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Sethuraman, Jay - Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University
/ 3907 no34 Mp 874 Wednesday Nov 18 12:01 PM INFMOR no34 0364-765X/98/2304/0874/$05.00
Many-To-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness Jay Sethuraman
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) 10.1007/s00236-003-0119-6 Acta Informatica 39, 597612 (2003)
Jay Sethuraman Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
Optimal Stochastic Scheduling in Multiclass Parallel Queues Jay Sethuraman Mark S. Squillante
An Equivalence result in School Choice Jay Sethuraman
Optimal Crawling Strategies for Web Search Engines J.L. Wolf, M.S. Squillante,
Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
The bipartite rationing problem Herve Moulin
Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues
Approximately OptimalControl of Fluid Networks Lisa Fleischer* Jay Sethuramant
Balancing Supply and Demand Under Bilateral constraints
Cooperation in Queues Akshay-Kumar Katta
Pricing strategies and service differentiation in queues --A profit maximization perspective
Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result
House Allocation With Fractional Endowments Stergios Athanassoglou
Stochastic search in a forest revisited Jay Sethuraman
A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
Effective routing and scheduling in adversarial queueing networks Jay Sethuraman
A NOTE ON BANDITS WITH A TWIST AKSHAY-KUMAR KATTA AND JAY SETHURAMAN
Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions
Theory and Methodology On a cutting plane heuristic for the stable roommates problem and
Optimal Scheduling of Multiclass Parallel Machines Jay Sethuraman*
0022-0000/01 $35.00 2001 Elsevier Science (USA)
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 28, No. 2, May 2003, pp. 309326
Effective Routing and Scheduling in Adversarial Queueing Networks
Groupstrategyproofness of the Egalitarian Mechanism for Constrained Rationing Problems
Balancing Supply and Demand Under Bilateral constraints
House Allocation With Fractional Endowments Stergios Athanassoglou
Equivalence results in the allocation of indivisible objects: A unified view
Groupstrategyproofness of the Egalitarian Mechanism for Constrained Rationing Problems
The bipartite rationing problem Herve Moulin
