Chen, Yiling - School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University

• SRC Technical Note June 17, 1997
• The Role of Game Theory in Human Computation Systems Shaili Jain
• A Game-Theoretic Framework for Analyzing Trust-Inference Protocols
• An Auction-Based Method for Decentralized Train David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar
• Efficiency and Nash Equilibria in a Scrip System for P2P Eric J. Friedman
• E#cient CollisionResistant Hashing from WorstCase Assumptions on Cyclic Lattices #
• Dealing with bad nodes: challenges and existing mechanisms New decision strategy: reelection
• More Constructions of Lossy and Correlation-Secure Trapdoor Functions
• Research Statement David C. Parkes
• To appear in Proceedings of International Workshop on Information Presentation and Natural Multimodal Dialogue IPNMD'01, Verona, Italy, December 2001
• Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation Under Some Common Voting Rules
• Foundations of Information Aggregation Mechanisms Preliminary and Incomplete: a Revision will be Sent Later
• On the Hardness of Finding Optimal Multiple Preset Dictionaries
• Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting Yuga J. Cohler
• AMPL-CPLEX Setup Guide for OS X (Intel-based) Applied Mathematics 121
• Challenging Studentswith CreativeAssignments Michael Mitzenmacher*
• Provably Secure FFT Hashing Vadim Lyubashevsky
• David M. Brooks School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
• Computational Mechanism Design: Towards Online Mechanisms Harvard University
• Simplified Mechanisms A study on the applications to
• AGeneralApproachto EnvironmentDesign
• New Heuristic and Interactive Approaches to 2D Rectangular Strip Packing
• Correlated-Q Learning Cyclic Equilibria in Markov
• Input-Agreement: A New Mechanism for Collecting Data Using Human Computation Games
• The mechanics of phishing Rock-phish attacks
• HOUSE EVENT REGISTRATION Instructions: This form should be used to register House-based events whose participants are limited to members of the
• A Bipartite Graph Co-Clustering Approach to Ontology Mapping Yiling Chen Frederico Fonseca
• In Proc. 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), pp. 1161-1168. 1 Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges
• Empirical Methods for Artificial Intelligence. Paul Cohen, 2006 Empirical Methods for Artificial Intelligence
• journal of computer and system sciences 55, 119 139 (1997) A Decision-Theoretic Generalization of On-Line Learning
• In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI00), pp. 7481. 1 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
• Crowdsourcing with All-pay Auctions: a Field Experiment on Taskcn
• Problem Set 2 Geometry, Algebra, Reality
• Recompromise of phishing websites Evil searching
• Voting procedures with incomplete preferences Kathrin Konczak
• "!# $%$'& ()01"! 2436587 9A@CBEDGFIH
• 4648 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 52, NO. 10, OCTOBER 2006 0x dx = 1 +
• Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests Shuchi Chawla
• A port of the GNU tools to the Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontrollers
• Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Vol.3, No.2, pp.198{212, Algorithms for Distributed Constraint Satisfaction
• Errata II: Second Printing of Mitzenmacher/Upfal Probability and
• Socially Desirable Approximations for Dodgson's Voting Rule Ioannis Caragiannis
• Unscrambling AddressLines -4ndrei Broder" Michael Mitzenmacher* Laurent Mall"
• Information Processing Letters 110 (2010) 221225 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
• Mirage: A Microeconomic Resource Allocation System for Sensornet Testbeds Brent N. Chun
• March 15, 2006 10:29 Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in paper4 EGG: AN EXTENSIBLE AND ECONOMICS-INSPIRED
• TBBL: A Tree-Based Bidding Language for Iterative Combinatorial Exchanges Ruggiero Cavallo
• Market Manipulation with Outside Incentives Yiling Chen
• Toward Automatic Task Design: A Progress Report School of Engineering and
• Algorithmica manuscript Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies
• Complexity of Combinatorial Market Makers Yiling Chen
• Socially Embedded Prediction Markets Yiling Chen David M. Pennock
• Electron Commerce Res (2006) 6: 201221 DOI 10.1007/s10660-006-6958-9
• Predicting Uncertain Outcomes Using Information Markets Yiling Chen Tracy Mullen Chao-Hsien Chu
• Security Design and Information Aggregation in Markets
• On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions Florin Constantin
• HarTAC -The Harvard TAC SCM '03 Agent Rui Dong, Terry Tai and Wilfred Yeung
• An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains
• Learning Game Representations from Data Using Rationality Constraints
• Approximate and Compensate: A method for risk-sensitive meta-deliberation and continual computation
