- Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard
- Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions Jonathan Bredin
- Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Information Aggregation in Online Decision-Making A dissertation presented
- Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism Katherine L. Milkman
- Socially Desirable Approximations for Dodgson's Voting Rule
- Efficient Mechanisms with Dynamic Populations and Dynamic Types
- Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions Ruggiero Cavallo and David C. Parkes
- Social Welfare Maximization in Dynamic Strategic Decision Problems
- Handling Self-Interest in Groups, with Minimal Cost Ruggiero Cavallo
- Essays on Mobile Advertising and Commerce
- A Scheduling Approach to Coalitional Manipulation Department of Computer
- Online Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values Florin Constantin
- Selfish Peering and Routing in the Internet Jacomo Corbo1
- Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- On Non-Cooperative Location Privacy: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
- Dynamic Matching with a Fall-back Option Sujit Gujar1 and David C. Parkes 2
- Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money School of Engineering
- Automatic Task Design on Amazon Mechanical Turk A thesis presented
- Coordination and Costly Preference Elicitation in Electronic Markets
- ARTICLE IN PRESS ARTINT:2410 Please cite this article in press as: A.I. Juda, D.C. Parkes, An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem, Artificial Intelligence (2009),
- The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution
- Using Virtual Markets to Program Global Behavior in Sensor Networks
- Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks
- Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Anshul Kothari
- CALCULATION AND ANALYSIS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA OF VICKREY-BASED PAYMENT RULES
- Fair Package Assignment Sebastien Lahaie
- On the Communication Requirements of Verifying the VCG Outcome
- Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation Sebastien M. Lahaie
- A Utility-Based Approach to Bandwidth Allocation and Link Scheduling in Wireless Networks
- Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Geoffrey Mainland, David C. Parkes, and Matt Welsh
- Understanding Elections: Measuring Electoral Determinants with
- Specifying and Monitoring Economic Environments using Rights and Obligations
- Studies of Intrapersonal Conflict and its Implications A dissertation presented
- Consensus Mechanisms: Anytime Strategyproof Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions A Thesis presented
- Joint Action Learners in Competitive Stochastic Games
- On the Sybil-Proofness of Accounting Mechanisms Sven Seuken
- Promoting Sustainability: Exploring the Role of Expressive, Indirect, and Hidden Markets
- Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy David C. Parkes1
- authors here 1 Computational Mechanism Design page 4
- Auction Design with Costly Preference Elicitation David C. Parkes
- This is page 1 Printer: Opaque this
- Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism David C. Parkes
- Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes
- An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design
- Using Redundancy to Improve Robustness of Distributed Mechanism Implementations
- ARTICLE IN PRESS YGAME:1514 Please cite this article in press as: D. Mishra, D.C. Parkes, Multi-item VickreyDutch auctions, Games Econ. Behav. (2008),
- Enabling Spectrum Sharing in Secondary Market Auctions Ian A. Kash
- Utility-Based Bandwidth Allocation and Link Scheduling in Wireless Networks: Linear Programming
- On Indirect and Direct Implementations of Core Outcomes in Combinatorial Auctions
- Cryptographic Securities Exchanges Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes
- Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions
- Chapter 2: Iterative Combinatorial Auctions David C. Parkes
- Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design Paul Dtting
- Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions William E. Walsh
- COMBINATORIAL CLOCK AUCTION OF AIRPORT TIME SLOTS
- Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions
- Economic Hierarchical Q-Learning Erik G. Schultink, Ruggiero Cavallo and David C. Parkes
- The Dancer and the Dance: Agents, Beliefs, and Actions in Prediction Markets
- ARTICLE IN PRESS YJCSS:2409 Please cite this article in press as: O. Dekel et al., Incentive compatible regression learning, J. Comput. System Sci. (2010), doi:10.1016/j.jcss.2010.03.003
- Preference Elicitation in Proxied Multiattribute Auctions Aditya V. Sunderam
- Efficiency and Redistribution in Dynamic Mechanism Design
- Move Prediction in the Game of Go A Thesis presented
- Multi-Stage Information Acquisition in Auction Design A thesis presented
- An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions
- An Online Mechanism for Multi-Speed Electric Vehicle Charging
- 40 1094-7167/03/$17.00 2003 IEEE IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS Published by the IEEE Computer Society
- Passive Verification of the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms in Open Environments
- Practical Secrecy-Preserving, Verifiably Correct and Trustworthy Auctions
- Connections Between Markets and Learning YILING CHEN
- Five AI Challenges in Strategyproof Computing David C. Parkes
- !"$#&%('0)212"43536"%(7 8%93 @BACD98%(76@ 35@E'F"$75%
- A Market-Based Approach to Software Evolution David F. Bacon
- Market Design & Analysis for a P2P Backup System Sven Seuken
- Hard-to-Manipulate VCG-Based Auctions Saurabh Sanghvi
- Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms using Rights and Obligations
- Pricing WiFi at Starbucks Issues in Online Mechanism Eric J. Friedman
- Partially-Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design Sven Seuken, Ruggiero Cavallo, and David C. Parkes
- Optimal Decision-Making With Minimal Waste: Strategyproof Redistribution of VCG Payments
- Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions Pavithra Harsha
- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Shaili Jain David C. Parkes
- Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
- Analysis of Bidding Networks in eBay: Aggregate Preference Identification through Community Detection
- Voting Almost Maximizes Social Welfare Despite Limited Communication Ioannis Caragiannis
- Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation
- A Decentralized Auction Framework to Promote Efficient Resource Allocation in Open Computational Grids
- Rationally Motivated Failure in Distributed Systems A dissertation presented
- Expressive Power-Based Resource Allocation for Data Centers Benjamin Lubin
- Informativeness and Incentive Compatibility for Reputation A Thesis presented
- Journal of Economic Theory 132 (2007) 335366 www.elsevier.com/locate/jet
- The Role of Value of Information Based Metareasoning in Adaptive Sponsored Search Auctions
- Distributed Generalized Vickrey Auctions Based on the Dantzig-Wolfe and Benders Decomposition Methods for
- Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting Yuga J. Cohler
- Challenge Problem: Agent-Mediated Decentralized Information Mechanisms
- Expressiveness and Optimization under Incentive Compatibility Constraints in Dynamic Auctions
- "Entertainment Shopping" An Analysis of Profit and Strategy in a New
- Open Mechanism Design: Ensuring and Verifying the Strategyproofness of
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 30 (2007) 133179 Submitted 3/07; published 9/07 Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching
- Combinatorial Markets in Theory and Practice: Mitigating Incentives and Facilitating Elicitation
- Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions William E. Walsh
- GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms David C. Parkes
- Specification Faithfulness in Networks with Rational Nodes Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes
- On the Limits of Dictatorial Classification Reshef Meir
- Value-Based Policy Teaching with Active Indirect Elicitation Haoqi Zhang and David Parkes
- When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-Correcting
- A Modular Framework for Multi-Agent Preference Elicitation
- Leveraging Bidder Behavior to Identify Categories of Substitutable and Complementary Goods on eBay
- Finding True Beliefs: Applying Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory
- RABID: Random Auctions for Bandwidth in Internet Devices A thesis presented
- Optimal Envy-Free Cake-Cutting A thesis presented by
- Designing a Transcription Game A Thesis Presented
- ow can we design intelligent protocols to coordinate actions, allocate resources, and make decisions in envi-
- Online Mechanism Design for Electric Vehicle Charging Enrico H. Gerding
- Online Mechanism and Virtual Currency Design for Distributed Systems
- A Random Graph Model of Kidney Exchanges: Efficiency, Individual-Rationality and Incentives
- Designing Incentives for Online Question-and-Answer Forums Shaili Jain
- Task Routing for Prediction Tasks Haoqi Zhang
- 100 CommunICatIons of the aCm | MAy 2011 | vOl. 54 | nO. 5 the fLoW of capital in the financial in-
- Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions Shaili Jain
- Impersonation Strategies in Auctions Ian A. Kash and David C. Parkes
- Market User Interface Design [Extended Abstract]
- Designing for Incentives: Better Information Sharing for Better Software Engineering
- Incentive Design for Adaptive Agents
- Designing Incentive Compatible Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions with Structural SVMs
- An Optimization-Based Framework for Automated Market-Making
- Move Ranking and Evaluation in the Game of Arimaa A thesis presented
- Decision Markets With Good Incentives Yiling Chen, Ian Kash, Mike Ruberry and Victor Shnayder
