from National Nuclear Security Administration, as well as ES, Subject Matter Expert support. The assessment plan identified 5 areas of review for Electrical Safety. An integrated process has been established to ensure electrical safety hazards are identified and that adequate controls are defined and implemented. The M&O contractor and other NTS Users management actively participate in the ES program. An implemented Work Control process is in place that ensures

209

Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide Review Questions  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Oak Ridge Operations Oak Ridge Operations Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Fundamentals Self-Study Guide Review Questions Name: Organization: Directions: This is an open-book evaluation. Complete the questions, and submit your answers (hand-written or electronically) to the Training Center. Someone will check and grade your answers. If you achieve a score of at least 80%, you will receive a completion certificate. Questions: 1. What is safety basis (SB)? 2. How does SB fit with integrated safety management (ISM)? 3. In what primary DOE documents can requirements and guidance for SB be found? 4. What are the "graded approach" factors that DOE takes into account in ensuring that the level of analysis and documentation and the actions used to comply with the requirements are

210

Facility Representative Program: 2003 Facility Representative Workshop  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

3 Facility Representative Workshop 3 Facility Representative Workshop May 13 - 15, 2003 Las Vegas, NV Facility Rep of the Year Award | Attendees list | Summary Report [PDF] WORKSHOP AGENDA Day 1: Tuesday, May 13, 2003 Theme: Program Successes and Challenges 8:00 a.m. John Evans, Facility Representative Program Manager 8:15 a.m. Welcome Kathleen Carlson Manager, Nevada Site Office 8:30 a.m. Keynote Address Savannah River Site and Facility Reps - A Shared History and Common Future Jeffrey M. Allison Manager, Savannah River Operations Office 9:00 a.m. Videotaped Remarks from the Deputy Secretary Kyle E. McSlarrow, Deputy Secretary of Energy 9:10 a.m. Facility Representative of the Year Presentation Mark B. Whitaker, Jr., Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

211

DOE standard: Integration of environment, safety, and health into facility disposition activities. Volume 2: Appendices  

SciTech Connect

This volume contains the appendices that provide additional environment, safety, and health (ES and H) information to complement Volume 1 of this Standard. Appendix A provides a set of candidate DOE ES and H directives and external regulations, organized by hazard types that may be used to identify potentially applicable directives to a specific facility disposition activity. Appendix B offers examples and lessons learned that illustrate implementation of ES and H approaches discussed in Section 3 of Volume 1. Appendix C contains ISMS performance expectations to guide a project team in developing and implementing an effective ISMS and in developing specific performance criteria for use in facility disposition. Appendix D provides guidance for identifying potential Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs) when decommissioning facilities fall under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability Act (CERCLA) process. Appendix E discusses ES and H considerations for dispositioning facilities by privatization. Appendix F is an overview of the WSS process. Appendix G provides a copy of two DOE Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Standards memoranda that form the bases for some of the guidance discussed within the Standard. Appendix H gives information on available hazard analysis techniques and references. Appendix I provides a supplemental discussion to Sections 3.3.4, Hazard Baseline Documentation, and 3.3.6, Environmental Permits. Appendix J presents a sample readiness evaluation checklist.

NONE

1998-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

212

December 16, 2003, Board Public Meeting - Board Opening Remarks  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

SAFETY BOARD + + + + + PUBLIC MEETING ON OVERSIGHT + + + + + TUESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2003 + + + + + The meeting was held at 9:00 a.m., in the DNFSB Hearing Room, 625...

213

December 3, 2003, Board Public Meeting Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

William Brumley, Manager NNSA Y-12 Site Office U.S. Department of Energy Before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board December 3, 2003 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony on the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 Site Office's processes for contractor oversight and our role in ensuring the missions assigned to the NNSA are accomplished. I understand that the Board has particular questions on the status of our oversight, our personnel, and our plans for future changes to our oversight model. I am prepared to address these questions for you today. I have a BS in Nuclear Engineering from North Carolina State University, am registered

214

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting Presentations - DNFSB Staff Remarks  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

James J. McConnell James J. McConnell Deputy Technical Director, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board October 21, 2003 Good morning, my name is Jim McConnell and I am the Deputy Technical Director for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. At the beginning of the first session on oversight held in September, I provided some remarks on behalf of the Board's staff concerning the role of oversight in the larger system by which DOE directs its activities. I am pleased this morning to add to that discussion focusing more specifically on DOE's current and planned oversight activities. At the last public meeting I described the system that DOE uses in its roles as customer, owner, and enforcer, to communicate its expectations to its contractors and the methods DOE uses to ensure that

215

May 15, 2012, Federal Technical Capability Program Face to Face Meeting … Speech: Safety Culture And Training and Competency  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Safety Safety Culture Safety Culture And Training and Competency Joseph F. Bader Board Member Board Member Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Thanks to Tim Hunt and Doug Minnema Objectives * Discuss the Board's approach to staff training * Review the Board's concerns about safety culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) * Understand what group culture is and why it is an g p y important part of nuclear operations * Explore the linkage between safety culture and training and competency June 2012 DOE FTCP Meeting 2 The Board's Technical Staff * Currently about 85 Technical Staff members. * Essentially all of the Technical Staff members have at least one technical master's degree, ~20% have a PhD. * Extensive experience in nuclear, mechanical, electrical,

216

January 20, 2006, Board letter forwarding DNFSB Technical Report 36,  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

[DNFSB LETTERHEAD] [DNFSB LETTERHEAD] January 20, 2006 The Honorable Samuel W. Bodman Secretary of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20585-1000 Dear Secretary Bodman: In its response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (Board) Recommendation 2004-1, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Organizations, the Department of Energy (DOE) committed to revitalizing Integrated Safety Management (ISM) with “a set of actions the Department will pursue to re-confirm that ISM will be the foundation of the Department’s safety management approach and to address identified weaknesses in implementation”. The enclosed technical report, DNFSB/TECH-36, Integrated Safety Management: The Foundation for an Effective Safety Culture, provides an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the

217

Nuclear criticality safety evaluation -- DWPF Late Wash Facility, Salt Process Cell and Chemical Process Cell  

SciTech Connect

The Savannah River Site (SRS) High Level Nuclear Waste will be vitrified in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for long term storage and disposal. This is a nuclear criticality safety evaluation for the Late Wash Facility (LWF), the Salt Processing Cell (SPC) and the Chemical Processing Cell (CPC). of the DWPF. Waste salt solution is processed in the Tank Farm In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) process and is then further washed in the DWPF Late Wash Facility (LWF) before it is fed to the DWPF Salt Processing Cell. In the Salt Processing Cell the precipitate slurry is processed in the Precipitate Reactor (PR) and the resultant Precipitate Hydrolysis Aqueous (PHA) produce is combined with the sludge feed and frit in the DWPF Chemical Process Cell to produce a melter feed. The waste is finally immobilized in the Melt Cell. Material in the Tank Farm and the ITP and Extended Sludge processes have been shown to be safe against a nuclear criticality by others. The precipitate slurry feed from ITP and the first six batches of sludge feed are safe against a nuclear criticality and this evaluation demonstrates that the processes in the LWF, the SPC and the CPC do not alter the characteristics of the materials to compromise safety.

Williamson, T.G.

1994-10-17T23:59:59.000Z

218

Preliminary safety analysis report for the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) will be a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility used to characterize, treat, and repackage radioactive and mixed material and waste for reuse, recycling, or ultimate disposal. A significant upgrade to a previous facility, the Temporary Hot Cell, will be implemented to perform this mission. The following major features will be added: a permanent shield wall; eight floor silos; new roof portals in the hot-cell roof; an upgraded ventilation system; and upgraded hot-cell jib crane; and video cameras to record operations and facilitate remote-handled operations. No safety-class systems, structures, and components will be present in the AHCF. There will be five safety-significant SSCs: hot cell structure, permanent shield wall, shield plugs, ventilation system, and HEPA filters. The type and quantity of radionuclides that could be located in the AHCF are defined primarily by SNL/NM's legacy materials, which include radioactive, transuranic, and mixed waste. The risk to the public or the environment presented by the AHCF is minor due to the inventory limitations of the Hazard Category 3 classification. Potential doses at the exclusion boundary are well below the evaluation guidelines of 25 rem. Potential for worker exposure is limited by the passive design features incorporated in the AHCF and by SNL's radiation protection program. There is no potential for exposure of the public to chemical hazards above the Emergency Response Protection Guidelines Level 2.

OSCAR,DEBBY S.; WALKER,SHARON ANN; HUNTER,REGINA LEE; WALKER,CHERYL A.

1999-12-01T23:59:59.000Z

219

Review of the Savannah River Site Salt Waste Processing Facility Safety Basis and Design Development, August 2013  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Savannah River Site Savannah River Site Salt Waste Processing Facility Safety Basis and Design Development May 2011 August 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose.................................................................................................................................................... 1 2.0 Background ............................................................................................................................................. 1 3.0 Scope and Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 2 4.0 Results .................................................................................................................................................... 3

220

Review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Tritium Gas Containment Vital Safety System, January 2013  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Independent Oversight Review of the Independent Oversight Review of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Tritium Gas Containment Vital Safety System January 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Health, Safety and Security U.S. Department of Energy Table of Contents 1.0 Purpose............................................................................................................................................. 1 2.0 Background...................................................................................................................................... 1 3.0 Scope................................................................................................................................................ 1

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


221

Facility Representative Program: 2001 Facility Representative Workshop  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

1 Facility Representative Workshop 1 Facility Representative Workshop May 15 - 17, 2001 Las Vegas, NV Facility Rep of the Year Award | Attendees list | Summary Report [PDF] WORKSHOP AGENDA Day 1: Tuesday, May 15, 2001 Theme: Program Successes and Challenges 8:00 a.m. - Logistics Announcements & Opening Remarks - Joe Arango, Facility Representative Program Manager 8:15 a.m. - Welcome - Debbie Monette, Assistant Manager for National Security, Nevada Operations Office 8:30 a.m. - Keynote Address - Ralph Erickson, National Nuclear Security Administration 9:00 a.m.- DOE Facility Representative of the Year Presentation - Mark B. Whitaker, Jr., Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 9:30 a.m. - Break 9:50 a.m. - Program Summary - Joe Arango 10:10 a.m. - Management Panel/Questions and Answers

222

"Defense-in-Depth" Laser Safety and the National Ignition Facility  

SciTech Connect

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the largest and most energetic laser in the world contained in a complex the size of a football stadium. From the initial laser pulse, provided by telecommunication style infrared nanoJoule pulsed lasers, to the final 192 laser beams (1.8 Mega Joules total energy in the ultraviolet) converging on a target the size of a pencil eraser, laser safety is of paramount concern. In addition to this, there are numerous high-powered (Class 3B and 4) diagnostic lasers in use that can potentially send their laser radiation travelling throughout the facility. With individual beam paths of up to 1500 meters and a workforce of more than one thousand, the potential for exposure is significant. Simple laser safety practices utilized in typical laser labs just don't apply. To mitigate these hazards, NIF incorporates a multi layered approach to laser safety or 'Defense in Depth.' Most typical high-powered laser operations are contained and controlled within a single room using relatively simplistic controls to protect both the worker and the public. Laser workers are trained, use a standard operating procedure, and are required to wear Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as Laser Protective Eyewear (LPE) if the system is not fully enclosed. Non-workers are protected by means of posting the room with a warning sign and a flashing light. In the best of cases, a Safety Interlock System (SIS) will be employed which will 'safe' the laser in the case of unauthorized access. This type of laser operation is relatively easy to employ and manage. As the operation becomes more complex, higher levels of control are required to ensure personnel safety. Examples requiring enhanced controls are outdoor and multi-room laser operations. At the NIF there are 192 beam lines and numerous other Class 4 diagnostic lasers that can potentially deliver their hazardous energy to locations far from the laser source. This presents a serious and complex potential hazard to personnel. Because of this, a multilayered approach to safety is taken. This paper presents the philosophy and approach taken at the NIF in the multi-layered 'defense-in-depth' approach to laser safety.

King, J J

2010-12-02T23:59:59.000Z

223

DOE-STD-1120-2005; Integration of Environment Safety and Health into Facility Disposition Activities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

20-2005 20-2005 Volume 1 of 2 April 2005 DOE STANDARD INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH INTO FACILITY DISPOSITION ACTIVITIES Volume 1 of 2: Documented Safety Analysis for Decommissioning and Environmental Restoration Projects U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE TS i This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831; (423) 576-8401. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; (703) 605-6000.

224

Securing Operating Data From Passive Safety Tests at the Fast Flux Test Facility  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is the most recent Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) to operate in the United States, from 1982 to 1992. The technologies employed in designing and constructing this reactor, along with information obtained from tests conducted during its operation, are currently being secured and archived by the Department of Energys Office of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program. This report is one in a series documenting the overall project efforts to retrieve and preserve critical information related to advanced reactors. A previous report summarized the initial efforts to review, retrieve and preserve the most salient documents related to Passive Safety Testing (PST) in the FFTF. Efforts continue to locate, secure, and retrieve record copies of original plant data tapes for the series of passive safety tests conducted between 1986 and 1991.

Wootan, David W.; Omberg, Ronald P.; Makenas, Bruce J.; Nielsen, Deborah L.; Nelson, Joseph V.; Polzin, David L.

2011-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

225

Securing Operating Data From Passive Safety Tests at the Fast Flux Test Facility  

SciTech Connect

The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is the most recent Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) to operate in the United States, from 1982 to 1992. The technologies employed in designing and constructing this reactor, along with information obtained from tests conducted during its operation, are currently being secured and archived by the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program. This report is one in a series documenting the overall project efforts to retrieve and preserve critical information related to advanced reactors. A previous report summarized the initial efforts to review, retrieve and preserve the most salient documents related to Passive Safety Testing (PST) in the FFTF. Efforts continue to locate, secure, and retrieve record copies of original plant data tapes for the series of passive safety tests conducted between 1986 and 1991.

Wootan, David W.; Omberg, Ronald P.; Makenas, Bruce J.; Nielsen, Deborah L.; Nelson, Joseph V.; Polzin, David L.

2011-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

226

Coordination Meeting with National Nuclear Security Administration Los Alamos Field Office Safety Basis Review Team Leader for Transuranic Waste Facility Preiminary Documented Safety Analysis Report  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

HIAR-LANL-2013-04-08 HIAR-LANL-2013-04-08 Site: Los Alamos National Laboratory Subject: Office of Enforcement and Oversight's Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Activity Report for Coordination Meeting with National Nuclear Security Administration Los Alamos Field Office Safety Basis Review Team Leader for Transuranic Waste Facility Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis Report Dates of Activity : 04/08/13 Report Preparer: James O. Low Activity Description/Purpose: The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) staff visited the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to coordinate with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Los Alamos Field Office (NA-00-LA) Safety Basis Review Team (SBRT) Leader for review of the revised preliminary documented safety analysis (PDSA) for the Transuranic Waste

227

Coordination Meeting with National Nuclear Security Administration Los Alamos Field Office Safety Basis Review Team Leader for Transuranic Waste Facility Preiminary Documented Safety Analysis Report  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

HIAR-LANL-2013-04-08 HIAR-LANL-2013-04-08 Site: Los Alamos National Laboratory Subject: Office of Enforcement and Oversight's Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Activity Report for Coordination Meeting with National Nuclear Security Administration Los Alamos Field Office Safety Basis Review Team Leader for Transuranic Waste Facility Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis Report Dates of Activity : 04/08/13 Report Preparer: James O. Low Activity Description/Purpose: The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) staff visited the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to coordinate with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Los Alamos Field Office (NA-00-LA) Safety Basis Review Team (SBRT) Leader for review of the revised preliminary documented safety analysis (PDSA) for the Transuranic Waste

228

June 2010, Risk Assessment in Support of DOE Nuclear Safety  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance Nuclear Safety, Quality Assurance and Environment Information Notice June 2010 1 BACKGROUND & PURPOSE: On August 12, 2009, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) issued Recommendation 2009-1, Risk Assessment Methodologies at Defense Nuclear Facilities. This recommendation focused on the need for clear direction on use of quantitative risk assessments in nuclear safety applications at defense nuclear facilities. The Department of Energy (DOE) is presently analyzing directives, standards, training, and other tools that may support more effective development and use of

229

Nuclear criticality safety analysis summary report: The S-area defense waste processing facility  

SciTech Connect

The S-Area Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) can process all of the high level radioactive wastes currently stored at the Savannah River Site with negligible risk of nuclear criticality. The characteristics which make the DWPF critically safe are: (1) abundance of neutron absorbers in the waste feeds; (2) and low concentration of fissionable material. This report documents the criticality safety arguments for the S-Area DWPF process as required by DOE orders to characterize and to justify the low potential for criticality. It documents that the nature of the waste feeds and the nature of the DWPF process chemistry preclude criticality.

Ha, B.C.

1994-10-21T23:59:59.000Z

230

Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan, Oak Ridge, Tennessee  

SciTech Connect

The Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) policy is to provide a safe and healthy workplace for all employees and subcontractors. The implementation of this policy requires that operations of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF), located one-half mile west of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex, be guided by an overall plan and consistent proactive approach to environment, safety and health (ES&H) issues. The BJC governing document for worker safety and health, BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', describes the key elements of the BJC Safety and Industrial Hygiene (IH) programs, which includes the requirement for development and implementation of a site-specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) where required by regulation (refer also to BJC-EH-1012, 'Development and Approval of Safety and Health Plans'). BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', implements the requirements for worker protection contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 851. The EMWMF site-specific HASP requirements identifies safe operating procedures, work controls, personal protective equipment, roles and responsibilities, potential site hazards and control measures, site access requirements, frequency and types of monitoring, site work areas, decontamination procedures, and outlines emergency response actions. This HASP will be available on site for use by all workers, management and supervisors, oversight personnel and visitors. All EMWMF assigned personnel will be briefed on the contents of this HASP and will be required to follow the procedures and protocols as specified. The policies and procedures referenced in this HASP apply to all EMWMF operations activities. In addition the HASP establishes ES&H criteria for the day-to-day activities to prevent or minimize any adverse effect on the environment and personnel safety and health and to meet standards that define acceptable waste management practices. The HASP is written to make use of past experience and best management practices to eliminate or minimize hazards to workers or the environment from events such as fires, falls, mechanical hazards, or any unplanned release to the environment.

Flynn, N.C. Bechtel Jacobs

2008-04-21T23:59:59.000Z

231

December 3, 2003, Board Public Meeting Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

7 7 TESTIMONY Daniel E. Glenn, Manager Pantex Site Office National Nuclear Security Administration U. S. Department of Energy Before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board December 3 and 4, 2003 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony on the Pantex Site Office's (PXSO) current practices for oversight and management of the Management and Operating contractor activities at the Pantex Plant. Transition from the long-standing roles and responsibilities to the re-engineered NNSA presents some challenges, but these changes are needed as we strive to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and most importantly the safety of our site operations. I fully support the NNSA Reengineering effort and believe that appropriate level of Contractor

232

December 16, 2003, Board Public Meeting - Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Ralph E. Erickson, Manager Los Alamos Site Office National Nuclear Security Administration U.S. Department of Energy Before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board December 16, 2003 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony on the Los Alamos Site office's current practices for oversight and management of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). There are four priorities at LANL in my mind in the following order - safety, security, environmental compliance and program. My responsibility as Manager is to ensure that my staff and the staff of the management and operating contractor carry out these four in accordance with the laws and the orders governing the DOE. To effectively accomplish

233

Nuclear Safety  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

Nuclear Safety information site that provides assistance and resources to field elements in implementation of requirements and resolving nuclear safety, facility safety, and quality assurance issues.

234

SUBJECT: Guidance on Retention of Facility Representative Technical Competence during Reductions in Force, 4/21/1998  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The Departments Revised Implementation Plan (IP) for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 93-3 renews the Departments commitment to maintaining the technical capability...

235

Style, content and format guide for writing safety analysis documents: Volume 2, Safety assessment reports for DOE non-nuclear facilities  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of Volume 2 of this 4-volume style guide is to furnish guidelines on writing and publishing Safety Assessment Reports (SAs) for DOE non-nuclear facilities at Sandia National Laboratories. The scope of Volume 2 encompasses not only the general guidelines for writing and publishing, but also the prescribed topics/appendices contents along with examples from typical SAs for DOE non-nuclear facilities.

Mahn, J.A.; Silver, R.C.; Balas, Y.; Gilmore, W.

1995-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

236

2009 VHA Facility Quality and Safety Report - Infrastructure | Data.gov  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Infrastructure Infrastructure Consumer Data Apps Challenges Resources About Blogs Let's Talk Feedback Consumer You are here Data.gov » Communities » Consumer » Data 2009 VHA Facility Quality and Safety Report - Infrastructure Dataset Summary Description The 2008 Hospital Report Card was mandated by the FY08 Appropriations Act, and focused on Congressionally-mandated metrics applicable to general patient populations. The 2009 VHA Facility Quality and Safety Repor report, not required by Congress, shifts to Veteran-centered metrics, and includes information related to infrastructure, care provided in outpatient and hospital settings, quality of care within given patient populations, accreditation status, patient satisfaction and patient outcomes for FY2008. The data in this report have been compiled from multiple sources throughout VHA. This dataset is a compilation of available services within each medical center, whether a medical center is accreditated by Joint commission and/or CARF and details the number of admissions by bed section, admissions per 1000 uniques, and average length of stay by bed sections. Total number of outpatient visits, number of unique patients and the medical center staffing.

237

Facilities  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Environment Feature Stories Public Reading Room: Environmental Documents, Reports LANL Home Phonebook Calendar Video About Operational Excellence Facilities Facilities...

238

February 9, 2004, Board Public Meeting Presentations - Beverly A. Cook  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Beverly Cook, Assistant Secretary Beverly Cook, Assistant Secretary Environment, Safety and Health U.S. Department of Energy Before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board February 9,2004 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Board, for this opportunity to address you today. You have invited me to speak on the roles and responsibilities of the Office of Environment, Safety and Health in the oversight process. In keeping with some of the questions you have sent to me, I would like to expand my remarks somewhat to the role of EH in assuring safety of the operations of the Department of Energy. I will speak to both my role personally, and that of my organization. I will also address efforts underway to improve DOES performance, and where I continue to be concerned. I would like to start with some of my overall assumptions. I absolutely believe that our

239

Safety System Oversight Assessment of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Tritium Gas Handling System  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Site Visit Report Site Visit Report Safety System Oversight Assessment of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Tritium Gas Handling System INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW This report documents the results of the Office of Health, Safety and Security's (HSS) review of a safety system oversight (SSO) assessment of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) tritium gas handling system (TGHS). The assessment evaluated the TGHS's ability to perform as required by safety bases and other applicable requirements. The assessment was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Site Office (LASO) and was conducted October 25 - November 5, 2010. LASO was the overall lead organization for the evaluation, which included independent

240

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety Oversight Principles As described in the Board's Strategic Plan, the Board executes its safety oversight responsibility according to the following principles: The primary...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


241

FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM STATUS, 6/21/1999 | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM STATUS, 6/21/1999 FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM STATUS, 6/21/1999 FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM STATUS, 6/21/1999 Since September, 1993, the Office of Field Management has served as the Department's corporate advocate for the Facility Representative Program. The Facility Representative (FR) is a critical technical position serving as line management's "eyes and ears" for operational safety in our contractor-operated facilities. I recognize the importance of the FR Program, and commit the Office of Field Integration (FI) to its continued crosscutting support. The FI staff continues to work with your staff members and with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) staff on FR Program issues, including staffing, training and qualification, recruitment, and retention. The Board is clearly interested in the

242

Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreator Nuclear Facility Document Safety Analysis  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

SENSITIVE DOE-STD-3009-94 July 1994 CHANGE NOTICE NO. 1 January 2000 CHANGE NOTICE NO. 2 April 2002 DOE STANDARD PREPARATION GUIDE FOR U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONREACTOR NUCLEAR FACILITY DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSES U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, DC 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. TS TS This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax: (301) 903-9823. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161;

243

Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

DOE-STD-3009-94 July 1994 CHANGE NOTICE NO. 12 January 2000 5 December 24 April 20021 DOE STANDARD PREPARATION GUIDE FOR U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONREACTOR NUCLEAR FACILITY DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSISANALYSES REPORTS U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, DC 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. TS This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax: (301) 903-9823. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161;

244

DOE-HDBK-1113-98, CN 1, Reaffirm; Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

REAFFIRMATION WITH REAFFIRMATION WITH ERRATA April 2005 DOE HANDBOOK RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING FOR URANIUM FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy FSC 6910 Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOE-HDBK-1113-98 ii This document has been reproduced from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax: (301) 903-9823. Available to the public from U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; (703) 605-6000. DOE-HDBK-1113-98 iii April 2005 Reaffirmation with Errata Changes to DOE-HDBK-1113-98, Radiological

245

DOE-HDBK-1113-98, CH 1; Radiological Safety Training for Uranium Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

3-9 8 February 199 8 CHANGE NOTICE NO. 1 December 2002 DOE HANDBOOK RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING FOR URANIUM FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy FSC 6910 Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. A pproved for public release; dist ribution is unlim ited. DOE-HDBK-1113-98 This document has been reproduced from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from ES&H Technical Information Services, U.S. Department of Energy, (800) 473-4375, fax: (301) 903-9823. Available to the public from U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; (703) 605-6000. DOE-HDBK-1113-98 iii Foreword This Handbook describes a recommended implementation process for additional training as outlined in

246

Accident safety analysis for 300 Area N Reactor Fuel Fabrication and Storage Facility  

SciTech Connect

The purpose of the accident safety analysis is to identify and analyze a range of credible events, their cause and consequences, and to provide technical justification for the conclusion that uranium billets, fuel assemblies, uranium scrap, and chips and fines drums can be safely stored in the 300 Area N Reactor Fuel Fabrication and Storage Facility, the contaminated equipment, High-Efficiency Air Particulate filters, ductwork, stacks, sewers and sumps can be cleaned (decontaminated) and/or removed, the new concretion process in the 304 Building will be able to operate, without undue risk to the public, employees, or the environment, and limited fuel handling and packaging associated with removal of stored uranium is acceptable.

Johnson, D.J.; Brehm, J.R.

1994-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

247

DOE-STD-6002-96; DOE Standard Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities: Requirements  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

6002-96 6002-96 May 1996 DOE STANDARD SAFETY OF MAGNETIC FUSION FACILITIES: REQUIREMENTS U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831; (423) 576-8401. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; (703) 487-4650. Order No. DE96009495 DOE-STD-6002-96 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page FOREWORD....................................................................................................................... v

248

PP-226 Brownsville public Utilities Board | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Board to construct, operate, and maintain electric transmission facilities at the U.S-Mexican border. PP-226 Brownsville public Utilities Board More Documents & Publications...

249

Safety Oversight of Decommissioning Activities at DOE Nuclear Sites  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is an independent federal agency established by Congress in 1988 to provide nuclear safety oversight of activities at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. The activities under the Board's jurisdiction include the design, construction, startup, operation, and decommissioning of defense nuclear facilities at DOE sites. This paper reviews the Board's safety oversight of decommissioning activities at DOE sites, identifies the safety problems observed, and discusses Board initiatives to improve the safety of decommissioning activities at DOE sites. The decommissioning of former defense nuclear facilities has reduced the risk of radioactive material contamination and exposure to the public and site workers. In general, efforts to perform decommissioning work at DOE defense nuclear sites have been successful, and contractors performing decommissioning work have a good safety record. Decommissioning activities have recently been completed at sites identified for closure, including the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, the Fernald Closure Project, and the Miamisburg Closure Project (the Mound site). The Rocky Flats and Fernald sites, which produced plutonium parts and uranium materials for defense needs (respectively), have been turned into wildlife refuges. The Mound site, which performed R and D activities on nuclear materials, has been converted into an industrial and technology park called the Mound Advanced Technology Center. The DOE Office of Legacy Management is responsible for the long term stewardship of these former EM sites. The Board has reviewed many decommissioning activities, and noted that there are valuable lessons learned that can benefit both DOE and the contractor. As part of its ongoing safety oversight responsibilities, the Board and its staff will continue to review the safety of DOE and contractor decommissioning activities at DOE defense nuclear sites.

Zull, Lawrence M.; Yeniscavich, William [Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Ave., NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901 (United States)

2008-01-15T23:59:59.000Z

250

Criticality safety strategy for the Fuel Cycle Facility electrorefiner at Argonne National Laboratory, West  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Integral Fast Reactor being developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) combines the advantages of metal-fueled, liquid-metal-cooled reactors and a closed fuel cycle. Presently, the Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) at ANL-West in Idaho Falls, Idaho is being modified to recycle spent metallic fuel from Experimental Breeder Reactor II as part of a demonstration project sponsored by the Department of Energy. A key component of the FCF is the electrorefiner (ER) in which the actinides are separated from the fission products. In the electrorefining process, the metal fuel is anodically dissolved into a high-temperature molten salt and refined uranium or uranium/plutonium products are deposited at cathodes. In this report, the criticality safety strategy for the FCF ER is summarized. FCF ER operations and processes formed the basis for evaluating criticality safety and control during actinide metal fuel refining. In order to show criticality safety for the FCF ER, the reference operating conditions for the ER had to be defined. Normal operating envelopes (NOES) were then defined to bracket the important operating conditions. To keep the operating conditions within their NOES, process controls were identified that can be used to regulate the actinide forms and content within the ER. A series of operational checks were developed for each operation that wig verify the extent or success of an operation. The criticality analysis considered the ER operating conditions at their NOE values as the point of departure for credible and incredible failure modes. As a result of the analysis, FCF ER operations were found to be safe with respect to criticality.

Mariani, R.D.; Benedict, R.W. [Argonne National Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Lell, R.M.; Turski, R.B.; Fujita, E.K. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

251

Office of Nuclear Facility Basis & Facility Design  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Office of Nuclear Safety Basis & Facility Design(HS-31) Reports to the Office of Nuclear Safety About Us The Office of Nuclear Safety Basis & Facility Design establishes safety...

252

Letter from Nuclear Energy Institute regarding Integrated Safety Analysis: Why it is Appropropriate for Fuel Recycling Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

082 l F: 202.533.0166 l rxm@nei.org l www.nei.org 082 l F: 202.533.0166 l rxm@nei.org l www.nei.org Rod McCullum DIRECTOR FUEL CYCLE PROJECTS NUCLEAR GENERATION DIVISION September 10, 2010 Ms. Catherine Haney Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Subject: Integrated Safety Analysis: Why It Is Appropriate for Fuel Recycling Facilities Project Number: 689 Dear Ms. Haney: Enclosed for your review is a Nuclear Energy Institute white paper on the use of Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed recycling facilities. This paper is intended as an information source for the NRC and should serve as a foundation for discussion with industry representatives on the issue.

253

JM to Revise DOE O 420.1B, Facility Safety (9-23-10)  

Directives, Delegations, and Requirements

This approval includes revision of the three implementing Guides: DOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosive Safety Criteria Guide ...

2010-09-23T23:59:59.000Z

254

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting Testimony - Attachment 2  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

' ' TESTIMONY Kyle E. McSlarrow, Deputy Secretary of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Public hearing October 21,2003 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Board for providing me the opportunity to address you today. In my role as the Deputy Secretary of Energy, I serve as the Department's Chief Operating Officer and have responsibility for providing direction to all DOE organizations, including NNSA. The subject of today's hearing - safety oversight - is a critical component of the Department's management system. The Secretary and I take our responsibility to ensure the Department's missions are performed safely very seriously, and the Secretary has made this clear from his first year in office. For example, the Secretary stated, in remarks at the 2001 Executive Safety

255

H. R. 1836: A Bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with regard to Department of Energy nuclear facilities, and for other purposes. Introduced in the House of Representatives, One Hundredth First Congress, First Session, April 12, 1989  

SciTech Connect

H.R. 1836: A Bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with regard to Department of Energy nuclear facilities, and for other purposes. The amendments change the title Defense Nuclear facilities to Department of Energy Nuclear facilities used for defense purposes and the related facilities Safety Board.

Not Available

1989-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

256

Safety classification of systems 300 area N reactor fuel supply facilities  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Classification of the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) safety systems, equipment, and components is presented.

Benecke, M.W., Westinghouse Hanford, Richland, WA

1997-10-10T23:59:59.000Z

257

The Department of Energy nuclear criticality safety program.  

SciTech Connect

This paper broadly covers key events and activities from which the Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) evolved. The NCSP maintains fundamental infrastructure that supports operational criticality safety programs. This infrastructure includes continued development and maintenance of key calculational tools, differential and integral data measurements, benchmark compilation, development of training resources, hands-on training, and web-based systems to enhance information preservation and dissemination. The NCSP was initiated in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 97-2, Criticality Safety, and evolved from a predecessor program, the Nuclear Criticality Predictability Program, that was initiated in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 93-2, The Need for Critical Experiment Capability. This paper also discusses the role Dr. Sol Pearlstein played in helping the Department of Energy lay the foundation for a robust and enduring criticality safety infrastructure.

Felty, J. R. (James R.)

2004-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

258

December 4, 2003, Board Public Meeting Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety Board December 4, 2003 2 Contractor Oversight Structure Guidance Documents - DOE P 450.4, Safety Management System Policy (ISMS) - EM-1 memo, 52303, EM Project...

259

November 24, 2009, Board Public Meeting on Oversight of Complex, High Hazard Nuclear Operations - Transcript  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc. Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc. 202-234-4433 Page 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA + + + + + DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD + + + + + OVERSIGHT OF COMPLEX, HIGH-HAZARD NUCLEAR OPERATIONS + + + + + TUESDAY NOVEMBER 24, 2009 + + + + + The Board met in the DNFSB Hearing Room at 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004, at 9:00 a.m., John E. Mansfield, Vice Chairman, presiding. UPRESENTU : JOHN E. MANSFIELD, Ph.D., Vice Chairman JOSEPH F. BADER, Board Member LARRY W. BROWN, Board Member PETER S. WINOKUR, Ph.D., Board Member USTAFF PRESENTU : RICHARD A. AZZARO, General Counsel TIMOTHY J. DWYER, Technical Director BRIAN GROSNER, General Manager RICHARD E. TONTODONATO, Deputy Technical Director Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.

260

Safety analysis--200 Area Savannah River Site: Separations Area operations Building 211-H Outside Facilities. Supplement 11, Revision 1  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The H-Area Outside Facilities are located in the 200-H Separations Area and are comprised of a number of processes, utilities, and services that support the separations function. Included are enriched uranium loadout, bulk chemical storage, water handling, acid recovery, general purpose evaporation, and segregated solvent facilities. In addition, services for water, electricity, and steam are provided. This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents an analysis of the H-Area Outside Facilities and is one of a series of documents for the Separations Area as specified in the SR Implementation Plan for DOE order 5481.1A. The primary purpose of the analysis was to demonstrate that the facility can be operated without undue risk to onsite or offsite populations, to the environment, and to operating personnel. In this report, risks are defined as the expected frequencies of accidents, multiplied by the resulting radiological consequences in person-rem. Following the summary description of facility and operations is the site evaluation including the unique features of the H-Area Outside Facilities. The facility and process design are described in Chapter 3.0 and a description of operations and their impact is given in Chapter 4.0. The accident analysis in Chapter 5.0 is followed by a list of safety related structures and systems (Chapter 6.0) and a description of the Quality Assurance program (Chapter 7.0). The accident analysis in this report focuses on estimating the risk from accidents as a result of operation of the facilities. The operations were evaluated on the basis of three considerations: potential radiological hazards, potential chemical toxicity hazards, and potential conditions uniquely different from normal industrial practice.

Not Available

1993-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


261

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Printable Printable copy Comment Reference Material Enabling Statute for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 42 U.S.C. § 2286 et seq., National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, (P.L. 100-456, September 29, 1988), as amended by National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, (P.L. 101-510, November 5, 1990), National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-190, December 5, 1991), Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486, October 24, 1992), and National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160, November 30, 1994). Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Policy Statement PS-1, "Criteria for Judging the Adequacy of Department Responses and Implementation Plans for Board Recommendations," October 19, 1990.

