Fitelson, Branden - Department of Philosophy, University of California at Berkeley

• 111.-CAUSATION AND RECIPES By DouGLAS GASKING
• Knowing is not a State of Mind a discussion of T.Williamson, "Is Knowing a State of Mind?",
• How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens Branden Fitelson
• Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism BRANDEN FITELSON
• RUDOLF CARNAP definitions of these concepts use quantitative terms, viz. the degree of confirmation,
• NOTES ON WILLIAMSON: CHAPTER 11 ASSERTION 11.1 Constitutive Rules
• Critical Notices Is Knowing a State of Mind?
• THE INTRANSITIVITY OF CAUSATION REVEALED IN EQUATIONS AND GRAPHS* I. Introduction
• CONTRASTIVE BAYESIANISM BRANDEN FITELSON
• Lewis's Causal Explanation ! Main Thesis: Explanations of particular events are either (a) chunks of information about the event's
• 172 Experimentation and Scientific Realism 12. But excludingLeibniz, who "knew" there had to be some real, natural dif-
• 172 Causation and din turn depends on Ct. Causal dependence is here intransitive: Ct
• Philosophy 101 Grades update. Rough Curves for HWs 4/5 & Q5
• Independence and Counterfactual After briefly discussing two other counterfactual theories of causation, this
• Notes for Week 7 of Confirmation Branden Fitelson
• Notes from Class Discussion: Week 2 (led by Ben Escoto) Branden Fitelson
• Nickerson`s RBH model: MODEL1 = PrSAT@8Pr@HD 1 2,
• Branden Fitelson Lectures on Inductive Logic & Confirmation 0 LECTURES ON INDUCTIVE LOGIC & CONFIRMATION
• When Warrant Transmits NYU Dept of Philosophy
• Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 516521; December 2002
• Working in Groups Philosophy 142
• Completeness in Propositional vs Predicate Logic Branden Fitelson
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 1 Scientific Explanation & Scientific Realism: Day 2
• Philosophy 57 --Quiz #4 (solutions posted 4/8/03)
• 7.1 After formality? At the beginning of After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre asks us to imagine a future dark ages
• *Received March 2000; revised November 2001 To contact the author, please write to Nancy Cartwright, Department of Philosophy,
• Notes for Week 5 of Confirmation Branden Fitelson
• Working in Groups Philosophy 12A
• Reflections on Skolem's Relativity of Set-Theoretical Concepts! IGNACIO JANE"
• 450 THEJOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY DUTCH-BOOKARGUMENTS DEPRAGMATIZED
• Distributivity in L0 and Other Sentential Logics
• NOTES AND COMMENTS Degree ofConfirmation
• Hume, Induction, Probability
• Philosophy 164/264 Syllabus September 27, 2001
• Philosophy 164/264 Paper Topics & Questions --Weeks 78 The following questions pertain to various topics discussed in the first several chapters of Salmon's Four
• Using Mathematica to Understand the Computer Proof of the Robbins Conjecture
• Millsop (1) THE NATURE OF NORMATIVITY IN
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 1 The Pragmatics of Explanation I
• Inference to the Best Explanation Harman, 1965
• Discussion: Re-solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence* James Hawthorne and Branden Fitelson
• WHAT CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY COULD NOT BE ABSTRACT. Kolmogorov's axiomatization of probability includes the familiar ratio
• Philosophy 269 January 8, 2002 1 Probability, Counterfactuals & Causation
• well as other students of nature have long been concerned with ascertaining the effects produced by various systems and subsystems; and that a reasonably
• Frequency illusions and other fallaciesq Steven A. Sloman,a,* David Over,b
• Declarations of Independence Branden Fitelson and Alan Hjek
• Studia Logica (2007) 86: 215246 DOI: 10.1007/s11225-007-9060-y Springer 2007
• VOLUMELXI, NO. 21 NOVEMBER12, 1964 SYMPOSIUM: INTENTIONALITY
• 40 Joseph Ullwn 14. Joseph Ullian and Nelson Goodman, "Bad Company A Reply to Mr.
• CHARLES S. CHIHARA AND DONALD A. GILLIES AN INTERCHANGE ON THE POPPER-MILLER
• On the Properties of Conditional Independence* Wolfgang Spohn
• Zoe Drayson 22 April 2009
• HEMPEL'S AMBIGUITY * J. ALBERT0 COFFA
• Testing Arguments for Validity and Soundness Philosophy 12A
• VAN FRAASSEN AND THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF EXPLANATION FABRIZIO CARIANI
• 108 CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY Kyburg, H. 1978. Subjective probability, Journal of Philosophical Logic 7,
• The Pragmatic Theory of Explanation
• ACTUAL CAUSATION: ANALYSIS, MODELING &
• 12 Introduction degree of logical sophistication about what is required for one thing
• Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength
• Value Monism in Epistemology MICHAEL R. DEPAUL
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Overview of Today's Lecture
• Notes for Week 12 of Confirmation Branden Fitelson
• Philosophy 57 --Extra-Credit Problems May 1, 2003 (due Tuesday, May 20, 2003)
• Studying Discrete Time Dynamics of 2 x2 Normal -Form Games
• Philosophy 269 January 22, 2002 1 Causation and Manipulability
• Ifs and Oughts NIKO KOLODNY AND JOHN MACFARLANE
• THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME XCVIII, NO. 6, jUNE 2001
• 134 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY since it was proposed by Boole as a test of the "received" theory of proba-
• Philosophy 101 You should be reading well into Chapter 3 now...
• BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN CLARENDON PRESS -OXFORD
• Wesley C. Salmon You awaken to the soundofyour alarmclock; you getoutofbed to turn itoff. Causal
• IN DEFENCE OF CLOSURE IN DEFENCE OF CLOSURE
• Bennett's Ch. 17: `Even If...' Maile Holck, 11/16/04
• Blackwell Publishing 2006 Philosophy Compass 1/1 (2006): 95113, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00011.x
• Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits Seminar Fall 2006 Sherri Roush
• Companion Mathematica Notebook for "What is The 'Equal Weight View'?" David Jehle
• The-PhilosophicalReview, XCIII, No. 3 (July 1984) 1953 AND ALL THAT. A TALE OF TWO
• VOLUME LXI, No. 19 OCTOBER 15, 1964 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
• Some Remarks on the "Intelligent Design" Controversy Branden Fitelson
• ON INDUCTIVE LOGIC RUDOLF CARNAP
• 6 The Basic Rules of Probability This chapter summarizes the rules you have been using for adding and
• Aaron Leung Philosophy 290-6
• Philosophy 101 Quiz #2 to be returned today (end of class)
• 60 Wesley C. Salmon the probability for a randomly selectedmemberof the human populationat large.
• Joyce's Argument for Probabilism Patrick Maher (p-maher@uiuc.edu)
• BOOLEAN ALGEBRA Boolean algebra, or the algebra of logic, was devised by the English mathematician
• Case for Scientific Realism 9 A Case for Scientific Realism
• Copyright 1955 by Rudolf Carnap
• CHAPTER XVI "When I see a billiard ball moving towards another, my mind is im.
• ELLIOTT SOBER EQUILIBRIUM EXPLANATION*
• 932 R. CARNAP, REPLIES AND EXPOSITIONS BETH ON CONSTRUCTED LANGUAGES 933 reconstructions of the ordinary language within constructed systems
• An Extended Reconstruction --in Detail April 7, 2011
• THE MISHAP AT REICHENBACH FALL: SINGULAR VS. GENERAL CAUSATION CHRISTOPHER READ HITCHCOCK
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Announcements and Such
• 54 Chapter Two 7. For a detailed discussion of this move by the skeptic, see Alston 1993,
• Explicativity: A Mathematical
• PATRICK MAHER PROBABILITIES FOR MULTIPLE PROPERTIES
• Mind, Vol. 116 . 463 . July 2007 doi:10.1093/mind/fzm597
• Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 35 (1984), 65-80 Printed in Great Britain 65 Review Article
• Synthese (2007) 156:563585 DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9138-5
• we already are if we wish to improve. It is good to know our flaws if we aim to remove them, our strengths if we aim to preserve them. We want to know how
• Fall 2006 Sherri Roush Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, Chapters 5 and 6
• In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for John MacFarlane
• PROBABILITY, AND CONFIRMATION these two mistakes and I apologise. But fortunately these regrettable errors do not
• Assignment #2 Solutions and Common Mistakes 1 Problem #1
• 192 h , Explanation and Realism 6.C.Hempel and P. Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," in
• A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency Eleonora Cresto CONICET (Argentina)
• Biometrika (1995), 82, 4, pp. 669-710 Printed in Great Britain
• This essay and the sections of Causal Asymmetry from which it draws could not have been written without many detailed and helpful criticisms and suggestions from Ellery Eells. Thanks also
• We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now* Juan Comesaa
• Philosophy 148: HW #4 Solutions (i) E1 Hempel-Confirms H. (E1 = Raa&Rab&Rba&Rbb)
• Introduction L ARGUMENTS
• A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence BRANDEN FITELSON
• COMMENTS AND CRITICISM COMMENTS AND CRITICISM
• Philosophy 101 HW #3 due Today (end of class)
• Psychological Review VOLUME 90 NUMBER 4 OCTOBER 1983
• Forthcoming in INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE: PERSPECTIVES FROM ETHICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY, ed. M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (OUP, 2002)
• JONATHAN VOGEL ARB THERE COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE CU)SURE PRINCIPLE?
• Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
• Comparison of confirmation measures q,qq Katya Tentori a,*, Vincenzo Crupi a,c
• Cognitive Science 28 (2004) 467477 The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding
• TRUTH AND PROBABILITY (1926) & "Further Considerations" (1928) & "Probability and Partial Belief" (1929)
• PSYCHOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND SKEPTICISM IN HUME'S ARGUMENT ABOUT INDUCTION
• PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION .. he first edition of this book has been out of print for some time. In
• Is Causation Influence?1 David Lewis has recently given a new version of the counterfactual
• Events and Times: A Case Study in Means-Ends Metaphysics Christopher Hitchcock
• Notes on De Re Modality Branden Fitelson
• The Interpolation Theorem for Classical Logic Branden Fitelson
• Branden Fitelson Recent Results Obtained Via Automated Reasoning 0 SOME RECENT RESULTS IN ALGEBRA & LOGICAL CALCULI
• Work in progress Send comments to tshogenji@ric.edu
• What are propositions and why does a realist believe in them? To answer this, consider the question: What is asserted when you say (or think)
• Introduction 1. S O M E QUESTIONS
• 556 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY CAUSATION *
• Philosophical Perspectives, 1, Metaphysics, 1987 EVENT CAUSATION
• Philosophy of Science December, 1981
• The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, by James Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Pp. xii + 268. H/b 45.00.
• Forthcoming in Williamson and His Critics, ed. P. Greenough and D. Pritchard (OUP). Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits1
• Kim's Argument for the Unconfirmability of Disjunctive Laws Branden Fitelson
• Notes on Gibbard's Theorem Branden Fitelson
• Philosophy 142 Syllabus August 27, 2008
• COMMENTS AND CRITICISM 383 A QUERY ON CONFIRMATION
• Philosophy 164/264 Paper Topics & Questions --Weeks 12 The following questions are drawn from my own readings of (and puzzlings over) chapters 1, 2, 6, and 8 of
• Philosophy 140A Take-Home Mid-Term Branden Fitelson
• 718 Book Reviews public' (p. vii) and one presumably to a more scholarly audience. This history
• CONTENT AND DEGREE OF CONFIRMATION Remarks on Popper's Note on Content and Degree ofConfirmation
• Do Large Probabilities Explain Better?* Michael Strevenstt
• Notes for Week 13 of Confirmation Branden Fitelson
• Conceptualism and the Myth of the Given Walter Hopp
• 50 CHAPTER III rationally justified if for every level (k) of rules of that system there is
• Symposi.urn: ON TH;; ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
• A Formal Account of Epistemic Defeat Matthew Kotzen
• Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty Analysis, 60(2): 143-147, 2000.
• THEJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY FOUNDEDBY FREDERICKJ. E.WOODBRIDGEAND WENDELL T. BUSH
• RECENT PROBLEMS OF INDUCTION
• Semantics for Conditional Logics: A First-Order Formalization with Applications Branden Fitelson
• 112 THE JOURNAL O F PHILOSOPHY DUTCH BOOKIES AND MONEY PUMPS*
• SIMILARITY IS A BAD GUIDE TO COUNTERFACTUAL TRUTH ABSTRACT. The most popular theory of how to evaluate counterfactuals is to use the Lewis-
• Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXX, No.2, March 2005
• Brown, Lipton, and the Prospects of High-level IBE Brown's Project
• Philosophy 101 I've posted solutions to HW #3 (study these!)
• KNOWLEDGE FROM FALSEHOOD Ted A. Warfield
• CHRISTOPHER READ HITCHCOCK A GENERALIZED PROBABILISTIC THEORY OF CAUSAL RELEVANCE*
• Notes on Chapter 2 of Knowledge and its Limits We will focus mainly on the argument "from internalism to the denial that knowing is a mental state"
• Oxford Studies in Epistemology II final version Rational Credence and the Value of Truth
• 228 Tbe Logic of Structure-Based Counterfactuals In cases wbere we tend to assert categorically tbat tbe flow of causation in a feed-
• Aristotle's Division of the World --Notes & Reflections Branden Fitelson
• The sceptical problem about the future, often called the problem of induction, was first published in 1739, in David Hume's A Treatise
• Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 59 (2008), 89119 What Evidence Do You Have?
• Mind, Vol. 106 . 422 . April 1997 Oxford University Press 1997 Distinct Indiscernibles and the
• A Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism Kenny Easwaran and Branden Fitelson
• Studia Logica (2007) 86: 183213 DOI: 10.1007/s11225-007-9059-4 Springer 2007
• EPISTEMICMERIT,INTRINSICAND INSTRUMENTAL* Roderick Firth
• Bayesian Probability Patrick Maher
• Risk Aversion and Rationality Lara Buchak, January 2010
• 114 Probability some inductive inferences are as probable in relation to the
• THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME LXXIV, NO. 2, FEBRUARY, 1977
• Causality and Explanation: A Reply to Two Critiques*
• Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow
• Name Section Philosophy 57 --Quiz # 6
• Brit. ]. Phil. Sci. 41 (1990), 333-350 Printed in Great Britain The Epistemology of J. M. Keynesl
• LMPL-Validity is Decidable Branden Fitelson
• Three Attempts to Refute Skepticism and Why They Fail Richard Foley
• Christopher Peacocke 2001 Does Perception have a Nonconceptual Content?1
• Empirical concepts and the content of experience Hannah Ginsborg
• THE INFERENCE T O THE BEST I WISH to argue that enumerative induction should not be consid-
• Our Axiom (1) Can't Be Derived from Skyrms's Six "Rules" Branden Fitelson
• Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction
• Notes on Warfield's "Knowledge from Falsehood" Branden Fitelson
• DEGREE OF-FACTUAL SUPPORT JOHN G. KEMENY AND PAUL OPPENHEIMl
• 2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiii
• Forthcoming in P. Greenough and D. Pritchard, eds., Williamson on Knowledge (OUP) Evidence = Knowledge
• DownloadedBy:[UniversityofCaliforniaBerkeley]At:22:2522November2007 Quarterly Journal of ExperimentalPsychology (1971) 23, 63-71
• Possible Worlds CORNELL UNIVERSITY
• Philosophy 101 This is PHIL 101 (section 2) --"Logic, Reason, and Persuasion"
• Causation, Regularities, and Time: Hume's Theory
• Explaining theSuccess Karl Popper has steadfastly held that tlie success of science is not to be
• Philosophy 101 Solutions to HW #2 posted (study them!)
• Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky
• Notes on Field's "What is the Normative Role of Logic?" Branden Fitelson
• qualitative (or projectable) predicates. On this issue dissensus reigns. It is obvi-ously crucial to anyonewho adoptsany sortof covering law view, but it is equally
• Brit. 1.Phil. Sci. 45 (1994).467-476 Printed in Great Britain Bayesian Confirmation
• 108 CHAPTER V January 12, 1999, he would have been under seven feet tall. I will say that if a
• Notes for Week 9 of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology Branden Fitelson
• Pollock on Probability in Epistemology Branden Fitelson
• Epistemology Seminar Branden Fitelson
• 462 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY cause some fundamental rethinking (at least in the "analytic" tra-
• 2009 The Aristotelian Society Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiii
• From association to causation via regression David A. Freedman
• DIFFERENCE-MAKING IN CONTEXT1 Peter Menzies
• If we now let jn(o)stand for the number of heads in the first n trials of w, the weak and strong form of the law of large numbers can be stated as
• A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications Branden Fitelson
• 922 R. CARNAP, REPLIES AND EXPOSITIONS E. The concept of analyticity in philosophy. I believe that the distinc-
• EXPLANATION A N D REFERENCE Explanation and reference"
• Some History Surrounding our Deductive Apparatus for P Branden Fitelson
• Field on the Normative Role of Logic Gilbert Harman
• VOL. LIV. NO. 213.1 [January, 1945. A QUARTERLY REVIEW
• Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism Alvin Goldman
• Ellen Bales November 9, 2004
• Models and Reality --A Review of Brian Skyrms' Evolution of the Social Contract
• ROGER WHITE PROBLEMS FOR DOGMATISM
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Announcements and Such
• Bennett's Ch 7: Indicative Conditionals Lack Truth Values Jennifer Zale, 10/12/04
• separate distinct problems, to 'seek the limits and conditions of each, and to show how illusory is the e~e with which
• COUNTER-CLOSURE Federico Luzzi
• Causality and the Inference from the Observed to the Unobserved
• Bayesianism Its Scope and Limits Elliott Sober*
• My Rendition of Hunter's Strong Inductive Proof of The Deduction Theorem for PS Branden Fitelson
• 14. Joseph Ullian and Nelson Goodm~, "Bad Company: A Reply to Mr. Zabludowski and Others," ]. PhUlJsl1jJhy 72, 5 (March 13, 1975), 142.
• Modal ~zctionalzsm~ G I D E O N ROSEN
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Overview of Today's Lecture
• MONIST; APRIL 01, 2001 WHAT IS WRONG WITH BAYES NETS?[*]
• Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LIX,No. 4, December 1999
• Name Section Philosophy 57 --Mid-Term Exam
• Original version March 2009 Rev October 2010. Rev December 2010 This version Jan 6, 2011 Inventing New Signals
• 1. The problem of causal order The aim of science may be presented in a variety ofways: to discover
• 62 Chapter 2 3Success Stories
• Carl Hempel, "Two Models of Scientific Explanation"
• Branden Fitelson Comments on Presting's "Computability and Newcomb's Problem" 1 COMMENTS ON PRESTING'S "COMPUTABILITY AND NEWCOMB'S PROBLEM"
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Announcements and Such
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Announcements and Such
• Events and Reification----------..---. When Frege introduced quantification, he illuminated three subjects: logic,
• On the Regress Argument for Infinitism Synthese 166:1 (Jan 2009)
• Branden Fitelson Logical Foundations of Evidential Support 0 Logical Foundations of Evidential Support
• TELL ME YOU LOVE ME BOOTSTRAPPING, EXTERNALISM,
• Introduction1 This is not the dissertation that in 1990 I set out to write. That one would have been
• Notes for Week 2 of Confirmation Branden Fitelson
• Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens
• 'CONTENT' AND 'DEGREE OF CONFIRMATION' plausible measures of informative content, some of which have been dis-
• 502 E. W. BETH theoretical investigation; for the philosophy of (exact) science, in
• 250 A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY PT. III of a phenomenon which has appeared as part of a more complex
• NOTES INDUOTION AND ANALOGY 275 NOTES ON PART III
• John Earman and Wesley C . Salmon In Chapter 1 we considtred the nature and importance of scientific explanation. If we
• Inductive Logic 1. Brief Historical Background and Motivation
• What is the Normative Role of Logic? Abstract: The paper tries to spell out a connection between deductive logic and
• Evidence of evidence is not (necessarily) evidence Branden Fitelson1
• Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength Branden Fitelson
• Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength Branden Fitelson (UC|Berkeley)
• What is the "Equal Weight View"? David Jehle and Branden Fitelson
• Bayesians sometimes cannot ignore even very implausible theories
• GOODMAN'S "NEW RIDDLE" BRANDEN FITELSON
• Ian Hacking. An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. Cambridge University Press 2000, xvii + 302 pp.
• The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
• Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism
• Shortest Axiomatizations of Implicational S4 and S5 Zachary Ernst
• papers/blackwell/essay created 09-24-99
• A CONCISE AXIOMATIZATION OF RM ZACHARY ERNST, BRANDEN FITELSON, KENNETH HARRIS, AND LARRY WOS
• Comments on Some Completeness Theorems of Urquhart and Mendez & Salto
• Is it rational to have faith? Looking for new evidence, Good's Theorem,
• The Paradox of Confirmation Branden Fitelson1
• Confirmation Theory as a Branch of Inductive Logic: Historical and Philosophical Reflections APA Eastern 2005 Inductive Logic Symposium Script
• Motivating Problems & Logical Background AR Representation AR Results Conclusion References Automated Reasoning in Modal Logics
• Branden Fitelson Relational & Non-Relational Support 2 The Favoring Relation: The Central Concept in the Debate
• Initializations (Evaluate this cell first) The Monty Hall Problem: Animation
• Branden Fitelson Probabilistic Coherence from a Logical Point of View 1 Probabilistic Coherence from a Logical Point of View
• Branden Fitelson Some Recent Fallacies of Approximation 1 Some Recent Fallacies of Approximation in Bayesian Confirmation Theory
• Script for "Logical Foundations of Evidential Support" (Do not quote or cite without permission.)
• Comments on Jim Franklin's "The Representation of Context: Ideas from Artificial Intelligence"
• RETHINKING THE PROBLEM OF OLD EVIDENCE 0 Overview of Presentation
• Putting The Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction
• Accuracy, Language Dependence and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism Branden Fitelson
• Dempster-Shafer Functions as Metalinguistic Probability Functions Branden Fitelson
• Draft: Please do not quote without permission (comments welcome). Earman on Old Evidence and Measures of Confirmation
• A Concise Analysis of Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude Branden Fitelson
• Philosophy 101 Syllabus Branden Fitelson
• Philosophy 101 --Five Extra-Credit Problems 04/28/11 (due 5/12/11)
• Philosophy 101 By now, you should have read all of Chapter 2 (carefully!).
• Three Possible Causes of Irrational Belief February 3, 2011
• Philosophy 101 By now, you should have read all of Chapter 2 (carefully!).
• Philosophy 12A Syllabus May 25, 2010
• Outline The Logical Norms Kolodny's Error Theory Objections to Kolodny Assertion Self Talk A New Error Theory Formal Coherence is a Myth
• Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 30 April 2007 at 4:15 pm.
• Do Imprecise Credences Make Sense? Department of Philosophy
• Notes for Week 2 of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology Branden Fitelson
• Philosophy 148 --Extra-Credit Problems These extra-credit problems are due at the final exam (May 20 @ 8am). A total of 160 points are possible
• PROBABILITY CAPTURES THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC CONFIRMATION
• -----WESLEy C. SALMON-----Confirmation and Relevance ,
• Keynesian Logical and Probabilistic Notation Branden Fitelson
• Notes for Week 1 of Confirmation Branden Fitelson
• xvi Preface to the second edition Acknowledgments
• My main aim is to make accessible to readers without any specialist training in mathematics, and with only an elementary
• In defence of scientijic realism 71 4 In defepre of scientifict , " .
• Notes on Two Versions of the Slingshot Argument Branden Fitelson
• Notes on Rigidity, Abstract Reference & Predication Branden Fitelson
• The problem of universals I Metaphysical realism
• OSITION BLV D E X P . I s.a
• Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Kevin T. Kelly
• INTEGRATIVE REDUCTION, CONFIRMATION, AND THE SYNTAX-SEMANTICS MAP
• Testimony as Evidence Katie Steele
• Securing Decision Theory's Foundation: Why the Theory of Practical Rationality Needs to Include a Substantive Notion of Utility
• Decision making under indeterminacy J. Robert G. Williams
• Collective Reasons via Judgment Aggregation 1 Introduction
• Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder University of Southern California
• Cause and Chance* Christopher Hitchcock
• 1/17/11 7:02 PMSeminar on Scientific Explanation: Syllabus Page 1 of 2http://fitelson.org/woodward/syllabus.html
• Inductive-StatisticalExplanation 1 I Inductive-Statistical Explanation
• 232 P A U L H U M P H R E Y S I emphasize here that the difficulty is one of actual causal interaction and not one of
• Statistical Explanation WESLEY C. SALMON
• THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY CAUSATION
• CAUSALITY WITHOUT COUNTERFACTUALS* WESLEY C. SALMONH
• Why-Questions : 87 SYLVALN BROMBERGER
• Scientific Explanation Seminar Background Notes (2/1/11) 1 Scientific Explanation --More Background Notes
• 182 THEJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY CAUSATION AS INFLUENCE*
• Statistics and Causal Inference PAUL W. HOLLAND*
• BRINGING ABOUT THE PAST I OBSERVE first that there is a genuine sense in which the
• THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME XCVII, NO. 4, APRIL 2000
• Causality in Economics and Econometrics An Entry for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
• ACTIONS, CONSEQUENCES, AND CAUSAL RELATIONS 1
• Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 45 (1994), 1001-1021 Conditioning and Intervening
• Cognition, 25 (1987) 265-288 2 Do six-month-old infants perceive causality?*
• CHAPTER THREE The Acquisition of Physical Knowledge in
• Causal Laws and Effective Strategies NANCY CARTWRIGHT
• Econometrica, Vol. 28, 2 (April I960) RECURSIVE VS. NONRECURSIVE SYSTEMS
• Brit.]. Phil. Sci. 44 (1993). 187-203 Printed in Great Britain Causation as a Secondary Quality
• CARTWRIGHT, NANCY, How to Hunt Quantum Causes , Erkenntnis, 35:1/3 (1991:July) p.205 CARTWRIGHT, NANCY, How to Hunt Quantum Causes , Erkenntnis, 35:1/3 (1991:July) p.205
• Philip Kitcher,
• 28 August1959,Volume130, Number3374 WSZ 'I IF1 Explanation and Prediction
• do not quote without approval of author alexrose@duke.edu How is Biological Explanation Possible?
• Evidentialism Reconsidered David Papineau
• The Explanatory Role of Irreducible Properties
• An Axiomatic Characterization of Causal Counterfactuals
• Philosophy 101 This is PHIL 101 (section 2) --"Logic, Reason, and Persuasion"
• Philosophy 101 You should be reading well into Chapter 3 now...
• Philosophy 101 HW #2 to be returned today (end of class)
• Philosophy 101 I've posted solutions to HW #3 (study these!).
• Philosophy 101 I've posted solutions to HW #3 & HW #4.
• Philosophy 101 I've posted solutions to HW #3 & HW #4.
• Philosophy 101 HW #5 to be returned Today (end of class)
• Philosophy 101 Grades update. Rough Curves for HWs 4/5 & Q5
• Philosophy 101 HW #6 will be returned on Thursday
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Announcements and Such
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Announcements and Such
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Overview of Today's Lecture
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Overview of Today's Lecture
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Overview of Today's Lecture
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Announcements and Such
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Announcements and Such
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 12A Notes 1 Announcements and Such
• The "Short" Truth-Table Method: Three Examples Philosophy 12A
• Working with LMPL Interpretations Philosophy 12A
• Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence Roger White
• IMPRECISION AND INDETERMINACY IN PROBABILITY ISAAC LEVIt
• Ifs and Oughts NIKO KOLODNY AND JOHN MACFARLANE
• IS8 KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 18 Williams also takes this issue up in "Ethical Consistency,II in his
• STRENGTHENING THE CASE FOR KNOWLEDGE FROM FALSEHOOD BRANDEN FITELSON
• 9. 1 KNOWLEDGE AS JUSTIFYING BELIEF Tradition has it that the main problems of philosophy include the
• DECEPTION AND EVIDENCE1 Nicholas Silins
• Mark Schroeder University of Southern California
• DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9703-9 Evidence and armchair access
• Is Knowledge Easy -or Impossible? Externalism as the Only Alternative
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• Lara Buchak, November 2009 DRAFT DO NOT CITE
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• 6 Inference and the extension of knowledge
• 494 RICHARD FELDMAN routinely counsel our first-year students not to do. We ought not let examples such
• AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy Vol. 74, No. 4; December 1996
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• Chapter Two The Structure of Skeptical Arguments
• I 0 Skepticism I think that we all know many things. I believe I know many facts about my
• 92 Sources of justification, knowledge and truth Notes 4 Reason
• Kleist's heroes confront this absurdity with demonic defi-ance. Thus Michael Kohlhaas, in the novella of the same
• Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXVI, No. 3, May 2003
• The Philosophical Review, LXXXVIII, No.1 (January 1979) FOUNDATIONALISM, EPISTEMIC PRINCIPLES,
• The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism Joe Cruz, Williams College
• 190 linda zagzebski Epistemic Value Monism
• Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LV,No. 4, December 1995
• The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 4 (October 2003) How Truth Governs Belief
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• Directionof Fit I. L. HUMBERSTONE
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• Lecture 2. What is the Normative Role of Logic? What is the connection between (deductive) logic and
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• Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic Volume 24, Number 1, January 1983
• Appendix 1: Logic The only symbolic logic used in this book is a small part of
• ARGUMENTS FOR OR AGAINST PROBABILISM? 0. Introduction
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• Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief"
• SLIGHTLY MORE REALISTIC PERSONAL PROBABILITY IAN HACKING
• Why Have Consistent and Closed Beliefs, or, for that Matter, Probabilistically Coherent Credences?*
• Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 30 April 2007 at 4:15 pm.
• INTRODUCTION As will have been clear in Part I, and even more in Part 11,
• A Nonpragrnatic Vindication of Probabilism*
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• Eric Swanson ericsw@umich.edu
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• INDUCTIVE .LOGIC AND SCIENCE B I B L I O G R A P H Y
• BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN RELATIVE FREQUENCIES*
• Interpretations of Probability It is clear that the classical principle of indifference was neither so clear-cut
• 262 STUDIES IN INDUCTIVE LOGIC AND PROBABILITY [71 -. "Logikk og Sannsynlighet" (in Norwegian), Nordisk Mat.
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• TBB JOURNAL OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC Volume 6, Number 4. December 1940
• Brit. }. Phil. Sci. 39 (1988), 111-116 Printed in Great Britain On the Alleged Impossibility of
• Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 42 (I991),547-5 55 Printed in Great Britain The 'Old Evidence' Problem
• 156 PATRICK MAHER One criticism is that it is not always clear precisely what probability func-
• ---------Daniel Garber ---------Old Evidence and Logical Omniscience in
• ---------Richard Jeffrey --------Bayesianism with a Human Face
• HAIM GAIFMAN REASONING WITH LIMITED RESOURCES AND ASSIGNING
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• 46656 V A R I E T I E S OF BAYESIANS (#765) 21 46656 Varieties
• *Received May 2002, revised July 2002. Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, San Jose State Uni-
• Philosophy of Science, 71 (October 2004) pp. 505514. 0031-8248/2004/7104-0005$10.00 Copyright 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
• Philosophy of Science, 71 (October 2004) pp. 515520. 0031-8248/2004/7104-0006$10.00 Copyright 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
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• DownloadedBy:[CDLJournalsAccount]At:20:515August2007 1996 Psychology Press, an imprint of Erlbaum (UK) Taylor & Francis Ltd
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• Probability began about 1660, but the word 'probability' is, in languages drawing on the Latin, a good deal older..The prehIstory
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• CHAPTER xvm INTRODUCTION
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• 468 VII. COMPARATIVE INDUCTIVE LOGIC 87. Hempel's Analysis of the Concept of Confirming Evidence
• NOTES AND COMMENTS Comments ott ' Degree ofConfirmation ' by Professor K. R. Popper
• 164 INDUCTIVE LOGIC "Corroboration versus Induction," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
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• THE PASSING OF THE POSSIBLE feh to non-manifest cases is obviously not very different
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• DownloadedBy:[CDLJournalsAccount]At:06:4327August2007 MANY REASONS OR JUST ONE 319THINKING AND REASONING, 1998, 4 (4), 319352
• Notes for Week 3 of Confirmation Branden Fitelson
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• Confirmation Theory James Hawthorne
• A function is a relation that satisfies certain conditions. (A function is an abstract thing. It is not to be identified with any
• 74 Chapter 3: Semantics for Sentential Logic 7 Expressive completeness
• Part (d) of Hunter's Proof of Henkin's Completeness Theorem for PS Branden Fitelson
• Some Remarks and Extra-Credit Exercises Concerning the Deductive System of Hiz Branden Fitelson
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• special constructions always stay within logicism? Whitehead was as pat as Russell in his lecture: 'The whole of mathematics is here.', he announced confidently, 'it is
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• TW Chapter 3 -Roush This chapter is meant to deepen and broaden an argument that goes something like this
• Knowledge and its Limits Seminar Fall 2006 Roush Chapter 4: Anti-Luminosity
• Fall 2006 Sherri Roush Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, Chapter 7, "Sensitivity"
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• Seminar presentation on Knowledge and Its Limits. Prof. Sherri Roush and Prof. Branden Fitelson
• An edited version of this review should be appearing in an upcoming issue of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Please do not quote or cite page numbers from this draft, as it may differ from the published version.
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 1 Conditionals Seminar: Day 1
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 1 Conditionals Seminar: Day 2
• Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 1 Conditionals Seminar: Day 4
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• 14. Reflections on Legality Michael Caie
• Nicolas Gomes Chapter 18
• Chapter 19 Subjunctive Conditionals And Time's Arrow
• Chapter 20: Support Theories Kenny Easwaran
• 50 CARL G. HEMPEL '-Fb v -Ga v Ha'. Kim shows generally that his additional requirement blocks
• intent of the given argument and of the background assumptions that may be assumed to have been tacitly taken for granted, or at least to be avail-
• AMERICANPHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY Volume j,Number 3, July 1968
• TWENTY-TWO . Causal Explanation'"
• 74 MlCHAEL SCRIVEN inclusion of evidence for this. Instead of similarly requiring a causal connection, it actually
• An Approach to Explanation 19 An Approach to Explanation
• 348 Symmetry and Logical Probabilify what I called the Revelation model is the correct model of
• microform I -I lJO&521-0600 toll-hee
• EDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE SYSTEMATIZATION '%".-TUDY IN THE LOGIC
• 50 RONALD N. GIERE Nisbett, R. and L. Ross. (1980) Human Inference: Strategies and
• Anthony A. Derksen ism has already been successfullydefended.]
• burgh Series in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol. 8. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University ef lcalifornia Press.
• forthcoming BJPS The Present State of the Scientific Realism Debate
• 5 Resisting the pessimistic I The explanationist defence of realism (EDR) has suffered a rather serious
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• 150 Letter w Husserl, 24.5.1891 With a concept word it takes one more step to reach the object
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• THEJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY CAUSATIONAS INFLUENCE*
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• Philosophy 269 January 10, 2002 1 Humean and Neo-Humean (Deterministic) Causation
• Probability, Interpretations of1 1. INTRODUCTION
• 50 AI MAGAZINE u n d e r s t a n d i n g
• The Counterfactual Theory Chapter 3 explored the possibilities of explaining the asymmetry of causa-
• Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth* 1. Introduction
• I thank Dan Hausman, Christopher Hitchcock, Stephen Leeds, Alfred Mele, and Elliott Sober for useful comments or discussion.
• Bayesian networks basics Finn V. Jensen
• Bayesian Nets Are All There Is To Causal Dependence Wolfgang Spohn
• REASONING WITH CAUSE AND EFFECT Judea Pearl
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• procedure would be viciously circular. It follows that the holistic naturalist cannot explain why holistic justifIcation supplies us with a reason for thinking that the holis-
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• Pluralism in Logic Hartry Field
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• 198 THEJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY CAUSATION AND THE PRICE OF TRANSITIVI1Y
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• DEMONSTRATIVE INDUCTION Most of the arguments encountered in scientific literature are sup-
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• My Rendition of Hunter's Proof of Metatheorem 45.12 Branden Fitelson
• Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 46 (1995), 523-544 Redundant Causation
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• 258 A P P E N D I X .-*'*S "L g w E N H E I M * s= B E O R E M 259 Case 1:All of 'zl', 'a', ...without end turn up in sequents of S. then, by the reasoning of p. 9711, S' will be true also under some
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• How Not to Detect Design* A review of William A. Dembski's The Design Inference --Eliminating Chance Through Small
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• 8 JOSEPH PITT explanation or was deduced from an inference to the best explanation. Thus, the
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• VOL. LIV. No. 213.J [January, 1945.
• On Foley's "Justified Belief as Responsible Belief" and Wolterstorff's Agreements and Disagreements
• 32 Wesley C. Salmon -it has been appropriate to deny that such appeals to functions involve the con-
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• VISIBILITY OF EARTH-BOUNDSATELLITES: A DEEPSPACE NETWORK STUDY
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• GEORGE KITCHER Princeton University
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• IV. THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC is elliptical and analytic, expressing a logical relation between two factual
• in J. Greco and E. Sosa, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell Publishers, 1999. This is a preliminary version; consult the final, published version for quotations.
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• 204 Wesley C. Salmon EUery EeUs 38. Adolf Griinbaum, "Can a Theory Answer More Questions Than One of Its Rivals," British
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• NOUS 30:4 (1996) 508-526 Causal Decision Theory and
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• Philosophy 57 --Quiz # 7 (solutions posted 05/13/03)
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• STUDIES IN BAYESIAN CONFIRMATION THEORY
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• Philosophy 269 February 19, 2002 1 Bayesian Networks --An Introduction
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• Aftermath of Today's Seminar Concerning Chapter 8 11/03/06 (B.F.)
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• 126 PART II: BAYESIAN INDUCTION:DETERMINISTIC THEORIES Bayesian confirmation function which he appropriated. (For a
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• CAN I KILL MY YOUNGER SELF? TIME TRAVEL AND THE RETRO-SUICIDE PARADOX
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• 210 ROBERT C. STALNAKER Reasonable inference. The inference from a sequence of sentences of L,
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• Introduction The search for scientific knowledge extends far back into antiquity. At some
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• THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY RELIABILISIVILEVELED*
• Inferential chains and the structure of belief As in discussing inference, it is useful to call the kind of inferential belief,
• David Howie, Interpreting Probability: Controversies and Developments in the Early Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2002), xi + 262 pp., $60.00 cloth.
• 178 VI. CLASSICAL PROBABILITY AND ITS RENAISSANCE 11. M. Tribus, Rational Descriptions, Decisions and Designs, p. 130. Oxford: Pergamon,
• A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications
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• No Model, No Inference: A Bayesian
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• Events and Times: A Case Study in Means-ends Metaphysics
• Ashley Sides Reality of the conjunction fallacy Running head: REALITY OF THE CONJUNCTION FALLACY
• 658 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM AND INFERENCE
• Inductive Logic and the Justification of Induction Patrick Maher (p-maher@uiuc.edu)
• Copyright 2000 Psychonomic Society, Inc. 360 Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
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