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- International Journal of Game Theory (1991) 19:431-456 Internal Correlation in Repeated Games I
- International Journal of Game Theory (1990) 19:191-217 Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games With
- GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 8, 123-163 (1995) Subjective Games and Equilibria
- International Journal of Game Theory (1991)20:129-147 Global Games a
- MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 35, No. 4, November 2010, pp. 851863
- Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010) 670682 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
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- International Journal of Game Theory (1993) 22:31-42 Bounded Variation of { V.} and its Limit 1
- Games and Economic Behavior 69 (2010) 127137 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
- REPEATED GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ON ONE SIDE: THE CASE OF DIFFERENT DISCOUNT FACTORS
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- Int J Game Theory (2002) 31:253268 Approachability in infinite dimensional spaces
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- International Journal of Game Theory (1989) 18:195-207 RegularSimple Games
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- Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (2010) 393399 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games Author(s): Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer
- International Journal of Game Theory (1996) 25:177-188 Mediated Talk
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- Journal of Mathematical Economics 20 (1991) 107-I 18. North-Holland On a representation of a relation by a
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- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 37, 191-201 (1985) Notes, Comments, and Letters to the Editor
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- International Journal of Game Theory (1992) 20:211-226 On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player
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- Economics Letters 23 (1987) 341-342 North-Holland
- Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs Dario Bauso