262

December 4, 2003, Board Public Meeting Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

TM TM Westinghouse Savannah River Company "Assessment Program" Presentation to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board R. A. Pedde 12/4/03 TM 2 Overview WSRC Assessment Program Line Oversight/Contractor Assurance System Technical Staffing Corrective Action Program Program Enhancements Closing Remarks Questions & Answers TM 3 Assessment Program WSRC Recognizes that a Robust Assessment Program is Key to: ⎟ Meeting the Integrated Safety Management System's Requirements and Expectations for "Feedback & Improvement" ⎟ Meeting the Requirements of the Quality Assurance Rule and Order, ⎟ Identifying and Correcting Precursor Problems Before a More Serious Incident Occurs, and, ⎟ Ensuring Continuous Improvement Throughout the Organization

263

October 24, 2003, Criteria and Guidelines For the Assessment of Safety System Software and Firmware at Defense Nuclear Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

3.1 3.1 Revision 3 October 24, 2003 U. S. Department of Energy Criteria and Guidelines For the Assessment of Safety System Software and Firmware at Defense Nuclear Facilities October 24, 2003 CRAD - 4.2.3.1 Revision 3 October 24, 2003 i TABLE OF CONTENTS ACRONYMS...................................................................................................................................ii GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................................................iii 1.0 INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................1 2.0 BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................2

264

DOE-STD-101-92; Compilation of Nuclear Safety Criteria Potential Application to DOE Nonreactor Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

-1O1-92 -1O1-92 DE92 011016 COMPILATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY CRITERIA POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO DOE NONREACTOR FACILITIES Published: March 1992 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Standards Washington,DC 20585 This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Informa- tion, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831; prices available from (423) 576-8401. Available to the public from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Rd., Springfield, VA 22161. Order No. DE92011016 DOE-STD-101-92 CONTENTS FOREWORD 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose 1.2 Sources of Criteria and Format 1.3 Safety Analysis Report Criteria

265

Corporate Board Meeting Minutes  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

th th Environmental Management Quality Assurance Corporate Board Meeting Minutes February 16, 2011 - Oak Ridge, TN Page 1 of 17 Voting Board Members in Attendance (general attendance sheet for the meeting is attached): *Greg Hayward - Idaho Robert Brown - Oak Ridge Ray Corey - Richland *Bill Rowland - Savannah River Bud Danielson -Chief of Nuclear Safety T.J. Jackson - EMCBC Ken Picha (chair) - Headquarters Acting EM-20 Russell McCallister - Portsmouth/Paducah Bob Murray (vice-chair) - Headquarters EM-23 No Voting Member Present - Carlsbad Jonathan (JD) Dowell - River Protection *Note: The by-laws require the voting member to be the Site Manager or assistant/deputy manager. The noted

266

Incentives for the Department's Facility Representative Program,  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Incentives for the Department's Facility Representative Program, Incentives for the Department's Facility Representative Program, 12/17/1998 Incentives for the Department's Facility Representative Program, 12/17/1998 The Department's Revised Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 93-3 has once again underscored the Department's commitment to maintaining the technical capability necessary to safely manage and operate our defense nuclear facilities. Attracting and retaining highly qualified employees and placing them in our critical technical positions is vital to fi.dfilling this commitment. You have identified 95'% of your Facility Representative positions as critical technical positions. The Office of Field Management has noted a 12'?40annual attrition rate of Facility Representatives from the Facility

267

Health and safety plan for characterization sampling of ETR and MTR facilities  

SciTech Connect

This health and safety plan establishes the procedures and requirements that will be used to minimize health and safety risks to persons performing Engineering Test Reactor and Materials Test Reactor characterization sampling activities, as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration standard, 29 CFR 1910.120. It contains information about the hazards involved in performing the tasks, and the specific actions and equipment that will be used to protect persons working at the site.

Baxter, D.E.

1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

268

August 17, 2005, Department letter forwarding the Department's implementation plan in response to the Board's recommendation 2005-1, Nuclear Material Packaging  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

August 17,2005 August 17,2005 The Honorable A . J. Eggenberger Chairman Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20004 - 2901 Dear Mr. Chairman: We are pleased to forward the enclosed Implementation Plan (Plan) for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board) Recommendation 2005-1, Nuclear Material Packaging. This Plan provides the Department's approach to ensure safe storage and handling of nuclear material at our sites. We appreciate the support provided by the Board and its staff during the development of this Plan. We will keep you informed of our progress in completing the Plan. I have assigned Mr. Richard M. Stark as the responsible manager for ensuring the Plan's successful completion. You may contact Mr. Stark at (301) 903-4407 to answer any

269

Prepared by: Facilities and Environmental Health & Safety Divisions June 17, 2011  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

state. The LOTOAuthorized Employee must test potential energy sources using appropriately rated of Energy (DOE), LBNL requires all construction subcontractors to comply with the DOE Worker Safety ­ Industrial Hygiene Chapter 5 ­ Occupational Safety Chapter 6 ­ Safe Work Authorization Chapter 8

Knowles, David William

270

Criticality safety aspects of decontamination and decommissioning at defense nuclear facilities  

SciTech Connect

Defense nuclear facilities have operated for forty years with a well-defined mission to produce weapons components for the nation. With the end of the cold war, the facilities` missions have changed to one of decontamination and decommissioning. Off-normal operations and use of new procedures, such as will exist during these activities, have often been among the causal factors in previous criticality accidents at process facilities. This paper explores the similarities in causal factors in previous criticality accidents to the conditions existing in current defense nuclear facilities undergoing the transition to decontamination and decommissioning. Practices to reduce the risk to workers, the public, and the environment are recommended.

Croucher, D.W.

1994-02-01T23:59:59.000Z

271

December 4, 2003, Board Public Meeting Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Henschel Henschel Jim Henschel WTP Project Director WTP Project Director Presented to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board December 4, 2003 Bechtel National, Inc. U.S. Department of Energy Contractor Oversight 2 Safety - Quality Oversight Design Construction Procurement 3 WTP Project Success Factors -- Safety -- Quality -- Compliance -- Technical -- Schedule -- Cost 4 QA Independent Audits/Surveillance Oversight Hierarchy DOE DNFSB EPA WA Ecology, Health Management/Self-Assessments Worker Self-Check Supervisory Check Second-Party Check DOE Client/Regulators Quality Assurance Organization Functional/Line Organization Industrial and Academic Reviews Corporate Oversight of Safety, Quality and Technical External Self- Assessments 5 Requirements Flow To Assessment Process Contract Commitments 10CFR 830 Subpart A

272

Guidance for the design and management of a maintenance plan to assure safety and improve the predictability of a DOE nuclear irradiation facility. Final report  

SciTech Connect

A program is recommended for planning the maintenance of DOE nuclear facilities that will help safety and enhance availability throughout a facility`s life cycle. While investigating the requirements for maintenance activities, a major difference was identified between the strategy suitable for a conventional power reactor and one for a research reactor facility: the latter should provide a high degree of predicted availability (referred to hereafter as ``predictability``) to its users, whereas the former should maximize total energy production. These differing operating goals necessitate different maintenance strategies. A strategy for scheduling research reactor facility operation and shutdown for maintenance must balance safety, reliability,and predicted availability. The approach developed here is based on three major elements: (1) a probabilistic risk analysis of the balance between assured reliability and predictability (presented in Appendix C), (2) an assessment of the safety and operational impact of maintenance activities applied to various components of the facility, and (3) a data base of historical and operational information on the performance and requirements for maintenance of various components. These factors are integrated into a set of guidelines for designing a new highly maintainable facility, for preparing flexible schedules for improved maintenance of existing facilities, and for anticipating the maintenance required to extend the life of an aging facility. Although tailored to research reactor facilities, the methodology has broader applicability and may therefore be used to improved the maintenance of power reactors, particularly in anticipation of peak load demands.

Booth, R.S.; Kryter, R.C.; Shepard, R.L.; Smith, O.L. [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Upadhyaya, B.R. [Univ. of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN (United States). Dept. of Nuclear Engineering; Rowan, W.J.

1994-10-01T23:59:59.000Z

273

Quality Assurance Corporate Board | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Quality Assurance » Quality Quality Assurance » Quality Assurance Corporate Board Quality Assurance Corporate Board The Office of Environmental Management (EM) Quality Assurance Corporate Board is an executive board that includes both senior U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and contractor representatives who are involved with construction, operating, and decommissioning projects. The Board acts in an advisory capacity to the EM Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Safety and Security Program, who is the Chief Executive Officer and Chair of the Board. Decisions on the Corporate Board's recommendations are acted on by EM senior management. The Corporate Board provides the management structure to integrate the independently managed federal and contractor Quality Assurance Programs into a single corporate entity. The Board serves as a consensus-building

274

DNFSB 2002-1 Software Quality Assurance Improvement Plan Commitment 4.2.1.2: Safety Quality Assurance Plan and Criteria for the Safety Analysis Toolbox Codes  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

2-Criteria 2-Criteria Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2002-1 Software Quality Assurance Improvement Plan Commitment 4.2.1.2: Software Quality Assurance Plan and Criteria for the Safety Analysis Toolbox Codes U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environment, Safety and Health 1000 Independence Ave., S.W. Washington, DC 20585-2040 November 2003 Software Quality Assurance Criteria for Safety Analysis Codes November 2003 INTENTIONALLY BLANK ii Software Quality Assurance Criteria for Safety Analysis Codes November 2003 FOREWORD This document discusses the Software Quality Assurance plan, and criteria and implementation procedures to be used to evaluate designated, safety-related computer software for the

275

Approach to developing a ground-motion design basis for facilities important to safety at Yucca Mountain  

SciTech Connect

The Department of Energy has proposed a methodology for developing a ground-motion design basis for prospective facilities at Yucca Mountain that are important to safety. The methodology utilizes a quasi-deterministic construct that is designed to provide a conservative, robust, and reproducible estimate of ground motion that has a one-in-ten chance of occurring during the preclosure period. This estimate is intended to define a ground-motion level for which the seismic design would ensure minimal disruption to operations; engineering analyses to ensure safe performance in the unlikely event that the design basis is exceeded are a part of the proposed methodology. 8 refs.

King, J.L.

1990-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

276

February 13, 1995, Board announcement of a Public Meeting on the DOE Plutonium Vulnerability Study  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

§552b), §552b), notice is hereby given of the following Board meeting and staff briefing: FEDERAL REGISTER CITATION OF PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT: Previously announced in the February 14, 1995, Federal Register. PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED TIME AND DATE OF THE MEETING: 2:00 p.m., February 21, 1995. CHANGES IN THE MEETING: The Board is broadening the scope of matters to be considered by adding the following information: The Board will also convene a panel of nationally-recognized experts to discuss the DOE Plutonium Vulnerability Study and to address questions that may arise from the results of this study. CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Robert M. Andersen, General Counsel, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 208-6387.

277

Criticality Safety Evaluation Report for the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facilities Process Water Handling System  

SciTech Connect

This report addresses the criticality concerns associated with process water handling in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility. The controls and limitations on equipment design and operations to control potential criticality occurrences are identified.

KESSLER, S.F.

2000-08-10T23:59:59.000Z

278

Fuel-cycle facilities: preliminary safety and environmental information document. Volume VII  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Information is presented concerning the mining and milling of uranium and thorium; uranium hexafluoride conversion; enrichment; fuel fabrication; reprocessing; storage options; waste disposal options; transportation; heavy-water-production facilities; and international fuel service centers.

Not Available

1980-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

279

Evaluation of a Radiation Worker Safety Training Program at a nuclear facility  

SciTech Connect

A radiation safety course was evaluated using the Kirkpatrick criteria of training evaluation as a guide. Thirty-nine employees were given the two-day training course and were compared with 15 employees in a control group who did not receive the training. Cognitive results show an immediate gain in knowledge, and substantial retention at 6 months. Implications of the results are discussed in terms of applications to current radiation safety training was well as follow-on training research and development requirements.

Lindsey, J.E.

1993-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

280

April 27, 2010, Department letter transmitting revised Implementation Plan for Recommendation 2009-1, Risk Assessment Methodologies at Defense Nuclear Facilities  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

April 27, 20 10 April 27, 20 10 The Honorable Peter S. Winokur Chairman Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004-294 1 Dear Mr. Chairman: In a letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board dated February 1, 20 10, I reaffirmed our acceptance of Recommendation 2009- 1, Risk Assessment Methodologies at Defense Nuclear Facilities, and committed to several changes to the Department's Plan for implementing the recommendations therein. Enclosed please find the revised Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safity Board Recommendation 2009-1 that incorporates those changes. I want to express my thanks for your staffs input on this revision and look forward to similar contributions as we revise the Department's Nuclear Safety Policy and implement

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


281

Observation challenges in a glovebox environment : behavior based safety at a plutonium facility.  

SciTech Connect

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is one of the Nation's leading scientific and defense laboratories, owned by the Department of Energy and managed by the University of California. LANL is one of the original weapons complex labs dating back to the days of the Manhattan Project during World War II. Since then, radioactive materials research has continued at LANLs Plutonium Facility, and remains a primary responsibility of the Laboratory. The Nuclear Materials Technology Division (NMT) is a multidisciplinary organization responsible for daily operations of the Plutonium Facility and the Chemistry Research Metallurgy Facility. NMT Division is responsible for the saence, engineering and technology of plutonium and other actinides in support of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear materials disposition, and nuclear energy programs. A wide amy of activities are performed within NMT Division, such as analytical chemistry, metallurgical operations, actinide processes, waste operations, radioactive materials research and related administrative tasks.

Montalvo, M. L. (Maryrose L.)

2002-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

282

Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Waste Receiving and Processing Facility (WRAP), 2336W Building, on the Hanford Site is designed to receive, confirm, repackage, certify, treat, store, and ship contact-handled transuranic and low-level radioactive waste from past and present U.S. Department of Energy activities. The WRAP facility is comprised of three buildings: 2336W, the main processing facility (also referred to generically as WRAP); 2740W, an administrative support building; and 2620W, a maintenance support building. The support buildings are subject to the normal hazards associated with industrial buildings (no radiological materials are handled) and are not part of this analysis except as they are impacted by operations in the processing building, 2336W. WRAP is designed to provide safer, more efficient methods of handling the waste than currently exist on the Hanford Site and contributes to the achievement of as low as reasonably achievable goals for Hanford Site waste management.

TOMASZEWSKI, T.A.

2000-04-25T23:59:59.000Z

283

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

I I OVERVIEW 1. INTRODUCTION. This Manual presents the process the Department of Energy (Department) will use to interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) and its staff. The requirements and guidance in this Manual apply to Departmental personnel, including employees of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), who are to use this Manual to facilitate the quality and responsiveness of the Departmental interactions with the Board and its staff. Attachment 1, Contractor Requirements Document (CRD), provides requirements that can be applied to contractors and subcontractors responsible for managing and operating Departmental facilities, as adapted to meet site-specific needs. Contractor compliance with the CRD will be required consistent with the conditions set forth in the controlling contract.

284

September 10, 2003, Board Public Meeting Presentations - Lessons Learned from Nuclear Power Industry  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DAVIS DAVIS - - BESSE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD DEGRADATION BESSE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD DEGRADATION LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD PUBLIC MEETING PUBLIC MEETING September 10, 2003 September 10, 2003 Ed Hackett, Project Director Ed Hackett, Project Director Project Directorate II Project Directorate II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission EMH1@NRC.GOV EMH1@NRC.GOV DAVIS DAVIS - - BESSE RACTOR VESSEL HEAD DEGRADATION BESSE RACTOR VESSEL HEAD DEGRADATION BACKGROUND BACKGROUND FEBRUARY, 2002 FEBRUARY, 2002 -

285

Review of Documented Safety Analysis Development for the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (LBL Facilities), April 23, 2013 (HSS CRAD 45-58, Rev. 0)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

U.S. Department of U.S. Department of Energy Subject: Review of Documented Safety Analysis Development for the Hanford Site Waste Treatment and Immob ilization Plant (LBL Facilities) - C riteria and Review Approach D oc um~ HS: HSS CRAD 45-58 Rev: 0 Eff. Date: April 23, 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Acting Di rec or, Office of Safety and Emergency Nltanagement Evaluations Date: Apri l 23 , 20 13 Criteria and Review Approach Document ~~ trd,James Low Date: April 23 , 20 13 1.0 PURPOSE Within the Office of H.ealth, Safety and Security (HSS), the Office of Enforcement and Overs ight, Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations (HS-45) miss io n is to assess the effectiveness of the environment, safety, health, and emergency management systems and practices used by line and

286

Review of Nuclear Criticality Safety Requirements Implementation for Hanford Tank Farms Facility  

SciTech Connect

In November 1999, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy directed a series of actions to strengthen the Department's ongoing nuclear criticality safety programs. A Review Plan describing lines of inquiry for assessing contractor programs was included. The Office of River Protection completed their assessment of the Tank Farm Contractor program in May 2000. This document supports that assessment by providing a compliance statement for each line of inquiry.

DEFIGH PRICE, C.

2000-08-09T23:59:59.000Z

287

October 21, 2003, Board Public Meeting Testimony - Attachment 6  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Glenn Podonsky Glenn Podonsky Director, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance U.S. Department of Energy Before the DFfense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board October 21,2003 Introductory Remarks Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify today. My office - the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance - was established by the Secretary of Energy as the independent evaluation element of the Department's integrated oversight system. We are responsible for evaluating environment, safety, and health; emergency management; cyber security; and safeguards and security programs at Department of Energy sites. Consistent with the scope of this hearing, I will focus my testimony today on our safety oversight role. Role of Independent Oversight

288

Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report contains health and safety information relating to the chemicals that have been identified in the mixed waste streams at the Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Information is summarized in two summary sections--one for health considerations and one for safety considerations. Detailed health and safety information is presented in material safety data sheets (MSDSs) for each chemical.

Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

1992-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

289

Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Part 2, Chemical constituents  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This report contains health and safety information relating to the chemicals that have been identified in the mixed waste streams at the Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Information is summarized in two summary sections--one for health considerations and one for safety considerations. Detailed health and safety information is presented in material safety data sheets (MSDSs) for each chemical.

Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

1992-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

290

DOE Order Self Study Modules - DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities Documented Safety Analyses  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

3009-94 3009-94 PREPARATION GUIDE FOR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONREACTOR NUCLEAR FACILITY DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSES DOE-STD-3009-94 Familiar Level June 2011 1 DOE-STD-3009-94 PREPARATION GUIDE FOR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONREACTOR NUCLEAR FACILITY DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSES FAMILIAR LEVEL _______________________________________________________________________________ OBJECTIVES Given the familiar level of this module and the resources listed below, you will be able to answer the following questions: 1. What are five general requirements for contractors who are responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility, as related to establishing a safety basis? 2. What actions must a contractor take when it is made aware of a potential inadequacy of

291

Risk Assessment in Support of DOE Nuclear Safety, Risk Information Notice,  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Risk Assessment in Support of DOE Nuclear Safety, Risk Information Risk Assessment in Support of DOE Nuclear Safety, Risk Information Notice, June 2010 Risk Assessment in Support of DOE Nuclear Safety, Risk Information Notice, June 2010 On August 12, 2009, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) issued Recommendation 2009-1, Risk Assessment Methodologies at Defense Nuclear Facilities. This recommendation focused on the need for clear direction on use of quantitative risk assessments in nuclear safety applications at defense nuclear facilities. The Department of Energy (DOE) is presently analyzing directives, standards, training, and other tools that may support more effective development and use of risk assessment. Working with the Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety and the Chief of Nuclear Safety, staff from the Office of Health,

292

December 3, 2003, Board Public Meeting - Transcript  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2 0 21 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 7 Thank you. CHAIRMANCONWAY: Okay. Our first witness this morning is Dan Glenn, Manager of the Pantex Site Office, who is an employee of DOE/NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration]. And, Dan, I will put in the record your background, which will go into the record prior to your speaking. Welcome, Dan. MR. GLENN: Thank you, sir. Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and members of the audience. Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony on the Pantex Site Office's current practices for oversight and management of our management and operating contractor activities at the Pantex Plant. Transition from the long-standing roles and responsibilities to the re-engineered NNSA

293

Use of Administrative Controls for Specific Safety Functions, 10/21/03. |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Use of Administrative Controls for Specific Safety Functions, Use of Administrative Controls for Specific Safety Functions, 10/21/03. Use of Administrative Controls for Specific Safety Functions, 10/21/03. On December 11,2002, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued Recommendation 2002-3. Recommendation 2002-3 noted concerns about the lack of rigor and quality assurance accorded some discrete operator actions or administrative contols that are required to control or mitigrate the consequences of accidents at DOE nuclear facilities. The Bpard noted that the DOE does not have adequate set of requirements for the design, implemnation and maintenance of important safety-related adminisitrative controls toensure that they will be effective and realiable. The Board recommended that DOE promulgate a set of requirements to establish

294

September 24, 2003, Board announcement of a series of Public Meetings regarding the Department of Energy's oversight scheduled for October 21  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

two two meetings described below. The Board will also conduct a series of public hearings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 8 2286b and invites any interested persons or groups to present any comments, technical information, or data concerning safety issues related to the matters to be considered. TIME AND DATE OF MEETING: 9:00 a.m., October 21,2003, and 9:00 a.m., October 23, 2003. PLACE: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Public Hearing Room, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20004-2001. Additionally, as a part of the Board's E-Government initiative, the meetings will be presented live through Internet video streaming. A link to these presentations will be available on the Board's web site (www.dnfsb.gov). STATUS: Open. While the Government in the Sunshine Act does not require that the

295

Assessment of nuclear safety and nuclear criticality potential in the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Revision 1  

SciTech Connect

The S-Area Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) will initially process Batch 1 sludge in the sludge-only processing mode, with simulated non-radioactive Precipitate Hydrolysis, Aqueous (PHA) product, without the risk of nuclear criticality. The dilute concentration of fissile material in the sludge combined with excess of neutron absorbers during normal operations make criticality throughout the whole process incredible. Subsequent batches of the DWPF involving radioactive precipitate slurry and PHA will require additional analysis. Any abnormal or upset process operations, which are not considered in this report and could potentially separate fissile material, must be individually evaluated. Scheduled maintenance operation procedures are not considered to be abnormal.

Ha, B.C.

1993-07-20T23:59:59.000Z

296

Cost-effective facility disposition planning with safety and health lessons learned and good practices from the Oak Ridge Decontamination and Decommissioning Program  

SciTech Connect

An emphasis on transition and safe disposition of DOE excess facilities has brought about significant challenges to managing worker, public, and environmental risks. The transition and disposition activities involve a diverse range of hazardous facilities that are old, poorly maintained, and contain radioactive and hazardous substances, the extent of which may be unknown. In addition, many excess facilities do not have historical facility documents such as operating records, plant and instrumentation diagrams, and incident records. The purpose of this report is to present an overview of the Oak Ridge Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) Program, its safety performance, and associated safety and health lessons learned and good practices. Illustrative examples of these lessons learned and good practices are also provided. The primary focus of this report is on the safety and health activities and implications associated with the planning phase of Oak Ridge facility disposition projects. Section 1.0 of this report provides the background and purpose of the report. Section 2.0 presents an overview of the facility disposition activities from which the lessons learned and good practices discussed in Section 3.0 were derived.

NONE

1998-05-01T23:59:59.000Z

297

DOE Annual Reports to Congress On Board-Related Activities -...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-1 APPENDICES A Orders and Departmental Safety Directives of Interest to the Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 B Site Visits Supported by...

298

November 6, 1995, Board letter forwarding staff trip report regarding...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

provide the Board's staff with their resolution. 3. Battery Ventilation: ANSI C2 National Electric Safety Code requires adequate ventilation and loss of ventilation alarms for...

299

Board of Governors Awards  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Tim Fister Earns Henderson Prize from University of Washington Tim Fister Earns Henderson Prize from University of Washington Challenge Met as APS Sends Final Chambers to LCLS A Marriage of Hardware and Hard Work Shaken but Not Stirred 2008 Rosalind Franklin Young Investigator Award APS News Archives: 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 2000 Subscribe to APS News rss feed Board of Governors Awards JUNE 3, 2008 Bookmark and Share The UChicago Argonne, LLC Board of Governors for Argonne will honor 10 employees and one child of an employee with awards at its 2008 Awards Program on Tuesday, June 24, 2008. Included in that number are two Advanced Photon Source (APS) staff members, a member of the Scientific User Facilities Directorate, and the son of another APS staffer. Outstanding Service Awards (OSAs), the highest honor the university gives

300

Calculational framework for safety analyses of non-reactor nuclear facilities  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

A calculational framework for the consequences analysis of non-reactor nuclear facilities is presented. The analysis framework starts with accident scenarios which are developed through a traditional hazard analysis and continues with a probabilistic framework for the consequences analysis. The framework encourages the use of response continua derived from engineering judgment and traditional deterministic engineering analyses. The general approach consists of dividing the overall problem into a series of interrelated analysis cells and then devising Markov chain like probability transition matrices for each of the cells. An advantage of this division of the problem is that intermediate output (as probability state vectors) are generated at each calculational interface. The series of analyses when combined yield risk analysis output. The analysis approach is illustrated through application to two non-reactor nuclear analyses: the Ulysses Space Mission, and a hydrogen burn in the Hanford waste storage tanks.

Coleman, J.R.

1994-06-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


301

May 21, 2004, Board letter forwarding Recommendation 2004-1, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

John I Conway, Chdmnm A J Fggenberger, Vice C h u m a n John F Mmsfield R Bruce lMalrhews 625 Indmna Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washmgton, D C 20004-290 1 (202) 694-7000 May 2 1,2004 The Honorable Spencer Abraham Secretary of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20585- 1000 Dear Secretary Abraham: On May 2 1 , 2004, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 8 2286d(a), unanimously approved Recommendation 2004-1, which is enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 2004- 1 deals with Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations. After your receipt of this recommendation and as required by 42 U.S.C. 0 2286d(a), the Board will promptly make it available to the public. The Board believes that the

302

Development of a pilot safety information document (PSID) for the replacement of radioactive liquid waste treatment facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Based on recent decisions made by Los Alamos National Laboratory concerning the development of site-wide National Environmental Policy Act documents, an effort was undertaken to develop a Pilot Safety Information Document (PSID) for the replacement Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility. The PSID documents risk analysis for the proposed facility and some of the alternatives, accident analysis, radioactive and hazardous material doses to off-site individuals, and the cumulative safety risk from adjacent facilities. In addition, this study also compared two methods for calculating the consequences of a radioactive spill. The methods compared were the Superfund model and the release fraction model. It was determined that the release fraction model gives a more realistic estimate of the doses incurred as the result of an accident, and that the Superfund model should be used for estimating the dose before and during the remediation effort. The cumulative safety risk was determined by calculating the exceedance probability if the individual dose from four geographically related facilities. The risk for cancer fatalities was determined to be within the DOE's Nuclear Safety Policy Goals.

Selvage, Ronald Derek

1995-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

303

Office of Nuclear Safety  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Office of Nuclear Safety (HS-30) Office of Nuclear Safety (HS-30) Office of Nuclear Safety Home » Directives » Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Rules » Nuclear Safety Workshops Technical Standards Program » Search » Approved Standards » Recently Approved » RevCom for TSP » Monthly Status Reports » Archive » Feedback DOE Nuclear Safety Research & Development Program Office of Nuclear Safety Basis & Facility Design (HS-31) Office of Nuclear Safety Basis & Facility Design - About Us » Nuclear Policy Technical Positions/Interpretations » Risk Assessment Working Group » Criticality Safety » DOE O 420.1C Facility Safety » Beyond Design Basis Events Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs (HS-32) Office of Nuclear Facility Safety Programs - About Us

304

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SITE-SPECIFIC ADVISORY BOARD  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Washington, D.C. 20585 Washington, D.C. 20585 April 25, 2013 2 Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board - April 25, 2013 Meeting Minutes LIST OF ACRONYMS AB - Advisory Board ANL - Argonne National Laboratory ARP - Accelerator Retrieval Project BNL - Brookhaven National Laboratory BRC - Blue Ribbon Commission CAB - Citizens Advisory Board D&D - Decontamination & Decommissioning DDFO - Deputy Designated Federal Officer DOE - Department of Energy DUF6 - Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride DWPF - Defense Waste Processing Facility EIS - Environmental Impact Statement EM - DOE Office of Environmental Management EM SSAB - DOE Office of Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board EPA - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FY - Fiscal Year

305

July 12, 2006, Department letter forwarding the Department's revised implementation plan in response to the Board's recommendation 2004-2, Active Confinement Systems  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

1 1 2 , 2 0 0 6 The Honorable A. J. Eggenberger Chairman Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20004 - 2901 Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed is a revised Department of Energy (DOE) Implementation Plan (IP) in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-2, Active Conjinement Systems. The changes in Revision 1 of the IP are summarized in the "Background" section of Revision 1. This revision establishes a phased-in schedule for several commitments relating to confinement systems in the DOE complex. This phased-in schedule reflects an increased understanding of the time and resources that are needed at several DOE sites to effectively review new and existing facility active confinement ventilation systems

306

Nuclear Safety Workshops  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Directives Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Rules Nuclear Safety Workshops Technical Standards Program Search Approved Standards Recently Approved RevCom...

307

School Land Board (Texas)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The School Land Board oversees the use of land owned by the state or held in trust for use and benefit by the state or one of its departments, boards, or agencies. The Board is responsible for...

308

Safety Basis Requirements for Nonnuclear Facilities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site-Specific Work Smart Standard Revision 3 December 2006  

SciTech Connect

This standard establishes requirements that, when coupled with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL's) Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) methods and other Work Smart Standards for assuring worker safety, assure that the impacts of nonnuclear operations authorized in LLNL facilities are well understood and controlled in a manner that protects the health of workers, the public, and the environment. All LLNL facilities shall be classified based on potential for adverse impact of operations to the health of co-located (i.e., nearby) workers and the public in accordance with this standard, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 830, Subpart B, and Department of Energy Order (DOE O) 420.2A.

Beach, D; Brereton, S; Failor, R; Hildum, J; Ingram, C; Spagnolo, S; van Warmerdam, C

2007-06-07T23:59:59.000Z

309

Alternative Fuels Data Center: Propane Board and Dealer Requirements  

Alternative Fuels and Advanced Vehicles Data Center (EERE)

Propane Board and Propane Board and Dealer Requirements to someone by E-mail Share Alternative Fuels Data Center: Propane Board and Dealer Requirements on Facebook Tweet about Alternative Fuels Data Center: Propane Board and Dealer Requirements on Twitter Bookmark Alternative Fuels Data Center: Propane Board and Dealer Requirements on Google Bookmark Alternative Fuels Data Center: Propane Board and Dealer Requirements on Delicious Rank Alternative Fuels Data Center: Propane Board and Dealer Requirements on Digg Find More places to share Alternative Fuels Data Center: Propane Board and Dealer Requirements on AddThis.com... More in this section... Federal State Advanced Search All Laws & Incentives Sorted by Type Propane Board and Dealer Requirements The Idaho Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Public Safety Act established the

310

October 24, 2003, Assessment Criteria and Guidelines for Determining the Adequacy of Software Used in the Safety Analysis and Design of Defense Nuclear Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

4.1 4.1 Revision 3 October 24, 2003 U. S. Department of Energy Assessment Criteria and Guidelines for Determining the Adequacy of Software Used in the Safety Analysis and Design of Defense Nuclear Facilities October 24, 2003 CRAD - 4.2.4.1 Revision 3 October 24, 2003 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................................iii GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................................................iv 1.0 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 2.0 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2

311

Air Resources Board  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The Air Resources Board (the Board or ARB) will conduct a public hearing at the time and place noted below to consider amendments to the Verifkztion

unknown authors

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

312

Air Resources Board  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The Air Resources Board (the Board or ARB) will conduct a public hearing at the time and place noted below to consider amendments to the Verification

unknown authors

2003-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

313

FACILITY SAFETY (FS)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

protection program has been established and implemented. (10 CFR 830.204(b)(5); 10 CFR 835; DOE O 5400.5; DOE N 441.3) 2. The radiological protection organization is...

314

4Q CY2007, Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

6, 2008 6, 2008 MEMORANDUM FROM: DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATNE TO THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD OFFICE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY SUBJECT: Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report, October - December (4th Quarter CY2007) Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from October to December 2007. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per DOE-STD- 1063-2006, Facility Representatives, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback to improve the FR Program. A summary of this quarter's data concluded: 83% Fully Qualified (last Quarter was 82%) 85% Staffing Level (last Quarter was 93%) 45% Time Spent in the Field (DOE goal is >40%)

315

2Q CY2007, Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

0,2007 0,2007 M E M 0 R A N D ; p s ' X Z FROM: M RK B. WHI DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD OFFICE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY SUBJECT: Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report, April - June (2nd Quarter CY2007) Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from April to June 2007. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per DOE-STD-1063-2006, Facility Representatives, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback to improve the FR Program. A summary of this quarter's data concluded: 74% Fully Qualified (last Quarter was 72%) 94% Staffing Level (last Quarter was 9 1 %)

316

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM BOARD OF SUPERVISORS  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

DIRECTOR STUDENT HEALTH CENTER PAIGE PICKETT DIRECTOR CO-CURRICULAR DISABILITY & TESTING SERVICES STACY & SAFETY DON BRASWELL DIRECTOR TECHNICAL SERVICES CHRIS HENDERSON DIRECTOR FACILITY & SUPPORT SERVICES SAM

Selmic, Sandra

317

Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Minnesota Agri-Power Plant and Associated Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

85 85 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 194 / Wednesday, October 7, 1998 / Notices FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth M. Pursateri or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 208-6400. Dated: October 1, 1998. John T. Conway, Chairman. Appendix-Transmittal Letter to the Secretary of Energy DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 208-6400 SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA September 30, 1998 The Honorable Bill Richardson, Secretary of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585- 1000 Dear Secretary Richardson: On September 30, 1998, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(a)(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 98-2, which is enclosed for

318

H. UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

all safety basis documents submitted to DOE and (2) preparation of a safety evaluation report concerning the safety basis for a facility. 2. DOE will maintain a public list on the...

319

Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory  

SciTech Connect

This report describes health and safety concerns associated with the Mixed and Low-level Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Various hazards are described such as fire, electrical, explosions, reactivity, temperature, and radiation hazards, as well as the potential for accidental spills, exposure to toxic materials, and other general safety concerns.

Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

1992-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

320

Mixed and low-level waste treatment project: Appendix C, Health and safety criteria for the mixed and low-level waste treatment facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Part 1, Waste streams and treatment technologies  

SciTech Connect

This report describes health and safety concerns associated with the Mixed and Low-level Waste Treatment Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Various hazards are described such as fire, electrical, explosions, reactivity, temperature, and radiation hazards, as well as the potential for accidental spills, exposure to toxic materials, and other general safety concerns.

Neupauer, R.M.; Thurmond, S.M.

1992-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


321

SUBJECT: Guidance on Retention of Facility Representative Technical  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

SUBJECT: Guidance on Retention of Facility Representative Technical SUBJECT: Guidance on Retention of Facility Representative Technical Competence during Reductions in Force, 4/21/1998 SUBJECT: Guidance on Retention of Facility Representative Technical Competence during Reductions in Force, 4/21/1998 The Department's Revised Implementation Plan (IP) for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 93-3 renews the Department's commitment to maintaining the technical capability necessary to safely manage and operate defense nuclear facilities. Retaining highly qualified employees in critical technical skills areas is vital to the maintenance of these technical capabilities. The Department has therefore committed in the revised R? to the development of a model that offices can use to proactively manage and preserve critical technical capabilities. During the

322

Environmental Management Advisory Board Charter | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Services » Communication & Engagement » EMAB » Environmental Services » Communication & Engagement » EMAB » Environmental Management Advisory Board Charter Environmental Management Advisory Board Charter The Environmental Management Advisory Board's (EMAB)'s most recent charter outlines the objective, structure, and scope of the Board. EMAB Charter More Documents & Publications SEAB Charter 2012 Methane Hydrate Advisory Committee Charter Electricity Advisory Committee, U.S. Department of Energy: Advisory Committee Charter, August 9, 2012 Waste Management Nuclear Materials & Waste Tank Waste and Waste Processing Waste Disposition Packaging and Transportation Site & Facility Restoration Deactivation & Decommissioning (D&D) Facility Engineering Soil & Groundwater Sustainability Program Management

323

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

4 4 2004 BY MONTH: JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC This list last updated Friday, August 09, 2013 DECEMBER December 29, 2004, Department letter reporting completion of the Office of Environmental Management's (EM) portion of Commitment 4.2.3.3 in the 2002-1 implementation plan, Quality Assurance for Safety-Related Software at Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities, which requires the assessment of EM's safety software. [HTML] [PDF] [DOC] December 23, 2004, Department letter forwarding the Department’s implementation plan in response to Board Recommendation 2004-1, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations. [HTML] [PDF] [DOC] December 22, 2004, Department letter regarding Facility Representatives staffing and training recruitment for the National Nuclear Security Administration sites. [HTML] [PDF] [DOC]

324

The Environmental Agency's Assessment of the Post-Closure Safety Case for the BNFL DRIGG Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility  

SciTech Connect

The Environment Agency is responsible, in England and Wales, for authorization of radioactive waste disposal under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993. British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) is currently authorized by the Environment Agency to dispose of solid low level radioactive waste at its site at Drigg, near Sellafield, NW England. As part of a planned review of this authorization, the Environment Agency is currently undertaking an assessment of BNFL's Post-Closure Safety Case Development Programme for the Drigg disposal facility. This paper presents an outline of the review methodology developed and implemented by the Environment Agency specifically for the planned review of BNFL's Post-Closure Safety Case. The paper also provides an overview of the Environment Agency's progress in its on-going assessment programme.

Streatfield, I. J.; Duerden, S. L.; Yearsley, R. A.

2002-02-26T23:59:59.000Z

325

Facility Representative Program: 2010 Facility Representative Workshop  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

10 Facility Representative Workshop 10 Facility Representative Workshop May 12 - 13, 2010 Las Vegas, NV Facility Rep of the Year Award | Attendees | Summary Report Workshop Agenda and Presentations Day 1: Wednesday, May 12, 2010 8:00 a.m. Opening Remarks James Heffner, Facility Representative Program Manager Earl Hughes, Safety System Oversight Program Manager Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance Office of Health, Safety and Security 8:15 a.m. Welcome from the Nevada Site Office John Mallin, Deputy Assistant Manager for Site Operations Nevada Site Office 8:30 a.m. Workshop Keynote Address Todd Lapointe Chief of Nuclear Safety Central Technical Authority Staff 9:15 a.m. Facility Representative and Safety System Oversight Award Ceremony James Heffner, Facility Representative Program Manager

326

SI Safety Information  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Information Information Policies and Procedures Radiation Safety Device List (full version)(compressed version) APS QA APS Safety Page DOE Orders DOE Order 420.2 (11/08/95) DOE Order 420.2A (01/08/01) Accelerator Safety Implementation Guide for DOE Order 420.2 DOE Order 420.2B (07/23/04) Expires (07/23/08) (html) (pdf) Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE O 420.2B (html) (pdf) Safety of Accelerator Facilities (02/18/05) Accelerator Facility Safety Implementation Guide for DOE O 420.2B (pdf) Safety of Accelerator Facilities (7/1/05) ESH Manual Guidance 5480.25 Guidance for an Accelerator Facility Safety Program 5480.25 Guidance (09/01/93) Bases & Rationale for Guidance for an Accelerator Facitlity Safety Program (October 1994) NCRP Report No. 88 "Radiation Alarms and Access Control Systems" (1987) ISBN

327

March 1, 2013, DOE/Union Leadership Safety Culture Meeting - Meeting Summary  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

3-12-13 3-12-13 DOE/Union Leadership Safety Culture Meeting March 1, 2013 Meeting Summary History:  DOE's Office of Enforcement and Oversight [Independent Oversight], within HSS, conducted an independent assessment of the nuclear safety culture and management of nuclear safety concerns at DOE's Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) in response to a Recommendation by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.  As a result of the safety culture weaknesses unveiled, DOE embarked on a mission to determine the extent of the condition, and HSS was tasked to conduct independent assessments at 5 primary DOE nuclear facilities.  DOE is currently pursuing corrective actions. A consolidated report of the Independent

328

Nuclear Safety Research and Development (NSR&D) Program  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Nuclear Safety (HS-30) Office of Nuclear Safety Home Directives Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Rules Nuclear Safety Workshops Technical Standards Program Search ...

329

Advisory Board Meets to Discuss EM Cleanup's Future | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Advisory Board Meets to Discuss EM Cleanup's Future Advisory Board Meets to Discuss EM Cleanup's Future Advisory Board Meets to Discuss EM Cleanup's Future December 6, 2012 - 12:00pm Addthis EM Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Tracy Mustin, second from right, speaks with members of the Environmental Management Advisory Board this week as EM Deputy Assistant Secretary, Safety, Security and Quality Programs, Matthew Moury, second from left, listens. EM Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Tracy Mustin, second from right, speaks with members of the Environmental Management Advisory Board this week as EM Deputy Assistant Secretary, Safety, Security and Quality Programs, Matthew Moury, second from left, listens. WASHINGTON, D.C. - EM Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Tracy Mustin this week sought guidance from the Environmental Management Advisory Board

330

Criticality safety evaluation report for the cold vacuum drying facility's process water handling system  

SciTech Connect

This report addresses the criticality concerns associated with process water handling in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility. The controls and limitations on equipment design and operations to control potential criticality occurrences are identified.

NELSON, J.V.

1999-05-12T23:59:59.000Z

331

December 3, 2003, Board Public Meeting Speaker Presentations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

from Mike Mallory Before the DNFSB December 3, 2003 from Mike Mallory Before the DNFSB December 3, 2003 Page 0 Testimony of Mike Mallory, BWXT Pantex President and General Manager Before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Regarding Contractor Assurance System at Pantex Plant December 3, 2003 Testimony from Mike Mallory Before the DNFSB December 3, 2003 Page 1 The Contractor Assurance System at BWXT Pantex Introduction Thank you for the opportunity to speak today regarding the Contractor Assurance System at BWXT Pantex. I am Mike Mallory, the President and General Manager of BWXT Pantex, the M&O contractor of the Pantex Plant for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. BWXT Pantex is responsible for five core missions at Pantex. 1) We evaluate, retrofit and repair

332

Generic safety documentation model  

SciTech Connect

This document is intended to be a resource for preparers of safety documentation for Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico facilities. It provides standardized discussions of some topics that are generic to most, if not all, Sandia/NM facilities safety documents. The material provides a ``core`` upon which to develop facility-specific safety documentation. The use of the information in this document will reduce the cost of safety document preparation and improve consistency of information.

Mahn, J.A.

1994-04-01T23:59:59.000Z

333

AOCS Governing Board  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Listing of Governing Board members. AOCS Governing Board Volunteer Opportunities aocs Author authors. speakers awards call for papers committees fats global governance inform job listings member membership network oils Present Publish Serve on a c

334

Governing Board Committees  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The Governing Board establishes and implements the the strategic goals of the Society. AOCS Executive Committee, Members-at-Large and Strategic Working Groups. Governing Board Committees AOCS History and Governance about us aocs committees contact

335

Tank Waste Corporate Board Meeting 07/29/09 | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

9/09 9/09 Tank Waste Corporate Board Meeting 07/29/09 The following documents are associated with the Tank Waste Corporate Board Meeting held on July 29th, 2009. Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program Retrieval and Repackaging of RH-TRU Waste - General Presentation Modular Hot Cell Technology Tank Waste System Integrated Project Team Gunite Tanks Waste Retrieval and Closure Operations at Oak Ridge Nattional Laboratory Integrated Facilities Disposition Program Oak Ridge National Laboratory TRU Waste Processing Center Tank Waste Processing Supernate Processing System Chemical Cleaning Program Review Enhanced Chemical Cleaning Hanford Single-Shell Tank Integrity Program Modeling the Performance of Engineered Systems for Closure and Near-Surface Disposal Nuclear Safety R&D in the Waste Processing Technology Development &

336

March 10, 2005, Board letter forwarding Recommendation 2005-1, Nuclear Material Packaging  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

FACLLTIlEs FACLLTIlEs SAFETYBOARD John T. Conway, Chairman A.J. Eggenberger, Vice Chairman Joseph F. Bader John E. Mansfield R. Bruce Matthews 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Wa5hington. D.C. 20004-2901 (202) 694-7000 March 10, 2005 The Honorable Samuel W. Bodman Secretary of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20585-1000 Dear Secretary Bodman: On March 10,2005, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 9 2286a(a)(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 2005- 1, Nuclear Material Packaging, which is enclosed for your consideration. This recommendation addresses issuance of a requirement that nuclear material packaging meet technically justified criteria for safe storage and handling outside of engineered contamination barriers.

337

TIP Advisory Board Members  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... Visiting Scientist at Jet Propulsion Lab. ... Board of US Secretary of Energy, National Biotech Policy ... experience in technology development, feasibility ...

2011-02-02T23:59:59.000Z

338

MEP Advisory Board Webcast  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... Circuit Board Assemblies Plastics Glass Printed Art Metal Die Casting Sand Casting CNC Machining Extrusions ECP: Services Overview ...

2012-02-17T23:59:59.000Z

339

Quarterly report on the Ferrocyanide Safety Program for the period ending June 30, 1994  

SciTech Connect

This is the thirteenth quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue associated With Hanford site high-level radioactive waste tanks. Progress in the Ferrocyanide Safety Program is reviewed, including work addressing the six parts of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990). All work activities are described in the revised program plan (Borsheim et al. 1993), and this report follows the same format presented there. A summary of the key events occurring this quarter is presented in Section 1.2. More detailed discussions of progress are located in Sections 3.0 and 4.0.

Meacham, J.E.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

1994-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

340

Quarterly report on the ferrocyanide safety program for the period ending March 31, 1996  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This is the twentieth quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks. Progress in the Ferrocyanide Safety Program is reviewed, including work addressing the six parts of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990). All work activities are described in the revised program plan (DOE 1994b), and this report follows the same fomzat presented there. A summary of the key events occurring this quarter is presented in Section 1. 2. More detailed discussions of progress are located in Sections 2. 0 through 4. 0.

Meacham, J.E.

1996-05-08T23:59:59.000Z

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


341

Pre-title I safety evaluation for the retrieval operations of transuranic waste drums in the Solid Waste Disposal Facility. Revision 2  

SciTech Connect

Phase I of the Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facility Line Item Project includes the retrieval and safe storage of the pad drums that are stored on TRU pads 2-6 in the Solid Waste Disposal Facility (SWDF). Drums containing TRU waste were placed on these pads as early as 1974. The pads, once filled, were mounded with soil. The retrieval activities will include the excavation of the soil, retrieval of the pad drums, placing the drums in overpacks (if necessary) and venting and purging the retrieved drums. Once the drums have been vented and purged, they will be transported to other pads within the SWDF or in a designated area until they are eventually treated as necessary for ultimate shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico. This safety evaluation provides a bounding assessment of the radiological risk involved with the drum retrieval activities to the maximally exposed offsite individual and the co-located worker. The results of the analysis indicate that the risk to the maximally exposed offsite individual and the co-located worker using maximum frequencies and maximum consequences are within the acceptance criteria defined in WSRC Procedural Manual 9Q. The purpose of this evaluation is to demonstrate the incremental risk from the SWDF due to the retrieval activities for use as design input only. As design information becomes available, this evaluation can be revised to satisfy the safety analysis requirements of DOE Orders 4700 and 5480.23.

Rabin, M.S.

1992-08-01T23:59:59.000Z

342

December 3, 2003, Board Public Meeting - Board Member Remarks  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

"and enhance the safety of operations of DOE'S nuclear "and enhance the safety of operations of DOE'S nuclear facilities and to restore public confidence that these facilities are operated without undue risk to public health and safety. These hearings are in accordance with that mandate from the Congress, and we are holding these public hearings in order to ensure the public that we are doing our job, and that the DOE is moving ahead and doing its job in a safe manner. So that is part of the reasons we are holding this series of hearings. Dr. Eggenberger? VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: I have no questions at this time. When the first witness appears, I have an extensive line of questioning. CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Dr. Mansfield? DR. MANSFIELD: Nothing at this time. CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dr. Matthews?

343

Safety Communications  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Communications Communications New Staff & Guests Safety Topics ISM Plan Safety Communications Questions about safety and environmental compliance should first be directed to your supervisor or work lead. The Life Sciences Division Safety Coordinator Scott Taylor at setaylor@lbl.gov , 486-6133 (office), or (925) 899-4355 (cell); and Facilities Manager Peter Marietta at PMarietta@lbl.gov, 486-6031 (office), or 967-6596 (cell), are also sources of information. Your work group has a representative to the Division Environment, Health, & Safety Committee. This representative can provide safety guidance and offer a conduit for you to pass on your concerns or ideas. A list of current representatives is provided below. Additional safety information can be obtained on-line from the Berkeley Lab

344

Safety System Oversight: Subject Matter Links  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

of Occupational Safety & Health (NIOSH) American Board of Industrial Hygiene American Industrial Hygiene Association Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Environment DOE...

345

The Criticality Safety Information Resource Center (CSIRC) at Los Alamos National Laboratory  

SciTech Connect

The Criticality Safety Information Resource Center (CSIRC) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is a program jointly funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in conjunction with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 97-2. The goal of CSIRC is to preserve primary criticality safety documentation from U.S. critical experimental sites and to make this information available for the benefit of the technical community. Progress in archiving criticality safety primary documents at the LANL archives as well as efforts to make this information available to researchers are discussed. The CSIRC project has a natural linkage to the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP). This paper raises the possibility that the CSIRC project will evolve in a fashion similar to the ICSBEP. Exploring the implications of linking the CSIRC to the international criticality safety community is the motivation for this paper.

Henderson, B.D.; Meade, R.A.; Pruvost, N.L.

1999-09-20T23:59:59.000Z

346

ARM - Facility News Article  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

4, 2013 [Facility News] 4, 2013 [Facility News] Work Cut Out for ARM Science Board Bookmark and Share With a new fixed site on the horizon in the Azores, a third ARM Mobile Facility gearing up for action in the Arctic, and more aircraft probes and sensors than scientists can shake a stick at, the ARM Facility continues to expand its considerable suite of assets for conducting climate research. Along with this impressive inventory comes the responsibility to ensure the Facility is supporting the highest-value science possible. Enter the ARM Science Board. This eleven-member group annually reviews complex proposals for use of the ARM mobile and aerial facilities. To maintain excellence and integrity in the review process, each member serves a renewable term of two years, with membership updated annually.

347

Criticality Safety Evaluation Report CSER-96-019 for Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Processing and Storage Facilities Multi Canister Overpack (MCO)  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This criticality evaluation is for Spent N Reactor fuel unloaded from the existing canisters in both KE and KW Basins, and loaded into multiple canister overpack (MCO) containers with specially built baskets containing a maximum of either 54 Mark IV or 48 Mark IA fuel assemblies. The criticality evaluations include loading baskets into the cask-MCO, operation at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility,a nd storage in the Canister Storage Building. Many conservatisms have been built into this analysis, the primary one being the selection of the K{sub eff} = 0.95 criticality safety limit. This revision incorporates the analyses for the sampling/weld station in the Canister Storage Building and additional analysis of the MCO during the draining at CVDF. Additional discussion of the scrap basket model was added to show why the addition of copper divider plates was not included in the models.

KESSLER, S.F.

1999-10-20T23:59:59.000Z

348

DOE-STD-3007-93 CN-1; DOE Standard Guidelines For Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

7-93 7-93 November 1993 CHANGE NOTICE NO. 1 September 1998 DOE STANDARD GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING CRITICALITY SAFETY EVALUATIONS AT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NON-REACTOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES U.S. Department of Energy AREA SAFT Washington, D.C. 20585 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, P.O. Box 62, Oak Ridge, TN 37831; (423) 576-8401. Available to the public from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161; (703) 605-6000. Order No. DE98003918 Change Notice No. 1 DOE-STD-3007-93 September 1998

349

DOE 2010 Safety and Security Reform Project - HSS Directives Disposition and Status (December 4, 2012)  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

10 Safety and Security Reform Project - HSS Directives Disposition and Status (December 4, 2012) 10 Safety and Security Reform Project - HSS Directives Disposition and Status (December 4, 2012) Page 1 of 3 2010 HSS Directives Disposition Status Secretary of Energy Notice SEN-35-91, Nuclear Safety Policy Revise Complete - see Policy 420.1. Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment Revise Complete - see Order 458.1. Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities Revise Complete - see Order 422.1. Order 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Training, Qualification, and Certification Requirements Revise Complete - see Order 426.2. Order 5480.30, Nuclear Reactor Design Criteria Re-certify Complete - re-certified. Manual 140.1-1B, Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Re-certify Complete - re-certified.

350

OpenEI - board  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

http:en.openei.orgdatasetstaxonomyterm4340 en Alabama State Oil and Gas Board: Oil Well Records (2911 - 31811) http:en.openei.orgdatasetsnode469

The Alabama...

351

TIP Advisory Board  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

... The TIP Advisory Board reports on the general health of the Program and offers guidance on investment areas that are appropriate for TIP funding. ...

2012-07-17T23:59:59.000Z

352

Board of Directors  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

Head of Research & Development Center & 2012 TMS President, Hydro Aluminium Rolled Products GmbH. TERM:2/1/2013 4/1/2014. TMS Board Member

353

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

and Procedures, dated January 11, 2013. PS-3 Board Oversight of Department of Energy Decommissioning Activities at Defense Nuclear Facilities, dated August 19, 1996. PS-2...

354

Environmental, Health and Safety Assessment: ATS 7H Program (Phase 3R) Test Activities at the GE Power Systems Gas Turbine Manufacturing Facility, Greenville, SC  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

International Technology Corporation (IT) was contracted by General Electric Company (GE) to assist in the preparation of an Environmental, Health and Safety (HI&3) assessment of the implementation of Phase 3R of the Advanced Turbine System (ATS) 7H program at the GE Gas Turbines facility located in Greenville, South Carolina. The assessment was prepared in accordance with GE's contractual agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy (GE/DOE Cooperative Agreement DE-FC21-95MC3 1176) and supports compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970. This report provides a summary of the EH&S review and includes the following: General description of current site operations and EH&S status, Description of proposed ATS 7H-related activities and discussion of the resulting environmental, health, safety and other impacts to the site and surrounding area. Listing of permits and/or licenses required to comply with federal, state and local regulations for proposed 7H-related activities. Assessment of adequacy of current and required permits, licenses, programs and/or plans.

None

1998-11-17T23:59:59.000Z

355

Facility Representative Program: 2004 Facility Representative Workshop  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

4 Facility Representative Workshop 4 Facility Representative Workshop May 18 - 20, 2004 Las Vegas, NV Facility Rep of the Year Award | Attendees list | Summary Report [PDF] WORKSHOP AGENDA Final Day 1: Tuesday, May 18, 2004 Theme: Program Successes and Challenges 8:00 a.m. Opening Remarks John Evans, Facility Representative Program Manager 8:15 a.m. Welcome Kathy Carlson, Nevada Site Office Manager 8:30 a.m. Videotaped Remarks from the Deputy Secretary Kyle E. McSlarrow, Deputy Secretary of Energy Deputy Secretary's Remarks 8:40 a.m. Keynote Address - NNSA Evaluation of Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report Brigadier General Ronald J. Haeckel, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Military Applications, NNSA Other Information: NASA’S Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report

356

DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility Disposition Activities DOE Standard Integration Of Environment,Safety, and Health Into Facility Disposition...

