Advanced Search

Browse by Discipline

Scientific Societies

E-print Alerts

Add E-prints

E-print Network

  Advanced Search  

Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions Kaustubh Deshmukh1

Summary: Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions
Kaustubh Deshmukh1
, Andrew V. Goldberg2
Jason D. Hartline1
, and Anna R. Karlin1
Computer Science Department, University of Washington. Supported in part by
NSF grant CCR-0105406. {kd,hartline,karlin}@cs.washington.edu
Microsoft Research, 1065 La Avenida, SVC 5, Mountain View, CA 94043.
Abstract In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mecha-
nism for double auctions where bidders each bid to buy or sell one unit
of a single commodity. We assume that each bidder's utility value for
the item is private to them and we focus on truthful mechanisms, ones
where the bidders' optimal strategy is to bid their true utility. The profit
of the auctioneer is the difference between the total payments from buy-
ers and the total payments to the sellers. We aim to maximize this profit.
We extend the competitive analysis framework of basic auctions [12] and


Source: Anderson, Richard - Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Washington at Seattle
Sandholm, Tuomas W. - School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University


Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences