Anshelevich, Elliot - Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

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Anshelevich, Elliot - Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Exact and Approximate Equilibria for Optimal Group Network Elliot Anshelevich
Noname manuscript No. (will be inserted by the editor)
THE PRICE OF STABILITY FOR NETWORK DESIGN WITH FAIR COST ALLOCATION
Noname manuscript No. (will be inserted by the editor)
Network Formation and Routing by Strategic Agents using Local Contracts
On Survivable Access Network Design: Complexity and Algorithms
NETWORK DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT WITH STRATEGIC A Dissertation
TERMINAL BACKUP, 3D MATCHING, AND COVERING CUBIC GRAPHS ELLIOT ANSHELEVICH AND ADRIANA KARAGIOZOVA
Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings Elliot Anshelevich
Strategic Network Formation through Peering and Service Agreements
Strategic Network Formation through Peering and Service Agreements
Deformable Volumes in Path Planning Applications Elliot Anshelevich Scott Owens Florent Lamiraux Lydia E. Kavraki
Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing Elliot Anshelevich
Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games
Copyright by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. SIAM J. COMPUT. c 2008 Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
THE PRICE OF STABILITY FOR NETWORK DESIGN WITH FAIR COST ALLOCATION #
Path Decomposition under a New Cost Measure with Applications to Optical Network Design
NEAR-OPTIMAL NETWORK DESIGN WITH SELFISH AGENTS ELLIOT ANSHELEVICH, ANIRBAN DASGUPTA, EVA TARDOS , AND TOM
CSCI 6963 Fall 2011 Algorithmic Game Theory Problem Set 1
Strategic Pricing in Next-hop Routing with Elastic Elliot Anshelevich
Algorithmic Game Theory -Approximate Syllabus CSCI 6963 (Fall 2011)
CSCI 6963 Fall 2011 Algorithmic Game Theory Problem Set 3
CSCI 6963 Fall 2011 Algorithmic Game Theory Problem Set 4