357

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

5 5 2005 BY MONTH: JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC This list last updated Tuesday, April 02, 2013 DECEMBER December 29, 2005, Department letter transmitting Exclusion Reports consistent with Commitment 8.3 of the Department of Energy's Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 2004-2, Active Confinement Systems. [HTML] [PDF] [DOC] December 27, 2005, Department letter forwarding the Deputy Secretary's memorandum regarding the Department's process criteria and attributes for delegations of safety responsibilities, completing Commitment 9A in the 2004-1 implementation plan, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations. [HTML] [PDF] [DOC] December 22, 2005, Department letter regarding the Comprehensive Flowsheet Review of the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP). [HTML] [PDF] [DOC]

358

International Oil and Gas Board International Oil and Gas Board...  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

Board International Oil and Gas Board Address Place Zip Website Abu Dhabi Supreme Petroleum Council Abu Dhabi Supreme Petroleum Council Abu Dhabi http www abudhabi ae...

359

AVIATION BOARD OF DIRECTORS BYLAWS AND PROTOCOLS  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

AVIATION BOARD OF DIRECTORS AVIATION BOARD OF DIRECTORS BYLAWS AND PROTOCOLS The Department of Energy strives to manage its Aviation Program toward the highest standards of safety, efficiency, fairness in contracting, preservation of competition in the private sector, open communication, prudent property management, and the best examples of resource management. Toward these ends, the Department has established a management structure led by a Board of Directors comprising active Federal employee aviation managers from the Department. AUTHORITY: The following authorities serve as basis for this structure and system: Office of Management and Budget Circular A-126, FMR 102.33, DEAR 109, DOE Order 440.2B, Aviation Management Review Team Report, March 1999, and Secretary of Energy Appointment and Delegation of Authority, April 15, 1999.

360

Nuclear Safety Regulatory Framework  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Department of Energy Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Regulatory Framework DOE's Nuclear Safety Enabling Legislation Regulatory Enforcement & Oversight Regulatory Governance Atomic Energy Act 1946 Atomic Energy Act 1954 Energy Reorganization Act 1974 DOE Act 1977 Authority and responsibility to regulate nuclear safety at DOE facilities 10 CFR 830 10 CFR 835 10 CFR 820 Regulatory Implementation Nuclear Safety Radiological Safety Procedural Rules ISMS-QA; Operating Experience; Metrics and Analysis Cross Cutting DOE Directives & Manuals DOE Standards Central Technical Authorities (CTA) Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) Line Management SSO/ FAC Reps 48 CFR 970 48 CFR 952 Federal Acquisition Regulations External Oversight *Defense Nuclear Facility

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


361

ARM - ARM Safety Policy  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety Policy Safety Policy About Become a User Recovery Act Mission FAQ Outreach Displays History Organization Participants Facility Statistics Forms Contacts Facility Documents ARM Management Plan (PDF, 335KB) Field Campaign Guidelines (PDF, 1.1MB) ARM Climate Research Facility Expansion Workshop (PDF, 1.46MB) Facility Activities ARM and the Recovery Act Contributions to International Polar Year Comments? We would love to hear from you! Send us a note below or call us at 1-888-ARM-DATA. Send ARM Safety Policy The ARM Climate Research Facility safety policy states that all activities for which the ARM Climate Research Facility has primary responsibility will be conducted in such a manner that all reasonable precautions are taken to protect the health and safety of employees and the general public. All

362

ERDA Geothermal Component Test Facility (GCTF), East Mesa, Imperial Valley, California. Test operations management plan  

DOE Green Energy (OSTI)

Discussion of the operation of the Geothermal Component Test Facility (GCTF), established for testing heat extraction and energy conversion equipment and materials, is presented under the following section headings: purposes of the facility; operating policies: service, conflicts, safety and environmental, investigator activities, shops and equipment, and test certification; organization: chart; Lawrence Berkely Laboratory: organization, responsibilities, individual responsibilities, and funding; Bureau of Reclamation: organization, responsibilities, and funding; operations contractor: contract, qualifications, and personnel; Test Operations Advisory Board; experiment processing: test acceptance, scheduling and priorities, cost reimbursement, and activities flow chart.

Not Available

1976-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

363

Office of Health, Safety and Security Report to the Secretary of Energy -  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Office of Health, Safety and Security Report to the Secretary of Office of Health, Safety and Security Report to the Secretary of Energy - February 2011 Office of Health, Safety and Security Report to the Secretary of Energy - February 2011 February 2011 Status and Effectiveness of DOE Efforts to Learn from Internal and External Operating Experience in Accordance with Commitment #20 of the DOE Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-1 The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) performed an effectiveness review of the DOE Action Plan for the Columbia space shuttle accident and Davis-Besse event and the comprehensive operating experience program. The review was performed to fulfill Commitment #20 of the DOE Implementation Plan to Improve Oversight of

364

DOE: Assessment Criteria and Guidelines for Determining the Adequacy of Software Used in the Safety Analysis and Design of Defense Nuclear Facilities, 10j/24/03  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

This document contains software quality assurance (SQA) assessment criteria and guidelines for assessing the safety software currently in use in the safety analysis and design of structures,...

365

December 17, 1998 Memo, Incentives for the Department's Facility Representative Program  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

mE mE F 1325.8 (a89) EFG (U7-W) United States Government Department of Energy memorandum DATE: December 17, 1998 REPLY TO ATTN OF: FM- 10(J. Hassenfeldt, 202 586-1643) SUBJECT Incentives for the Department's Facility Representative Program TO:Distribution The Department's Revised Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 93-3 has once again underscored the Department's commitment to maintaining the technical capability necessary to safely manage and operate our defense nuclear facilities. Attracting and retaining highly qualified employees and placing them in our critical technical positions is vital to fi.dfilling this commitment. You have identified 95'% of your Facility Representative positions as critical technical positions. The Office of Field Management has noted a 12'?40 annual attrition rate of Facility Representatives

366

Pantex Facility 10-Year Natural Phenomena Flood Hazard Analysis  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Planning (cont.) What's Next FDC-1 Facilities (500 yr Storm) * Critical Mission SSCs * Essential Safety Facilities * Essential Security Facilities Conceptual Study * Mitigation...

367

Documented Safety Analysis  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Documented Safety Analysis Documented Safety Analysis FUNCTIONAL AREA GOAL: A document that provides an adequate description of the hazards of a facility during its design, construction, operation, and eventual cleanup and the basis to prescribe operating and engineering controls through Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) or Administrative Controls (AC). REQUIREMENTS:  10 CFR 830.204, Nuclear Safety Rule  DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization, 1992.  DOE-STD-1104-96, Change Notice 1, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Documents (documented Safety Analyses and Technical Safety Requirements), dated May 2002.  DOE-STD-3009-2002, Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, Change Notice No. 2, April 2002.

368

Technical Safety Requirements  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Safety Requirements Safety Requirements FUNCTIONAL AREA GOAL: Contractor has developed, maintained, and received DOE Field Office Approval for the necessary operating conditions of a facility. The facility has also maintained an inventory of safety class and safety significant systems and components. REQUIREMENTS:  10 CFR 830.205, Nuclear Safety Rule.  DOE-STD-3009-2002, Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses.  DOE-STD-1186-2004, Specific Administrative Controls. Guidance:  DOE G 423.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical Safety Requirements.  NSTP 2003-1, Use of Administrative Controls for Specific Safety Functions. Performance Objective 1: Contractor Program Documentation

369

February 9, 2004, Board Public Meeting Speaker Bio  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

for worker and public health and safety at DOE sites, including the former nuclear weapons production complex, research and testing facilities, and the national laboratories....

370

Argonne Chemical Sciences & Engineering - Facilities - Electrochemical...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

facility." After fabrication, the prototype cells are then evaluated for performance, battery life and safety in Argonne's state-of-the-art battery testing facilities....

371

board | OpenEI  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

board board Dataset Summary Description The Alabama State Oil and Gas Board publishes well record permits to the public as they are approved. This dataset is comprised of 50 recent well record permits from 2/9/11 - 3/18/11. The dataset lists the well name, county, operator, field, and date approved, among other fields. State's make oil and gas data publicly available for a range of topics. Source Geological Survey of Alabama Date Released February 09th, 2011 (3 years ago) Date Updated March 18th, 2011 (3 years ago) Keywords Alabama board gas oil state well records Data application/vnd.ms-excel icon Well records 2/9/11 - 3/18/11 (xls, 28.7 KiB) Quality Metrics Level of Review Some Review Comment Temporal and Spatial Coverage Frequency Time Period License License Open Data Commons Attribution License

372

AIR RESOURCES BOARD Acknowledgements  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This report was prepared with the assistance and support from other agencies, divisions and offices of the Air Resources Board, and private firms. Staff would especially like to thank the following individuals for their assistance in developing this proposed pathway:

Green Wastes; Green Wastes; Richard Corey; Deputy Executive Officer; Cynthia Marvin Chief; Michael Waugh Chief; Kamal Ahuja; Brian Helmowski; Wes Ingram; Ray Asregadoo (arb; Juliet Bohn (hwma; Richard Boyd (arb; Alicia Chakrabarthy (ebmud; Steven Cliff (arb; Kevin Dickison (ebmud; Jacques Franco (calrecycle

2012-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

373

Bird-Feeding Boards  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

live here all winter. Now is the time. The simplest device is a board or a piece of plywood nailed on a window sill. It should be at least 12 inches wide and 24 inches long, set...

374

RS-232 Led Board  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

This article demonstrates how to develop a Microchip PIC16F84 based device that supports RS-232 interface with PC. Circuit (LED Board) design and software development will be discussed. PicBasic Pro Compiler from microEngineering Labs, Inc. is used for PIC programming. Development of LED Board Control Console using C/C++ is also briefly discussed. The project requires basic work experience with Microchip PICs, serial communication and programming.

Tskhvaradze, Vladimir

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

375

Air Resources Board  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

The Air Resources Board (ARB or Board) will conduct a public hearing at the time and place noted below to consider adoption of the Proposed Airborne Toxic Control Measure (ATCM) to Reduce Formaldehyde Emissions from Composite Wood Products. The proposed ATCM would reduce the publics current exposure to formaldehyde by reducing emissions from hardwood plywood (HWPW), particleboard (PB) and medium density fiberboard (MDF) panels. The ATCM would also apply to finished goods made with these materials.

unknown authors

2007-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

376

Third Radiation Effects Research Foundation Board of Councilors Meeting  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Third Radiation Effects Research Foundation Board of Councilors Third Radiation Effects Research Foundation Board of Councilors Meeting Held in Hiroshima Third Radiation Effects Research Foundation Board of Councilors Meeting Held in Hiroshima July 22, 2013 - 4:54pm Addthis Third Radiation Effects Research Foundation Board of Councilors Meeting Held in Hiroshima The third Board of Councilors (BOC) meeting was held on June 18-19 at the Hiroshima Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), a bi-national U.S.-Japan research organization. The BOC is the highest decision-making body at RERF, consisting of eight Councilors elected from the United States and Japan. A total of 23 participants, including 8 Councilors from the United States and Japan and officials from the U.S. and Japanese Governments, were present at the meeting. The Office of Health, Safety and

377

Establishing the Office of Environmental Management Quality Assurance Corporate Board  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

DISTRIBUTIO DISTRIBUTIO FROM: DAE Y. CHUNG DEPUTY ASSISTA@SECRETARY FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS SUBJECT: Establishing the Office of Environmental Management Quality Assurance Corporate Board The purpose of this memorandum is to introduce the Office of Environmental Management (EM) Quality Assurance (QA) Corporate Board which implements EM'S policy and guidance and promotes lessons learned and best practices across the sites. The Corporate Board provides the management structure to integrate the independently managed federal and contractor QA Programs into a single corporate entity. The Board serves as a consensus-building body to facilitate institutionalization of a QA Management System across the EM-Complex. The Corporate Board concept originated from the EM Quality Improvement Initiative in

378

CRITICALITY SAFETY (CS)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Objective CS.1 - A criticality safety program is established, sufficient numbers of qualified personnel are provided, and adequate facilities and equipment are available to ensure criticality safety support services are adequate for safe operations. (Core Requirements 1, 2, and 6) Criteria * Functions, assignments, responsibilities, and reporting relationships are clearly defined, understood, and effectively implemented. * Operations support personnel for the criticality safety area are adequately staffed and trained. Approach Record Review: Review the documentation that establishes the Criticality Safety Requirements (CSRs) for appropriateness and completeness. Review for adequacy and completion the criticality safety personnel training records that indicate training on facility procedures and systems under

379

Safety Basis Criteria & Review Approach Documents | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Safety Basis Criteria & Review Approach Documents Safety Basis Criteria & Review Approach Documents Safety Basis Criteria & Review Approach Documents Documents Available for Download CRAD, Safety Basis - Idaho MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility CRAD, Safety Basis - Idaho Accelerated Retrieval Project Phase II CRAD, Safety Basis - Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility CRAD, Safety Basis - Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility CRAD, Safety Basis - Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor CRAD, Safety Basis - Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor Contractor ORR CRAD, Safety Basis - Oak Ridge National Laboratory TRU ALPHA LLWT Project CRAD, Safety Basis - Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility

380

Lawrence Livermore National Laborotory Safety Basis Assessment...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

of the safety basis for LLNL nuclear facilities. It describes the method for categorizing nuclear facilities and summarizes the resulting requirements for the contents of the DSA....

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


381

Policy Statement 2, Transmittal of Trip Reports and Other Safety...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

2 Date: December 31, 1992 Subject Board policy on transmittal of trip reports and other safety information to the Secretary of Energy Summary This policy statement establishes...

382

Kitchen Knife Safety  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Kitchen Knife Safety 1) Use a good quality cutting board (flat and stable). 2) Use a kitchen towel underneath a cutting board so that it won't slip. Observe above: Warped and unbalanced cutting board vs. flat and well-anchored board. 3) Sharp knives are safer knives. Dull knives can skip, slide, snag, or get stuck while cutting, leaving you off balance. 4) Use the right knife for the job. a. Serrated knives are long and lean that help grip and saw through the crust of rustic breads without using too much strength. b. Paring knives are used for smaller foods, such as limes, cherry tomatoes or shallots, for better control and lighter weight (less chance of skipping off of a smaller cutting surface). c. Chef's knives (one of the most used in the kitchen) can be used for

383

Survey for Safety Software Used in Design of Structures, Systems, and Components  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Design Software Survey September 2003 1 Design Software Survey September 2003 1 Survey of Safety Software Used in Design of Structures, Systems, and Components 1. Introduction The Department's Implementation Plan for Software Quality Assurance (SQA) that was developed in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2002-01, Quality Assurance for Safety-Related Software, includes a commitment (4.2.1.5) to conduct a survey of design codes currently in use to determine if any should be included as part of the toolbox codes. The toolbox codes are a small number of standard computer models (codes) supporting DOE safety analysis that have widespread use and appropriate qualification. Generally, the toolbox codes will have been developed and maintained within the DOE complex. However, the toolbox may also include

384

Office of Independent Oversight's Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations Activity Report for the Visit at the LANL CMRR Project Facility Construction Site, November 1-5, 2010  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Office of Independent Oversight's Office of Environment, Safety and Health Office of Independent Oversight's Office of Environment, Safety and Health Evaluations Activity Report for the Visit at the LANL CMRR Project Facility Construction Site, November 1-5, 2010 The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Independent Oversight, within the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), conducted an orientation visit on November 1-5, 2010, at the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project site at the Department of Energy Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The purpose of the visit was to determine ways in which HSS would be able to carry out its independent oversight responsibilities with respect to this project in a method that encourages integration with DOE-LANL. The orientation visit was conducted by the HSS LANL Site Lead and an HSS contractor.

385

Electrical safety guidelines  

SciTech Connect

The Electrical Safety Guidelines prescribes the DOE safety standards for DOE field offices or facilities involved in the use of electrical energy. It has been prepared to provide a uniform set of electrical safety standards and guidance for DOE installations in order to affect a reduction or elimination of risks associated with the use of electrical energy. The objectives of these guidelines are to enhance electrical safety awareness and mitigate electrical hazards to employees, the public, and the environment.

Not Available

1993-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

386

DOE handbook electrical safety  

SciTech Connect

Electrical Safety Handbook presents the Department of Energy (DOE) safety standards for DOE field offices or facilities involved in the use of electrical energy. It has been prepared to provide a uniform set of electrical safety guidance and information for DOE installations to effect a reduction or elimination of risks associated with the use of electrical energy. The objectives of this handbook are to enhance electrical safety awareness and mitigate electrical hazards to employees, the public, and the environment.

NONE

1998-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

387

Integrated Facilities Disposition Program  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Facilities Facilities Disposition Program Tank Waste Corporate Board Meeting at ORNL Sharon Robinson Dirk Van Hoesen Robert Jubin Brad Patton July 29, 2009 2 Managed by UT-Battelle for the U.S. Department of Energy The Integrated Facility Disposition Program (IFDP) addresses the remaining EM Scope at both ORNL and Y-12 Cost Range: $7 - $14B Schedule: 26 Years 3 Managed by UT-Battelle for the U.S. Department of Energy Scope of work * Treatment and disposition of legacy materials and waste * D&D 327 (1.5 M ft 2 ) excess facilities generating >2 M yd 3 debris * Soil and groundwater remedial actions generating >1 M yd 3 soils * Facilities surveillance and maintenance * Reconfiguration of waste management facilities * Ongoing waste management operations * Project management

388

California Air Resources Board | Open Energy Information  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

Air Resources Board Jump to: navigation, search Logo: California Air Resources Board Name California Air Resources Board Place Sacramento, California Website http:www.arb.ca.gov...

389

DOE: Criteria and Guidelines For the Assessment of Safety System Software and Firmware at Defense Nuclear Facilities, 10/24/03, rev. 3  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

This document contains software qualification assessment criteria and guidelines for assessing the safety system software used for instrumentation and controls (I&C) at Department of Energy ...