• Hidden Market Design Sven Seuken
• Faithfulness in Internet Algorithms Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
• Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties
• Peer Prediction with Private Beliefs Jens Witkowski
• Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms Computer Science Division
• Cryptographic Combinatorial Securities Exchanges Christopher Thorpe and David C. Parkes
• Algorithmic Game Theory Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani
• In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00), pp. 74-81. 1 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
• In Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00), pp. 82-89. 1 Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions
• Some Open Questions Related to Cuckoo Michael Mitzenmacher
• Less Hashing, Same Performance: Building a Better Bloom Filter
• Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament Alon Altman
• Assignment 2 (C) I Can't Get No Satisfaction
• Continuous Combinatorial Exchange with an Application to Course-Swapping Aftermarkets
• Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Andrea Wilson
• FEBRUARY 3, 2009 What Other Financial Crises Tell Us
• Information Elicitation for Decision Making Yiling Chen
• Human Computation and Multiagent Systems: An Algorithmic Perspective
• This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research
• Oral Care 2025 Innovation/Finance/Delivery
• A Computational Characterization of Multiagent Games with Fallacious Rewards
• On the Agenda(s) of Research on Multi-Agent Learning
• Impersonation Strategies in Auctions Ian A. Kash David C. Parkes
• A Dependently Typed Assembly Language University of Cincinnati
• Computational Mechanism Design The classic mechanism design literature largely ignores computational considerations. It
• From Putting Auction Theory to Work by Paul Milgrom. Getting to Work
• Mix and Match Itai Ashlagi
• AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching Aranyak Mehta Amin Saberi Umesh Vazirani Vijay Vazirani
• A Game-Theoretic Memory Mechanism for Coevolution
• Causality-Based Versioning Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy and David A. Holland
• Section Notes 3 The Simplex Algorithm
• Ethical Dilemmas in Take-down Research Tyler Moore
• Problem Set 3 Let's Simplex
• Littauer Room Bookings Spring Master As of:&[Date] [Time] 219 M-15 M-16 M-17 M-34/36 219 M-15 M-16 M-17 M-34/36 219 M-15 M-16 M17 M-34/36 219 M-15 M-16 M17 M-34/36 219 M-15 M-16 M17 M-34/36
• A Versatile and User-Oriented Versioning File System A THESIS PRESENTED
• A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search
• Mediators and Truthful Voting Bezalel Peleg
• Introduction & background Attacks on time-of-flight distance-bounding protocols
• Probability Surveys Vol. 6 (2009) 133
• IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON BIOMEDICAL CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 1, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2007 203 The Advanced Health and Disaster Aid Network: A
• ConstantRound Oblivious Transfer in the Bounded Storage Model
• Ad Auctions October 8, 2010 Ad Auctions
• New Mathematics and Natural Computation c World Scientific Publishing Company
• Competition and Efficiency in Congested Networks Competition and Efficiency in
• Foot strike patterns and collision forces in habitually barefoot versus shod runners
• Optimizing Streaming Applications with Self-Interested Users using M-DPOP
• DANIEL M. REEVES Yahoo! Research
• Theory Comput. Systems 32, 361386 (1999) 1999 Springer-Verlag
• An Improved Construction for Counting Bloom Filters
• Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting Yiling Chen
• Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes Alvin AuYoung, Alex C. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat
• Popularity is everything A new approach to protecting passwords from statistical-guessing attacks
• Layering in Provenance-Aware Storage Systems Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy, Joseph Barillari, Uri Braun,
• Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2010) 20:105122 DOI 10.1007/s10458-009-9078-9
• Multiagent Learning in Large Anonymous Games Department of Computer Science
• Multi-Winner Elections: Complexity of Manipulation, Control, and Winner-Determination
• Course Allocation via Proxy Auctions Mike Ruberry1
• 68 AI MAGAZINE Adaptive graphical user interfaces (GUIs) automatically tai-
• LISP Review September 17, 2007
• A New Perspective on Implementation by Voting Trees*
• Interactive Data Summarization: An Example Application Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories
• Prediction Markets: Economics, Computation, and
• Can Approximation Circumvent Gibbard-Satterthwaite? Ariel D. Procaccia
• The RAND Corporation A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation
• Voting Almost Maximizes Social Welfare Despite Limited Communication Ioannis Caragiannis
• Automatically Generating Personalized User Interfaces Krzysztof Z. Gajos
• Can Approximation Circumvent Gibbard-Satterthwaite? Ariel D. Procaccia
• Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (2007) Submitted September 6, 2007; published M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social
• GeoffreyWerner-Allen, Konrad Lorincz,
• Reducing Storage Management Costs via Informed User-Based Policies Erez Zadok, Jeffrey Osborn, Ariye Shater, Charles Wright, and Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy
• Incentive design for adaptive agents Yiling Chen
• Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 34 (2009) 209-253 Submitted 06/2008; published 03/2009 Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful
• Concurrent Zero Knowledge with Logarithmic RoundComplexity Manoj Prabhakaran #
• The Communication Complexity of Coalition Formation among Autonomous Agents
• Assignment 8 (W) Distributed AI
• Economics of BitTorrent Communities Ian A. Kash
• CitySense: An Urban-Scale Wireless Sensor Network and Rohan Narayana Murty , Geoffrey Mainland , Ian Rose , Atanu Roy Chowdhury
• style is a basis for good code-writing, not an afterthought CS182 Fall 2007
• Sybilproof Reputation Mechanisms Alice Cheng
• A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Shaili Jain David C. Parkes
• Black Scholes Pricing Model -National Business News -Print -Port... http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/200... 1 of 4 3/12/08 1:06 PM
• Antitrust Lawsuit Against the Resident In 2002, 16 law firms filed a class action law suit,
• AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning? Piotr Faliszewski
• MEASURES OF THE VALUE OF INFORMATION BY JOHN MCCARTHY
• Noname manuscript No. (will be inserted by the editor)
• Approximating Power Indices Yoram Bachrach
• A Market-Based Approach to Software Evolution David F. Bacon
• Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets
• Information Markets vs. Opinion Pools: An Empirical Comparison
• An Introduction to Support Vector Machines Yiling Chen (yxc194@psu.edu)
• Xi (Alice) Gao Harvard University
• An Axiomatic Characterization of Continuous-Outcome Market Makers
• AM121 Course Logistics Spring 2011
• AN EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF SCRIP SYSTEMS IAN A. KASH, ERIC J. FRIEDMAN, AND JOSEPH Y. HALPERN
• Brief Announcement: The Lotus-Eater Attack Ian A. Kash
• Computational Mechanism Design and Auctions
• Robert Carr Application Portfolio
• Crowdsourcing General Computation Haoqi Zhang
• Economics of BitTorrent Communities Ian A. Kash John K. Lai Haoqi Zhang Aviv Zohar
• Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart
• Value-Based Policy Teaching with Active Indirect Elicitation
• Enabling Environment Design via Active Indirect Elicitation
• Evaluating a Pattern-Based Visual Support Approach for Humanitarian Landmine Clearance
• Dynamic Accessibility: Detecting and Accommodating Differences in Ability
• An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity
• An Approximation to the Greedy Algorithm for Differential Compression of Very Large Files
• Barter -Mechanism Design of A Market-incented Wisdom Exchange for Organizations and Communities
• Task Routing for Prediction Tasks Haoqi Zhang
• Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions Shaili Jain
• Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation
• Eliciting Properties of Probability Distributions [Extended Abstract]
• Experimental Economics, 1:4362 (1998) c 1998 Economic Science Association
• Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations Author(s): Leonard J. Savage
• MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Vol. 51, No. 9, September 2005, pp. 13591373
• Minimum Payments that Reward Honest Reputation Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
• Collusion-resistant, Incentive-compatible Feedback Payments
• Truthful Surveys Nicolas Lambert and Yoav Shoham
• Collective Revelation: A Mechanism for Self-Verified, Weighted, and Truthful Predictions
• Creating Truthtelling Incentives with the Bayesian Truth Serum The "Bayesian Truth Serum" (BTS) is a survey scoring method that provides truthtelling
• Composition of Markets with Conflicting Incentives Stanko Dimitrov
• Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions
• Decision Rules and Decision Markets Abraham Othman
• Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Strategic Traders
• Combinatorial Prediction Markets for Event Hierarchies Duke University
• The Weighted Majority Algorithm Nick Littlestone
• Optimal Strategies from Random Walks Jacob Abernethy
• The convex optimization approach to regret minimization September 10, 2009
• Incentive Compatible Regression Learning$ Ofer Dekela,1
• DARPA!NETWORK!CHALLENGE! PROJECT!REPORT!
• Crowdsourcing and All-Pay Auctions Dominic DiPalantino
• Problem Set 5 Game Theory
• Section Notes 2 Introduction to optimization and linear optimization
• Section Notes 4 Duality, Sensitivity, Dual Simplex, Complementary Slackness
• Section Notes 9 IP: Cutting Planes
• AMPL-CPLEX Setup Guide for Windows Applied Mathematics 121
• Graphing in Maple Maple is a great software for doing the simple things: graphing linear inequalities, performing pivot operations
• Computer Science 50: Introduction to Computer Science I Harvard College
• Computer Science 50: Introduction to Computer Science I Harvard College
• Computational Mechanism Design The classic mechanism design literature largely ignores computational considerations. It
• Linear Programming and Auction Design Mechanism design proposes the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism as a solution for the
• Linear Programming and Vickrey We have assumed up to this point that agents follow myopic best-response bidding strate-
• Bounded-Rational Compatible Auctions & Myopic Best-Response
• Extended Example: Distributed Train In this chapter I present a computational study of an auction-based method for decentral-
• Conclusions Auctions o er great promise as mechanisms for optimal resource allocation in complex
• Bibliography AS98 Martin Andersson and Tuomas W Sandholm. Leveled commitment con-
• Preference Elicitation in Proxied Multiattribute Auctions Aditya V. Sunderam
• Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems
• Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems
• Cost and Trust Issues in On-Line Auctions Lyle H. Ungar1, David C. Parkes2, and Dean P. Foster3
• RC 22218 W0110-065 (10/23/2001) This draft: March 13, 2002. Computer Science/Mathematics
• Two Auction-Based Resource Allocation Environments: Design and Experience
• Sensor Networks for Medical Care Victor Shnayder, Bor-rong Chen, Konrad Lorincz,
• CodeBlue: Wireless Sensor Networks for Emergency Medical Care
• Simulating the Power Consumption of Large-Scale Sensor Network Applications
• Cooperative Multiagent Search for Portfolio Selection David C. Parkes
• Privacy for the Stock Market Giovanni Di Crescenzo
• Risk Assurance for Hedge Funds using Zero Knowledge Proofs
• CS286r Computational Mechanism Design: Project Suggestions Spring, 2005
• Panos M. Pardalos Center for Applied Optimization
• Economics of Network David Levinson
• The 2003 Supply Chain Management Trading Agent Competition Raghu Arunachalam
• Bidding for Customer Orders in TAC SCM: A Learning Approach David Pardoe and Peter Stone
• Zero Intelligence Plus and Gjerstad-Dickhaut Agents for Sealed Bid Auctions A. J. Bagnall and I. E. Toft
• Artificial Intelligence 175 (2011) 16551671 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
• A New Perspective on Implementation by Voting Trees Felix Fischer
• Discrete Mathematics 310 (2010) 34323435 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
• Journal of Computer and System Sciences 76 (2010) 759777 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
• Incentive Compatible Regression Learning Felix Fischer
• Would a `Cyber Warrior' Protect Us? Exploring Trade-offs Between Attack and Defense of Information Systems
• Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting Yiling Chen
• Socially Desirable Approximations for Dodgson's Voting Rule
• On the Limits of Dictatorial Classification Reshef Meir
• Artificial Intelligence 173 (2009) 11331149 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
• Learning Voting Trees Ariel D. Procaccia and Aviv Zohar and Yoni Peleg and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
• Automated Design of Scoring Rules by Learning from Examples
• Algorithms for the Coalitional Manipulation Problem Michael Zuckerman
• On the Approximability of Dodgson and Young Elections Ioannis Caragiannis
• Information Processing Letters 108 (2008) 390393 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
• Towards a Theory of Incentives in Machine ARIEL D. PROCACCIA
• On the Robustness of Preference Aggregation in Noisy Environments
• Average-Case Tractability of Manipulation in Voting via the Fraction of Manipulators
• Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 28 (2007) 157181 Submitted 08/06; published 02/07 Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of
• Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections
• The Distortion of Cardinal Preferences in Voting Ariel D. Procaccia and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
• Neural Information Processing -Letters and Reviews Vol. 10, No. 7, July 2006 Exact VC-Dimension of Monotone Formulas
• Extensive-Form Argumentation Games Ariel D. Procaccia Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
• Take-Home Exam Shahar Dobzinski Michael Zuckerman
• Improved Analysis of D* Craig Tovey1
• A Sufficient Condition for Backtrack-Free Search EUGENE C. FREUDER
• Soc Choice Welfare (1989) 6:22%241 SocialChoice
• http://www.jstor.org An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
• On Maximal Classes of Utility Functions for Efficient one-to-one Negotiation Yann Chevaleyre
• Reaching Envy-free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings Yann Chevaleyre
• 42 AI MAGAZINE echanism design has been described as "inverse game
• An Axiomatic Characterization of Continuous-Outcome Market Makers
• Betting on the Real Line , Yiling Chen1,
• Policy Teaching Through Reward Function Learning Haoqi Zhang
• Self-Financed Wagering Mechanisms for Forecasting Nicolas Lambert
• Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets
• The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School
• Usable AI: Experience and Reflections Introduction
• The Many Faces of Consistency in Cross-Platform Design
• Cross-Device Consistency in Automatically Generated User Interfaces
• Improving User Interface Personalization Krzysztof Gajos, Raphael Hoffmann and Daniel S. Weld
• Offer letter sent (misc people)
• On the Zero-Error Capacity Threshold for Deletion Channels
• The Price of Privately Releasing Contingency Tables and the Spectra of Random Matrices with Correlated Rows
• J A C O M O C O R B O Maxwell Dworkin #219 Voice: +1 617 297 2242
• Research Statement Jacomo Corbo
• Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks Jeffrey Shneidman and David C. Parkes
• "!#$!#%&'()021435768()9 A@B()'DC$EGFH(PIQR'ST6
• Collecting Data for One Hundred Years Jeffrey Shneidman, Bryan Choi, Margo Seltzer
• Virtual Economies: Threats and Risks Christopher Thorpe1
• Regret-based Utility Elicitation in Constraint-based Decision Problems
• Plenary talk: 1994 Society for Economic Dynamics and Control Meetings Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play*
• Competition and Consumer Confusion Xavier Gabaix
• Learning Social Preferences in Games Ya'akov Gal
• Reasoning about Rationality and Beliefs Ya'akov Gal and Avi Pfeffer
• Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation Sebastien M. Lahaie
• Bidders with Hard Valuation Problems Kate Larson KLARSON@CS.CMU.EDU
• Interaction between selfish and conditionally altruistic players -a model suggested by public good
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• The Psychology of Preference Elicitation
• Representing Agents' Beliefs, Preferences and Decision-
• Peloton: Coordinated Resource Management for Sensor Networks
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• The Case for Browser Provenance Daniel W. Margo and Margo Seltzer
• Securing Provenance Uri Braun, Avraham Shinnar
• CONCURRENCY AND COMPUTATION: PRACTICE AND EXPERIENCE Concurrency Computat.: Pract. Exper. 2008; 20:531540
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• Biologically-Inspired Control for Self-Adaptive Multiagent Systems
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• PRESS RELEASES SEAS Contact: Michael Patrick Rutter, 617-496-3185
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• Implementing Minimized Multivariate PKC on Low-Resource Embedded Systems
• Simulating the Power Consumption of Large-Scale Sensor Network Applications
• Lessons Learned from Implementing Ad-hoc Multicast Routing in Sensor Networks
• Konrad Lorincz Harvard University
• Mercury: A Wearable Sensor Network Platform for High-fidelity Motion Analysis
• Abstract--We present work to develop a wireless wearable sensor system for monitoring patients with Parkinson's disease
• MoteTrack: A Robust, Decentralized Approach to RF-Based Location Tracking
• 16 PERVASIVE computing Published by the IEEE CS and IEEE ComSoc 1536-1268/04/$20.00 2004 IEEE F I R S T R E S P O N S E
• !#"%$'&)()012 433"%5$6879@ ACBEDF$6@1HGIP$Q#(RTSC"%$6VUP()W
• MoteTrack:MoteTrack: A Robust, Decentralized Approach toA Robust, Decentralized Approach to
• Monitoring Volcanic Activity at Reventador Volcano, Ecuador with a
• Geoffrey Mainland Research Statement
• Foundations for Provenance-Aware Systems A dissertation presented
• Provenance as First Class Cloud Data Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy and Margo Seltzer
• Improving recoverability in multi-tier storage systems Marcos K. Aguilera
• Provenance-Aware Storage Systems Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy, David A. Holland, Uri Braun, Margo Seltzer
• A Versatile and User-Oriented Versioning File System Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy, Charles P. Wright, Andrew Himmer, and Erez Zadok
• Making a Cloud Provenance-Aware Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy, Peter Macko, and Margo Seltzer
• Ad-Hoc Multicast Routing on Resource-Limited Sensor Nodes Bor-rong Chen, Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy, and Matt Welsh
• Reducing Storage Management Costs via Informed User-Based Policies Erez Zadok, Jeffrey Osborn, Ariye Shater, Charles Wright, and Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy
• CSE 508 -Group 13 Project Report LSM for Enhanced Access Control
• Provenance refers to the complete history of a document. A Provenance Aware Storage System (PASS) treats the provenance of a file as a first class citizen: Provenance is generated and
• Mapping the Urban Wireless Landscape with Argos Ian Rose and Matt Welsh
• Cobra: Content-based Filtering and Aggregation of Blogs and RSS Feeds
• December 14, 2010 Faculty Contact List Fall 2010-Spring 2011
• December 14, 2010 Staff Contact List Fall 2010-Spring 2011
• Workshops & Seminars AY11 Workshop Name Course # Faculty Name Coordinator Time Location
• Graduate Courses Fall 2010 Graphic Schedule as of: 6/18/2010 8:30 2530a 2142 2530a 2142 8:30
• Writing Economics Robert Neugeboren with Mireille Jacobson
• Name (Program) Email/Primary Fields/Advisors and References Barza, Rachael (E) rbarza@fas.harvard.edu
• Economics focus Sep 10th 2009
• Will Europe's Economies Regain Their Footing? by Kenneth Rogoff
• Economics focus Drastic times
• BARBARA J. GROSZ Higgins Professor of Natural Sciences, Tel. (617) 495-3673; Fax (617) 496-1066
• Notes on the Negative Binomial distribution for word occurrences Edoardo Airoldi, Carnegie Mellon University (eairoldi@cs.cmu.edu)
• Research Statement Salil Vadhan
• TYLER W. MOORE Harvard University
• Economics and Internet Security: a Survey of Recent Analytical, Empirical and Behavioral Research
• Temporal Correlations between Spam and Phishing Websites Tyler Moore
• Data collection methodology Comparing website lifetimes and spam campaigns
• Security & Privacy Economics Editors: Michael Lesk, lesk@acm.org
• Ethical Dilemmas in Take-down Research Tyler Moore1
• Security Economics and European Policy Ross Anderson1
• Introduction to PhishTank data collection and analysis Testing the accuracy of PhishTank's crowd decisions
• Fast exclusion of errant devices from vehicular networks
• Introduction & background Path-key-enabled attacks
• Collaborative Scheduling: Threats and Promises Rachel Greenstadt and Michael D. Smith
• Experimental analysis of privacy loss in DCOP algorithms Rachel Greenstadt (student)
• Privatizing Constraint Optimization Rachel Greenstadt
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• Set separation Neural Network paradigms
• Emacs and Lisp on ice September 2007
• Assignment 0 (W) What's intelligence?
• Assignment 1 (C) Problem Encoding and Search
• Assignment 2 (W) I Can't Get No Satisfication.
• Assignment 3 (C) Game Trees and Alpha-Beta Pruning
• Assignment 5 (C) How to be a better neighbor.
