- Position Auctions and Nonuniform Conversion Rates Liad Blumrosen
- Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods
- On Algorithms for Ecient Data Migration Joseph Hall y Jason Hartline y Anna R. Karlin y Jared Saia y John Wilkes z
- Algorithmic Pricing via Virtual Valuations Shuchi Chawla
- A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions
- Lectures on Approximation in Mechanism Design Jason Hartline1
- On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction
- Optimization in the Private Value Model: Competitive Analysis Applied to Auction Design
- Competitive Generalized Auctions School of Comp. Sci.
- EnvyFree Auctions for Digital Goods Andrew V. Goldberg
- NearOptimal Online Auctions Avrim Blum # Jason D. Hartline +
- A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions
- Lectures on Frugal Mechanism Design # Jason Hartline +
- Bayesian Optimal Nodeficit Mechanism Design # Shuchi Chawla 1 , Jason D. Hartline 2 , Uday Rajan 3 , and R. Ravi 4
- Models for Sponsored Search: What are the right questions?
- Characterizing History Independent Data Structures Jason D. Hartline # Edwin S. Hong + Alexander E. Mohr #
- From Optimal Limited To Unlimited Supply Auctions Jason D. Hartline
- Knapsack Auctions Gagan Aggarwal # Jason D. Hartline +
- Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions Kaustubh Deshmukh 1 , Andrew V. Goldberg 2 ,
- On ProfitMaximizing Envyfree Pricing Venkatesan Guruswami # Jason D. Hartline + Anna R. Karlin # David Kempe #
- Characterizing History Independent Data Structures
- Reducing Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design via Machine Learning #
- Position Auctions and Non-uniform Conversion Rates Liad Blumrosen
- CollusionResistant Mechanisms for SingleParameter Agents # Andrew V. Goldberg + Jason D. Hartline +
- Characterizing History Independent Data Structures Jason D. Hartline
- Characterizing History Independent Data Structures
- Competitive Generalized Auctions School of Comp. Sci.
- Bayesian Optimal No-deficit Mechanism Design Shuchi Chawla1
- Envy, Truth, and Profit Jason D. Hartline
- Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Agents Andrew V. Goldberg
- Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Matchings Jason D. Hartline
- Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing
- Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design [Extended Abstract]
- Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms Jason D. Hartline
- Limited and Online Supply and the Bayesian Foundations of
- Selling Ad Campaigns: Online Algorithms with Cancellations
- Reducing Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design via Machine Learning
- Competitive Auctions Andrew V. Goldberg
- Knapsack Auctions Gagan Aggarwal
- From Optimal Limited To Unlimited Supply Auctions Jason D. Hartline
- Derandomization of Auctions Gagan Aggarwal
- Near-Optimal Online Auctions Jason D. Hartline
- On Profit-Maximizing Envy-free Pricing Venkatesan Guruswami
- Optimization in the Private Value Model: Competitive Analysis Applied to Auction Design
- Envy-Free Auctions for Digital Goods Andrew V. Goldberg
- Competitiveness via Consensus Andrew V. Goldberg
- Lectures on Optimal Mechanism Design Jason Hartline
- Lectures on Frugal Mechanism Design Jason Hartline
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology Course Notes, Week 1 6.042J/18.062J, Fall '05: Mathematics for Computer Science September 7
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology Course Notes, Week 3 6.042J/18.062J, Fall '05: Mathematics for Computer Science September 20
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology Course Notes, Week 12 6.042J/18.062J, Fall '05: Mathematics for Computer Science November 21
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology Course Notes, Week 13 6.042J/18.062J, Fall '05: Mathematics for Computer Science November 28
- Competitive Auctions Andrew V. Goldberg #
- Auctions for Structured Procurement Matthew C. Cary # Abraham D. Flaxman + Jason D. Hartline # Anna R. Karlin
- Derandomization of Auctions # Gagan Aggarwal +
- Competitive Auctions and Digital Goods Andrew V. Goldberg
- Optimal Mechanism Design and Money Burning Jason D. Hartline #
- Optimal Marketing Strategies over Social Networks Jason Hartline
- Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions Kaustubh Deshmukh 1 , Andrew V. Goldberg 2 ,
- Competitiveness via Consensus Andrew V. Goldberg #
- Optimal Mechanism Design and Money Burning Jason D. Hartline
- Auctions for Structured Procurement Matthew C. Cary
- An Experimental Study of Data Migration Eric Anderson 1 , Joe Hall 2 , Jason Hartline 2 , Michael Hobbs 1 , Anna R. Karlin 2 ,
- Mechanism Design via Machine Learning Maria-Florina Balcan
- On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction
- Prior-independent Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design