390

Secure collaborations over message boards  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

We provide a message board model for collaborative systems, and propose an architecture and protocol for securing collaborative applications over message boards. The proposed architecture employs only efficient symmetric cryptographic principles, and ... Keywords: collaborative systems, cryptography, key predistribution, message boards, networks, secure collaboration, security, service attacks, trust modules

Mahalingam Ramkumar; Nasir Memon

2006-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

391

Environmental Management Advisory Board Members | Department...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

comprise the current Board: Current Members James A. Ajello EMAB Board Chair Read Bio Dennis P. Ferrigno EMAB Board Vice-Chair Read Bio Franklin E. Coffman EMAB Board...

392

Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Subcommittee (SEAB) on Shale Gas  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

of Energy Advisory Board Subcommittee (SEAB) on Shale Gas of Energy Advisory Board Subcommittee (SEAB) on Shale Gas Production Posts Draft Report Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Subcommittee (SEAB) on Shale Gas Production Posts Draft Report November 10, 2011 - 1:12pm Addthis WASHINGTON, D.C. - The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Subcommittee (SEAB) on Shale Gas Production released its second and final ninety-day report reviewing the progress that has been made in implementing the twenty recommendations in its initial report of August 18, 2011. The Subcommittee was tasked with producing a report on the immediate steps that can be taken to improve the safety and environmental performance of shale gas development. The Subcommittee believes that these recommendations, if implemented, would help to assure that the nation's considerable shale

393

On-board Diagnostics  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

On-board On-board Diagnostics for Big Data J. Zurawski ⇤ , S. Balasubramanian ⇤ , A. Brown ‡ , E. Kissel † , A. Lake ⇤ , M. Swany † , B. Tierney ⇤ and M. Zekauskas ‡ ⇤ Energy Sciences Network (ESnet) Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, USA Email: {zurawski, sowmya, andy, bltierney}@es.net † Indiana University School of Informatics and Computing, Bloomington, IN, USA Email: {ezkissel, swany}@indiana.edu ‡ Internet2 Ann Arbor, MI, USA Email: {aaron, matt}@internet2.edu Abstract-Big science data necessitates the requirement to incorporate state-of-the-art technologies and processes into science workflows. When transferring "big data", the network infrastructure connects sites for storage, analysis and data transfer. A component that is often overlooked within the network is a robust measurement and testing infrastructure that

394

Seismic Safety Guide  

SciTech Connect

This guide provides managers with practical guidelines for administering a comprehensive earthquake safety program. The Guide is comprehensive with respect to earthquakes in that it covers the most important aspects of natural hazards, site planning, evaluation and rehabilitation of existing buildings, design of new facilities, operational safety, emergency planning, special considerations related to shielding blocks, non-structural elements, lifelines, fire protection and emergency facilities. Management of risk and liabilities is also covered. Nuclear facilities per se are not dealt with specifically. The principles covered also apply generally to nuclear facilities but the design and construction of such structures are subject to special regulations and legal controls.

Eagling, D.G. (ed.)

1983-09-01T23:59:59.000Z

395

Facility worker technical basis document  

SciTech Connect

This report documents the technical basis for facility worker safety to support the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis and described the criteria and methodology for allocating controls to hazardous conditions with significant facility worker consequences and presents the results of the allocation.

EVANS, C.B.

2003-03-21T23:59:59.000Z

396

Safety System Oversight: 2010 Safety System Oversight Workshop  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety System Oversight Workshop Safety System Oversight Workshop May 12 - 13, 2010 Las Vegas, NV 2010 Facility Representative and Safety System Oversight Workshops Summary: PDF SSO Steering Committee Meeting Minutes: PDF 2009 Safety System Oversight Annual Award Workshop Agenda: PDF Workshop Presentations: Panel Discussion on the Integration of Facility Representatives and Safety System Oversight Personnel at Site Programs Presentation Panel Highlights Introduction, Goals, and Objectives for SSO Workshop Community Update Demographic Survey Results Introduction of the Safety System Oversight Steering Committee Earl Hughes Presentation Oak Ridge Fire Protection SSO Program Pat Smith, Oak Ridge Office Presentation Commercial Grade Dedication Fran Lemieux, NSTec, Nevada Test Site Presentation

397

The U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board Status Update  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

NWTRB NWTRB www.nwtrb.gov U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board The U S Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board The U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board Status Update Presented to: National Transportation Stakeholders Forum Presented By: National Transportation Stakeholders Forum Mark Abkowitz May 11, 2011 The Board's Statutory Mandate * The 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) established the U S Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board established the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. * The Board evaluates the technical and scientific validity of DOE activities related to: - transportation, packaging and storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) - site characterization, design, development, and operations of facilities for

398

H. UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

3 3 Department of Energy Pt. 835 H. UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS 1. The USQ process is an important tool to evaluate whether changes affect the safety basis. A contractor must use the USQ proc- ess to ensure that the safety basis for a DOE nuclear facility is not undermined by changes in the facility, the work performed, the associated hazards, or other factors that support the adequacy of the safety basis. 2. The USQ process permits a contractor to make physical and procedural changes to a nuclear facility and to conduct tests and ex- periments without prior approval, provided these changes do not cause a USQ. The USQ process provides a contractor with the flexi- bility needed to conduct day-to-day oper- ations by requiring only those changes and tests with a potential to impact the safety

399

H. UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Department of Energy Pt. 835 H. UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS 1. The USQ process is an important tool to evaluate whether changes affect the safety basis. A contractor must use the USQ proc- ess to ensure that the safety basis for a DOE nuclear facility is not undermined by changes in the facility, the work performed, the associated hazards, or other factors that support the adequacy of the safety basis. 2. The USQ process permits a contractor to make physical and procedural changes to a nuclear facility and to conduct tests and ex- periments without prior approval, provided these changes do not cause a USQ. The USQ process provides a contractor with the flexi- bility needed to conduct day-to-day oper- ations by requiring only those changes and tests with a potential to impact the safety

400

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Hanford Tank Farms Flammable Gas Safety Strategy 2012-2 BY YEAR: 2013 2012 This page last updated Thursday, July 18, 2013 Board Recommendation: from Chairman Peter S. Winokur to...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


401

FACILITY WORKER TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

This technical basis document was developed to support RPP-13033, ''Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). It describes the criteria and methodology for allocating controls to hazardous conditions with significant facility worker (FW) consequence and presents the results of the allocation. The criteria and methodology for identifying controls that address FW safety are in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses''.

SHULTZ, M.V.

2005-03-31T23:59:59.000Z

402

Review of the Savannah River Site Salt Waste Processing Facility...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

River Site Salt Waste Processing Facility Safety Basis and Design Development May 2011 August 2013 Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Office of Enforcement...

403

Kansas City Board of Public Utilities- Commercial Energy Efficiency Rebate Program  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

The Kansas City Board of Public Utilities provides incentives for commercial customers to install, or upgrade to, energy efficiency equipment in new and existing facilities.Rebates are available...

404

May 6, 1997, Board public meeting notice for May 28-29, 1997...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

facilities; and Development of the Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities Manuals. On May 29, also starting at 9 a.m., DOE staff will brief the Board on: Efforts to...

405

Nuclear criticality safety  

SciTech Connect

Important facts of the nuclear criticality safety field are covered in this volume. Both theoretical and practical aspects of the subject are included, based on insights provided by criticality experts and published information from many sources. An overview of nuclear criticality safety theory and a variety of practical in-plant operation applications are presented. Underlying principles of nuclear criticality safety are introduced and the state of the art of this technical discipline is reviewed. Criticality safety theoretical concepts, accident experience, standards, experiments computer calculations, integration of safety methods into individual practices, and overall facility operations are all included.

Knief, R.A.

1985-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

406

Facility Centered Assessment of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Science and Technology Operations - Facility Operations Director Managed Facilities, August 2011  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Review Report Review Report Facility Centered Assessment of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Science and Technology Operations - Facility Operations Director Managed Facilities May 2011 August 2011 Office of Health, Safety and Security Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Table of Contents Background ................................................................................................................................................... 1 Results ........................................................................................................................................................... 2 Conduct of the FCA ......................................................................................................................... 2

407

Facility Centered Assessment of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Science and Technology Operations - Facility Operations Director Managed Facilities, August 2011  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Review Report Review Report Facility Centered Assessment of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Science and Technology Operations - Facility Operations Director Managed Facilities May 2011 August 2011 Office of Health, Safety and Security Office of Enforcement and Oversight Office of Safety and Emergency Management Evaluations Table of Contents Background ................................................................................................................................................... 1 Results ........................................................................................................................................................... 2 Conduct of the FCA ......................................................................................................................... 2

408

LOFT facility and test program  

SciTech Connect

The Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT) test facility, program objectives, and the experiments planned are described. The LOFT facility is related to the smaller Semiscale facility and the larger commercial pressurized water reactors. The fact that LOFT is a computer model assessment tool rather than a demonstration test is emphasized. Various types of reactor safety experiments planned through 1983 are presented.

McPherson, G.D.

1979-11-01T23:59:59.000Z

409

Safety System Oversight Workshop (May 12-13, 2010) - Agenda  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Opening Remarks James Heffner, Facility Representative Program Manager Earl Hughes, Safety System Oversight Program Manager Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance Office...

410

Safety System Oversight Workshop (May 12-13, 2010) Presentation...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

and Safety System Oversight Combined Workshop Panel Discussion: The Integration of Facility Representatives and Safety System Oversight Personnel Panel Highlights i Panel...

411

2012 Safety System Oversight Annual Award Nominees - Joseph L...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety and Security Page 1 of 2 2012 Safety System Oversight Annual Award Nominee Assigned Facilities and Description of Duties Mr. Joseph...

412

10 CFR 851 Worker Safety and Health Program (WSHP) Description...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

the following facilities: o 701 Scarboro Road o ORAU Main Campus Integrated Safety Management System A major concept of ISMS is the integration of safety awareness and good...

413

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY & HEALTH (ISH)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

BASIS (SB) BASIS (SB) OBJECTIVE SB.1 Facility safety documentation is in place and has been implemented that describes the "safety envelope" of the facility. The safety documentation should characterize the hazards/risks associated with the facility and should identify preventive and mitigating measures (systems, procedures, administrative controls, etc.) that protect workers and the public form those hazards/risks. Safety structures, systems and components (SSCs) are defined and a system to maintain control over their designs and modification is established. (Core Requirement 7) Criteria 1. The TA-55 SST Facility safety basis and related documentation address the full spectrum of hazards/risks associated with operations. 2. Controls designed to mitigate the consequence of analyzed TA-55 SST Facility

414

Use of a Web Site to Enhance Criticality Safety Training  

SciTech Connect

Currently, a website dedicated to enhancing communication and dissemination of criticality safety information is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). This website was developed as part of the DOE response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 97-2, which reflected the need to make criticality safety information available to a wide audience. The website is the focal point for DOE nuclear criticality safety (NCS) activities, resources and references, including hyperlinks to other sites actively involved in the collection and dissemination of criticality safety information. The website is maintained by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) under auspices of the NCSP management. One area of the website contains a series of Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer Training (NCSET) modules. During the past few years, many users worldwide have accessed the NCSET section of the NCSP website and have downloaded the training modules as an aid for their training programs. This trend was remarkable in that it points out a continuing need of the criticality safety community across the globe. It has long been recognized that training of criticality safety professionals is a continuing process involving both knowledge-based training and experience-based operations floor training. As more of the experienced criticality safety professionals reach retirement age, the opportunities for mentoring programs are reduced. It is essential that some method be provided to assist the training of young criticality safety professionals to replenish this limited human expert resource to support on-going and future nuclear operations. The main objective of this paper is to present the features of the NCSP website, including its mission, contents, and most importantly its use for the dissemination of training modules to the criticality safety community. We will discuss lessons learned and several ideas for future development in the area of web-based training for criticality safety professionals. Our effort is intended to stimulate a discussion of ideas and solicit participation in the development of the next generation of a web-based criticality training site that can be used to assist the training of newcomers to this important safety discipline.

Huang, S T; Morman, J

2003-08-04T23:59:59.000Z

415

Facility Representative Program: Facility Representative Program Sponsors  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Facility Representative Program Sponsors Facility Representative Program Sponsors There are 29 Facility Representative Program Sponsors Office Name Title E-Mail Phone ASO Larry Pendexter ES&H Div Dir (Argonne) larry.pendexter@ch.doe.gov 630-252-1485 BHSO Bob Desmarais Operations Management Division Director desmarai@bnl.gov 631-344-5434 CBFO Glenn Gamlin Facility Representative Supervisor glenn.gamlin@wipp.ws 575-234-8136 CBFO Casey Gadbury Operations Manager casey.gadbury@wipp.ws 575-234-7372 FSO Mark Bollinger Deputy Manager Mark.Bollinger@ch.doe.gov 630-840-8130 FSO John Scott FR Team Lead john.scott@ch.doe.gov 630-840-2250 HS-30 James O'Brien Director, Office of Nuclear Safety James.O'Brien@hq.doe.gov 301-903-1408 HS-32 Earl Hughes Facility Representative Program Manager Earl.Hughes@hq.doe.gov 202-586-0065

416

State Oil and Gas Board State Oil and Gas Board Address Place...  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

Board State Oil and Gas Board Address Place Zip Website Alabama Oil and Gas Board Alabama Oil and Gas Board Hackberry Lane Tuscaloosa Alabama http www gsa state al us ogb ogb html...

417

CRAD, Criticality Safety - Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility CRAD, Criticality Safety - Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility January 2005 A section of Appendix...

418

CRAD, Safety Basis - Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility CRAD, Safety Basis - Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility January 2005 A section of Appendix C to...

419

CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations Oxide Conversion Facility January 2005 A section of...

420

DRAFT Bear Safety Plan  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Bear Safety Plan June 2010 Bear Safety Plan June 2010 NSA_bsp_Rev9.doc 1 Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Climate Research Facility/ North Slope of Alaska/Adjacent Arctic Ocean (ACRF/NSA/AAO) Bear Safety Plan Background As a major part of DOE's participation in the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), the North Slope of Alaska (NSA) and Adjacent Arctic Ocean (AAO) Climate Research Facility (ACRF) exists on the North Slope of Alaska with its Central Facility near the town of Barrow. A secondary facility exists at Atqasuk, a town 100km inland from Barrow. Other instrumentation locations in more remote areas on the North Slope may be established in later stages of the project. Polar bears, and to a lesser extent, brown bears (barren ground grizzly) are significant hazards within the ACRF/NSA/AAO

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


421

Safety System Oversight  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety System Oversight Safety System Oversight Office of Nuclear Safety Home Safety System Oversight Home Annual SSO/FR Workshop DOE Safety Links › ORPS Info › Operating Experience Summary › DOE Lessons Learned › Accident Investigation Program Assessment Tools › SSO CRADS Subject Matter Links General Program Information › Program Mission Statement › SSO Program Description › SSO Annual Award Program › SSO Annual Award › SSO Steering Committee › SSO Program Assessment CRAD SSO Logo Items Site Leads and Steering Committee Archive Facility Representative Contact Us HSS Logo SSO SSO Program News Congratulations to Ronnie L. Alderson of Nevada Field Office, the Winner of the 2012 Safety System Oversight Annual Award! 2012 Safety System Oversight Annual Award Nominees SSO Staffing Analysis

422

Safety Management System Policy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

POLICY POLICY Washington, D.C. Approved: 4-25-11 SUBJECT: INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT POLICY PURPOSE AND SCOPE To establish the Department of Energy's (DOE) expectation for safety, 1 including integrated safety management that will enable the Department's mission goals to be accomplished efficiently while ensuring safe operations at all departmental facilities and activities. This Policy cancels and supersedes DOE Policy (P) 411.1, Safety Management Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities Policy, dated 1-28-97; DOE P 441.1, DOE Radiological Health and Safety Policy, dated 4-26-96; DOE P 450.2A, Identifying, Implementing and Complying with Environment, Safety and Health Requirements, dated 5-15-96; DOE P 450.4, Safety Management

423

Occupational Safety & Health Criteria & Review Approach Documents |  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Occupational Safety & Health Criteria & Review Approach Documents Occupational Safety & Health Criteria & Review Approach Documents Occupational Safety & Health Criteria & Review Approach Documents Documents Available for Download CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Idaho MF-628 Drum Treatment Facility CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Idaho Accelerated Retrieval Project Phase II CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Los Alamos National Laboratory TA 55 SST Facility CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor CRAD, Occupational Safety & Health - Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor Contractor ORR

424

Corporate Board By-Laws  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

May 2011 May 2011 By-Laws Office of Environmental Management Quality Assurance Corporate Board Article 1 Name The name shall be the Environmental Management (EM) Quality Assurance (QA) Corporate Board (hereafter referred to as the Board). Article 2 Mission The Board will serve a leadership role within EM for facilitating, championing, and overseeing the effectiveness of a consistent and graded approach to implementing the corporate QA program, policies and requirements, and disseminating lessons learned and best practices such that a consistent and effective approach to quality is obtained through independently managed federal and contractor QA Programs. The Board will serve as a consensus-building body to facilitate institutionalization of a streamlined and efficient QA

425

Montana State Land Board | Open Energy Information  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

Land Board Jump to: navigation, search Name Montana State Land Board Place Helena, Montana Website http:dnrc.mt.govLandBoardS References Webpage1 This article is a stub. You...