• Assignment 6 (C) First-Order Logic and Knowledge Representation
• Assignment 7 (W) Computer Science 182 --Fall 2007
• Assignment 8 (C) Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problems
• 3 Introduction to Noncooperative Game Theory: Games in Normal Form
• Economic Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents
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• Incentive Compatible Ranking Systems Alon Altman
• Manipulability of PageRank under Sybil Strategies Alice Cheng
• Sum of Us: Strategyproof Selection from the Selectors Tel Aviv University and Microsoft Israel R&D Center
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• Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users G.Aggarwal & J. Feldman & S. Muthukrishnan & Martin Pal
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• An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising
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• Self-Correcting Sampling-Based Dynamic Multi-Unit Auctions Florin Constantin and David C. Parkes
• Single-Value Combinatorial Auctions and Implementation in Undominated Strategies
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• MATHEMATICS OF OPERAl IONS RtSKARt II Vol. 5, No, I. February 1981
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• Introduction to Market Design, Econ 2056a and Business 4150
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• Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Ron Holzman
• Applications of Approximation Algorithms to Cooperative Games
• Z .GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 21, 2 14 1997 ARTICLE NO. GA970585
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• Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition Ross Cressman, January, 2006
• Adaptive Heuristics Prepared for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
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• Provenance for the Cloud Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy, Peter Macko, and Margo Seltzer
• The Click Modular Router EDDIE KOHLER, ROBERT MORRIS, BENJIE CHEN, JOHN JANNOTTI,
• Versions PASS tracks versions of both processes and
• Problem Set 3 Let's Simplex
• Section Notes 2 The Linear Programming Model
• Using Shapes for Function in Evolutionary Robotics A Senior Thesis
• AM 121: Intro to Optimization Models and Methods
• Littauer Room Bookings Spring Master To reserve a classroom email david_wright@harvard.edu 219 M-15 M-16 M-17 M-34/36 219 M-15 M-16 M-17 M-34/36 219 M-15 M-16 M17 M-34/36 219 M-15 M-16 M17 M-34/36 219 M-15 M-16 M17 M-34/36
• AM121 Course Logistics Spring 2012
• Identification and Functional Validation of the Novel Antimalarial Resistance Locus PF10_0355 in Plasmodium
• ECONOMICS FACULTY DIRECTORY (Updated February 2012)
• Problem Set 4 Duality, Sensitivity, Dual Simplex, Complementary Slackness
• External-Memory Multimaps Elaine Angelino
• 2010NatureAmerica,Inc.Allrightsreserved. nature CHeMICaL BIOLOGY | vol 6 | february 2010 | www.nature.com/naturechemicalbiology 105
• Task Routing for Prediction Tasks Haoqi Zhang
• Pivoting in Maple/Matlab/Mathematica February 24, 2012
• Graphing in Mathematica This is the Mathematica version of the graphing guide. Mathematica is another great piece of software
• Causality-Based Versioning Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy and David A. Holland
• Provenance Integration Requires Reconciliation Elaine Angelino
• Collecting Provenance via the Xen Hypervisor Peter Macko
• Predicting Your Own Effort David F. Bacon
• AM 121: Intro to Optimization Models and Methods
• Econ Staff Directory (Updated February 2012)
• Provenance Map Orbiter: Interactive Exploration of Large Provenance Graphs
• Compressing graphs with semantic structure Elaine Angelino
• BioMed Central Page 1 of 11
• Problem Set 1 Getting Started with Linear Programming
• Constraining Provenance Queries Daniel Margo, Peter Macko, and Margo Seltzer
• Making a Cloud Provenance-Aware Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy, Peter Macko, and Margo Seltzer
• Tracking Back References in a Write-Anywhere File System Peter Macko
• AM 121: Intro to Optimization Models and Methods
• StarFlow: A Script-centric Data Analysis Environment
• AM 121: Intro to Optimization Models and Methods
• Excitability Constraints on Voltage-Gated Sodium Channels
• Magnetic Resonance in Medicine 58:497510 (2007) Regularized, Fast, and Robust Analytical Q-Ball Imaging
• Apparent Diffusion Coefficients from High Angular Resolution Diffusion Imaging: Estimation and
• Problem Set 5 Game Theory
• AM121 Mathematical Programming Style Guide This is a class in which clear and precise expression is essential. When formulating mathematical
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• Section Notes 1 Introduction to Optimization and Mathematical Programming
• Extreme Optimization 1 Help cure cancer
• Section Notes 3 The Simplex Algorithm
• AM121: Useful LATEX code snippets You should find these code snippets very useful for your assignment and extreme
• Section Notes 4 Duality, Sensitivity, and the Dual Simplex Algorithm
• AM 121: Intro to Optimization Models and Methods
• DOI: 10.1126/science.1183863 , 883 (2010);327Science
• AM 121: Intro to Optimization Models and Methods
• Layering in Provenance Systems Kiran-Kumar Muniswamy-Reddy, Uri Braun, David A. Holland,