MANHATTAN DISTRICT HISTORY

BOOK I - GENERAL

VOLUME 4 - AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER 1

LEGISLATIVE CONTACTS OF MANHATTAN DISTRICT

CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED
DOE NSI DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW E.O. 12958
BY J.L. Broady  DOER-70 10-3-05
FOREWORD

This chapter has been prepared to explain the legislative contacts made by, and for, the Manhattan District under the District's financial program, construction program and for domestic atomic energy legislation. The information presented is general in scope and emphasizes the steps taken for maintenance of security.

Each of the various sections of this chapter have been arranged, insofar as is practicable, to indicate the sequence of action, and the chapter, as a whole, covers the period from the inception of the Manhattan District to 31 December 1946.

The brevity of the text is such that the inclusion of a Summary is not considered to be essential.

5 May 1947.
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CHAPTER 1 - LEGISLATIVE CONTACTS OF MANHATTAN DISTRICT

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

1-1. General. - It is the purpose of this chapter of the subject history to briefly record the legislative contacts made by, or for, the Manhattan District. These contacts were somewhat limited in their scope, for reasons which are indicated herein, and concerned the financial program, construction program, and the presentation of testimony which contributed to the domestic atomic energy legislation and the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Such limitation of legislative contacts, particularly that concerning the financial and construction programs under a project of such scope as attained by the Manhattan District is most unusual under federal procedure; and it is, therefore, proposed that some of the pertinent explanation for this condition be indicated by following paragraphs. It will be evident to the reader of this historical account that, because of security classification of the subject matter, records were avoided in certain instances; for example, legislative hearings in regard to appropriations were essentially all conducted in closed session and off the record. For this reason personal reference to many of the participating legislators has not been included. It will be evident also that the account places emphasis upon the difficulties in obtaining sufficient funds. That difficulty, for the reasons cited, is believed to be quite understandable and any
reference herein to any legislative hesitancy to provide overall approval without the benefit of detailed information is not presented in any critical sense and not intended to detract in any way from the legislative cooperation which was most definitely provided. That that cooperation existed is evidenced by the facts that enormous sums of money were made available, a time schedule was adhered to, and the work of the Manhattan project was brought to a successful completion.

1.2 Directive. - In June 1942, prior to the formation of the Manhattan District, the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee submitted a report covering the status of the atomic bomb program to the President of the United States, through a Top Policy Group consisting of the Vice President, Secretary of War and the Army Chief of Staff. In addition to an account of what had been accomplished under the program the report contained a number of recommendations for future procedure. Among those recommendations were several which apply to this portion of the project history, and which are outlined as follows:

a. That construction of the project plants be placed under direction of the Army.

b. That, for initial costs of the program under Army direction, funds be made available to the Chief of Engineers for the fiscal year 1943. It was, however, indicated that, in order to avoid delay and suspension of the work, the Chief of Engineers
should be authorized to make expenditures, or over obligate any funds under his control, with the understanding that he be reimbursed for such an expenditure at a later date.

c. That extreme secrecy should be exercised in connection with the project, particularly with respect to its purpose, the raw materials used to develop the final product and the manufacturing processes involved.

Presidential approval for the report and recommendations contained therein was indicated and served as a directive to the OSRD and the Army in the establishment and completion of a program of tremendous magnitude.

1.3 Military Security. - Conformation with the basic directive, and compliance with subsequent instructions given by the President to the Commanding General, Manhattan District, made it imperative that only those for which the knowledge was a vital necessity should be informed in regard to the atomic bomb program. And further, that that information, when it was determined to be required, should be made available in minimum detail only. Conditions within enemy countries during the early history of the Manhattan District project fully confirmed that military security necessitated strict adherence to the restrictive requirements of the basic directive and subsequent instruction. Therefore, a determined effort was made to withhold the atomic bomb project information from all personnel, including members of Congress, who were not definitely authorized to receive that knowledge.
SECTION 2 - FINANCIAL PROGRAM

2.1 History of Fiscal Procedures. - The historical account, contained in this chapter, for the financial program concerns that portion of the program relating to legislative contacts only. A more complete history of the overall fiscal program is presented by Book I - General, Volume 5 - Fiscal Procedures, and reference is made to that volume. However, in order that some of the outstanding features and the extent of the general program may be appreciated, the following items covered by the preceding history are repeated here:

a. During the early months of the Manhattan project (prior to March 1943) the lack of basic estimate data and rapidly changing plans did not permit the establishment of a standard procedure for obtaining cost estimates. Funds already available to the War Department were, therefore, requested on an "as required" basis.

b. Beginning March 1943 construction estimates were obtained monthly through Field Progress Reports. Operators' estimates were obtained from time to time, roughly quarterly.

g. The customary annual budget procedure was not followed during the early period of the project. Fund requirements were received from time to time and arrangements were made to provide necessary allotments from funds available to the War Department.

g. The first annual budget was transmitted to the Office Chief of Engineers on 3 February 1945 for the fiscal year 1946.
9. The total amount of funds allotted for the Manhattan project during each fiscal year was as follows: (That for F.Y. 1947 refers to net result after revocations).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>$385,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>$422,933,396.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>$1,069,929,509.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>$567,658,130.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947 (to 12/31/46)</td>
<td>-$134,976,911.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$2,310,544,125.35</td>
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10. The total amount of expenditures including advancement of funds by the Manhattan District to other organizations during each fiscal year was as follows: (These are field expenditure figures and include some estimated items).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>$77,098,355.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>$729,981,724.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>$856,901,959.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>$356,056,772.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947 (to 12/31/46)</td>
<td>$171,419,990.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$2,191,458,303.00</td>
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g. * Advances of funds to other Government agencies for certain phases of the work performed under the Manhattan District

2.2
The amount turned over to the account of the Atomic Energy Commission at the termination of Manhattan District control was $501,000,000.00.

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**Note:** These items are included to indicate the large sums involved. A part only of the allotments, from which these transfer amounts were obtained, was made to the Manhattan District. Other allotments involved were handled directly by the War Department. These advances of funds are not included with the expenditures indicated by the directly preceding item 6.

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As a concluding item of reference to Book I, Volume 5 the following quotation from the testimony of the Comptroller General of the United States appears to be appropriate. This testimony was given at a hearing before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, United States Senate, on 4 April 1946.
"We have audited, or are auditing, every single penny expended on this project... We audited on the spot and kept it current, and I might say it has been a remarkably clean expenditure..."

"... the very fact ... that our men were there where the agents of the Government could consult with them time after time assured, in my opinion, a proper accountability..."

"... from the very beginning he (General Groves) has insisted upon a full audit and a full accountability to the General Accounting Office..."

2.2 Conferences with Legislative Leaders. - As has been referred to previously, initial allotments, and those for a considerable time during the Manhattan project, were obtained from funds available to the War Department. Those funds were principally "Engineer Service Army" and "Expediting Production" moneys, the latter of which were under the supervision of the then Under Secretary of War. During the progress of the work two factors contributing largely to difficulties in obtaining necessary funds were: the magnitude of the project and the enormous costs involved in carrying it to a successful con-
clusion; and the secrecy with which the entire undertaking had to be
clothed. This last factor was particularly far-reaching in its effect
as is illustrated by an incident which occurred during late 1943 when
unofficial information had reached Congressman Albert J. Engel concerning
the Manhattan project construction taking place at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Through correspondence with the Under Secretary of War, Congressman
Engel referred to the information which had reached him, requested
that he receive further detailed information and stated his intention
of visiting the plant site in the near future. Mr. Engel was informed
by the Under Secretary of War concerning the highly secret status of
the project and that the information requested by him could not be
supplied at that time. Mr. Engel was also prevailed upon to refrain
from making his contemplated visit to the plant site. That such ex-
planations, as has just been outlined, were accepted, even with a de-
gree of reservation, was of considerable benefit to the War Department.
However, it was recognized that the existing conditions could not be
permitted to continue for any great length of time. The personnel
directly and indirectly engaged in plant and equipment construction had
increased to a vast number and it was only to be expected that, as con-
stituents, a certain amount of information regarding the work would be
referred to their legislative representatives. Some of this information,
as with any large construction job, could reasonably in many instances
be colored, or distorted, because of the limitation of overall knowledge
on the part of the informant and might readily be the cause of grave
concern to the Members of Congress who received the information. It
was evident, and understandable why it should be so, that there were
Members of Congress who were becoming restless in regard to the appro-
priations which had been made and those to be anticipated. This rest-
lessness was particularly emphasized in view of the condition that the
details of the Manhattan project were not officially being made avail-
able to them. All of the foregoing made it apparent, in order for the
magnitude and urgency of the project to be more readily appreciated by
them, and to further safeguard the secrecy of the entire undertaking
through their cooperation, that it was highly desirable that confer-
ences be held with the leaders of both the House of Representatives
and the Senate. General Groves was insistent upon such a procedure,
although he felt that it would serve a better end if he was not among
those present at the conferences. Arrangements were, therefore, made
for the following:

a. Meeting With Leaders of House of Representatives. — On
18 February 1944 Secretary Stimson, General Marshall and Mr. Bush at-
tended a conference at the House Speaker's office. The legislative
personnel present were Messrs. Rayburn, McCormick and Martin, res-
pectively Speaker, Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the House.

Secretary Stimson reviewed the general status of the
atomic bomb project and referred to the amount of money which had
been expended, the amount available, and the estimated total amount
still required for completion of the project. He described the general
program of construction, and emphasized the probability of a race with
the enemy being in existence. He indicated an approximate schedule
for completion of the project.

General Marshall referred to the possible relationship of the atomic bomb project to the general strategic war plans.

Mr. Bush outlined some of the scientific background of the project and explained the general magnitude of the destruction that could be caused by the proposed atomic weapon.

All three Congressmen present indicated, without reservation, that the matter should certainly be pursued with the utmost possible speed, that while the amount of money involved was large, it was nevertheless not a matter of consequence in consideration of the importance of the subject, and that certainly the matter would need to be handled in the coming appropriations bill without complete explanation to the full committees. They offered to aid in this matter in any way possible.

As a specific method of procedure it was understood that the Speaker would be informed as to the way in which the requests for appropriations for the subject project were inserted in the appropriations bill so that it might be identified by him. This information was proposed to be made available to Messrs. McCormick and Martin by the Speaker. It was further indicated that the three Congressmen proposed to discuss the situation with a few members of the appropriations committee and to explain to them that they had gone into the subject with the Secretary of War, the Army Chief of Staff and that this particular item should not be questioned. For all discussion with other members of Congress it was proposed that only very general reference should
be given to the basic reasons which required the matter being handled in this especial secret fashion.

b. Meeting With Leaders of Senate. - Secretary Stimson, Major General Richards and Dr. Rush (General Marshall was unable to be present) conferred at the Senate Office Building on 10 June 1944 with Senators Barkley, White, Elder Thomas and Bridges. These latter gentlemen being respectively the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate and the Chairman and Senior Minority Member of the Sub-committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee handling the War Department Appropriations Bill.

Secretary Stimson informed the group of the presence in the War Department Appropriations Bill of an item covering work on atomic fission for the next fiscal year. He referred to the importance of this work becoming evident in 1939 with the scientific discovery of the theoretical possibilities of making an explosive of enormous power by this method. He traced the efforts made since that time, referred to the necessity of constructing extensive manufacturing facilities in order to obtain the desired results, and mentioned that this fact made it possible for a rich nation only to pursue such development. An indication of the effect of the final product was given by stating its equivalent in tons of TNT and the area of devastation that could be thus produced. The time schedule was approximated only by stating that the Appropriations Bill item contemplated the completion of construction and operation also during the coming fiscal year. He gave the approximate physical size of the bomb and
indicated that it could be carried by a single aircraft. In General
Marshall's absence, Secretary Stimson quoted his remark made at a
corresponding House conference to the effect that this was the single
new development of this war which might, in case of a deadlock, deter-
mine the outcome of the war. Secretary Stimson traced our knowledge
of German efforts, including their construction of a factory in Nor-
way, and said that certainly in the early part of this effort we had
been in a serious race with Germany; and that it was felt at the be-
ginning that they were probably ahead of us. He stated the location
of the two principal plants in this country engaged on the matter. He
gave the sums of money, approximately, which had been expended up to
the present time. Finally he brought out the need for great secrecy
on the matter.

Dr. Bush presented a somewhat more scientific status
of the matter and said that there was then no scientist either in
Britain or the United States associated with this matter who did not
believe that the program would be successful. (The reference to uni-
versal belief of the British and American scientists is believed to
have been somewhat exaggerated). He also told briefly of certain ex-
periments which had checked theory and thus indicated success, and in
particular told of the existence of a pile of material which was self-
sustaining in operation. He stated that we had devoted our entire
efforts to the military aspects of the subject, and hence had not
studied definitely into the possible commercial aspects. Dr. Bush

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indicated his personal belief that atomic fission would ultimately prove to be a new source of power of great importance to the human race, but that this would certainly not occur for a considerable period of years, because of the difficulty and danger of operating the process. He made it clear that extreme care had been used in experimentation and in manufacture not to allow the process to get out of control or to have premature explosions or the like. He pointed out the extraordinary nature of the material which made it impossible to make tests on a small scale. He also went into somewhat greater detail about what we knew and did not know about German developments. He stated that he felt personally that, due to the bombing program, we were probably then well ahead of Germany.

General Richards pointed out the position of the item in the bill. It appeared as a carry-over, and there was a provision for a single nominal appropriation in order to render that carry-over available for the next year. General Richards also gave the amounts involved, and stated that of the carry-over $600,000,000 was intended for use on this project.

There was then general discussion among the Senators as to the manner of handling the subject in Committee and on the floor. They stated very definitely that they would maintain complete secrecy; and on the other hand that they felt the matter could be handled through Committee and on the floor simply on the basis of their statement that the subject must not be inquired into. They felt they could make this
latter statement, if necessary, and indicated that they foresaw no difficulty in prompt handling of the matter in this way.

2.3 Legislative Contacts for the Procurement of Subsequent Funds. - The preceding conferences with the Congressional Leaders proved to be of considerable value in that through the aid of the respective leaders necessary funds were made available and a certain amount of questioning on the part of the individual legislators was undoubtedly repressed through the reassurance made available to them. During the calendar year of 1944 there were a number of hearings, all in closed session and off the record, with the Military Appropriations Committee, Deficiency Sub-committee and War Sub-committee. The Under Secretary of War, General Marshall and General Richards testified at various of these hearings and as an overall explanation indicated that the large amounts asked for in connection with "Engineer Service Army" and "Expediting Production" funds were due in a great measure to the Manhattan project costs. As time progressed it again became evident that restlessness and impatience were growing among members of Congress in regard to the size and cost of the project, and also because no official explanation of the purpose and nature of the work was forthcoming. This culminated in an exchange of views, shortly after a House Deficiency Sub-committee hearing in early February 1945, when permission was requested to transfer other War Department appropriations to "Expediting Production" funds. Opposition was not indicated by the Sub-committee to this request, however, subsequent to the
hearing, definite opposition was expressed by Congressman Engel to passing upon the subject appropriations without more detailed justification. As a means of providing that justification, and still remaining within reasonable limitations of the initial directive for security, general information relating to land, roads, housing and industrial facilities of the project were made available to Congressman Engel. This action appeared to relieve some of the objection, which had been caused by various rumors of great waste and unreasonably high cost, although it was obvious that necessary appropriations for the coming year would be most difficult to obtain without more detailed discussion with, and the provision of more detailed information of the project to Members of Congress. It was therefore urgently proposed by General Groves that the leaders of both the House and the Senate be approached again. This time with the request that they advise upon the suggestion that representative legislators, of their selection, be invited to visit the plant site at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and if, so desired, the site at Hanford, Washington. It was intended that those representatives be permitted to assure themselves of the reasonableness of the various living accommodations which had been provided, that they actually observe the size and scope of the installations and that some of the complexities of the project be demonstrated to them. This proposal was followed out shortly after the death of the late President Roosevelt and resulted in Congressmen Cannon, Snyder (since deceased) and Mahon, and Taber and Albert J.
Engel visiting the Clinton Engineer Works on 23 and 24 May 1945.
There is no evidence otherwise but that the representatives who
inspected this main plant of the Manhattan project were satisfied in
regard to the planning, the type of construction, and the general
disposition of funds; and that they were impressed with the magnitude
of that portion of the project which they had observed.

The release of information concerning the combat use
of the atomic bomb, and the subsequent lifting of certain of the
security restrictions permitted the procedure for procurement of
funds to be placed immediately in a normal channel and therefore
special legislative handling, such as has been indicated herein,
was no longer required.
SECTION 3 - CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

3.1 General. — Reference has been made in Section 2 of this Chapter to the rumors which were expected, and which actually existed, in regard to waste, unsuitable living conditions, poor administration, etc., pertaining to the construction phase of the Manhattan project. It seems most reasonable, with any construction of appreciable size, that incidents will occur which, through actual error or through misunderstanding on the part of one or more individuals, lead to formal complaint. The Manhattan project was effected in this respect particularly because of the extensive activities and the condition that steps were taken to acquaint each employee only with that portion of the work necessary for his duty assignment. This latter condition, of course, contributed to a lack of understanding of the broad overall program being obtained by any except a few top personnel, and is believed to have been the direct cause for many of the objections which were raised. Some of the objections, however reached such proportion that they were referred to legislative representatives with the request that they be investigated. While it is the purpose of this portion of the Manhattan District history to confine the account to legislative contacts only, nevertheless it may be well to state that regardless of whether or not legislative investigation was conducted, a candid effort was made by the Manhattan District to investigate each individual complaint and to make any logical adjustment that appeared
necessary.

3.2 Senate, Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. - The Senate, Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program became interested in various phases of the work early in the history of the Manhattan project. The secret classification of the project activities again presented considerable difficulty when reports and information received by the Committee caused it to seek more detailed official information, or prompted its desire for investigation to be conducted at the plant sites. It is recognized that some of the reports received by this Committee may have caused concern, however, the Committee under the chairmanship of both Senator Truman and Senator Keck cooperated wholeheartedly and avoided any action contributory to delay of the project completion or to the impairment of security. Brief accounts of the subject legislative contacts under the respective Chairmen of the Committee are provided by the directly following subparagraphs:

a. Under Chairmanship of Senator Truman. - In June 1943, President Truman, then Senator Truman, requested that the Committee hold a meeting in the neighborhood of Pasco, Washington, to investigate conditions at the Hanford Engineer Works. Secretary Stimson conferred with Senator Truman and it was agreed that such legislative investigation would be held in abeyance until the project had served its war purpose or until the then existing security restrictions could be lifted. During early 1944, acting upon reports received by him.
normal functions of the committee. Action would have to be taken by any person or group of persons in the committee to prevent the occurrence of any accident or danger to persons or property. Any person who commits or aids in the commission of any act in violation of the Act shall be liable to the penalties prescribed by law. The committee may, by resolution, adopt regulations for the prevention of accidents, and to carry out the objects of the Act.

In the event of any accident or damage occurring to any property of the committee, or to any person or group of persons, in consequence of the wants of the committee, the committee may, by resolution, adopt regulations for the prevention of accidents, and to carry out the objects of the Act.
Committee in the investigation of various items which jointly concerned associated agencies and the Manhattan District, however, there were no further requests by Senator Truman's Committee, subsequent to the above exchange of views, for investigation on the ground in the vicinity of the plants.

b. Under Chairmanship of Senator Mead. - Under date of 8 September 1944 the Chief Counsel of the Mead Committee indicated the desirability of an investigation - this time in reference to the Clinton Engineer Works. He was informed on the following day that the War Department position with respect to secrecy of the Manhattan project had not changed since the understanding reached with Senator Truman. Every evidence of cooperation with the War Department, such as existed under the Truman Committee, was continued by the Mead Committee. Various reports and complaints received by the Mead Committee were made available to the War Department and investigations were always conducted by the Manhattan District. During the latter part of August 1945, after combat use of the atomic bomb, arrangements were made for members of the Committee to visit the Hanford Engineer Works. Included among those arrangements were statements to Senator Mead that a representative of the Manhattan District would be prepared during the visit of the Committee members to the project site: to present figures concerning the cost of the entire project, and of each major installation thereof; to present some of the breakdown figures on each such installation; and to present data as to the scale of wages paid.
and the labor turnover. It was further indicated that if other costs, or similar data, were requested at the hearing the Committee would be supplied with that data to the extent that it could be revealed under the then existing secrecy requirements. In conformance with these arrangements members of the Committee visited the Hanford Engineer Works and were informed as is outlined by the following pertinent quotations of an official report submitted to Major General L. R. Groves by Colonel D. E. Antes:

"1. The Sub-Committee of the Head Committee arrived at Pasco Naval Air Base, Pasco, Washington, 12:35 p.m. 20 August 1945. The party consisted of Senator Mitchell of Washington; Senator Ferguson of Michigan; Senator Kilgore of West Virginia; Mr. Hugh Fulton, Associate Counsel of the Committee; Mr. Flanagan, Special Investigator for the Committee; Mr. Shipman, Secretary to Senator Mitchell; Brig. General Frank H. Lowe, Liaison Officer; Colonel Miles Knowles, War Department Legislative & Liaison Division; and several other persons, bringing the party to a total of 14.

"2. Arrangements had been made with Captain Schumacher, Commanding Officer of the Air Base, to feed the group luncheon in the officers' mess at the Base. They were then taken by automobile to Richland where they were briefed at Colonel Matthias' office and the reasons explained for the enormous reservation which the project occupies.

"3. The undersigned discussed costs and informed the Committee that there was a prepared statement which had been cleared with General
Groves for submission to them with the understanding that the only figure that could be published was the overall construction cost, $353,002,231. They were further informed that the Committee had been advised by letter signed by General Royall, Legislative and Liaison Division, that General Groves would be willing to appear before the Committee if a date of meeting could be mutually agreed upon, at which time General Groves would answer any questions where he could do so without violating security restrictions.

"4. The Committee was then informed that they would be taken into two manufacturing buildings which at the present time were highly restricted. They could ask no questions as to what, how or how much concerning the processes involved. As representatives of their Government, it was expected that they would safeguard and refrain from discussing anything which they saw in any of the buildings. They were then taken to the hospital where each individual submitted to a blood test before proceeding to the manufacturing areas.

"5. At this point, the party was divided into groups of 3 each and placed in cars, each of which was driven by an officer. Colonel Matthias escorted Senator Mitchell, Mr. Shipman and Mr. Flanagan. The undersigned escorted Senator Ferguson, Mr. Fulton and Col. Knowles. Colonel Rogers escorted Senator Kilgore, General Lowe and a Navy representative who holds a position with the committee similar to that held by General Lowe for the Army.

"6. On the way to the manufacturing areas, the various types
of housing erected in Richland Village were pointed out, with the statement that all housing was erected under lump sum contract and that they were within the statutory limitations as to cost. The group was advised that the occupants of the houses were responsible to keep the premises in a neat and presentable condition, and that they had done their own seeding, with government-furnished seed. The senators were informed of the number of miles of road constructed, railroads and other pertinent information.

"7. The group was driven through the old Hanford Camp to impress them with the fact that only the barest minimum was constructed. From the Hanford Camp the group proceeded to the 100-F Area where they were shown through the experimentation being conducted by Dr. Foster on Salmon and Steelhead trout, the two most important fish in the Columbia River.

"8. They were next shown through main pump house, filtration plant and water cooling plant. In the pile building they were shown the face of the pile and the control room. From there the party proceeded to the other pile areas, but did not enter. The purpose of this was to impress upon the Senators the necessity for the long distances between manufacturing areas, and they were informed that it was for safety precautions only.

"9. In the 200 Area, the party was shown the operating gallery of the canyon and the three Senators, donning protective clothing, along with Colonel Matthias and Mr. Simon of the DuPont Company, were taken to the upper floor to be shown the remote control procedures.
employed in operating this building and were permitted to view them through the periscopes on the cranes in use.

"10. The party then proceeded to the WP mess hall where they were served supper, prior to returning them to the Naval Base at Pasco where they took off for Spokane that evening."

The Committee "was informed that they were the first civilians who were not directly connected with the project that have ever been permitted to enter the buildings. The reaction of the Committee as a whole can be summed up in Senator Ferguson's own words to me: 'This job is well constructed but there is no evidence of any embellishments or extravagance of funds anywhere.'"
SECTION 4 - DOMESTIC ATOMIC ENERGY LEGISLATION

4.1 General. - It is considered preferrable that the Manhattan project legislative contacts pertaining to the domestic atomic energy legislation section of this historical account be presented in a general manner only and that the reader be referred to appropriate publications where the full context of any particular item may be obtained.

4.2 Brief Resume' of Domestic Atomic Energy Legislation. - Initial legislative contacts, on the part of the War Department, began during May 1945 when Secretary Stimson, at the request of President Truman, appointed an interim committee to recommend atomic energy legislation. This committee consisted of Secretary Stimson as chairman, George L. Harrison as alternate chairman, James F. Byrnes (prior to his appointment as Secretary of State), Ralph A. Bard, William L. Clayton, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. James B. Conant, and Dr. Karl T. Compton. The committee was assisted as called upon, by Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, Dr. Enrico Fermi, Dr. A. H. Compton, Major General L. R. Groves and representatives of industry, all of whom acted as advisors. A bill for domestic control of atomic energy was drafted by this committee, referred to various Governmental Departments for any desired revision, and ultimately became House and Senate bills respectively designated H.R. 4280 and S. 1463 (May-Johnson Bill).

Amendments proposed for bill H.R. 4280 resulted in the introduction of bill H.R. 4566 and bill S. 1324, the latter of which differed from all preceding bills.
Senate Resolution 179 was introduced shortly after the introduction of bill S. 1463 and proposed the formation of a special committee to study the problems relating to atomic energy and to report by bill, or otherwise, to the Senate.

Adoption of the above Resolution resulted in bill S. 1717 being introduced in the Senate on 20 December 1945 and approval, on 1 August 1946, of Public Law 585 - 79th Congress - 2nd Session, the "Atomic Energy Act of 1946".

(Reference is made to the various bills, Senate Calendar No. 1251, Report No. 1211 - 79th Congress, 2nd Session, and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Bulletin No. 44 for a more detailed account of all of the preceding legislative action.)

4.3 Manhattan District Participation. - The inherent complexity of the problem of legislation for the domestic control of atomic energy was emphasized by the controversy which arose prior to enactment of the law. All of the bills introduced were in general agreement in granting extensive powers over the use and development of fissionable materials, but they disagreed in regard to the administrative provisions, the composition of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the manner of participation of the military services under a system of civilian control. The Manhattan District participation in this matter consisted of legislative contacts made principally through testimony presented at hearings for the respective bills or under Senate Resolution 179. Such testimony for the Manhattan project was presented on a number of
occasions by General Groves and other representatives. The published hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 79th Congress, 1st session on H.R. 4280, and those before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, U. S. Senate, 79th Congress, 2nd Session on S. 1717 are referred to for full details of the testimony which was presented. That the testimony provided by representatives of the Manhattan project was of such value that it could not have been dispensed with does not appear to be any manner of an overstatement and requires no further elaboration, with the exception that it was predicted upon the basic experience which had been obtained and served as the foundation upon which to build a National policy.

As a concluding item, it may be well to refer to an example of steps taken by the Manhattan project which were of particular assistance to the establishment of legislation for the conversion of atomic energy uses from war to peacetime purposes by providing the following quotation from The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Bulletin No. 44.

"The possible uses of nuclear energy for peacetime purposes were foreseen at the time the atomic bomb was being developed. In 1944, Major General Leslie R. Groves appointed Dr. R. C. Tolman, Dean of the Graduate School of the California Institute of Technology, to be chairman of a committee to study and make recommendations regarding non-military uses of atomic energy. These uses lie in the field of power and in radioactive by-products for scientific, medical,
and industrial purposes. — — In March 14, 1946, General Groves announced that approval had been granted by higher officials to release information on the use of atomic energy for peacetime purposes provided it does not impair our national security. The Tolman Committee recommended the type of organization which would be desirable for handling this problem."