426

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD Guidelines for Warranty,  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD Guidelines for Warranty, Multi-Parameter, and Best Value Contracting TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 2001 OFFICERS Chair: John M. Samuels, Senior Vice President Director, Utah DOT Executive Director: Robert E. Skinner, Jr., Transportation Research Board MEMBERS

Sheridan, Jennifer

427

August 25, 2009, Board letter providing an outline of topics to be addressed at the September 29, 2009, public meeting on Recommendation 2004-1, and inviting the Secretary to testify  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700 Washington. D.C. 20004-2901 Peter S . Winokur (202) 694-7000 August 25,2009 The Honorable Steven Chu Secretary of Energy U. S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, S W Washington, DC 20585-1000 Dear Secretary Chu: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is planning a series of public hearings on the Department of Energy's (DOE) implementation of Recommendation 2004-1, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations, issued May 21,2004. The DOE Implementation Plan for this recommendation should have been completed by now. Unfortunately, major commitments remain incomplete and others need to be reviewed and reinforced by cognizant managers to reaffirm the continued achievement of their purposes and

428

BNL | Accelerator Test Facility  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Accelerator Test Facility Accelerator Test Facility Home Core Capabilities Photoinjector S-Band Linac Laser Systems CO2 Laser Nd:Yag Laser Beamlines Beamline Simulation Data Beamline Parameters Beam Diagnostics Detectors Beam Schedule Operations Resources Fact Sheet (.pdf) Image Library Upgrade Proposal (.pdf) Publications ES&H Experiment Start-up ATF Handbook Laser Safety Collider-Accelerator Dept. C-AD ES&H Resources Staff Users' Place Apply for Access ATF photo ATF photo ATF photo ATF photo ATF photo A user facility for advanced accelerator research The Brookhaven Accelerator Test Facility (ATF) is a proposal driven, steering committee reviewed facility that provides users with high-brightness electron- and laser-beams. The ATF pioneered the concept of a user facility for studying complex properties of modern accelerators and

429

R&D for a Soft X-Ray Free Electron Laser Facility  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Radiation Lightsource (SSRL), Photon Science (PS), andRadiation Laboratory (SSRL) Member of the editorial board ofradiation user facilities SSRL (based on SPEAR3, a third-

Staples, John

2009-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

430

February 28, 2006, Department letter reporting completion of NNSA portion of Commitment 23 in the 2004-1 implementation plan, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations, which requires the development of site office action plans to improve the consistency and reliability of work planning and work control at the activity level, including the incorporation of Integrated Safety Management core functions  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Washington, DC 20585 Washington, DC 20585 February 28, 2006 OFFICE O F THE ADMINISTRATOR The Honorable A. J. Eggenberger Ch a i rm an Defensc Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20004-2901 Dear Mr. Chairman: On Julie 10, 2005, Secretary Bodnian submitted the Department's Iiizplenzentution Plun to Itizpt-ove Oversight qf'Nucleur Operutions in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2004- I , Oversight qf Complex, High-Hrrzurd Nucleur Openrtiotzs. Section 5.3 of the Implementation Plan (IP) addresses Revitalizing Integruted SU/i-'ty Munagernent Implementution, and Subsection 5.3.2 addresses Work Plunning mil Work Control ut the Activity Level. Commitment 23 of the 1P requires development of site office action plans to improve the consistency and reliability of work

431

Cold vacuum drying facility design requirements  

SciTech Connect

This document provides the detailed design requirements for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Cold Vacuum Drying Facility. Process, safety, and quality assurance requirements and interfaces are specified.

IRWIN, J.J.

1999-07-01T23:59:59.000Z

432

User Facilities and Technical Capabilities | Biosciences Division  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

User Facilities and Technical Capabilities BIO Home Page About BIO News Releases Research Publications People Contact Us Organization Chart Site Index Inside BIO BIO Safety About...

433

CRAD, Engineering Design and Safety Basis - December 22, 2009 | Department  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Engineering Design and Safety Basis - December 22, 2009 Engineering Design and Safety Basis - December 22, 2009 CRAD, Engineering Design and Safety Basis - December 22, 2009 December 22, 2009 Engineering Design and Safety Basis Inspection Criteria, Inspection Activities, and Lines of Inquiry (HSS CRAD 64-19, Rev. 0) The engineering design and safety basis inspection will evaluate the effectiveness of programs and processes for the design and safety basis of selected safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) of a nuclear facility. The nuclear facility may be an existing facility, a major modification to an existing facility, or a new facility under construction. Accordingly, the safety basis for the facility, for example, a documented safety analysis (DSA) or a preliminary documented safety analysis (PDSA),

434

CRAD, Engineering Design and Safety Basis - December 22, 2009 | Department  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Engineering Design and Safety Basis - December 22, 2009 Engineering Design and Safety Basis - December 22, 2009 CRAD, Engineering Design and Safety Basis - December 22, 2009 December 22, 2009 Engineering Design and Safety Basis Inspection Criteria, Inspection Activities, and Lines of Inquiry (HSS CRAD 64-19, Rev. 0) The engineering design and safety basis inspection will evaluate the effectiveness of programs and processes for the design and safety basis of selected safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) of a nuclear facility. The nuclear facility may be an existing facility, a major modification to an existing facility, or a new facility under construction. Accordingly, the safety basis for the facility, for example, a documented safety analysis (DSA) or a preliminary documented safety analysis (PDSA),

435

December 16, 2003, Board Public Meeting Agenda  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

16, 2003 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Sites Session 2 December 16 0900 Opening Remarks Chairman Conway 0905 Board Member Remarks Board Members 0915 Los Alamos...

436

Coldwater Board of Public Utilities - Commercial & Industrial...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

here Home Savings Coldwater Board of Public Utilities - Commercial & Industrial Lighting Rebate Program Coldwater Board of Public Utilities - Commercial & Industrial Lighting...

437

Alternative Energy Development Board | Open Energy Information  

Open Energy Info (EERE)

Development Board Jump to: navigation, search Name Alternative Energy Development Board Place Islamabad, Pakistan Product Islamabad-based autonomous body under the Ministry of...

438

December 3, 2003, Board Public Meeting - Agenda  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

3 0900 Opening Remarks Chairman Conway 0905 Board Member Remarks Board Members 0915 Pantex Plant Daniel E.Glenn Manager, Pantex Site Office Michael B. Mallory General...

439

December 4, 2003, Board Public Meeting Agenda  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Remarks Chairman Conway 0905 Board Member Remarks Board Members 0915 Savannah River Site Jeffrey M. Allison Manager, Savannah River Operations Office Robert A. Pedde President,...

440

Surface Transportation Board Website Citations | Department of...  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Surface Transportation Board Website Citations Surface Transportation Board Website Citations Presentation made by Ray English for the NTSF annual meeting held from May 14-16, 2013...

Note: This page contains sample records for the topic "facilities safety board" from the National Library of EnergyBeta (NLEBeta).
While these samples are representative of the content of NLEBeta,
they are not comprehensive nor are they the most current set.
We encourage you to perform a real-time search of NLEBeta
to obtain the most current and comprehensive results.


441

APS Engineering Support Division | Service Coordination Board  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Coordination Board (SCB) Service Coordination Board Meeting Reports Septemeber, 2013 August, 2013 July, 2013 June, 2013 May, 2013 April, 2013 March, 2013 February, 2013...

442

Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Environmental Management Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) Environmental Management Advisory Board (EMAB) MISSION The mission of the Environmental Management Advisory Board is to provide independent and external advice, information, and recommendations to the

443

The Editorial Board  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

About the Journal The International C2 Journal was created in 2006 at the urging of an international group of command and control professionals including individuals from academia, industry, government, and the military. The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP, of the U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, or OASD-NII) responded to this need by bringing together interested professionals to shape the purpose and guide the execution of such a journal. Today, the Journal is overseen by an Editorial Board comprising representatives from many nations. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Rights and Permissions: All articles published in the International C2 Journal remain the intellectual property of the authors and may not be distributed or sold without the express written consent of the authors. For more information Visit us online at: www.dodccrp.org

Paul W. Phister, Jr.; The; International C Journal; David S. Alberts; Chairman Of The Editorial Board; Reiner Huber (deu; Universitaet Der Bundeswehr Muenchen

2010-01-01T23:59:59.000Z

444

Safety System Oversight Assessment, Los Alamos National Laboratory- May 2011  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE))

Safety System Oversight Assessment of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Tritium Gas Handling System

445

Nuclear Facilities Production Facilities  

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Sand 2011-4582P. ENERGY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF) The GIF provides test cells for...

446

Facility Representative Program: 2006 Facility Representative Workshop  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

6 Facility Representative Workshop 6 Facility Representative Workshop May 16 - 19, 2006 Knoxville, Tennessee Facility Rep of the Year Award | Attendees list | Summary Report [PDF] WORKSHOP AGENDA Final To view Pictures, scroll the mouse over the Picture icon To view Presentations, Picture Slideshows and Video, click on the icon Day 1: Tuesday, May 16, 2006 8:00 a.m. Opening Remarks John Evans, Facility Representative Program Manager 8:15 a.m. Welcome from Oak Ridge Office Gerald Boyd, Manager, Oak Ridge Office 8:25 a.m. Welcome from Y-12 Site Office Theodore Sherry, Manager, Y-12 Site Office 8:35 a.m. Videotaped Remarks from the Deputy Secretary The Honorable Clay Sell, Deputy Secretary of Energy 8:40 a.m. Keynote Address - Safety Oversight at Environmental Management Activities Dr. Inés Triay, Chief Operating Officer, Office of Environmental Management

447

April 14, 1997, Board letter forwarding a staff trip report regarding...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

and maintenance and operating procedures. In some cases, even compliance with basic safety codes (e.g., the National Electric Code) has been neglected. As a result, facility...

448

May 5, 1995, Board letter forwarding staff trip report on LANL...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

are the requirements of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) C2, National Electric Safety Code. b. TA-55 Facility: 1. Oil-Insulated Transformer: Four oil-insulated...

449

Pipeline Safety (Pennsylvania) | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Pipeline Safety (Pennsylvania) Pipeline Safety (Pennsylvania) Pipeline Safety (Pennsylvania) < Back Eligibility Utility Investor-Owned Utility Industrial Municipal/Public Utility Rural Electric Cooperative Program Info State Pennsylvania Program Type Safety and Operational Guidelines Provider Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission The Pennsylvania legislature has empowered the Public Utility Commission to direct and enforce safety standards for pipeline facilities and to regulate safety practices of certificated utilities engaged in the transportation of natural gas and other gas by pipeline. The Commission is authorized to enforce federal safety standards as an agent for the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety. The safety standards apply to the design, installation, operation,

450

The Office of Health, Safety and Security  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

3 3 2003 BY MONTH: JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC This list last updated Friday, August 09, 2013 DECEMBER December 31, 2003, Department letter reporting completion of Commitments 4.2.2 in implementation plan 2002-3, Requirements for the Design, Implementation, and Maintenance of Administrative Controls and Commitment 4.1.5 in the Department's Software Quality Assurance Implementation Plan with the submission of the DOE Technical Standard on Specific Administrative Controls and the revised DOE Safety Management Functions, Responsibilities and Authorities Manual (FRAM). [HTML] [PDF] [DOC] December 31, 2003, Board letter forwarding a staff report on the Oxide Conversion Facility in Building 9212 at Y-12. [HTML] [PDF] [DOC] December 24, 2003, Department letter regarding Commitment 4.2.1.5 in implementation plan 2002-1, Quality Assurance for Safety-Related Software, requiring the Department to conduct a survey of design codes currently in use to determine if any should be included as part of the toolbox codes. [HTML] [PDF] [DOC]

451

Worker Safety and Health Enforcement Letter issued to Los Alamos National Security, LLC, related to Worker Beryllium Exposure during Machining at the Los Alamos National Laboratorys Beryllium Technology Facility, May 29, 2013 (WEL-2013-01)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

29, 2013 29, 2013 Dr. Charles F. McMillan, President Los Alamos National Security, LLC Los Alamos National Laboratory Mailstop A 100, Drop Point 03140071S Bikini Atoll Road, TA-3 Los Alamos, New Mexico 87454 WEL-2013-01 Dear Dr. McMillan: The Office of Health, Safety and Security's Office of Enforcement and Oversight evaluated the circumstances surrounding a work evolution performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Technical Area 3, Building 141, Beryllium Technology Facility (BTF), on July 11, 2012. The work evolution resulted in a worker exposure to beryllium in excess of the Department of Energy (DOE) action level of 0.2 micrograms per cubic meter for an 8-hour, time-weighted average. Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS), which manages and

452

Safety Resources  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Resources Print LBNLPub-3000: Health and Safety Manual Berkeley Lab safety guide, policies and procedures. Environment, Health, and Safety (EH&S) Staff Contact information for the...

453

Safety for Users  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Safety for Users Safety for Users Safety for Users Print Safety at the ALS The mission of the ALS is "Support users in doing outstanding science in a safe environment." All users and staff participate in creating a culture and environment where performing research using the proper safeguards and fulfilling all safety requirements result in the success of the facility and its scientific program. The documents and guidance below will assist users and staff to achieve these goals. How Do I...? A series of fact sheets that explain what users need to know and do when preparing to conduct experiments at the ALS. Complete Experiment Safety Documentation? Work with Biological Materials? Work with Chemicals? Work with Regulated Soil? Bring and Use Electrical Equipment at the ALS?

454

Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Program (Maryland) | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Facility Siting Program (Maryland) Facility Siting Program (Maryland) Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Program (Maryland) < Back Eligibility Commercial Construction Industrial Investor-Owned Utility Municipal/Public Utility Retail Supplier Rural Electric Cooperative Transportation Utility Program Info State Maryland Program Type Siting and Permitting Provider Maryland Department of the Environment The Hazardous Waste Facilities Siting Board is responsible for overseeing the siting of hazardous waste facilities in Maryland, and will treat hazardous waste facilities separately from low-level nuclear waste facilities. This legislation describes the factors considered by the Board in making siting decisions. The Board is authorized to enact rules and regulations pertaining to the siting of hazardous and low-level nuclear

455

Rates for Alternate Energy Production Facilities (Iowa) | Department of  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Rates for Alternate Energy Production Facilities (Iowa) Rates for Alternate Energy Production Facilities (Iowa) Rates for Alternate Energy Production Facilities (Iowa) < Back Eligibility Municipal/Public Utility Utility Savings Category Alternative Fuel Vehicles Hydrogen & Fuel Cells Buying & Making Electricity Water Home Weatherization Solar Wind Program Info State Iowa Program Type Generating Facility Rate-Making Provider Iowa Utilities Board The Utilities Board may require public utilities furnishing gas, electricity, communications, or water to public consumers, to own alternate energy production facilities, enter into long-term contracts to purchase power from such facilities, and/or provide supplemental or backup power to alternate energy production facilities. Uniform rates for these transactions will be set by the board. Some exemptions apply

456

Environment, Safety & Health Directorate Assistant Laboratory Director (ALD)  

E-Print Network (OSTI)

Environment, Safety & Health Directorate Assistant Laboratory Director (ALD) Environmental Division (4) Matrixed from Safety & Health Services Division (5) Matrixed from Procurement & Property Procurement Support (5) D&D Manager Work Control Manager Safety & Health Manager (4) Facility Configuration

Homes, Christopher C.

457

NSLS Committees | Environmental, Safety & Health Committee  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Environmental, Safety & Health Committee Charge The NSLS ES&H Committee shall meet as needed to review: Proposed modifications to the accelerator facility, its operation, or...

458

Nuclear Safety Technical Positions/Interpretations  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

(OPI) responsible for the development, interpretation, and revision of a number of DOE directives. Technical Positions to directives issued by Nuclear and Facility Safety...

459

July 1995, Department's Criticality Safety Assessment Program...  

NLE Websites -- All DOE Office Websites (Extended Search)

Company at the Lynchburg Research Center; and two-and-a-half years as a Criticality Safety Analyst for General Electric Company at the Wilmington Fuel Fabrication Facility....

460

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY & HEALTH (ISH)  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

HEALTH (ISH) HEALTH (ISH) OBJECTIVE ISH.1 A comprehensive industrial safety & health program has been implemented to address applicable safety requirements at the TA 55 SST Facility. (Core Requirements 1, 3, and 4) Criteria * Procedures are implemented to address applicable industrial & health safety issues. * An adequate number of trained personnel are available to support SST facility regarding industrial safety & health concerns. * Portable fire extinguishers are appropriate for the class of fire they are expected to fight and are located within the proper distance. * Cranes, hooks, slings, and other rigging are plainly marked as to their capacity and inspected prior to use. * Forklifts and other powered lifting devices are adequately inspected.

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461

DOE to Host Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Natural Gas Subcommittee  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

to Host Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Natural Gas to Host Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Natural Gas Subcommittee Meeting DOE to Host Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Natural Gas Subcommittee Meeting May 27, 2011 - 12:00am Addthis Washington, DC - On Wednesday, June 1 and Thursday, June 2, 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy will host the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) Natural Gas Subcommittee meeting. The meeting will allow subcommittee members to hear from key stakeholders as it works to identify immediate steps that can be taken to improve the safety and environmental performance of hydraulic fracturing. Media wishing to attend should contact Niketa Kumar at niketa.kumar@hq.doe.gov by 5pm on Tuesday, May 31. Requests received after 5pm on May 31 will be accommodated if possible. What: Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Natural Gas Subcommittee Meeting

462

Tank Waste Corporate Board | Department of Energy  

Energy.gov (U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)) Indexed Site

Tank Waste Corporate Board Tank Waste Corporate Board Tank Waste Corporate Board The Tank Waste Corporate Board is a chartered group of senior DOE, contractor, and laboratory managers and staff that meets approximately semi-annually to formulate and coordinate implementation of an effective and efficient national Tank Waste program. August 1, 2012 Tank Waste Corporate Board Meeting 08/01/12 The following documents are associated with the Tank Waste Corporate Board Meeting held on August 1st, 2012. November 18, 2010 Tank Waste Corporate Board Meeting 11/18/10 The following documents are associated with the Tank Waste Corporate Board Meeting held on November 18th, 2010. July 29, 2009 Tank Waste Corporate Board Meeting 07/29/09 The following documents are associated with the Tank Waste Corporate Board

463

Training and qualification program for nuclear criticality safety technical staff  

SciTech Connect

A training and qualification program for nuclear criticality safety technical staff personnel has been developed and implemented. The program is compliant with requirements and provides evidence that a systematic approach has been taken to indoctrinate new technical staff. Development involved task analysis to determine activities where training was necessary and the standard which must be attained to qualify. Structured mentoring is used where experienced personnel interact with candidates using checksheets to guide candidates through various steps and to provide evidence that steps have been accomplished. Credit can be taken for the previous experience of personnel by means of evaluation boards which can credit or modify checksheet steps. Considering just the wealth of business practice and site specific information a new person at a facility needs to assimilate, the program has been effective in indoctrinating new technical staff personnel and integrating them into a productive role. The program includes continuing training.

Taylor, R.G.; Worley, C.A.

1996-10-22T23:59:59.000Z

464

SSC Safety Review Document  

Science Conference Proceedings (OSTI)

The safety strategy of the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) Central Design Group (CDG) is to mitigate potential hazards to personnel, as far as possible, through appropriate measures in the design and engineering of the facility. The Safety Review Document identifies, on the basis of the Conceptual Design Report (CDR) and related studies, potential hazards inherent in the SSC project independent of its site. Mitigative measures in the design of facilities and in the structuring of laboratory operations are describ