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C bi t i l A tiCombinatorial Auctions Adapted from notes by Vincent ConitzerAdapted from notes by Vincent Conitzer
 

Summary: 10/29/2010
1
Auctions &
C bi t i l A tiCombinatorial Auctions
Adapted from notes by Vincent ConitzerAdapted from notes by Vincent Conitzer
Auctions Assumption is ­
· If you buy the item for exactly what it isIf you buy the item for exactly what it is
worth, there is no utility.
· Yale slides bring this home ­ especially if
your evaluation isn't correct.
· If you sell the item for exactly what is ity y
worth, there is no utility.
· We are trying to do better than purchase for
its actual value ­ a good deal for both.
2
10/29/2010
2
Auction Parameters
· Goods can have
­ private value (Aunt Bessie's Broach)

  

Source: Allan, Vicki H. - Department of Computer Science, Utah State University

 

Collections: Computer Technologies and Information Sciences