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Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria Baruch Awerbuch
 

Summary: Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria
Baruch Awerbuch
Yossi Azar
Yossi Richter
Dekel Tsur
Abstract
We investigate the problem of routing traffic through a congested network in an environment
of non-cooperative users. We use the worst-case coordination ratio suggested by Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou to measure the performance degradation due to the lack of a centralized
traffic regulating authority. We provide a full characterization of the worst-case coordination
ratio in the restricted assignment and unrelated parallel links models. In particular, we quantify
the tradeoff between the "negligibility" of the traffic controlled by each user and the coordination
ratio. We analyze both pure and mixed strategies systems and identify the range where their
performance is similar.
1 Introduction
Overview: In most communication networks it is infeasible to maintain one centralized authority
to route traffic efficiently. As a result, users may decide individually how to route their traffic. Each
user behaves selfishly in the sense that he wishes to minimize his transmission cost while being aware
of the network congestion caused by other users. A system of users decisions is said to be in a
Nash equilibrium if no user can benefit from changing his decision. Simple examples in game

  

Source: Awerbuch, Baruch - Department of Computer Science, Johns Hopkins University

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences