
- Person as scientist, person as moralist Joshua Knobe
- Intuitions about Consciousness: Experimental Studies1
- An Anomaly in Intentional Action Ascription: More Evidence of Folk Diversity Adam Feltz (adf04@fsu.edu)
- Forthcoming in Journal of Cognition and Culture Experimental Philosophy and Folk Concepts
- Forthcoming in The Philosophers' Magazine What Is Experimental Philosophy?
- Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation
- Forthcoming In Hutto, D. & Ratcliffe, M. (ed.) Folk psychology reassessed. Kluwer/Springer Press.
- Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Fred Adams and Annie Steadman
- Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism vs. Reductionism
- Person as scientist, person as moralist Joshua Knobe
- Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypotheses
- The Folk Concepts of Intention and Intentional Action: A Cross-Cultural Study1
- Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow Thomas Nadelhoffer
- Psychological Science, in press Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect
- Intentional action and `in order to' Eric Wiland
- Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of MAX DEUTSCH
- Causation and Culpability 1 Causation, Norm Violation and Culpable Control
- Folk Judgments of Causation1 Joshua Knobe
- Love and Happiness Jonathan Phillips1
- The Deep Self Model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action
- Free Will and the Bounds of the Self1 [Forthcoming in Robert Kane, ed. Oxford Handbook
- Three-and-a-half folk concepts of intentional action by Alessandro Lanteri (alelanteri@gmail.com)
- Philosophical Studies (2006), 130, 203-231 The Concept of Intentional Action
- Does emotion mediate the effect of an action's moral status on its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence
- Intention, Intentional Action and Moral Considerations One of the most complex and long-standing problems in the
- Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality Jennifer Nado
- Mind Perception and Objectification 1 Running Head: Mind Perception and Objectification
- The Knobe Effect 1 RUNNING HEAD: The Knobe Effect
- Intuitions about Consciousness: Experimental Studies1
- Individual differences, judgment biases, and theory-of-mind: Deconstructing the intentional action side effect asymmetry
- Forthcoming in a special issue of Philosophical Studies. EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITION
- Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist1 Joshua Knobe
- BLAMING BADLY MARK D. ALICKE1
- The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy Revised draft
- Folk Psychology and Folk Morality: Response to Critics1
- Forthcoming in Mind & Language. Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect revisited*
- BAD ACTS, BLAMEWORTHY AGENTS, AND INTENTIONAL ACTIONS: SOME PROBLEMS FOR JUROR IMPARTIALITY
- Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies Hugh J. McCann
- Mark Phelan Hagop Sarkissian (mphelan@email.unc.edu) (hss12@duke.edu)
- Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays Harvard University
- Word count: 10200 (including footnotes and references) The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and
- The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk Psychology
- MORALITY OR MODALITY? WHAT DOES THE ATTRIBUTION OF INTENTIONALITY DEPEND ON?
- Forthcoming in Annual Review of Psychology Experimental Philosophy
- Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology1 Joshua Knobe
- Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action Frederick Adams & Annie Steadman
- Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?* Forthcoming in Mind & Language
- Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys draft of June 2010 Keith DeRose, Yale University
- Unintentionally biasing the data: Reply to Knobe ROBLIN R. MEEKS
- In Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions, Aguilar, J & Buckareff, A (eds.) London: Automatic Press.
- How to study Folk Intuitions about Phenomenal Consciousness1 Justin M. Sytsma and Edouard Machery
- Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility
- Implicit Bias and Moral Judgment 1 Do theories of implicit race bias change moral judgments?
- Judgments of Intentionality and Moral Worth: Experimental Challenges to Hindriks' FORTHCOMING: Philosophical Quarterly
- Forthcoming in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment
- Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Significance Joshua Knobe
- Forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology Folk Psychological Concepts: Causation1